AZNAR v.
DUNCAN
17 SCRA 590 (1966)
FACTS: Edward Christiansen was a citizen of California and was
domiciled in the Philippines. When he died he left a will which alleged
that he had only one child, Lucy Christiansen Duncan, and that he was
giving a devise of P3,600 to Helen Christiansen Garcia (whom he
alleged to be not related to him). In the probate proceedings, the court
ruled that Helen was a natural child of the deceased and that the
properties of Edward are to be divided equally among Helen and Lucy
pursuant to the project of partition submitted by the administrator. Lucy
appealed said order.
ISSUE: Whether the estate should be divided equally among the two
children (Article 854) OR whether Lucy’s share should just be reduced
to meet the legitime of Helen (Article 906)
HELD: Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no
preterition. For preterition to apply there must be a total omission of the
compulsory heir so as to deprive her of her legitime. As correctly
pointed out by appellant, Article 906 is applicable. Manresa defines
preterition as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not naming
him at all or, while mentioning him as an heir, by not giving him
properties from the estate.
Donation v. Support: It is important to determine whether what was
received was a donation or part of support. Support is not a gift. Thus,
if the compulsory heir received a certain sum during his lifetime, there
is a need to determine whether such constitutes support or an advance
of his legitime.
Preterition v. Disinheritance: Preterition is the omission in the testator’s
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not mentioning
them, or although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. If the will does not explicitly disinherit the heir(s),
then it is an invalid disinheritance. If the will simply omits the name of
the heir(s) altogether, then it is preterition.
ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN (A.K.A. AZNAR VS. GARCIA)
FACTS: In accordance w/ the will executed by the decedent Edward
Christensen (a US citizen but Phil domiciliary) , the executor in his final
account & project of partition, ratified the payment of P3,600 to Helen,
for such amount that was bequeathed & devised by the testator to her.
The executor then proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to the decedent’s daughter Lucy. Helen opposed saying
that she was deprived of her legitime as the acknowledged natural
child of the decedent. The legal ground of her opposition was that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Phils.
ISSUE: Phil or California law? Philippine law although the decedent is
a California citizen. Read on.
HELD: As Edward was a citizen of the US & of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights & intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the laws of
California. According to California law, a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, bec. the right of absolute
dominion over his property is sacred & inviolable.
But as provided in Art. 16 (supra), the national law of the
decedent applies. And so, what is the national law? There is no
single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions.
Each state of the union has its own private law applicable to its
citizens only & in force only w/in the state. The California Probate
Code provides that the testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form & manner he desires (internal law) BUT Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California provides that the law of the testator’s domicile
governs (conflicts rule) Applying the principle of renvoi, Art. 16 will
apply. The reason being that California internal law should be applied
to its citizens residing therein, & enforce the conflict rule for citizens
domiciled abroad. Hence, Helen has the right to demand completion
of her legitime.
REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85 (1967)
DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the death of the
testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes holds
that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must
be a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line
received something from the testator under the terms of the will, such
heir cannot be considered preterited
FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their
lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in
Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.
1. When BibianoBarretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City
of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to
SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia
Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as legacies
to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarretto and his
nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in
barrio San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned,
however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerard. In the
meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By
virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was
signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor
Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The distribution of the
estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed.
As a consequence, SaludBarretto took immediate
possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in
her own name.
2. Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered
that she executed two will. In the first will, she instituted
Salud and Milagros as her heirs. In the second will, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in favour of
Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first
rejected.
3. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, husband
of the deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children, it was
determined by the lower court that Salud was not a child of
Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. This ruling was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.
4. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria
Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now
falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased
BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow
Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence, this action for
the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
5. Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the
Distributee, SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps.
The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of the Civil
Code of 1889 which provided that :
“A partition in which a person was believed to be
an heir, without being so, has been been included,
shall be null and void.”
The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties
received under the project
of partition.
ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is
void ab initio and that Salud did not acquire title thereto
HELD: NO
1. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir in
the late BibianoBarretto's last will and testament together
 with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not
null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a
daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of
the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
BibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his
estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½)
assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir
of BibianoBarretto.
2. Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimate
daughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstance
would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an heir,
since there was no preterition or total omission of the forced
heir.
3. Where a partition was made between two persons instituted
as heirs in the will, and one of them was found out later not
to be the testator’s daughter, while the other was really his
daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was a void
compromise on the civil status of the person who was not
the testator’s daughter. At the time of the partition, the civil
status of that person was not being questioned. There can
be no compromise on a matter that was not an issue. While
the law outlaws a compromise over civil status, it does not
forbid a settlement by the parties regarding the share that
should correspond to the claimant to the hereditary estate.
4. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution
of the hereditary estate, which the court may accept or
reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It is the
final judicial decree of distribution that vests title in the
distributees. If the decree was erroneous, it should have
been corrected by an opportune appeal; but once it had
become final, its binding effect is like that of any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a
decree of distribution and the same has become final, the
validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes
irrelevant.
5. A distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to his
will should be respected. The fact that one of the
distributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court
issued the decree of distribution does not imply that the court
had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. The
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate is a
proceeding in rem. It is binding on the distributee who was
represented by her mother as guardian.
6. Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one of
them did not know that she was not really the child of the
testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the other heir
who was the testator’s daughter. At any rate, relief on the
ground of fraud must be obtained within 4 years from its
discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, when
the fraud was allegedly perpetrated and she became of age
in 1944, and became award of the fraud in 1946, her action
in 1956 to set aside the partition was clearly barred.
Reyes v. Barretto Datu
FACTS: The judgment of the CFI (now RTC) distributed the estate of
the deceased erroneously, but the decision was not appealed. It
consequently became final. What can be done about the erroneous
distribution of the estate?
HELD: The distribution remains, for the judg-ment has become final,
and therefore can no longer be attacked except for lack of jurisdiction
or extrinsic fraud.
FACTS: A father instituted his illegitimate daughter to a share less than
her legitime AND a stranger. Is the institution of the stranger valid?
HELD: Yes, for there was no preterition of the compulsory heir, the
illegitimate daughter. Her being instituted to a share less than her
legitime is not preteri-tion.
NUGUID v. NUGUID
17 SCRA 449 (1966)
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, died without descendants. Her surviving
relatives are her parents and six brothers and sisters. On May 18,
1963, Remedios, sister of the deceased, filed a petition to probate a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years prior to her
death. Both parents opposed on the ground that the institution of
Remedios as universal heir resulted to their preterition, they being
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line.
ISSUE: Whether the will is void due to preterition.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that what we have is a case of
disinheritance rather than preterition. This is not meritorious, as this
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between preterition and
disinheritance. Preterition is the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not mentioning them, or
although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. The will does not explicitly disinherit the parents. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than being labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the forced heir suffers
from preterition.
The effects of preterition are totally different from disinheri-tance.
Preterition annuls the institution of heirs, except devises and legacies
insofar as the latter are not inofficious. In disinheri-tance the nullity is
limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived. Considering, however that the will before us
solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is void.
Legal Effects of preterition:
1. Annulment of the institution of heirs: The annulment of the
institution is mandatory so that a portion of the estate may be freed to
satisfy the remaining unpaid legitimes.
2. Legacies and devises cannot be cancelled but can be
reduced only if the estate is still insufficient to pay the legitimes after
the annulment of the institution. Instituted heirs do not enjoy any
preference over specific properties unlike legatees and devisees who
enjoy a priority because the testator has indicated the specific property
to be given to them. Nevertheless, legatees and devisees can still lose
their legacies and devises if the portion of the estate is insufficient to
pay the legitime(s) of the preterited heir(s).
