PADILLA v.

COMELEC boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria

G.R. No. 103328 / October 19, 1992 / Padilla, J. / LOCGOV – Creation of LGUs / ECSCALA established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political (UNIT OR)* units
NATURE Special Civil Action of Certiorari directly affected.”
PETITIONERS Hon. Roy A. Padilla, Jr., as Governor of Camarines Norte
RESPONDENTS COMELEC ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the plebiscite is valid.– NO.
SUMMARY. RA 7155 creating the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa was promulgated by  SC looked at the deliberations in the 1986 ConCom. Mr. Davide objected to the
COMELEC subject to the approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political adherence to the original “unit or units”. He stated that in the plebiscite to be
units directly affected. Majority of the votes were against the creation of the said conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay,
municipality, thus, resulting in its disapproval by the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers. the municipality itself must participate in the plebiscite because it is affected. It would
Petitioner Padilla, as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside said plebiscite on the mean a loss of a territory.
ground that should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the  Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase “political units directly affected,” is
12 barangays comprising the new Municipality, not including the remaining area of the the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.10 Logically,
mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. SC disagreed and upheld the those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the brgys of the
decision of COMELEC. proposed Municipality of TulayNaLupa as well as those living in the parent
DOCTRINE. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted “in the political units Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
directly affected,” it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. DECISION.
Petition Dismissed.
FACTS.
 RA 7155 creating the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa in the province of Camarines Norte
promulgated by COMELEC subject to a plebiscite. The 11 Brgys that would comprise
the said Municipality would be brgys currently in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte.
 In the plebiscite held on Dec. 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890
favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against it.
 Petitioner Padilla, as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside said plebiscite
on the ground that should have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality, not including the
remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo.
 Argument: Following the ratification of the 1987 Consitution, particularly Art. X, Sec.
10, the ruling set forth in Tan vs. COMELEC relied upon by COMELEC is now passé, thus
reinstating the case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary which held that where a local
unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated
should be included in the plebiscite. Note: Tan vs. COMELEC relied on Art. XI, Sec. 3 of
the 1973 Constitution. Art. X, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution is the same but the
phrase “unit or”. *See phrase in parenthesis in the provision.

 Important Provisions:
o Sec. 134 of BP 337 provides: “Manner of Creation—A Municipality may be
created, named, and its boundaries defined, altered or modified only by an
Act of the Batasang Pambansa, subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the unit or units affected. Except as
may otherwise be provided in said Act, the plebiscite shall be conducted by
the Commission on Elections, within 120 days from the date of its effectivity.”
o Article X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
 CAWALING V COMELEC
G.R. No. 146319 / October 26, 2001 / SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J./LOCGOV/Miggy
NATURE Petition for Certiorari
PETITIONERS BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR.
RESPONDENTS COMELEC and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero
SUMMARY. Cawaling assails (1) the constitutionality of RA 8806 for violating Sec. 450 of
LGC in relation to Sec 10 Art X of the Consti; and (2) the plebiscite was conducted beyond
the 120 day period as provided in Sec. 54 of the Code. SC held that (1) it is constitutional
because the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger
of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such
merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code; and (2) the
plebiscite was conducted within the 120 day period. The reckoning point should be the date
of effectivity(upon publication), not date of approval.
DOCTRINE. The reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct
the plebiscite is determined from the date of effectivity (publication), not from the date of
its approval when the law had not yet been published. Publication is indispensable for the
effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera, the plebiscite can only be
conductedafter the Act took effect.
FACTS.
 This case involved 2 separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 8806
which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted
pursuant thereto
o August 16, 2000: President Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act
creating the City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.
o Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, COMELEC, on
December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
o December 17, 2000: the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC)
proclaimed the creation of theCity of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
 Cawaling, as resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, filed the
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
o The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120
-day period from the approval of
R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
o COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensiv
e information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite.
 Two days after filing the said action, Cawaling instituted another petition, this time for
prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
o 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Consti
tution) which requires that only
a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component ci
ty; and
o 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City
of Sorsogon and the (b)
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating t
he one subject-one bill rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
 Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 e
lections, the newlycreated Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then
, the City Government of Sorsogon has
been regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A
. No. 8806.
ISSUES & RATIO.
2. WON RA 8806 is CONSTITUTIONAL. – YES.
RA 8806 is constitutional. The phrase “A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by
which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the
merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay
in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.
Presumption of constitutionality: This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a
becoming courtesy for each others acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of
the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord
with the fundamental law.[8] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one
(1) Petitioner’s argument: R.A. No. 8806 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only
by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as
what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
SC: Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)
Section 450 LGC. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants,
as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis
ours)
Also, Sec. 8 of the LGC provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units
shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local
government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in
this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government
unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. x x x.
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a
merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by
the Code.
(2) Petitioner: no compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone
already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city.
SC: goes into the wisdom of the law
3. WON the plebiscite is conducted on time – YES
The plebisicite was conducted well within the 120 day period provided in Sec. 54. The
reckoning point in determining the 120 day period is the publication of the law, NOT
date of approval of law.
Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the
ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a
plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act.
Petitioner’s argument: The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President
Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late
from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period
having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no
longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
COMELEC’s argument (WHICH SC UPHELD): it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16,
2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act.
Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general and local circulation.
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of general
circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation
in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on
September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning
point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from
the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The
COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law,
citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera, it could only schedule the plebiscite after
the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite
was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or
ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. (Emphasis
ours)
Consequently, the word approval in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read
together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean effectivity as
used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code.
DECISION.
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit..
NOTES.
Petitioner also argues that the law violated one subject one bill rule i.e. (1) the creation of
the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. SC
held it did not violate such rule. The abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the
City of Sorsogon was created.
 CAGAS v. COMELEC
GR No. 209185/ OCT 25 2013/ CARPIO, J./ LOC GOV – Creation of Local Government Units /RLAurellano
NATURE Special Civil Action in the SC (Prohibition)
PETITIONER Marc Douglas IV C. Cagas
RESPONDENTS Commission on Elections and the Provincial Election Officer of Davao
del Sur
SUMMARY. Petitioner former Rep. Cagas is asking the SC to stop COMELEC from holding a
plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental, because the COMELEC did not follow the 60
day plebiscite holding deadline stated in Sec 46 of the Davao Occidental Charter (RA
10360). Prior to the effectivity of the Law, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of
plebiscites to prepare and focus on the 2013 midterm elections, which is why the COMELEC
failed to follow the deadline. Court denied the petition, and held that the COMELEC has the
necessary and incidental powers to hold the plebiscite beyond the deadline stated in RA
10360.
DOCTRINE. Re: the topic: The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a
province, as provided for in Secs 10-11, Art X of the Consti. Sec. 10 emphasizes the direct
exercise by the people of their sovereignty. After the action by the legislature to modify the
boundaries on an LGU, the people directly affected can register their approval or disapproval
of the change.
FACTS.
 Petitioner Cagas was a former representative of the 1 district of Davao del Sur. He co-
st
filed a bill for the creation of Davao Occidental. This bill became RA 10360
o Sec. 46 of RA 10360 provided that a plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental
(plebiscite) shall be conducted within 60 days after the effectivity of the law, and that
the necessary amount for the plebiscite shall be borne by the COMELEC
 The bill was signed by Pres. Aquino on 14 Jan 2013. It was published in the PH Star
and MB on 21 Jan 2013. It took effect after 15 days on 4 Feb 2013. This means that the
COMELEC has until 6 Apr 2013 to conduct the plebiscite according to RA 10360
 On 27 Nov 2012, COMELEC had suspended the conduct of all plebiscites in view of the
midterm elections. On 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite on 28
Oct 2013, simultaneous with the Brgy elections, to save on expenses.
o The decision re: the plebiscite was approved in COMELEC Minute Resolution 13-0926,
signed on 6 Aug 2013. On 14 Aug 2013, the election officers of Davao del Sur were
furnished a copy of the minute reso.
 On 9 Oct, Cagas filed this petition, arguing:
o COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to amend or modify Sec 46 of RA 10360 by
mere minute resolution
o COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold the plebiscite on 28 Oct because
the period provided for in RA 10360 had already lapsed
o There is no other legal remedy available to him (Cagas) except a TRO
o RA 10360 did not confer express or implied power to COMELEC to exercise discretion
when the plebiscite should be held
 ’60 days from effectivity’ as per Sec 46 is absolute and mandatory
 The OSG responds:
o The Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the creation of an LGU
o There was logistical and financial impossibility to hold the plebiscite at a mere 2 mos
notice
o The legislative intent of RA 10360 is going to be implemented anyway
o Public interest demands that the plebiscite still be conducted
o COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the resolutions
ISSUES & RATIO.
4. WON the COMELEC abused its jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite on
26 Oct 2013 – NO, because the COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the
power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province, as provided for in
1
Secs 10-11, Art X of the Consti . Sec. 10 emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of
their sovereignty. After the action by the legislature to create, divide, merge, or alter the
boundaries on an LGU, the people directly affected can register their approval or
disapproval of the change in s plebiscite.
 The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held, in
2
contrast with the Consti provs on the election of the Pres, VP, and Congresspeoplez.
 While RA 10360 provides a specific date when the plebiscite should be conducted, Sec.
2(1), Art IX(C) of the Constitution grants the COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of ensuring free, orderly, and
3
honest elections.
o Sec. 10 of the LGC provides for the general rule when plebiscites may be held, which
is within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance, unless the law
or ordinance provides otherwise.
 The tight time frame rendered impossible the holding of the plebiscite . The logistic
4
and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the midterm elections is
unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative
5
mishaps, covered in Secs 5 of BP 881.
1 Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a
plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain
their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination.
2 Congresspeoplez: Sec 8, Art VI; Pres and VP: Sec 4, Art VII
3 As held in Pangandaman v. COMELEC
4 The Court stated that the COMELEC was swamped, according to the OSG:
 COMELEC had to accredit and register the candidates for Party-List elections (taken judicial
notice of)
 Preparation of Project of Precincts
 Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors
 Inspection, verification, and sealing of the Book of Voters
 Finalization and printing of voters lists
 Preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of voters’ information
 Configuration, testing, and demonstration of PCOS machines
5 Omnibus Election Code
 o The Court cites the OSG, which said that the COMELEC had to focus all its attention
and resources on its preparation for the midterm elections. In addition, if the
plebiscite were to be conducted within the period fixed by RA10360, the PCOS
machines would have to be reconfigured for that purpose. Conducting it manually
would require another set of ballots and election paraphernalia.
o The COMELEC was also not given a special budget to defray the cost of the plebiscite
 The Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections
6
o Pangandaman v. COMELEC : failure of elections in Lanao del Sur. COMELEC called
for special elections more than 30 days after the regular elections. Pangandaman
asserts that the COMELEC cannot do this, because it is Congress which has the
power to call for special elections 30 days after regular elections. The Court denied
the petition, and held that the text and intent of the Constitution gives COMELEC all
the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Pursuant to this intent, this Court
has been liberal in defining the parameters of the COMELEC’s powers in conducting
elections.
o Sambarani v. COMELEC: No special elections conducted on supposed date of special
Brgy and SK elections (yep, two failures of elections). Instead of another failure of
elections, COMELEC directed the DILG to appoint the officials. The Court directed
the COMELEC to conduct special elections, because the deadline in Sec 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people. The
prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the
cause of the failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the
COMELEC possesses residual power to conduct special elections even beyond the
deadline prescribed by law.
 The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding
election or plebiscites.

