JURISDICTION
prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature
HANNAH SERRANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan—the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin
requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of
PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.
It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an individual is
interested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the
other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec.
4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g)
of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or
manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a nonstock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, albeit
the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature—the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the
commission of a criminal offense.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the
Latter Is Criminal.
A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus
negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In
a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,
under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to
of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt
act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person
and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners
contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid
substituted service of summons, thus: SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders.
Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which
a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen.
Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by
affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II
were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However,
such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
Requirements as laid down in Manotoc vs CA 1. Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying
on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at
least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates. 2. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must
describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. 3.
Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or
residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business.
ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORENA
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information
or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861 over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts
showing the intimate relation between the office and the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information—it is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction
in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office
of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner
does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the
re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in
relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies
a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court,
as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police
Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.
Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears
stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may be applied retroactively.
PEOPLE VS HENRY GO
DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as
co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent
can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy
between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor
did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the
death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary
Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
RAMISCAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: In finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case.
Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
shall not bar the filling of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause
in the resolution subject of the motion
The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are: unsoundness of mind,
prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which
the suspension shall not exceed 60 days. Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a
valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.
With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr.,
failed to establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable cause in
the filing of the case.
PEOPLE VS BENIPAYO
DOCTRINES:
1. Jurisdiction in libel cases belong to the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts.
2. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief
is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
3. The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether the
alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the
resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which court–the RTC or the Sandiganbayan–has
jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong
premise. The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under
our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC
with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it
would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is
explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus: The criminal and civil action
for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense xxx. [Underscoring and italics ours.]
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya, acknowledged the unmistakable import of the
said provision: There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from
doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required is
application. What the law ordains must then be followed.
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,
where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is
committed “by similar means,” and despite the fact that the phrase “by similar means” is not repeated in the
latter portion of Article 360. In these cases, and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its
pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel
cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, we explained at length that: The applicable law is still Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon
City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case, the
MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691.
Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judge’s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7,
1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said
Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it
is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper
disposition.”
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: “Anent the question of
jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional
Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of
six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty
is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 ), said law however,
excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The
Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the
Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel
cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel
cases.”
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in ordering that the
criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding
the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not
alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. “Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively
with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law.” A later enactment like
RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction
that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates
of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted
by a general law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the
jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated
because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict
should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed
as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new
and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the
jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking
cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such
grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of
B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal
libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction
over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
“RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES
AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL
CASES. x x x x “LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER
THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.” (Underscoring supplied)
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41]
Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at
present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a
law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in
writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation
to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive
and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in
relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary
and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion
reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as
former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross
error. This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407
and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the Court
finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.”
LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOCTRINE: Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249, the Congress simply restored the
original provisions of Presidential Decree 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public
officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related
to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIO
DOCTRINE: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the information.
The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In
effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree.
Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense,
but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with
a specific penalty which is in the highest degree.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with
the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl
was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the
other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one
of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of
merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of
them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and
aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in
succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The trial courts impressions of the star
witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses. Further, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi but
positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, demolishes the
alibi.
Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of the
respondent Judge Demetriou denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other
persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was
discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that
even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to
compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.
DISINI JR VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Sec. 21 provides that the RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of RA 10175
(Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) including any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the
place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or
committed with the use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such
commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed,
was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by specially trained judges to handle cybercrime
cases
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
JIMENEZ VS SORONGON
DOCTRINE: The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People
in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the SC.
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]"
"who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the
CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on
his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the
present case.
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
DOCTRINE: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements
of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ personal
violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of
their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that
merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the
execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there
are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery
constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement accords with the
presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly
accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and
with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged
In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused (Motion to Suspend Pendente
Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings filed for and against them achieved the goal of
the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just oral arguments but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given
an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against a mandatory suspension under RA 3019,
then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that
to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.
PEOPLE VS SORIA
DOCTRINE: The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the of ense should be regarded
as a description of only one of ense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of
multifariousness.
1. Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1
of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and
it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is
commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse but It is evident from the
testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and
entered her organ. AAA stated that she only knew that it was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into
her vagina after being told by her brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s
penis which touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that
there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, which declaration was hearsay
due to BBB’s failure to testify.
The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular instrument
or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was
inserted into her vagina. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the
act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence
and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual assault.
It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA to file the charges
publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed committed.
2. The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph 2
thereof. The Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted
rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged
that appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause
ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not
invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an offense may be
committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more
modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing
the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the
information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness." Any objection from the
appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same
before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault,
depending on the evidence adduced during trial.
In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A, it is essential to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of "AAA".
There must be proof that his penis touched the labia of "AAA" or slid into her female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing therein that would show that she was raped through
sexual intercourse. While "AAA" categorically stated that she felt something inserted into her vagina, her
testimony was sorely lacking in important details that would convince us with certainty that it was indeed the
penis of appellant that was placed into her vagina.
Based on the evidence adduced, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by
sexual assault.
UNION BANK VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is two- fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on
trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that subject to existing laws,
the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states: Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it
can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.
RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE:
1. Civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
The circumstances that have been established do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so.
His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how
the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr.
Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are
not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
2. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only
to that arising from the offense charged.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the
criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial
entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard
was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect.
Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a
party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched
here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly,
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation
"engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng
Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum
must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the
operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly,
assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
CASTILLO VS SALVADOR
DOCTRINE: An acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused is not exempt from civil liability,
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
In Manantan v. CA, we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused as
follows. "Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act
or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability, which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.
A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [S]ince the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, [Phillip] is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,
we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
In discrediting [Castillo's] allegation that she gave [Phillip] US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1)
[Castillo] failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave
conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) [Castillo]failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she
could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-
carried toHong Kong; (3) [Castillo's] claim of trust as reason for not requiring [Phillip] to sign a receipt was
inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) [Castillo's] behavior after
the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been
swindled.
LIM VS. KOU CO PING
DOCTRINE: If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. Because of the
distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the of ended party
may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without of ending the rules on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be
pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil
Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute
felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of
the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the
criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil
liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the
final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing
the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.”
The independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as
provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the
offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending
the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
DOCTRINE: The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that
the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action.”
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for
quasi-delict—without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend
the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or
guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against
the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in
the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
PEOPLE VS ROMERO
DOCTRINE: The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability ex delicto.
Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero.
MAGISTRADO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case,” therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other. However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon
proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another
case pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants.
Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in
the first action are settled, the second action should be stayed. The power to stay proceedings is incidental to
the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time
and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants
and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.
PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL
DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the
resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. Clearly, the
civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action
was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.
A prejudicial question is defined as: “x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.”
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution
of their marriage, in case the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is granted, it will have no effect on
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
J.M. DOMINGUEZ VS LICLICAN
DOCTRINE: As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence
of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
1. As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two
essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case. To be
sure, the Civil involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD’s meetings, election and acts of
its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two
contesting group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company’s helm. Without resolution of the civil
case, petitioners’ authority to commence and prosecute the Criminal case against respondents for qualified
theft in JMD’s behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
2. In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion
when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial question.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge presiding
over its JDR. As correctly held by the CA.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have barred the
filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a juridical person
can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before Judge Tiongson-
Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers, injunction and other
reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate directors of JMD such
that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for JMD.
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
FENEQUITO VS VERGARA, JR.
DOCTRINE: It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the
RTC. Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275,
entitled “Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and
City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was
the law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to
as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or
municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to
the institution of criminal prosecutions.”
1. The Court notes at the outset that one of the grounds relied upon by the CA in dismissing petitioners’
petition for review is the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to
the petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, they, however, failed to comply with these requirements. Worse, they did not even
mention anything about it in the said Motion. Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides: “Sec. 3. Effect of
failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service
of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude
is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In
an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with
greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. In the instant case,
petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the Rules. Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their
non-observance even when they sought reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing their petition. Such
obstinacy is incongruous with their late plea for liberality in construing the Rules. On the above basis alone, the
Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
2. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Upon the other
hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
done upon its merits. The RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of
petitioners’ motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e., the continuation of the
criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Specifically, the MeTC has yet
to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and finally render the proper judgment.
Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report, submitted as evidence by
respondent to the prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus,
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The Court is not persuaded.
It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that the
document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the
standard signatures “reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an
indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.” The Court agrees with the
prosecutor’s pronouncement in its Resolution dated September 22, 2003, that although the findings of the
PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that “no definite conclusion
can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are photocopies wherein minute details are not
clearly manifested,” the fact that an expert witness already found that the questioned signatures were not
written by one and the same person already creates probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime of
falsification of public document.
In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense
charged was committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof.
With respect to respondent’s legal personality to appeal the Order of the MeTC, suffice it to say that the
appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public prosecutor who handles the
case.
It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the RTC. Section
35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled
“Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City
Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the
law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as
prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or
municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to
the institution of criminal prosecutions.” In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held by
this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial
courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial
courts. Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City
Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the same.
Moreover, petitioners’ reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision refers only
to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor’s power to file an information or dismiss a case is
predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State
Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor
or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the
Chief State Prosecutor. Stated differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State
Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of
probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION VS REYES
DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a
case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision
and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts.
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely,
there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code,9 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision
and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts.
In the present case, after review and reconsideration, the Secretary of Justice reversed the investigating
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause that all the elements of the crime of estafa are present. Estafa, under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by―
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).―Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below: x x x x
 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: (a) x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting,
to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
In reversing the finding of probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed, the Secretary of Justice
reasoned out that, [the] theory of conversion or misappropriation is difficult to sustain and that under the
crime of estafa with grave abuse of confidence, the presumption is that the thing has been devoted to a
purpose or is different from that for which it was intended but did not take place in this case. The CA, in
sustaining the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, ruled that the element of misappropriation or
conversion is wanting. It further ratiocinated that the demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and
the failure of the accused to account for it, are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation, however, the said
presumption is rebuttable and if the accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing
delivered in trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.
It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its
purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely,
there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all
the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of
P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of
land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the
failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so,
constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion,
that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
ABANADO VS BAYONA
DOCTRINE: The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.”
Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. The courts must consider the
rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the actions
of a public prosecutor is put in question. The Department of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS)
Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as
far as practicable. Such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA VS OBIAS
DOCTRINE: The justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the investigating
prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court; The justice secretary’s subsequent
resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction
over the case.
Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where there are facts
and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, "[t]he parties can be present at the hearing but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may
be asked to the party or witness concerned." Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for
reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate petitioners’ right to due process.
The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to
the power of review by the DOJ.
Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall
direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the
parties. In reversing the DOJ’s finding of probable cause, the OP found merit in the argument of the
respondent that the DOJ’s finding that she was with Aclan when she went to the residence of Engr. Tria early in
the morning of May 22, 1998, was not sufficiently established. The OP gave more weight to the affidavit of
Calayag stating that Aclan was not around when they and respondent, among other visitors, were at Engr. Tria’s
house at that time -- than that account given by SA Eduarte, which was uncorroborated.
As to the double sale allegedly committed by the respondent from which the latter’s strong motive to liquidate
Engr. Tria was inferred, the OP found this as a mere expression of opinion by the investigators considering that
Engr. Tria’s widow, Mrs. Pura Tria, categorically admitted her knowledge of the said transaction. Neither was
the OP persuaded by the NBI’s "kiss of death" theory since it is but a customary way of greeting a friend to
shake hands and hence it cannot imply that respondent utilized this as a signal or identification for the gunman
to shoot Engr. Tria. Respondent’s alleged indifference immediately after Engr. Tria was gunned down while
conversing with her, was also negated by the affidavit of an employee of Philippine Air Lines based at the Pili
Airport, stating that right after the incident took place he saw respondent in the radio room in shock and was
being given water by another person.
Considering the totality of evidence, the OP was convinced there was nothing suspicious or abnormal in
respondent’s behavior before, during and after the fatal shooting of Engr. Tria as to engender a well-founded
belief of her complicity with the killing of Engr. Tria. Petitioners, however, maintain that the records are replete
with abundant proof of respondent’s complicity in the murder of Engr. Tria.
