Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
34 Phil 311
FACTS:
The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E.
Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work.
One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle
Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance.
The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been
negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized
and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much
so that he could never perform his job the way he used to
and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used
to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought
to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the
legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear
in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount
of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government is liable for the
negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives
its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized.
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of
such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault
nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the
state in the organization of branches of public service and
in the appointment of its agents.
The State can only be liable if it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which
these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a
special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the
government. “The Government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”
Lim v. Brownell
G.R. No. L-8587 March 24, 1960
FACTS:
 This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dismissing plaintiff's action for the
recovery of real property for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of
land situated in Tondo, City of Manila, with a total area of
29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last world
war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United
States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa,
national of an enemy country, Japan, as evidenced by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to 65140,
On March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the
authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United
States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over
two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2
On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator (successor of the Alien Property Custodian)
under the authority of the same statute issued
supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to the
remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the
United States) and the President of the Philippines,
executed two formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1
and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said
Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the
Republic of the Philippines upon the latter's undertaking
fully to indemnify the United States for all claims in relation
to the property transferred, which claims are payable by
the United States of America or the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator of the United States under the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and for all such
costs and expenses of administration as may by law be
charged against the property or proceeds thereof hereby
transferred.
On November 15, 1948, the latter's son Benito E.
Lim filed a formal notice of claim to the property with the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator On the theory that
the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. that
they were mortgaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of
China; that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the
property was sold at public auction during the war to the
Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and
intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez
a from exercising her right of redemption; and that Kagawa
never acquired any valid title to the property because he
was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential
land in the Philippines by reason of alien age.
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the
Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, and copy of the decision
disallowing the claim was received by claimant's counsel on
the 15th of that month
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as
administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later
substituted by the Attorney General of the United States)
for the recovery of the property in question with back rents.
The complaint was later amended to include Asaichi
Kagawa as defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Intervenor-Appellee (Republic of the
Philippines) be sued?
HELD:
No suit or claim for the return of said properties
pursuant to Section 9 or 32 (a) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act was filed by Plaintiff within two years from the
date of vesting, the “later” date and the last on which suit
could be brought. A condition precedent to a suit for the
return of property vested under Trading with the Enemy
Act is that it should be filed not later than April 30, 1949, or
within two years from the date of vesting, whichever is
later, but in computing the two years, the period during
which there was pending a suitor claim for the return of the
property of the Act shall be excluded.
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, Co.
G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1950
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against
the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,
alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission
the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing
to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of
the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel
mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-
payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool
possession of said vessel and considered the contract of
sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and
delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of
the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines
and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights
under his original contract with the Shipping Commission.
Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but
the latter refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond
accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued
for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and
appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to
have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court
issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by
virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of
its possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff
‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that
when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping
Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to
the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever
rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash
of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender
possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover
possession thereof and have him declared the rightful
owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was
allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage
constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
intervenor with regard to the counterclaim?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government
impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint
in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for
affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the
vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not
deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by
taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the
state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to
the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever
claims and other defenses he might have against the state.
USA VS RUIZ
G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487
May 22, 1985
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders
and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair
projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the
company received from the US two telegrams requesting it
to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company.
The company construed this as an acceptance of its
offer so they complied with the requests. The company
received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of
Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of
the petitioners herein informing that the company did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and
that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this
reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him
against the US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said
contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity.
Rulings:
 Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States
and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order, they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into
business contracts.
USA v. Guinto (and companion cases)
182 SCRA 644
These are cases that have been consolidated because they
all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States
of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has
moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits
against it to which it has not consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US
Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents
wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that
Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the
invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as
cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John
Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation
that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The
club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the
case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found
him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners,
who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force
Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the
trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the
charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He
then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it
was because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents
against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries
allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat
them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them.
The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were
arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the
injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit
under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is
one of the generally accepted principles of international
law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by
the generally accepted principles of international law under
the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society
of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
states for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle
do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts
done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from
suit in this country merely because they have acted as
agents of the United States in the discharge of their official
functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it
has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such
waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject
to the concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The
Court would have directly resolved the claims against the
defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity
of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in
the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available.
Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for
further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the
John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business
enterprise undertaken by the US government in its
proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the
US government can claim such immunity because by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the
discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still
dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground
that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in
the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they
conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified
against the complainant. For discharging their duties as
agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations
in this case need a closer study of what actually happened.
The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants
were really discharging their official duties or had actually
exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The
needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it
may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO
THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE
DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO
BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business
relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
3. Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the
exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v.
Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
Ministerio v. CFI
G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971
FACTS:
 Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu sought the payment of just
compensation for a registered lot that the National
Government through its authorized representatives took
physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City,
without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal.
There was an allegation of repeated demands for the
payment of its price or return of its possession, but
defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor
General refused to restore its possession.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants are immune from suits.
HELD:
No, they are not. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the
governing law at the time, a complaint would have been
filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled
to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right
to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate
the same to the public use defined in the judgment."
If there were an observance of procedural
regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there
was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the
government would stand to benefit. It is just as important,
if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the
part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
It is not too much to say that when the government takes
any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained,
it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of
immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Amigable v. Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977,
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the
registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in
Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title) issued
to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any
right or interest in the property appears at the back
of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in
1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow,
unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now,"
and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and
the formal construction in 1925."
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the
government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a
quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17,
1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic
of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of land traversed by the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of
compensatory damages for the illegal occupation of her
land, moral damages and the costs of the suit.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for
the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial
court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding
that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion
of her lot in question on the ground that the government
cannot be sued without its consent; nor did it have
jurisdiction over said claim because the government had
not given its consent to be sued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
government.
RULING:
Yes. Where the government takes away property
from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated
sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of her certificate of title
and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of
any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered
owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of
the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the government is neither convenient nor
feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is
entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the
time that payment is made by the government. In
addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the
amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after
hearing.
Santiago v. Republic
87 SCRA 294
FACTS:
On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his
counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation
executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with
the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga City.
Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to
the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and
water system on the property and to build an office building
and parking lot thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7,
1974.
That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago
concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an
explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v
Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in
favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot
be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is
discernible.
The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed
the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate.
Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its
consent?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court rules, that the
constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is
consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be
express. It can be implied. In this case it must be
emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with
the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle
to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions
of such donation.
The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the
order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside
and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby
directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure
set forth in the rules of court. No cost.
US v. Rodrigo
G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1920
(please refer to the US v. Guinto Consolidated Cases)
Republic v. Villasor
54 SCRA 84
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines seeks to nullify the
ruling of the CFI in garnishing the public funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines
July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special
Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming
the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40,
subject of Special Proceedings.
Hon. Guillermo Villasor issued an order declaring
the July 3,1961 decision as final and executory, ordering the
sheriffs to execute the decision. The writ of execution
prompted the provincial sheriff to serve notice of
garnishments to several banks. The deposited funds in
Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB by AFP are public funds
for payment of pensions, military and civilian personnel
allowances, and maintenance operations of the AFP.
The Republic of the Philippines filed prohibition
proceedings against Hon. Guillermo Villasor for acting in
excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of
a writ of execution against the properties of the AFP.
Therefore, the writ of execution and notice of garnishment
issued to several banks are null and void.
ISSUE/HELD 1:
1. WON the state can be sued without its consent?
No, the state may not be sued without its
consent
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism
flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that
the state as well as its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because
of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends.
A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may cause private parties, the
loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far
greater is such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy
were not thus restricted.
2. WON the notice of garnishment issued by Hon.
Guillermo Villasor is valid?
No, the notice of garnishment issued by Hon.
Guillermo Villasor is not valid.
What was done by respondent Judge is not in
conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
From a logical and sound sense from the
basic concept of the non-suability of the State,
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
PNB v. Palaban
83 SCRA 595
FACTS:
Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution on
December 17, 1970. It was followed thereafter by a notice
of garnishment on the funds of respondent Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration for the sum of P12,724.66.
