TEAM CODE: 27P

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF UPARGANJ

AT UPARGANJ

IN THE MATTER OF:

GALON KASRA….………………………….………...……………………………
PETITIONER
v.
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE…………….……………………….………...
…..RESPONDENT
WRIT PETITION

[UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ]

AND

ASSARDEI JEDPARE……………………………………….………………………PETITIONER
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, HAMRAK PRISON…………...
……………………………….RESPONDENT
WRIT PETITION

[UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ]

AND

GALON KASRA…………………………………………….………………………
PETITIONER
v.
STATE OF UPARGANJ…………………….……...……………………………….RESPONDENT
REVISION PETITION NO.
[UNDER SECTION 397 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973]
AND

UPARGANJ NEWS NETWORK & ORS….………………….………………………

PETITIONER
v.
HIGH COURT OF UPARGANJ………….................
……………………………….RESPONDENT
AND

GALON KASRA…..……………………………………….………………………PETITIONER
 v.
HIGH COURT OF UPARGANJ…………...………………………………..
……….RESPONDENT
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
[UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ]

ALL CLUBBED AND BROUGHT UNDER ARTICLE 142 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER-

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................................5

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................................7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.........................................................................................12

STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................13

ARGUMENTS PRESENTED.................................................................................................15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..............................................................................................16

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................17

Contention 1: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AGAINST THE SP FOR THE

RELEASE OF MAIA SHOULD BE GRANTED...............................................................17

I. The writ petition is maintainable...............................................................................17

II. Maia has the rights available to a person under law..............................................18

III. Maia’s custody by the police is unlawful...............................................................19

Contention 2: THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED

BY THE PRISON AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE GRANTED..........................................20

I. The writ of certiorari filed by Mr Jedpare is maintainable.......................................20

II. The conditions imposed by the prison authorities are violative of Art.19(1)(a)....22

Contention 3: THE ORDER OF IN CAMERA TRIAL AND PROHIBITION OF AUDIO-

VIDEO RECORDINGS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS NOT JUSTIFIED.........................24

I. Order of the High Court infringes Fundamental Rights of the press and citizens.. . .25

II. Maia’s free speech and expression and right to a fair trial is contravened............27

III. Inconvenience is not a valid ground for ordering in-camera trial..........................29

IV. AV recordings of the court proceedings further the fundamental principles of

justice...............................................................................................................................31

Contention 4: MAIA IS NOT LIABLE FOR ALLEGED OFFENCE OF ABETMENT OF

SUICIDE..............................................................................................................................33

I. Maia is incapable of standing the trial for abetment of suicide.................................33

II. Arguendo, Dr Ahtme had a right to die..................................................................34

3
 III. Arguendo, actions of Maia do not amount to abetment of suicide as per Sec.306 of
the UPC............................................................................................................................35

PRAYER..................................................................................................................................37

4
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
A.C. Appeal Cases
A.I.R All India Reporter
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
All E.R. All England Law Reports
Art. Article
AV Audio/Video
C.L.R. Commonwealth Law Reports
Co. Company
Cr.L.J. Criminal Law Journal
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Del. Delhi
E.H.R.R. European Human Right Reports
E.W.H.C. England & Wales High Court
ed. edition
Govt. Government
H.L.R. Harvard Law Review
I.C.C.P.R. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
I.C.E.S.R. International Covenant on Economic and Social
Rights
Ibid. Ibidem
Id. Idem
K.B. King’s Bench
Ker. Kerela
L.R. Law Report
Ltd. Limited
Mad. Madras
NCT National Capital Territory
No. number
Ors. Others
P.C. Privy Council

5
pp. page
Q.B. Queen’s Bench
Q.B.D. Queen’s Bench Division
S.C. Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
S.L.P. Special Leave Petition
S.P. Superintendent of Police
Sec. Section
U.O.I Union of India
U.S. United States
UNN Uparganj News Network
UPC Uparganj Penal Code
v. versus

6
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
A. G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175...........................................................29
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 S.C.C. 262..............................................................21
Adi Pheroz Shah v. H.M. Seervai, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 385..........................................................20
A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), [1990] 1 A.C. 109, 183, C.A................................22
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 S.C.C. 648...................................33
Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 512..................................................36
Angelo Brothers Ltd. v. Official Liquidator, 2015 S.C.C. OnLine Cal. 2036..........................32
Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 15 S.C.C. 480.....................35
B. Raman v. M/S Shasun Chemicals and Drugs Ltd., 2006 Cr. L.J. 4552 (Mad.)....................19
Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 S.C.C. 188.......................................................29
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802............................................17
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dhubalkar, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2092................................20
Bishwanath & Anr. v. Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji & Ors., 1967 S.C.R. (2) 618...................18
Carter v. Canada, 2015 S.C.C. 5.............................................................................................34
Chatisgarh Mukti Morcha v. State of M.P., 1996 Cr.L.J. 2239 (M.P.).....................................31
Chief Education Officer, Salem v. K.S. Palanichamy, 2012 Cr. L.J. 2543 (Mad.)...................18
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1950 S.C.R 759...........................................27,34
Davies v. U.S., (1917) 247 Fed. 394.........................................................................................28
De Jong v. Oregon, (1937) 299 U.S. 353 (365).......................................................................26
Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306............................................................25
Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v. Oscar Leonard Pistorius, (2015) Z.A.S.C.A.
204........................................................................................................................................32
Express Newspaper Limited v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578.....................................27
F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, 1 (1957) S.C.R. 1151..........................................21
First Television case, 12 BVerfGE 205, 260 (1961)................................................................22
Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices, [1926] A.C. 586,602.......................................21
G.K. Moopanar v. State, 1990 Cr.L.J. 2685.............................................................................19
Gannett Company, Inc. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).................................................25
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)................30
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India & Ors., 1960 A.I.R. 554..........................................26
Hinds v. R., (1976) 1 All E.R. 353............................................................................................30
In R. v Legal Aid, [1999] Q.B. 966..........................................................................................26