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or
may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is
not a pronouncement of guilt. On the other hand, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
We reverse the OP’s ruling that the totality of evidence failed to establish a prima facie case against the
respondent as a conspirator in the killing of Engr. Tria. To begin with, whether or not respondent actually
conspired with Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved during the preliminary investigation. The absence or
presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated
before the trial court during trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially
an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a
crime. Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary
investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely
to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave
abuse.
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, we find no such grave abuse when the Secretary of
Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.
The following facts and circumstances established during preliminary investigation were sufficient basis to
incite reasonable belief in respondent’s guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had credible reason to have Engr. Tria
killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for estafa from her double sale of his lot prior to his
death, judging from the strong interest of Engr. Tria’s family to run after said property and/or proceeds of the
second sale to a third party; (b) Access - respondent was close to Engr. Tria’s family and familiar with his work
schedule, daily routine and other transactions which could facilitate in the commission of the crime eventually
carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan) she and her father categorically admitted being in her
company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before the latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious
Behavior -- respondent while declaring such close personal relationship with Engr. Tria and even his family,
failed to give any satisfactory explanation why she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend while
they conversed and shook hands at the airport.
Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if nothing happened, as
what she did, nor refuse to volunteer information that would help the authorities investigating the crime,
considering that she is a vital eyewitness. Not even a call for help to the people to bring her friend quickly to
the hospital. She would not even dare go near Engr. Tria’s body to check if the latter was still alive. All the
foregoing circumstances, in our mind, and from the point of view of an ordinary person, lead to a reasonable
inference of respondent’s probable participation in the well-planned assassination of Engr. Tria.
UY VS JAVELLANA
DOCTRINE: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be
conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an of ense where the penalty prescribed by law is
at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.
Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v.
Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never
previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) ofthe Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be
dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon
requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the
express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellana’s argument
that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v.
Celeste, et al. were not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground.
Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the
accused in People v. Celeste, et al. (hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he
needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to
arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of
said Rule. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were charged
with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under
Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
PEOPLE VS VALENCIA
DOCTRINE: 1. Information can be filed without a preliminary investigation against an accused arrested without
warrant.
2. Preliminary investigation; deemed waived when not invoked.
A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of
Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. 24 Under said Section 7, Rule 112, 25 the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court
without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant’s case
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the
case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, 27 the
Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, 28 when he did, in fact,
pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment.
PCGG VS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
DOCTRINE: 1. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts
as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
2. Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable
basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for
it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
It must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information
should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there
is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in
an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court's
pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:
xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination of the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it,
in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.] (Emphasis and underscoring in
the original)
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by the
Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to
hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,
the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following manner,
to wit:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable
basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for
it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint against individual respondents for lack of probable cause, as will be
explained hereunder.
As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the elements of
which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in
the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were likewise charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of
the same law, which has the following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into
a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may also be charged with violation
of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.
Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings contained in the Executive
Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative
value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada
v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held
that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay, viz.:
Justice Brion's pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable cause does not depend on the
validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies
presented" correctly recognizes the doctrine in the United States that the determination of probable cause can
rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the hearsay statement is
credible. In United States v. Ventresca, the United States Supreme Court held:
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long held that "the term
'probable cause' . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation," x x x and that a finding of
"probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial, x x x As the Court
stated in Brinegar v. United States x x x, "There is a large difference between two things to be proved (guilt and
probable cause), as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the
quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." Thus, hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the
warrant "so long as there ... [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." x x x And, in Aguilar, we
recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal
observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances"
supporting the affiant's conclusions and his belief that any informant involved "whose identity need not be
disclosed..." was "credible" or his information "reliable." x x x.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties, x x x.
DE LIMA VS REYES
DOCTRINE: The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal.
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of
prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions." A quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature." Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders
awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of
a court.
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent-is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the
prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v. Go:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He
does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the fiscal to prepare-his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it. is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-
judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of
the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A
quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same
effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.
In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was filed
against the Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The assailed order directed all prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Celso de los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel created by the Department of Justice.
This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to
tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely
administrative or executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform
functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency:
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial
office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ
exercise a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable
cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating: . . . [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does
not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the
public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity, between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly ends there. For sure,
a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its
awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same
effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against
a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor's orders or resolutions.
RULE 113 – ARREST
SARAUM VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to
the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were
justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from
it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty
are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to
sustain the judgment of conviction.
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness on the findings of
fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and
binding. Besides, a review of the records reveals that the CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. In
this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia,
particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in
evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant in
accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante
delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum’s statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of his
arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a
disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, while they were in
the course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest,
entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items.
Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust
operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the
contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that
they were indeed drug paraphernalia. There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and
finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said
items since possession itself is the punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and
seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the
various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing
them. Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise
lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore,
admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the
judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he did
not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived."
In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia,
invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution.
COMERCIANTE VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers
have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to
discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance
inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act
could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former
had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with
a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3
Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the
fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and
seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that
what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have
been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of
the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably
committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not
obtain in this case.
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and
frisk" searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is,
law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself
or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police
officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
x x x x Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and
frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable
cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of
the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it
cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which,
taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all
will not result in a reasonable search.
LUZ VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be
used against them.
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136,
or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or
take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself
testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.Even if one were to work under the assumption that
petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. GRANTED.
ANTIQUERA VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain
his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in
that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a
pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects
relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt
used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body
in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the
prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not
for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused
was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a “peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of
107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them
to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol
car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where
they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted
their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search
and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the
police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid
search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.”
PEOPLE VS VASQUEZ
DOCTRINE: Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea on arraignment.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in
People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against
them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the
fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover
police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having
established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of
the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected
in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)Thus, the appellant cannot seek
exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
RULE 114 – BAIL
FLORESTA VS UBIADAS
DOCTRINE: Judges owe it the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply
to a given controversy.
Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the
law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording the prosecution due process.
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the Code of Judicial
Conduct, they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to
a given controversy. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for
judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the
proper court, not file an administrative complaint.
However, having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Ubiadas is liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
The Court takes the occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the interests of
the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt,
and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction, against the
right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements.
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the
government service for assistance.
Judge Ubiadas was not only aware of complainant’s designation, hence, belying his explanation that he must
have overlooked the same. It also shows his ignorance of the provision of the Ombudsman Act which does not
require the presence of a special reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any
prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.
ZUNO VS CABEBE
DOCTRINE: The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in
cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter
of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion.It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion,
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order
for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be
held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for
bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section
19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a
hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of
the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these
are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Respondent’s contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that the
prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify
the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has
been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his
office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render justice without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these standards.
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPEC. ADM. REGION VS OLALIA
DOCTRINE: The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation
of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No.
153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in
international law:
1. the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
2. the higher value now being given to human rights;
3. the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and
4. the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and
the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual
and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee
may be allowed to post bail.
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. A grant of bail does not prevent
the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on
the merits.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail
may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the
assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan,
seem to be a flight risk.
As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing sway to
the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release on bail. As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates
the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner
is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder
after all the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the
evidence for or against the bail application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present
case, respondent Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of the main case.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the
evidence.
OKABE VS GUTIERREZ
DOCTRINE: Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify
previous rulings of the Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon; Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application.
In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should
not rely solely on the said report.[The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor
but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the
accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his
duty and rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary
investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the
filing of the Information.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant such
set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
judge must make a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused. Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in
conducting a preliminary investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for the purpose of
securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information against the respondent, he
executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence presented, there is a
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the
trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.
LEVISTE VS CA
DOCTRINE: Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty
and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. An erroneously convicted accused who is
denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed; Under what circumstances an accused
may obtain bail pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused;
In the exercise of discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.
Under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more
than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances:
1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification;
3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed
grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
1. Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides: Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to
judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The
hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
a) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
b) Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section
19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail.
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis
in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. They arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the
Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellants control or possession.
The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it
established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that
petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an
electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in
the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of
the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: To be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires,
inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or
omissions and its attendant circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the
court to pronounce judgment.
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In
particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in
the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the
law. The raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a person
of common understanding in appreciating the import of the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality. A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he
ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages
to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would
yield.
Suspension is valid.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given
an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A.
No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well
settled that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.
PEOPLE VS LARA
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins
and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not part of
custodial investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel.
• That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification
of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
• People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda
rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts
when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
• The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.
• An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a
group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all
or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. During the police line-up, the accusatory process
had not yet commenced.
• Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a
prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.
SANICO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so serious
that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be reopened to give to the
client another chance to present his case.
Without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect that his counsel would afford to him competent legal
representation. The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the protection
of the interests of the petitioner as the client — as manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings
discovered in the petition for review — was gross negligence in any language because the defects were plainly
avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules of Court. If the
incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so serious that the client was
prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be reopened to give to the client another
chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have his
conviction reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
PEOPLE VS AYSON
DOCTRINE: The rights guaranteed a person under Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution are not available when he
is not under custodial investigation. Thus, a statement or confession voluntarily given by an employee during
an administrative investigation that he had malversed his employer’s funds is admissible although without a
prior information of said rights and without the assistance of counsel.
The handwritten admission and statement of accused were declared to be admissible.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry.” It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party
or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to
him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength
of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against selfincrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well-known
axiom that everyone is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character
or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
VILLAREAL VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The right to a speedy trial is violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for
no cause or justifiable motive.
The SC did not see any grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to
the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to
secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September
21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of
Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply
with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December
27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven
years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas
motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant
for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon.
RULE 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
PEOPLE VS ESTOMACA
DOCTRINE: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge
himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking
him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the
accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be
strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense
in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
The transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely consisted of the bare reading of the 5 complaints. It was
reported in the transcript that “Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect”.
Since it was stated in the singular, the court speculates whether all 5 complaints were actually ready, translated
or explained to him on a level within his comprehension considering his limited education. Parenthetically,
there was no statement of record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes
added significance since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language, spoken in a major part of
Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz.
Within a province or major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects
spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript intended to
convey that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it
would be different if local dialect was used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably,
without identifying what it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provision of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of
the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or information be read to the
accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his comprehension of the charges.
The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable
demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and
throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which
appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect is known as kinaray-a. Barring previous exposure to or as
a consequence of extended social or commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor
spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an
appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is the dialect of kinaray-a, since
they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but
in technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were translated to
Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant was truly and honestly made aware of the charges and,
especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything on
this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a man's life is
at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty. Since no valid
judgments can be had upon an invalid arraignment, the cases were set aside and were remanded to the trial
court.
PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN
DOCTRINE: Procedural defect of belated arraignment was cured when the counsel of the accused participated
in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after the
case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the
appellant and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him.
He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time
the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
The accused is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment,
conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against
him.
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were
appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the
proceedings?We do not think so. Appellant’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural
defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet
to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise,
his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when
appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial
court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his
constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not
allow it.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we
held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision,
the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced
by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him was not violated.
DAAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: 1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval—it usually involves the defendant’s
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
2. Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings but it may also be made
during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: SEC.
2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of
the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court.
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made
during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of
guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use
word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely
to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution
had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The
Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the
charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are
likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits
they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus,
setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However,
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be
accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount
of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In
short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the
accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
PEOPLE VS JANJALANI
DOCTRINE:
1. All trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice
demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction;
The requirement for a judge to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.
2. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the
defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused—the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the
accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.
3. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment.
The SC ruled that the trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital of ense; reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez,
the Court noted that since accusedappellant’s original plea was “not guilty,” the trial court should have exerted
careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to “guilty.”
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it
was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in
this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the
accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea;
that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death
would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is
stringent and mandatory. Nevertheless, the High Court is not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The
Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge—multiple murder
—based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt—
one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during
pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances,
we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the “searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the
case for rearraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment under consideration.
ABS-CBN CORP. VS GOZON
TOPIC: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.—Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office.
