Study of Combat Experiences

Summer 1942

High Command of the Army

General Staff Training Section (II) Nr. 1550/42 g
(2, 3, 4, 5, 7)
Translator’s note.

This is a translated compendium of lessons learned during the German war against
Russia. The Oberkommando des Heeres published many pamphlets and manuals to instruct
units and pass on important information learned in combat. The experiences contained within
this document stem from two major campaigns in Russia during the summer months of 1942.

Publications like this one present a very different picture of both the German and
Russian soldier than we are accustomed to reading. Unlike propaganda of the Third Reich,
this was classified material never intended for the public’s eyes. Had the Red Army not
captured the original, it would have never seen the light of day.

I have attempted to maintain the cadence and paragraph structure of the original
document whenever possible. Also, there are a number of sentence fragments, which I left
as-is, except where clarification was necessary. In these few cases, I have inserted one or
two helper words enclosed by brackets.

For the most part, my translated terminology follows German army definitions. I made use of
three reference works to assist me with deciphering specific titles, words, and phrases that
were unique to the time. These were The Military Eitzen, edition of 1943, TM 30-506, German
Military Dictionary, 1944, and Special Series #12, German Military Abbreviations, 1943.

I tried to mirror the appearance of the original, making use of bolded words where they
appeared there. Each of these five summaries was first issued individually. When the printer
at OKH assembled them into this compendium, he retained the original number sequence
from each pamphlet. For clarity’s sake, I have modified page numbers in my translation to run
sequentially through the entire document.

Mark W. Flowers
High Command of the Army Army Headquarters, 29 May 1942
General Staff/Training Section (II)
Nr. 1550/42 g (2)

Secret!

Concerning: Combat experiences in Kertsch and Charkow.

The following experiences during the battles on the Kertsch Peninsula and at Charkow are
brought to the attention of the army:

1. Painfully exacting preparation for the attack played a significant role in the rapid and
sweeping battle on the Kertsch Peninsula. This extended to, among other measures:

Continuous collection and evaluation of experiences and lessons learned

during recent operations, exchange between command echelons, and
distribution down to the company level.

Rehearsals by units at all levels on terrain similar to that on which the attack
is planned, under similar battle conditions (training fortifications), deception.
These include versatility of all resources, agility, and without a rigid
scheme. Deception continues on the first and second attack days.

2. The following have been proven in the execution of the attack:

Exploitation of surprise, including attack at the first break of dawn, not

registering artillery targets before the attack, foregoing preparatory fires by
artillery, rocket launchers, and heavy weapons. Starting the attack simultaneously
with a heavy and concentrated barrage by all supporting weapons in a narrowly-
focused sector.
Employment of heavy artillery at the main point of firepower effect,
above all, every available rocket launcher to the division. Positioning strong
combat engineer teams forward in the assault echelons. The success of the
attack depends upon clearing obstacles early, especially minefields in-depth.
Ensuring exact grouping of airpower in time and place and close
coordination with attacking forces in all situations. Personal contact between
responsible air and ground commanders. Attachment to the divisions of air
liaison officers who are well-equipped with communications equipment.
Constantly drive the infantry attack forward through defensive positions
by employment of strong air force units. To this end, regulate timing so that the
air force always has adequate time to refuel and rearm between missions so
airpower can be deployed in support at the point of maximum effort with all
available forces.
 –2–

Ensure adequate air support by the air force for units that are operating
detached from the main force, such as the advance guard. Eliminate the
possibility of bombs being dropped on friendly troops by early orientation
of the air force regarding the mission, time of attack, and direction of flight.
Ground forces should be well-supplied with ground-air recognition panels
and smoke grenades. An air force liaison officer with communications
equipment must be attached. Changes in the flow and sequence of aerial
operations must be communicated by previously agreed-upon radio code
words, thereby avoiding time-consuming encryption.

3. The following procedures have proven effective in rapidly crossing minefields:

To determine the exact location and situation of minefields, all scouting
and reconnaissance results - above all, aerial photos - must be interpreted
with precision. The attack across a extensive minefield is organized
similarly to a river crossing attack (start lines, assembly areas, collecting
points on the far side, corresponding communications links, etc.).
Mine detection teams are deployed with point elements of the spearhead
unit. They mark the mine-free lanes with barrier tape. Directional sentries
are posted on the friendly side of these lanes. Their duties are similar to
those of bridge sentries. They are relieved by following units.
The infantry crosses the minefield in squad columns protected by heavy
covering fire. They stay in the cleared lanes by guiding on the marker tape.
Mine clearance teams widen the lanes marked by the mine detection
teams. The individual lanes should be 5 to 10 meters wide, and must be well-
marked. If at all possible, each company zone should have two cleared lanes.

Further, the following experiences have been reported:

4. During strong attacks by enemy armor, units have achieved success by quickly
occupying a strong point on terrain impassable to tanks, and concentrating fires
of all antitank weapons at the decisive point.
Commanders have also had success by massing artillery fire (including
anti-aircraft guns) in the antitank role in especially endangered areas.

5. In many instances, Russian defenders have allowed our advancing troops to come
so close to their positions, that heavy weapons and artillery could no longer be
employed. This was especially so in confused terrain, such as townships surrounded
by gardens, etc. Therefore, casualties can be prevented during the approach across
confused terrain by deploying single heavy weapons and guns in continuous fire
support. These weapons can then be rapidly employed against suspicious terrain
areas, groups of building, etc.
 –3–

6. Leaders at all levels must strive to prevent advances in massed formations.

Spreading out in-depth, exploited covered and concealed terrain, save blood and
make the attack easier.

