Agencies Involved
1. DENR vs Yap (G.R. No. 167707, October
08, 2008)
FACTS:
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for
declaratory relief to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes for the land they’ve
been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as “public forest,” which was
not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC
Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG
appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in
May 2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-
eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for
right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other
Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the
Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the
Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested
rights” over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on
their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The
OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the
island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705.
Being public forest, the claimed portions of the
island are inalienable and cannot be the subject
of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is
only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay
et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. All lands that
have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In the case at
bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court
cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already
open to disposition before 2006. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years
under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Private
claimants’ continued possession under Act No.
926 does not create a presumption that the land
is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to
argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested
rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private
claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. The SC noted that the
earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being
of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation commenced on
June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a
vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing
the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give
them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No.
1064.
The continued possession and considerable
investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently
occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented
and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation
of title over their occupied portions in Boracay
even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.
2. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila
(18 G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947)
Facts:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a
residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in
December 1941. The registration was
interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought
to accomplish the said registration but was
denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on
the grounds that he is a foreigner and he
cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction.
Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of
Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a
land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an alien may own private lands
in the Philippines.
Held:
No. Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks
about the conservation and utilization of
natural resources. The said provision embraces
all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its
purpose is to establish a permanent and
fundamental policy for the conservation and
utilization of all natural resources of the
nation. Although it mentions agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands, the court held that
in determining whether a parcel of land is
agricultural, the test is not only whether it is
actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility
to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence,
“public agricultural land” was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or
mineral. Therefore, it includes residential
lands.
3. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela
Rosa (GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1988)
Facts:
These cases arose from the application for
registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his
own behalf and on behalf of his three children,
Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan
Psu-225009. According to the application,
Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots
6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and
Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. The
application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5,
Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of
Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-
9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and
Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her
father shortly after the Liberation. Benguet
opposed on the ground that the June Bug
mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-
interest of James Kelly, who located the claim
in September 1909 and recorded it on October
14, 1909. From the date of its purchase,
Benguet had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings
and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes
on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots
1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930,
and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office
of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims
were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since
then been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession of the said lots as evidenced by its
annual assessment work on the claims, such as
the boring of tunnels, and its payment of
annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also
interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16,
1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding
that the applicants had failed to prove their
claim of possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered. The applicants
appealed to the respondent court, which
reversed the trial court and recognized the
claims of the applicant, but subject to the
rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their
mining claims. In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la
Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both
Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court,
invoking their superior right of
ownership. Issue:
Whether respondent court’s decision, that the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-
surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claim is correct.
Held:
No. The Court’s holding is that Benguet and
Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation
of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes. It is true that the subject property
was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did
not impair the rights already vested in Benguet
and Atok at that time. Such rights were not
affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain
except those agricultural in nature for this was
made subject to existing rights. The perfection
of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force
removed it from the public domain. By such
act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without
need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As
the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The
Court of Appeals justified this by saying there
is “no conflict of interest” between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-
surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a
well-known principle that the owner of piece
of land has rights not only to its surface but
also to everything underneath and the airspace
above it up to a reasonable height. Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as
mineral underneath and agricultural on the
surface, subject to separate claims of title. This
is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.
Ancestral Domain (RA No. 8371) "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.”
4. Cruz vs. DENR Secretary (G.R. No.
135385, December 6, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution. ISSUES:
W/N Sec. 3 (a) and (b), 5,6,7,8, 57 and 58 of
RA 8731 (IPRA) and its IRR are
unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving the
State of its ownership over lands of the public
domain, minerals and other natural resources
therein, violating the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the
Constitution. HELD:
The Supreme Court deliberated upon the
matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no
majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed
and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include natural
resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: (NOTE: more
important in this case) • Justice Kapunan:
NO
• Said provision affirming the ownership by
indigenous people of their ancestral
lands and domains by virtue of native
title do not diminish the State’s
ownership of lands within the public
domain, because said ancestral lands
and domains are considered as private
land, and never to have been part of
the public domain, following the
doctrine laid down in Cariño vs.
Insular Government.
• Sec. 3(a) does not confer or recognise any
right of ownership over the natural
resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose
is definitional and not declarative of a
right or title.
• Sec. 57 only grants “priority rights” to
ICCs/IPs in the utilisation of natural
resources and not absolute ownership
thereof. The State retains full control
over the exploration, development and
utilisation of natural resources through
the imposition requirements and
conditions for the utilisation of natural
resources under existing laws, such as
the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
and the Philippine Mining Act of
1995. Neither does the grant of said
rights exclude non- Indigenous people
from undertaking the same activities
within the ancestral domains upon
authority granted by the proper
government authority.
• Justice Puno: NO
• Ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong
to the ICCs/IPs. The
classification of lands in the
public domain under Sec. 3,
Art. XII of the Constitution
does not include ancestral
lands nor ancestral domains.
The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands may be
 acquired in two modes: (1)
by native title over both
ancestral lands and ancestral
domains; or (2) by torrens
title under the Public Land
Act and the Land
Registration Act with
respect to ancestral land
only. Both modes presume
or recognise the land as
private and not public.
• The right of ownership to
ancestral domain under Sec.
7(a) involves “lands,bodies
of water traditionally and
actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them
at any time within the
domains,” not “waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum,
and the mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy
fisheries, forests or timbers,
wildlife, flora and fauna and
other natural resources
enumerated in Sec. 2, Art. ancestral domain
XII of the constitution. encompasses natural
Ownership therefore of resources found therein],
natural resources remain and 3(b) [defines ancestral
with the State. lands as those possessed by
• Small-scale utilisation of ICCs/IPs since time
resources in Sec. 7(b) is also immemorial] contravenes
allowed under paragraph 3, Sec. 2, Art. XII of the
Sec. 2, Art. XII of the constitution, which declares
Constitution. that the State owns all lands
• Finally,thelarge- od the public domain,
scaleutilisationofnaturalreso minerals and natural
urcesinSec.57ofRA8731/IPR resources—none of which,
Aisallowedunder except agricultural lands,
paragraphs 1 and 4, section can be alienated. In addition,
2, Art. XII of the mere possession or
Constitution since only utilisation of land, however
“priority rights” are given to long, does not automatically
convert them into private
ICCs/IPs.
properties.
• However, by including natural
• IPRA/RA8371doesnotspecifylimit
resources, Sec. 1, Part II,
stoancestrallandsanddomain
Rule III of the Implementing
s.
Rules goes beyond Sec. 7(a)
• IPRA/RA 8731 relinquishes the
and therefore
State’s power under Sec. 2,
unconstitutional.
Art. XII of the Constitution
• Justice Panganiban: YES
• Sec. 3(a) [whose definition of of full control of natural
resources in ancestral lands
 and ancestral domains in
favor of ICCs/IPs, who may
exercise these rights without
any time limit. In addition,
they are also given the right
to negotiate directly the
terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural
resources under Sec. 7(b), a
right vested by the
Constitution only to the
State.
• Justice Vitug: YES •
Sec.7and57gobeyondtothecontextoft
hefundamentallawandvirtuallyamou
ntamounttoan undue delegation, if
not an acceptable abdication, of
State authority over a significant
area of the country and its
patrimony.