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Quarter 1 2017
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Introduction
2
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Introduction
Global LNG Outlook comes from the Nexant Base Case sent out to licensees of Nexant’s World Gas Model ((WGM).
) Licensees
receive updates each quarter.
Decisions to invest in new supply and infrastructure are not solely based on economics but political and regulatory issues play an
important part – the WGM user decides on supply and infrastructure start up dates – the model does not build capacity.
Pipeline and LNG contracted flows take priority up to TOP levels. Most contracts expire at end of contractual term but some key
ones assumed to be extended under the same terms and conditions e.g. Russia to Germany, Qatar to Japan
WGM solves for spot prices – they are not an assumption or input – based on the marginal cost of supply, competing prices and
market tightness
Production
Country and node
LNG and Regas throughput
balances
Pipeline, LNG and
Storage
Infrastructure
Contractual flows Inter and intra regional flows
Oil Price Contracts:
LNG, Pipe & Transport
World Gas Model
Carbon Price Prices Spot Prices
(Node and Arc with
LP Formulation)
LNG Routes
Coal Price
Weighted average
Pipeline trade
import prices
Gas Demand by Sector
& Country
Consumption Cost Stacks
Demand Response
Europe FSU
North
America
Middle Asia
East
Africa
Asia
South Pacific
America
Keyy Assumptions
p
6
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
140
7.0 140
120
6.0 120
80 4.0 80
60 3.0 60
40 2.0 40
1.0 20
20
0.0 0
0 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Cent App $/mmbtu NW Europe $/mmbtu
Brent Crude Oil West Texas Intermediate Japan $/mmbtu Ave OECD Import $/Tonne
Japan Crude Cocktail
Oil prices are not assumed to rise above $100 a barrel in real terms – the levels seen in 2008 and in the 2011 to
2014 period, in excess of $100 a barrel, are seen as an aberration. Assumed to rise gradually to $85 a barrel by
2023
Coal prices average out at $80 a tonne in longer term
Global LNG Outlook Medium and Long Term Quarter 1 2017 7
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
500 three projects, all on the Pacific coast, in the second and
400 third wave.
300
Most Asia Pacific capacity additions are located in Australia
Australia,
although Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea also
200 contribute.
100 The FSU has multiple new sources of LNG, all in Russia. In
the medium
medium-term,
term the Yamal LNG venture currently under
0 construction and an expansion of the existing Sakhalin II
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
venture provide incremental sources of regional supply
North America Europe Asia In Africa, new liquefaction capacity is assumed in Angola,
Asia Pacific Latin America FSU Cameroon Equatorial Guinea
Cameroon, Guinea, Mozambique and Tanzania
Tanzania,
Africa Middle East mainly 2025 on. Offline liquefaction capacity in Egypt is
expected to re-enter full service in 2023.
Pipeline Capacity
Inter-Regional
te eg o a Pipeline
pe e Import
po t Capacity
Capac ty Inter-Regional
te eg o a Pipeline
pe e Export
po t Capacity
Capac ty
700 600
600 500
500
400
400
BSCM
BSCM
300
300
200
200
100 100
0 0
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
North
o t America
e ca Europe
u ope Asia
sa
E
Europe A i
Asia FSU Af i
Africa Middl E
Middle Eastt
Asia Pacific Latin America FSU
Main growth in pipeline capacity is out of FSU – Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan – to Europe and Asia (China)
Middle East also expands out of Iraq and Iran to Europe and Asia (Pakistan)
11
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Latin America
Asia Pacific
Asia
Europe
North America
BSCM
LNG Imports
Pipeline Imports
Production
LNG Imports
Change
g in LNG Imports
p – 2015 to 2020
China
India
United Kingdom
Indonesia
France
Pakistan
Latin America
Belgium
Malaysia
LNG Bunker Fuel
Spain
Singapore
Poland
Chinese Taipei
Other Europe
Bangladesh
Turkey
Korea
Thailand
Middle East
Egypt
Japan
North America
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
BSCM
China and India growth is key to increase in LNG imports. UK imports partly “re-exported” to continental Europe. Indonesia
imports are mainly from “East” to “West”. Start of use of LNG as bunker fuel. Japan imports decline
40
Middle East mostly Oman
Other in 2019 and 2020 is the slow
30 build up of Yamal
20
10
0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
CM
CM
40
BSC
40
BSC
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2011
AP to AS ME to AS ME to AP AF to EU NA to AP AF to AS ME to EU AF to AP RU to AP NA to EU
Middle East exports more to China, India and Pakistan as volumes diverted away from Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific
volumes
l also
l feed
f d Asia.