Also, careless movement under enemy observation must be avoided. This

includes movement on the skylines of ridges and hills, and cluttering the forward
areas with staff units, dispatch riders, and vehicles.

7. Difficulties in traffic regulation often occur because individual traffic sentries are not
equipped with communications equipment to talk with each other. This eliminates the
traffic regulation officer’s ability to influence in maintaining traffic flow.

Fieseler-Storch aircraft must be placed at the disposal of responsible

commanders and traffic regulation officers so they can carry out their duties from
above. By this method, unit movements can be directed with foresight, and logistical
convoys guided, all in keeping with tactical necessities.

8. At various locations, a certain carelessness has been noted when enemy aircraft
appear.

Even when our air force has established air superiority, ground attack by single
enemy aircraft must be taken into account.

Tabulated

signed: Halder
High Command of the Army Army Headquarters, 10 June 1942
General Staff/Training Section (II)
Nr. 1550/42 g (3)

Secret!

Concerning: Combat experiences.

The basics as outlined in our service regulations have also proven effective during the
campaign in the east.
Lessons learned for combat in wooded areas are in Circular Nr. 760/42 of 31 March 44,
antitank defense experiences are in Nr. 1550/42g (1) of 19 May 42, and about the battles on
the Kertsch peninsula and at Charkow, in Nr. 1550/42g (2) of 29 May 42. They will no longer be
mentioned in collections to come.

Command.

1. The German practice of providing combat mission remains in effect.

However, commanders must not fear uncompromisingly intervening when the
mission is endangered.

2. Commanders must devote special care in keeping far-flung subordinate elements under
firm control, especially during movement. In particular, flexible command by use of short
radio orders is important.

3. The Russian does not know the concept of withdrawal under pressure of a threat
to his flanks. He also demonstrates an astonishing lack of attention to his flanks.
During the breakthrough, this frequently results in the attack and destruction of his
holding forces. Leaders must, based upon the situation, issue orders on which
elements accomplish this mission.

4. It is important to nimbly transition from one type of combat to another. This includes
more than simply switching from movement to the halt. Agility entails quickly reorganiz-
ing to achieve a concentration of forces at the decisive point.

The March.

5. Lack of roads and natural terrain obstacles, like river sectors, swamps, and impassable
forests, bring movement to a stop and often force detours over a long distance.
Thorough map study and scouting of terrain are therefore of critical importance. The
direction of movement must be determined based on the long-range viewpoint.
Routes and weather must be considered in mission assignment and
determination of march times.
 –5–

6. In the east, the heavy burden placed on the few and often poor roads forces march
columns to become stretched out. This applies not just to armored and motorized units,
but also to the infantry.
Prolonged time necessary to bring following units forward frequently dictates that
large portions of the artillery, heavy weapons, means of communication, and strong
combat engineer elements, be positioned close to the front in the march column.
To assure that units are supplied under poor road conditions, supply columns
must be incorporated into combat elements. They carry pre-determined loads of fuel
and munitions.

7. The danger from ambushes or surprise attacks in stretched-out wooded areas often
makes it necessary to deploy columns to the side of the marching unit for flank security.
These security elements must be able to fight independently. Therefore, heavy weapons
must be attached, and they must be capable of moving off-road

Combat Reconnaissance, Scouting of Terrain, and Security.

8. The Russian deploys his combat reconnaissance effort smartly, and on a broad scope.
They provoke our fire with strong infantry probes. In this manner, they are frequently
able to determine our weak spots.
For the most part, it is only by means of the attack that we can determine
whether enemy positions are strongly or weakly occupied. This is also true for locating
existing gaps. Clarity is achieved through infantry probes with limited objectives across
a broad frontage, under the fire protection of heavy weapons and artillery. Strict control
of heavy weapons and artillery, as well as keeping the necessary attack forces in a high
state of readiness, must all ensure quick exploitation of intelligence by means of the
attack.

9. The German soldier often shows lack of agility during reconnaissance. Moving silently
like a hunter, cunning and stealth, as well as camouflage, must all be reinforced in
training.
Reconnaissance patrols must advance by bounds from one key terrain feature
to the next while heavy weapons provide overwatch.

10. In the east, it is frequently the case that there are either no usable roads, or terrain to
the sides is impassable (swamps, flooding, impenetrable forests). As a result, terrain
scouting and analysis are of critical importance. This goes hand-in-hand with combat
reconnaissance. Every commander has the duty of developing the clearest picture of
terrain conditions into the enemy’s depth. All available means, such as observation with
optics, reconnaissance patrol reports, and interpretation of aerial photos, must be used
in this effort. Terrain must never be classified as impassable unless this has been
verified by extensive terrain scouting and analysis.
 –6–

11. There exists the danger that our troops will neglect the security effort, above all,
during the quiet hours of night. This is due to exhausted soldiers, lack of knowledge in
the important role that sentries play against an enemy closely attuned to nature, or
through simple lack of training. Officers must ensure watchfulness by sentries through
frequent and unannounced inspections.
The reconnaissance and security effort must be thoroughly planned and
executed in the depth of the combat zone. This promotes a sense of security, and
ensures that combat activities and rest periods receive the same weight of emphasis.