7
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883......................................30
Kozulina v. Belarus, CCPR/C/112/D/1773/2008 Communication No. 1773/2008.................19
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, (1939) 306 U.S. 451 (458).................................................................24
Lekhraj v. D.Y. Custodian, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 334.....................................................................21
Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar, 2 (1958) S.C.A. 240........................21
Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1828.............................18
McPherson v. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177............................................................................29
Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu Muiahid v. State of Maharashtra,
(2012) 9 S.C.C. 234..............................................................................................................31
Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 S.C.C. 653....................................................25
Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd. & Ors. v. National Prosecuting Authority, (2014) 2 All S.A.
446 (GP)...............................................................................................................................32
Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 1 S.C.C. 797...................................................25,30
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1……………………..27
Near v. Minnesota, (1913) 283 U.S. 697..................................................................................26
New York Times v. U.S., (1971) 403 U.S. 713..........................................................................26
Observer and Guardian v. UK (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 153, ¶ 59.................................................22
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)..............................................................................26
Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.C. 1...................................................................23
Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT Delhi, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 1444.....................................................20
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 139........................18
Press Enter-Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984)...........................26
Probodh Verma v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 167.............................................................21
Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das Advani, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222........................................21
Raj Bala vs State of Haryana & Ors. , S.C. Criminal Appeal nos. 1049-1050/2015
18.08.2015............................................................................................................................33
Raj Pal Singh v. State of UP, 1983 Cr.L.J. 1009......................................................................19
Rajani Kanta Meheta v. State of Orissa, 1975 Cr.L.J. 83 (Ori.)..............................................19
Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and Ors. , A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 277............................17
Rao v. Government of AP, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 828......................................................................17
Re Agricultural Industries, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1188.................................................................25
Regina (John M'Evoy) v. Dublin Corporation, [1978] 2 L.R. Irish 371, 376..........................21
Reji Michael v. Vertex Securities Ltd., 1999 Cr. L.J. 3787 (Ker.)............................................19
Reliance Petrochemicals v. Indian Express, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 190..........................................27
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)...............................................25,27,29

8
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124.....................................................21
Russell v. Russell, (1976) 134 C.L.R. 495, 520........................................................................29
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574..........................................................21
Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India,
(2012) 10 S.C.C. 603............................................................................................................31
Sakal Papers v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305........................................................21,25
Satyanarayan Sinha v. S. Lal & Co., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2720...................................................20
Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417.................................................................................................29
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373....................................................23
South African Broadcasting Corporation v. National Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors.,
(2006) Z.A.C.C. 15..............................................................................................................25
Spiegel case, 20 BVerfGE 162, 174-6 (1966)………………………………………….…….22
State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vital, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4258......................................20
State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina pani Dei, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269....................................................21
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.R. 28..........................................................20
State of Orissa v. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 85...............................................................20
State v. Charulata Joshi, (1999) 4 S.C.C. 65...........................................................................23
State v. Mathivanan, 1995 (1) Crimes 7 (Mad.).......................................................................19
Storer v. British Gas Plc, [2000] 2 A.I.I. E.R. 440...................................................................25
Target Overseas Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. A.M. Iqbal, 2005 Cr. L.J. 1931 (Ker.)............................19
Terry v Persons Unknown, [2010] E.W.H.C. 119 (Q.B.).........................................................25
The King v. London County Council, [1931] 2 K.B. 215.........................................................21
Thomas Pacham Dale’s case, 1881 (6) Q.B.D. 376.................................................................17
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)..........................................................................................34
U.S. v. Cohen Grocery, (1921) 255 U.S. 81.............................................................................24
Union of India v. Yumnam Anand, (2007) 10 S.C.C. 190.........................................................17
Vijay Singhal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2013 S.C.C. Online Del 1221...................................31
Waller v. Georgia, (1984) 467 U.S. 39 (45-48)...................................................................30,36

Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of India, 1950 Art. 19(1) (a).................................................................23,24,30,34

International Covenants and Treaties

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/ 21/2200, Dec. 16, 1966............................................................................18,19,20,24
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 10(1)......................................................28
9
Publications
Claire Baylis, ‘Justice done and Justice Seen to be Done – The Public Administration of
Justice’, (1991) 21 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 177.............................29
Law Commission of India, 210th Report on Humanization and Decriminalization of Attempt
to Suicide (October, 2008)...................................................................................................34
Lewis Sargentich, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine (83 H.L.R. 844, 1970)
………………………………………………………………………………………….24
National Police Commission, 3rd Report………………………………………………..……19
Royal Commission on the Press (Cmnd 6810, 1977)..............................................................22

10
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Mr Galon Kasra has approached the High Court of Uparganj with a W.P. under the Article
226 of the Constitution of Uparganj, 1950.

Mr A. Jedpare has approached the High Court of Uparganj with a W.P. under the Article 226
of the Constitution of Uparganj, 1950.

Mr Galon Kasra has approached the High Court of Uparganj with a Revision Petition under
the Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

UNN has approached the Supreme Court of Uparganj with a S.L.P. under the Article 136 of
the Constitution of Uparganj, 1950.

Mr Galon Kasra has approached the Supreme Court of Uparganj with a S.L.P. under the
article 136 of the Constitution on Uparganj, 1950.

All of which are humbly submitted.