DECISION.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit

6Court quoted a lot from this case but mostly election law things. Page 18-21 of original, if you want
to check
 LATASA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 154829 / Dec 10, 20013 / Azcuna, J. / Creation of LGU/ KGarcia
PETITIONERS Arsenio A. Latasa
RESPONDENTS COMELEC, Romeo Sunga
SUMMARY. After Latasa served three terms as mayor of the MUNICIPALITY of
Digos, Digos was converted to a CITY. Latasa wants to run for mayor of the CITY of
Digos. Sunga, a co-candidate, wants Latasa to be disqualified for violating the
three year term limit. SC found Latasa ineligible to run. True, the new city acquired
a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the three-term limitation would
apply. The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos remained the same as that of
the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
DOCTRINE. Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For
one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and
undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason
why Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution mandates a plebiscite. (Here, this general
rule was not applied since nothing changed as to the territorial jurisdiction and the
population of Digos)
FACTS.
 Petitioner Arsenio Latasa has been elected mayor of Municipality of Digos for
three consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 1998).
 In 2000, the Municipality was converted into a City through R.A. 8798.
 In 2001, Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor for the 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible to run. He also disclosed that he
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
 Private respondent Sunga, also a candidate for mayor, filed a petition for
disqualification against Latasa for falsely representing in his certificate of
candidacy that that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City (since Latasa
had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor
from 1992 to 2001)
 COMELEC’s First Division issued a Resolution in favor of Sunga, ordering the
cancellation of Latasa’s certificate of candidacy. Latasa filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR)
 Pending the MR, Latasa won in the election and was sworn into as newly
elected mayor of Digos City.
 Subsequently, COMELEC denied Latasa’s MR. Hence this petition for certiorari
filed by Latasa.
ISSUE/RATIO.
WON Latasa is eligible to run as mayor – NO
LATASA: A city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus
they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. Latasa does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal
mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to
a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the
same local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code provides
7
for the requisites.
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is
a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit
when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes
affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
7
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified
by the National Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land are shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more island. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of
a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such
8
creation or conversion is based on verified indicators .
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a
component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and
bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of the
Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a
time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already
qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, the delineation of the metes and
bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. The elective officials of the
Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office
of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is
the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
8
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected
capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the
size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power
and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed
another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would
then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
WON Sunga should be the deemed as the mayoralty candidate with highest
number of votes - NO
The disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the
candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the
elections (Labo vs COMELEC)
The fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible
candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be
disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making
the winning candidate’s election a nullity.
In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent Sunga
as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa. The second placer is
obviously not the choice of the people in that particular election. In any event, a
permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created which should be
filled by succession.
DECISION.
Petition dismissed.
NOTES:
The Court distinguished the present case from related cases:
Borja vs COMELEC
WON a vice-mayor who became In Borja, the private respondent therein, before he assumed the
mayor by operation of law and who
served the remainder of the mayor’s
term should be considered to have
served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit under
the Constitution – NO, he cannot be
construed as having served a full
term as contemplated under the
subject constitutional provision. The
term served must be one "for which
[the official concerned] was elected”
WON a mayor who was not able to
serve his 3rd term can be considered
disqualified when he runs for his 4th
term – NO, HE did not fully serve the
3rd mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office
WON an assumption to office
through a recall election should be
considered as one term in applying
the three-term limit rule – NO, officer
was not technically elected and has
served for three consecutive terms
WON an officer who has already
served for three years is qualified to
run during recall elections – YES, as
the principle behind the three-term
limit rule is to prevent
consecutiveness of the service of
terms, and that there was in his case
a break in such consecutiveness
after the end of his third term and
before the recall election
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break
in the service of the local elective official. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.
position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local
government unit. The nature of the responsibilities and duties
of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor.
The vice-mayor does not hold office as chief executive over his
local government unit. In the present case, petitioner, upon
ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city,
continued to hold office as chief executive of the same
territorial jurisdiction. There were changes in the political and
economic rights of Digos as local government unit, but no
substantial change occurred as to petitioner’s authority as chief
executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a
short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner
Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties
and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
Adormeo vs COMELEC
For nearly two years, private respondent therein lived as a
private citizen (when he has not yet assumed the office through
a recall election). The same, however, cannot be said of
petitioner Latasa in the present case.
Quick facts: PR served as mayor for 2 terms. He lost in his 3rd
term. His opponent served for 2 years, until he was
dispossessed for some reason. Through recall proceeding, PR
assumed the unexpired portion of the term.
SOCRATES vs COMELEC
Here, there was a break in service. In Latasa’s case, there was
none.
 LACEDA v. LIMENA ISSUES & RATIO.
G.R. No. 182867 / NOV 25, 2008 / QUISUMBING, J. / LOCGOV – Creation / MEEMARCILLA 5. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. – NO
NATURE Motion for Reconsideration 2 Requisites for RA 9164 to apply:
PETITIONERS Roberto Laceda, Sr. (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
RESPONDENTS Randy Limena and the Commission on Elections government post and
(2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.
SUMMARY. Laceda and Limena were candidates for Punong Brgy. Limena filed a petition
for disqualification against Laceda because Laceda already served for 3 consecutive terms In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and
th
and is prohibited from running for the 4 time. Laceda argues that the City of Sorsogon Bacon were merged and converted into a city, it cannot be said that for the purpose of
rd rd st
was created before his 3 term so his 3 term should be considered as his 1 in the new applying the prohibition, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
political unit. SC held that the office of Punong Brgy of Brgy Panlayaan, Municipality of Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as
Sorsogon cannot be construed as a different post from Punong Brgy of Brgy Panlayaan, that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City.
City of Sorsogon.
The territorial jurisdiction is the same as before the conversion. The inhabitants of the
DOCTRINE. An elective local official is not barred from running again in for same local barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and
elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda’s
has fully served three consecutive terms term.