The Attack.

12. Quirks of the combat zone in Russia, characterized by wide distances and poor or
no roads, have led to our forces clinging onto any available routes during movement.
As a result, the Russian has frequently placed his point of main resistance and
necessary troops across our routes of advance. He then falls upon our flanks by fire
and counter-thrusts.
Therefore, it is often useful to execute attacks on roads and paths with limited
infantry forces, while maintaining a strong envelopment force. This element must be
as strong and mobile as possible.
Due to the state of roads, it frequently proves necessary to incorporate the mass
of artillery within the infantry column of attack. In this case, every effort must be made to
attach at least some guns with ample munitions to elements advancing to the flanks of
the main route of march.
Based upon the situation, the enveloping force’s point of main fire effort is formed
with heavy infantry weapons, especially heavy mortars. Additionally, artillery fire support
is ensured by attaching an ample quantity of forward observers to the force.
Even weak enveloping units can achieve decisive success, when they execute a
surprise flak attack in synchronization with forces attacking frontally.

13. The battles on the Kertsch Peninsula have again shown that [Russian] deep fighting
holes, and well-built battle positions, prevent destruction by our artillery, heavy
weapons fire, and air bombardment. Mostly, only suppression of the enemy is achieved.
Therefore, the infantry must stay close to the artillery barrage/impact zone during the
attack. They then drive into the enemy with the final impacts [of supporting arms].

14. In every attack, a Russian counterattack must be expected, typically into the flanks of
our advancing force. Attention by the artillery, and a high volume of correctly timed and
concentrated machine gun fire, almost always causes these flanks attacks to fail, with
correspondingly heavy enemy losses.
 –7–

Establishing the Point of Maximum Effort.

15. Even small unit leaders must echelon their forces deeply, and establish a point of
maximum effort. Commanders must strive to employ their units cohesively, while this
simplifies the establishment of the point of maximum effort (especially for the artillery).
Situation and terrain may dictate an attack by reinforced regimental groupings.
In these cases, establishment of the point of maximum effort requires special measures.
The commander must form the point of maximum effort by concentrating the fire
effect of as many weapons as possible, especially that of the artillery. He establishes
this decisive point by subordinating all other less important demands.

Synchronization of Weapons.

16. Our superiority depends not least upon carefully synchronizing weapon systems
down to the smallest elements. The infantry must not depend exclusively on artillery
fire, assault guns, or tank support. But rather, it must exploit organic heavy weapons
to the maximum extent. It can be a useful practice to attach all necessary heavy
weapons with the rifle company so it can carry out independent missions.

17. Prisoner interrogations and captured orders demonstrate over and over how sensitive
the Russian is to coordinated fires from our mortars and infantry guns. The NCO in
charge of fire direction must synchronize fires of machine guns, mortars, and infantry
guns in short and intense barrages against specific targets. Whenever necessary, he
couples the effects of indirect and flat-trajectory fires.

18. The fire of artillery must destroy the enemy, or at a minimum, suppress him. Destructive
effect is only achieved by ground or aerial spotting for individual batteries with exact
registration of targets. This is followed by the employment of many batteries for intense
and concentrated barrages. Rocket launchers and heavy rocket launchers of the smoke
troops are perfectly suited to these tasks.

19. The duration of artillery preparatory fires is based upon the number, situation, and
strength of the enemy fortifications.

20. Among the important missions for divisional artillery is counter-battery fire against
the enemy’s artillery, and not exclusively to engaging enemy infantry. The infantry
accomplishes this mission in large part with its own organic heavy weapons, in
particular, infantry guns and mortars. Thereby, fragmentation of the artillery and
unnecessary expenditure of muntions are prevented. (Fire plan for all weapons!)
 –8–

21. Early and expert deployment of artillery reconnaissance elements is a requirement

for fighting enemy artillery. If observation battalions or armored observation
batteries are either insufficient or not available for reconnaissance of enemy artillery
across the entire sector of the attack, available forces determine the enemy artillery’s
point of maximum effort without consideration of corps or divisional boundaries.
Splitting up of these units must be prevented.

Cooperation Between Infantry and Armored Forces.

23. Many Russian attacks with armored support were flops. Among others, the cause lay
with the infantry failed to keep up with the tanks, thereby losing the suppressive effect
of tank weapons.
The attack by tanks must be constantly overwatched and supported with other
weapons, which also provide flank security.
All available weapons must be incorporated in the fight against enemy antitank
weapons, and for obstacle clearance. This can only be achieved by careful preparation
for the cooperation of tanks with the infantry, combat engineers, antitank weapons,
and artillery. Also, terrain in the zone of attack must be carefully scouted and analyzed.

24. The infantry commander must understand that tank crews only need a few hours
during which they can repair minor damage. Otherwise, in short while, tanks will break
down and be out of the fight for a prolonged period.

25. After reaching the attack objective, the tanks are pulled out of the front line so they
can quickly rearm, refuel and perform maintenance on their vehicle.

Combat During Darkness.