11
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. In the year 2020, Dr Hadvin Ahtme created the world’s first cybernetic brain- Maia
(Multifaceted Artificial Intelligence Assistant), which was virtually indistinguishable
from the human brain. Maia looked, sounded and felt like a human being and also
passed the well-publicised Turing tests with flying colours. Maia was designed to
assist the elderly in as human a manner as possible. When the rush of companies
approached Dr Ahtme, seeking the rights to produce copies of Maia, she refused,
believing that the corporations were incapable of putting the technology behind Maia
for the use of humanity. Dr Ahtme even threatened to destroy all her research pre-
emptively, when there was talk of Uparganj Government ‘nationalising’ Maia.
II. One morning, the world was shocked to find Dr Ahtme dead. Dr Ahtme’s family and
editors of leading news outlet found an email from Dr Ahtme’s email id in their
inboxes, saying that Dr Ahtme had a terminal form of stomach cancer. Because of the
disease, she had decided to take her end her life by depleting her intake of food and
water progressively. The email further stated that Maia had faithfully carried out her
instructions to reduce her intake and not let the outside world interfere. Dr Ahtme
entrusted Maia and all the intellectual property rights vested in her to Galon Kasra,
her nephew, for safekeeping, through the email.
III. As this letter became public, concerned police authorities began investigating the
death of Dr Ahtme. Mr Kasra was approached and asked to turn over the custody of
Maia to verify the correctness of Dr Ahtme’s letter. Mr Kasra did as requested.
However, since the technology of Maia was beyond the capacity of any engineer or
scientist to dismantle and decode, Maia was verbally interrogated. The investigating
officer, Ms Dyan Bell, found that the contents of the letter were true in all respects.
Maia had indeed followed the instructions given by Dr Ahtme dutifully.
IV. Ms Bell filed a First Information Report, charging unknown persons with abetment to
suicide of Dr Ahtme. Maia was collected as evidence and stored in the record room.
On being informed about the same, Mr Kasra strongly objected in a letter to the
Superintendent of Police (“SP”) stating that Maia was a person and deserved to be
treated like one. Being a person and not an accused, Maia had to be released into the
custody of the de facto guardian- Mr Kasra. When the SP refused, Mr Kasra filed a
writ petition before the High Court of Uparganj (“High Court”) asking the Court to
issue a writ of habeas corpus against the SP and release Maia. On the direction of the
High Court, Maia was moved from the custody of the police to Hamrak prison where
both the undertrials and convicts were kept.

12
V. The developments of the case captured the interest of all the people. Mr Assardei
Jedpare, a journalist of the Uparganj News Network (“UNN”), approached the
Superintendent of the Hamrak Prison, seeking permission to interview Maia within
the jail premises. The permission was granted by way of a letter subject to the
conditions that no questions which would undermine the on-going trial or violate any
other Uparganj law in force would be asked. The footage had to be pre-approved by
the prison authorities. Mr Jedpare objected to the conditions since they violated
freedom of press and freedom of speech. Pursuant to the same, he approached the
High Court, for a writ of certiorari to strike down those conditions and get fresh
permission in accordance with the law and Constitution of Uparganj.
VI. After completing the investigations, the Uparganj police charge-sheeted Maia with the
offence of abetment to suicide of Dr Ahtme. The Sessions Judge framed charges
against Maia under Sec.306 of the Uparganj Penal Code (“UPC”). Mr Kasra filed a
revision petition in the High Court. The High Court issued notice to the Police
authorities in the present matter, directing that Maia be produced before the Bench in
Court to ascertain whether Maia could stand trial.
VII. The possibility of the first public appearance of Maia since the death of Dr Ahtme,
prompted multiple applications to the Chief Justice of the High Court, to specifically
allow for audio-video (“AV”) recordings of the proceedings. The revision Bench
rejected the applications, noting the possibility that there would be great
inconvenience suffered by the court in conducting the proceedings at the next date of
hearing. The court also directed that all proceedings in the High Court, where Maia
was present would be conducted in camera. A Special Leave Petition (“SLP”) was
filed by UNN before the Supreme Court of Uparganj to set aside the order of the High
Court and permit AV recording of the proceedings. A separate SLP was filed by Mr
Kasra against the order of the High Court, contending that the in camera hearings in
this case amounted to a violation of freedom of speech and expression.
VIII. In its interim order, the Supreme Court directed that both these appeals be heard
together. It suo motu transferred all the other cases to itself, since they concerned the
same set of facts and circumstances and needed to be decided in harmony.

Hence the present petitions before this Hon’ble Court.

ARGUMENTS PRESENTED

1. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AGAINST THE SP FOR THE RELEASE OF MAIA
SHOULD BE GRANTED.

13
2. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE PRISON

AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE GRANTED.

3. THE ORDER OF IN CAMERA TRIAL AND PROHIBITION OF AV RECORDINGS IS NOT

JUSTIFIED.

4. MAIA IS NOT LIABLE FOR ALLEGED OFFENCE OF ABETMENT OF SUICIDE.

14
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AGAINST THE SP FOR THE RELEASE
OF MAIA SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The detention of Maia in judicial custody is unlawful and violates Maia’s rights. Maia is a
legal entity and subject to certain legal rights and duties. The treatment of Maia as an object
is wrong and the detention is unlawful since it does not follow due procedure. Therefore,
Maia must be released from judicial custody.
II. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY
THE PRISON AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The conditional permission given by the prison authorities is beyond the powers allowed to
the authorities by the Jail Manual. Being vague, they fall under the doctrine of ‘overbreadth’.
They are unreasonable and violative of the freedom of press and freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by the Constitution to the petitioners. The conditions must thus be
struck down by granting the writ of certiorari.
III. THE ORDER OF IN CAMERA TRIAL AND PROHIBITION OF AUDIO-
VIDEO RECORDINGS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS NOT JUSTIFIED.
The Petitioners’ humbly submit that the order for an in-camera trial is infringing the freedom
of speech and expression of the press, the citizens and the accused. Open court is the rule of
trial proceedings and an exception can be made in only special circumstance. Inconvenience
is not a ground for allowing in camera proceedings. Moreover, the restriction on access to
court is unreasonable and also violates the accused’s right to a fair and public trial. The
petitioner also requests the court to allow AV recordings of the proceeding which will
enhance the principle of open justice.
IV. MAIA IS NOT LIABLE FOR ALLEGED OFFENCE OF ABETMENT OF
SUICIDE.
Maia, being an artificial intelligence is incapable of standing trial. Punishing artificial
intelligence by incarceration does not serve the objects of punishment. Arguendo, Dr Ahtme
had a right to die. Since Sec.309 is obsolete and in contravention with the constitutional
provisions, there arises no question of Maia’s dutifully carrying out Dr Ahtme’s instructions
being against law. Thus Maia is free from any criminal liability. Arguendo, the actions of
Maia do not amount to the abetment of suicide. Provisions of Section 306 of UPC require
criminal intention/ mens rea which is lacking in Maia's case.