This amount was said to belong to Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration and was deposited with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) La Union branch.
On January25, 1971, it is ordered that Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration funds deposited with PNB
shall be garnished and delivered to the plaintiff
immediately to satisfy the Writ of Execution for one-half of
the amount awarded in the decision of November 16, 1970.
PNB invoked the doctrine of non-suability in behalf
of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. PNB claims
that since fund is public in character, a prohibition must be
issued against Pabalan’s order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not funds are public in character, thus
immune from suit?
HELD:
No. Petition dismissed. It is to be admitted that
under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit
as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set
forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without
its consent."
If the funds appertained to one of the regular
departments or offices in the government, then, certainly,
such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not
the case here.
It is well-settled that when the government enters
into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality
of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice
of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation
subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
Shell Phils Exploration B.V. v. Jalos
G.R. No. 179918 September 8, 2010
FACTS:
 Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the
Republic of the Philippines entered into Service
Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of
petroleum in northwestern Palawan (1990)
 Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the
Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its
development of the well under the Malampaya Natural
Gas Project
 construction and installation of a pipeline from
Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant
in Batangas
o pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed
the Oriental Mindoro Sea
 respondents (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for
damages against Shell before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
(2003)
 Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint
 Jalos, et al claimed that they were all subsistence
fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the
construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline
o fish catch became few after the construction
of the pipeline
o average net income per month fell from a
high of ₱4,848.00 to only ₱573.00
 o have to stay longer and farther out at sea to
catch fish, as the pipeline’s operation has driven the
fish population out of coastal waters
 the pipeline greatly affected biogenetically hard-
structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to]
stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea
 Shell alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the action, as it is a "pollution case" under
Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control Law.
o The Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has
primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions
for related damages
 It claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the
doctrine of state immunity without the State’s consent
o under Service Contract 38, it served merely
as an agent of the Philippine government in the
development of the Malampaya gas reserves
 Shell said complaint failed to state a cause of action
since it did not specify any actionable wrong or
particular act or omission on Shell’s part that could
have caused the alleged injury to Jalos, et al
 Complaint likewise failed to comply with
RULING OF THE SC
requirements of a valid class suit, verification and
certification against forum shopping, and the
requisites for a suit brought by pauper litigants
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT/S
 RTC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the action
was actually pollution-related, although denominated
as one for damages. The complaint should thus be
brought first before the PAB, the government agency
vested with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases
 Court of Appeals reversed such order and upheld the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the action.
o Shell was not being sued for committing
pollution, but for constructing and operating a
natural gas pipeline that caused fish decline and
considerable reduction in the fishermen’s income
o Claim for damages was based on a quasi-
delict over which the regular courts have
jurisdiction
 CA also rejected Shell’s assertion that the suit was
actually against the State
o the government was not even impleaded as
party defendant
 CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged
an actionable wrong
o Jalos, et al invoked their right to fish the sea
and earn a living, which Shell had the correlative
obligation to respect
 CA held that Jalos, et al substantially complied with
the technical requirements for filing the action but
failed to prove the requisites of a class suit, only those
who have verified the complaint should be deemed
party plaintiffs
 Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the
Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the
exploration and development of one of the country’s
natural gas reserves
 The Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party
to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-
Malampayo area under the State’s full control and
supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become
the State’s "agent" within the meaning of the law
o An agent is a person who bind himself to
render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter
 o An agent’s ultimate undertaking is to execute
juridical acts that would create, modify or
extinguish relations between his principal and
third persons
o The power to affect the principal’s
contractual relations with third persons that
differentiates the agent from a service contractor
 Shell’s primary obligation under the contract is not
to represent the Philippine government for the
purpose of transacting business with third persons.
Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and
manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State
 Shell is a provider of services, technology and
financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project
o not immune from suit and may be sued for
claims even without the State’s consent.
