which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy,
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both
as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter
No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of
and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a
joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The
affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
 There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the
law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void
from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the
court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article
29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover,
the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer
as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful,
is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for
the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should
be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
 The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID
NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant
in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers
death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article
58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code
provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil
registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to
the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down
the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for
a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground
for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane
spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as
if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

 FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of
the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived
of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal
acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then
Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the
Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested
by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties
on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia
had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is
located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the
parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the
marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas
of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if
he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that
the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships
and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge
initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage
license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application
that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification
that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000.
Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract
of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter
could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar
of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license
due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined
to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent
judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that
his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be
skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded
the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as
the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this
nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone
a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that
power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair
the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and
wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would
have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus
filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao,
which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those
affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each
other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the
fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that
both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In
fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as
the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn
to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each
other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no
one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is
highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175581
Petitioner, are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
- versus -
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
JOSE A. DAYOT, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
Respondent.
x------------------x The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of
Petitioner, G.R. No. 179474
a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November
Present: 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of
VELASCO,** and Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He
REYES, JJ.
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
JOSE A. DAYOT, Promulgated:
Respondent. he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent
March 28, 2008 to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he
came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
DECISION approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave
them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that
he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on
top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered
that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as
man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-
trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June
1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that
the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses
version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could
have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were
at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was
made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took
him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper
that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does
not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in
for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was
belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when
he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to
be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that
the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was
because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse
because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under
oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on
November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court
if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more
belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
 the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February,
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after
1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
the discovery of the fraud. Thus: marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent
was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the
to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12] solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court
the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In
this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that
on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect
marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was the parties marriage.
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for
the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of
the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and
the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose
A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court
in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that
they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying
that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and
set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared
valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No.
179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007,
this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the
Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of
the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain
in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment
of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been
filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To
reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments
vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to
the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion,
the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which
they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the
statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential
and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required
to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It
also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
 The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect
of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code
governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the
[30]
fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to
[31]
the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties,
after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter
2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article
76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a
state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
[37]
marry each other. One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but reasonably
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where
a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms,
places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of
the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a
need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual
findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative
body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not
apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of
Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported
by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
 In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of
law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage,
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
question.
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization
of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa
permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth
marriage license.
in our laws.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity
to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent
of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all.
 WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be criminal liability, if any. No costs.
[54]
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a law on
SO ORDERED.
the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of
the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity
of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and

Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be
reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-
year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
 SECOND DIVISION
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172
69166,[2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
Petitioner,
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until
Present: properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

QUISUMBING, J.,
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES, Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
TINGA, and married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of

VELASCO, JR., JJ. Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
Respondent.
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
Promulgated: 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least
February 13, 2008 five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

DECISION On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
TINGA, J.: income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
 On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his
[4]
child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage
is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was
merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and
that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child.
[5]
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and
thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter
is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage
is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of
the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal
to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that
he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties,
as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.[7] The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital
Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.[9] Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with
respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the
marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being
that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit
should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
[10]
license. Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not
an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their
marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling
of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be
presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for
the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.[12] Finally, petitioner claims that
in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his
legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.[13]
In her Comment, [14]
respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory
tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings
and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot
be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed
out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover,
she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. [15]
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper
for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in
the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass
upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from
petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented
during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a
man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that themarriage between petitioner and respon
dent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that
the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction
to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action
for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
 However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.[20]
[21]
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim
for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of
a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
[22]
a marriage an absolute nullity.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable.[23] In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as
husband and wife for the last five years on or before March
13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.[25]
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.[26] In the
instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and
therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]
The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, October 2000is hereby REINSTATED.
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

SO ORDERED.
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who
was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro
Manila;[30]