A i US volumes
l head
h d to
t Europe
E and
d Asia
A i Pacific
P ifi
Market Tightness
Market
a et Tightness
g t ess Indices
d ces – 2012
0 to 2020
0 0
1.02
1 00
1.00
0.98
0.96
Index 2005 = 1
0.94
0.92
0.90
0.88
0.86
2012 Q1
2012 Q2
2012 Q3
2012 Q4
2013 Q1
2013 Q2
2013 Q3
2013 Q4
2014 Q1
2014 Q2
2014 Q3
2014 Q4
2015 Q1
2015 Q2
2015 Q3
2015 Q4
2016 Q1
2016 Q2
2016 Q3
2016 Q4
2017 Q1
2017 Q2
2017 Q3
2017 Q4
2018 Q1
2018 Q2
2018 Q3
2018 Q4
2019 Q1
2019 Q2
2019 Q3
2019 Q4
2020 Q1
2020 Q2
2020 Q3
2020 Q4
North America Europe Asia Asia Pacific
Asia markets tighten as demand rises sharply. Europe tightened in 2015 as production declined but market
eases as import supply increases. North America tightens as LNG exports rise. Asia Pacific eases again in 2017
as more LNG export capacity comes on
20
18
16
14
12
$/MMBTU
U
10
8
6
4
2
0
2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018 2019 2019 2020 2020
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3
Even though Europe and Asia Pacific markets are becoming more supply long, spot prices remain flat – rising
cost of supply and rising competing prices offset les tight market. Gap opens up between spot and contract
prices in Japan as oil prices rise
16
14
12
10
MBTU
8
$/MM
6
4
2
0
-2
2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018 2019 2019 2020 2020
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3
Henry Hub Netback from Japan Spot (Full) Netback from Japan Spot (Marginal) Netback from Japan Contract (Full)
Netback from Japan is higher than Henry Hub on a marginal basis. From end 2018 the netback from average
Japan LNG contracts is higher than Henry Hub as oil prices rise
2020 to 2040
21
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
2015-2020
2015 2020 2020-2030
2020 2030 2030-2040
2030 2040
500
BSC
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
400
portfolio export in chart is total
300
portfolio export TOP less portfolio
200
import TOP
100
0
Market appears over contracted
through 2020 – some contracts will
-100
therefore undertake
However, contracts may have more
flexibility and lower TOP as part of
Point to Point TOP Portfolio Import TOP renegotiations than thought
P tf li Export
Portfolio E t TOP U
Uncontracted
t t d
BSC
Middl E
Middle Eastern
t LNG imports
i t are
50 displaced by deliveries from North
America, new African LNG projects,
0
and eventually, flows from expanded
-50 andd new ventures
t in
i RRussia’s
i ’
advantageously-located Far East.
-100 Current inter-regional Asia Pacific
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
pipeline receipts more than double
Pipeline Imports from Asia LNG imports from N America
after 2030, when additional flows from
Myanmar (Asia) commence.
LNG imports from Latin America LNG imports from FSU Inter-regional Asia Pacific natural gas
LNG Imports from Africa LNG imports from ME exports chiefly comprise Australian
LNG flows to Asia. These grow
LNG Imports from Other Sources LNG Exports to Asia
significantly over the forecast period.
The Asian market may help
underwrite future expansions of
Australasian LNG export capacity.
Global LNG Outlook Medium and Long Term Quarter 1 2017 28
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Qatar
Oman
60 Nigeria
Egypt
Angola
40 Algeria
Russia Far East
Trinidad and Tobago
20 PNG
Malaysia Borneo
Indonesia East
0 Brunei Darussalam
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Australia North
USA Alaska
Contracted
Norway
60 Peru
Australia East
Australia West
USA Louisiana
50 USA South West
Canada West
Equatorial Guinea
40 Yemen
UAE
Qatar
BSCM
Oman
30
Nigeria
Egypt
Angola
20 Al i
Algeria
Russia Far East
Trinidad and Tobago
10 PNG
Malaysia Borneo
Indonesia East
Brunei Darussalam
0 Australia North
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Contracted
Demand expected to recover over time from current lows – consistent with IEA
As contracts fall away Russia takes bigger share of market, with PNG supply also
Assumes most contracts not renewed
renewed, but if they were even with different volumes and pricing then supply patterns
would change
18
16
14
MBTU
12
Real 2014 $/MM
10
8
6
4
2
0
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Henry Hub NBP Japan Spot Average_LNG: Japan Average_Pipe: China East
Long term contract prices in Japan and China steady at $12 per MMBTU at $85 oil. There is a large gap between spot and contract
prices in 2020 which narrows over time as the market tightens
p g and more expensive
p g
gas is required
q to satisfy
y demand. HH levels
out as around $4 per MMBTU
14
12
10
8
TU
$/MMBT
0
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040
Netback to HH from Japan contract more than covers the full cost of delivery at oil prices over $70 a barrel. The
netback from Japan Spot covers the full cost around 2030.