15
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
CONTENTION 1: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AGAINST THE SP FOR THE
RELEASE OF MAIA SHOULD BE GRANTED.
After being verbally interrogated about Dr Ahtme’s suicide, Maia was not charged in the First
Information Report (“FIR”) filed by the investigating officer. Nevertheless, Maia was
detained as evidence as part of the investigation. The police authorities refused to release
Maia to Mr Kasra, its de facto guardian, even after his request. Hence, Mr Kasra filed the
present writ petition for the release of Maia.
The petitioner submits that the present writ petition is maintainable [I.]. It is further shown
that Maia should be released because Maia has the rights available to a person under law [II.]
and has been detained unlawfully [III.].
I. The writ petition is maintainable.
This petition filed by Mr Kasra for the release of Maia from judicial custody, is maintainable
because Mr Kasra has the locus standi to move the Court to ‘produce the body’ of Maia
detained wrongfully in police custody.
If a person is wrongfully or illegally deprived of their liberty, it is open to anybody interested
in the person to file a writ under Art.32 of the Constitution, 1 provided that he is not an
absolute stranger.2 Mr Kasra, being the de facto guardian of Maia, has the right over Maia’s
custody,3 and also the locus standi for this petition. It is the duty of the detaining authority to
show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by
law,4 and if they fail to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity then the court
will not allow the imprisonment to continue.5
A writ of habeas corpus can be issued against anyone who has the person in his custody, 6
whether in prison or in private custody7 and no privilege of person or place can stand against
it.8 If the applicant shows a prima facie case of his unlawful detention, and the response to it
is not good enough, then the writ must be granted as a matter of right.9
The custody of Maia by the court’s order is challenged through this writ. Anyone deprived of
his liberty by detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court. 10 The custody of
1
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
2
Rao v. Government of AP, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 828.
3
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8.
4
Ibid.
5
Thomas Pacham Dale’s case, 1881 (6) Q.B.D. 376; Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and Ors. , A.I.R.
1953 S.C. 277.
6
A.V. Dicey, Law and the Constitution 219, (1915).
7
Hardinge Giffard, 11 Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th Ed. 1987), pp. 768-69 ¶ 1453.
8
Ibid.
9
Union of India v. Yumnam Anand, (2007) 10 S.C.C. 190.
10
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 21/2200, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 9(4).
16
Maia, without affording it a hearing, is inconsistent with the principles of natural justice.
Maia has not been charged with an offence, 11 and the treatment of Maia as evidence rather
than a person,12 is inconsistent with Maia’s rights.
Hence, the writ is prima facie maintainable. The writ must be admitted by the court, and tried
on its merits.
II. Maia has the rights available to a person under law.
Maia is an artificial intelligence entity exhibiting human characteristics. 13 It would best be
described by the term legal entity, i.e. having the status of a person in law. It is entitled to
certain rights under law.
A ‘person’ is a subject of legal rights and duties, and the question of whether an entity should
be considered a legal person or not can alternatively be addressed as whether that entity can
and should be made the subject of legal rights and duties. 14 Inanimate things have always
been the subject of legal rights and duties.
In a previous case, counsel was appointed by an appellate court to represent a family idol in a
dispute over who should have custody over it.15 A temple idol, though inanimate, is also
considered a juristic person and can file a suit to enforce its rights. 16 Ancient Greek law and
common law have made objects the subject of legal duties,17 and in admirality law, a ship can
be the subject of an action in rem and can be arrested.18 A person, for the purposes of criminal
investigation, includes ‘any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated
or not’.19
However, the definition of ‘person’ under the UPC is merely inclusive in nature, 20 and it has
been interpreted by courts to include an incorporated person 21 or a juristic person22 as well.
The rights and duties that accompany an entity can vary according to the nature of the entity.
For example, a business corporation, a government entity and a human being are all legal
persons but have different sets of rights and duties.