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he
conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual
dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that
he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures
taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and
C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H,
H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is
seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another
picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.[31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City,
and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen,
in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at
2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that
he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show
a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and
MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of
his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not
issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with
the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was
prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract
and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor,
and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing
officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-
in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at
her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the
marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of
the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she
is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993;
(b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted
in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of
Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A
certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them
to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that
the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage
was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner
and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation
by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil
registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied
the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that
said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case
against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05
October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed
[sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid
and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read
as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided
in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with
the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it
did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification
could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not
be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was
it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to
the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In
fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License
No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in
said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a
location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus,
a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and
submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was
a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate
of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the
restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is
Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of
a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993
is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee Associate Justice
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said
Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy
(Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
 SECOND DIVISION Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
The decree provides in part:
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs. [T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

QUISUMBING, J.: The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil
Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion
allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial The parental custody for the children
court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September
30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of
nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for is granted to the father.
reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing
Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg,
or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan,
petitioner and private respondent.
Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on
November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion
to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of
that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its
order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied
Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the
the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of
July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting
aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent
portion of said order provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14,
1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and
considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was
included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though
the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had
obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and
considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article
43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the
dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and
custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside
with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing
her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated
July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is
completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16,
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or
denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order
the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant
case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial
Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court
by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14
may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such
terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to
conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.
Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
 Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under
this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than
all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to
it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a
case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of
July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held
that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to
do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact
that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997
has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby
endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy
mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to
the contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German
court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had
no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment
was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that
when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This
is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded
the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning
property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that:
"[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property
nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage." 29 Herein petitioner did not
contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the
allegations and the proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings
that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert
jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding
the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the
matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We
hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as
to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children,
namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner --
a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground
that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.Rather, it based its Decision on
the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1 The Petition is partly meritorious.
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
4 of the place where the marriage was performed.
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5 marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate
on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Courts Ruling
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for
our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by
a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage
was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted
in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity
to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only
the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d)
Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information
of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and
(e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio
since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground
of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines DECISION

Supreme Court
BRION, J.:
Manila

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
THIRD DIVISION
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571

Petitioner,
Present: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18,

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
BRION,
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
BERSAMIN,
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
- versus - *
ABAD, and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.[5]

Promulgated: Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
August 11, 2010 Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on
GENERAL,
his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
Respondents. -- - official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial
and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends
that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution, [19]
enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose
or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
[27]
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within
[28]
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of
a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include
a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided
in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of
the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive
rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to
be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what
had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. [35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law
on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
[36]
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
cancellation of entries in the civil registry. and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be SO ORDERED.
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be ARTURO D. BRION
[39]
made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be Associate Justice
[40]
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine
qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588,
which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties
is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office,
Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action
consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal
Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo
L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later
on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both
of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat
her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way

he chastised them.Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave
their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had
a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and
their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he
got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them
with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set
forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove
that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity
was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the
following issues:
 "I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings
by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all
the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family
Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration'
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
 in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,
and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only
to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has
not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey
over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has
been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by
the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
(Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20,
1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up
to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect
on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them.
But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but
he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are
still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
(Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size
of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before
the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
 in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally
absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should
retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When
petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based
on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the
trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and
an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short
span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a
finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses
to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of
the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he
wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime
he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing
in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with
his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that
there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the
wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during
the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to
be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact
that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of
her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the
innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and
of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven
self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concu

 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked
as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by
THIRD DIVISION her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was
prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This,
NILDA V. NAVALES, G.R. No. 167523 despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money from them and that
Petitioner, she had an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him.[3] The two got married
Present:
on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu.[4]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well. Problems
CHICO-NAZARIO, arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take care
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. of him and attend to household chores.[5] Things worsened when she started working as an aerobics
instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity
REYNALDO NAVALES, Promulgated:
Respondent.* June 27, 2008 recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself
x--------------------------------------------------x as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time
when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home
DECISION late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a
child with him, as it would destroy her figure.[6] On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: reconciled with her again.[7]

On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment[2] of
marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2, 2002,
indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same
declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.[8]
incapacity.

Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing
The facts are as follows:
that Nilda used her maiden name Bacon instead of Navales.[9] Reynaldo also

presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at
the bar called Appetizer, and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy,
beautiful, and jolly to talk with.[10] Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified
that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that
she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she
flirts with them; and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went
with another man, which angered Reynaldo.[11]
Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a
Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001.[12] In said
Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a
social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which
illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital
role as wife to Reynaldo.[13]
Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo
continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage.[14] She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who
was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and
subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA
to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for
other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo,
with concubinage.[15] Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating
that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies,[16] as well as a
statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, NildaB. Navales.[17]
On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo
V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29,
1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.[18]
The RTC held that:
x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established
that the defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had
no appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of
concealing her marital status by using her maiden name Nilda T. Bacon,
augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories;
by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the latter's
insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep, whose name her husband
did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch
her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her
even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather
than losing her job as aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a
child fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear
indication of the herein defendant's psychological incapacity.[19]
Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002.[20]
The CA dismissed Nildas appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital
status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania,
the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for psychological incapacity;
and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by
Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.[21]
Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
I
The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital
obligations as a wife.
II
Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or
INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF
MARRIAGE.
 III
The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
IV
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly
preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].
V
The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family Code
has not been strictly complied with.[22]
Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never
had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against
her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage.[23] She questions the
lower courts finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert
witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that
[24]
she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living together.
Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v. Molina[25] were not complied
with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory
in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was given
weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already
existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring
[26]
about the disability of the wife to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
[27]
excess of jurisdiction. Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a
review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and
passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of
law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the
requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo
City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses,
one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause
of action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present
her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by
nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to
Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo
and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report
of Vatanagul.[28]
Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments.[29]
Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo
and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.
The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.[30] The
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties.[31] The Family Code under Article 48[32] therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to
appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of
the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of
marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[33]
While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it is
agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages,[34] still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the
[35]
State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.
In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the case through
the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consists only of the Report
dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion
exists between the parties;[36] the OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage dated June 2, 2000;[37] and the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on
Reynaldo[38] and his witness Abales.[39] There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers
filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the
judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the
Court finds the State's participation in this case to be wanting.[40]
But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary
to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically
incapacitated.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such
principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of
facts.[41] Such is the case at bar.
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36[42] of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[43]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[44] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[45] In Republic of the Philippines v.
Molina,[46] the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code, thus:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. x x x
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological --- not physical, although its manifestation and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
 principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.[47]
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt
before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics
instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride
home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while
in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably
hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a
psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations.[48] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.[49] Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.[50]
As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first
year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during
the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.[51]
In determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, the same must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35,[52] 37,[53] 38[54] and 41[55]of the
Family Code that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void abinitio; or Article
45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation.[56] These various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.[57] Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.[58]
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name Bacon to prove
that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings
presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995,[59] after Reynaldo admittedly
left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has
no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot
agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be
single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for
its understanding of the human personality,[60] and that there is no requirement that the defendant
spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity may be declared,[61] still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained,[62] and said incapacity
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.[63]
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to
establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a
nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual
urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience
or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several
occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms,
deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive, irresponsible and vain.[64] She further
defined nymphomia as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown
by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband.[65]
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that
she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagulclaims,
during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but
also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a
certain Marvin and a certain Susan.[66] Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these
persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their
respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack
sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause
of Nilda'spsychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her
from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her
psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage.[67] Hence, the Court cannot give
weight to said assessment.
The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed
very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[68]
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld by the
trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no
other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to
support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge
the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage.[69]
While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.[70] And this Court,
even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may
be.[71]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-
799, is DISMISSED.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds
the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings
and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to
run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
 6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social
worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof
to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in
effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the
trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities"
is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of
Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with
another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically unfit for each other but
they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of
this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the
oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
 THIRD DIVISION
NACHURA, J.:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793

Petitioner, Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
Present: incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our
jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that
current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept
Chairperson,
was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
NACHURA, and For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Respondent,
Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
PERALTA, JJ.
G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution[2]denying
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
Promulgated:
Oppositor.