2030
Quarter 1 2017
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
1. Introduction
1
2. Industrial Structure
3. European
p Gas Pricing
g
4. Removing Destination Clauses
5. TPA in LNG Receiving Terminals
Introduction
35
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Introduction
Two p
part presentation
p – Changing
g g European
p Gas Market and Global LNG Outlook
1. Impacts of market liberalization to industrial structure in Europe (merger to gas & power company, market oligopoly by a
limited number of large companies, etc)
2. How natural gas price is determined in in sub-regions of Europe (oil price link in continental countries, hub link in UK or
Belgium, etc)
3. Responses of market players to the EU's decision of free destination, such as Qatar's acquisition and utilization of receiving
capacity in European market.
4. Actual implementation and operation of third party access of LNG receiving terminals in Europe (we understand that some of
new
e LNG G receiving
ece g terminals
te a s are
a eeexempted
e pted from
o TPA regulation).
egu at o )
Industrial Structure
37
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Industrial Structure
Impacts
p of market liberalization to industrial structure in Europe
p ((merger
g to g
gas & p
power company,
p y market oligopoly
g p y by
y a limited
number of large companies, etc)
The old model saw large producers selling gas to merchant gas transmission companies who then sold on the gas to LDCs who
were the main sellers to end users. In some countries the gas transmission company also owned the LDCs e.g. British Gas in the
UK market.
Market liberalisation has led, along with privatisation, to essentially 4 groups of companies:
1 Producers
1. P d and
d exporters
t off gas as a commodity
dit
2. Suppliers and traders of wholesale and retail gas
3. Generation, regasification and storage asset owners
4. Network owners and operators – transmission and distribution
A number of companies are involved in more than one element of the chain – a few in all of the first three.
Companies also move into other commodities, especially electricity, wholesaling and retailing both gas and electricity. In addition
network owners and operators, such as National Grid in the UK, cover both electricity and gas networks. What network owners
and operators generally cannot do is to become involved in the commodity side of the business wholesaling and retailing of gas.
Network operators, however, are often also owners of regasification assets in particular and storage assets and sometimes
generations assets.
• Many
a y European
u opea companies
co pa es followed
o o ed similar
s a restructuring
est uctu g anda d unbundling
u bu d g although
a t oug some
so e remain
e a whollyo y or
o partly
pa t y state o
owned.
ed
• The main unbundling is splitting the network operations from the wholesale and retail supply – the infrastructure versus the
commodity
European
p Gas Pricingg
40
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
IGU Wholesale Price Survey has been monitoring prices and price formation mechanisms since 2005
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
100% 100%
90% 90%
80% 80%
70% 70%
60% 60%
50% 50%
40% 40%
30% 30%
20% 20%
10% 10%
0% 0%
2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
OPE GOG BIM NET RCS RSP RBC NP OPE GOG BIM NET RCS RSP RBC NP
100% 100%
90% 90%
80% 80%
70% 70%
60% 60%
50% 50%
40% 40%
30% 30%
20% 20%
10% 10%
0% 0%
2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
OPE GOG BIM NET RCS RSP RBC NP OPE GOG BIM NET RCS RSP RBC NP
Elsewhere GOG shares are smaller – some 32% in Mediterranean (principally in Italy)
Almost non-existent in Southeast Europe.
OPE dominates
d i t still
till in
i Mediterranean
M dit – Spain
S i and
d Turkey,
T k and
d shares
h Southeast
S th tEEurope with
ith th
the RCS category
t in
i Romania.
R i
Southeast Europe
Mediterranean
Central Europe
Northwest Europe
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Snapshot of 2015
Scandinavia and Baltics has some GOG
2016 survey will
ill be
b outt in
i May
M – expected
t d to
t show
h further
f th move to
t GOG
46
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
In the EU, destination clauses that prevent onward sales within the EU are considered 'hardcore' restrictions of competition and
prohibited under the EU competition rules. Alternative mechanisms, such as profit
profit-sharing
sharing mechanisms (PSMs) have been
permitted where the LNG is sold on a delivery ex ship (DES) basis.