ACAIN v. IAC
155 SCRA 100 (1997)
FACTS: Acain instituted Constantino not relative of his brothers and
sisters in his will. He provided that all of his share in the conjugal
property shall given to his brother and that in the event the latter
predeceased him the share shall go to the children of Segundo. The
probate of the will was opposed by the widow of the testator and his
legally adopted child on the ground that there were preterited and that
therefore the institution of heir shall be annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not preterition occurred?

HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned
therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs not
expressly disinherited. As regards the widow, Article 854 of the Civil
Code may not apply since the spouse is a compulsory heir not in the
direct line. However the same thing cannot be said of the adopted
child. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same right
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that
the adopted child was totally omitted and preterited in the will of
testator. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.
Crisologo vs Singson
Facts:
Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's
death death—whether this happens before or after that of Donya
Leona's death—Consolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the
Donya Leona.
Issue:
Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.
Held:
No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration
shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly
made of the o f ideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a clear
statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only
enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As
already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death—whether
this happens before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall
belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.—It is of
the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be
clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another
the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or
upon the happening of a particular event.
The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere
sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the
brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death
of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
CRISOLOGO VS. SINGSON
Facts: Dna. Singson died single. She gave her property to
Consolacion Florentino w/ the condition that should the latter die,
whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix, the property
bequeathed to her shall be delivered in equal parts to the testatrix’s
three brothers, & or to their forced heirs should anyone one of them die
ahead of Consolacion.
Held: The substitution here is a substitucion vulgar. The substitution
provided is not expressly made to be of the fideicommissary kind. Nor
does it contain a clear statement to the effect that Consolacion, during
her lifetime, shall only enjoy the usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the
brothers of the testatrix. It merely provides that upon C’s death
-whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix - her share
shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA
Facts: Ana Maria Alcantara died. She left a certain sum of money to
her niece, Carmen. A certain Garchitorena obtained judgment of a
sum of money against Carmen’s husband. The sheriff levied an
attachment on the money given by Ana Maria w/c was deposited w/ La
Urbana.
Held: The will instituted Carmen’s children as fideicommissary heirs of
the testatrix Ana Maria. Thus, said deposit, w/c was part of the
inheritance does not belong to Carmen, not can the same be the
subject of execution of the judgment against Carmen’s husband who is
not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
G. de Perez v. Garchitorena
54 Phil. 431
FACTS: Ana instituted Carmen as her heir with the fol-lowing
stipulations in her will:
Should Carmen die, the whole estate should pass
unimpaired to Carmen’s children.
The estate should never pass out of the hands of Carmen
and her children as long as this was legally possible.
Should Carmen die after Ana while Carmen’s chil-dren are
still minors, the estate would be adminis-tered by the executrix.
It should be noted that in the will, no express mention was made of a
fideicommissary substitution. Neither was there any statement as to
whether Carmen was to die before or after Ana. It was thus alleged
that no fideicommissary substitution was made, and so, after Carmen’s
death, the property belonged to her estate and not to the children as
substitutes, and therefore, creditors could attach the same.
HELD: The properties belonged to the children, and not to Carmen’s
estate. This is because all the requirements of a fi-deicommissary
substitution are present here, and consequently, the creditors cannot
go against the property. The requisites for a fideicommissary
substitution are present because the first and second heirs exist, in the
proper relationship, and were both alive at the testatrix’s death. The
phrase “shall pass un-impaired” and the phrase “should never pass out
of the hands,” show an obligation to preserve and transmit. Finally, the
phrase “should Carmen die after Ana” anticipates a situation where a
first heir, Carmen, will later die after having enjoyed the inheritance.
Morente v. De la Santa
9 Phil. 387
FACTS: In her will, a wife provided as follows:
“1. I hereby order that all real estate which may
belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa;
“2. That my said husband shall not leave my sisters
after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should
my husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey
any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third
part thereof and the two-thirds remaining shall be and
remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have
any;
“3. After my death, I direct my husband to dwell in the
ca-marin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the
properties belonging to me.”
Questions:
If the husband marries again, will he forfeit the devise?
