a.
No question was raised as to the award
WASSMER V VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964
FACTS:
On August 23, 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz
Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. In
preparation for their wedding on Sept. 4, invitations
were distributed and apparel were purchased. On Sept.
2, Velez left a note for Wassmer to the effect that the
wedding will have to be postponed due to the
opposition thereto of his mother. The day after, he sent
a telegram assuring her of his return. Alas, he never did.
Velez was declared in default after failure to answer
Wassmer’s suit for damages, and was ordered to
indemnify plaintiff. Velez filed a petition for relief from
judgment on the ground of excusable negligence, as
well as a motion for new trial and reconsideration on
the ground that there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant’s petition for relief on the
ground of excusable negligence is valid;
2. WON mere breach of a promise to marry is an
actionable wrong;
3. WON defendant must be held answerable in
damages;
4. WON the damages awarded were excessive.
HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Defendant’s petition was NOT VALID because it
wasn’t supported by an affidavit of merits
based on FACTS. The contention that his failure
to marry plaintiff was due to fortuitous event is
a mere conclusion or opinion.
2. Mere breach of a promise to marry is NOT AN
ACTIONABLE WRONG (Estopa v. Biansay).
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.
3. The circumstances surrounding the breach of
promise to marry are contrary to good customs
for which defendant MUST BE HELD
ANSWERABLE in damages. Article 21, CC,
provides that "any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
of actual damages. As per Article 2219,
CC, moral damages are recoverable in
this case. As per Article 2232, CC,
exemplary damages are also
recoverable because the circumstances
indicate that defendant acted in a
wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
4. Considering the particular circumstances, the SC
affirmed the lower court’s judgment but
REDUCED the initial moral and exemplary
damages from PHP25000 to PHP15000 as a
reasonable award.
TANKANCO V CA
G.R. No. L-18630 ll Dec. 17, 1966 ll J.B.L Reyes, J.
PETITIONER: APOLONIO TANJANCO
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS
FACTS:
From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO
courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being
of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for Santos who eventually
reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of
marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal
knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one year,
Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually
led to Santos getting pregnant. As a result of her
pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of
unemployment Santos became unable to support
herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not
fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental
anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to
the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the
unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for support
and damages.
Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court
granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the latter
decided the case, stating that no cause of action was
shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for
its support, but a cause of action was present for
damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco
appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach
of a promise to marry are not permissible in this
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to
Santos for breach of his promise to marry her
HELD:
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to
the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of
the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the
memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that
it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced.
Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That
definition of seduction is not consistent with the
position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted
carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with
him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived,
Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is
incompatible with the premise behind the idea of
seduction.
Decision of Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of
the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Complaint of
Santos is dismissed for failure to state cause of action.
DE JESUS V SYQUIA
G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CESAR SYQUIA
FACTS:
Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as a cashier
for a barber shop of which defendant Cesar Syquia, an
unmarried man from a prominent family, was
accustomed to get his haircut. The two became
acquainted and developed an amorous relationship
which resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.
During the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy,
defendant was a constant visitor at her home, and in
February 1931, he handed Antonia a letter which was
addressed to the priest who was to christen the baby
acknowledging that the baby is his and that it be
christened in his name.
Defendant showed paternal interest in the situation
that even when he was abroad, he continued to write to
Antonia cautioning her to take care of herself so that
“junior” would be strong.
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and the child in
his house where they lived together in regular family
style with all household expenses paid for by Syquia.
When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy,
Syquia left her and thereafter married another woman.
During the christening of the child, the defendant
caused the child to be given the name Ismael Loanco
instead of the originally planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
ISSUE:
1. WON the breach of promise to marry is
actionable.
2. WON the letters made by defendant prove
sufficiency of acknowledgment of paternity.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for breach
of promise to marry. The action has no standing in civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features
necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore,
there is no proof upon which a judgment could be
based requiring the defendant to recognize the second
child, Pacita Loanco.
The sufficiency of acknowledgement of paternity is
satisfied by the production of one or more documents,
of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing
father, as contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code. The admission of paternity is contained
in the note to the priest and the other letters addressed
to Antonia during her pregnancy.
PACCININNI V HAJUS
FACTS:
The petitioner, Piccininni, claims that the defendant,
Hajus, made him believe that they would get married
and live at Hajus’ house. Because of this, Piccininni
spent $40,000 to renovate and improve her house.
Hajus claimed that she can’t be charged with fraud and
that what she committed was a breach of promise to
marry. Therefore, no action can be brought upon her
because of the Heart Balm Act.