11
Supra note 3, ¶ 13.
12
Ibid.
13
Supra note 3, ¶ 5
14
John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 27 (Rolland Gray ed. Macmillan 1921) (1909).
15
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 139.
16
Bishwanath & Anr. v. Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji & Ors., 1967 S.C.R. (2) 618.
17
Supra note 14, at 46.
18
Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1828; Shrikant Pareshnamt Hathi(DR.) &
Binita Hathi (MS), Partners, Brus Chambders, Advocate & solicitors, Ship Arrest in India and Admirality Laws
in India, Chapter 32, available at http://www.admiraltypractice.com/, accessed 25 January 2016.
19
Indian Penal Code, 1860 § 11.
20
Chief Education Officer, Salem v. K.S. Palanichamy, 2012 Cr. L.J. 2543 (Mad.).
21
B. Raman v. M/S Shasun Chemicals and Drugs Ltd., 2006 Cr. L.J. 4552 (Mad.); Target Overseas Exports Pvt.
Ltd. v. A.M. Iqbal, 2005 Cr. L.J. 1931 (Ker.).
22
Reji Michael v. Vertex Securities Ltd., 1999 Cr. L.J. 3787 (Ker.).
17
An artificial intelligence cannot be classified as a human being, but it can be made the subject
to obligations under law, and consequently be entitled to certain rights. These rights vary
according to the nature of the entity and are peculiar to it.
III. Maia’s custody by the police is unlawful
The custody of Maia by the police authorities is prima facie arbitrary and the only reason for
the detention by the police authorities is to serve the purpose of investigation into Dr Ahtme’s
suicide. Such a detention cannot be considered as reasonable or justifiable.
The detention pending trial must be based on a determination that it is reasonable and
necessary in all circumstances, in order to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the
recurrence of crime, and the court must examine whether alternatives to pretrial detention
would render detention unnecessary in a case. 23 Further, an order of detention should only be
passed when the investigation shows a prima facie case against the accused, and it should not
be passed mechanically.24 A remand by a Magistrate is not an automatic one and sufficient
grounds must exist for the Magistrate to exercise the power of remand. 25 If the detention is
found unlawful, release must be ordered immediately.26
Maia has been kept in custody with both undertrials and convicts, which is in clear violation
of Sec.28 (4) and (7) of the Delhi Prisons Act, 2000. Further, the police have not found any
evidence against Maia to support such an action, which is also clear from the fact that Maia
has not been charged with any offence in the FIR.27
In such conditions, where it can reasonably be inferred that a person will not try to abscond or
evade the law and when there is no prima facie justification in support of the charge, the
person must be released.28 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person and no one
shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention or deprived of one’s liberty except in
accordance with such procedure as is established by law.29
Maia must not be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention without due procedure established
by law. Its custody should be restored to Mr Kasra since it was entrusted to him by Dr
Ahtme.30

23
Kozulina v. Belarus, CCPR/C/112/D/1773/2008 Communication No. 1773/2008; See communications
No. 1369/2010, Kulov v. Kyrgyzstan, Views adopted on 26 July 2010, ¶ 8.3; No. 1940/2010, Cedeño v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Views adopted on 29 October 2012, ¶ 7.10; No. 1178/2003, Smantser v.
Belarus, Views adopted on 23 October 2008, ¶ 10.3.
24
Rajani Kanta Meheta v. State of Orissa, 1975 Cr.L.J. 83 (Ori.).
25
G.K. Moopanar v. State, 1990 Cr.L.J. 2685; Raj Pal Singh v. State of UP, 1983 Cr.L.J. 1009; State v.
Mathivanan, 1995 (1) Crimes 7 (Mad.).
26
Supra note 10, Art. 9 (4).
27
Supra. note 3, ¶13.
28
State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vital, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4258.; Third Report, National Police
Commission, pp. 22.28; Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT Delhi, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 1444.
29
Supra note 10, Art. 9 (1).
30
Supra. note 3, ¶8.
18
CONTENTION 2: THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE CONDITIONS
IMPOSED BY THE PRISON AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE GRANTED.
Mr Jedpare asked for permission to interview Maia in the prison in a bid to satisfy the
growing public interest about Maia. The prison authorities imposed certain conditions on Mr
Jedpare for the interview to be taken which were: (i) not to ask any questions which would
undermine the ongoing trial, (ii) not to violate any other Uparganj law in force, (iii) have the
footage pre-approved by the prison authorities.
Mr Jedpare moved the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to quash these conditions. This
writ is prima facie maintainable [I.] because the conditions violate the freedom of press and
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution [II.].
I. The writ of certiorari filed by Mr Jedpare is maintainable.
The writ is maintainable in Court because the petitioner has the locus standi to challenge the
action of the prison authorities [A.] which act as quasi-judicial bodies [B.].

A. Mr Jedpare has the locus standi to move the Court for a writ of certiorari.
A writ petition is amenable under Art.226 only if there is an existence of a legal right.31
A petitioner has locus standi if he or she is a person aggrieved. 32 A person aggrieved is a
person who has suffered a legal grievance or who is affected by a decision pronounced
against him.33 When the writ application is made by a person aggrieved, the court must
intervene ex debito justitiae.34
Mr Jedpare’s right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed by Art.19 (1) (a) of the
Constitution. Moreover, the press in Uparganj is free and thriving and a right of the freedom
of press is guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a), which includes the freedom of communication of ideas
through various mediums,35 the freedom of publication and circulation.36
Since this freedom of press and right to free speech of Mr Jedpare is being interfered with,
Mr Jedpare has the locus standi to move the court for a writ of certiorari.

B. Prison authorities act as a quasi-judicial authority.

37
A writ of certiorari can be issued against the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. The
prison authorities act as quasi-judicial authorities.

