CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
RAPE
PEOPLE VS ORITA
Facts: The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime
of rape before the RTC in Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information
states:
“That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a
boarding house at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, the accused with
lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife and with threats and
intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay
with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan
against her will and without her consent.”
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at
the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a
Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant’s classmates had
just brought her home from a party. When she knocked at the door of
her boarding house, somebody suddenly held her and poked a knife to
her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of
another boarder.
With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a
"balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs.
With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered
complainant's room. With one hand holding the knife, appellant
undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes.
Scared, she did as she was told.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her as he
continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant
could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as
she kept on moving. Appellant then lay down on his back and
commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again
of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had
both his hands flat on the floor.
Complainant ran to the next room and then to another jumped out
through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building. When the policemen
who were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant
naked sitting on the stairs crying. When they discovered what happened,
Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house.
Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar
Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined and issued a
medical certificate which states:
xxx
Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the
vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice,
tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining
finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no
discharges noted.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the
offense charged. The RTC found the accused of the crime of Frustrated
Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating
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circumstances of dwelling and nighttime with no mitigating circumstance
to offset the same.
The CA modified the RTC’s decision and found the accused guilty of the
crime of rape.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting
aside its and forwarded the case to this Court.
Issue: WON the accused’s conviction of frustrated rape is proper/WON
the frustrated stage apples to the crime of rape
Held: NO. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and,
from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender,
because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.
Thus, the felony is consummated [Art. 266 and Art. 6].
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the
male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction.
PEOPLE VS MANGALINO
Facts: The accused Semion Mangalino was convicted of statutory rape
under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code states:
“That on or about March 7, 1984, in the city of Manila the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have
carnal knowledge with the complainant’s daughter Marichelle, a minor,
6 years of age, against her will and consent.”
At about 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1984, Marichelle
Carlos, 6 years old and a Grade I pupil was playing "takbuhan" alone at
the first level of the two-story apartment of the accused, Semion
Mangalino, 53, married to 55-year old Laura Gasmin, childless, a security
guard by occupation. At the time of the incident, Laura was in Balayan,
Batangas, having left the day before the incident. The accused and
Marichelle's parents (Tomas and Bernardine Carlos) are neighbors, their
respective rented apartments being almost opposite each other.
Accused’s grandson Ramil las Dulce and Laura's nephew, Armando
Ayroso, were allegedly playing chess in the sala of the apartment. Ramil
testified that he did not hear or see the accused calling out to Marichelle
and motioning her to go inside his bedroom or "sleeping quarters" at
one end of the sala of the ground floor, opposite the kitchen.
Once inside the bedroom, the accused handed the girl a two peso bill
(P2.00) and told her not to tell anybody about his calling her to his
bedroom. The girl assented.
The accused then laid Marichelle down, removed her jogging pants, and
placed them beside her feet. He kissed her and fondled her infantile
breasts. He inserted his finger into the private part of the victim and
then forcibly and repeatedly introduced his sexual organ into her
undeveloped genitalia, but in vain.
Upon being fetched, the victim put on her garments, and on the way
home noticed that her jogging pants were wet. Upon reaching her
house, Marichelle narrated to her mother what had happened, saying,
"Si Mang Semion nilagay ang daliri niya sa pikpik ko," and "yong titi ni
Mang Semion nilagay sa pikpik ko."
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
That same day, Bernardine submitted her daughter to a physical and
genital examination.
Dr. Garcia opined that the vestibular mucosa contusion could have been
caused by a hard object like an erected penis and such bruises at such
part of the girl's vagina if caused by an erected penis would be an
indication of an unsuccessful penetration. He discounted the probability
of an accident, like bumping at an edge of a chair, or any blunt object,
since there was no contusion of the labia.
The confrontation between the victim and the accused took place when
Staff Sergeant Mario Oser who conducted the initial investigation, invited
the accused to the P.C. Headquarters. There, Marichelle Identified
Semion Mangalino as the man who had abused her.
The accused vehemently denied having ever abused Marichelle. He
argued that the bruises in the complainant's vestibular mucosa may
have been self-inflicted. Marichelle, who was constantly running about,
might have bumped her pelvis against a chair, which explained the
absence of signs of contusions in the labia.
Curiously, the young victim candidly testified that she felt no pain when
the accused was allegedly trying to insert his penis into her vagina. She
did not cry in pain nor shout for help when she was being abused.
Issue: WON statury rape has been committed.
Held: YES. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided
in Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Marichelle, a little over 6
years of age at the time, was raped. Beyond that, proof of intimidation
or force used on her, or lack of it, is immaterial.
The findings of Dr. Roberto V. Garcia, the NBI Medico Legal officer
conclude that rape could have been perpetrated. The forcible attempt
of an erected penis to have complete penetration caused the 3 1/2-
centimeter contusion prior to the hymen. The government doctor further
discounted the probability of an accident, such as bumping the edge of
a chair, or violent contact with a blunt object, as there was no contusion
of the labia.
In any case, the Court has consistently held that for rape to be
committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is
proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the
female organ. Indeed, even the slightest penetration is sufficient to
consummate the crime of rape.
PEOPLE VS ERINIA
Facts: Defendant Julian Erinia was found guilty of the crime of
consummated rape.
The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and
the evidence is conclusive that the defendant endeavored to have carnal
intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt whether he
succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the
timely intervention of the mother and the sister of the child.
The physician who examined the genital organ of the child a few hours
after the commission of the crime found a slight inflammation of the
exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an effort had been made to
enter the vagina, but in testifying before the court he expressed doubts
as to whether the entry had been effected. The mother of the child
testified that she found its genital organ covered with a sticky substance,
but that cannot be considered conclusive evidence of penetration.
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Issue: WON the crime of statutory rape has been committed.
Held: NO. It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age
that penetration was impossible; that the crime of rape consequently
was impossible of consummation; and that, therefore, the offense
committed should be treated only as abusos deshonestos.
We do not think so. It is probably true that a complete penetration was
impossible, but such penetration is not essential to the commission of
the crime; it is sufficient if there is a penetration of the labia. In the case
of Kenny vs. State where the offended party was a child of the age of 3
years and 8 months the testimony of several physicians was to the effect
that her labia of the privates of a child of that age can be entered by a
man's male organ to the hymen and the defendant was found guilty of
the consummated crime rape.
There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ
of the offended party, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the
doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape, but in view of the
fact that he was living in the house of the parents of the child as their
guest, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence existed.
PEOPLE VS. CASTRO
Facts: On the witness stand, six (6) year old Diana Rose Castro narrated
how, while playing with a neighbor sometime on 4 October 1986, she
was pulled by the accused inside a bathroom, prevented from going out,
and made to stand on the toilet bowl. Accused is a first cousin of Diana
Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin, as Diana Rose referred to the accused, then
put up her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and,
despite her efforts to pull away he inserted his private part into her
causing pain. Then she was told by the accused to go home. At home,
she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice because
it was hurting and painful. Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother,
testified that she was asked by her husband to find out why Diana was
crying. She found out that the genital of her granddaughter is swollen
and when she aked her, Diana said “nasabit sa hiyero”. But when she
asked Diana again, the latter admitted that his Kuya Delfin had sexual
intercourse with her. Because of Diana's revelation, the grandmother
brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination.
Under the “genital examination” the hymen of the subject person was
noted to be bruised or contused meaning it could have come in contact
with a hard object, the contract must have been done with a certain
amount of force or produced by the insertion of a male organ. A sworn
complaint for rape was filed against Delfin Castro y Lozada. Accused
pleaded not guilty and posted bail for his provisional liberty.
Diana went to his house while he was taking a bath. She was crying and
went inside the bathroom. When asked by the accused why, she replied
that while going down the stairs, a dog whose two (2) hind legs were
limping, chased her and so she tripped. The accused told Diana to go
out because their dog might bite her. He proceeded to dress up and saw
the victim playing outside. The accused also claim that he went to
Adamson University for his term paper the day after. Delfin further
narrated that on or about 8 October 1986, he was invited to the Pasay
Police Headquarters for questioning. While there, he was asked to
undress, was blindfolded and beaten by around 7 to 10 policemen for
about half an hour and made to admit that he raped Diana. Since he
could no longer stand the torture, he told them that he used his small
finger to touch her private part. 1 Finding the testimony of Diana
positive, clear and credible, the Regional Trial Court disregarded the alibi
of the accused and convicted him.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
From the said decision sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and indemnify the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 by way
of damages, the accused appealed to this Court pointing out the
following alleged errors:
1. there is no rape because —
a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
b. the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being
committed.
c. the victim is still a virgin.
2. reliance on the conflicting testimony of the victim and not that of the
accused.
Issue: Whether or not Castro is liable for the crime of rape
Held: Yes. A recent decision of this Court in a case of statutory rape
observed that, usually, the average adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3
centimeters in diameter, making it compatible with, or easily penetrable
by an average size penis. The victim being of tender age, the penetration
of the male organ could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, for
rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that
there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is
sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. 12
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina
are not essential for the offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the
least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. 13
Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.
Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable,
is not improbable. The RTC decision explained:
. . . For her account that she was made to stand on the toilet bowl made
it easy for the accused to do the act as she was too small and their
private parts would not align unless she was elevated to a higher
position. The suggestion of the defense counsel that a finger could have
been used is absurd. For if it were only a finger there would have been
no need to let Diana stand on the toilet bowl..
Therefore, Castro is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
PEOPLE VS. ATENTO
Facts: The complainant is Glenda Aringo, who was sixteen years old at
the time of the alleged offense. She is the neighbor of Cesar Atento, the
herein accused-appellant, a 39-year old store-keeper with a wife and
eight children. Her claim is that Atento raped her five separate times,
the first sometime in April 1986.
She says that on that first occasion she went to Atento's store in
Barangay 18, Minoro, Cabagñan, in Legazpi City to buy bread. Her
parents were at work and Atento was alone in his house except for his
three-year old daughter. Glenda claims Atento cajoled her into coming
inside the house and then took her downstairs, where he succeeded in
deflowering her. She says her maiden head ached and bled. Afterwards,
he gave her P5.00.
Jaica
Glenda speaks of four other times when he raped her. It was later
(presumably because her hymen had healed) that she felt tickled by his
manhood and described the act of coitus as "masarap." 1
The girl says she never told anybody about Atento's attacks on her
because he had threatened her life. But she could not conceal her
condition for long and after five months had to admit she was pregnant.
She revealed the accused-appellant as the father of the foetus in her
womb. The child was delivered on December 27, 1987, and christened
Hubert Buendia Aringo.
Atento denies the charge against him, saying it was pure harassment
concocted by a relative of the girl who wanted to eject him from the
land where his house was erected. Insisting that Glenda was a girl of
loose morals, he says he had twice seen her in sexual congress with a
man and that she had once offered her body to his thirteen year old son
for a fee of P5.00.
Glenda's description of the act of coitus as pleasurable would have
destroyed the whole case against Atento but for one singular significant
fact. The girl is a mental retardate.
Glenda was subjected to a series of intelligence tests (ie. Wecslar adult
intelligence scale) by Ascendo Belmonte, a clinical psychologist anfd
found out that her intellectual capacity is between the ages of nine (9)
and twelve (12) years. Her fund of information is inadequate, her
judgment is unsound, her thinking and working capacity is poor.
However, in the midst of all these, Glenda was found capable of telling
the truth. 2 testimonies: by her mother and a relative, respectively said
that 1. She preferred to play with children younger than she, even when
she was already pregnant and even after delivering her child she would
play marbles with the children rather than feed her baby 2. Glenda had
the mentality of a 12-year old and was fond of rubber bands and playing
cards.
Issue: Whether or not Atento is liable for rape
Held: Yes. It is worth observing that Glenda's child was born on
December, nine months after her rape in April, and that, according to
the trial judge, there was a remarkable resemblance between Atento
and the boy.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape committed. –– Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither
of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs
shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
It has not been clearly established that Atento employed force or threat
against Glenda to make her submit to his lust. Nevertheless, there is no
question that Atento is guilty of rape upon Glenda under paragraph 2,
because the girl was deprived of reason. Alternatively, he is liable under
paragraph 3, because his victim had the mentality of a girl less than
twelve years old at the time she was raped.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
There is no doubt that when she submitted herself to the accused later
for subsequent intercourses, she was dominated more by fear and
ignorance than by reason.
In any event, whether under paragraph 2 or under paragraph 3 of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant deserves to be
punished for the rape of Glenda Azingo.
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of rape as charged,
meaning that he raped the victim five times, but we do not agree that
the other four rapes have been conclusively proven. Otherwise, he
would have to be punished for five separate rapes.
PEOPLE VS. CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
Facts: On May 27, 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of
statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty
of death. on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma.
Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan,
went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. Primo was a helper of Conrado
Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks,
she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting
Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside
her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging
pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis
into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina
mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. Corazon then ran out
and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle
to chase the accused. 8Seconds later, Primo was apprehended. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of
extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on
Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm.
in diameter.
Primo Campuhan maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as
a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will
against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. Although Primo
Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997
found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty
of death.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma.
Corazon Pamintuan. . He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him
to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister was also
in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo
drinks for her daughters. He asserts that the absence of any external
signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts
more than bolsters his innocence
Issue: Whether or not the accused can be held liable for consummated
rape
Held: NO. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal
knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the
mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. 10 But the act of touching should be understood here as
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female
organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
Jaica
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked
the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape.
Prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to
penetrate Crysthel’s vagina however slight. Corazon did not say, nay,
not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an
erection. On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold
his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an
erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's
vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's
advances by putting her legs close together; consequently, she did not
feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to
her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!"
In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had
anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on
the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of
discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was
already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.
None was shown in this case. Although a child's testimony must be
received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the Court
endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears
to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the
accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the
testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for
consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this
case that there were no external signs of physical injuries on
complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although
the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the
possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to
hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim.
PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and
sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead
found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term
KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION
PEOPLE VS TOMIO
Appellants were arrested at about 3:45 o'clock in the afternoon of 12
May 1986 at the main branch of the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) in Makati, Metro Manila, while allegedly receiving
the partial payment of the ransom money from Tatsumi Nagao, a
Japanese tourist. On 15 May 1986, an Information for Kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom (Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code) was filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila by
Vivencio Dionido, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 86-45055. The accusatorial portion of the Information
reads:
That on or about May 2, 1986, and subsequently thereafter, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with six (6) others whose true names, real Identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, being
then private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the immediate
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
family of TATSUMI NAGAO, kidnap or detain the latter and deprive him
of his liberty, without legal justifications and against his will.
Contrary to Law.
The information was filed after an ex-parte preliminary investigation,
conducted pursuant to General Order No. 39, since the offended party
is a tourist. This General Order grants civil courts concurrent jurisdiction
with the military tribunals over crimes where the offended party is a
tourist or a transient, which the former has to dispose of within twenty-
four (24) hours after their filing by the arresting officers. 1
On 16 May 1988, the trial court issued an Order setting the arraignment
and trial of the appellants on 19 May 1986 an appointing Citizens
Attorney Abdulkalim Askali of the CLAO (now PAO.) as counsel de officio
for the accused. 2
On 19 May 1986, appellants, through a de parte counsel, Jose T. Arroyo,
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila a Very Urgent Motion For
Re-investigations 3 alleging therein that the Information was filed
without the benefit of a preliminary investigation and that they are
innocent, which they can prove at a preliminary investigation.
However, the records fail to show that Atty. Arroyo insisted on this
motion. On the contrary, at the arraignment on 19 May 1986, he
categorically stated that the appellants were ready for arraignment, and
even requested for a Japanese interpreter, which was not favorably
acted upon since the appellants understand and can speak English and
Tagalog. 4 Both having entered a plea of not guilty, trial proceeded
immediately. 5
At the trial on that day and the succeeding two days, the prosecution
presented seven witnesses, namely: Pat. Eugenio Guillermo, Pat. Marlon
Ursua, Cpl. Virgilio Cabural, complainant Tatsumi Nagao, Sgt. Jovito
Gutierrez, Wally Martinez and Daishin Nagao, and offered documentary
exhibits.
For their defense, appellants relied on their own testimonies which they
gave in open court on 22 May 1986.
On 27 May 1986, the trial court promulgated a decision finding the
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer the death penalty and to pay the
costs. 6
The case is now before Us for automatic review.
The facts of the case, as established by the evidence for the prosecution
and summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee,
are:
Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986
for a five-day vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn (pp. 5-
6, tsn, May 21, 1986).
On May 2, 1986, while Nagao was having lunch alone at the coffee shop
of the hotel, two (2) Japanese men approached his table and asked him
if he were a Japanese to which he answered in the affirmative. Later,
he came to know one of the men as Maida Tomio alias Sato Toshio and
the other as Mitamura. They joined him at his table and informed him
that they have been in the Philippines for quite a time and offered
themselves as his guides in Manila. Thereafter, Mitamura brought him
to the sauna bath of the hotel and a department store in Manila.
Jaica
Eventually, they ended up at the Leo's Restaurant located along Roxas
Boulevard at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening where they had dinner.
Before leaving the restaurant, Nagao's companion placed a pack of
cigarettes on his (Nagao's) shirt pocket and him to just wait because he
has to talk to a taxi driver. After taking few steps from the restaurant,
Nagao was approached by five (5) plainclothesmen who Identified
themselves as policemen. They bodily searched him and found the pack
of cigarettes earlier given him which the policemen claimed contained
marijuana. Thereafter, the policemen brought him to the Southern
Police District Station (pp. 23-26 tan, May 20, 1986).
While Nagao was at the police station, accused-appellant Tagahiro
Nakajima alias Yamada arrived. Later, Sato Toshio alias Maida Tomio
also arrived. Both acted as interpreters for him. One of them inform him
that if he is found guilty of possession of marijuana, he can sentenced
from six (6) to twelve (12) years imprisonment. The two (2) then
suggested that Nagao give money to the policemen who, they claim,
demanded U.S. $100,000.00 for his release. Nagao agreed. Thereafter,
Toshio and Nakajima informed him that they had advanced the payment
of the bribe money to the policemen who, accordingly, agreed to release
him (pp. 36-41, tsn, May 20, 1986).
Thereafter, Nagao returned to his hotel escorted by the appellants and
a policeman. While there, his escorts did not allow him to leave the
hotel. They also demanded that he immediately call up his parents in
Japan for the money they allegedly advanced. Instead of calling up his
parents, he called up a friend and told him of his predicament. The three
escorts stayed with him in the hotel up to 10:00 o'clock the following
morning. Thereafter, they checked out and transferred to the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Appellants again ordered Nagao to call
up his parents. Later, appellants transferred Nagao to the Philippine
Village Hotel where they again asked him to call up his father in Japan
about the money. Nagao's father refused to pay the amount demanded
but when Sato talked to him over the phone, he agreed to pay three
million yen (pp. 17-31, tsn, May 21, 1986).
From the Philippine Village Hotel, Nagao was brought by the appellants
to the Virra Condominium in Makati. When he called up his father upon
orders of the appellants, he learned that his father had already remitted
money to the Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) in
Makati. Forthwith, appellants brought Nagao to RCBC where he
withdrew U.S. $1,850.00 and gave it to them. Upon leaving the bank,
they were met by policemen from the Western Police District whose help
had been earlier sought on May 8, 1986 by the Japanese Embassy in
Manila. Appellants and Nagao were brought to the Western Police
District for investigation (pp. 38-40, tsn, May 19, 1986).
Appellants were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. ... 7
Upon the other hand, the version of the accused-appellants, as testified
to by them, is summarized by the trial court as follows:
The version given by the defense in exculpation of the accused is as
follows:
On May 2, 1986, the accused NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO alias YAMADA
TAKAO met for the first time Tatsumi Nagao at the Southern Police
District headquarters in Manila. Tatzumi had been arrested by the police
earlier for possessing marijuana cigarettes and since he could not speak
English very well he was contacted to act as Nagao's interpreter. Nagao
intimated to him that he (Nagao) wanted to settle the case and offered
money to the police. The accused MAIDA TOMIO alias SATO TOSHIO
later came and together they requested the police to release Nagao
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
because according to him the marijuana was not his but belonged to
somebody who gave it to him. Nagao told the accused that he offered
to pay the amount of US $100,000 to the police which he said he would
borrow them from a friend. Yamada told Nagao that the amount was
too much and suggested that he (Nagao) should call his father in Japan
to send the money here. Nagao was ultimately released by the police
for some reason not known to Yamada and he went back to his hotel at
Holiday Inn together with the accused YAMADA and SATO.
At the hotel Nagao called up his friend in Japan with the help of YAMADA
who placed the call since Nagao cannot speak English. YAMADA did not
have occasion to talk to Nagao's friend over the phone. After 30 minutes,
another call was made by Nagao to Japan. That night of May 2 both
accused slept with Nagao in the latter's room at Holiday Inn due to
Nagao's request not to leave him inside the hotel.
The following day, May 3, Nagao did not know where to go so the
accused suggested they look for the cheapest hotel or one where they
could stay on credit. The accused MAIDA then made arrangements with
a travel agency and, after checking in at the Intercontinental Hotel, they
checked out at Holiday Inn and transferred to the Intercontinental Hotel
where they stayed up to May 7. At this hotel, Nagao made many phone
calls to Japan the accused YAMADA always placing the calls for Nagao.
During their stay at the hotel the accused and Nagao went on foot to
see a movie at the Quad Theater and to eat at a Japanese restaurant.
They also went to Maalicaya Sauna Bath in Quezon City about four times
around 10:00 to 11:00 in the evening where Nagao was left alone in
one of the rooms with his massage girl attendant. On some of those
occasions Nagao would finish and would wait for the accused at the
lobby. Twice Yamada brought Nagao to his house because Nagao
requested him not to leave him. On one occasion, the three of them
brought down a Filipina girl from their hotel room but only Nagao
accompanied her outside the hotel for five to fifteen minutes to see her
off and then he came back to the hotel.
Yamada denies that he and Sato were always guarding Nagao. As a
matter of fact, one time while they were at Virra Condominium the
accused went out together to meet some Japanese in Roxas Boulevard
around midnight and went back to the hotel almost 4:00 in the morning
leaving Nagao alone in the hotel room in the meantime. At Virra
Condominium they stayed for two (2) or three (3) days together in one
room with Nagao sometimes holding the key to the room. There Nagao
also would go out to buy something, eat meals and have some fun. He
even bought Nagao, who was with him, a t-shirt in Makati where there
were many people. With the help of accused Maida, Nagao made an
overseas call to Japan at Virra.
The reason they went along with Nagao to the RCBC bank on May 12
was that he did not know how to go there so they brought him to the
bank so that he could withdraw the remittance from Japan which was
intended as payment for his hotel accommodation and other expenses.
After their arrest at the bank they were brought to the WPD
headquarters about 4:30 in the afternoon where he (Yamada) was hit
by the policemen on his face, body and abdomen. He was also brought
inside a room where his hands and feet were tied with a rope and his
face covered with cloth after which water was poured on his nose and
mouth while the police were asking him questions. In fact, they started
hitting him at the bank while he was handcuffed. Besides, his watch
costing around 250,000 yen, his 100 grams 18-karat gold bracelet and
his necklace were all taken from him and his Mustang car confiscated.
His driver's license was also taken and he lost his money in the amount
of almost P3,000.00. The police did not even want to accept the name
that he gave them which was Nakajima Tagahiro but insisted on
adopting Yamada as his name. When his statement was taken he was
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not asked to seek the assistance of a lawyer. It was the investigator who
made the answers in the statement and he was not even allowed to
read it but just to sign it which he did almost 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning
already after being subjected to blows on his face. He declared that he
never demanded money from Nagao for his release.
On cross-examination Yamada admitted he is an immigrant and has
stayed in the Philippines for almost 12 years but is always going back
and forth to Japan.
TOMIO MAIDA alias Sato Toshio also met Tatsumi Nagao for the first
time on May 12, 1986 but at the coffee shop of Holiday Inn where
Tatsumi was staying. SATO had a Japanese guest who needed to change
his Philippine pesos to Japanese yen since he was going back to Japan
and it was Tatsumi whom SATO saw at the coffee shop and whom he
requested to make the currency exchange. Tatsumi was subsequently
invited by a Mr. Mitamura to SATO's table where there were many
Japanese. Sato left ahead for the airport leaving Tatsumi and Mitamura
in conversion. When SATO saw Tatsumi again it was at the Southern
Police District headquarters that same day being arrested for illegal
possession of marijuana. He talked to the policemen and requested for
an interpreter for Nagao since he cannot understand and speak English
well. He found out Nagao had promised to pay the policemen $100,000
already but he was not able to put up the amount. Anyway, he went to
the Holiday Inn and there discovered that Nagao had no more money
and they talked about the hotel accommodation and other expenses
starting the following day. Nagao tried and was able to speak over the
phone with Mr. Nagao in Japan who asked him to explain what
happened. From Holiday Inn they transferred to Intercontinental Hotel
where Nagao was able to check in without his passport as SATO brought
him an accommodation request from El Sol travel agency. While they
were at the Intercontinental Hotel there was no reason Nagao could not
leave the hotel as he was always free to leave it. They also went to
Maalicaya Sauna Bath where they each had separate rooms.
When he was arrested at the bank with his co-accused his watch, his
wallet and his money totaling around P900.00 were taken by the
policemen including his necklace and gold bracelet. They also boxed
him. During the investigation they let him lie down on the table with his
hands handcuffed and, while his face was covered with cloth, they
poured water on it. Since he was afraid of what the policemen would do
to him he just signed the statement. He did not even know the lawyer
Bienvenido de los Reyes who was supposed to assist him during the
investigation. He was not allowed to read the statement before he
signed it.
From Intercontinental Hotel they transferred to Virra condominium. He
brought Tatsumi there because he requested him to look for a cheaper
hotel.
On cross-examination SATO disclosed that the Japanese Mitamura
whom he met for the first time on May 2, 1986, informed him that a
Japanese was arrested by the police for possessing marijuana and that
when he arrived at the police headquarters he found out it was Nagao
who was the one arrested. 8
The trial court ruled that the accused-appellants were guilty as charged
because they deprived the offended party, Tatsumi Nagao, of his liberty
for the purpose of extorting ransom from him. It said:
It must be noted that during all this time, from the evening of May 2
until the arrest of the accused in the afternoon of May 12, it cannot be
denied that the accused were always with Tatsumi, singly or both of
them, at his hotel room and never losing sight of him. As a matter of
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
fact, the only instance he was ever allowed to go out on his own was at
the Intercontinental Hotel when he accompanied a girl out of the hotel
to send then the accused were likewise downstairs at the hotel that
Tatsumi thought he was only being tested by the accused whether he
would escape. Besides, we have to consider that as far as Tatsumi
Nagao was concerned he was in a foreign country with no relatives nor
close friends. He could not speak or understand any Philippine
Language. On top of this, he had no more money as this was taken from
him by the police and, worse, his passport was being held by the
accused thus destroying any hope of escape from them. Even if he did
escape, where would he go without any money or passport and how
would he be able to communicate with people since he could not speak
English or tagalog? Moreover, what was foremost in his mind was that
he was merely on a temporary leash (sic) from the police who were
poised arrest him anytime he reneged on his alleged promise to pay.
This would mean at least six years imprisonment not to mention
ignominy he would cause on his person and the consequent scandal
since he is a Buddhist priest. During all this time that he was with
accused he knew that the only way he could prevent any further
restraint on his person was to pay the accused from the remittance of
his father in Japan. That is why, even the accused were not armed and
did not physically restrain his movements, all these circumstances taken
together created in Tatsumi Nagao such fear which actually restrained
him from doing what he freely wanted to do and resulted in a deprivation
of his liberty. In other words, while there was no money to give to the
accused he was stuck with them.