25. During night attacks, all units will be given exact and limited attack objectives.
Thorough preparation according to the plan forms the basis for success. To this
belongs collection of intelligence - as thorough as practicable - by reconnaissance
and scouting patrols during daylight hours before the attack.
As a useful expedient for orientation during night operations, the practice of
setting fire to haystacks or building in enemy-held areas has proven effective.
Heavy weapons can also effectively support night attacks by engaging suspected
targets, returning fire toward muzzle flashes, etc. They can also fire down the long axis
of roads, village streets, etc. Even without hitting anything, their morale affect is large.
 –9–

Cooperation with the Air Force.

26. Frequent communication, either in-person or by telephone, between the respective

commanders, is essential for successful cooperation between army and air force units.
Air liaison officers should be posted with divisions and they must be well-equipped with
communications equipment. Further, they must understand and exploit the capabilities
inherent in this equipment for contact between ground troops and aircraft.
It is essential that radio nets remain under firm control for ground-to-air, and
for ground-to-ground-to-air traffic between the army and air force. Because there are
variations in aircraft radio equipment, personal contact between respective communica-
tions officers for units that have been newly tasked to work together.

Actions against the Enemy Air Force.

27. Every soldier must be steeped in the concept of destroying aerial attackers.
A significant defensive success is achieved when the attacking aircraft is either
damaged, or is prevented from effectively targeting our troops with bombs or machine
gun fire.
Fire may only be initiated against aircraft that are positively identified as
hostile. Leaders of all ranks who order that fire be opened bear responsibility for this.

28. A frequent cause of losses from enemy air attack lies in failure to create or take cover
at the right time, even without a specific order to do so. Poor or incorrect camouflage
is another cause, and the following mistakes are observed over and over:

– Failure to maintain march interval by vehicles of all types, often by several

columns side-by-side. Tailgating on the near side of choke points, during halts,
and lack of camouflage.
– Parking vehicles in straight rows on open ground.
– Camp life by troops at rest, smoke from field kitchens, hanging out laundry
to dry.
– Ineffective or no camouflage of field fortifications.
– Laying out conspicuous foot paths straight across terrain.
– Failure to enforce light discipline in quarters and for vehicles.

During prolonged halts, deep and narrow slit trenches are to be dug next to
stopped motorized columns, single vehicles, etc.
Slit trenches must be dug at rail stations, supply installations, etc.
There must be enough so that entraining or debarking troop units can find
cover. Communications sites and connections must also be protected.
 – 10 –

Mobile Troops.

29. Combat across far-flung areas and along roads frequently dictated the establishment
of mixed combat groups, in which tanks were often included. These caused a rapid
drop in the number of tanks due to enemy action. As a result, armored units lacked
the combat power for independent attack against distant objectives.
The armored division of a tank regiment of three battalions, and an armored
infantry battalion, is capable of far-reaching missions. But the tank regiment should
be employed as a cohesive team with the armored infantry attached in close
cooperation.

30. Surprise attacks executed cross-country often achieved more success and
fewer losses than attacks straight down roads, despite terrain obstacles and
more time needed for movement. This type of attack also avoids locations where
the enemy expects the attack and has strongly prepared (mines). Therefore, the
commander of mobile forces must fight against the timidity of troops to get off-road.
Early scouting, reconnaissance, and security are requirements for successful cross-
country operations.

31. In the defense, mobile units must be held back in reserve under the commander’s
control. In this manner, their mobility and speed are exploited for flanking attacks
against the penetration, thereby smashing the enemy force in conjunction with the
infantry.

Defense.

32. Captured territory is to be immediately oriented toward the defense. To this end,
security against enemy armor attacks is of special importance (in particular at
endangered locations, exploitation of terrain that tanks either cannot cross, or
where their movement is hindered).

33. The Russian generally does not attack with well-known units, and he avoids roads.
Instead, he attempts to find our flanks and rear by exploiting trackless terrain such
as ravines, swamps, and wooded areas. To achieve this, he often leaves behind
equipment that would otherwise hinder his movement. Using this technique at night,
he silently penetrates our sentry screen, taking out our defensive positions by surprise
assault from the rear.
Therefore, the defense - especially on a broad front and in confused terrain -
must not be limited to strong points dependent on roads and built-up areas. Instead,
the entire sector should be defended by continuous obstacle belts. Units must maintain
constant observation, and control the terrain by fire from defensive positions located
apart from roads and villages.
 – 11 –

34. A breakthrough by enemy motorized and armored forces is best defeated by using
tactics like those recommended by Russian commanders for their troops. Mobile
response forces are established, well-provided with antitank weapons and close
combat materials. They are positioned in the depth of the combat zone. Obstacle
belts, antitank ditches, and defensive positions are established, above all in areas that
are endangered by armored attack. The response force is held in readiness, if at all
possible, on terrain impassable to tanks. The mission of this force is to assault the
enemy by surprise and from the flank, cut off connections to his rear, and destroy him.

35. The following points, the importance of which has been confirmed again and again
in the eastern campaign, must be constantly reiterated:
– For all infantry weapons, especially for machine guns, mortars, and antitank guns,
a wide sector of fire is not so important as effective camouflage and protection against
heavy enemy fire. Defensive positions must have interlocking fields of fire, and be able
to rapidly fire at close-in ranges.
– Defensive positions should be sited, if possible, in areas impassable to tanks. They
must be capable of all-around defense and be surrounded by minefields and obstacles.
Every position should have an antitank weapon if at all possible, and be well-stocked
with ammunition beforehand.
– Our combat power should be protected for as long as possible. Munitions are to
be saved (no revenge firing, no ‘mad minutes’ unless necessary). Our troops should
allow the Russians to get careless, enticing them out of their positions. Then they are
smashed with concentrated fires.