February 13, 2009 The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January
1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]

DECISION
 Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another
and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or
around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At
first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In
April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house
and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay
with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He
was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place
where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who
suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed
this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed
with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they
telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate
lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its
behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it
could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended
trial on the merits.[14]
 The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born
and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently
unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA
GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of
Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one
deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by
whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said
virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He
generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried
his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet
and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s]
on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is]
said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days
as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy
father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and
this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a
month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their
lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is
not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the
idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going
to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was
compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should
go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of
the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the
meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few
days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he
arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home
again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and
became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he
would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent
brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,]
agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents
uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner
was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his
family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and
relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only
live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away
from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should
already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he
chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing
the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited
and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support
her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner
that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom,
while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows
as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still
unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still
founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded
as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest
in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too
akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to
commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as
aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of
the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen
 to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-
petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner
knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did
realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her
not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided
way out of the relationship.
by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
REMARKS:
the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. [22] The CA
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to,
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by as the case may be, the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for
petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware
of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening
their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other
hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required
It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable
presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]
since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for
them to take.[15]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage
void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage
for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is
of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic,
had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]
 For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations
that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was
likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The
purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not
satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law.
Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court
of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code
Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a
no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and
the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal
separation, and (b) whenever a married person
would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil
Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as
a special contract of
permanent partnership between a
man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering
the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees
in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages
on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds
similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration
of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages
contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even
if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
 Art. 32. The absolute constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
nullity of a marriage may be and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
invoked or pleaded only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of
Article 34. In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

Art. 33. The action or

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
defense for the declaration of the
read:
absolute nullity of a marriage shall
not prescribe.

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time

of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
xxxxxxxxx
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country after the celebration.
today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed
by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment
of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
produced the following revised provision even before the session was
University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of
over:
the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null
and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in
other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or (7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly manifest after the celebration.
normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed
the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to
mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea .
. . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being a
defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable
of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent;
it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz.:

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree. as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term 3. special cases and special situations.
psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in
the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would
cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in
rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . .
the Family Code as finally enacted.
Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a

ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for
being psychological in nature.
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
sex. time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled
is capable of ratification or convalidation.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered

the inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
 With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in
the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
at least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity:
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence.
valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state,
Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union
annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,
is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
made during the wedding ceremony.
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only
be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil
of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage,
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary.
themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the
Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use
Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
 ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow
some resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with
that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual
distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs of
C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and
the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a
rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption
that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract,
there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is
located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the
contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of
them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of
the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological
process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that
both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3
deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act,
however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not
with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent,
but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941
regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity
which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which
ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies
always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition
which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and
freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say,
they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal
system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher
faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human
acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there
are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person
towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have
its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity
seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he
itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties
on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and
though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities
intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of
which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In
eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge,
obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of
had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and
consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a
person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused,
evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering
in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too
of the goods.
clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity
to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at
the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the
prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks
selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain
freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the
progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume
moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible
the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object
compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made
of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a
as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It
free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and
would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as
weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a
this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only
question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and
with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with
continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem
regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that
entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in
corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free,
but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not
that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire. unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is
qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of
binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the
anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of
moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both
of the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this
consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the
parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does
not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to
maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be
due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or
maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse
is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to
the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua
conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such
would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring
the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not
capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are
general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering
from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may
have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations
of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as
regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the
moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of
execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the
marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be
factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks
of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is
not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially
at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money
and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to
achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered
around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise
to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is
impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal
relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and
antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under
what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of
marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the
inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider,
with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is
to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object
of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in
corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of
C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account
for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual
is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the
spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does
not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this
sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and
intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to
assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill
this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity
lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object
of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is
the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a
psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is
a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there
must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when
there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the
person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the
person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by
C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad
habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to
qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of
the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of
freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that
should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the
Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,[43]ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate
courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not
a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that
when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina,[46]thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each
othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership
concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V.
Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as
aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[48]
 Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied
the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each
case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for
the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36
as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world.[50] The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little
by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what
was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman
Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by
Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather be
alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity,
the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36
will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too
much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its
business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the
other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the
latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in
this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met
in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion
of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony,
were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in
this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made
in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result
of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp
and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right
to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept
the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains
of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she
has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity
to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence).
An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry
out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
the marriage was entered into.[58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point,
finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to
refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who
are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with
personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic
of a persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving
and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood
and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have
more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the
disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived
by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal,
without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to
trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other
areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced
self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These
include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain
stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types.Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal
stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness
and an inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or
fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality
patterns.
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or
eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a

genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest often appear anxious or fearful.
that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific personality
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal
specific personality disorders.
personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase
(MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually

have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG)
have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave
is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients
reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities,
compared with 19 percent in a control group. Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric

Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into
three major clusters:
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily
hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
 During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred
to as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make
everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may
allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality disorders,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[65]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court,
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness;
and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for
the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal
behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There
is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also
may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics
whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others
may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where
to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty
doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering;
she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and
void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July
14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which
Supreme Court
reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Manila Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified
Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS
SECOND DIVISION

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493
Petitioner, Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn
and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Present:
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
BRION,

DEL CASTILLO,

- versus - ABAD, and Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd
PEREZ, JJ.
jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand,
refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and
Promulgated: violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.

ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF March 10, 2010

THE PHILIPPINES, Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another
Respondents. woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
BRION, J.:
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July
1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which
caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the
plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which
makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff
causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from
the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and
proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by
Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion
existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist
testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition,
including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-
examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that
Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent
before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will
you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of
violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of
violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical
interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent
during the time of the marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-
social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently
incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the
marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by
the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no
pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found to be
very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with
respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is
a statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the
clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had
already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of
marriage.Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and callous
emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful
relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a
person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is
serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love,
caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic
and long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder
was present at the time of the wedding and became manifest
thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently
grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic
mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has
been there long before he entered marriage apparently, it came during
early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure
such because psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to
others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind
of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present
during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became manifest
thereafter?
 A. Yes, maam. Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner
suffers a lot (sic)?

xxxx
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of
marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:

Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on parents (sic)?
Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)? respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no apparent
reason (sic).

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated

without any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the Court:
respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of
psychological disorder (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will

not admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic). Court:

Court: Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

 A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of
the respondent (sic).
A. They do not have children because more often than not the
respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful
harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing
Court:
what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid
instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and
enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
Q. How was the petitioner tortured? petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown
by the respondent (sic). love to the petitioner?

Court: A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to

sustain the marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices
thru the petitioner (sic).
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.
Court:

Court:
Q. What are the vices?

Q. Why did you know?

A. Alcohol and gambling.
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person
itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect
the other party (sic). Court:

Court: Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform

marital obligation?

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

 A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person.[4]
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
pertinently states:[5]
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO,
a petitioner for Nullity of Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year
high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father
is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a
heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common
knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit
relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic
whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day
living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life
is adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create inner
tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image
but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of containing
the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic)
with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward
for a better future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the
past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple
life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and
limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to
direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration
appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to
discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification
filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito;
thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law
that a person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated,
there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be
unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack
of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise
peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink
and the next drinks (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy,
p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony
of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the
petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and
respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being
irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a
wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior
and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four
months of messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from
the start of her married life with the respondent, she already suffered
from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that
she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her
husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living
with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the household chores
an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she
served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be
attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she and her
husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the
feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the
petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the
psychologist testimony quoted above] would only tend to show that
the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity
which is not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the
Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the
testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who
testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that
there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to
comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and
clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed
for.
 A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological
incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and
without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as
the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the
respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad
reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag
during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment
should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering
petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons
with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision,
ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the
guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of
Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court
adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or
clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the
evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of
the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were
not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the
absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose
mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold
that the respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into the
marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due
to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As
observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to
provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical
abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of
a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal
at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was
due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or
the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into
a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a
permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to
engage in productive work and more stable relationships with
another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were
under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the
respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this
reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our
strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family
that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity
is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses
of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of
the CA ruling based on the following arguments:
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these
criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of
psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave
lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological
incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists
totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage only in name.
null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court
as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the
Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial
courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private THE COURTS RULING
respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous;
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with
incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider
discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a
person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows: The Law, Molina and Te
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are
to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential
obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely
introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with
the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very
least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept
of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as
the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements
of Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows
that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurabilitycan be duly established.[15]
[16]
Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then
already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules)
promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with
the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations,
if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of
these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial
conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds
for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to
us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state
of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which
revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code
did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some
resiliency in its application.[19]
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is
consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-
to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the
findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with
which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other
perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated
that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the

relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular
root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in
the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by
a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the
pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely stands
for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in
these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough
and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for
a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on
Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders,
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown.[26] Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part
of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal
validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos
psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based
on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to
undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts
appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged
psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion
evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that
Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated
Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with
due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is
grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we
recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete
personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such
as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally
obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on
doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos.
The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering
from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court
can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These
particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or
incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with
Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed.However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her
Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up
in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation
on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it
was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based
entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and
to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects
of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important
concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success
of Jocelyns cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and
the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony,
to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of
Angelitos psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely
testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and
the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the
marriage.Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of
violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the
courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the
alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place whether it was
near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear
evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence
require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these
simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as
the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological
incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted
in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different
treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal
behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present
case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even
assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of the physical beatings she received from
Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its
related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases
we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the
finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main
anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that,
on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the
facts and the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443. Costs against the petitioner.

-SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its
BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. No. 166562
assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional
Petitioner, Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
Present:
respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson, The facts follow.

CARPIO MORALES,*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
NACHURA, and (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.[5] They fell in
PERALTA, JJ. love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child.

Promulgated:

CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in

March 31, 2009 Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple decided to
Respondent.
move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In September 1975, Benjamin passed the
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
medical board examinations[8]and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to
become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin
completed the preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
DECISION for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active staff,[10] while
Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]

NACHURA, J.:
 The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975;
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles
Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne,
born on June 16, 1991.[12]
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner
and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter. [13]
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already
aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.[14] But after
they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about
midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would
confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.[15]Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to
the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass
the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to
her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge
the same.[16]
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money
for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on
drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. [17] He
rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his obligation to his children.[19]
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would
gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from
loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own
jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also an instance when the spouses had to
sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just
to be able to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in
1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he
purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.[23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found
it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited
 from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
money to pay the same; and psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of
Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.[24]
hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate
concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse
of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is
an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin
[33]
in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness. Dr. Obra
claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic
from Velez Hospitalwhen he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his
notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview
means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who
is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship
often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.[35]
friends twice a week.[28]

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny
Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and
to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally
found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person
with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing
even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and
defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code.
xxx
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that
no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos
v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was
promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated
March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens
motion for reconsideration.[45] On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous
ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision [46] reversing its first
ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision.[47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied
by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it
refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of
proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance
with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once
a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the
English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this legal principle
in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means
stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started
with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of
the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by former precedents
where the same points come again in litigation. As the rule evolved,
early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be
followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of
the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the
decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized
by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict
rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in
the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison
disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would
allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas reveal
a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule
of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal
conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over
two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in
the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed
as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a
policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not
one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of
horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis
stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The
rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what
we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on
judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens
explains: after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by
a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect
for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble
of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings;
(3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to
follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The
most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld
as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on
public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously
held that separate . . . is inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from
the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this
Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule
in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly,
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and
held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft
of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major
countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should
be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In
addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants:
closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood
v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to
a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
(3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed
as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to
be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.[53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was
struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we
explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that,
in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing
all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
[57]
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with another.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions
as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given case presented before
it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular
root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed
it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the
Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric
experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by
respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the
duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [61] The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his
friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove
such defects to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence
in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained
that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration
 Associate Justice
the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with
Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and

gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to
justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity
to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent,
to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity

of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has
not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December
13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA