2011 ZA 2011 ZB 2012 ZA 2012 ZB 2013 ZA 2013 ZB

1. NPV 3(c) Compare NPV IRR 5(a) NPV for project 7(a) Calculate NPV&IRR 8(a) Calculate NPV&IRR 4(b) Compare NPV IRR 2(c) Derive Gordon model
4(a) Fisher 4(a) Compare NPV IRR Situation they not agree 7) NPV
5) NPV for project 6) NPV
2. CAPM 1(a) Diversification 1(a) Derive CAPM 6(a) beta (b) alpha value 5(a) beta (b) alpha value 1(a) amomalies 4(a) diff capm with
1(b) Rolls Critique (b) Rolls Critique (b) Roll’s critique empirical line (b) if not
6(a) beta, E® 6(a) return and risk hold > efficient?
5(a) beta
3. Factor 6(b) portfolio weights to 6(a) portfolio weights to
replicate & arbitrage replicate& arbitrage
opportunity opportunity
4. Derivatives 8 8 5 7
5. EMH 3(b) Semi strong form 3 (b) weak form 2(a) explain diff form & 4(a) explain diff form & 5(c) violation of form 2(b) violation of form
relates relates 1(c) anomalies consistet
(b) violation of form (b) violation of form with market efficiency
6. MM1 4(a) MM1 irrelevancy of 1(a) MM1 irrelevancy of 2(a) dividend irrelevant 3(a) MM1 violates with 1(b) personal taxes
debt capital structure (b) tax on capital gain / tax 8) Capital structure is
4(b) MM2 Tax effect on (b) MM2 interest tax is dividend / interest 7) Capital structure is irrelevant
debt deductible (c) personal taxes irrelevant
(c) personal taxes affect
7. WACC 6(c) Regeared 5(c) Regeared 8(a) WACC 5(b)(c)(d) WACC
(d) beta of conglomerate (d) beta of conglomerate (b) Regeared (c) beta
equity
(d) FCF > sales price
8.Asymmetric 2(b) agency cost of debt 2(b) agency cost of equity 4(c) Debt signaling 6(b) face value of loan 3(a) debt overhang 1(a) risk shifting
info 3(a) debt signaling 4(b) debt signaling 8(b) face value of loan (c) risk shifting 2(b) debt signaling, (c) debt overhang, debt
(c) risk shifting pecking order signaling (violate MM1)
(c) debt overhang risk 2(a) pecking order theory
shifting (violate MM1)
9. Dividend 4(b) dividend signaling & 3(a) dividend signaling 4(a) Lintner’s 3(a) Lintner’s 3(b) clientele theory 3(c) Lintner’s
policy clientele effect 4(a) irrelevancy of (b) tax clientele theory (b) tax clientele theory 5(a) dividend signaling 5(a) dividend signaling
dividend (c) dividend signaling
10. Takeover 2(a) Impossible Efficient 2(a) How Efficient 3(a) Free rider problem 1(a) Free rider problem 4(c) Free ride problem
Takeover takeover & Implication return to & Implication return to Way to overcome
7) calculate net gain, Occur bidder & target bidder & target Empirical evidence
gain ,cost, net cost for 7) calculate net gain, (b) Explain dilution (b) Explain dilution
shares and exchange gain ,cost, net cost for (c) secret buying shares (c) secret buying shares
shares and exchange
 2014 ZA 2014 ZB 2015 ZA 2015 ZB 2016 ZA 2016 ZB
1. NPV 4(a) Compare NPV IRR 1(c) Compare NPV IRR 4(b) Fisher separation 3(c) Fisher
5(a) Lease NPV 7(a) buy machine (c) Compare IRR NPV 5) NPV
7) NPV
2. CAPM 3(a) Intuition CAPM 3(b) undiversifiable risk 3(b) undiversifiable risk 4(a) anomalies
(b) empirical evidence (c) diversifiable risk (c) diversifiable risk
- anomalies (d) Roll’s / Fama French
(c) Rolls critique
6(a) Beta, E®
3. Factor 3(d) Fama French 4(a) Fama French
4. Derivatives 8 6 8 7 5 6
5. EMH 4(a) Violation of form 3(a) event studies 3(a) event studies 3(a) meaning, diff form 1(a) meaning, diff form
(b) Semi strong form (b) Semi strong form
(c) joint hypothesis (c) joint hypothesis
(d) autocorrelation (d) autocorrelation
6. MM1 1(a) MM1 irrelevancy of 1(b) MM1 irrelevancy of 4(a) MM1 irrelevancy of 2(a) MM1 irrelevancy of 2(a) assumption, MM1 4(a) assumption, MM1
capital structure capital structure capital structure capital structure irrelevancy of capital irrelevancy of capital
6(a) Share price bf and 5(a) Share price bf and structure structure
after tax* after tax* (b) bankrupt cost (b) bankrupt cost
7. WACC 5(b) Equity beta
8.Asymmetric 1(b) debt overhang, debt 4(a) risk shifting 4(b) agency cost (violates 2(b) agency cost (violates 2(c) agency cost of equity 3(b) pecking order theory
info signaling (violate MM1) (b) debt overhang MM1) (c) empire bulding MM1) (c) empire bulding 6) debt overhang empirical evidence
7(a) debt overhang (c) agency cost (d) risk shifting (d) risk shifting 4(c) debt signaling
8) debt overhang (e) debt overhang (e) debt overhang 8) debt overhang
6(a) debt overhang* 8(a) debt overhang*
9. Dividend 1(c) dividend signaling 3(a) Lintner 1(a) dividend signaling 1(b) dividend signaling 1(b) dividend signaling 2 (b) clientele theory
policy (violate MM1) (b) Tax clientele theory (b) tax clientele (c) tax clientele (c) agency cost (c) agency cost
(c) Dividend signalling
10. Takeover 2(a) Free rider problem 2(a) motive of takeover 5(a)-(d) takeover problem* 6(a)-(d) takeover problem* 8(a)-(d) takeover problem 7(a)-(d) takeover problem
(b) Empirical facts (b) Empirical facts (e) free rider problem (e) free rider problem
(c) solution (c) free rider problem
 2017 ZA 2017 ZB
1. NPV 2(a) two fund separation
2. CAPM 6(a) beta
3. Factor
4. Derivatives 1,7
5. EMH 1(b) (b) weak form
Technical trading&
calendar effect
c) market mispricing
6. MM1 2(a) trade off theory 3(a) trade off theory
(b) personal taxes
7. WACC 6(b) wacc
(a) sell division, add debt
8.Asymmetric 1(c) debt overhang 3(c) agency cost of equity
info and debt
4(a) moral hazard
(c) debt overhang
8) risk shifting
9. Dividend 1(a) Lintners 4(b) Lintners
policy
10. Takeover 2) type of merger, reduce 5(a) takeover problem
agency cost (e) impossible efficient
merger & Empirical
evidence