Conduct by Staffs and Troops within Range of Enemy Fire.

36. Staffs and troops conducting themselves as if in peacetime has led to frequent
and unnecessary casualties.
Failure of the German soldier to dig himself in during the course of battle,
against positioning reserves under cover, carelessness directly behind the front lines,
and poor combat reconnaissance in confused terrain, all frequently cause significant
casualties and must be avoided.
Therefore, in the interest of our protecting our precious German people,
it is the duty of every superior to ensure correct wartime conduct, by force if
necessary.

Tabulated

signed: Halder
 Concerning: Training Proposals Based Upon Front Experiences

This circular has been created based upon lessons learned and
experiences as reported by our forces. It also includes training proposals
related to these reports.

The Army General Staff concurs with these proposals.

Tabulated

Krantz

– 1 Attachment –
 – 13 –

Attachment to Army General Staff Training Section (II)

Nr. 1550/42 g (4) 28 June 1942

Collected Training Topics

Which Should be Emphasized Based Upon Experience Reports By the Troops

1. Because of the width and depth of the eastern area, every leader must be educated
to fight independently, to secure his flanks and rear, and to execute his combat mission
as part of the bigger picture. Therefore, a more fundamentally mobile schooling is
necessary for the noncommissioned officer corps. The type of enveloping attack from
both sides as assumed in our regulations only occurs rarely in the east.

2. Experiences of combat in wooded areas can be found in the publication “Forest

Combat”, see attachment 2 to Army Service Regulation 1a, page 18, number 12
(Army General Staff Training Section (II) Nr. 760/42 31 March 1942).

3. Basics of behavior under various effects of the enemy. Everyone, but especially
every responsible leader, must constantly fight to stamp out severe carelessness,
advancing in tight packs, careless movement in areas under observation, clattering
about with equipment, chattering, etc.
Furthermore, more emphasis must be devoted to - and this is a primary
responsibility of the company commander - preventing soldiers from moving about
the battlefield in tight clumps, but instead, in loose formations. If a pause occurs,
every soldier has to either seek cover, or assume a prone position. Everything must
be done to prevent unnecessary losses due to carelessness and a certain herd instinct.
It is exactly the officer - through his exemplary field skills, enthusiastic sense of
duty, and initiative - who must present an example in this respect.

4. In respect to reconnaissance activities, officers and soldiers have little experience and
practice. The following are lacking: ability to move like a hunter, navigation, use
of the marching compass, security to all sides, quick situational analysis, and security
in wooded areas. Young company-grade officer lack a basic officer’s instruction. This
shortcoming cannot be replaced by combat experience. Therefore, it is essential that
company-grade officers learn the following:
a) Tactical basics as laid out in regulations, and based upon combat experiences,
b) Analysis of situation and terrain,
c) Decision-making and issuance of orders,
d) Cooperation with heavy weapons, artillery, and tanks,
e) Training as reconnaissance patrol and assault team leader,
 – 14 –

f) Organization, weapons, equipment, and training of reconnaissance patrols and

assault teams.
The work of the assault team does not demand just a high degree of courage and
reckless daredevilry, but also, fundamental training. Detailed instruction is required
for planning and execution of assault team missions against enemy defensive positions
and fortifications, also at night, and in conjunction with exact observation of enemy
activities. This is especially important in positional warfare.

5. It has been shown repeatedly, that when troop units are pulled off the front for rest
and refitting, most officers and NCOs do not know how to conduct training correctly.
Mainly, the following shortcoming become apparent:
– Lack of knowledge how to construct a correct training plan (training of 8 days,
14 days, etc.).
– Lack of knowledge how to construct a daily training schedule wherein training
builds on skills learned the previous day.
Just going out to the field for nine or ten hours is not sufficient. Rather, every
officer and NCO in charge of training must be informed of the specific training subject,
and how each minute of the hour will be used.
There is an applicable regulation for every period of training and it belongs
in the pocket of every instructor. The instructor must be clear on which areas of the
regulation he is going to practice. There is no shame in frequently checking to ensure
compliance with the regulation, even while on duty.

6. It has been shown again and again that NCOs and soldiers, for the most part, do not
know about combat potential in relation to physical fitness. Self-confidence suffers
because of this shortcoming. It is necessary that more instructions and training be
devoted to gymnastics, field training, and close combat schools. This lacking causes
a disadvantage, primarily during assault team operations.

7. In live-fire training, emphasis must be devoted to the following: designating fires

within the rifle company, in other words, concentrating the fire of riflemen, appointment
of expert riflemen as designated marksmen, area firing, shooting in fields (kneeling
position), rapid fire, concentrating fires of riflemen and machine guns, concentrating
fires of rifle grenadiers, riflemen and machine guns. To this belongs development of
fire plans, and simple range cards.
During live-fire training, it is not just about the rifleman shooting bullets, rather
that he understand his weapon (how to clear stoppages, how to replace the bolt, and to
change barrels). All technical skills must be translated into flesh and blood. But full trust
in the weapon’s capabilities is especially important.
 – 15 –

Shooting with the rifle and machine during twilight and in darkness.
Frequently, the rifle is used only grudgingly due to a lack of shooting instruction.
The level of trust by the soldier in the effectiveness of his weapon, in particular
the rifle, must be increased.