FACTS. In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, this Court held that where a person has been elected
 Roberto Laceda, Sr., and Randy L. Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such
Barangay Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay three-year term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the prohibition applies to
 On October 23, 2007, Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in
ineligible candidate against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had the continuity of the terms.
already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for 3 consecutive terms since
1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section 2 of DECISION.
9
Republic Act No. 9164. MR DENIED.
 Laceda admitted this. HOWEVER, he asserted that when he was elected for his first 2
rd NOTES.
terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his 3 term, the
Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to
form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806. Thus,
rd st
he argued that his 3 term was actually just his 1 in the new political unit and that he
was accordingly entitled to run for 2 more terms.
 Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served 3 consecutive terms, Rep.
Act No. 9164 which imposes the 3-term limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it would
violate his vested right to office. He alleged that when he was elected in 1994 the
prohibition did not exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for
th
the 4 time, he would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to the
election in 2007.
 COMELEC: disqualified Laceda
 SC: dismissed petition for certiorari by Laceda

9 SEC. 2. Term of Office.—The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity
of this Act shall be three (3) years. No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
 Navarro vs Ermita
GR 180050/ April 12, 2011/ Nachura J./ SILVA/- Loc Gov- Creation
Urgent motion to recall entry of judgment dated Oct 20, 2010
PETITIONERS RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte
(Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial Board)
RESPONDENTS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the
Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT;
House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del
Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new
Province of Dinagat Islands
Movants- CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON.
Intervenors ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON.
MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR
M. BAGUNDOL Elected officials of Surigao de Norte province in the May 2010
elections
Ponente: Nachura
Concur: Corona, Velasco, Leonardo de Castro, Bersamin, Abad, Perez
Concurring subject to internal rules: Del Castillo, Mendoza
Dissent: Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Sereno
SUMMARY. RA No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao
Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the
population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec.
461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as
unconstitutional. The SC held that that the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate
province constitutional. The SC looked at the central policy considerations in the
creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of
municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement
in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC
concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception
to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC
(provision relating to creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR
thus correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true
legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction
which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of
local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land
area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
DOCTRINE. The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units
are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services
to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code (LGC),
i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why the exemption from the land area
requirement when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces—it is, therefore,
logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442
(for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the Local Government
Code (LGC), but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces)
FACTS.
1. Background
a. 2 Oct 2006: President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into
law
i. Income : 82.69M/year
ii. Population : 106,951
iii. Land Area : 802.12 sq. km
b. 3 Dec 2006: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of
10
province. People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Dinagat Islands voted.
Affirmative Votes: 69,943
Negative Votes: 63,502
c. President appoints interim set of provincial officials
d. 1 July 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office
e. Navarro, Bernal and Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9355.
The court dismissed on technical grounds. MR denied.
f. Another petition, as taxpayers and residents of Surigao del Norte was granted.
- The SC, on 10 Feb 2010, declared RA 9355 unconstitutional. (failure to comply
with requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province
under the LGC.)
- Also declared null and void LGC-IRR provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGCIRR), stating that, “[t]he land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands” for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
2. The Republic, represented by the OSG, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. The SC denied. Republic and Dinagat’s Motions for
leave of court to admit their second MR, accompanied by their second MR. These
motions were eventually “noted without action” by the SC.
3. Movantsintervenors, as duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte filed on June 18, 2010
a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8790. They allege that election to their respective offices would
necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of
the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be
conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
10
LGC, SECTION. 10. Plebiscite Requirement.—No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or
ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
 Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the
interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of
this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative
set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees
will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and
other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights
cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights
would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
They argue that:
1. that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC;
2. that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application
of the minimum land area requirement; and
3. that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable
4. On October 5, 2010, the SC issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
5. This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment
of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties.
6. COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was declared
final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a non-
province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have to be nullified,
and a special election would have to be conducted for various positions (Governor, Vice-
Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte.
Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the
2010 case decision. (Cong Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but were
declared to have no standing since at that time, they were still candidates in the May
2010 elections.)
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. Locus Standi? YES, Movant-Intervenors have sufficiently shown personal and
substantial interest.
 It cannot be denied that movantsintervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality; We are not
only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire
repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than
dismissed on account of mootness.
2. Moot and Academic Principle? 2nd Exception applied.11 There is an exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved.
11 (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised
requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
 The Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of
attendant extraordinary circumstances—the power to suspend or even disregard rules of
procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
had already declared final.
3. WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land
area requirement? YES
 It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e.,
income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this
light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of
these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear
intent of the framers of the LGC.
 It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the
creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with
respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the
local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of
the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component
city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-
created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer
that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR, the inclusion was intended to correct
the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC—and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR.
 Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision
could prove to be counterproductive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component
cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the
province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress
 has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land 2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion
area over one composed of islands—and negate the greater imperative of development for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration
of selfreliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 3. GRANT the Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,
2,000squarekilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass. provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID.
clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands)
enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read
is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
together with territorial contiguity. Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and
 Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, 4. The petition is DISMISSED.
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of Dissents and Concurring to follow 
executive and/or legislative construction—Article 9(2) of the Local Government
CodeImplementing Rules and Regulations (LGCIRR) should be deemed incorporated in
the basic law, the Local Government Code (LGC); It is well to remember that the LGC-
IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the
Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the Local
Government Code (LGC).
 The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with
all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local
autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code (LGC) when the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) was formulated, amounting not only to an executive
construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative
construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four
leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee; In effect,
pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the Local Government CodeImplementing Rules and
Regulations (LGCIRR) and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
 The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in
both Chambers of Congress —thereby, and by necessity, the Local Government Code
(LGC) was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
 What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat
is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity.