DOCTRINE: The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment
of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela PeñaReyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after
the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. The trial court
erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the
case.
The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits allowed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v.
Judge Mogul was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department
of Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already pending with this
court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court. The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela PeñaReyes and Manalastas’ arraignment
after the 60day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8,
2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full
control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure
to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the requirements of due process and erodes the Court’s
independence and integrity.”
ENRILE VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless
grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of
the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. The general function of a
bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the
function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not
be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove
the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information
included in the bill of particulars.
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is
filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of
discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a
bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary without
any explanation supporting this conclusion constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Some of the desired details
are material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The
Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the
necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile
stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired
details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the
desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an
accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the proof; it
limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as supplemented
by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the
right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or
less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
Sec, 9 Rule 116, Bill of particulars.—The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to
enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an
accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In
civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary procedural document consisting of
an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation
of the facts recited in the pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a
party to prepare his responsive pleading properly. In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific
conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its
purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case; to prepare his defense and to
avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same
offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence. In dealing with a
motion for a bill of particulars in a criminal case, judges should observe that: (a) the remedy is distinct from a
motion to quash in the sense that it presupposes that the acts or offenses constituting the offense (or the
ultimate facts that comprise the crime’s component elements) are already stated in the Information, albeit
may be couched in vague language; (b) the remedy is, as mentioned, not meant to supply evidential
information (or evidentiary facts); and (c) the particulars to be allowed are only those details that would allow
a man of ordinary intelligence, as may be reasonable under the circumstances, to, again, properly plead during
his arraignment and to prepare his defense for trial. Accordingly, the analysis involved in motion for bill of
particulars should go beyond a simple ultimate factsevidentiary facts dichotomy. If the Information is lacking, a
court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of particulars
elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the
accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position
of disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of
which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The
accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes
more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital
punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of
transactions spread over a considerable period of time.
RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH
PEOPLE VS LACSON
DOCTRINE: The interpretation of Sec. 8 of Rule 117 to the effect that in the event that the accused is
prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an identical information, the new proceedings being
conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh has in its favor the soundest policy considerations based
no less on the fundamental objectives of procedural rules.
Section 1 (g) of Rule 116—Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused. The time of the pendency or a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes
justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on
the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived. The
public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order
of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on
the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the
writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or
silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional
dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be
revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The
case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to
oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the
filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no
need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies
or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the
new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For
his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a
personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to
have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its examination.
The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the
presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had
already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that: 1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this
Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and 2) warrants for the arrest of the
accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident. Other
equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99- 81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
PANAGUITON VS DOJ
DOCTRINE: The prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods.
Act 3326 provides: “Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy.”
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted. “the term ‘proceedings’ should now be understood either executive or judicial in character”. To rule
otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control.
PEOPLE VS DUMLAO
DOCTRINE: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash—insufficiency of evidence
is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.
Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground
for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of
evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated
the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and
to prove the culpability of the accused.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not
consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him,
and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
SORIANO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a),19 Rule 117 of
the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law.
The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved
by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than one (1) offense is
charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were
duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section
3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous
information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.15
Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or
multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with
more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity
of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the charges filed
against him proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that
he cannot be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already
being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
The contention has no merit.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held: As early as
the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than
one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses
arising from the same act are not "the same" — x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the
same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is
consistent with settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A
DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling
requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related
interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to
enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department.
The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the
prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was,
therefore, proper.
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the same do
not constitute an offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law.
The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved
by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.
We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material allegations charging Soriano with
violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the informations alleged that Soriano was the
president of RBSMI, while Ilagan was then its general manager; that during their tenure, Soriano, with the
direct participation of Ilagan, and by using the names of Virgilio Malang and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to
indirectly obtain loans without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling
requirements, in violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 37722 as amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with estafa thru falsification of
commercial document. They allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol
obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the
amounts reflected in the promissory notes and other bank records.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b)23 of
the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same; (ii) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender,
or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended party to the offender.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further alleged the following essential elements
of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage. The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981, thus, charge
petitioners with the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail
the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter
a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to
quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their
motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify
immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error,
much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
CEREZO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the
sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the
trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.
It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial
court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is
the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial
court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were
thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were
void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.
This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to
determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
Information anew. It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as
in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Since we have held that the Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the
case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the
case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
CO VS NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
DOCTRINE: While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the
right of the accused to speedy trial.
Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence
that the alleged “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the
same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has
emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.”In determining whether
the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the
proceedings.The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. “While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.”
PEOPLE VS DE LEON
DOCTRINE: A Buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the
operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and ruled that the
elements of the crime were sufficiently established, thereby affirming the decision of the CA.
RULE 119 – TRIAL
SALVANERA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at
a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
To require Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is
to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the
proposed state witnesses. The Supreme Court ruled that a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a
fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are
corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony
only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects. It
is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the
case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are
corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes
manifest."
As co-conspirators, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is
contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of
the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No
one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed
state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
VDA. DE MANGUERRA VS. RISOS
DOCTRINE: It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is
pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his
right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This
is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the
parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to
support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe
the witnesses’ demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is
also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive
the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in
the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
PEOPLE VS. JIMENEZ
DOCTRINE: The requirement is that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she
should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the
accused may be given the same penalty due to conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the
least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. What the rule
avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms
of participation would be penalized.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness, what are
controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed.
The SC ruled that from the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge
Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of
his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. While Lope allegedly
assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not indicate that he had active participation in
hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual
killing of Ruby Rose which was executed by accused Lennard. Montero’s participation was limited to providing
the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box to seal the
cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box
containing the cadaver into the sea.
The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty
is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the
commission of the crime. The appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court
on this factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes.
PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO
DOCTRINE: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of
innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
The RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of the other
accused during the promulgation of judgment. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in
absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused
may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived.
When the Decision was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in
their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, RTC not only failed to cause the arrest
of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint MR with respect to the respondents who
were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a MR that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at
large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court.
ASISTIO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: “Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case
on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court
is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc."