31
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.R. 28; State of Orissa v. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 85.
32
Satyanarayan Sinha v. S. Lal & Co., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2720.
33
Adi Pheroz Shah v. H.M. Seervai, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 385; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dhubalkar,
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2092.
34
Supra, note 32.
35
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574.
36
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124; infra note 69.
37
Lekhraj v. D.Y. Custodian, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 334; Probodh Verma v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 167.
19
The writ lies to upon judicial orders, and a ‘judicial’ act in this connection would not be
limited to acts of judges or legal tribunals, but would also be an act done by a competent
authority imposing liability or affecting the rights of the others, upon consideration of facts
and circumstances.38 Whenever a body of persons having legal authority to determine
questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, acts in excess
of their legal authority, it is subject to the controlling jurisdiction exercised in these writs.39
An order will be judicial or quasi-judicial if it is laid down by an authority that is legally
bound to or authorised to act as if he was a court or a judge. 40 Acting as a court or a judge
involves giving an opportunity to the party, who is affected by the order, to make a
representation.41 It involves making some kind of enquiry, weighing evidence and considering
facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of the controversy before any decision affecting
the rights of one or more parties is arrived at.42
Where there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, a duty to act
judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. 43 To determine a quasi-judicial order, the
duty to act judicially is there, which implies nothing but a duty to act fairly and justly and not
arbitrarily or capriciously.44 For example, a simple act such as imposition of a fine or a
penalty can also be a judicial45 or a quasi-judicial act.46
It is imminent from the action taken by the Superintendent of the Hamrak prison that he had
the authority to make the decision about the interview, based on its merits, and he had a
further duty to make a judicial decision since it involves the rights of Mr Jedpare being
restricted. The petitioners would like to submit that the decision taken by the Superintendent,
in as much as it imposes the conditions on Mr Jedpare, does not seem to be reasonable or a
judicial one. The petitioner seeks the writ of certiorari in the present matter and requests the
court to adjudicate upon the matter by considering it on its merits.
II. The conditions imposed by the prison authorities are violative of Art.19(1)(a).
The conditions imposed by the prison authorities is an infringement of the freedom of speech
and expression and freedom of press since these rights also extend to prison interviews [A.].
The conditions should be struck down, since they are unreasonable [B.].

38
Regina (John M'Evoy) v. Dublin Corporation, [1978] 2 L.R. Irish 371, 376; Frome United Breweries Co. v.
Bath Justices, [1926] A.C. 586,602; infra note 40.
39
The King v. London County Council, [1931] 2 K.B. 215; infra note 40.
40
Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das Advani, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina pani Dei, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269.
44
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 S.C.C. 262.
45
Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar, 2 (1958) S.C.A. 240.
46
F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, 1 (1957) S.C.R. 1151.
20
 A. Freedom of speech and freedom of press under Art. 19(1) (a) extends to prison
interviews.
The petitioners submit that the press has a right to freedom of speech and expression under
Art. 19(1) (a). Such a right includes interviews, as means of collection and dissemination of
information, and in the present case this right extends to the right of Mr Jedpare to conduct
Maia’s interview in the Hamrak prison.
The press provides readers, listeners, and viewers with information and that range of ideas
and opinion which enables them to participate actively in a society. The press performs a vital
role as the ‘public watchdog’47 and as the ‘eyes and ears of the general public’.48
Freedom of the press simply refers to the free speech rights of owners, editors, and journalists
who perform the role of the press. This implies that liberty of the press is derived from
freedom of speech.49 Press freedom is defined as ‘that degree of freedom from restraint which
is essential to enable proprietors, editors, and journalists to advance the public interest by
publishing facts and opinions’.50 The press enjoys constitutional protection and independence
from state control.51 Press freedom is concerned with the protection of the organisational and
framework conditions necessary to enable the media to contribute to the formulation of
public opinion.
The right to means of information through the medium of an interview can be claimed only if
the person sought to be interviewed expresses his willingness for the same. 52 Since in the
present case, there is no indication as to Maia’s willingness or non-willingness to participate
in the interview, it would be reasonable to proceed on the basis that the prisoner is willing to
be interviewed.53
Public gaze must be directed towards the functioning of the prison authorities and therefore
pressmen, as friends of the society and public spirited citizens should have access not only to
information but also interviews.54 Mr Jedpare’s right as a pressman to keep the public aware
about the happenings in the country must be protected by allowing him access to the jail
premises to interview Maia under reasonable conditions.

47
Observer and Guardian v. UK (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 153, ¶ 59.
48
A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), [1990] 1 A.C. 109, 183, C.A.
49
Supra note 6.
50
Royal Commission on the Press (Cmnd 6810, 1977), ¶. 2.3.
51
First Television case, 12 BVerfGE 205, 260 (1961); Spiegel case, 20 BVerfGE 162, 174-6 (1966).
52
Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.C. 1.
53
Ibid.
54
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373.
21
 B. The restrictions placed on Mr Jedpare are unreasonable.
Mr Jedpare has been asked by the Hamrak Prison authorities to comply with the conditions
given in order to be able to interview Maia. The petitioner contends that the conditions are
unreasonable.
Rule 41 of Delhi Prison Rules55 grants the unconvicted criminals facilities for letters and
interviews with their relatives and friends. The Court has also recognized the rights of press
to interview the prisoners.56 However, journalists do not enjoy unrestricted freedom of
interviewing prisoners and reasonable restrictions can be imposed on their freedom. 57 It was
emphasized in State v Charulata Joshi58 that any weighty and justifiable restrictions could be
placed by jail authorities but they should be subject to the prohibitions mentioned in the jail
manual.
Rule 24 states the authority of prison superintendent to grant permissions for the interview. 59
Rule 38 empowers prison superintendent to refuse to allow interview but with recording of
the reason of refusal.60 Superintendent is also entitled to examine a letter written by prisoner
and ask to delete a specific portion if it is likely to endanger the security of the state or
contains false information.61 But he is nowhere authorized to censor an interview's questions
and provide guidelines on what can and what cannot be asked.
Conditional permission granted to Mr Jedpare curtails his freedom of speech and
expression.62 The restrictions imposed are nowhere in accordance to the specific restrictions
mentioned under Art. 19(2) of the constitution 63 and Art. 19(3) of ICCPR64 and neither the
superintendent is competent to place restrictions by the prison manual.
Moreover, making the undertaking ‘not to violate any other law in force’ 65 and restricting the
questions that would undermine the trial is too vague. A law broader than intended or than the
constitution comes under the overbreadth doctrine.66 The conditions do not provide an
‘ascertainable standard of guilt’67 so that a man of common intelligence is able to determine
whether or not he is committing an offence.68