DECISION.
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movantsintervenors, dated
and filed on October 29, 2010;

Municipality of Malabang v. Benito
G.R. No.L-28113 / March 28, 1969 / Castro, J./LOCGOV/MPESQUIVIAS
NATURE Action for prohibition
PETITIONERS Municipality of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Amer Macaorao Balindong
RESPONDENTS Pangandapun Benito, Hadji Norodin Macapunung, et al.
SUMMARY. The petitioners seek to nullify EO 386, which created the municipality of
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from
performing their official functions, per the ruling of the court in Pelaez, which held that the
Presidential power to create municipalities was unconstitutional. Respondents argue this
doesn’t apply because Balabagan was a de facto corporation. SC ruled it wasn’t. Per existing
analyses, there can be no de facto corporation where there can be no de jure one. As,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation, there is no de facto corporation.
DOCTRINE. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or
potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat. 
 I.
FACTS.
 Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while Benito is the mayor (and the
rest of the respondents are councilors) of the municipality of Balabagan, of the same
province. Balabagan was formerly a part of Malabang, having been created on March
15, 1960, by EO 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of
the latter municipality.
 The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to
restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their
respective offices, relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (and
12
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva ):
o Sec. 23 of the Barrio Charter Act (RA 2370), by vesting the power to create
barrios in the provincial board, is a “statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio and implies a negation of the bigger power to
create municipalities”;
o Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power
to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against
section 10(1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President’s
power over local governments to mere supervision.
 Respondents:
o The rule (^) announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because
unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is
at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute
before this was declared unconstitutional. Following this, its existence cannot
12
The Court granted the petition for prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the
municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality
was created in 1961, before section 68 of the Administrative Code, under which the President had acted,
was invalidated. The issue of de facto municipal corporation did not arise in this case.
13
be collaterally attacked, except via quo warranto at the instance of the State.
(It was organized before Pelaez was promulgated.)
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Balabagan is a de facto corporation – NO
(WON a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted organization of a
municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional – See ratio)
This question has divided US Courts. Some hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist
where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be no de
facto corporation where there can be no de jure one, while others hold otherwise on the
theory that a statute is binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional.
An article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following principles:
The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal
corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature. 

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for
a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant
for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its
potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state. 

II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or
potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat. 

III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the
invalidity of which is apparent on its face. 

IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing
de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.
The mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been
invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of
the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give
color of authority to its creation.
In fine, EO 386 “created no office.” HOWEVER, this is not to say that the acts done by
the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity, for
the existence of Executive Order 386 is “an operative fact which cannot justly be
ignored.”
The effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects—with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
13
Court: “The rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least
a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is
that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one
whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless
they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.”
 conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in light of the nature of both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination.

DECISION.
Petition granted. EO 386 void, respondents permanently restrained from performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices.

NOTES.
Concurring, Fernando, J.

 The effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality of legislative acts must be viewed

realistically. He cites Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank: Although the
general rule is that an unconstitutional statute—confers no right, creates no office,
affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it x x x there are several
instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation x x x or qualified its
effects since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative
fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
 For executive acts, it must be the same. The act stricken down, whether proceeding
from the legislature or the Executive, could in the language of the Chicot County case,
be considered, prior to the declaration of invalidity, as “an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.”
 There would be an unjustified deviation from the doctrine of separation of powers if a
consequence attached to the annulment of a statue is considered as not operative
where an executive order is involved.
 He clarifies the Pelaez ruling: If there be admission of the force of the assertion that the
Pelaez opinion went no further than to locate in the challenged Executive orders
creating municipal corporations an act in excess of statutory authority; then our decision
in this case is all the more noteworthy for the more hospitable scope accorded the
Chicot doctrine. For as originally formulated, it would merely recognize that during its
existence, prior to its being declared violative of the constitute, the statute must be
deemed an operative fact. Today we decide that such a doctrine extends to a
Presidential act held void not only on the ground of unconstitutional infirmity but
also because in excess of the statutory power conferred.
 CANDIJAY v. CA
G.R. No.116702/ Dec. 28, 1995/ PANGANIBAN, J. / LocGov – De Facto Corporations / PSPAMBID
PETITIONER The Municipality of Candijay, Bohol through its Sanguniang Bayan and
Mayor
RESPONDENTS CA and The Municipality of Alicia, Bohol
SUMMARY: Mun. of Candijay questioned the jurisdiction of the Mun. of Alicia over barrio
Pagahat (boundary dispute). CA ruled in favor of Alicia. Candijay was attacking the
juridical personality of Alicia, it having been created under a void executive order. Citing
San Narciso vs Mendez, the Court ruled that Alicia had been in existence for 16 years
when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated (declaring the EO void). Also, various
governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and
acknowledgment of the existence thereof.
DOCTRINE: A municipality created under a void executive order does not lose its juridical
personality merely on such basis. Peculiar circumstances, such as continued recognition
of its existence by the State without any judicial declaration of its legality, allows its
attainment of a status approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC, is also a curative law which converted the status of
municipal corporations created by E.O.s and other issuances prior to its enactment into
de jure municipalities.
FACTS.
1. RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms
part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and
further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's
control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest,
disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio"
2. CA:
a. rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain
exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat and
parts of 3 other barrios within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee
Candijay
b. found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and
respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as
identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and the
Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the
Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis
Island, Tagtang Canlirong, mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line
declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located."
c. After weighing and considering certain official acts, including Executive Order
No. 265 (which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of
the municipality of Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission
(which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of
Mabini and Candijay), the CA concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where
barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted
as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show
that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of
Candijay."
d. THERE IS EQUIPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE! When the scale shall stand
upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline
it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON CA correctly applied Equipoise rule - YES
1. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the CA involves the
appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this
Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such
showing.
2. WON the challenged Decision "does not solve the problem of both towns but
throws them back again to their controversy." – WAPAKELS COURT KUNG MAG-AWAY
SILA
1. The fact remains that neither party was able to make out a case; neither side could
establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no
better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof,
the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but
to dismiss the complaints/petitions.
3. WON Alicia lacked juridical personality, as a result of having been created under
a void executive order- NO
1. Candijay commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of Alicia some
thirty five years after respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949
during the proceedings in the court a quo.
2. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to
bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had
no juridical personality. It contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President
Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and
void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on
which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of
legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared
unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
3. in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr:
 Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres
was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally
decided to challenge the legality of the executive order
 the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began
and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created
local government unit.
 a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
 Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being
the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice
other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
 attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a
attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. regular, de jure municipality.
 Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of
San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 DECISION
December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling Petition is DENIED.
could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the
case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the
State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres.
i. Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San
Andres as a fifth class municipality.
ii. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 also indicated that
the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.
 Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve
(12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of
Quezon.
 Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code: municipal districts
"organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."
 The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the
Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at
giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing
laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in
this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of
vested rights.
 All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in
the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
4. Alicia's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality
of San Andres. It was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten
years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence
for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated.
5. Various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's
recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof.
 under The Judiciary Reorganization Act, the Municipality of Alicia was
covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the
province of Bohol.
 under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the
Third District of Bohol.
6. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the
municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section
 MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ VS. BAZ, JR.
G.R. No. 105746/ DEC 2, 1996 / MENDOZA, J./LOC GOV-De Facto Corporations/JMB
NATURE Petition for Review of RTC Decision
PETITIONERS MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYOR ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO,
VICEMAYOR ROBINSON B. LOMO, COUNCILORS, etc.
RESPONDENTS HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 14, 10th JUDICIAL REGION, OROQUIETA CITY, and MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN
through its MAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD, VICEMAYOR BASILIO M. BANAAG,
COUNCILORS…and THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL through the PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL and its members
SUMMARY. Muncipality of Sinacaban was created by EO, 16 years before Pelaez ruling.
When it won in a claim for certain barangays belonging to petitioner Municipality of
Jimenez, the latter initiated an action questioning its existence. The Court held for
Sinacaban since its status as a de facto corporation has been unchallenged for 40 years and
because the State and even Jimenez have recognized its existence as a municipal
corporation. Moreover, the status of Sinacaban was deemed to have been cured by reason
of Sec 442 of the LGC of 1991.
DOCTRINE Where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation
where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
FACTS.
- August 30 1949: President Quirino signed EO 258 which created the Municipality
of Sinacaban pursuant to Sec 68 of the Admin Code. Such municipality will be located in the
province of Misamis Occidental.
- Sinacaban then laid a claim to a portion of Barrios Tab-o, Macabayao,
Adorable,Sinara Baja and Sinara Alto which were originally found in the Municipality of
Jimenez. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in 1988.
- Petitioner Muni of Jimenez conceded that while the areas were part of Sinacaban
under EO 258, Resolution No 77 (Feb 1950) of the Provincial Board realigned the boundaries
between the two municipalities.
- Provincial Board ruled on October 11 1989 that the disputed area was part of
Sinacaban. According to the Board, the previous resolution 77 was void because the Board
had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in the EO, that power being
vested in Congress pursuant to Constitution and the Old LGC (BP 337)
- March 2 1990, Municipality of Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the RTC of Oroquieta City against Muni of Sinacaban, Province of
Misamis Occidental and its Board, the CoA, DILG, DBM and Exec Secretary.
o Ground? According to Pelaez v Auditor General, the power to create municipalities
is essentially legislative and Sinacaban, created by EO had no legal personality and right to
assert a claim against Jimenz,
- Feb 1992: RTC denied the petition and declared a status quo.
o In its order, the RTC held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had
completely organized itself even prior to Pelaez and exercised corporate powers for forty
years before being questioned.
o The RTC also ruled that Jimenez had no standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban, the same being reserved for the state in a qui warranto proceeding.
o The RTC also ruled that Jimenez was estopped from questioning Sinacaban’s legal
existence by entering into an agreement with it concerning their common boundary.
o Lastly, the RTC held that any question as to Sinacaban’s existence has been
14
rendered moot by section 442(d) of the LGC. MR denied.
o The RTC however rendered the Provincial Board decision of October 1989 void for
being contrary to the boundaries found in EO 258 and ordered a relocation survey of the
boundary of Sinacaban
- MR denied so petition for review of a decision of the RTC
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim. – YES.
The state and even Jimenez have acknowledged Sinacaban’s existence.
If yes, WON the boundary provided for in EO 258 or Reso 77 should be used for ruling
on the claim. – EO 258
The technical description in the EO creating Sinacaban is controlling.
1st Issue
- Jimenez still relies on the Pelaez ruling, which has been reiterated in a number of
cases. However, the Court have since held that where a municipality created by EO is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned
- The Court, in Muni of San Narciso v Mendez, Sr considered the ff factors as
validating the creation of a municipal corporation which was created by EO before the
Pelaez ruling:
o The fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had
never been challenged
o The fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to
question the validity of the EO creating such municipality
o The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality,
organized as a part of a MTC ad considered as a part of a legislative district in the
Constitution apportioning the seats in the HoR.
o Section 442(d) of the LGC has cured any defects regarding municipalities created
through EO.
- Applied to case, the same factors are present to give Sinacaban the status of at
least a de facto municipal corp.
o Sinacaban had been in existence for 16 years before Pelaez (Dec 24 1965 decided).
Its existence was only questioned 40 years after its creation and only because it had laid
claim to an area apparently desired for its revenue.
o Under Rule 66, Section 16 of the RoC, a quo warranto suit for forfeiture of a
corporation’s charter must be brought within 5 years from the time the act complained of
was committed or done.
14Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Cde shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal fficials holding office at the time at the time
of effectivity of this Cde shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.
 o State and even Jimenez have recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence: Under
AO 33 by the SC and BP 129 Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for
purpose of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez on the other hand
recognized the opponent by entering into an agreement regarding their common
boundary.
- It can even be said that Sinacaban has attained a de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Consti (apportioning legislative districts within the
country) which considered Sinacaban part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidetal. Also
Sec 442 LGC is deemed to have cured any defect in Sinacaban’s creation.
o Jimenez is arguing that Section 442 of LGC violates the Constitutional and
statutory requirement for the holding of a plebiscite in the creation of new municipalities.
The Court held that since Sinacaban has attained de facto status at the time 1987 Consti
took effect on Feb 1982 t is not subject to the plebicite requirement. The plebiscite
requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the 1st time under the Consti
(both 1987 and 1973 Consti)