In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of
evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the
merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the
prosecution. This being the case the RTC order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal hence may still be
subject to an appeal under Rule 41 of the ROC.
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It must
be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence,
and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction. The requisites that must be
present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or
the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. There is no double jeopardy in
this case as the dismissal was with the accusedappellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the
case through a demurrer to evidence he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.
CABRADOR VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: One can avail of a demurrer to evidence only after the plaintiff or the prosecution has rested its
case. Resting one’s case requires a formal offer of evidence which has been commented on or has been
opposed and the court has already ruled on the formal offer of evidence together with the opposition or
comment thereto.
The SC ruled that Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer to evidence. He did not waive his right to
present evidence. There are 2 stages in the trial proper of a criminal case: (1) prosecution's presentation of
evidence against the accused; and (2) accused's presentation of evidence in his defense. If after the first stage,
the evidence appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion
of the accused dispense with the second stage, and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial
court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the
remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must
consider the ff: the allegations in it were made in good faith; the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; the
primary objective of the party filing it.
Cabador in his MTD pointed out how the trial dragged on for years; the gaps between hearings were long, with
hearings often postponed due to the absence of the prosecutor. And it was compounded by the repeated
motions for extension by the prosecutor to make the formal offer, and its failure to make such offer. He invoked
his right to speedy trial.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy
trail. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the
accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of
Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such
evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime, something that is fundamental in ay demurrer. It did not
touch on any particular testimony or documentary exhibit. He could not do so because he did not know that
the prosecution finally made its offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his MTD.
A demurrer assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. In this case, after the prosecution filed its
formal offer, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity to object to the admission of those
exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be
deemed to have rested its case. The MTD was filed before he could object to the offer, before the trial court
could rule on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case. It cannot be said that he intended his
MTD to serve as a demurrer. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
PEOPLE VS. TAN
DOCTRINE: The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had
pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express
consent. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Double jeopardy applies. In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and cannot be appealed.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that
the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it
conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC violate
petitioner’s right to due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as
gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence, no
grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at
after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, RTC extensively discussed its
position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s
decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World
Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares,
or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
IMPERIAL VS. JOSON
DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays.
The accused’s right to speedy trial was not violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because it would place accused in double jeopardy. It is still reviewable but only through
certiorari under Rule 65.
Actual damage to government arising from non-liquidation of cash advance is not an essential element.
Instead, mere failure to timely liquidate is the gravamen of the offense. Even if Sandiganbayan proceeded from
an erroneous interpretation of law, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. The
error committed is of such nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by prosecution because it would
place accused in double jeopardy. Such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already set in.
BANGAYAN, JR. VS. BANGAYAN
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, acquittal of accused or dismissal of case against him can only be appealed by
Solicitor General. Court cannot review an order granting demurrer to evidence. Acquitting the accused on
ground by insufficiency of evidence is of such based on the merits, thus to do so will place accused in double
jeopardy.
Double jeopardy already set in. All 4 elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid information for bigamy
was filed against petitioners. They pleaded not guilty to charges against them and subsequently case was
dismissed after the prosecution rested its case. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants
demurrer, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to acquittal of the accused. Even
if trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against petitioners, it only committed an error of
judgment and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by certiorari. It must be shown that a party
was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. JOSE GO
DOCTRINE: Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. To
be sufficient, evidence must prove: (1) that commission of crime and (2) precise degree of participation by the
accused. Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence
is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Trial court effectively failed and /or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against Go, which it was duty-
bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC
depositors’ money – not to mention that banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court
should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving issues.
Demand is not an element of the felony. Furthermore, as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to
be the author of the falsification. It is irrelevant that the proceeds of supposed loans were made payable to
entities other than the alleged borrowers. The bottom line is that they are encashed using bank funds, and the
proceeds were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used to fund personal checks.
PEOPLE VS. PEPINO
DOCTRINE: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a
witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on an independent in-court
identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court identification during the police lineup.
The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all
other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless
arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and
had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test , there was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after
the gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition,
Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day" during the four days that he was detained.
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In
addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among
those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants
of the car when he was about to be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the person who pointed a
gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors.
She maintained that she was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not
forget Pepino's face.
Police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup;
Edward was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have been
ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been a separate
lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did
not render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to
Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those already presented
to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the
appellants were already the focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial
investigation when the out-of-court identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having been tainted by an irregular
out-ofcourt identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests.
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to him.
RULE 120 – JUDGMENT
LLAMAS VS. CA
DOCTRINE: The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.
Rule 47 limits the scope of the remedy to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTC for
which ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petitions for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. The remedy cannot be resorted to when RTC judgment being
questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not
permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases as stated in Sec 18 Rule 124: only Rules 42,
44 to 46 and 48 to 56.
PEOPLE VS. MONTECLAROS
DOCTRINE: When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of crime and
though all the persons who took part in commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared
among them. It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when
they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of crime and consequently, differing degrees of
liability. The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on nature and degree of his
participation in commission of crime.
Finding guilt of Ida as an accomplice in rape is dependent on proving the guilt of principal accused. Ida
participated in commission of crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not
that of a principal but as an accomplice. Community of design between acts of Tampus and Ida is present.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. The courts have discretion to determine the
apportionment of civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice, and accessory are respectively liable for,
without guidelines with respect to basis of allotment. Each of the participants should be liable only for acts
actually committed by him. The power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal
and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and caprice.
Since Tampus died before final judgment, his civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished. His share in civil
indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice. And even if Tampus were alive, Ida would
only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity. With death of Tampus, Ida’s subsidiary
liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that accessory follows the
principal.
HIPOS SR. VS. BAY
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or
the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. If petitioners believed that the
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuance of Order denying Motion to Withdraw
Information, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for certiorari against the
assailed order. Furthermore, once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or
dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court.
Remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not discretionary one. While
judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be compelled by mandamus to act on the
same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e. to grant or deny such Motion. The trial court, when
confronted with Motion to Withdraw Information on ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the
resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of
the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfies by the respondent judge in the case at bar.
PEOPLE VS. LORENZO
DOCTRINE: Presumption of innocence of accused is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused in guilty of offense charged by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of drug. It must be established with moral certainty. Non-compliance with the
stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officers.