 Philippine government recognized that Shell could
be sued in relation to the project. This is evident in the
stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service
Contract 38.
o Article II, paragraph 8, Annex "B" of Service
Contract 3832 states that legal expenses,
including "judgments obtained against the
Parties or any of them on account of the
Petroleum Operations", can be recovered by
Shell as part of operating expenses to be
deducted from gross proceeds.
o Article II, paragraph 9B of the same
document allows a similar recovery for "[a]ll
actual expenditures incurred and paid by
CONTRACTOR [Shell] in settlement of any and
all losses, claims, damages, judgments, and any
other expenses not covered by insurance,
including legal services."
"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and
REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV 82404 dated November 20, 2006. Respondent Efren
Jalos, et al’s complaint for damages against Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. in Civil Case P-1818-03 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro is ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to its
refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB.
SO ORDERED."
+++++++++++++++
 Administrative Agencies; Definition of "Pollution"
"Although the complaint of Jalos, et al does not use the
word "pollution" in describing the cause of the alleged fish
decline in the Mindoro Sea, it is unmistakable based on
their allegations that Shell’s pipeline produced some kind
of poison or emission that drove the fish away from the
coastal areas. While the complaint did not specifically
attribute to Shell any specific act of "pollution," it alleged
that "the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-
structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to]
stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea." This
constitutes "pollution" as defined by law.
Section 2(a) of P.D. 984 defines "pollution" as "any
alteration of the physical, chemical and biological
properties of any water x x x as will or is likely to
create or render such water x x x harmful, detrimental
or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or
which will adversely affect their utilization for
domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational or other legitimate purposes."
 Same; Jurisdiction; National Pollution and Control
Commision transferred to the pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB); Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
empowered to determine the location, magnitude,
extent, severity, causes and effects of water pollution;
The PAB's final decisions may be reviewed by the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
"Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the
powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control
Commission provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984.
These empowered the PAB to "[d]etermine the location,
magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects" of water
pollution. Among its functions is to "[s]erve as arbitrator for
the determination of reparation, or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution." In this
regard, the PAB has the power to conduct hearings, impose
penalties for violation of P.D. 984, and issue writs of
execution to enforce its orders and decisions. The PAB’s
final decisions may be reviewed by the CA under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court."
 Same; Same; Exhaustion of administrative remedies;
Resort must first be made to the PAB which is the
agency possessed of expertise in determining
pollution-related matters before filing the complaint
before the regular courts
"Jalos, et al had, therefore, an administrative recourse
before filing their complaint with the regular courts. The
laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise.
The definition of the term "pollution" itself connotes the
need for specialized knowledge and skills, technical and
scientific, in determining the presence, the cause, and the
effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not
within the competence of ordinary courts. Consequently,
resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency
possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related
matters."
 Remedial law; Actions; Cause of action; A cause of
action is the wrongful act or omission committed by
the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff; Elements of a cause of action
"A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
rights of the plaintiff. Its elements consist of: (1) a right
existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the
defendant to respect the plaintiff’s right, and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of such right. To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
however, the complaint must show that the claim for relief
does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain."
 Same; Same; Same; The test for determining the
sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether the
complaint alleges facts which, if treu, would justify the
relief demanded
"The construction and operation of the pipeline may, in
itself, be a wrongful act that could be the basis of Jalos, et
al’s cause of action. The rules do not require that the
complaint establish in detail the causal link between the
construction and operation of the pipeline, on the one hand,
and the fish decline and loss of income, on the other hand,
it being sufficient that the complaint states the ultimate
facts on which it bases its claim for relief. The test for
determining the sufficiency of a cause of action rests on
whether the complaint alleges facts which, if true, would
justify the relief demanded. In this case, a valid judgment
for damages can be made in favor of Jalos, et al, if the
construction and operation of the pipeline indeed caused
fish decline and eventually led to the fishermen’s loss of
income, as alleged in the complaint."
