Agency Jurisprudence

 No contract of agency exists where a common carrier leases the trucks of another carrier, for there is no power of
representation by one with respect to the other and neither was there any authority to represent the other by the
terms of the arrangements.
 Prescinding from the obligatory force of the contract of agency, the mere fact that “other agents” intervened in the
consummation of the sale and were paid their respective commissions could not vary the terms of the agency with
the plaintiff-agent who remains entitled to a 5% commission based on the selling price.
 The fact that two agents enter into a contract of behalf of their principals, even if the principals do not actually and
personally know each other, does not affect their juridical standing as agents
 Even when the Agreement provides that the manager shall be considered an independent contractor and not an
agent, nonetheless since the manager is expressly authorized to solicit and remit offers to purchase interments
spaces, it covers an agency arrangement.
 A co-owner as such does not become an agent of the other co-owners, and any exercise of an option to buy a piece of land
transacted with one co-owner does not bind the other co-owners. The most prudent thing for buyer should have done was
to ascertain the extent of the authority said co-owner; being negligent in this regard, he cannot seek relief on the basis of a
supposed agency.
 Art. 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom
he contracts; it is the principal who is liable on the contracts of the agent.
 When an agent purchases the property in bad faith, the principal is deemed a purchaser in bad faith.
 Under the principle that knowledge of the agent is considered knowledge by the principal, spouses cannot contend lack of
knowledge of the rules upon which they received their tickets from the airline company since their travel agent, who
handled their travel arrangements, was duly informed by the airline representatives.
 The relationship between the corporation which owns and operates a theatre, and the security guard it hires to
maintain the peace and order at the entrance of the theatre is not that of principal and agent, because the principle
of representation was in no way involved.
 That the operator owed his position to the company which could remove him or terminate his services at will; that
the service station belonged to the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold only the products of
the company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the company and were just loaned to the
operator and the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the company
supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company’s gasoline and service station; that the
price of the products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not by the operator; the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the operator was an agent of the company and not an independent contractor should not
be disturbed
 When under the agreement the agent becomes responsible for any changes in the acquisition cost of the object
he has been authorized to purchase from a supplier in the United States, the underlying agreement is not a
contract of agency to buy, since a true agent does not bear any risk relating to the subject matter or the price.
Being a contract of sale and not agency, any profits realized by the purported agent from discounts received from
the American supplier pertained to it with no obligation to account for it, much less to turn it over, to the purported
principal.
 Where buyers-a-retro failed for several years to clear their title to the property purchased and allowed seller-a-
retro to remain in possession in spite of expiration of the redemption period, the execution of the memorandum of
repurchase by the buyers’ son-in-law, which stood for years unrepudiated, constituted an implied agency under
Art. 1869, from their silence or lack of action, or their failure to repudiate the agency. Conde v. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 245 (1982).
 The registered owner who placed in the hands of another an executed document of transfer of the registered land,
was held to have effectively represented to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal
with the property.
 When the owner of a hotel/café business allows a person to use the title “managing agent” and allows such person
to take charge of the business during his prolonged absence, performing the duties usually entrusted to managing
agent, then such owner is bound by the act of such person.
 When the law firm has allowed for quite a period the messenger of another office to receive mails and
correspondence on their behalf, an implied agency had been duly constituted, specially when there is no showing
that counsel had objected to such practice or took step to put a stop to it.
 The respondent’s acquiescence of Hojilla’s acts was made when they failed to repudiate the latter’s act. They
knowingly permitted Hojilla to represent them and petitioners were clearly misled into believing Hojilla’s authority.
 A law firm acting as counsel for one of the parties in the intestate proceedings cannot file a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals to protect its own interest. Under the law of agency, an agent is not personally liable for the
 obligations of the principal unless he performs acts outside the scope of his authority or he expressly binds himself to
be personally liable. Otherwise, the principal is solely liable. Here, there was no showing that SRMO bound itself
personally for Gerardo’s obligations. SRMO also acted with the bounds of the authority issued by Gerardo, as the
transferee pendent lite of the widow’s interest, to receive the payment. xSiquion Reyna Monecillo and Ongsiako Law
officers v. Chinlo-Sia, 783 SCRA 56 (2016).
 When no particular formality is required by law, then the principal may appoint his agent in any form which might suit
his convenience or that of the agent, in this case a letter addressed to the agent requesting him to file a protest in behalf
of the principal with the Collector of Customs against the appraisement of the merchandise imported into the country
by the principal. xKuenzle and Streiff v. Collector of Customs, 31 Phil 646 (1915).
 The dated letter relied upon by the petitioners was signed by Fernandez alone, without any authority from the owners.
There is no actuation of Fernandez in connection with her dealings with the petitioners. As such, said letter is not binding
on the respondents as owners of the subject properties. xLitonjua v. Fernandez, 427 SCRA 478 (2004).
 In a case involving authority to act in baranggay conciliation cases covering an ejectment for failure to pay rentals: “A
power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and
confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal. The written
authorization itself is the power of attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a “letter
of attorney.” xWee v. De Castro, 562 SCRA 695 (2008).