The Heart Balm Act states “no action shall be brought
upon any cause from alienation of affections or from
breach of promise to marry.” Trial court ruled that the
Heart Balm Act bars Piccininni from charging Hajus.
Case brought to SC.
ISSUE:
WON Piccinnini can recover his property in light of the
Heart Balm Act.
HELD:
Yes. Piccininni is not asking for damages because of a
broken heart or a mortified spirit. He is asking for the
return of things which he gave to Hajus because of her
fraudulent representations. Picininni does not assert
that Hajus wronged him in failing to marry him. He just
asserted that she wronged him in fraudulently inducing
him to transfer property to her. His complaint is based
on what she did, and not on what she refused to do.
Hence, trial court’s judgment was reversed.
1. HB Statute only meant to bar actions for
damages suffered from loss of marriage,
humiliation, and other direct consequence of
the breach
2. Gift given in contemplation of marriage is
CONDITIONAL.
a. HBA does not affect common law
principles governing a gift to a fiancée
made on condition of marriage.
3. Purpose of HBA: to prevent recovery of
damages based on feelings and sentiments, and
pecuniary and social advantages OFFERED (also
conditional) by marriage (Things you don’t have
yet, basically).
4. Plaintiff is not asking for damages of heartbreak
or broken spirit, but for a return of things which
he bestowed in reliance upon fraudulent
representations.
a. HBA does not preclude
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his die, and observe honesty and good
faith.
1. You can abuse your rights and injure others.
2. The old rule: classical theory, he who uses a
right injures no one”; no person can be held
liable for the damages to another by the
exercise of a right.
3. Right disappears through abuse; you do not
exercise a right while prejudicing another.
4. 3 principles why we should not abuse rights
a. Honeste vivere
b. Alterum non laedere
c. Jus suum quique tribuere
5. Test of abuse of right: abnormal exercise of
rights contrary to its socioeconomic purpose;
excessive or unduly; intention to injure; court
must base above on facts and circumstances.
6. Absence of good faith. Good faith – honest
intention to not take unconscientious
advantage of another. Thru technicalities of law
7. Article 1. Principle of abuse of rights (Art. 19)
and acts conta bonos mores (Art. 21) match.
8. Examples. (a) exercising a right with no
legitimate aim and with intent to spite another;
(b) there is no corresponding benefit to the
abuser, but there is a disadvantage to the other.
a. Pre-contractual abuse. Refusing to
receive certain guests by a hotel; racial/
sex discrimination by business owners,
employers, etc.
b. Contractual abuse. Dismissing
employees for no legit reason (e.g.
personal, political, union membership);
cut-throat competition; entering into
several contracts with competing
bodies.
c. Revocation of agency. If done
capriciously to prejudice agent, doer
must indemnify former for damages
latter may suffer (legal but abusive and
unjust).
d. Promise to marry. No obligatory force.
Breach has no liability for damages.
BUT, if shortly before wedding or after a
long engagement, one party breaks
engagement and causes moral and
material injury, liable for damages.
 9. No abuse of right if no intention to prejudice,
but damages where incurred.
a. A store after being built next to another
store, receives more customers;
b. Employee dismissed for growing slow
and inefficient.
10. Absolute right. Exercise of which is NEVER
BASIS OF LIABILITY.
a. Parents’ right to deny consent to
marriage of a minor.
b. Right to deprive legal heirs of an
inheritance by giving them to others, so
long as the legit is not impaired.
c. Right to set up nullity of contracts
d. Refusal to enter into a contract (cannot
ask why you refused!)
i. Under Art 21, if you refuse to
enter into contract, or
transaction, for no reason, and
you are the only accessible
vendor in town, you are liable
for depriving people to buy you
products.
11. Justice by own hand. NOT ALLOWED. Except:
a. Parents punishing child with
moderation
b. Owner of land to cut off roots of trees
of neighbor that penetrate his land.
c. Right to abate nuisance extrajudicially.
Art 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
1. Damages to person, liberty, or property.
2. Scope. Broad enough to cover all legal wrongs
not under violations of contract.
3. Moral negligence. We are required to act with
a. Prudence but not charity
b. Diligence not altruism
Egoism, failure to make sacrifices, and
moral fault or negligence do not
constitute liability.
Failure to help a victim or a person in
need is not liable.
Art 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
1. Art 19. Whose principles are basis of this
provisions.