8. Full exploitation of covering fire for lightning-like bounds is of special importance,

not just by the consolidated squad, but also by individuals. This prevents casualties.
The battlefield must appear empty not only while under enemy fire, but also during
the advance covered by supporting fires. Due to the necessity of preventing casualties,
this must be constantly reinforced.
Training in rifle and machine gun firing can take place even take place in quiet
areas of the forwardmost lines. In the course of the past six months, this has frequently
happened on the eastern front.
Practice in communicating targets to the artillery!

9. More emphasis must be devoted to close combat training in connection with assault
team and recon operations (with rifles, pistols, machine pistols, hand grenades, and
concentric charges), also for officers. Officers and NCOs must learn to recognize
every sign of weakness by the enemy, and be trained to quickly respond with
appropriate counter-measures. To this end, imaginative close combat training is
essential. Shooting from the hip while moving, use of the bayonet, pistol shooting,
use of the entrenching tool (eventually in the form of competitions).

10. The infantry must receive enhanced pioneer training to accomplish required pioneer
tasks without combat engineer support. They must also be issued with the
necessary equipment. Above all, every infantryman must be trained in how to work with
mines. Attacks are frequently brought to a standstill in front of minefields because not
enough combat engineers are available. Also, infantry pioneer platoons and tank
destroyer battalions must be capable of laying small mine obstacles to reinforce
defenses at specific terrain points (roads, paths, antitank positions, etc.).
Note: The requirements of Army Service Regulation 220/4b, paragraphs 56
to 149 (inclusive), remain in effect. This applies especially to the duty to complete
a minefield sketch, and submission of the completed sketch to higher echelons. The
so-called practice of ‘wild laying’ - with the consequence of severe losses - must
absolutely be avoided (forefields of the Westwall).
Again and again, combat engineer battalions are employed for infantry actions.
This practice dictates that engineer battalion and company commanders be trained to
lead reinforced battalions.
 – 16 –

11. Special emphasis should be placed to training at night. This cannot be confined to
classroom instruction on what to do at night. The following skills should be thoroughly
practiced: secure movement across all types of terrain at night, staying in contact
between soldiers and units, blackout driving, navigation under moonlight and
by the stars, and use of the marching compass.

12. Training in camouflage and construction of field fortifications under all combat
conditions. The sloth that all arms and services show to entrenching must be
overcome with nothing less than training by the book. During the course of the war,
this laziness has led to severe losses. While the Russian basically digs in whenever
he is not attacking, the German infantryman only does it when the rounds start
impacting (fast digging and camouflage of a fighting hole, construction of heavy
weapon or gun positions, simple field fortifications). The art of regulations and training
must be to unite the offensive spirit of German infantry with their disappearance in the
earth when the attack pauses.

13. Units must be able to rapidly reorient from the attack into defense and in reverse.

14. While halted, at rest, and especially at night, the hedgehog belongs to the most
secure formation types for preventing ambushes and raids. In the war against
Russia, this has become a proven defensive measure. Therefore, the hedgehog
must be learned according to regulation. In conjunction, units must be drilled to
immediately execute an attack out of the hedgehog to destroy the enemy. Every
troop unit must provide its own security and defend itself against enemy attack.
Sentries must be drilled to a higher degree of alertness, and be continuously
inspected.

15. All combat arms must become accustomed to flexible use of landmines.

16. Thorough training enhances antitank defense, first and foremost tank destruction in
close combat ( see also Combat Experiences in Antitank Defense, Army General Staff
Training Section (II) 1550/42 g (1), 19 May 1942).

17. More emphasis should be given to antiaircraft defense with rifles and machine guns
(fire direction, leading the target/point of aim). A victory against an attacking aircraft
does not just occur when it is shot down, but also when:
(a) our ground fire drives off the attacking aircraft,
(b) our ground fire damages the attacking aircraft, often putting pilot and machine out
of action for a prolonged period.
 – 17 –

18. During instruction on how to conduct a frontline relief in place, the following points
should receive particular emphasis in turning over a position to a relieving unit:
combat sectors and areas, current enemy actions, identified locations of his heavy
weapons and artillery, etc.

19. Execution of the counter-thrust, or of the counter-attack, out of the defense is

especially important. The two courses of action must be kept entirely apart.
A counter-thrust [immediate counterattack] is rapidly executed by a pre-positioned
response force, while a [deliberate] counter-attack is prepared according to a plan.
In the event of a Russian breakthrough, priority is generally given to an immediate
counter-thrust because he is highly vulnerable in the moments following the penetration.
He must not be allowed any time to dig in. The following points must be incorporated
into every training exercise: Coordination of forces in the sector, establishment of
combat groups, immediate reconnaissance necessary for the course of action.

20. Particular emphasis in training must be given to: emplacements with embrasures,
bunkers, fortified buildings, etc. It is wrong when the infantry leaves reduction of these
positions to heavy weapons. In these circumstances, mission accomplishment usually
requires a great deal of munitions, or success is achieved only late or in part.
Well-trained infantry is highly capable of destroying these types of targets with their
own resources. Because the Russian is very smart and skillful at rapidly construction
field and area fortifications, this branch of training is of critical importance.
Instruction on fighting in built-up areas must be conducted in conjunction with
close combat training.