2nd issue
- Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary
of Sinacaban because the brgys which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in EO
258. It also reirated that the parties entered into an agreement where the brgys would be
a part of Jimenez.
- SC said that EO 258 did not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios therein
mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios without saying they are
the only ones comprising it. IT was the technical description, the metes and bounds which
controlled he boundaries. Thus the RTC was correct in ordering a relocation survey as the
means of determining the proper boundaries
- What about Resolution 77 of the Provincial Board? The SC held that although the
Admin Code of 1917 provides that disputes as to jurisdiction of muni govs over places or
barros shall be decided by the prov’l boards of the provinces in which such municipalities
are situated, the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an
administrative nature, limited to just implementing the law creating the municipality. If,
therefore, the order of the Provincial Board is contrary to law, it would amount to an
amendment which the Provincial Board cannot do.
- Minor: Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision of Oct 11 1989
of Provincial Board. Accordin to Section 79 of the Old LGC, if no settlement of boundary
disputes is made the dispute should be brought to the RTC of the province. Even if the
RTC failed to decide within in 90 days (as required by Sec 79 of the old LGC and Article VIII
section 15 of the Consti) it would only make the judge liable administratively, the ruling
remaining valid.

DECISION.
Petition denied. RTC decision affirmed.
 Tobias vs. Abalos
G.R. No. 114783 / December 8, 1994 / Bidin, J./LOCGOV-General Power and Attributes;
Plebiscite JMQAquino
NATURE Petition to render RA7675 unconstitutional
PETITIONERS Robert V. Tobias, Ramon M. Guzman, Terry T. Lim, Gregorio D.
Gabriel, Roberto Tobias, Jr.
RESPONDENtS Hon. City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, City Treasurer William
Marcelino, Sangguniang Panglungsod, all of the City of Mandaluyong
SUMMARY. Petitioners assail the constitutionality and validity of RA 7675 “An Act
converting Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City”. The law provided for
the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts. Petitioners argue, among others, that the plebiscite should have included the
residents of San Juan.
DOCTRINE. The inhabitants of San Juan, which used to be part of the congressional district
together with Mandaluyong, were properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city since the matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto
FACTS.

15
Feb 9 1994: Ramos signed RA 7675 “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong”
 April 10 1994: Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held
asking the people of Mandaluyong whether they approved of the conversion of the
municipality into a city.
 The turnout was 14.41% of the voting population. 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,911
voted “no”. RA 7675 was deemed ratified by virtue of these results
 Petitioners now assail the constitutionality and validity of RA 7675 on the grounds that:
16 17
o Art VIII, Sec 49 of RA 7675 violates the one subject-one bill rule . The inclusion of
which in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the
division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts. The second is not germane to the subject matter of RA 7675 since the title
expresses the conversion of Mandaluyong into a city.
o The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition
15 Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, incumbent congressional representative of the legislative district
to which the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged, sponsored the bill
which eventually became RA 7675
16 “As a highlyurbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of
this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall
become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at
the same election.”
17
Constitution, Art VI, Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof
of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the
18
Constitution .
o Furthermore, said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. There
is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San
Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify
their separation into two legislative districts
o Sec 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
19
districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) of the Constitution
o [RELEVANT] The people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative
district.
o RA 7675 has resulted in “gerrymandering” (practice of creating legislative districts
to favor a particular candidate or party)
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON RA 7675 is unconstitutional- NO
a. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a city but is a natural
and logical consequence thereof. The title of RA 7674 necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Sec 49 on the creation of a separate
congressional district.
The creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is in
compliance with the “one city-one representative” in Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the
Constitution, which reads: “x x x Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative”
(Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Moreover, we ruled that the one subject-one bill rule should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject.
20
b. A reading of Art VI, Sec 5(1) shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. It provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
18
Constitution, Art VI, Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
19
Constitution, Art VI, Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.
20 supra
 more than 250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” Thus, the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through
a legislative enactment.

c. That there was no mention in the assailed law of any census does not suffice to
strike down the validity of RA 7675. It enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws from the
legislature contain all relevant data considered by Congress in their enactment.

d. The argument that Sec 49 preempts the right of Congress to reapportion

legislative district borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact
that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the
assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself
on a right which pertains to itself.

e. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary to the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite, which was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.

f. Argument that the law resulted in gerrymandering is incredible. It should be noted

that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently
won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.

