RIGHT TO LIFE
In his SinumpaangSalaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of
Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo Facts/ Issues:
In 2007, Jonas Burgos was abducted at about 1:30 pm by 4 armed men and
a woman in civilian clothes while having lunch at the HapagKainan Restaurant
in Ever Gotesco Mall, Quezon City.
On the same year, Jonas’s family files a complaint at the Commission on
Human Rights alleging military involvement in the abduction of Jonas after
tracing the license plate number of the vehicle used in the abduction to a
vehicle impounded in the 56th Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Burgos family also filed a complaint with the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Task Force-
USIG National Capital Region.
The Burgos family files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Philippine
Court of Appeals asking that the government produce Jonas to the court which
was denied, however, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Almost five
years since the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, the Burgos family concluded
their presentation of witnesses and evidences for the Habeas Corpus Petition.
The defense shall start presenting their witnesses in May 2012. In light of the
latest developments on the abduction case of Jonas Burgos, the Supreme
Court reviews the Court of Appeal’s decision on the consolidated petitions of
Edita Burgos for Habeas Corpus, Contempt and Writ of Amparo.
The assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioner's motion to declare the respondents in
Contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
Last 2010, the Supreme Court issued a resolution ordering the Commission
on Human Rights to continue the investigation regarding the abduction of
Jonas Burgos. The Court tasked the CHR to conduct further investigations
because of the lapses by the PNP-CIDG
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA's dismissal of the petitions
for Contempt and for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to
President Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to immunity from
suit.
March 15, 2011
–
The Commission on Human Rights submits its report to the Supreme Court
The Commission Submitted the following findings:
a. Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR
finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had
transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and security were
violated by the Government have been fully determined.
b.
HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from
the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described
to the police, after he was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year
Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years
thereafter. The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB
Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who also positively
identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman's SinumpaangSalaysay states that
he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company Commander in the 56th IB while
he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002)
also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. UsmalikTayaban, the Commander of Bravo
Company
c. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not
been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up
by some police and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to
provide the CHR with the requested documents does not only defy the
Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable
presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction and that
their superiors would be found accountable, if not responsible, for the crime
committed. This observation finds support in the disputable presumption "
That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." (Paragraph
(e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules
on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).
d. As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer
Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively
crushed the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas.
Baliaga's true identity and affiliation with the military have been established by
overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag-
uman.
e. Interview with VirgilioEustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for
Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas
Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament,
Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.
ISSUE:
WON the CHR report on the disappearance of Jonas Burgos is sufficient
enough for the SC to issue a final ruling and to:
1) Issue a writ of Habeas corpus—YES
2) Declare respondents in contempt—NO
3) Issue a writ of Amparo—NO
Court’s Ruling AMPARO
1. After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our
findings in our June 22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the
recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th
Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors
of Jonas, we resolve to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the
Amparo aspect of the present case and refer this case back to the CA in order
to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo respondents to file their
respective Comments on the CHR Report within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.
2. The Court of Appeals shall continue hearing on the Amparo petition.
3. On the non-compliance of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG)
to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas,
and thereby disobeyed our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
4. Acting on the CHR's recommendation and based on the above
considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010
Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, to show cause and
explain, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for defying
our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
Habeas Corpus
1. In light of the new evidence, the Court hereby dismisses the Court of
Appeal’s decision to dismiss the habeas corpus petition.
2. For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to
the habeas corpus
petition and require him - together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the
incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding
Officer of the 56th IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col.
Feliciano - to produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should
not be released from detention
Petition of Contempt
1. Two types of Contempt: Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is
criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.
2. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent
and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction of the court
and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for
the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged
is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable certainty and moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
3. For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in
contempt for filing false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the
CA, she has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had custody of Jonas.
4. In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo who is no the longer the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
she should now be dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions.
BALAO et al vs. GMA
G.R. No. 186050
December 13, 2011
FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in
favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men earlier.
Named respondents in the petition were then President GMA, Exec Sec
Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among
others.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio.
In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance
(CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the
Cordillera Region.
According to witnesses’ testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men,
saying they were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then
made to ride a white van.