If the husband leaves the sisters of the wife, will he forfeit the
devise?
If the husband does not live in the camarin, will he forfeit the
devise?
If the husband has children by anyone, will he forfeit a part of
the devise?
HELD:
(a), (b), and (c) — No. Reason: The happening of these
events should not be considered as the fulfillment of conditions which
would annul or revoke the devise. They were mere orders and there
was no condition or statement that if he should not comply with the
wishes of the testatrix he would lose the devise given him. The
condition should have been expressly provided. It was not.
In this case, he would lose two-thirds of the devise.
Reason: There was a statement that should he have children
by anyone, the forfeiture would take place. Here the condition was
expressly provided.
Miciano v. Brimo
50 Phil. 867
FACTS: Joseph G. Brimo’s will provided that even if he was a Turk, still If a Texan (US) provides in his will that his proper-ties in the Philippines
he wanted his estate disposed of in accordance with Philippine laws; should be distributed in accordance with the Philippine law on
and that should any of his legatees op-pose this intention of his, his or succession, the provision is to be regarded as VOID because it
her legacy would be cancelled. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the contravenes Art. 16 (par. 2) which ordains the application of his own
deceased, did not want this disposition in accordance with Philippine national law.
laws, and so he opposed practically every move that would divide the Thus, if the Texan, under Texan law, has no com-pulsory heirs, the
estate in accordance with Philippine laws. Issue: Does Andre Brimo Philippine law on the legitimes of compulsory heirs cannot be applied.
lose his legacy?
HELD: No, Andre Brimo does not lose his legacy, because the
condition, namely, the disposal of the testator’s estate in ac-cordance
with Philippine law, is against our laws which provide that “intestate
and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law (Turkish law) of the person whose succession is under
consideration whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” (2nd
paragraph, Art. 16). The condition being disregarded, the legacy
becomes uncondi-tional, and therefore Andre Brimo is entitled to his
legacy.
A provision in a foreigner’s will to apply Phil law & not the national
law of the decedent is illegal & void.

BELLIS v. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358 (1967)
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, an American citizen and resident of San
Antonio, Texas executed a will in the Philippines, in which he disposed
of his estate to his relatives including his first wife, his 3 illegitimate
children, and his surviving children by his first and second marriage.
Upon the death of Amos G. Bellis, his will was admitted to probate in
Manila. The executor of the will complied with the provisions of the will
and filed with the court a Project of Partition. Herein plaintiffs, 2 of the 3
illegitimate children of Amos, opposed said Project of Partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children. The lower court dismissed the opposition filed by plaintiffs and
admitted the Project of Partition relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code
which states that the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
Texas law shall be applied. Texas law did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: Which law should apply – Texas law or Philippine law?
HELD: Texas law should apply. Article 16, par.2 and Article 1039 of the
Civil Code state that the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, shall govern with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (4) the capacity to
succeed. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Estate of Amos Bellis (a.k.a. Bellis vs. Bellis)

FACTS: The decedent Amos Bellis was born in Texas & was a citizen
& resident thereof at the time of his death. Under Texas law, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. He executed a will in the Phils in w/c he
directed that after all taxes, obligations & expenses his estate shall be
divided thus: (1) $240,000 to his 1st wife; (2) P120,000 to his 3 illegit
children, divided equally; & (3) the remainder goes to his surviving
legitimate children. The 3 illegit children filed their opposition to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitime under Phil law (By the way, the illegit children are all in the
Phils)
ISSUE: Texas law or Phil. law? TEXAS
HELD: Texas law will apply since the decedent is both a citizen & a
domiciliary of said state. Unless there is a Texas conflicts rule applying
lex rei sitae (law of the place where the properties are situated), renvoi
will not apply in this case.
Art. 16 & Art 1039 render applicable the national law of the
decedent in intestate & testamentary succession w/ regard to:
1. order of succession
2. amount of successional rights
3. intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
4. capacity to succeed

Bellis v. Bellis
L-23678, June 6, 1967