 Same; Same; Same; Shell's primary obligation under
the contract is not to represent the Philippine
government for the purpose of transacting business
with third persons; Its contractual commitment is to
develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf
of the State
"Shell’s main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to
"[p]erform all petroleum operations and provide all
necessary technology and finance" as well as other
connected services to the Philippine government. As
defined under the contract, petroleum operation means the
"searching for and obtaining Petroleum within the
Philippines", including the "transportation, storage,
handling and sale" of petroleum whether for export or
domestic consumption. Shell’s primary obligation under the
contract is not to represent the Philippine government for
the purpose of transacting business with third persons.
Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and
manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State."
Saez v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 183533 August 31, 2010
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner, vs.
GMA, et. al.
FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with
the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for
temporary protection order, inspection of place and
production of documents. In the petition, he expressed
his fear of being abducted and killed. He likewise
prayed for the military to cease from further
conducting surveillance and monitoring of his
activities and for his name to be excluded from the
order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP).
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that
starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always
being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague
at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in
the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before
the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached
and informed him of his marital status and current job
as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel"
inquired if the petitioner was still involved with
ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during
the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to
Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in
the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio
who was always at the pier. The CA ruled that the
petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to
substantiate his petition for habeas data and writ of
amparo. The CA likewise dropped as respondent, for
Pres. GMA on the ground of her immunity from suit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the President should be immediately
dropped as respondent on the ground of her immunity
from suit.
HELD. NO. The President cannot be automatically
dropped as a respondent pursuant to the doctrine of
command responsibility.
In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et
al., the Court stated:
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it
must now be resolved whether the president, as
commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. We rule in the
affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of
command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the
crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or
punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all
armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that
although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such
may nonetheless be established through
circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more
liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged
with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed
by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226,
otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the
Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all
Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of
Command in the
Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement
Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a government
official may be held liable for neglect of duty under
the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed,
is being committed, or has been committed by his
subordinates, or by others within his area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not
take preventive or corrective action either before,
during, or immediately after its commission.
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes
or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government official’s area of
jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or
regularly committed within his area of responsibility;
or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility,
the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP,
can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s
rights to life, liberty and security as long as
substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had
exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with
knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise
necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the
necessary investigations required under the rules.
The Court also stresses that rule that the
presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president’s incumbency.
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity
cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for
acts committed during his or her tenure. Courts look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the
burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter
 liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights
against life, liberty and security. In the instant case,
the petitioner merely included the President’s name as
a party respondent without any attempt at all to show
the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the
alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the
petition, there was no request or demand for any
investigation that was brought to the President’s
attention. Thus, while the President cannot be
completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data
merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from
suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish
accountability of the President, as commander-in-
chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
Rodriguez v. Arroyo
G.R. no. 191805 November 15, 2011
FACTS:
1.) Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa
Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP).
2.) Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged
KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its
members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
3.) On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from
a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy.
Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and
forced him to get inside a car where more men in
civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45
caliber pistol).
4.) The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car,
and forced him to confess that he is a member of the
New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained
silent until they reached a military camp belonging
to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
5.) Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and
torture by members of the Philippine Army.
Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is
an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA
members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez
cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured.
6.) Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several
documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
7.) On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and
brother came to see him (accompanied by members
of the CHR - Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They
insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to
Manila.
8.) Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18.
Callagan and 2 military members went inside their
house and took pictures for around 30 minutes
despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
9.) On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices
that several suspicious-looking men are following
them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.
10.) On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition
for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents
and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
11.) The petition was filed against former
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt.
Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z.
Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De
Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac,
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
 12.) Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a
double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
13.) Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
through the solicitor-general, insisted on her
immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as
president).
14.) Supreme Court granted the writs after
finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of
the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of
Appeals to hear the petition.
15.) CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found
Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos,
De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and
torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was
dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the
case was dismissed on account of her immunity from
suits.
ISSUE:
(1) WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a
respondent by virtue of her presidential immunity from suit
(2) WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be
used in writs of amparo and habeas data cases.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the
presidential immunity from suits only applies during her
incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit
or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We
emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits
during their tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the
presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from
judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or
accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be
used to determine whether respondents are accountable for
and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in
order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not
determine criminal, civil or administrative liability, but this
should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may
refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or
omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the
other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing the
application of the command responsibility doctrine to
amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to
prove through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of
his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to
prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent
Callagan for lack of merit.