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for
(1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police
facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for activists
abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all
documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order
of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3)
a witness protection order. the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing
as follows:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where
James is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his unlawful
detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting
harm upon his person; and
DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and
WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply
with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and
substantiate the same
ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by
the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24,
2007 amidst rising incidence of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances.” It was formulated in the exercise of this Court’s expanded
rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations.
“Extralegal killings” refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced
disappearances” are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such person outside the protection of law.
**
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of
briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the anti-
insurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President
Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF,
which included the CPA, and their members, as “enemies of the state.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military’s
counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard
provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity
between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not,
necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated
such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer
government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents
in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-
leaning groups.
**
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James
on the very positions held by the respondents. The Court in Rubrico v.
Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command
responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply
to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA
seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of
amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was
conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, “is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or
administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.” Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the
nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings].
x x x x
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner
of military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been
adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established,
much less their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete
evidence indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or with
acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in
granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of
public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence.
However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by
respondent officials are “very limited, superficial and one-sided.” Its candid and
forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are borne by
the evidence on record.
**
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen
the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before
making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance
of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified several
military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the
testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions
involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention
centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production order was
predicated on petitioners’ bare allegation that it obtained confidential
information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was
included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have
sanctioned any “fishing expedition” by precipitate issuance of inspection and
production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA INFAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZGR NO.
191805NOVEMBER 15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan (Kagimungan), apeasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the militarytagged KMP as an
enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.Rodriguez was abducted
by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused toconfess to his
membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo andand Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for
Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, andProduction of Documents and
Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, etal.
The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent,
as she may not be suedin any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
Issue:
1.Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis
of presidentialimmunity from suit
2.Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases.
3.Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
responsible oraccountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
4.Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo isresponsible or accountable for his abduction.
Held:
1.No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative,
civil or criminalliability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can
only go as far as ascertainingresponsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.As was held in the case of Estrada v
Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for
acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor
upon
the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search
for truth or impairs thevindication of a right. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear
that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not
histerm. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
the office as of right, andfixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure representsthe term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term
forreasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former
Pres. GMA cannot use suchimmunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the contextof amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
 3. Facial Challenge
2.Yes.
As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to 4. Locus Standi
the"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate 5. Declaratory Relief
members of the armedforces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic 6. One Subject/One Title Rule
(wala na naputol na. hahaha)

IMBONG VS OCHOA
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Issue/s:
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the unconstitutional for violating the:
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
1. Right to life
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
against hazardous products.
6. Due process clause
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
7. Equal protection clause
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
PROCEDURAL:
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
clause of the Constitution.
controversy.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected
by the Constitution 1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy. 4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question
or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as
a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to
one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court
has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
“so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in
passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at
this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed
that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the
traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support
the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to
the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line
with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling
its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind
the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from
a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not
the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy
or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution
or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even
with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this
mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and
the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH
Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as
it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
“non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about
family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception
may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of
Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role
of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term
“primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of
the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents
in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials,
and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could
very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of
the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution
as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service
provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be
seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section
7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number,
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the
RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
 bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second,
Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes
a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on
the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.
has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the
Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple.
For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist
no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through
an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after
all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that
the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a
textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they:
a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which
is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are
ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the
RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
RIGHT TO LIBERTY
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Powers – Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro
were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence
from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in
Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain
plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be
of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but
was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he
escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on
behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of
the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they
had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes
undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their
liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine
of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to
execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial
governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to
give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a
literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to
degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to
religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives
of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the
Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace
and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down
where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists
a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
People Vs. Pomar
46 Phil 126 G.R. No. L-22008
Nov. 3, 1924
Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco
factory. She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which
commenced on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time,
she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No.
3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said
Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein
defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint
did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the aforementioned
provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071
provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory,
shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman
employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay
before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer
shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being
required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting
from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the
penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature
in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding
the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of
any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable
support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the
fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment.
Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid
exercise of Police Power.
Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be
unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to
freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been decided several times,
that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The
contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they
may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public
policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police
power may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes,
for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But that power
cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or
violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is subject
to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state,
and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.
CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a
hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City
of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION
OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499
which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not
err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and
void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power
as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the
due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection
of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
community’s social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated,
the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se
offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used
as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per
se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and
other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees.