21. Basic instruction [is needed] in terrain observation and analysis, target recognition,
use of covered and concealed terrain - not only by the individual soldier, but by the
squad, platoon, and company.
Interpretation of poor maps, navigation with the marching compass, sun, moon,
and stars, have won a special meaning in the far-flung spaces of the east. Officers,
NCOs, and enlisted soldiers have not grown into the demands of this task. One must
frequently navigate by terrain association, sounds of water, and villages that are often
depicted incorrectly on the map. Corresponding practice maps must be prepared for
training.
In addition to knowing how to use hand grenades, officers and NCOs must
become familiar with military explosives.

22. Instruction [is needed] for officers and NCOs of combat arms in construction of simple
field-expedient bridges to cross small streams and terrain areas.
 – 18 –

23. Instruction [is needed] in how to cross poor, swampy stretches of the route.
Construction of roads! This is not just a task for engineer and construction battalions,
but the business of all combat arms.

24. Officers and NCOs must be instilled to quickly become familiar with captured weapons,
and to wring out every drop of their potential. A certain zeal must be instilled in officers
that they understand all types of weapons and their capabilities.
The officer and NCO must know how to operate every weapon used by
their combat arm. If gaps exist in knowledge, they must be closed in combat as
needed. During officer’s training, it must be made clear that there is no shame if an
officer does not know every single weapon. But through training, he must strive
even harder to close gaps in his knowledge as quickly as possible.
In regard to this topic, soldiers must always take care of their weapons and
equipment. Every soldier must be encouraged to maintain his weapon in faultless
condition, to protect his equipment, and not to lose it.
Field-expedient maintenance of vehicles and harnesses [must be taught].

25. Reports on the enemy and situation must be composed so they give a thorough
picture to higher headquarters.
Reports on the enemy must give more weight to describing the enemy
impression that troops at the front have. Therefore, carefully evaluate the report
and correspondingly, where it should be sent. Training [is needed] so one can develop
his own situational analysis whenever possible.
There is a propensity to declare every company-sized reconnaissance probe
against a divisional sector as an attack that was repulsed. This conclusion must be
resisted.
If an area is occupied without active combat, it is not reported as ‘taken’,
but as ‘occupied’.
High Command of the Army Army Headquarters, 7 July 1942
General Staff/Training Section (II)
Nr. 1550/42 g (5)

Secret!

Concerning: Experiences in the East, Tanks and Armored Infantry

The attached experiences were made by armored and armored infantry

units during offensive and defensive combat in the Charkow area and are brought
to the attention of the army. Because this document deals with experiences of
individual armored divisions, a final analysis with combat and training instructions
has not yet been made.
These experiences consist solely of suggestions.

Tabulated

Blumentritt
– 1 Attachment –
 – 20 –

Attachment to Army General Staff Training Section (II)

Nr. 1550/42 g (5) 9 July 1942

I. General.

1. Even in sectors where the Russian had the strength of one or more brigades, these
did not enter the battlefield in concentrated form for effect. His armored units mostly
operated as groups with a strength of 20-30 tanks, engaging from the halt at long range
(about 2,000 m). In these conditions, coordination and unified command could not be
recognized.
When Russian tank units attacked, they broke up into small groups, splintering their
combat power.

II. Combat by our Armored Forces

2. During our tank attacks, the Russian usually did not succeed in concentrating his
tanks quickly to achieve unified counter-effect. Also, it was observed that the Russian
sometimes employed his tanks defensively, as a sort of mobile bunker. Enemy tanks
mostly conducted the firefight from well-camouflaged positions in defiles and areas,
stream courses, and the edges of villages.

Observations:
a) The superiority of our tanks (flexible command by radio, better visibility)
[is exploited] by rapidly concentrating all available armored forces for a unified
surprise attack against the enemy’s flanks and rear.

b) Keep moving, and under no circumstances allow oneself to be drawn into a

firefight against enemy tanks at long range. (range of the enemy 7.62 cm gun, with
which most Russians tanks (T34 and KW.I) are equipped, is longer).

c) Once our armored attack has been identified by the enemy, immediately exploit
the highest speed for the assault. Then the enemy frequently becomes uncertain,
begins to yield, loses his coordination, and can be individually destroyed.

d) Fire initiation at close range (400-100 m) against the sides and rear of enemy
tanks (greater vulnerability). Then, straight-on attack and as the enemy yields, pursue
to keep him in motion.
 – 21 –

e) If the enemy succeeds in getting reset, do not pursue frontally. Instead, renewed
approach against the flank and rear. To this end, precise briefing about terrain, identify
the location of enemy tanks, then probe forward so long as movement is not identified
by the enemy.

f) In a sudden encounter with enemy armor in a strong position, pull back, and attack
after sending out fresh scouting and reconnaissance to the flank and rear.

3. With the new 5 cm (long) and 7.5 cm (long) tank guns, the troops have been given
weapons that have proven themselves in an outstanding manner under all combat
conditions.
These weapons can engage English tanks with certainty. Against Russian tanks
(except the reinforced KW.I), they are also effective.
Combat experience has for the most part confirmed the data regarding armor
penetration contained in Army Service Regulation 469/3b (Tank Firing Tables, Armor
Section). This information was generated by the Army Weapons Office in armor
penetration tests. Some armored regiments have noted divergent penetration data
in combat, showing in part a higher level of performance.