Lozada v. Arroyo
G.R. No.s 184379-80 April 24, 2012
PEOPLE INVOLVED: Petitioner Lozada was the former
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Forest Corporation (PFC), a government-owned- and
-controlled corporation under the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). [2]Petitioner
Violeta Lozada (Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo
Lozada (Arturo) is his brother.
At the time the Petition for the Writ of Amparo was
filed, respondent former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(former President Arroyo) was the incumbent President of
the Philippines. Meanwhile, Eduardo Ermita (ES Ermita) was
then the Executive Secretary; Avelino Razon (Razon), the
Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP);
Angel Atutubo (Atutubo), the Assistant General Manager for
Security and Emergency Services of the Manila International
Airport Authority; and Rodolfo Valeroso (Valeroso), an agent
of the Aviation Security Group (ASG) of the PNP.
SUMMARY: Lozada was issued a subpoena by Senate with
regards to the NBN-ZTE scandal. He did not appear during
the hearing and instead flew to London on ‘official
business’. Upon his return, he was escorted by several men
and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking to ES
and Ma’m, whom Lozada assumed to be ES Recto and the
President. Lozada was brought to LSGH where he was
purportedly harassed and threatened by the police. His
brother filed for a writ of amparo. The court held that the
Writ of Amparo was properly denied by the CA because the
petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial
evidence and that they failed to prove the existence of a
continuing threat.
FACTS: The instant Petition stems from the alleged
corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between
the Philippine government, represented by the National
Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a
Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.
Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada
as an unofficial consultant innthe ZTE-NBN deal. The latter
avers that during the course of his engagement, he
discovered several anomalies in the said transaction
involving certain public officials. These events impelled the
Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a
subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30
January 2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee.
DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada was in an
official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an
order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering his arrest
and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to
implement such order and make a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the
Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his family that he
would be arriving in Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm. In his petition,
Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held
his arms and took his bag. He allegedly insisted on joining
his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the
men when he heard them say in their handheld radio
‘[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado.’
Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there,
called his brother, Arturo and informed him of his situation.
He observed that there were several cars tailing their car.
Sec. Atienza called him and assured him that he was with
government people and that Sec. Atienza would confer with
ES and Ma’m. Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and
the President. He was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta,
who was making public statements asking for her
husband’s return. Along the way, the men asked Lozada to
draft an antedated letter requesting police protection.
Lozada asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was
refused due to security risks. They stopped at Outback
restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col.
Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the
blanks of an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his
request. He observed that policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his,
his family and the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of
LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to
the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an affidavit.
On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and
his brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the
Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ
of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c)
Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents
related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as
well as any other document that would show responsibility
for his alleged abduction.
Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting
police protection. On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to
hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-
at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him. He
claimed that after his press conference and testimony in
the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed,
stalked and threatened.
Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and control of what
happened from the time of his arrival, he voluntarily
entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived
of his liberty and that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the
custody of the Senate
THE COURT OF APPEALS:
(a) Dismissed the Habeas Corpus case in open court for
being moot and academic, as Lozada was physically
present and was not confined or detained by any of
the respondents.
(b) Denied the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on
the ground that the alleged acts and statements
 attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos)
were irrelevant to the Amparo case, and that to
require them to testify would only result in a fishing
expedition.
(c) Dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent
on the ground that at the time the Petition in
the Amparo case was filed, she was still the
incumbent President enjoying immunity from suit
(d) Denied petitioners of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo - petitioners were unable to prove
through substantial evidence that respondents
violated, or threatened with violation, the right to
life, liberty and security of Lozada.
ISSUES: In ruling on whether the CA committed
reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision, three issues
must be discussed:
I. Whether the CA committed an error in
dropping former President Arroyo as a
respondent in the Amparo case.