In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired
end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes
on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and
property.
Modality employed is unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can
not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is
intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory”
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited”
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to “wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area.” The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the
previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well.
The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not reasonably be
made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may
not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of
local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to
disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community.”
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels,
inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.
By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for
prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid
as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial
distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside
the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to
banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of
the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress
and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is
a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in
a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to
the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had
already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be
valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the
council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property
rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The
Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend
the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
REYES VS GONZALES
WRIT OF AMPARO
DEFINITION:
Is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
FACTS:
Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige
and were charged of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
DILG issued Hold Departure Order in the interest of national security and
public safety.
On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for
Rebellion against the petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.
That petitioners and other accused civilians were arrested because they
ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out
from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police
authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite
the dismissal of the crime of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at
NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List. This happens every
time he left for abroad.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the
petitioner’s constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened
with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to
the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private person or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or threats
thereof.
Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free form
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities he has been
endowed by his Creator.
Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom from threat.
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner;s right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not
unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend
that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom
of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during
the forth coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the
previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and
also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio
guestings and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on
airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based”
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains
the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based”
airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling
state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom
of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence
of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the
aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the
Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of
languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people
may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners, vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in
society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
 engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for
privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others,
in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia
and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by
Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in
the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students,
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were
barred from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas
data on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of
the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose,
that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is
there a right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its
users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the
ruling at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s
right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has,
in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The
remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files
in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting,
or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or
about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his
or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as
when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour,
for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will
not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control
information about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and
social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN
users, “in this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded
in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better
known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what
extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In
H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
“customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states
in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information,
these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of
digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except
for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks
of the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set
up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what
extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’
daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either
by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s
claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements
are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account
that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no
special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted
to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that
the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to
the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the
less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large
in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or
profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort
to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given
to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against
the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
“Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest
and palpable.
RIGHT TO PROPERTY
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section
15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution
No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f)
of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether
public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or
the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to
agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as
couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where
the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they
include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or
bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the
Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree
of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of
justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing
and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor
candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their
candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in
relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by
posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be
reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of
election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check
mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those
who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped
in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon
by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies
subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right
to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial
scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is
clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come
into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of
their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against
the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily
mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in
return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution
to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as
time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.
The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must
be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right
of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to
use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even
the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion
into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement
an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICERS VS LIM
(WALA)
LIGOT VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(WALA) succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, Section 24 thereof
specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the
CHAVEZ VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in
conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed
implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may be
Facts:
necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of
PNP.
the “Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms
Outside of Residence” (Guidelines)issued by respondent Hermogenes E.
2 . P o l i c e P o w e r
Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).Petitioner
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right
Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute
issued ,requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G.
necessary to the common good and general welfare.
Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-
Firearms and Explosives Division.
The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus:(1)The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
Issues:
particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and(2)The means
1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
Guidelines;
2. purposeand not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It is apparent from the
assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace
whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police
and order in the society.Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly
power?;
those committed by the New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb
the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a
Ruling:
1.Authority of the PNP Chief nationwide gun ban. Undeniably,the motivating factor in the issuance of the
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.The only question
that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are
departments: the legislative, theexecutive and the judiciary. Each has
not unduly oppressive.
exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
within its own sphere.The power to make laws – the legislative power – is
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of
vested in Congress. Any attempt toabdicate the power is unconstitutional and
firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their
void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non potest delegari” –
firearms outside of their residences mayre-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is
“delegated power may not be delegated.”The rule which forbids the
delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute andinflexible. It a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their
victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of
practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain
persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns.
commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.
includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.Act No.
1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority
CARLOS SUPERDRUG VS DSWD
(1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal
in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other
FACTS:
lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it
authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating pharmacies in
proper enforcement of the Act. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP the hilippines.
absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).Consequently, the PNP Chief
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ,
and the DILG, specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with
the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments.
On 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, otherwise known as the “Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assail the said Act because it allegedly constitutes deprivation of
private property and compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant
the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 4(a) of the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” is
constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.The State, in
promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose
upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government
program. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and
privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers
them an integral part of our society.