The Court does not believe the allegation of the accused that they were
not demanding any money from Tatsumi Nagao for why would they,
who only came to know Tatsumi Nagao on May 2, stick to him like a
leech that date until they were arrested on May 12? It could not have
been being simply charitable since it would have been more logical to
take Nagao temporarily into their homes to avoid more expenses if their
intention was really only to help their fellow countryman.
What was then the purpose in demanding for the money? The accused
suggest that it was for the purpose of reimbursing them for the expenses
they had incurred in accommodating Tatsumi Nagao in the hotels and
other places. Even if the purpose of the deprivation of Liberty of Tatsumi
Nagao alleged by the defense be accepted — that is, to compel payment
for the expenses incurred by the accused — under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1084, the offense
is still kidnapping for ransom. Under American rulings, "ransom" has
been held to mean in its ordinary sense as "money," price or
reconsideration paid or demanded by for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity' (See 75 C.J.
458; 36 Words and Phrases, 102; Keith vs. State, 163, So. 136 120 Fla.
487). Since the accused in this case demanded and received money as
a requisite for releasing Tatsumi Nagao from their hold, whatever other
motive may have impelled them to do so, the money is still "ransom"
under the law. 9
On 22 July 1986, Atty. Arroyo filed with this Court his Withdrawal of
Appearance as counsel for the appellant Maida Tomio. 10 the law firm
of Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario and Castillo then entered its appearance
for the latter.
On 18 August 1986, before they could file their Brief, appellants, through
another lawyer, Atty. Dominador R. Sta. Maria, Jr., filed with this Court
a petition for habeas corpus, 11 which was docketed as G.R. No. 75576.
They allege therein that the decision of the court below in Criminal Case
No. 86-46055, subject of G.R. No. 74630, is "void and illegal" because,
among other things, before being investigated, they were tortured,
threatened and deprived of their constitutional rights to due process and
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equal protection of the laws; moreover, aside from the fact that no
preliminary investigation was conducted, the complainant's father
influenced the Judge directly making the latter's decision "partial, bias
(sic) and prejudiced," and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
offense charged as it was committed at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City, not in Manila. In the resolution of 19 August
1986, 12 the Court noted that the questions raised in the petition are
also the subject of the appeal in G.R. No. 74630; consequently, the
former is but a duplication of the latter which is awaiting the filing of
briefs. However, without giving due course to said petition, it required
respondents to comment thereon.
In the meantime, specifically on 29 August 1986, appellant Tagahiro
Nakajima filed his Brief in G.R. No. 74630 13 wherein he ascribes to the
trial court the commission of the following errors:
I... IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING;
II... IN FINDING THAT FROM THE EVENING OF MAY 2 TO MAY 12, THE
ACCUSED WAS ALWAYS WITH NAGAO;
III... IN CONCLUDING THAT ESCAPE FOR TATSUMI NAGAO WAS
IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE HE IS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY WITH NO CLOSE
RELATIVES AND FRIENDS, BECAUSE HE COULD NOT EVEN SPEAK OR
UNDERSTAND ENGLISH WELL OR UNDERSTAND ANY PHILIPPINE
LANGUAGE, AND BECAUSE HE HAD NO MONEY AND PASSPORT, WITH
NOWHERE TO GO;
IV... IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HELD THE PASSPORT OF
TATSUMI NAGAO;
V... IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE LOGICAL IF
THEY TOOK NAGAO TO THEIR OWN HOUSES;
VI... IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED DEMANDED FOR RANSOM:
and
VII... IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED DEMANDED RECEIVED MONEY
AS PREREQUISITE FOR RELEASING NAGAO.
By way of an additional assigned error, which is unnumbered, but which
he claims to invoke for the first time, he alleges the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the crime charged because it was not committed in
Manila; if it were committed the Holiday Inn Hotel, which is not located
in Manila but Pasay City, it is the proper court of the latter city which
has jurisdiction over it.
Upon the other hand, appellant Tomio Maeda, through counsel, filed his
Brief 14on 18 October 1986. He contends that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS HURRIED AND RAILROADED
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE OF THE ACCUSED TOMIO MAEDA AND
TAGAHIRO NAKAJIMA WHOSE RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL PUBLIC TRIAL WERE DENIED.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE
POSITIVE AND CATEGORICAL TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED
TOMIO MAEDA AND TAGAHIRO NAKAJIMATHEY DID NOT KIDNAP
OR DETAIN COMPLAINANT NAGAO NOR DID THEY DEMAND
MONEY FOR HIS RELEASE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS
OF KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM WERE PRESENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION WERE GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSE TOMIO
MAEDA AND TAGAHIRO NAKAJIMA ON THE GROUND THAT THEIR
GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On 27 November 1986, the Plaintiff-Appellee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a motion for leave to file a consolidated Appellee's
Brief, 15 which the court granted in the resolution of 2 December 1986.
16
Then, on 4 December 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Comment for the respondents in G.R. No. 75578 17 asserting therein
that considering that petitioners (accused-appellants) perfected their
appeal from the challenged decision, they cannot avail of the writ of
habeas corpus since the main purpose of the latter is to determine
whether or not a petitioner is legally detained. 18 The issues then in the
petition should threshed out in the appeal.
In the resolution of 29 January 1987, 19 We dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that, per Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court, where the commitment is pursuant to a judgment of
conviction, the writ of habeas corpus will not lie. We further said:
In the present case, the petitioners have been found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping with ransom. They were accordingly
sentenced and are now suffering imprisonment by virtue thereof.
Dismissal of the petition is thus warranted, for their assertion that they
are being illegally deprived of freedom is without support in law.
Moreover, considering that the substance of the issues under
consideration is closely interrelated or shows a "parallelism" to the errors
allegedly incurred by the trial court and assigned by petitioners in their
briefs filed in G.R. No. 74630, the Court agrees with the submission of
the Solicitor General that the matters in controversy should be resolved
in G.R. No. 74630. This is in conformity with the settled rule that "when
a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the
accused, its judgment, order or decree is valid and is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus, for this cannot be made to perform
the function of a writ of error, and this holds true even if the judgment,
order or decree was erroneous." (Sotto vs. Director of Prisons, 5 SCRA
293, citing Vda. de Talavera vs. Superintendent and Warden of the
Correcional (sic) Institution, 67 Phil. 538).
Unsatisfied with the said Resolution, petitioners filed on 17 March 1987
a motion for its reconsideration, 20 focusing on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, which a Comment was filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General on 10 April 1987. 21 Thereafter,
petitioners filed a reply the comment. 22
This motion remains unresolved.
On 14 April 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General filed Appellee's Brief
in G.R. No. 74630 wherein it prays that this Court affirm the judgment
of conviction but reduce the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to
the new Constitution. 23
The assigned errors of both appellants in G.R. No. 74630 boil down to
the following issues:
1) Jurisdiction, which, as admitted by appellant Nakajima, is
raised for the first time;
2) Denial of due process, as raised by appellant Tomio Maeda;
and
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3) Sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution prove the
crime charged.
I. There is no merit in the claim of lack of jurisdiction. From totality of
the evidence presented by both parties, the conclusion is inescapable
that during the period from 2 to 12 May 1986, the complainant was
brought to or taken from different places by the appellants. More
specifically, on 2 May 1986, the day when they made their initial, but
crucial move on the target, the complainant (hereinafter referred to as
Mr. Nagao), appellants, through the overt act of accused Tomio Maeda
alias Sato Toshio and another Japanese, brought complainant "some
other places in Manila" 24 after they succeeded in getting his trust and
confidence, following a conversation over lunch in a coffee shop at
Holiday Inn Hotel.
The essential ingredients of the crime charged were thus committed in
various places.
The case can, therefore, be filed with the appropriate court in any of the
places where the complainant was brought to by appellants in the
pursuit of or in connection with the crime charged. Section 15 of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides that subject to existing laws, in all
criminal prosecutions, action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. 25
Moreover, in the proceedings below, there was not even the slightest
suggestion from the appellants to express their doubts as to the
jurisdiction of the court over the case. They did not present any evidence
to show that all of the acts involved in or related to the offense charged
took place outside Manila. On the contrary, from their arraignment until
the promulgation of the decision, they unequivocally recognized and
then yielded to the trial court's jurisdiction over their persons and the
offense charged. They voluntarily expressed their readiness to be
arraigned, 26 as in fact they were, abandoning in effect their urgent
motion for reinvestigation. They took very active part in the trial by
extensively and exhaustively cross-examining the witnesses for the
prosecution, testifying for themselves in the most detailed manner as
possible to conform with the strategy of their counsel, and allowing
themselves to be cross-examined by the prosecuting fiscal. There can
be no doubt that such active participation was motivated by one desire
and was riveted to one goal: a judgment of acquittal on the merits,
which necessarily carried with it an unqualified invocation of the
jurisdiction and authority of the court. Settled is the rule that a party
who voluntarily submitted his cause before a trial court, actively
participated in the hearings therein, or invoked its jurisdiction, may not
be heard to question its jurisdiction. 27 It would be placing a premium
on bad faith and yielding to attempts to make a mockery of the judicial
process if a party would be permitted to question the very power and
authority which he invokes for his own benefit or advantage once he
fails to obtain it.
II. Anent the denial of due process, the main grievance of appellant
Tomio Maeda focuses on the alleged "railroaded disposition of the case."
The filing of the case pursuant to General Order No. 39, which mandates
that it should be disposed of within twenty-four (24) hours after filing
by the arresting officer, is inconsistent with the need to make a thorough
review assessment of the facts, considering the gravity of the imposable
penalty. He further claims that they were tortured and forced to sign
statements in the absence of their lawyer, and that the trial on the
merits was an example of "justice in haste, justice denied."
We are not impressed by the plea.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
In the first place, the statements they made during custodial
interrogation were not taken into account against them. On the contrary,
the trial court rejected such statements in toto and deplored the failure
of the police to comply with the procedure prescribed by this Court in
making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. Said the
trial court:
At the outset, it may not be amiss to immediately point out in the case
of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 638, and reiterated in the more
recent case of People vs. Galit, G.R. No. 51770, March 20, 1985, 28 the
Honorable Supreme Court laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting custodial
investigation, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be use against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by most expedient means — by telephone if possible
— or by letter messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition of either the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The Court notes in this case that there was not even an attempt on the
part of the police investigators to allow or give a chance to the accused
to be assisted by a counsel of their own choice during the custodial
investigation. When, indeed a lawyer was provided the accused he
turned out to be, after all, a team member of the same police force
investigating the accused. When the accused finally signed their
respective statements it was already in the early morning of the
following day when the said lawyer who was supposed to assist them
was no longer around. Even the waiver of the accused Yamada of his
right to counsel has not been shown to have been assisted by counsel.
The Court therefore doubts the voluntariness of the statements of the
accused (Exhs. "C" and "K"). Hence, the same must be rejected in toto.
In the second place, while it may be true that the trial lasted only for a
few days and the decision was promulgated on the twelfth day after the
filing of the information, there is nothing on record that may cast any
doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the judge or on the fairness
of his decision which, as We observe, manifests a careful and thorough
analysis of the evidence. Appellants made no protest in the court below
as to the manner the trial was conducted. After they completed their
testimonies and offered their Exhibit "1," their counsel announced that
"we are respectfully submitting our case for decision of this Honorable
Court." 29 They did not even ask for time to submit a memorandum to
aid the court in appreciating the evidence, if indeed the facts and the
issues were complicated. They cannot now be heard to complain that it
hastily decided the case, or that it did not make a thorough review and
assessment of the evidence.
In the third place, all the requisites of due process are present in this
case, to wit: (a) a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (b) jurisdiction lawfully acquired by
it over the person of the appellants and over the offense; (c) the
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appellants were given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) judgment
was rendered upon lawful hearing. 30
In People vs. Castillo, et al., 31 We ruled that if an accused been
proceeded against under an orderly process of law, and only punished
after inquiry or investigation upon notice to him, with opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment rendered within the authority of the
constitutional law, then he has had due process. In the instant case, as
stated in the discussion above on jurisdiction, the accused-appellants
actively participated in hearing of the case before the trial court and had
full an unhampered opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution and to present their own evidence.
That General Order No. 39 directs civil courts to dispose the case within
twenty-four (24) hours after its filing by the arresting officer, considering
that the offended party is a tourist, does not detract from the above
conclusion that appellants we not deprived of due process. The
requirement, which is merely directory, is not wanting in reason or
purpose. The stay of tourists in the country is limited in duration.
Tourism is a major dollar-earning industry which the Government has
been to promote. Corollarily, it must have to adopt policies to attract
tourists and to insure their safety and security while they are in the
country. Special laws bearing upon procedure, with the end in view of
expediting the hearings and disposition of criminal cases where tourists
are the offended parties, may be validly enacted provided that there is
substantial compliance procedural due process and non-impairment of
substantive due process.
III. The third issue requires a determination as to whether or the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
the offense charged. Appellants contend that it has not, for Mr. Nagao
was not restrained of his liberty; he was free and could have easily
escaped. As to the ransom, appellant Tagahiro Nakajima asserts that:
The money remitted by Nagao's fatter was for the payment of his son's
hotel bills, and not for ransom purposes (p. 96, tsn., May 21, 1986).
Further Nagao's father testified that "That reason why I remitted this
money because I want to know whether my son can get this money and
to know the whereabout of my son, sir."(p. 107, tan., May 21, 1986).
32
However, appellant Tomio Maeda has a different version. According to
him, it was in payment of the sum which they advanced to the police
for and in behalf of Mr. Nagao to secure the latter's release, and the
amount spent for hotel accommodations and additional expenses they
incurred in his behalf. Otherwise stated:
... a simple contract of loan existed between complainant and the
accused whereby the complainant incurred a legal as well as moral
obligation to pay for the expenses advanced by the 2 accused in his
favor. This is another reason why complainant stayed in the company of
the accused. In the words of the complainant himself, he deemed it "an
obligation upon himself to pay for the expenses" advanced by the 2
accused in accommodating him (tsn, May 21, 1986, p. 24-25). Thus,
there was no force or compulsion in exacting payment from the accused.