There must be a Chain of evidence. However, in this case, it was not certain when and where the said marking
was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter. Prosecution did not
present poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone witness of prosecution was at
least four meters away from accused and poseur-buyer. With that distance, it was impossible for him to hear
the conversation.
Facts and circumstances create a doubt as to whether sachets of shabu seized were the same one that were
released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory exam.
PEOPLE VS. BARON
DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant conspired with his
coaccused in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury could not be sustained because there was no genuine,
imminent, and reasonable threat, preventing his escape that compelled him to take part in the commission of
the offense charged.
There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime.
However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts
and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours
and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at least request for
assistance from the people around him.
ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses
Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in
the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In case of exoneration of the accused, the civil liability
may still arise when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes
damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts
he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, Court found that the acts
allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto. Moreover, the defective
notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from
spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner
caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter
sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.
The Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action
for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages.
Sentences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose
sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot
impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.
PEOPLE VS. ASIS
DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. (2) While certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (3)
An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court s evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct
errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari is the proper remedy A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a
verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level.
Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed right against double
jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
appellate court. Exception to Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-
acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without
exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the
accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. In People v LouelUy, the Court said that petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is appropriate upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court in acquitting the
accused: (1) Committed reversible errors of judgment (2) Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment void. No
double jeopardy When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. OSG s petition for certiorari
before the CA, however, is bereft of merit While the CA was erroneous of dismissing the petition, the OSG s
petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft of merit. While certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. A
reading of the OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Also,
what the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating
Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for
certiorari cannot review a trial court s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment
cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those
involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. Error of Judgment v Error of Jurisdiction Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.
An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will botbe issued to cure errors by the trial
court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and
its conclusions of law.
BASILONIA VS. VILLARUZ
The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a
judgment in a criminal case became final and executory necessarily calls for the resolution of the twin issues of
whether the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime already
extinguished.
Prescription of Penalty
As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, the Court already opined that evasion of
service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al.
expounded on the rule that the culprit should escape during the term of imprisonment in order for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run.
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence
to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest
time, they were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by
final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state,
respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for
execution and in eventually granting the same.
Extinction of Civil Liability
In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the
five-year period or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. Worse, other than the bare
allegation that the judgment has not been enforced because the public prosecutor has not acted on the
request to file a motion for execution, no persuasive and compelling reason was presented to warrant the
exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant case does not fall
within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was entirely beyond their
control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same.
In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
MORILLO VS. PEOPLE
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that
some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first
court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain procedural
infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it
shall represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the
appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without
the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower
court, when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on
the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, when there is grave error committed by
the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires.
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial
of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting the aggrieved party’s prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy, in violation
of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated.
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the same
should be summarily dismissed. The unique and special circumstances attendant in the instant petition,
however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent.
Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a
dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal.
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show
that defendant’s guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or
that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.
The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal
and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided
on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant
could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case,
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of
its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of Appeals erred when
it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear
showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant
petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information,
in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper
interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints
filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a
blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the rules.
Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict
adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far
better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
CA decision reversed. RTC decision affirming MeTC’s decision is reinstated.
RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
ESTINO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction
becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial in
relation to the conviction of Estino and Pescadera for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
We resolve to grant petitioners a chance to prove their innocence by remanding the case to the Sandiganbayan
for a new trial of Criminal Case No. 26192. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial
before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that
petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental
Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented the evidence of payment of
RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was the nonpayment of benefits under the
1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998 reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled
during trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the
RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget because the prosecutions evidence was confined to alleged
nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget.
BRIONES VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the
following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of
the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial,
the other conditions were not established.
For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following
conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have
been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and
produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other
conditions were not established.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence,
have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or
reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial.
Under the circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the
firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm,
which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm and having
immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent to the place of the incident.
Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject firearm, but did not do
anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below. In any case, we fail to see how the
recovery of the firearm can be considered material evidence that will affect the outcome of the case; the
recovery of the subject firearm does not negate the commission of the crime charged.
SALUDAGA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative
or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
The Pornelos affidavit cannot qualify as newly-discovered evidence as it was already in existence prior to the
re-filing of the case.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the
evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment.
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in
November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found
evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was
among the documents considered during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to
petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding
was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.
LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it
must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered." Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must
be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court.
The affidavit of said police officer cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence as the defense failed to
show that it has exerted efforts during trial to secure testimonies of Jurado and others.
To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be
shown that the evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section 2,10 Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence,
have been discovered before the trial in the court below.11 Movant failed to show that the defense exerted
efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the
investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the
belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening
of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially
attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants
were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
PAYUMO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCTRINE: New and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial; requisites.
On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in Criminal Case No. 4219,
the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial. The records of the JAGO
relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would
merit a new trial.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are
met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking
to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such
records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered
evidence. There was nothing that prevented the accused from using these records during the trial to
substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a military operation. The Court finds and
so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it nullified the
November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction
where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as
determined by law.
RULE 122-125 - APPEALS
MACAPAGAL VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true
copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot ignore
and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice
of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below,
the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders
of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections
2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when
appeal is taken.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue
writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there
are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not
present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s
decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming
committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her
notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for
reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June
29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for
reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified
true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
PEOPLE VS. MORALES
DOCTRINE: "The accused must not have opportunity for escape of self-defense"
Since according to the ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a
person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In
Del Rosario, however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough -By not availing of the chance to
escape (since the other accused were waiting for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their allegation of fear or
duress becomes untenable, for it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
The fear (threats against family members), were not of imminence as to prevent any chance of escape, and
that this fear they allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the exempting circumstance.
The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they
are w/ them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom) clearly shows that there was close
coordination, indicating a common purpose or design.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense,
and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its
execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established.
It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
QUIDET VS. PEOPLE
While, generally, factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect by this Court, the Court may look into
such factual matters when the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case.
The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Quidet is criminally liable only for
his individual acts. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose.
Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by
the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interests. However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not sufficient that the attack
be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity
of action and purpose, which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. What is determinative is
proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial
evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this
Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the
hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Quidet conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes
of homicide and attempted homicide.
BALABA VS. PEOPLE
Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan.
Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which further defined the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, reads:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal before the Court
of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review
the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled: An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal.
However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to
appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even
if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
reads: "An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court
but shall be dismissed outright."
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period
to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14
January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004.
Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the
decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s
appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
PEOPLE VS. OLIVIO
Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence
before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by
the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial.
We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence
relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or
circumstantial evidence.
In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order.
One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and
who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal from the trial
court’s judgment. The record does not show the reason therefor.
Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict
appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should
not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact,
under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has
justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment
of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.
GUASCH VS. DELA CRUZ
DOCTRINE: In exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course
to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements
are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge
of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and,
second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts
exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to
an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements
are considered or the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
A review of the records shows that the evidence to make a determination of petitioner’s civil liability is already
at the disposal of the trial court. For example, the checks covering the amounts owed by petitioner to
respondent in the total amount of P3,300,000.00 were already submitted by petitioner to the trial court as
Annexes to the Motion to Quash28 that she filed. Neither can it be said that petitioner’s right to due process
shall be violated if her civil liability be determined in the same case.
PEOPLE VS. TARUC
DOCTRINE: Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he
loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to
have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
1. The escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review
jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it
is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. In this case, considering that the
penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon
review by the appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
2. By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc,18 the
Court enunciated that: “There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He
may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees
after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.”
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he
cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he
is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant
revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances
for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment
nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate
court.
Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well
as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his
appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would
succeed.
TIU VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the
Court of Appeals.
At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General.
Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled is
the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of
Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.
COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: When an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court
Ordinarily, Arnel Colinares would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum
of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would
be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
***Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to
qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently
disqualified from applying for probation.***
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he
certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum
jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the
lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation,
taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state from seeking the annulment of the judgment via
a Rule 65 petition; finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on
criminal judgments.
Only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the
correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention
that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to
reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as
when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating: Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment
of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to
prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of
conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had
been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed
against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the
effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. It must be clarified, however,
that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal
judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and
that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
criminal judgment.
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually
takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e.,
whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the
question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden
— a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law
or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.
DUNGO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated
October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is
either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court
of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter
judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed by
the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the
Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in
all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under
the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of
law.34 Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons.
In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may:
(1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the
Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners.
The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they could
only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply,36
which is a question of fact that would require an examination of the evidence presented. In the interest of
justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole
case for review.
Ultimately, the SC ruled against Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr, Affirming the findings of the CA.
MANANSALA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision
based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code; (b) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that the falsification caused damage to a third
party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender
makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose
only truthful statements in the documents she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject
report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her
personal use; (c) despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein
a statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was
terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that findings of
fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a
clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case or any clear showing
of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for the MeTC to appreciate
the "mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the CA to
affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without correcting the latter court's mistake.
To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the
same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following
elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent;
and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper,
the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in the
preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions, nothing would show
that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of employment should
she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that
would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's criminal liability in this
case - and also taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
RULE 126- SEARCH AND SEIZURE
MICLAT VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: [Under Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165; and the implementing provision of
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165], the failure of the law
enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the
evidence adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions. Verily, no
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is
subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) Search
of evidence in "plain view"; (3) Search of a moving vehicle; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs
search; (6) Stop and Frisk; and (7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a
lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In
the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since
petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the
evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which
incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were
admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.
[Under Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165; and the implementing provision of Section 21
(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165], the failure of the law enforcers
to comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence
adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the drugs seized from
the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken
from the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner
voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the
evidence seized from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were
turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the
subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief
of the SDEU endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District PNP Crime
Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa. After
a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the prosecution from the
arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the
items seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the investigating officer,
sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS
DOCTRINE: Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction
of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is
used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This exception is easy to understand. A
search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile
structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an
aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the
warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried
the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast.
It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the
circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant.
Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied
by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has
already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest
illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items. While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the
justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest
was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because
appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. Even
assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before
the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not.
Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
PEOPLE VS. TUAN
DOCTRINE: A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants residence,
consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
1. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:(1) it must be issued upon
probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The only issue is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular
description of the place to be searched and things to be seized. Probable cause generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. Before a search warrant can
be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being
connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by
a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with
the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this
case. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for Tuan’s residence after said
judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2
Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and
Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of Tuan.
2. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the
case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough.
There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting
of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In a “stop-and-frisk,” it is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual
suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a
dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
The circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her
person was warranted: The police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement
efforts when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her
cigarette case. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to
curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a
police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid “stop-
and-frisk” operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s possession -
later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she
placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruz in introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at
the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the
police officer had identified himself. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave
offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court
with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.
MARIMLA VS. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: As a rule, search warrants should be filed with the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the
crime was committed (Sec. 2 (a), Rule 126, Rules of Court).
The exceptions to the general rule are:
(a) for compelling reasons, it can be filed with the court within whose judicial region the offense was
committed or where the warrant is to be served;
(b) but if the criminal action has already been filed, the application for a search warrant can only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending; and
(c) in case of search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual
Property Code, the Anti- Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, the Executive Judges
and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the
ViceExecutive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by
the NBI, PNP and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF),
and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases,
the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the
application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the
Constitution. At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on
the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically,
Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive
Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP,
NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where
the warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-
10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search
warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the
search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of
the law. The petitioners’ contention lacks merit. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the
enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact,
the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The
Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which
explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN
I. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present during the initial search, the search
was witnessed by accused-appellants themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-
appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellants were caught in actual
possession of the prohibited drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from
assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the illegal drugs seized. They
have not proffered any valid defense in the offense charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
2.This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect
is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering
exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. In this case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was
duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by IO1 Pagaragan to its
subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in Quezon City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who
personally delivered and submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were kept in custody until they were presented as
evidence before the trial court and positively identified by IO1 Pagaragan as the very same specimens he
marked during the inventory.

The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does not undermine the
integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.