III. Armored Infantry in Half-Tracks

4. Observations of combat by armored infantry in half-tracks:

a) Basically, the battalion with half-tracks should be employed as a combined
element, even if the division has only one unit of this type. Do not split up this valuable
unit, and do not use individual vehicles as munitions or ration transporters, or for
medical evacuation.

b) The full combat power of half-track battalion is only achieved only when it is
linked with the divisional armored force. Following the tanks units, half-tracked infantry
likewise provides fire protection against enemy tank destruction teams, and gives the
tank crews a sense of security.

c) If our armored force make contact with enemy armor, the half-tracks displace
away from our tanks. In this way, they reduce the chance of being needlessly engaged
by enemy armor-piercing weapons.

d) The effect of enemy antitank weaponry against armored infantry can be

significantly reduced through constant and sharp observation to all sides. In this
manner, enemy antitank guns are spotted early, taken under fire, and suppressed.
Providing mutual fire support, the half-tracks then attack at the highest speed and
destroy the enemy in close combat.
 – 22 –

5. The light half-track company is the strongest combat element in the newly-organized
motorcycle battalion. The company has proven itself under all conditions, being
flexible and with good cross-country mobility.

The following observations have been made in the attack:

a) Basically, the half-track company deploys in the attack as a combined unit.
Do not detach individual vehicles for reconnaissance purposes.

b) So long as terrain permits, the mounted half-tracked company advances

ahead of the motorcycle infantry to rapidly break enemy resistance. In this way, the
need to dismount the motorcycles can often be reduced, which up until now has been
necessary when faced with even weak enemy resistance.

c) Sufficient heavy weapons should be provided to the company from the outset.
Attachment of antitank guns is critical so the company possesses an effective weapon
against the most dangerous threat to half-tracked infantry - enemy tanks.
After dismounting the armored infantrymen, the half-tracks seek cover while
protected by the attached antitank gun.
High Command of the Army Army Headquarters, 3 September 1942
General Staff/Training Section (II)
Nr. 1550/42 g (7)

Secret!

Concerning: Experiences of Russian Offensive Methods in Summer 1942.

In order to analyze our preparation for and execution of the defense, specific Russian
offensive procedures are hereby published to the army.

I. General.

1. The Russian has shown a declining level of training, in particular the infantry. But
under brutal and reckless command, his toughness is undiminished as he endures
every hardship - weather, terrain, and supply situation.
The following specifics have been noted in the Russian forces: Intelligent
exploitation of terrain for the approach and selection of assembly areas, ingenuity
in camouflage and deception efforts, effectiveness in exploiting nighttime and poor
weather for movement and changes of position, a high degree of agility in route
construction and preparation of newly won territory.

2. It has been recognized that all [Russian] combat arms are designated a point
of maximum effort relying on German doctrine.

II. Branch of Service.

3. Infantry.

For a while now, rifle corps have again been appearing at hot spots on the front.
These formations enable a sharper and more flexible battlefield command structure
than the previous rifle division subordinated directly to the army headquarters.
Before the attack [the Russian] is making greater use than previously of a
strong reconnaissance and scouting effort in the zone of attack. He is concentrating
his forces more sharply at the point of maximum effort. Much more notably than before,
he seldom attacks without heavy artillery preparatory fires or tank support. It has been
observed that he recognizes the importance of the deep attack.
Partially due to the sinking combat effectiveness of the Russian infantry, special
machine pistol formations up to battalion-level have been activated. During the attack,
these units are used for securing assembly areas, reconnaissance, infiltration through
gaps in the frontline, operations in our rear, as well as for exploiting success of the
attack in the depth of our positions.
 – 24 –

4. Armored Forces.

In combat operations by armored troops, the Russian has recently been

striving to concentrate his armored units. This is demonstrated organizationally
by grouping tank brigades into tanks corps, and in the formation of tank armies.
In the attack zone at Suchinitschi, he succeeded for the first time in forming
a strong reserve of two tank corps.
Captured Russian instructions about the armored attack specify a penetration
against enemy positions in three waves to win as much ground as possible in the
main direction of attack. The infantry is directed to closely follow the tanks.

5. Artillery and Mortars.

Recently, Russian artillery has been designating a distinct artillery point of

maximum effort

Through concentrated fires in a narrow sector, the Russian artillery prepares

the breakthrough for his infantry. Fires are adjusted forward somewhat schematically,
corresponding with the infantry’s rate of advance. Even the positioning of individual
guns into the front line is planned for.

At the same time, a portion of the artillery is designated solely to counter-battery

fires. In this connection, the Russian has been placing special emphasis on detection
of our artillery positions through light- and sound-ranging. This effort has shown good
results for him in places.

Russian artillery is also employing special measures to avoid identification by

our target detection equipment. These measures includes limiting night fires, and
simultaneous firing by several guns or batteries.

It is worth mentioning that the Russian sometimes designates a point of

maximum effort during mortar employment. In one case, the fires of seventeen
mortar battalions were concentrated into a single regiment.

5. Red Air Force.

The Russian has recognized decisive importance of designating a point of

maximum effort for air force units during offensive operations. This has led to the
formation of air divisions and armies, which simplifies air force operations in
cooperation with ground forces. And as with German doctrine, it also simplifies
use of air force units against important operational-level targets.