There was no demand, as there was no need for it. The complainant
knew that he had an obligation and that he had to comply with it. The
money to be paid was rightfully due to the 2 accused. It was nothing
more than a payment for a debt in money. 33
The trial court found otherwise. Its findings were based on its
appreciation of the evidence for the parties which, in turn, revolved upon
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
the credibility of the witnesses. It is well-settled that the conclusion of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight
and respect; and, unless there are substantial facts and circumstances
that have been overlooked, which if considered might effect the result
of the case, such findings are generally not disturbed on appeal. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to observe the
deportment and demeanor of witnesses to determine the veracity of
their answers; 34 it has the inestimable advantage of observing the
detailed demeanor of the witnesses. 35
We find no reason to depart from this rule. A painstaking review of the
evidence in this case clearly discloses the correctness of such findings.
The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that appellants, together with their co-conspirators, had an
elaborate and carefully designed plan to kidnap Mr. Nagao in order to
obtain ransom from him. The plan was effectively carried out at
lunchtime on 2 May 1986 at the coffee shop in Holiday Inn Hotel when
appellant Tomio Maeda alia Sato Toshio approached Mr. Nagao to find
out if the latter had Japanese yen to be converted to Philippine pesos
because a friend was to leave for Japan and needed the yen; Tomio
succeeded in having P1,100.00 exchanged for 10,000.00 yen belonging
to Mr. Nagao. Then, another Japanese companion of Tomio, one Mr.
Mitamura, invited complainant to join them at their table. Tomio left
them and proceeded to the airport to send off his friend who was to
depart for Japan. 36 By his addition admissions on cross-examination,
he clearly revealed, though rather unwittingly, how the plot would be
pursued with the assistance of law enforcement authorities. As early as
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, Mr. Mitamura called Tomio by
telephone to inform him that a Japanese was arrested for having
marijuana in his possession, although the name of the latter was not
mentioned. Without even being informed as to where the arrested party
was brought, Tomio proceeded to the Southern Police District and, upon
arriving there at 4:00 o'clock, merely informed the police that a
Japanese has marijuana in his possession. He could not, however,
mention the name of said Japanese. 37
It should be stressed that at that time, Mr. Nagao had not yet been
"arrested" by five (5) policemen of the Southern Police District for
possession of a pack of cigarettes allegedly containing marijuana. He
was arrested after seven o'clock that evening following a dinner at Leo's
Restaurant.
This visit then of Tomio to the Southern Police District must have had
something to do with a conspiratorial arrangement with some personnel
of said office, more specifically the five policemen who, at past 7:00
o'clock that evening, pounced on Mr. Nagao and "arrested" him for
alleged possession of marijuana.
From the Southern Police District, Tomio called Mitamura, who was in
the complainant's room at Holiday Inn Hotel; Mitamura told him that
they were to take their dinner at Leo's Restaurant. They did in fact have
dinner at Leo's Restaurant, 38 although on direct examination, he said
that after the meeting at lunchtime, he saw complainant again only at
the Southern Police District. 39
At Leo's Restaurant, Tomio claims: a ... Later on we saw one Japanese
holding marijuana inside the restaurant and then Mr. Mitamura
requested to call or contact the police in order that this Japanese who
was in possession of marijuana be arrested.
q So you were informed by Mitamura to contact the southern police
district (sic) that there was this two (sic) Japanese inside the Leo's
restaurant who was in possession marijuana cigarette (sic)?
Jaica
a Yes, sir.
q These two Japanese were left at Leo's restaurant and one Japanese
was in possession of marijuana cigarettes?
a Yes, sir.
q And did this police officer arrested (sic) these (sic) Japanese who is
(sic) in possession of marijuana?
a Yes, sir.
q And who made this plan?
a What plan, sir?
q About you and the southern police. At about 7:00 o'clock were (sic)
this Japanese holding marijuana was arrested?
a That was not a plan, sir. I got only the information fro Mr. Mitamura
that some Japanese were in possession of marijuana.
q You just gather (sic) this information from Mr. Mitamura but you
really inform,(sic) the police?
a Yes, sir.
q So that is the plan of Mr. Mitamura?
a I think so, sir. 40
Other than Mr. Nagao, no other Japanese was "arrested" for alleged
possession of marijuana at Leo's restaurant in the evening of 2 May
1986, after a pack of cigarettes was place inside his left shirt pocket by,
according to him, a Japanese.
After complainant was "arrested" by the five policemen from the
Southern Police District and brought to the headquarters, Tomio showed
up, talked to Mr. Nagao and the policemen an recommended the
assistance of an interpreter since, according to him, Mr. Nagao cannot
understand and speak English well. 41 The interpreter he had in mind
was his co-accused Tagahiro Nakajima, who he forthwith called; the
latter lost no time in coming to the Southern Police District to act as Mr.
Nagao's interpreter. 42 Mr. Nakajima offered additional information not
disclosed earlier, i.e., the policemen "found" in the possession of
complainant, not just one pack of cigarettes containing 15 stick of
marijuana, but a smuggling belt. 43
At the Southern Police District, appellants informed Mr. Nagao that if
found guilty of possession of marijuana he can be sentenced anywhere
from 6 to 12 years of imprisonment. The two then proposed that he
should give money to the policemen, who, they claimed, demanded
U.S.$100,000.00. They informed him that if he will not give the money,
his name and his case would be published in the newspapers because,
at that time, there were some newspaper reporters outside. Mr. Nagao,
however, did not have the money; he proposed to contact his parents.
However, after they talked to the police in another room, they informed
him that they had advanced the payment to the police who thereafter
released him. The appellants and a policeman then brought him to his
room at the Holiday Inn Hotel. 44
The foregoing scenarios were part of the script. With the obvious
connivance of the police, they put the pressure on the complainant by
demanding, allegedly for and in consideration of his release, the amount
aforestated. Under the circumstances, with the threat of adverse
publicity and imprisonment, it was easy to work on him. To show that
they commiserated with him, they made it appear that they advanced
the money to the police. We are, however, convinced that the accused-
appellants never advanced the money. That is why they stuck to the
complainant like "a leech," as vividly described by the trial court, after
he was eventually "released" by the police. There is no doubt in Our
mind that during the period from 3 May 1986 until the accused-
appellants were arrested on 12 May 1986, complainant was moved from
one hotel to another by the appellants, effectively depriving him of his
liberty. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, while it may be
conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did not
have the freedom to leave the hotel premises at will and go wherever
he pleased." 45 To keep him within their control, appellant Tagahiro
Nakajima, who is a businessman and a resident of 101 Peter's Street,
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila, had to abandon his business and
his family to be with Mr. Nagao. Thus, as he admitted upon question by
the court, he was, from 3 to 12 May 1986, with the complainant at
Holiday Inn Hotel, Intercontinental Hotel, Philippine Village Hotel and
Virra Condominium. He slept there, not in his residence. 46 The suite
(73) which they occupied Virra Condominium is owned by his co-accused
Tomio Maeda. 47
Moreover, appellants never refuted the testimony of Nagao made during
cross-examination, that at the hotel they told him that if he did not pay
them the amount demanded the policemen, plus the hotel bills and other
expenses, would do something to him; they kept on telling him that if
he did not pay them, the policemen would arrest him. 48
We are not persuaded by the theory of the appellants that money
involved was not ransom money, but rather payment of hotel bills (as
claimed by Tagahiro Nakajima) or for reimbursement of the sum they
advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel accommodations and
additional expenses spent for complainant (as claimed by Tomio
Maeda). In the first place, none of them claimed that either or both of
them advanced the money to the police. As a matter of fact, Tagahiro
Nakajima testified that he saw the complainant counting the money:
q Awhile (sic) ago you stated that he even offered money the
police?
a Yes, sir.
q How much?
a When I was reaching (sic) to them, they are (sic) writing
papers, after that I think he was counting dollar and he told us one
hundred thousand US dollar, but suring (sic) that time I was doubtful
how come that big amount he cannot pay the (sic) amount of (sic)
One Hundred Thousand US dollar (sic).
q Now, after that, what happened next?
a After that he told me that he will just borrow from his friend
One Hundred Thousand US dollar. I told him that is impossible and
that is too much, and I also told him better talk to your father to send
money then after that he called up to Japan (sic).
q Now, was he released by the police?
a Yes, sir. 49
Upon the other hand, as far as could be gathered from the testimony
of Mr. Tomio Maeda on direct examination, the money given to the
police did not also come from him. Thus:
q Did you know as to how much money did he promised (sic)
to the police?
a Yes, sir.
q How much?
a One Hundred Thousand US. Dollar (sic) ($100,000.00), sir.
q And do you know if he was able to put up that amount to
the police?
a No, sir.
q Now, from the headquarter (sic), where did you go?
a At Holiday Inn Hotel, sir.
q And upon reaching Holiday Inn Hotel, what happened or
what did you do?
a Mr. Nagao don't (sic) have any money anymore so we are
talking (sic) about hotel accommodation and other expenses starting
the next day and he is (sic) also trying to contact his friend, sir. 50
What then was the money they advanced to the police? Nothing.
However, they succeeded in making it appear to Mr. Nagao, after they
came out of the room at the Southern Police District, that they advanced
the amount to the police, for which reason he was released. This was
part of the stratagem to give a semblance of legality to the demand for
ransom.
Now then, if indeed the appellants only wanted reimbursement for the
money "paid" to the police, and that they were merely motivated by a
desire to help a fellow Japanese in distress, why did they have to bring
Jaica
him from one expensive hotel to the other, thereby incurring more
expenses? Why did they not bring him to their homes, as the trial court
asked, if only to show their genuine concern for him?
Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created
a simple loan contract between appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted
by appellant Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of the former's liberty until
the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or
illegal detention for ransom. In People vs. Akiran, et al., 51 this Court,
through Justice J.P. Bengzon, ruled that even if the kidnapping were to
compel the victim to fulfill his promise of defraying the hospital expenses
of a brother of one of the accused, there is still kidnapping for ransom,
since if that were indeed the purpose, the accused need not kidnap the
victim. Elaborating thereon, the Court stated that the last paragraph of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1084,
which took effect on 15 June 1954, which increases the penalty for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention if it is committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances mentioned in said Article were present in the
commission of the offense is:
... derived from statutes of the United States, particularly the Lindbergh
Law. Thus, American jurisprudence thereon has persuasive application.
"Ransom" under American rulings, as used in statutes making
kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom a capital offense, has been
held to mean in its ordinary sense as "money, price, or consideration
paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity." 52 Since the accused in this case
demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a person
from captivity, whatever other motive may have impelled them to do so,
the money is still ransom under the law. 53
The doctrine in the Akiran case is applicable here.
Thus, even if the theory of Tomio is correct, it was not necessary for
him and his co-accused Nakajima to deprive the complainant of his
liberty to compel him to pay the alleged loan.
We thus hold that upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the
guilt of the accused for the crime charged was proven beyond
reasonable doubt and the trial court committed no error in convicting
them accordingly. In view, however, of Section 19(1) of Article III of the
1987 Constitution which abolishes the death penalty and provides that
any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, the penalty imposed by the trial court is deemed reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
In the light of the foregoing, the motion of appellants dated 16 March
1987 to reconsider Our resolution of 29 January 1987 in G.R. No. 75576
must also be Denied for lack of merit.
This should not, however, end the story of Mr. Nagao. As adverted to
earlier, other parties, namely, Mr. Mitamura, a Japanese national, and
the five policemen from the Southern Police District, could be deeply
involved in the conspiracy to kidnap him for ransom. Our examination
of the records fails to show that Mr. Mitamura and the policemen were
investigated or prosecuted in connection with this case. This Court
would be remiss in its duty if it were to close its eyes on this matter,
more specifically on the alleged involvement of the policemen.
Policemen are supposed to enforce the law, protect the people, and
maintain peace and order. At the people's expense, they don the
uniform of authority and are allowed to carry the instruments of legal
violence. As such, they are bound to faithfully adhere to the
Constitutional directive to be at all times accountable to the people,
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
54 When they fail in that sacred duty and become the lawbreakers, they
have no business staying a minute longer in their offices and wearing
their uniforms. They deserve nothing but the severest criminal and
administrative penalties the law provides. The people's taxes should
never be used to maintain and support scalawags in our law
enforcement agencies who may use their uniforms and their lawfully
issued weapons as convenient shields or instruments for the
perpetration of their evil deeds. Accordingly, We direct the Philippine
National Police to conduct a thorough investigation, if none has been
done so far, into the involvement of the five policemen of the Southern
Police District and, should the evidence warrant, file the appropriate
criminal and administrative cases against them. As regards Mr.
Mitamura, if he is still in the Philippines, efforts must be exerted by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, in coordination with the
National Bureau of Investigation, to have him investigated and
prosecuted, should the evidence warrant. No alien should be allowed to
abuse Philippine hospitality and make our country a happy hunting
ground for his criminal activities.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In G.R. No. 74630, AFFIRMING, subject to the above provision
of Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the decision of
the trial court in Criminal Case No. 86-45055, and
2. In G.R. No. 75576, DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to
reconsider the resolution of 20 January 1987.
Costs against appellants. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS LIM
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Branch 46, the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Carmen
Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing
her to reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 22)
The information filed against the accused and John Doe reads:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about July 1, 1986, in the afternoon thereof, at Zurbito Street,
Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused who are private persons
conspired and mutually helped each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Aida and Avelyn both minors and
surnamed Villanueva; separating them from their parental care; Aida
Villanueva was detained for about twenty (20) days in the house of
Carmen Lim alias "Mameng" while Avelyn Villanueva was detained and
brought to Cebu City by the co-accused thereby depriving the two, Aida
and Avelyn of their personal liberties. (Records, p.1)
The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is summarized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That in the morning of July 1, 1986, Aida Villanueva and her younger
sister Avelyn Villanueva, 10 and 7 years old, respectively, were sent on
an errand by their father Charlito (should be Charito) Villanueva to buy
Jaica
rice in Masbate, Masbate. The Villanuevas lived in Mobo, a neighboring
town of the capital of the province. Upon their arrival at the poblacion
of the capital town of Masbate at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning,
Aida and Avelyn went to the pier, staying there up to 12:00 noon, to
meet their mother whom they thought would arrive by boat from Manila.