2. Reason: impossible to enumerate all wrongs
which cause damage (Code comm)jh
3. Effect on law of wrongs.
a. Broadened.
b. Now difficult to conceive of any
malevolent exercise of right without
being checked.
c. Fills gaps of statutes, permitting the
victimization of moral wrongs and
moral/material damages, though legal.
d. Obliterate line between morals and
laws (Code Comm)
4. Scope.
a. Acts which are legal and not prohibited,
but contrary to morals or good
customs.
b. Right or property injury
c. Material or immaterial injury
d. Act or omission
e. As long as there is willfulness and
contravention of morals or public
policy.
5. Requisites.
a. Willful – there is knowledge of the
injurious effect.
i. Injury does not have to be the
main purpose of act but should
be an effect.
ii. Act does not have to be done
against the person injured
(basta as long as alam mong
may at least isang taong
maiinjure)
6. Examples.
a. Refusing to enter into a contract
(although an absolute right), if for no
reason, and if you are the only available
source of resources (vendor) in town, is
liable.
b. Burning house of X to prejudice an
insurance company.
c. Causing financial ruin to another to
acquire buy his property at low cost.
d. Abuse of public office to obtain illicit
benefits to the injury of another
e. Delay of a pending case by setting up
defenses that are obviously.
f. Acquisition of property to prevent other
who actually need it from having
property.
 g. If an execution of judgment is contrary
to equity and justice.
7. Awarding damages for unjust decisions.
a. Does not violate res judicata
b. Unfair if a persons enriches himself
through an unjust decision at the
expense of another
8. Conflicts of interest. Unfair means employed
during a conflict of interest is liable for
damages. Examples:
a. Boycott may be immoral if purely for
vengeance or self-aggrandizement, or
threatening, defaming, and with
coercion.
b. Strikes immoral if based on false
assertions
c. Own example: Calling for a boycott
against a certain hospital because it
“did not treat you well”, when truly,
you failed to follow their professional
medical advice, simply because said
advice was “sketchy”, which may have
led to your physical deterioration
9. Illicit sexual relations.
A seduces 19 y.o. daughter of X. Promise of marriage
not made, or cannot be proved. Girl becomes pregnant.
Under present law, there is no crime, as the girl is above
18 y.o. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though a grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring any action for damages.
But under this article, she and her parents would have
such a right of action.”
11. Exception. Actor is not liable if damages are
caused by inexcusable fault or negligence of
victim. Doctrine of proximate cause.
12. Unjust enrichment. At expense of another.
Pioneered by German and Swiss laws.
Examples:
a. Condictio indebiti
b. Condictio cause data non secuta
c. Sine causa
d. Ex injustia causa
e. Turpis causa
Art 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
1. Quasi-delict. A negligent act or omission
causing harm to person or property of another;
exposes person to civil liability as if the act or
omission is intentional.

a. Example by Code Commission:

b. Seduction = deception
i. If no seduction, it is a
consensual, mutual act.
Therefore no basis for
indemnity
c. So long as there is a wrongful, willful act
resulting to injury, there is civil liability,
even though it is not criminal.
10. Breach of promise to marry is actionable in
Art. 21. But you don’t need such breach of
promise to pray for acknowledgment and
support of child from guy, if plaintiff is induced
(encouraged, persuaded) to live with defendant
contrary to morals and good customs.
 LOVING V VIRGINIA
Warren, CJ
FACTS:
In Virginia, there is a comprehensive statutory scheme
prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages.
Residents Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard
Loving, a white man, were married in the District of
Columbia. After their marriage, they established their
marital abode in Caroline County in Virginia. They were
convicted for violating Section 20--58 which states that
any white person and colored person shall go out of this
State for the purpose of being married, and with the
intention of returning and be married out of it, and
afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man
and wife, they shall be guilty of a felony and imprisoned
for not less than one nor more than five years. The
central feature of this act is the absolute prohibition of
a white person marrying other than another white
person. The couple instituted an action to nullify the
ruling of the Court as a violation of their 14th
amendment.
ISSUE:
WON the statutory scheme adopted by Virginia
preventing marriages between two persons solely on
the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses?
HELD:
State argument--- no violation of equal protection as
whites and colored people are punished with the same
degree. Furthermore, there is a rational basis, which is
based on scientific evidence, for it to outlaw interracial
marriages. The Court could not question the wisdom
behind the legislation.
Court: The history of the 39th Congress (one who
introduced the 14th amendment) and jurisprudence
reveal that equal protection is not limited to equal
application of penalty in the classification made by
legislature. There is no question that Virginia’s
miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions
according to race. The Court has consistently
repudiated these kinds of statutes as inimical to the
doctrine of equality. It entails the most rigid scrutiny for
the statute to be valid. However, there is no legitimate
and overriding purpose independent of racial
discrimination which justifies the classification.