Police power has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” For this
reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE, GR No. 175356, 2013-12-03
Facts:
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount
granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax
deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III,
Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation."... petitioners cite Central
Luzon Drug Corporation,[12] where it was ruled that the 20% discount
privilege constitutes taking of private property for public use which requires
the payment of just compensation
Issues:
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY
PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR
CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID ANDUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme
under RA 9257, as an exercise of police power of the State, has already
been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy
corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This
constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen
discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting
the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
As a form of reimbursement, the... law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior
citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners
have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report,
so that they have not been able to... show properly whether or not the tax
deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme
is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who,
at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses
and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities.
the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments
to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals,
senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern... it
does... not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the
operation or conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or
benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws
which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.[77] These laws
generally regulate public... utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with
public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable
pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on
investment of these corporations... considering that they have a monopoly...
over the goods or services that they provide to the general public.
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[78] however, describes the
20% discount as an exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax
credit, under the previous law, equivalent to the amount of discount given as
the just compensation... therefor.
It presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and,
hence, the profitability of a private establishment, automatically amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
If this were so,... then all price and rate of return on investment control laws
would have to be invalidated because they impact, at some level, the
regulated establishment's profits or income/gross sales, yet there is no
provision for payment of just compensation
The obiter is, thus, at odds with the settled doctrine... that the State can
employ police power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services,
and, hence, the profitability of business establishments in order to pursue
legitimate State objectives for the common good, provided that the regulation
does not go too far as to... amount to "taking."
Principles:
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the
use of liberty and property for public welfare.[58] The only limitation is that
the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.
"property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in...
order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses
and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference
[is] reasonable and not arbitrary.
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take
or appropriate private property for public use.
private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the...
payment of just compensation
In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation,[65]
or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted[66] to
promote public welfare.
payment of just compensation is not required.
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are
appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the
payment of just compensation therefor.
Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to the...
expropriating authority.
EXCLUSIONS

Pedro vs Provincial Board of RizalG. R. No. 34163, September 18,
FACTS:
Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928,
approved on December 29, 1928, by the temporary councillors
appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal Eligio Naval, on the ground
that(1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant (2) it was enacted on
account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and
not a g e n e r a l p u r p o s e , n a m e l y t o p r e v e n t , a t a n y
c o s t , t h e o p e n i n g , maintenance, and exploitation of the
cockpit of the said petitioner appellant and (3) it provides for special
committee composed of persons who are not members of the council,
vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be
delegated by said council to that committee.
he further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain,
exploit, and open to the public the cockpt in question, having paid
the license fee and fulfilled all the requirements provided by
Ordinance No. 30, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which cannot be
taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which
was subsequently approved.
ISSUE:
Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls
under property rights which a person !may not be deprived of without due
process of law.
HELD:
No. The court held (1) THat a license authorizing the operation and
exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may
not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may
be revoked when the public interests so require (2) that the work entrusted
by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the
sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishm ent of a
cockpit, is not legislative in character, but only informational, and may be
delegated and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a municipal council duly
constituted, which suspends the effects of another which had
been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid
and legal.
Aparri v.s. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the defunct
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA)
approved resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), which appointed
Appari as a general manager of the said company which will take
effect on January 16, 1960. However on March 15, 1962, the same
Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962)
which states that the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the
Board of Directors the desire of the office of the Philippines to fix
the term of Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of
the office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with paragraph 2,
section 8 of R.A. 1160:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board
of Directors shall have the following powers and duties:
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager …,
subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic
Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines,
…. The Board, by a majority vote of all members, may, for cause,
upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and
with the approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend
and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General
Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal
or dismissal of the petitioner without cause.
Rulings:
The court ruled that resolution no. 24 which approved by the Board
of Directors and pursuant to the desire of the office of the
President legally fixed the term of Appari. The word term in legal
sense means the definite period of time that an officer may hold an
office. The statue is undeniably clear. Resolution no. 24 speaks of
no removal but an expiration of the term of Appari. When the
language of the statue is plain, clear, and free from ambiguity, it
must be held to mean what it plainly says.