55
Delhi Prisons (Prisoners’ Welfare Fund, Appeals, Petitions, Interviews and Communications) Rules, 1988 §
41.
56
Supra note 52.
57
Supra note 54.
58
State v. Charulata Joshi, (1999) 4 S.C.C. 65.
59
Supra note 55, at §24.
60
Id. at §38.
61
Delhi Prisons Act, 2000 § 42(3).
62
Constitution of India, 1950 Art. 19(1) (a).
63
Id. at Art. 19(2).
64
Supra note 10, Art. 19(3).
65
Supra note 3, ¶ 20.
66
Lewis Sargentich, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine (83 H.L.R.. 844, 1970); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
(1962) 371 US 415.
67
U.S. v. Cohen Grocery, (1921) 255 U.S. 81.
68
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, (1939) 306 U.S. 451 (458).
22
Restrictions imposed by the prison superintendent are both unreasonable and ultra vires. Mr
Jedpare is not bound to follow the given specific guidelines to perform the interview.
The conditions should be struck down and a fresh permission should be granted in
accordance with the law and the Constitution.
CONTENTION 3: THE ORDER OF IN CAMERA TRIAL AND PROHIBITION OF
AUDIO-VIDEO RECORDINGS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS NOT JUSTIFIED.
The High Court rejected the applications made for allowing the AV recordings of the
proceedings and instead ordered an in-camera trial. Two SLPs were then filed separately
challenging this order as an infringement of the citizens’ right to know, freedom of press and
Maia’s freedom of speech and expression.
The petitioner submits that the above order of the High Court is infringing Fundamental
Rights of the press, the citizens [I.] and of the accused [II.]. Also, inconvenience is not a
valid ground for allowing in-camera trial [III.]. Hence, the order should be set aside and
instead, AV recording of the proceedings should be allowed [IV.].
I. Order of the High Court infringes Fundamental Rights of the press and citizens.
The freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) includes the freedom
of press (including the right to receive and/or disseminate ideas and information) 69 as well as
the citizens’ right to know.70 It is contended that the court by its order for an in-camera trial
has violated both the citizens’ right to know [A.] and the freedom of press [B.].

A. The order for in-camera trial infringes citizen’s right to know.

The petitioner contends that citizens’ have a right to know what is going on in courts and the
courts have a duty to encourage public understanding of their proceedings. 71By restricting
access to the court, this right to know is being restricted and hence infringed upon.
It is a general principle of administration of justice in England followed in Uparganj, that a
court must be open to the public. Publicity of judicial proceeding is regarded as a guarantee
of public security that justice will be properly administered, and free from bias and judicial
caprice.72 This is particularly vital in criminal trials.73
The partial dissent opinion in Gannett74 explained that the public has an intense need and a
deserved right to know about the administration of justice in general; about the conduct of the
judges, prosecutor, defense counsel, police officers, other public servants and all the actors in
the judicial arena; about the trial itself.
69
Sakal Papers v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305.
70
Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306.
71
South African Broadcasting Corporation v. National Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors., (2006) Z.A.C.C.
15.
72
Re Agricultural Industries, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1188, see also infra note 104.
73
Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 S.C.C. 653.
74
Gannett Company, Inc. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
23
Closed courts breeds suspicions of arbitrariness, prejudice and spawns disrespect for the
law.75 On the other hand, when trial is conducted in an open court, it has a therapeutic effect
and lets people know that justice is being administered impartially. 76 This rule is applied to
all courts, tribunals and boards,77 but assumes special significance in a criminal case, because
of two reasons:
(1) Crime is a transgression against the society more than the individual.
The Court has recognised that crime is an offence against the whole society. Since it involves
serious invasion of rights and liberties of some other person or persons, the people are
entitled to know whether the justice delivery system is adequate or not.78
(2) A criminal trial must necessarily satisfy the appearance of justice.
79
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Offutt v. United States, “To work effectively, it is
important that society’s criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice.” J. Wolfe wrote
about the principle of common law which requires that proceedings be “open to the public,
including the contents of court files and public viewing of trials.” 80 Open justice in the
ordinary course involves the public. Thus, openness serves the two-fold purpose of ensuring
basic fairness in a criminal trial as well as the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in a system.81
For Maia’s trial, ordinary conditions of open justice should have applied. The criminal trial
must be open to ensure public confidence in the judiciary. The public has a legitimate interest
in determining whether the transgression that has taken place is determined authoritatively or
not, and not allowing the same infringes their right to know.

B. The order for in-camera trial violates the freedom of press.

The petitioner contends that the press as a part of the public has the right to attend all court
proceedings. The order for in-camera trial contravenes the guarantees to the press by the
Constitution and violates its freedom [1.]. Moreover, it has the greater responsibility of
making sure that the information about public matters is disseminated [2.].

1. The Press has the right to attend Court proceedings.

Restricting the access of the press violates the rights guaranteed to the members of the press
as citizens of Uparganj to see court proceedings.

75
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
76
Terry v Persons Unknown, [2010] E.W.H.C. 119 (Q.B.).
77
Storer v. British Gas Plc, [2000] 2 A.I.I. E.R. 440.
78
Supra note 73.
79
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
80
In R. v Legal Aid, [1999] Q.B. 966.
81
Press Enter-Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
24
The right to receive and impart information belongs to an individual as a corollary from his
freedom of expression82 and the press has the right as a part of the citizens’ having the right to
receive information. The press, being one of the media through which citizenry gets
information, has the right to know and be informed about the administration of public affairs,
so that it can pass on the information to the people. 83 It follows that the right of the press to
access sources of information relating to public affairs 84 and public officials85 is only the
application of the individual right.
The journalists employed with the UNN have the right to carry on their occupation under Art.
19(1)(g); they have a right to assemble in a public place and attend court proceedings under
Art.19(1)(d); they have the right to publish as journalists a faithful report of the proceedings
which they have witnessed and heard in court, under the freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Art.19(1)(a).86
Restrictions on access to the court limit the information that may be imparted by the media
and received by the public. Art. 19(1) (a), thus encompasses not only the right to speak but
also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas, and the order for in-camera
trial violates that right.