It is also violative of the due process clause
as the freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. It is one of the basic
civil rights of man. The 14th amendment requires that
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. The freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
ZABLOCKI V REDHAIL
FACTS:
Wisconsin statute: members of a certain class of
Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or
elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order
granting permission to marry. The class is defined to
include any “Wisconsin resident having minor ISSUE not
in his custody and which he is under obligation to
support by any court order or judgment.” Court
permission cannot be granted unless the marriage
applicant submits proof of compliance with the support
obligation and, in addition, demonstrates that the
children covered by the support order “are not then
and are not likely thereafter to become public charges.”
Redhail was denied a marriage license because of his
failure to comply with the statute. It was found that
Redhail had a paternity action instituted against him,
alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of
wedlock. He was adjudged to pay $109/mo as support
for the child until she reached 18 years of age.
When Redhail applied for a marriage license, Zablocki
did not ISSUE the license for violating the statute on the
grounds that: (1) he had not satisfied his support
obligations to his illegitimate child and; (2) the child had
been a public charge since her birth, receiving benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program.
ISSUE:
WON the Wisconsin statute is constitutional
HELD:
NO. On privacy: Right to marry is of fundamental
importance, and since the classification at ISSUE here
significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, a “critical FAMILY CODE Art 1. Marriage is a special contract of
examination” of the state interests advanced in support permanent union between a man and a woman
of the classification is required. entered into in accordance with the law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
The decision to marry has been placed on the same foundation of the family and an inviolable social
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. It are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy except that marriage settlements may fix the property
with respect to other matters of family life and not with relations during the marriage within the limits
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is provided by this Code (52a).
the foundation of the family in [US] society
1. Based on Article 52 Civil Code, saying it is not a
Two interests are asserted: the permission proceeding mere contract.
--to---marry furnishes an opportunity to counsel the 2. Marriage; social institution. Institution of public
applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his prior order, founded on custom and morality.
support obligations; and the welfare of the out- a. Sui generis; has a social characters;
--of--custody children is protected. with consent of parties
b. juridical act for purposes of procreation
However, the State has already numerousother means and other material and moral ends.
for exacting compliance with support obligations, c. Foundation of domestic relations of
means that are as effective as the statute yet do not utmost importance to civilization and
impinge upon the right to marry: via wage assignments, social progress; why state is deeply
civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. concerned about its purity and
integrity.
The statutory classification interferes directly and 3. Characteristics.
substantially with the right to marry: a. Civil: established by state;
secular/irreligious
• No Wisconsin resident in the affected class may b. Public order or policy: governed by
marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a rules of law, not subject to stipulation
court order. of parties.
• Some of those in the affected class will never be c. Natural: objective to satisfy intimate
able to obtain the necessary court order, sentiments and needs of human beings
because they either lack the financial means to for organic perpetuation of man.
meet their support obligations or cannot prove 4. Marriage v ordinary contracts
that their children will not become public Similarity: Consent of both parties
charges. Ordinary Contract Marriage
• Some will be coerced in foregoing their right to Any number of persons One man and one
marry. can enter woman
Agreement of parties Law fixes duties and
Statute is grossly underinclusive since they do not limit
have force of law rights of the parties
in any way new financial commitments by the applicant
between them (readily-made contract?)
other than those arising out of the contemplated
Terminated by mutual Cannot be terminated,
marriage. Statutory classification is substantially
agreement eve though one party
overinclusive as well: Given the possibility that the new
subseq. fails to do his
spouse will actually better the applicant’s financial
part
situation, by contributing income from a job or
Breach of contract → Breach of obligations of
otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent
affected individuals from improving their ability to action for damages spouse → no action;
satisfy their prior support obligations. penal and civil sanctions
are for adultery,
Chapter 1 concubinage and legal
separation.
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
Once marriage has been properly solemnized and
obligations of marriage undertaken, validity cannot be
affected by antenuptial agreement not to live together,
nor by an agreement previously entered into that the
marriage should not be valid and binding, nor because
one or both parties did not intend it to be a permanent
relation.
5. Principal effects:
a. Personal and economic relations - bet.