They left the pier when their mother did not arrive and went to Helen
Theatre on Zurbito Street, Masbate, Masbate, to see a picture.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day while they were
in front of the Helen Theatre, they were called by the accused Carmen
Lim, in a loud voice. "Come here Nene" and asked them to go to her
house just infront of the moviehouse. Aida and Avelyn went to the house
of the accused and got inside passing through the front door.
After a brief conversation with the two children, the accused gave Aida
and Avelyn rice and kangkong for lunch. After they had finished eating,
Aida was told by the accused to take a bath. The accused gave Aida a
dress to wear.
From July 1, 1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was detained in the
house of the accused doing household chores such as cleaning the
kitchen, scrubbing the floor, washing the plates including removing lice
from the head of the accused and fanning her. Avelyn, the younger
sister of Aida, was brought by Carmen's mother (should be sister) in
Cebu on the same day they arrived in the house of the accused.
On July 15, 1986, Charito Villanueva, father of the two minor children,
found his daughter Aida in the house of the accused. He asked the
accused to let Aida go home with him, but the accused refused.
Charito came back to the house of the accused the following day, July
16, 1986, accompanied this time by Sgt. Antonio Ariate of the 266th PC
Company at Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate, Masbate, who had with him
an armalite. After Identifying himself to the accused, the soldier told the
accused that he was taking Aida with him.
Without resistance but uttering slanderous remarks, the accused
released Aida to Sgt. Ariate. Charito Villanueva and his daughter Aida
were brought by Sgt. Ariate to the 266th PC Company Headquarters
where the complaint of Charito was recorded in the blotter by CIC
Vincent Elliot Vasquez of the I & I Section. (Rollo, p. 12)
The appellant's version, on the other hand, is summarized in her brief
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
On or about 1:30 in the afternoon of I July 1986, the sisters went to
Helen Theater, located along Zurbito St., Masbate, Masbate, to look at
the pictures displayed outside. Helen Theater is located across the store
and residence of the appellant.
The sisters then proceeded to appellant's store which she was tending
at that time. Appellant noticed the sisters and caged them over. She
inquired from the sisters as to the whereabouts of their parents as they
were apparently alone. The sisters replied that their parents had
separated and that their mother had gone to Manila, and that their
father was in Buenavista, Uson, Masbate. The sisters claimed that they
were driven away by their father and that they were not given any food
to eat.
Taking pity on the sisters, appellant gave the sisters food and allowed
them to take a bath. Concerned for their safety, appellant offered to
shelter the sisters. As the younger sister of appellant was at that time
visiting appellant, appellant proposed to Aida to let Avelyn accompany
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
appellant's sister to the latter's home. Aida agreed, on condition that she
and Avelyn could meet every week.
Aida stayed in appellant's residence for about two (2) weeks. To help in
the house, Aida would go to the market to buy bread, fish and salt for
appellant's household. Aida also helped watch over appellant's store
from time to time.
On or about 9:00 a.m. of 15 July 1986, Charito Villanueva, the
complainant and father of the sisters, went to appellant's store. Charito
introduced himself to appellant as the father of the two sisters and
informed appellant that he was going to bring the sisters home. Charito
talked to Aida and asked her to go home with him. Aida, however,
refused to go with her father. As a result, Charito left. When asked by
appellant why she refused to go with her father, Aida replied that she
was afraid that her father would beat her up.
On 16 July 1986, Charito returned to appellant's store, this time
accompanied by Sgt. Antonio Ariate, Jr. of the Philippine Constabulary,
Sgt. Ariate introduced himself to appellant. Charito again talked to Aida
to convince her to go home with him. This time, Aida agreed to go home
with her father. (Rollo, pp. 44-46)
The appellant raises the following assignment of errors in her appeal, to
wit:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST
THE APPELLANT DESPITE THE DESISTANCE OF THE COMPLAINANT
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES' TESTIMONY WHICH WERE REPLETE WITH
INCONSISTENCIES AND CONTRADICTIONS
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT AIDA VILLANUEVA WAS NOT DETAINED BY
THE APPELLANT
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT APPELLANT HAD NO MOTIVE TO DETAIN
AIDA AND AVELYN VILLANUEVA (Rollo, pp. 47-48)
The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before
the accused may be convicted of any crime, his guilt must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are substantial facts which were
overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the results of the case
in favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully taken into
account by the reviewing tribunal. (People v. Torre, G.R. No. L-44905,
April 25, 1990)
In the case at bar, after a careful review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, we find the same to be insufficient to sustain a conviction.
The uncorroborated testimony of the alleged kidnapped victim, Aida
Villanueva, which was mainly relied upon by the trial court in convicting
the appellant, was not clear and convincing enough to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered
the appellant's residence through the front entrance. The fact of
detention which is an essential element in the crime charged, was not
clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual
confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. (See
People v. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501, 506 [1984]; US v. Cabanas, 8 Phil.
64, 67 [1907]). The appellant's residence has a store fronting the street
where many customers presumably come and go. The place is busy with
a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was locked up,
Jaica
physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with
anyone.
There are other circumstances which create grave doubts in Aida's
version of her two week detention. In her testimony, Aida claimed that
she attempted to escape three times but she was not able to do so.
(TSN, July 21, 1987, p. 34). Just how she tried to escape or why she did
not succeed is not explained clearly. When Aida saw her father for the
first time on July 15, 1986, she inexplicably did not shout for help or run
to him but just observed him and the appellant talk for half an hour.
(TSN, July 21, 1987, p. 23) The Solicitor General counters the appellant's
claim stating that Aida did ask for help from her father when the latter
was about to leave, but the appellant pushed her and refused to let her
go with her father. (TSN, July 21, 1987, pp. 25-26).
The actuations of both Aida and her father are highly incredible. They
are not the natural reactions of a ten-year old child who has been
detained against her will for two weeks and who has tried unsuccessfully
to escape three times.
The fact that her father was already there was the perfect opportunity
for Aida to try and get away from the appellant. She could have clung
to him from the moment he came in instead of quietly observing him
and the appellant talk for some time. Aida did not go with her father
because the appellant allegedly told her not to go. For someone who
had been detained against her will, as between her father and her
detainor, Aida would have disregarded the appellant's order and would
have run to her father. Neither is it believable that a father who has
been desperately looking for his two minor daughters for two weeks
would just calmly accept the appellant's refusal to let go of his daughter.
The Court is not unaware of previous pronouncements that the
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to
support a conviction. (People v. Aldeguer, G.R. No. L-47991, April 3,
1990; People v. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, 415416 [1988]) But as
discussed above, the testimony of Aida Villanueva does not inspire
credibility. Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed, must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value
of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind. (People v. Maspil, G.R. No. 85177, August 20,
1990; People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292, 297 [1987])
The fact of detention is also denied by the testimony of one of the
prosecution witnesses. Sgt. Ariate stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You also saw Aida Villanueva?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where did you see her?
A By the door of her store ... going inside. (TSN, October 22, 1987, p.10)
It is apparent that Aida had free access going in and out of the
appellant's residence. In fact, Aida could have escaped at that particular
period of time. She was three feet away from the appellant when Sgt.
Ariate saw her (TSN, October 22, 1987, p. 10) so she could have made
a run for it if she really wanted to go.
There is also the question of Sgt. Ariate's conflicting statements as to
the answer of Aida's father about his missing daughters which was
dismissed by the trial court as a minor inconsistency. In his testimony,
he stated that Aida's father said that he just sent his two daughters on
an errand and they were already missing (TSN, October 22, 1987, p. 9)
while in his answer to the questions propounded to him he stated that
Aida's father admitted that his daughter ran away. (Records, p. 15)
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
Such conflicting statements taken together with the statement of Charito
Villanueva, the father of the victim that "Aida Villanueva and Avelyn
Villanueva, 10 and 6 yrs. old were (sic) left their house without his
consent," (Records, p. 126) recorded in the blotter dated July 23, 1986
cast doubt on the criminal liability of the appellant. The answer of Sgt.
Ariate to the questions propounded to him and the statement in the
blotter corroborate the appellant's testimony that the two children ran
away from home. (TSN, April 22, 1988, pp. 4-5)
The unbelievable and conflicting evidence of the prosecution
strengthens the version of the appellant that she took pity on the two
runaway children and decided to give them food and shelter. Whether
or not she treated them like unpaid servants is not in issue. What is
apparent from the records is the absence of proof showing kidnapping
and serious illegal detention.
Another circumstance that belies the kidnapping charge is the
unexplained delay in the lodging of the complaint against the appellant.
An entire week passed before the complaint was lodged on July 23,
1986. (See People v. Antonio, 161 SCRA 72, 81 [1988])
The fourth circumstance present which calls for the reversal of the
conviction is that there is no motive whatsoever for the appellant to
kidnap the two children. The appellant is a woman of sufficient means.
It is undisputed that she is the owner of a store and was the employer
of two maids at the time of the incident. She did not know the two
children prior to the incident. Had she wanted to hire an additional maid,
she could certainly afford to hire another one without going to the extent
of committing a crime as serious as kidnapping. There was no need to
kidnap a minor and force her to work against her will. The appellant had
everything to lose and nothing to gain if it is true that she kidnapped
the two children. No motive was ever propounded by the prosecution.
We are thus ushered to applying the precept that though proof of motive
is not indispensable to conviction, yet a void in the evidence in this
respect discloses a weakness in the case for the prosecution. (People v.
Modesto, 25 SCRA 36, 46 [1968] It has also been held in People v.
Zamora, 59 Phil. 568, 569, [1934]):
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, no motive for the killing has been established, and
granting that proof of particular motive for taking the life of a human
being is not indispensable to conviction for homicide, the absence of
such motive is nevertheless important in determining which of two
conflicting theories is more likely to be true. (Emphasis supplied)
And finally, the execution of the affidavit of desistance by Charito
Villanueva, complainant in the kidnapping case, stating that his
daughters were not detained after all by the appellant taken together
with the circumstances abovementioned has the effect of exculpating
the appellant from the charge of kidnapping. As held in Gomez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (135 SCRA 620, 630 [1985]):
xxx xxx xxx
It is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute
criminal offenses under the full control of the fiscal and that the dismissal
of criminal cases by the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant is not looked upon with favor. However, it is also true that
an affidavit of desistance may create serious doubts as to the liability of
the accused. At the very least, it calls for a second hard look at the
records of the case and the basis for the judgment of conviction.
Jurisprudence on the effect of desistance notwithstanding, the affidavit
Jaica
should not be peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of paper.
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant case falls under the exception where an affidavit of
desistance is given due consideration. Significantly, the father of the two
girls testified in open court on November 24, 1987 that he was
withdrawing the case and that his children were not detained. The
prosecution had every opportunity to cross-examine or tear apart the
retraction and prove that the facts were as earlier alleged. It failed to
do so.
The Solicitor General quotes the trial court's statement that:
xxx xxx xxx
If the accused thought that the evidence of the prosecution was
fabricated or false, the accused could have presented her two maids as
witnesses to testify to rebut said evidence. Her failure to introduce them
as witnesses could only mean that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses about the detention of Aida in her house were all true. (Rollo,
p. 21)
It is a well-entrenched rule in our jurisprudence that the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness
of the defense. (People v. de Dios, G.R. No. 58174, July 6, 1990; People
v. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620, 626 [1988]) In this case, the prosecution
has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and appellant Carmen Lim is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged for failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. SO
ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS PADICA
Accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos appeals from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXVI, dated
January 8, 1990, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Kidnapping for ransom with murder upon an amended
information dated November 16, 1984 and reading as follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of February, 1978, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together with John Doe @ Boy Taga, Peter Doe @ Eddie Boy Marajas,
Richard Doe @ Tito and Edward Doe @ Elmer whose true names,
identities and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with the use of three (3) firearms with the different
caliber (sic) by means of craft, violence against and intimidation of
person, did then and there kidnap Francis Banaga, detain and deprive
him of his liberty for a period of three (3) days and demanded (sic) five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for his release and while thus
illegally detaining the latter, said accused, pursuant to said conspiracy
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill
and with treachery shoot Francis Banaga, thereby inflicting on him
gunshot wounds on the head and other parts of his body which caused
his instantaneous death as a consequences." 1
The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans,
Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo
Marajas were originally charged in the latter part of 1978 with
kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms
before Military Commission No. 27 in Criminal Case No 27-163 thereof.
However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused Leon Marajas, Jr.
prayed for the transfer of the case to the civil courts. 2
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed an
information for kidnapping for ransom with murder, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Pq-81-1596-P, before Branch III of the then Court of
First Instance of Pasay City against the aforementioned accused, but
with the exception of herein appellant whose name was inadvertently
not included therein. 3 A separate charge for illegal possession of
firearms was lodged before Branch 146 of the Makati Regional Trial
Court but the case was later placed in the archives some time in 1985.
4
Accused Romeo Padica and herein appellant were both arraigned on
January 15, 1982 and, with the assistance of their respective counsel,
both pleaded not guilty. 5 It appears, however, that appellant entered
his plea during the arraignment under the name of "Leonardo Marajas."
6 Trial thereafter ensued but, subsequently, the case was reraffled to
Branch CXVI, Pasay City, of the Regional Trial Court where it remained
until the conclusion of the trial in 1990.
Earlier thereto, however, upon discovery of the omission of herein
appellant's name in the original information, the prosecution filed a
motion on November 16, 1984 for the admission of an amended
information including appellant's name as one of the accused. 7 On May
30, 1985, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended
information. 8 Thereafter, or on July 17, 1985, appellant, duly assisted
by counsel, entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned on the
amended information. 9 On the other hand, in an order dated August
27, 1985, 10 accused Padica was discharged from the information to be
utilized as a state witness.