Destination clauses were removed for pipeline contracts more than 10 years ago when, following legal proceedings by the EU, the
gas producers agreed to remove them.
them
The enforcement of destination clauses in DES contracts, especially by Algeria to Spain, prompted the rise in the re-export market.
Qatar (as QP) really only holds actually capacity in South Hook which it owns and at Zeebrugge – a 20 year contract. It sells LNG
to Edison who have the capacity at Rovigo and to PGNIG in Poland and also to Spain and France on contracts. The buyers of
Qatar LNG at these plants will be the capacity holders.
Qatar also sells LNG on a spot basis into the European market, and in terms of the way it uses South Hook in the UK is that apart
from a contract with Centrica – which doesn’t actually require LNG to be delivered as they can source it at the NBP – they self
contract into the UK market, bringing cargoes in and selling the regasified gas on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
48
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
There are currently 25 large-scale LNG import terminals in Europe. Of these, 23 are in EU countries (and therefore subject to EU
regulation), two are in Turkey (which is a candidate for EU membership), 22 are land-based
land based import terminals, and three are floating
storage and regasification units (FSRUs).
The Third Gas Directive anticipates a system of regulated third-party access to LNG receiving terminals, and requires LNG
terminals in the EU to provide transparent and nondiscriminatory access arrangements.
arrangements Developers of new import facilities and
existing import facilities for which new capacity is being developed may obtain an exemption to such TPA requirements from the
national regulator if the project satisfies certain criteria. So far, exemptions to the TPA regime have been granted to six of the EU’s
operating LNG regasification terminals: three in the United Kingdom (Grain LNG, Dragon LNG and South Hook LNG), one in France
(Dunkerque), one in Italy (Rovigo) and one in the Netherlands (Gate).
The conditions and tariffs of third-party access (TPA) to regulated LNG terminals must be published by terminal operators, as well
as approved by the national regulator.
Where a TPA exemption has been granted, the owner of the LNG terminal can negotiate contracts directly with its primary
shippers/customers; however, the national regulator monitors anti-hoarding mechanisms, and ensures that shippers have access
to a sufficiently transparent secondary market.
TPA exempt terminals tightly clustered in Northwest Europe – all are TPA exempt apart from Zeebrugge – the oldest terminal
Rovigo is on Italy east coast
Notable that 2 recent terminals – in Poland and Lithuania are not TPA exempt.
In the UK market, the LNG terminals were regarded as being similar to the beach terminals where gas was brought ashore from the
North Sea. UK is the key trading market along with Netherlands.
In Spain in contrast,
contrast the terminals are much older and would probably not have been eligible for TPA exemption but Spain is a
relatively isolated market with no real liquid trading hub, although there are multiple terminals.
In the TPA regulated terminals usually plenty of primary capacity is available, but in the TPA exempt terminals the primary capacity
is often all booked e.g
e g in South Hook in UK an affiliate of the owners has booked all the capacity but there is a strong secondary
capacity market.
Wrapp Upp
52
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Wrap Up
Q&A
Model Detail
Overview
Mike Fulwood
February 2017
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
Key outputs include spot and contract prices, production and consumption, trade flows and infrastructure utilisation
Production
Country and node
LNG and Regas throughput
balances
Pipeline, LNG and
Storage
Infrastructure
Contractual flows Inter and intra regional flows
Oil Price Contracts:
LNG, Pipe & Transport
World Gas Model
Carbon Price Prices Spot Prices
(Node and Arc with
LP Formulation)
LNG Routes
Coal Price
Weighted average
Pipeline trade
import prices
Gas Demand by Sector
& Country
Consumption Cost Stacks
Demand Response
Yes No
Stop
Option to create output file later
F db k the
Feedback th spott prices
i
Output file
St
Stop
The level of market tightness for the particular market determines whether the forecast spot price is closer to the marginal cost of
supply or to the competing price.
The tighter is the market then the closer the spot price is to the competing price. In a less tight market the spot price might be
expected to be closer to the marginal cost of supply.