Parties; source
b. Legit sexual union and family
c. Personal and econ rel. between parent
and child – giving considerable rights
and duties
d. Family relationship – from which flow
various juridical consequences (i.e.
impediments to marriage; right to
support and inheritance)
e. Emancipation – of spouses from
parental authority
f. No donations – between spouses.
g. No testifying – of spouses against each
other
h. Modified criminal liability
i. Exemption – when one spouse
defends other from unlawful
aggression or is his accessory
after the fact
ii. Mitigation – when crime is
committed in vindication of
grave offense against spouse
iii. Aggravation – when injured is
spouse of offender
6. Contract to marry. When spouses mutually
agree at some future time; a.k.a. engagement
agreement; executory contract
a. Promise cannot be forced by court;
consent of actual marriage is purely or
VOLUNTARY.
b. no ceremony or formality required
c. BUT has to be believable enough to
injured party (e.g. persistence,
repetition of offer that give sign to
sincerity).
d. If, after breaking up, the couple make
up, say “no more misunderstandings”,
etc., it is considered continuation of
contract to marry.
7. Breach of promise.
a. Contracts to marry usually consist of
several promises made at different
times; BUT there is only one breach –
that is the ultimate breach of contract.
b. Request to postpose for a reasonable
cause is NOT a breach or repudiation of
contract and oblig’s.
c. Repudiation. Exists when, before
marriage, one party backs out, refuses
to further communicate or to maintain
relationship, marries another.
8. Damages of breach
There used to be an entire chapter on this in the
original CC, but the Code Com eliminate all 10
articles. In De Jesus v Syquia, CC says there is
not action for breach of promise to marry in Civil
Law apart from right to recover money or
property advanced by plaintiff upon the faith of
promise.
The Com eliminated this but intended to
maintain such rule, to avoid abuse of such
rights of action (reason for Heart Balm Act in
Paccininni v Hajus).
1. Can you recover damages after BOPM?
a. If purely based on breach: No
seduction = no cause of action
i. Emotional and mental
anguish = moral damages
(acc. Art. 2217 NCC); NOT
actionable.
b. If based on tort or quasi delict
(negligent act or omission causing
harm): actionable under Arts. 19,
21, 22.
2. Effect of Seduction.
Before NCC, promises or marriage based on
carnal relations is of unlawful consideration;
not actionable. Reason: if carnal intercourse
between parties is a crime, it is common to
both parties, against which Article 1411 (old
1305) bars recovery. If not a crime, then
immoral (Art. 1412/1306). Art. 2176 (1902)
says no recovery can be made if person
causes damage to another through
negligent act or omission, since the woman
participated in the act.
a. Other ways to recover. Ex., if guy
urges you to quit job upon
pregnancy, and you do, and the guy
leaves you, the guy is liable for
damages representing the salary
you should have earned.
 b. Possible to base an action upon
carnal knowledge of plaintiff by
defendant, separate from breach of
promise, under Quasi-delict (Art
2176) and Art 21)
i. Because carnal does NOT
constitute a promise to
marry. Marriage contract is
a mutual consideration, and
is not made upon carnal
relations.
ii. Promise to marry is a
means of seduction.
iii. It is also a breach of trust.
iv. Subsequent marriage
pardons this, but refusal to
marry makes seduction
VERY WRONG and
injurious.
Unfortunately, the doctrine is worded so
broadly, making it look like it is the
woman’s fault for having faith is the
man she thought was her hubby-to-be.
3. Abuse of right (Art 19).
a. Can be filed against under Art 19
even in absence of seduction.
b. Capriciously abandoning contract
for no reason, causing moral and
material damage has liability,
especially when done just before
marriage and after long
engagement.
4. Unjust enrichment (Art 22).
a. Includes gifts, money, etc., which
are legally conditional, may be
recovered
b. Absolute gifts (e.g. Christmas,
valentines, etc.) not recoverable.
5. Oral agreement.
a. Consideration of marriage. to be
actionable, it has to be proven by
written agreement.
b. Promise to marry. Does not need
written proof; there is presumption
that it is a mutual promise to marry
i. Parents of aggrieved bride
cannot sue, therefore, since
they are not part of the
promise, and promise is not
mutual on their part.
ii. Statute of Frauds. Only
apply to enforcement of
contract, not breach.
1987 CONSTITUTION
Art XV Sec 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Art XV Sec 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state.
1. Divorce. Is NOT absolutely prohibited by this
provision.
2. Consti does not establish parameters of state
protection to marriage. Legislature defines all
legal aspects of marriage and prescribe strategy
and modalities to protect it (Antonio v Reyes,
2006).
3. Annulment. Marriage is protected by
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
a. FC Art. 48 requires courts to order
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, in
annulment cases or declaration of
nullity, to appear on behalf of State to
take steps to prevent collusion between
parties, and prevent fabrication or
suppression of evidence
b. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of validity of marriage.
Art XV Sec 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of the spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The rights of the children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The rights of the family to a family living wage
and income’
(4) The rights of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that
affect them.
Art XV Sec 4. The family has the duty to care for its
elderly members but the State may also do so through
just programs of social security.