The People's brief, drawing principally from the factual findings of the
court a quo based on the evidence adduced in this case, with
supplemental data and documentation of the testimonial evidence as
borne out by the transcripts, which we find to be correct, presented the
prosecution's case in this wise:
"On or about 9:00 o clock in the morning of February 8, 1978, appellant
and his brother, Leopoldo Marajas, using a car driven by Leopoldo,
visited Romeo Padica in his house in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Leopoldo
requested Padica, his compadre, to drive for Eddie Boy Marajas, a
brother of Leopoldo and appellant, and his classmates, giving Padica
P100.00 for the purpose. Upon receiving the amount, Padica, pursuant
to the instructions of Leopoldo, drove the car, with Leopoldo and
appellant on board, and proceeded to Samson Tech in Pasay City,
arriving there at about 10:00 A.M. Leopoldo left the vehicle and, upon
coming back after a while, he told Padica that they were going to Sukat,
Parañaque. In Sukat, the three stopped at a restaurant when (sic) they
ordered something to eat (TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 6-10).
"Thereafter, with Padica still driving the car, they proceeded to the
Superville Subdivision, also in Sukat, where they arrived at about 11:30
A.M. of the same date. Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga, both
fourteen (14) years of age, more or less, were in said subdivision.
Leopoldo alighted from the car and talked to them. Subsequently,
Leopoldo together with Francis and Eddie Boy, boarded the car. All of
them proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with Padica still driving the
vehicle. Seated beside Padica was Leopoldo Marajas, while appellant
and Eddie Boy occupied the back seat, with Francis Banaga between
them (Ibid, pp.-10-13).
"Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00 noon of the same date,
Leopoldo Marajas told Padica, to drive the car into the sugarcane
plantation at the side of the road. Once inside the plantation, Padica
stopped the car when told to do so by Leopoldo, who then alighted from
the vehicle and told Francis Banaga to alight. However, Francis refused
to get down from the car. Notwithstanding his resistance, he was forced
out of the car by Leopoldo Marajas, Eddie Boy and appellant, who pulled
him out of the vehicle. Thereafter, the three brought Francis Banaga to
a place inside the sugarcane plantation, more or less ten (10) meters
away from the car, while Padica remained in the vehicle. Leopoldo
Marajas then delivered several stabbing blows at Banaga after which
Jaica
appellant shot Banaga with a handgun. Banaga fell on the ground.
Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and appellant returned to the car. Leopoldo took
the wheel from Padica and drove the car to Muntinlupa, where Padica
alighted and was left behind with Leopoldo warning Padica, 'Pare, steady
ka lang, isang bala ka lang.' (Ibid., pp. 10-19).
"On or about 5:00 P.M. of the same day, while in his house at Gatchalian
Subdivision in Parañaque, Tomas Banaga, father of Francis, became
alarmed when his son failed to come home. A few minutes after 6:00
P.M. of (the) same date, someone called up by phone, telling Tomas not
to look for his son as he was in good condition, and demanding
P500,000.00 for his (Francis') release. Tomas reported the incident to
the Philippine Constabulary authorities in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, Sgt. Villanueva and Sgt. Cierlito were dispatched to
the Banaga residence (TSN, January 15, 1982, pp. 4-6).
"On February 9, 1978, Tomas received a second phone call in the course
of which the caller reduced the amount demanded to P200,000.00. On
February 10, 1978, there was another phone call with (the) caller
lowering the amount to P23,000.00 and giving instructions that the
money be wrapped in a newspaper, placed in a paper bag, and delivered
by a girl wearing a T-shirt to Luneta, in front of the National Library,
under a true with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978 (Ibid.,
pp. 6-10).
"Norma Camello, sister-in-law of Tomas Banaga, volunteered to deliver
the money as the maid of (the) Banaga family who was supposed to do
it was scared. Between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978,
Camello was brought by Sgt. Bucao and CIC Ocampo in front of Bayview
Hotel at Roxas Blvd., Manila. At about 8:00 P.M. of the same date, she
went to the National Library at Luneta and positioned herself under a
tree with red flowers, pursuant to the instructions of the caller. A few
minutes later, a taxicab arrived. Appellant alighted from the vehicle,
approached Camello and got the money from her which was in a paper
bag, saying: 'Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang bata mamaya sa bahay.'
(TSN, Sept. 19, 1985, pp. 6-12). When appellant returned to the waiting
taxicab and was about to board it, Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of those
sent to Luneta to entrap the person who would receive the ransom
money, apprehended and arrested appellant (TSN, March 11, 1986, pp.
2-5).
"(At) or about 2:00 P.M. of February 11, 1978, pursuant to the
information given by appellant during the investigation, a Philippine
Constabulary team led by Lt. Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by
appellant, went to Calamba, Laguna search for the body of Francis
Banaga. Appellant led the team to the place where the cadaver was
dumped, which was inside a sugarcane plantation about 75 meters away
from the road. The team recovered the body of Francis Banaga and
brought it to the Municipal Health Officer of Calamba for autopsy (TSN,
October 2, 1986, pp. 10-17).
"According to the necropsy report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban of the
Calamba Municipal Health Office, Francis Banaga sustained two (2) entry
gunshot wounds, one on the head and the other on the chest, with two
(2) exit gunshot wounds and several lacerated wounds. The death of
Francis was caused by 'intra-thoracic brain hemorrhage due to gunshot
wounds.' (TSN, July 25, 1986, pp. 17-69).
"After three (3) years in hiding out of fear for his life, Romeo Padica
finally revealed to Lt. Cruz (sic) of Regional Security Unit Intelligence
Division, Lucena City that he (Padica) witnessed the killing of Francis
Banaga. Padica had met Lt. Cruz (sic) near the Lucena City Market and
after making the disclosure, surrendered to the authorities (TSN,
December 12, 1988, p. 6)." 11
Appellant predictably presented a different narration of the events that
led to his arrest. He insists that he was the victim of an elaborate frame-
up by the military authorities assigned to investigate the case. Appellant
claims that on February 8, 1978, the day that the victim disappeared,
he was in Batangas province, where he was a resident. In the early
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
morning of February 10, 1978, he decided to go to Manila, with Sto.
Tomas, Batangas as his point of departure, in order to thresh out some
financial matters in connection with his business of buy and sell. 12
He arrived in Manila at around 9:00 A.M. and proceeded to the office of
Mrs. Aquilina Marquez-Marajas, his sister-in-law, at Mabini Street in
Malate to talk to his brother, Leonardo. Not finding Leonardo there, he
then went to the house of his sister, Nelly Marajas, a neighbor of the
Banaga family, at Gatchalian Subdivision in Parañaque. He was about to
board a tricycle at the main gate of the subdivision at around 9:30 A.M.
when he was suddenly accosted by two Metrocom officers in civilian
clothes who forcibly took him to a car. Appellant was later brought at
about 12:00 noon to the Siesta Court Hotel, also in Malate, where he
was repeatedly beaten and subjected to torture by his abductors who
tried in vain to extract information about the disappearance of Francis
Banaga. 13
In the evening of the same day, he was taken out of the hotel and was
taken by the men to an unspecified safehouse where, once again, his
ordeal at their hands was resumed. Unable to bear the maltreatment
any further, appellant then tried to fool them by admitting that the
missing Francis Banaga could be found in Paete, Laguna. He then led a
group of his captors to the said place but they found no trace of the
missing boy. Incensed at the deception, the men took him back to the
safehouse. 14
Later, appellant was again taken out of the safehouse and, together with
another captive whom he identified only as "Florentino," he was brought
to an isolated sugarcane plantation. There Florentino led the military
team to the cadaver of Francis Banaga. 15 Appellant and Florentino were
later brought back to the safehouse. The former claims that he was kept
there for about two months, during which time he helped in the
maintenance and care of the safehouse and its surroundings. He also
met at the safehouse Leslie Gans, one of the accused, but he had no
occasion to discuss their predicament with him. After appellant's
confinement, he was turned over to the prison authorities of Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center where he remained until the start of the trial. 16
After more than eight years of trial, which for one reason or another
was punctuated by numerous and needless postponements, the trial
court rendered its assailed decision pronouncing the guilt of appellant
for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga,
father of Francis Banaga, the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the child, without pronouncement a to costs. 17
Appellant is now before us insisting on the reversal of the judgment of
conviction by theorizing that the court below erred: (a) in ruling that the
guilt of appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt; (b) in giving full
credence to the testimony of state witness Romeo Padica; (c) in laying
emphasis on the weakness of the defense interposed by appellant; and
(d) in disregarding the inconsistencies raised by the defense as minor
and insubstantial. 18
After a careful and exhaustive review of the records, the testimonial and
documentary evidence, and the arguments of the prosecution and the
defense, we are satisfactorily persuaded that the prosecution has duly
discharged its onus probandi insofar as the culpability of appellant is
concerned, but we do not adopt as correct the nature or categorization
of the offense for which he must do penance.
1. At the outset, from the evidence on record, we are not convinced that
the crime of kidnapping for ransom was committed as charged in both
the original and amended informations. Rather the crime committed was
murder, attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or
abuse of superior strength, and not the complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with murder as found by the trial court without objection by
either the prosecution or defense. The essential element in the crime of
kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his
liberty, 19 or that he was transported away against his will with the
Jaica
primary or original intent to effect that restraint, is absent in this case.
The malefactors evidently had only murder in their hearts when they
invited the trusting Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna, and not
to confine or detain him for any length of time or for any other purpose.
We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was
incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, 20 and
this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim
was taken from one place to another. 21 Thus, where the evident
purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the
accused it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to
detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of
the victims constitute the crime of murder, 22 hence the crime of
kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component
felony to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact,
as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et al., although the
accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed
him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money,
such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since
no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime
committed was only murder. 23
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his
brothers intended to kill the victim can readily be deduced from the
manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life
once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba,
Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or
from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim
intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary,
the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently
made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim's family very
much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and
deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim around five
hours earlier.
It will be observed that under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
circumstance that the kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of
ransom raises the imposable penalty to death. 24 It is essential,
however, that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty of the
victim be present. The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would
not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the
victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually
restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time
or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such
determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of
freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.
In addition, Francis Banaga, then already fourteen years of age and a
fourth year high school student, was neither forced nor coerced
unlawfully into going along with his killers. He voluntarily boarded the
car and went with the Marajas brothers to Laguna. The victim had every
reason to trust them as they were his neighbors in Gatchalian
Subdivision. In fact, one of the brothers, accused Leonardo Marajas alias
"Eddie Boy," was his schoolmate and a playmate. 25
There was treachery since, under the aforestated circumstances, the
victim was lured by his killers into going with them to Laguna without
the slightest inkling of their nefarious design, coupled with the sudden
and unexpected assault by the malefactors on the hapless victim in the
isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, which thereby divested him
of an opportunity either to effectively resist or to escape. 26 Abuse of
superior strength was likewise present, for the accused deliberately
resorted to their collective strength for the purpose of overpowering
whatever feeble defense the poor Francis Banaga could offer. 27 They
thus insured the commission of the crime with practically no risk at all
to themselves.
Under the factual features present in the commission of the crime,
however, we are inclined to grant that the circumstance of superior
strength should not be appreciated distinctly but should be considered
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
as being absorbed in and by treachery, 28 and the same is true with
regard to the allegation of craft. Hence, abuse of superior strength may
not be taken into account separately in this case, either as a qualifying
or as an aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, although the trial
court and both parties herein have again passed sub silentio thereon, it
is evident that the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was
present since appellant and his co-accused obviously and deliberately
chose the desolation and isolation of the sugarcane plantation to
perpetrate the crime far from the gaze of potential eye-witnesses. 29
This circumstance is underscored by the fact that they committed the
crime at about 12:00 noon, a time of day when any passersby or
assistance could hardly be expected in the vicinity of the locus criminis.
30 This aggravating circumstance of despoblado should, therefore, be
considered against appellant even if it was not alleged in the
informations since it was duly proved. 31
Appellant's defense that he was in another place at the time of Francis
Banaga's disappearance and killing must necessarily fail. Indeed, trite
as our innumerable reiterations have already made this statement of
rejection, we must perforce again reprobate appellant's alibi as an
inherently weak defense decidedly easy of concoction. Apart from that,
it is considered as clearly negative in nature. Hence, when arrayed
against the positive declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution,
the same would all the more be given little consideration. 32
For it to prosper, it must be shown that not only was the accused at
some other place at the time of the commission of the offense, but that
it was also physically impossible for him to have been there when it
happened. 33 Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the trial court in its
decision, appellant was not even sure as to his whereabouts on February
8, 1978. He simply offered as an explanation therefor that he was "more
or less" in Batangas, which allegation was completely uncorroborated.
34
In light of the foregoing, appellant's further denial that he was
entrapped on the night of February 10, 1978 by the authorities after
receiving ransom money from Norma Camello must likewise be rejected.
Both Norma Camello and Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the police
operatives, positively and without hesitation identified appellant as the
person who was collared at Luneta Park. 35 Moreover, the police report
clearly and definitely bears out the fact that appellant was arrested by
the investigating police officers on that night pursuant to the dragnet
plan that was prepared for the purpose, 36 the veracity of which record
further enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties which appellant failed to rebut.
2. Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have given credence
to the testimony of Romeo Padica as it is incredible and inconsistent
with the other evidence on record. He affects surprise as to why the
Marajas brothers would go to the extent of hiring Padica to drive for
them when, in fact, Padica himself knew that Leopoldo Marajas was a
skilled driver. Moreover, he expresses disbelief that Romeo Padica never
conversed with the group while they were on the road and that,
although the latter claims to be a close friend of Leopoldo, he never
even knew what was Leopoldo's profession and what was the surname
of their common "compadre." He likewise characterizes as incredible the
circumstance that he and his cohorts supposedly carried out the crime
in broad daylight and that thereafter they simply dismissed Padica with
a casual threat of "Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka lang."