DECISION. Petition Denied

 Pasig vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 125646/ Sept. 10, 1999 /Ynares-Santiago, J./LOCGOV-
Plebiscites/MBDELACRUZ
NATURE Certiorari and Prohibiton
PETITIONERS City of Pasig; Municipality of Cainta, RIzal
RESPONDENTS COMELEC
SUMMARY. 2 petitions question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Cainta and Pasig. G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while
G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. Pasig claims these areas as
part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Cainta claims that these proposed
barangays encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
DOCTRINE.
1. Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
2. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be
properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries.
FACTS.
 Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated
from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig, and to be converted
and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan,
the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No.
52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscites were
scheduled accordingly.
 Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the plebiscites scheduled, and filed TWO
Petitions with the COMELEC. In both Petitions, Cainta called the attention of
the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
for settlement of boundary dispute. Cainta claimed the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case;
hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
 1st petition: COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality
the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. Hence, the filing of G.R.
No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
 2nd Petition: The COMELEC dismissed the Petition for being moot in view of the
holding of the plebiscite where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified
and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of
G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan
and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments? YES. The
plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig
and Cainta by the Antipolo RTC. In the same vein, the plebiscite held to
ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and
set aside.
Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be
held.
Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a
civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as
in the instant case.
SC: in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42- in the interest of good order, we
can very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another
case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
 Pasig claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico are within its territory yet portions of the same area are
included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Antipolo RTC.
 WON the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Cainta or Pasig has material bearing to the creation of
the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico.
o A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or
by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely
because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality,
to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be
paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
The SC did not agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in
the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of
Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by Cainta
in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo
Regional Trial Court.
 Tan v. COMELEC: Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is
challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that
such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its
officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic.
DECISION.
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED.
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED.
 MARIANO v COMELEC
GR 11857 &118627 / Mar 7 1995 / PUNO, J. / Plebiscite / BUNYI
PETITIONERS Juanito Mariano +John Osmena
RESPONDENTS COMELEC, Municipality of Makati, Jejomar Binay, Municipal Treasurer, Sangguniang
Bayan of Makati
SUMMARY. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854 which converts the Municipality of
Makati into the City of Makati. SC ruled against them on all accounts. RA 7854 did not violate the
requirement that area of an LGU must be made by metes and bounds with technical description since
the delineation of the land area will not cause confusion, it was not defined by mete and bounds since
there was a pending territorial dispute, and the LGC requirement is only to reasonably ascertain the
territory of an LGU. There is no actual case or controversy which so SC cannot rule on the allegation that
Sec. 51 restarts the “3 consecutive term limit.” Furthermore, the increase in the legislative district is
constitutional.
FACTS.
 Petitioners are residents, taxpayers, and a senator and they assail RA 7854 "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” as
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Sec. 2 of RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Sec. 51 of RA 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
3. Sec. 52 of RA 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of
every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill;
and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON Sec. 221 of RA 7854 violates LGC which requires that the area of an LGU should be made by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions – NO
 The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU. It
can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought
to be avoided by the LGC.
 Petitioners have not shown that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati
will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land
area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
21Sec. 2. Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the
City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on
the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The
foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units.
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
 The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
At the time of the consideration of R.A. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of
respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to
the courts to decide.
 We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts.
 Thus, Sec. 2 of RA 7854 is not unconstitutional and we sustain the SolGen in this regard, viz.: The
LGC Sec. 7 and 450 requirement that “the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted
cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order
to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other
words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of
local government units. So long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this
case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them
their rightful due. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code.
WON Sec. 5122 of RA 7854 violates Art. X, Sec. 823 and Art. VI, Sec. 724 of the Constitution – NO
 Petitioners: Under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. By providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, Sec. 51 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, Sec. 51 favors the incumbent
Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, who has already served for 2 consecutive terms. Should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for
the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-
year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted.
SC: To challenge the constitutionality of a law: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. In this case, the
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run
again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
22 Sec. 51. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of
Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising their functions and
duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
23 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
24 Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the
House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
 he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has
yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig are not also
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
WON Sec. 5225 of RA 7854, which added a legislative district, is unconstitutional – NO
 Petitioners: Reapportionment cannot be made by a special law.
SC: In Tobias v. Abalos, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide,
would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be
denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations
will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
 Petitioners: Makati’s population stands at only 450,000 according to the latest survey so the
addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.
SC: Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000. In fact, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
 Petitioners: The creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly
stated in the title of the bill.
SC: In Tobias v. Abalos, Court reiterated that it favors a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of
a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. It should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to such general subject.
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria provided for
in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause
"as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section
only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not
a highly urbanized city. Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in
R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1,
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned in
the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows: “Within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.” In short, the clause refers to a general
reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of
the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as
follows: MAKATI: one (1)
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase
to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within
one hundred and twenty days before the election.

DECISION.
Petition DISMISSED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in
Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted should be properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions. The omission of R.A. No. 7854 to describe the territorial
boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make it unconstitutional or illegal. The
Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the