Appendix:
pp WGM Specifications
p
59
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
WGM is based on excel and with the system configuration below:
• Win 7 (8 GB RAM)/ Win 10 (16 GB RAM) [64 bit systems)
WGM is supplied with a comprehensive database on gas • Office 2010 / Office 13 [64 bit versions]
production, LNG and pipeline infrastructure, trade routes as • Linear Programming solver – What’s Best (64 bit)
well as long term contracts, storage facilities and demand
well as long term contracts, storage facilities and demand Run time: We have optimised run time to under 10 min for a full
Run time: We have optimised run time to under 10 min for a full
projection. All data needed to run the model is scenario run
supplied by Nexant and users are free to
add or overwrite the supplied System
assumptions to construct scenarios
assumptions to construct scenarios Database requirement
i t
of interest to their organisations.
and run time
WGM
Key outputs include spot and contract
prices, production and consumption, trade WGM runs on a stand‐alone computer
flows and infrastructure utilisation Support
Outputs or laptop. The Excel interface allows users
Global Consumption
to modify
to modify inputs easily and incorporate outputs
inputs easily and incorporate outputs
into other internal programs and systems.
European pipeline imports Nexant provides comprehensive support services including
Spot Price differentials
initial installation and training regular updates of data and
initial installation and training, regular updates of data and
technical support. All users benefit from a continuous
programme of model development and enhancements.
System Requirements
H d
Hardware S ft
Software
Standalone computer with 8 GB RAM Windows 7 (64-bit)
recommended
Office 2010 64-bit (English language version please)
The World Gas Model (WGM) is available to the clients to WGAS is a subscription program that provides coherent
use under license on their own systems. The clients benefit forecasts for global, regional and national supply/demand
from the database containing detailed Information about
from the database containing detailed Information about and prices for natural gas and LNG.
d i f t l d LNG
production, infrastructure and contracts, continuous
support and global coverage in WGM.
WGAS
Licensing Subscripti
on
Products
Bespoke
Scenario In a Scenario Week – we sit with the client
in their office running the scenarios and
Clients can consult with Nexant to create
Clients can consult with Nexant to create Week
S
Scenarios
bespoke scenarios starting with our base case,
i sensitivities in real time, providing the data,
iti iti i l ti idi th d t
results and analysis from each scenario.
and then changing key assumptions to generate
alternative scenarios and sensitivities.
Appendix:
pp Spot
p Price Backcastingg
64
IEEJ:April 2017 © IEEJ2017
16
14
12
10
MMBTU
8
$M
6
4
2
0
20066 Q1
20066 Q3
20077 Q1
20077 Q3
20088 Q1
20088 Q3
20099 Q1
20099 Q3
20100 Q1
20100 Q3
2011 Q1
2011 Q3
20122 Q1
20122 Q3
20133 Q1
20133 Q3
20144 Q1
20144 Q3
20155 Q1
20155 Q3
20166 Q1
20166 Q3
Calculated Spot Actual Spot
Tracks changes pretty well – 2011 and 2012 actual less than calculated
Europe Netherlands
18
16
14
12
MBTU
10
SMM
8
6
4
2
0
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
2006 Q
2006 Q
2007 Q
2007 Q
2008 Q
2008 Q
2009 Q
2009 Q
2010 Q
2010 Q
2011 Q
2011 Q
2012 Q
2012 Q
2013 Q
2013 Q
2014 Q
2014 Q
2015 Q
2015 Q
2016 Q
2016 Q
Calculated Spot Actual Spot
Tracks changes pretty well – since 2011 calculated level generally less than actual level
25
20
15
MMBTU
SM
10
0
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q3
2006 Q
2006 Q
2007 Q
2007 Q
2008 Q
2008 Q
2009 Q
2009 Q
2010 Q
2010 Q
2011 Q
2011 Q
2012 Q
2012 Q
2013 Q
2013 Q
2014 Q
2014 Q
2015 Q
2015 Q
2016 Q
2016 Q
Calculated Spot Actual Spot
Tracks changes pretty well – since 2011 calculated level slightly less than actual level
China spot LNG a pretty thin market though
25
20
15
%MMNTU
10
0
2006 Q1
2006 Q3
2007 Q1
2007 Q3
2008 Q1
2008 Q3
2009 Q1
2009 Q3
2010 Q1
2010 Q3
2011 Q1
2011 Q3
2012 Q1
2012 Q3
2013 Q1
2013 Q3
2014 Q1
2014 Q3
2015 Q1
2015 Q3
2016 Q1
2016 Q3
Calculated Spot Actual Spot
Tracks changes pretty well since 2008 (spot market thin before that) – but post-Fukushima calculated level generally
slightly less than actual level
Nexant Inc.
Nexant, Inc
San Francisco
New York
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