There is no merit in all the foregoing submissions and pretensions of
appellant. It is true that the testimony of a particeps criminis is to be
invariably viewed with much caution, coming as it does from a polluted
source. 37 However, in the case at bar and after a careful evaluation,
we find no plausible reason to depart from the favorable appreciation
by the trial court of Padica's testimony which the said court characterized
as reasonable and probable, given in a clear, straightforward and
convincing manner thereby leaving no doubt in the mind of said court
that he was telling the truth. 38
Jaica
Jurisprudentially embedded is the rule that the stamp of approval given
by the trial court on the testimony of a particular witness as a
consequence of its factual findings is normally accorded finality by
appellate courts, the court below having had the opportunity to observe
closely the manner by which such witness testified. 39 Furthermore, not
a single shred of evidence was introduced by the defense to show any
ill motive on the part of Padica to impute such a serious crime on
appellant and his brothers, thus entitling to considerable credit his
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding Francis Banaga's
death. These conclusions we confirm, not by mere reliance on dicta, but
from our own review and calibration of the evidence.
There is certainly nothing strange in the matter of the Marajas brothers
requesting Padica to drive for them. As testified to by the latter, he was
then a close friend of one of the brothers, Leopoldo, who was the one
who requested him to drive, and the latter presumably had full
confidence in him as he was at the time a professional driver of taxicabs.
Romeo Padica, likewise, can not be discredited just because of his
silence on the road and for not knowing Leopoldo's profession and the
surname of a common "compadre." It is of common knowledge that
there are persons who are taciturn and not as inquisitive as others, or
who disdain prying into the affairs even of their close friends.
Be that as it may, this witness did testify to and narrate in his sworn
statement some personal matters regarding the Marajas siblings, such
as the fact that Leopoldo was staying at a house adjacent to that of the
Banagas in Tionguiao Street at Gatchalian Subdivision together with his
wife, children and Eddie Boy Marajas; that said house was owned by a
sister of the brothers; and that Francis Banaga, whose picture he
positively identified in court, was a playmate and schoolmate of Eddie
Boy Marajas, thus lending credence to his claim of close and fraternal
ties with Leopoldo Marajas. 40
The fact that appellant and his co-accused carried out the murder of
Francis Banaga in broad daylight is hardly surprising. As pointedly noted
by the Solicitor General, "it is not difficult to believe that appellant and
his co-accused committed the crime in broad daylight because there
were no other persons at the scene of the incident," as the same was
inside a desolate sugarcane plantation in the outskirts of Calamba,
Laguna and the crime was perpetrated at noon of that day, as we have
earlier explained.
Having demonstrated to Padica the brutal and merciless manner in
which they disposed of Francis Banaga, appellant and his brothers were
undoubtedly secure in the thought that Padica would have been
sufficiently terrorized thereby and would thereafter keep his silence, and
so, just for good measure, they uttered the threat on the latter's life
simply as a reminder of what they had in store for him should he waver
and ignore that injunctive warning.
It is further contended by appellant that the trial court should not have
granted the motion to discharge Romeo Padica from the information, as
one of the conditions for its grant has not been met, namely, that the
prosecution has not shown that Padica did not appear to be the most
guilty. Incidentally, appellant slurs over the fact that this order of the
trial court was sustained by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16302
which denied appellant's petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
said order, the judgment therein having become final and executory on
January 20, 1989. 41
Appellant has also clearly lost sight of the rule that the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness, lies within the sound discretion of the
court before whom it is sought and in the exercise of that discretion, it
is not required that the court be absolutely certain that all the
requirements for the proper discharge of a co-accused be present. 42
In the case under consideration, the prosecution presented enough
evidence to support its motion for the discharge of Padica. The trial
court's reliance thereon and its consequent finding on the basis thereof
that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty must be respected as it
was in better position to evaluate such evidence.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
Appellant likewise points to portions in the testimony of Padica which
are allegedly not substantiated by the evidence on record. Thus,
appellant argues that while Padica claimed that the victim was stabbed
by Leopoldo Marajas and then shot at four times by appellant, yet the
necropsy report of the medico-legal officer, Dr. Eusebio P. Panganiban,
showed no stab wounds but only lacerated wounds and two gunshot
wounds. Further, Padica's testimony that the victim was dragged inside
the plantation and instantly stabbed and shot to death is supposedly
belied by the findings in the necropsy report that Francis Banaga's body
had several hematomas and contusions. 43
We nonetheless agree with and give due credit to the following
explanation of the court below regarding these seeming conflicting
aspects:
"The defense counsel also capitalized on the supposed inconsistency
between the allegation of Padica that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot Banaga four
(4) times and the autopsy report stating that the victim sustained two
(2) entry gunshot wounds. Padica testified that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot
Francis Banaga four (4) times without stating that the victim was hit also
four (4) times. The fact that he suffered two (2) entry gunshot wounds
clearly indicates that Francis was shot, supporting the version of Padica
that the child was fired upon by Leon Marajas, Jr.
"Also pointed out as a basis for not believing the testimony of Padica is
the supposed conflict between his assertion that Leopoldo Marajas
stabbed Banaga with a knife and the finding of Dr. Panganiban that the
victim, aside from the gunshot wounds, sustained only lacerated wounds
and contusions. The defense implied that Banaga was not stabbed by
Leopoldo Marajas as there is no finding that he sustained stab wounds.
A logical analysis of this point shows that there is no inconsistency.
Padica stated that he saw the accused Leopoldo Marajas stab the victim
but he did not say that Banaga was hit by the stabbing blows delivered
by the said accused. It could also be that one of the blows hit the boy
but without piercing his body, causing only lacerations thereon." 44
As for the several hematomas and contusions that were discovered on
the body of Francis Banaga, it is entirely possible that the same were
inflicted when the victim put up a furious struggle for his life against his
assailants. According to Padica, the Marajas brothers forcefully pulled
out Banaga from the car when they stopped by the roadside. They
continued to inflict physical harm on the boy while prodding him to
proceed inside the sugarcane plantation until they reached a clearing
where, after Leopoldo Marajas delivered stabbing blows on the victim
which may not have inflicted knife wounds but contusions from the
assailant's clenched fists, Leon Marajas, Jr. then fired away with the fatal
shots. All the while and just before he was shot to death, Padica narrated
that the victim desperately exerted all efforts to ward off the assault on
his person. 45
Appellant also raises as an issue the questionable manner in which
Padica surrendered, after nearly three years of hiding, to Lt. Cesar Perez
of the Lucena PC Regional Security Unit whom he met only for the first
time at the Lucena City marketplace.
But, as Padica candidly revealed, and we find his explanation satisfactory
and credible, he had desired all along to surrender as he had grown tired
of constantly fearing for his life and of his difficult plight as a fugitive
from justice. He was obviously always on the lookout for persons in
authority whom he could trust during his stay of two to three months in
Lucena City where he had in the meantime found work as a porter in
the public market. In the course of his stay there, he had heard about
the "kind-hearted" Lt. Perez, a ranking officer of the local constabulary.
46 His subsequent meeting and surrender to Lt. Perez at the
marketplace was no strange coincidence as it is obviously a place where
all kinds of people go to and cross paths.
That it may have taken Padica over two years to finally give himself up
to the authorities is understandable. He had witnessed a heinous crime
perpetrated on a defenseless fourteen-year old boy by his killers, and
Jaica
the latter had threatened him with bodily harm should he reveal what
they had done. In view thereof, it was but natural that Padica would
hide, away from the possible clutches of the Marajas brothers, and keep
unto himself the dark secret lest he suffer the same grim fate that befell
Francis Banaga.
3. Appellant finally contends that the failure of the prosecution to charge
him as an accused in the original information is a fatal defect. Again, we
find no merit in this fatuous assertion.
The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege
the name of the accused, failing which the complaint or information
would be rendered invalid. The test of sufficiency is laid down in Section
7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which states:
"Sec. 7. Name of the accused. — A complaint or information must state
the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname
by which he has been or is known, or if his name cannot be discovered
he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his
true name is unknown.
If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the accused is
disclosed by him, or appears in some other manner to the court, the
true name of the accused shall be inserted in the complaint or
information and record."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under
the original information and that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty
under the name of "Leonardo Marajas." At that juncture, appellant
should have raised the error as to his identity by filing a motion to quash
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, in line with the
doctrine explained in People vs. Narvaes 47 laid down as early as 1934.
But, as aforestated, appellant did not do so but instead voluntarily
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty thereat, albeit under
a different name. Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
his person and it could have rendered a valid judgment of conviction
based on the original information even without need of an amendatory
information to correct appellant's name. What we stated in Narvaes is
worth repeating:
". . . (w)hen the appellant was arraigned under the name of Pedro
Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he merely
entered his plea of 'not guilty' under the said name. It was on that
occasion that he should have for the first time raised the question of his
identity, by filing a demurrer based on the court's lack of jurisdiction
over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as Pedro Narvaes,
not Primo Narvaes. Not having filed the said demurrer, it must
necessarily be understood that he renounced it and therefore he is now
estopped from raising, or insisting to raise, the same question, not only
in this appeal but even at the trial . . ."
The subsequent amendment to insert in the information Leon Marajas,
Jr.'s real name involved merely a matter of form as it did not, in any
way, deprive appellant of a fair opportunity to present his defense. 48
Moreover, the amendment neither affected nor altered the nature of the
offense charged since the basic theory of the prosecution was not
changed nor did it introduce new and material facts. 49 Such an
amendment is explicitly allowed under the second paragraph of Section
7, in relation to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent
portion of which provides that "(t)he information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused." At
any rate, whatever irregularity may have attended the inclusion of
appellant's name as an accused in the amended information has been
waived by his subsequent appearance and entry of plea at his
arraignment under said amendatory information.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET
ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellant
Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of murder and IMPOSING upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the late Francis Banaga the sum of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, in line with current jurisprudential
policy, and likewise to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS SILONGAN
Facts: Appellants Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad Awal,
Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon Pasawilan
were convicted of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious
Illegal Detention.
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Barangay
Laguilayan, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Americo Rejuso, Jr., Ervin
Tormis, and Victor Cinco to meet with a certain Macapagal Silongan alias
Commander Lambada concerning the gold nuggets purportedly sold by
the latter. They arrived in the morning but due to someone having died
in his family, Macapagal had to pick up his brother and told them they
better transact business in the afternoon.
After fetching Macapagal’s brother in Cotabato City with Teddy and
Oteng Silongan, the group returned to Isulan on Macapagal's orders. He
gave additional instructions to wait until dark allegedly because the
funeral arrangements for his relative were not yet finished. When the
group finally got on their way, Macapagal ordered the driver to drive
slowly towards the highway. Oteng Silongan and his bodyguards
alighted somewhere along the way.
Then around 7:30 p.m., as they headed to the highway, Alexander
Saldaña noticed that Macapagal Silongan was busy talking over his
hand-held radio with someone in Maguindanaoan dialect. At 8:30 p.m.,
they neared the highway. Macapagal ordered the driver to stop.
Suddenly, armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions
were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded.
Macapagal and Teddy were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing
more was done to them. Alexander identified the appellants Oteng
Silongan, Akmad Awal, Abdila Silongan alias Long Silongan, and Rolly
Lamalan as belonging to the group that abducted them. He also pointed
to an elder brother of Macapagal, alias Keddy, alias Wet, and an alias
Ngunib as also belonging to the group.
The four victims were taken to a mountain hideout in Maganoy,
Maguindanao, where a certain Salik Karem, Hadji Kutang Omar alias
Commander Palito, and Jumbrah Manap met them. Initially, the three
demanded fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000) from Alexander Saldaña
for his release, but the amount was eventually reduced to twelve million
pesos after much haggling. They made Alexander write a letter to his
wife to pay the ransom. No ransom was obtained so Commander Palito
and Jumbrah Manap sent other persons and one of the victims, Americo
Rejuso, Jr., to renegotiate with Alexander's wife. No agreement was
likewise reached.
Seven days later, Alexander Saldaña and Americo Rejuso, Jr., were
transferred to the town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah
Manap, Sacaria Alon alias Jack Moro, Ramon Pasawilan, guarded them.
When the kidnappers learned that the military was looking for
Alexander, they returned to the mountain hideout and stayed there for
two weeks.
Alexander was brough to Talayan where he met Mayangkang Saguile
then to Maitum, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Mayangkang made
Jaica
Alexander write more letters to the latter's family. On several occasions,
Mayangkang himself would write letters to Alexander's wife. Alexander
personally was detained in Kabuntalan for a total period of five (5)
months and was kept constantly guarded by armed men who included
some of the appelants.
On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaña to
the military in exchange for a relative who was caught delivering a
ransom note to Alexander's family. However, only eight of the accused
were brought to trial.
The prosecution presented Alexander Saldana; his wife, and a certain
Major Parallag who was responsible for Alexander's release. Carmelita
testified as to matters relayed to her by Americo Rejuso, Jr., and
identified the ransom notes sent to her. Major Parallag, for his part,
testified as to the operations undertaken by the military to effect the
rescue of Alexander.
In their defense, all the accused, except Macapagal and Teddy Silongan,
denied ever having met Alexander Saldaña and his three (3) companions
much less having kidnapped them. Additionally, all eight of the accused
established that they came under the control of the government military
authorities when they surrendered as Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebels. They claim
they voluntarily surrendered when a certain Perry Gonzales convinced
them that the government would grant them amnesty, pay for their
guns, and give them the items listed in their lists of demands.
All eight of the accused, except Akmad Awal, admitted having signed
separate extra-judicial confessions admitting to their complicity in the
kidnapping of Alexander Saldaña and his companions, but they asserted
that they did not understand what they were signing. Additionally, they
assert that they did not know or hire Atty. Plaridel Bohol III, the lawyer
who appears to have assisted them in making their confessions.
Issue: WON the appelants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention
Held: YES. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with proof
beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same.
It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution:
(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission
of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267
be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the
appellants abducted Alexander Saldaña and his companions at gunpoint
and deprived them of their freedom. That the appellants took shifts
guarding the victims until only Alexander was left to be guarded and in
transferring Alexander from one hideout to another to prevent him from
being rescued by the military establish that they acted in concert in
executing their common criminal design.
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
PEOPLE VS TY
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
Facts: Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor which both pleaded not guilty
to.
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick
daughter Arabella, then only seven (7) months old, for treatment to the
Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic which was owned and operated by
the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering
bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the
child at the clinic for speedy recovery. About three (3) days later,
Arabella was well and was ready to be discharged but complainant was
not around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back but
did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of
P300.00. Complainant likewise confided to accused-appellant Dr.
Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she was
working. She then inquired about the rate of the nursery and upon being
told that the same was P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child
to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred
from the ward to the nursery.
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this
time that accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that
she hire a "yaya" for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of P50.00.
Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was then again
transferred from the nursery to the extension of the clinic which served
as residence for the hospital staff.
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited
her child nor called to inquire about her whereabouts. Her estranged
husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to get
in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address
or telephone number where she can be reached. This development
prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the child's
abandonment. Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of
Arabella.
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by
complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, suggested during
a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who
could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring
she badly needed as she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was
favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt,
Lilibeth Neri.
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned
some five (5) years back.
When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for
habeas corpus against accused-appellants which was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed.
Issue: WON appelants are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor
Held: NO. Accused-appellants must be acquitted of the crime charged,
there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina
Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established to be
complainant's daughter, Arabella. Even if Cristina Grace Neri and
Arabella Sombong is one and the same person, still, the instant criminal
case against the accused-appellants must fail.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must
concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody
Jaica
of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor
to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the
offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually
punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article
seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must
also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child
to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
The key word therefore of this element is deliberate. Essentially, the
word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than
mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or
failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of
the complainant's child to her. When the accused-appellants learned
that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of
apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein
complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic's
care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella's
guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was
already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians' residence
and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back.
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in
finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate
refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother.
Evidence is simply wanting in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants' conduct from the moment
the child was left in the clinic's care up to the time the child was given
up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest
desire to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.
PEOPLE VS AIDA MARQUEZ
Facts: Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18.
According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she
met Marquez at the beauty parlor where she was working as a
beautician. Merano confessed to easily trusting Marquez because aside
from her observation that Marquez was close to her employers, Marquez
was also nice to her and her co-employees, and was always giving them
food and tip.
After a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Merano’s
then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine)
to buy her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because
it was not unusual for Marquez to bring Justine some things whenever
she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine in the
afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask
them for Marquez’s address. However, Merano said that her employers
just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.
Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were
unsuccessful until she received a call from Marquez who allegedly told
Merano that she will return Justine to Merano the following day and that
she was not able to do so because her own son was sick and was
confined at the hospital. Marquez also allegedly asked Merano for Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the expenses that she incurred while
Justine was with her. When the supposed return of Justine did not
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
happen, Merano claimed that she went to Marquez’s house, using the
sketch that she got from her employers’ driver, but Marquez was not
home. Upon talking to Marquez’s maid, Merano learned that Justine was
there for only a couple of days. Merano left a note for Marquez telling
her that she will file a case against Marquez if Justine is not returned to
her.
On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell
her to pick up her daughter at Modesto Castillo’s (Castillo) house. The
following day, Merano, accompanied by SPO2 Diosdado Fernandez and
SPO4 Rapal, went to the house of Castillo in Quezon. Merano claimed
that Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and
that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) supposedly
for Merano who was asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a
photocopy of the handwritten "Kasunduan" wherein Merano purportedly
gave Justine to the Castillo spouses. The Castillos asked Merano not to
take Justine as they had grown to love her but Merano refused.
However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her because
the police advised her to go through the proper process as the Castillos
might fight for their right to retain custody of Justine. Merano then
learned from Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine,
the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the Reception and Study
Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
To defend herself, Marquez proffered her own version of what had
happened during her testimony. Marquez said that she had only formally
met Merano on September 6, 1998 although she had known of her for
some time already because Merano worked as a beautician at the beauty
parlor of Marquez’s financier in her real estate business. Marquez alleged
that on that day, Merano offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez
told Merano that she was not interested but she could refer her to her
friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo). That very same night, while Marquez
was taking care of her son who was then confined at the Makati Medical
Center, Merano allegedly proceeded to Marquez’s house in Laguna and
left Justine with Marquez’s maid. The following day, while Marquez was
at the hospital again, Castillo, accompanied by his mother, went to
Marquez’s house to pick up Justine. Since Marquez was out, she
instructed her maid not to give Justine to Castillo for fear of possible
problems. However, she still found Justine gone upon her return home
that evening. Marquez allegedly learned of the encounter between the
Castillos and Merano when a San Pedro police officer called Marquez to
tell her that Merano, accompanied by two police officers, went to
Castillo’s house to get Justine. This was confirmed by Castillo who also
called Marquez and told her that Merano offered Justine to him for
adoption.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Marquez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: WON Marquez is guilty of the crime charged
Held: YES. Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because the elements constituting the crime of serious
illegal detention or kidnapping found in Article 270 of the RPC are not
present in this case. Marquez further contends that it is illogical for her
to voluntarily divulge to Merano the whereabouts of Justine, even
recommending the assistance of police officers, if she were indeed guilty
of kidnapping.
Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and
appreciation of the crime she was charged with and eventually convicted
of.
Jaica
A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed
to Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her
deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after being
entrusted with said baby’s custody.
Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with
violation of Article 270, and not Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code.
The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who has
been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to
return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may be found in Article
270, which reads:
Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being
entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents
or guardians.
While one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender
was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person
to restore the minor to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as
used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something
more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with
the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Merano’s version of
Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquez’s version that
Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of
Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long
said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one
entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element
of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6,
1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez.
Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor
at that time, when demanded to do so by the latter’s mother, shows
that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.
ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S VICTIM
LAMERA v CA
FACTS: At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along
Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by
Lamera, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes
and Paulino Gonzal.
As a result, 2 informations were filed against Lamera. One for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries and an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of
the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
The latter was for Lamera's failure to help or render assistance to Reyes
when he lost consciousness, without justifiable reason.
The MTC of Pasig found Lamera guilty of the crime of Abandonment of
one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs.
RTC: Affirmed with modification.
CA: We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art.
275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since the evidence
allegedly shows that it was Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle driver, who
negligently caused the accident. Petitioner misses the import of the
provision. The provision punishes the failure to help or render assistance
to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or injured.
Accidental means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without
intention and design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.
Consequently, it is enough to show that petitioner accidentally injured
the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or render them
assistance. There is no need to prove that petitioner was negligent and
that it was his negligence that caused the injury.
ISSUE: Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under
Article 275, par. 2 when, he was previously charged with "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries" under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code? YES.
HELD: In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent People
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, putting
the issue squarely, thus:
. . . whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under
Article 275 of the same Code.
answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize different and
distinct offenses.
Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a
person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate
offenses.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa.
Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an
offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its
presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. The last
paragraph of the Article specifically provides:
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in hand to give.
Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information.
The information against petitioner in this case does not so allege.
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another
whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code which reads:
Jaica
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another
whom he he has accidentally wounded or injured.
GRAVE THREATS
REYES v PEOPLE
FACTS: Reyes was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange,
Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6,
1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to
30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the
United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards
bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con
Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka
rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin,
dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others.
Reyes informed Col. Monzon was the Military Liaison Officer that the
demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against
Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly
caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col.
Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's
residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station
to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him,
however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted
to blow off steam."
Agustin was inside his office during that time and when he knew of the
commotion, he requested that Col. Monzon escort him home. He was
followed by the demonstrators. The three jeeps carrying the
demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone
by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the
gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the
gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he
boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other
demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
Reyes was then charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation.
In the information for grave threats, the information provided that Reyes
"orally" threatened to kill Agustin, but was amended after Reyes was
arraigned. This was objected by his counsel, but the amendment was
allowed by the court.
ISSUE: Did the acts of Reyes amount to grave threats? YES.
HELD: After a careful consideration of the original information, we find
that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were
alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person
with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong
amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is
to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular
manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the
offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the
nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it
change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened
to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any
material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim,
made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under
paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since
there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was
made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally"
was effected in order to make the information conformable to the
evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal
amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main
gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in
trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated
threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one
conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of
creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat
would be carried into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive
of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to
escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going
on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not
merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the
dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore,
hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's
conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the
words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression
in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal
sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother.
In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by
appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more
emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this
Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening
than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object
to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be
considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final
threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion
which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter
part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important
and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances
the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense
committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the
statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute
an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted
separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of
the more important offense of threats.
CALAUAG v PEOPLE
FACTS: In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o’clock[8] in the
afternoon, Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking
spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at
the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from
several people including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag
butted in and replied, “Bakit kasama ka ba roon?,” and immediately
boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered
by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband.
Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid
his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around
6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the
barangay authorities.
Jaica
Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen
were on their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who
blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia
with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said “Saan ka pupunta, gusto
mo ito?” Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to
the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the
barangay authorities.
The MeTC found Calauag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries,
and Calauag guilty of grave threats.
The MeTC relied on Nestor’s testimony. It noted that Nestor did not
deny that he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted
that he got annoyed by Nestor’s attitude. The MeTC concluded that
Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s unruly
behavior. On the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste
time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay. While she had
intended to report the mauling of her husband, as he instructed her,
what she reported instead was what happened to her. With such
straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was
convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia.
Petitioner maintains that just because Julia immediately reported the
gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that
it actually happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did
poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as
defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC decision in toto.
ISSUE: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction
of grave threats? YES.
HELD: As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated,
the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural
course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost
control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed
by Nestor’s unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also
happened since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay
authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling of her husband, she
reported what happened to her in her hurry, excitement and confusion.
Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that petitioner
committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions.
The fact that Barrameda testified in petitioner’s behalf cannot be given
more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor
and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin
down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may
or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong
threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a
condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount
to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left
her house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her
husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a
gun to her forehead, while at the same time saying “Saan ka pupunta,
gusto mo ito?”[20] Considering what transpired earlier between
petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX
injury on her person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the
context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go
against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioner’s
accompanying act.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under
Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone
amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a
condition.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it
specifically states, “shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such
weapon in a quarrel”, since it presupposes that the threat to commit a
wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong
will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor
between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on
the other.
GRAVE COERCION
TIMONER VS PEOPLE
Facts: Jose Timoner, Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by
two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six
laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these
laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the
stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway.
Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual
Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one
Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended
for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-
compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI against Lourdes Pia-
Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stall. Subsequently,
petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged
with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet.
The said court acquitted the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of
the crime charged as principal by inducement.
Issue: Whether or not Timoner is guilty of grave coercion
Ruling: NO.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented
the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having
then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner
incurred no criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of
law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something
not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either
it be right or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1]
that any person be prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it
right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by
violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce
intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the
person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do
so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority
of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2
Jaica
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be
held guilty of grave coercion.
LEE VS CA
Facts: Complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, a bank employee,
was fetched from her house upon the instruction of the petitioner Branch
Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation (bank). Upon
arriving at the office of Pacific Banking Corporation located at Caloocan
City, petitioner Francis Lee did not attend to her immediately. After an
hour later, the petitioner confronted the complainant about a forged
Midland National Bank Cashier Check, which the latter allegedly
deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said
confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her with
piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until
she returned all the money equivalent of the subject cashier check.
Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal
slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she
was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the
money equivalent of the spurious check. During her stay at the said
bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in the family way, was
watched by the bank's employees and security guards. It was about six
o'clock in the afternoon of the same day when the complainant was able
to leave the bank premises.
Upon the other hand, the petitioner, presented his version, basically a
denial of the charges, to wit: he was the Branch Bank Manager of Pacific
Banking Corporation. After having been informed that Midland National
Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794 was dishonored for being spurious, he
examined the relevant bank records and discovered that complainant
Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was instrumental in inducing their bank to
accept the subject dollar check and was also the one who withdrew the
proceeds thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by
Honorio Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio Lumba, invited the complainant
to his office. Responding to his invitation, the complainant arrived at the
bank before noon of June 20, 1984, but was not attended to immediately
as the petitioner had to attend to other bank clients. The complainant
was merely informed about the subject fake dollar check that was
deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was genuine. The
complainant was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but she
acted freely and voluntarily in executing her affidavit and in returning
the money equivalent of the subject check. There was nothing unusual
during her lengthy stay in the bank.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting at the
complainant with piercing looks" and "threats to file charges against her"
are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion
Held: NO.
Petitioner's demand that the private respondent return the proceeds of
the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not
improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue.
The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her
protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all
the aforesaid acts.
We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the
petitioner's threat. It was rather due to her desire to prove her
innocence.
CRIMINAL LAW II: Rape and Titile IX Jaica
We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in her affidavit ( ibid, and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced
p. 5) it was not the petitioner who suggested the encashment of the in article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or
RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was not a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both.
the petitioner who agreed to the sister's suggestion but Cruz, the PRO
Manager, Foreign Department of the bank. It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and
was simply to protect private property rights. The fact that this argument
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which
was restrained, she, however, was able to move about freely unguarded the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as
from the office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to the office to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate
of Cruz at the mezzanine floor where her sister found her the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the appellants
saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi.
The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that
the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the
alleged threats of the petitioner. American authorities have declared that
"(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against
the will of the actor must be immediate and continuous and threaten
grave danger to his person during all of the time the act is being
committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in
praesenti.' It must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains
constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while the act
is being performed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety."

UNJUST VEXATION

PEOPLE VS REYES

Facts: In the barrio of Macalong, there is a chapel where it is customary

to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. As stated by the
lower court, "the term pabasa is applied to the act of the people,
professing the Roman Catholic faith," The pabasa in Macalong used to
begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night, without any
interruption whatsoever, until Good Friday.

While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between
11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana,
Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor
Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and
crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the
chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge
of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their
plan, by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it
was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. A
verbal altercation ensued.

When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who
were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was happening, they
became excited and left the place hurriedly. The pabasa was
discontinued and it was not resumed until after an investigation
conducted by the chief of police on the following morning, which
investigation led to the filing of the complaint appearing on pages 1 and
2 of the record.

CFI found the accused guilty under Art. 133.

Issue: Whether or not they are guilty under Art. 133 of the RPC

Ruling: NO, the accused are guilty under Art. 287.

The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character

under the old Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was
punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to
125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code