25Sec. 52: Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu
of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district.
 MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 / SEPT 16, 1999 / PUNO, J. /
LOCGOV – Plebiscite / JCFMAGSINO
NATURE Special Civil Action – Prohibition with Prayer for Prel. Injunction
PETITIONERS Jose C. Miranda, Alfredo S. Dirige, Manuel H. Afiado, Mariano
V. Barbaran and Andres R. Cabuyadao
RESPONDENTS Exec. Sec. Alexander Aguirre, Sec. Epimaco Velasco (DILG), Sec.
Salvador Enriquez (DBM), COA, COMELEC, Gov. Benjamin Dy
(Isabela), Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela, Atty. Baltazar Picio
(Provincial Administrator, and Antonio Chua (Provincial Treasurer)
INTERVENOR Giorgidi B. Aggabao
SUMMARY: RA No. 7720, which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. The people of Santiago ratified it in a
plebiscite. RA No. 8528 was enacted. It amended RA No. 7720, it changed the status of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Miranda, mayor of
Santiago assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 due to lack of ratification through
plebiscite pursuant to Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 10, Art. X addressed the undesirable practice where LGUs were created,
abolished, etc. on the basis of vagaries of politics and not of the people’s welfare. The
consent of the people was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide
on a matter that affects them. This is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to LGUs.
FACTS.
1. On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720, which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela
into an independent component city was signed into law. It was ratified by the people
of Santiago, in a plebiscite on July 4, 1994.
26
2. On February 14, 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted. It amended RA No. 7720 – among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city.
26
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720—AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words “an independent” thereon so
that said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago.—The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be known as
the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of
the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the
following:
‘SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, ViceGovernor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective
Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.—The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the
elections of the Provincial Governor, ViceGovernor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other elective provincial
positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and
any elective provincial office.’
SEC. 3. Repealing Clause.— All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
3. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 on the ground that it lacked a
provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
pleibiscite.
[Miranda – Mayor of Santiago; Afiado – Pres. of Liga ng mga Barangay; Dirige,
Cabuyadao, and Babaran - Residents]
4.
st
[1 Comment] Respondent Provincial Officials of Isabela maintained the statute’s
constitutionality and assailed the petitioners’ standing to file the petition. They claimed
that the petition raises a political question over which the SC lacks jurisdiction.
5.
nd
[2 Comment] The OSG, also contend that the petitioners are not real parties in
interest and that RA No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
city to a component city. It did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs,” hence, a plebiscite was unnecessary.
rd
6. [3 Comment] Intervenor Aggabao, member of the provincial board of Isabela,
contended that both the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 do not require a plebiscite
“to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial
elections.” The rules implementing the LGC cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged
that the petitioenrs lacked locus standi.
7. [Reply] Petitioners defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would
happen to the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON Petitioners have locus standi. – YES.
1. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who
will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
 Miranda, as the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in his own
right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, did not need the consent of the Santiago
City city council. The change of status will affect his powers as mayor.
o The injury he will sustain is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized
grievance shared with the people of Santiago city.
 On the other hand, residents and voters have the right to be heard in the conversion
of their city thru a plebiscite by the COMELEC. Denial of this right gives them proper
standing
WON Petition is barred on the ground that involves a political question. – NO.
1. Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution defines judicial power as including “the duty
of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.”
2. The cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by the Court in many
cases.
 Tanada v. Cuenco: ‘Political question’ connotes a question of policy. It refers
questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
SEC. 4. Effectivity.— This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
 sovereign capacity; or in regard to full discretionary authority delegated to the
legislative or executive branches. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
 Casibang v. Aquino: A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a
remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
3. The question regarding Congress’ compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution in passing laws poses questions that the SC alone can decide. The
proposition that the Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the
Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
WON RA No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of
Santiago city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebsicite. – YES.
1. Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution provides: “No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. ” Reiterated in Sec. 10, Ch. 2 (LGC – RA No. 7160).
2. The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of LGUs
belongs to Congress. This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the
Constitution vested in Congress.
3. The resolution of the issue depends on WON the downgrading falls within the meaning
of creation, division,… as per Sec.10, Art. X. A close analysis would reveal that the
creation, division,… of LGUs involves a common denominator – material change in
political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein.
 It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people “in political units directly affected.”
 Sec. 10, Art. X addressed the undesirable practice where LGUs were created,
abolished, etc. on the basis of vagaries of politics and not of the people’s welfare.
The consent of the people was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them – direct democracy. This is also in
accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to LGUs.
4. The result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are not insubstantial (Changes in political
autonomy).
 Independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished
 The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor
 Resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the
Provincial Board of Isabela; resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by
the Sang. Panglungsod are subject to review of the Sang. Panglalawigan.
 Taxes collected (sand, gravel, quarry resources, professional, amusement) by the
city will be shared with the province
 The reversion of Santiago City to the province of Isabela will be to the advantage of
the Prov. Government (PG) of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its
share in the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the national government since
IRA is based on land area and population of LGUs, provinces included.
 The downgrading will result in diminished funds for the local operations of the city
government because of reduced shares in the IRA (Sec. 285, RA 7160)
 Share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth will be
diluted; will accrue to the PG
 Registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial
officials
 Elective city officials will be under the control of the provincial governor
 As an independent component city, the Office of the President will have supervisory
powers over it (Sec. 25, RA 7160; Sec. 4, Art. X, Consti)
5. RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent
component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite. There is neither
rhyme nor reason why a plebiscite should not be called to determine the people’s will
when RA No. 8528 downgrades the status of the city – there is more reason to consult
when a law substantially diminishes a right.
 Rule II, Art. 6(f)(1) of the IRR of the LGC provides that no creation, conversion,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall
take effect unless by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in
the LGU/s affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120
days from the effectivity of the law, unless said law fixes another date.
 The rule covers ALL conversions – whether upward or downward in character, so
long as it results in a material change in the LGU directly affected (political and
economic rights).
Puno’s Comments on the Dissenting Opinions
 Justice Buena justifying RA No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power
to amend the charter of Santiago City – however, the power of amendment, is
limited by Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. When an amendment of a law involves
the creation, merger, etc. or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs, a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
 The contention that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of
Santiago as a city because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved
by RA No. 8528. Sec. 10, Art. X calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to
vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as
a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will
radically change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and
responsibilities of its people.
 Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the classification involves changes
in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need
for such changes to be approved by the people."
 Such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Sec. 10, Art. X. The
Constitution imposes two conditions: (1) the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria
fixed by the LGC on income, population and land area and (2) the law must be
approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."
 In accord with the Constitution, Secs. 7, 8, and 9 of the LGC fixed the said criteria
and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These
requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability
of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to
determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people.
 The principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory
 The two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria
fixed by the LGC on income, population and land area are designed to achieve
an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators attested by the
DOF, NSO, and the Lands Management Bureau of the DENR. The people's
plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a
check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering (legislative action
for the benefit of politicians and not the people): exercise of direct people power.
 As well-observed by one commentator, it is also imperative that these acts be done
not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality
concerned.
 The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain
segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time RA
No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent
component city barely 2 1/2 years ago and the conversion was approved by a
majority of 14,000 votes.
 Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status
of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-
political status.
 The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to
aspire for the leadership of the province. The alleged reason is unconvincing for it is
the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer
participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of
Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to
be independent from the province of Isabela.
 There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to
submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The
amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was
called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee, Sen. Sotto, announced the
withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversation with the
elders of the Body."
 The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the
downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of
the people of the city via a plebiscite.
 In the case of Tan v. COMELEC, BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of
Negros Occ. without consulting its people in a plebiscite. CJ Teehankee cited the
illicit political purpose behind its enactment. The voters of the whole and entire
province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the
plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and
substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the
areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as
allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
 Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when
allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component
cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis
Occidental, and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan whose charters were amended
to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the
province to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a
plebiscite.
 The cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city
of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component
cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were
not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities
which alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the
case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel
explained that the bill under consideration, merely empowers the voters of San
Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials and there was no intention to
downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing that the
enactment of this bill will diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by
the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component
city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier,
grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in any
way changing the character of its being a component city.
 It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill allowing qualified voters of the
city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis
Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being
given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component
city.
 During the debates, former Sen. Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy
the anomalous situation where voters of one component city can vote in the
provincial election while the voters of another component city cannot vote simply
because their charters so provide. Thus, Congress amended other charters of
component cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
DECISION
Petition GRANTED; Writ of Prohibition ISSUED commanding respondents to desist form
implementing the law. RA 8528 is declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 Samson v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133076 / September 22, 1999 / Quisumbing, J./Plebiscite/ GRACEgar
NATURE Original Action in the SC
PETITIONERS Moises Samson
RESPONDENTS Alexander Aguirre, Department of Budget, COMELEC
SUMMARY. RA No. 8535 created the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of QC. Samson
said the RA was unconstitutional. SC dismissed his action because he failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality of laws
DOCTRINE. (I actually don’t know why this is under plebiscite. Please see bold and
underlined texts in the ratio).
FACTS.
 On February 23, 1998, Pres. FVR signed RA No. 8535 creating the City of Novaliches out
of 15 barangays of QC.
 Samson, then councilor of the 1st district of QC challenged the RA’s constitutionality:
1. RA failed to conform to the criteria established by the LGC particularly Sections 7,
11(a), and 450(a)
a. Samson asserted that certifications as to income, population, and land area
were not presentd to the Congress during the deliberations. He said the
lack of certifications was evident in the minutes of public hearings
conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government.
b. Samson also said there was no certification attesting to the fact that QC,
the mother LGU, would not be adversely affected.
c. Samson argued that the RA failed to specify the seat of the proposed City
2. RA will in effect amend the Constitution
 Samson also asked the Court to enjoin Aguirre, then Executive Secretary, from ordering
the implementation of the RA, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite, and the DBM
from disbursing funds for said plebiscite.
 Aguirre and DBM said Samson failed to substantiate his allegations and hence, the action
should be dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON the action should be dismissed – YES
GR: Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular
congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his
allegations clearly and unmistakably.
In the case at bar, Samson has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by Republic Act No. 8535. Court noted that
the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives. Its
principal sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban of Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof,
but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local
Government, as is the usual practice in this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot
substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress, based on the
bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor.
(Let’s go to the concepts)
Under Sec. 7 of the LGC, there are 3 verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity
that will serve as basis for the creation or conversion of a new LGU: income, population, and
land area. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department
of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Now, under
Article 11 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code, the following are the
requisites for creation of new LGU: 1) income – not less than 20M, 2) population or land area
– not leass than 150,000 inhabitants as certified by NSO or land area which must be
27
contiguous with an area of 100 sq km. The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less
than the prescribed minimum requirements.
Court said that officials of NSO, Bureau of Local Gov’t Finance, Land Management Bureau,
DBM, and QC officials were present during the public hearings held by the Senate
Committee. BLGF said the combined average income of the 13 brgys were aroun
P26,952,128.26; NSO said the proposed City of Novaliches had an estimated population of
347, 310. Official statements of said agencies could serve the same purpose contemplated by
law requiring certificates. In addition, although there was no seat specified in the RA, Court
held that it was not fatal to the validity of the law since under Sec. 12 of the LGC, the City
can still established a seat of government after its creation. With the alleged adverse effect
on QC, Samson failed to present any concrete evidence. Then QC Mayor Ismael Mathay Jr.
was present during the deliberations and the fact that he did not raise any adverse issue
during the public hearings on R.A. No. 8535, stressing instead his concern on the matter
of inclusion of all Quezon City voters in the plebiscite that would decide the fate of the
City of Novaliches, is indicative of the nonexistence of such negative issues. Moreover,
in the plebiscite as contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously have
the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question of
the cityhood of Novaliches.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely
apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in
the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only
17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner.
DECISION.
Petition dismissed.
27 The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed
of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city
sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds.
 Sultan Usman Sarangani v. COMELEC
G.R. No.135927/ June 26, 2000 / Buena, J./LOCGOV/MJCMARTINEZ
NATURE Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
PETITIONERS Sultan Usman Sarangani et al.
RESPONDENTS Commission on Elections and Hadji Abolais Omar et al.
SUMMARY. COMELEC, upon investigation of a special task force, declared Padian Torogan
in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as a ghost precinct. Mayor, former mayor, and current vice
mayor assail said Order alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. SC
denied said petition for certiorari: no irregularity in the conduct of investigations.
DOCTRINE. The findings of the COMELEC, as an administrative agency, cannot be reversed
on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have substantially
affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true
results of an election by means available to it.
FACTS.
 A petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R.
Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin including the precinct of Padian Torogan.
 The incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, petitioner Usman T. Sarangani
together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the 23
barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and
abolished filed an "Answer in Opposition" which included the affidavits of the barangay
28
chairmen attesting that the move was made to diminish the bailiwicks of the mayor.
 COMELEC then issued an Order referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate
investigation.
 The COMELEC Law Department then issued a memorandum directing Atty. Muslemin
Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City "to conduct a rigorous incisive
investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and submit a report on the investigation."
 Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM directing Election Officers "to
conduct ocular inspection on the alleged 12 ghost barangays in the Municipality of
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."
 June 18, 1998: an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts yielding
the following results :
o At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team accompanied by traditional leaders,
political leaders, many concerned residents of this town, a representative from the
Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics Office and a Team from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao
del Sur, arrived in the area supposedly Barangay Padian Torogan.
o The area had only 2 structures: a concrete house with no roof, and a wooden
structure without walls and roof. This obviously means that no single human being
could possibly reside in these two structures.
o The name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. This contradicts
the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the Census saying that the
area has 45 households with a total population of 285.
28 district or jurisdiction of a bailie or bailiff.
o None of the people around when asked answered affirmatively that they are
residents or registered voters in the so-called Barangay Padian-Torogan.
o The team proceeded to Brgy. Lumbac. However, at the peak of this ocular
inspection, the Madalum Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI
pistolized Machine Gun, arrived at the scene at exactly 12:55 pm boarding an orange
Mitsubishi car with four armed bodyguards, confronted the Team Leader of the
COMELEC Investigating Group and angrily insisted to stop the ocular inspection.
o When a photographer attempted to take a picture of the Chief of Police while he is
arguing with the investigating leader, the police pointed a gun at the photographer.
 On the basis of the report, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial
Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement reporting the results
of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.
 On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding Padian Torogan as
ghost precinct and excluding it from the special election to be conducted in Madalum.
 On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor
Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and
Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus urging the
SC to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
ISSUES & RATIO.
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as
ghost precinct. – NO.
It appears from the records that Padian Torogan is a barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur
and it was erroneous for the COMELEC to consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost precinct. In
any case, the court is not tasked to determine whether the so-called Padian Torogan is a
barangay or a mere election. The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay
Padian Torogan was the one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the
assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as
ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would
be the election precinct in the said place.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per barangay.
Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not
and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On
such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its
own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon the Court, more so,
in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.
COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public
or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If
there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered
voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have
inhabitants considering that people migrate.
A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does
not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the
case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may
be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject
to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political units
affected.