II. Whether the CA committed an error in
denying petitioners Motion for the Issuance
of a Subpoena Ad Testificandum.
III. Whether petitioners should be granted
the privilege of the writ of amparo.
RULING:
First issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President
enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office
or actual incumbency.[68] Conversely, this presidential
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting
president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.
[69]
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the
present action, as well as the filing of the original Petition
and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the
incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it
was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a
respondent on account of her presidential immunity from
suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her
tenure of office has already ended, former President Arroyo
can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity
as a defense to evade judicial determination of her
responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or
threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security
of Lozada.
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still
results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of former
President Arroyos alleged responsibility or accountability. A
thorough examination of the allegations postulated and the
evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to
sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her
part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to
life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare
claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain Ma[a]m,
[70]
whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b)
Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the President was hurting
from all the media frenzy,[71] there is nothing in the records
that would sufficiently establish the link of former President
Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010,
as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his
family purportedly received.
Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum
This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,[72] ruled that for a
subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or
documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant
to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
A subpoena is a process directed to a
person requiring him to attend and to testify
at the hearing or trial of an action or at any
investigation conducted under the laws of the
 Philippines, or for the taking of his
deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2)
kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things or
documents therein specified. As
characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The
Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces
tecum is, in all respects, like
the ordinary subpoena ad
testificandum with the
exception that it concludes
with an injunction that the
witness shall bring with him
and produce at the examination
the books, documents, or
things described in the
subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a
subpoena duces tecum may issue, the
court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present: (1)
the books, documents or other things
requested must appear prima
facie relevant to the issue subject
of the controversy (test of
relevancy); and (2) such books must
be reasonably described by the parties
to be readily identified (test of
definiteness).[73](Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the CA correctly denied
petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the
witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima
facie irrelevant to the issues of the case.
All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or
Abalos were solely with respect to the ZTE-NBN deal, and
not to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or
to the ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly
received. Although the present action is rooted from the
involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction,
the testimonies of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless
not prima facie relevant to the main issue of whether there
was an unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents
that violated the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in
denying the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum.
Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ
of amparo (DENIED)
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life,
liberty and security of Lozada
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims by
substantial evidence,[75] or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[76] The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals
the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
addressing amparo situations.[77]
In cases where the violation of the right to life,
liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for
the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of
a continuing threat. In the present case, the totality of the
evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the
threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the
evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case
boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the
parties diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-
6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement
with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada
was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when
he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led
to the departure area of the airport, [81] as he voluntarily
submitted himself to the custody of respondents.
This Court does not find any evidence on record
that [Lozada] struggled or made an outcry for
help when he was allegedly grabbed or
abducted at the airport. [Lozada] even testified
that nobody held him, and they were not hostile
to him nor shouted at him. With noon day clarity,
this Court finds that the reason why [Lozada] was
fetched at the airport was to help him avoid the
Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain him
at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, until
such time that he would appear and give his
testimony, pursuant to the Order of the Senate on
the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada] clearly knew this
because at that time, it was still his decision
not to testify before the Senate. He agreed with
that plan.
Petitioners, also insist that while they were able to
sufficiently establish their case by the required evidentiary
standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to
prove their defenses by substantial evidence and to show
that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[84] This Court
has squarely passed upon this contention in Yano v.
Sanchez,[85] to wit:
The failure to establish that the public official
observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the
automatic grant of the privilege of
the amparo writ. It does not relieve the
petitioner from establishing his or her claim
by substantial evidence.
Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must
establish their claims by substantial evidence, and
they cannot merely rely on the supposed failure of
respondents to prove either their defenses or their
exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case, the
totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails
to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the
privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered
moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to
Lozadas liberty.
B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ
of amparo and its interim reliefs (No basis for interim
reliefs since writ of amparo denied)
In Yano v. Sanchez, this court declined to grant the prayer
for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and
Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated
public officials were not accountable for the disappearance
subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous
to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection
and Production Orders and at the same time rule that there
no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to
Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no
basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim
reliefs can be anchored.