The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in
the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-
existent, said order shall stand.

DECISION.
Petition dismissed. Order of COMELEC upheld.

NOTES.
No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed
by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral
exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and
are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all
the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of
suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some
ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.
 SALVA VS. MAKALINTAL
G.R. No. 132603 / September 18, 2000 / PADILLA, J. / Abolition / EFHDy
NATURE PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC
PETITIONERS Elpidio Salva and Others Too Numerous To Enumerate As A Class Suit
RESPONDENTS Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal, RTC Judge, Hon. Sangguniang
Panglalawigan Of Batangas, Batangas City; Hon. Sangguniang
Pangbayan, Calaca, Batangas; and Hon. Commission on Elections
SUMMARY. The Sangguiniang Panglalawigan of Batangas enacted an ordinance w/c
abolished Brgy. San Rafael and merged it w/ Brgy. Dacanlao. Pursuant to this COMELEC
issued a resolution providing for rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite. Petitioners, as officials and residents of Brgy. San Rafael, filed a class suit in the
RTC and seek to enjoin the conduct of the plebiscite. RTC Judge denied the issuance of TRO,
saying that accdg. to the Constitution, the proper jurisdiction of suits that question the act
of COMELEC lies w/ the SC. SC held that only quasi-judicial acts of COMELEC are
contemplated by the consti, as opposed to administrative acts, w/c are cognizable by the
lower courts. In this case, the COMELEC resolution was issued pursuant to its administrative
functions and not quasi-judicial, hence RTC has jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE. What is contemplated by the term ‘final orders, rulings and decisions’ of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
FACTS.
 The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas enacted Ordinance No. 05, which declared
the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality
of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required
plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991
 The Sangguniang Panglalawigan also enacted Resolution No. 345, w/c affirmed the
effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, after it had been vetoed by the governor of Batangas.
 COMELEC then promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to
decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay
Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.
 Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a
class suit in the RTC for the annulment of Ordinance No.5, Resolution No. 345, and
Resolution No. 2987 and requested for the corresponding TRO.
 RTC Judge Makalintal denied the issuance of TRO, ruling that it didn’t have any
jurisdiction, and that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of
the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.
 In the SC, petitioner contends that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its
acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a
purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court.
 COMELEC, on the other hand, submits that the power to review or reverse COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court.
ISSUES & RATIO.
3. WON RTC has jurisdiction. – YES.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
“SEC.7.x x x. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
The Court has previously interpreted that “what is contemplated by the term final orders,
rulings and decisions’ of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as
provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.”
We agree with the Solicitor General that “x x x. [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution
No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and
parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on
the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants,
relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election
laws.”
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not
be deemed as a “final order” reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.
DECISION.
Petition for review GRANTED. RTC order SET ASIDE and ANNULED. RTC ordered to
proceed with dispatch in resolving the Civil Case.