2. Media has the responsibility to make sure that information to the public is
disseminated.
The press is entitled to attend and report court proceedings extensively so that the gap
between the courts and public is reduced.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to know of the citizens is a basic right which
citizens’ of a country aspire in the broader horizon to live in this age on our land under Art.21
of the Constitution. This right puts greater responsibility upon those who take it upon
themselves the responsibility to inform.’87 Freedom of press rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public.88
Hence, in a country with a free and thriving press, 89 this restriction is grossly
disproportionate, in addition to being inappropriate and violative of fundamental rights, since
restrictions cannot be imposed on any grounds except those which are reasonable and
mentioned in Art.19(2) and ‘inconvenience’ is not a ground for restriction.90
82
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India & Ors., 1960 A.I.R. 554.
83
Cf. New York Times v. U.S., (1971) 403 U.S. 713.
84
Cf. De Jong v. Oregon, (1937) 299 U.S. 353 (365).
85
Near v. Minnesota, (1913) 283 U.S. 697.
86
See, Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1, ¶ 19, Supra note 75.
87
Reliance Petrochemicals v. Indian Express, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 190, ¶ 34.
88
Express Newspaper Limited v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578.
89
Supra note 3, ¶ 1
90
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1950 S.C.R 759.
25
 II. Maia’s free speech and expression and right to a fair trial is contravened.
It is submitted that by conducting in-camera proceedings, the High Court shall violate the
freedom of speech and expression of the accused. The accused being a virtual person, is
entitled to the freedom of speech and expression [A.] and further has a right to fair trial as an
accused [B.].

A. Maia is entitled to the free speech and expression.

The present case for determining the status of a virtual person is sui generis with no guiding
precedent. However, the absence of a law does not disentitle Maia from her freedom of
speech and expression.
Even companies have been given the status of artificial legal entity with certain rights and
obligations.91 Maia, on the other hand, is an artificial intelligence entity with a cybernetic
brain which is “virtually” indistinguishable from a human brain. It looks like, sounds, feels
like a human. Everyone unanimously agrees that Maia can easily pass for a human being in
terms of intelligence and ability to hold conversation with others.92
Freedom of speech and expression entails with it the right to not only express one’s opinions
or ideas, but also an untrammelled flow of words in an open forum. It includes within it the
right to express one’s views through any medium. It includes freedom of communication and
propagation of view. The right to communicate information without hindrance is a part of
Art.19.
The present order is causing hindrance to its right to speech and expression because it is not
being able to communicate with the general public to defend itself. Additionally, Maia is
entitled to a public trial which is the right of an accused.

B. Maia has the rights of an accused and hence is entitled to a fair trial.
As an accused brought to the courtroom to defend itself, Maia cannot be denied the right to a
fair and public trial which is guaranteed under various conventions of which Uparganj is also
a part.
The 6th Amendment in the US, grants the right to a ‘public trial’ in all criminal prosecutions,
to prevent ‘Star Chamber practice’.93 The UDHR, 1948, declares that “everyone is entitles in
full equality to a fair and public hearing…”94 Art.11 declares that everyone has the right to
defend himself “in a public trial”. Art.14 of the ICCPR 95 reaffirms the objects of the UDHR.

91
Indian Companies Act, 2013.
92
Supra note 3, ¶ 5
93
Davies v. U.S., (1917) 247 Fed. 394.
94
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 10(1).
95
Supra note 10.
26
Art.6 of the European Convention on Human Rights echoes the same idea. Art.21 of the
Constitution of Uparganj guarantees procedural fairness to any ‘person
The the Articles are worded to give these rights to ‘everyone’, which includes all ‘persons’.
The legislators would have meant it as rights guaranteed to human beings, however, the
statutes must be interpreted progressively to ensure that the proper relation between the
subjective and objective purposes of law is maintained.96
In camera trial in a case like this vitiates the concept of freeness and fairness of legal
proceedings. It is immaterial whether the public attends the proceedings or not, but the trial
should be conducted in an open court, it satisfies the appearance of justice in the criminal
process.97
Maia should be allowed justice in an open court. This is important to maintain its right to a
fair and public trial. Far from being intrinsically inimical to a fair trial, open justice is an
important part of that right and serves as a great bulwark against abuse of judicial process.
The order of the High Court for an in-camera trial should be set aside.
III. Inconvenience is not a valid ground for ordering in-camera trial.
It is a cardinal principle of law that trial shall be held in open court. The petitioners contend
that this principle of open justice is a rule which can be interfered with only in special
circumstances [A.] and inconvenience is not a valid ground for ordering in-camera trial [B.].

A. Open Justice is the general rule which can be dispensed with in only special
circumstances.
The Open Court principle is a venerable principle, deeply rooted in the western
consciousness.98 Open Justice is recognized as fundamental in most jurisdictions and can be
interfered with only when special circumstances are shown to exist.
Open Court principle is a fundamental element of the law in many countries including
Canada,99 the UK,100 the US,101 Australia,102 South Africa and New Zealand.103 Openness is a
principle of constitutional significance in some of these countries. Internationally, it has been
recognised as a norm of great importance. For example, Art.14 of the ICCPR guarantees right
to a public hearing in both civil and criminal matters.
96
Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 S.C.C. 188.
97
McPherson v. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177.
98
Rt Hon. B. McLachlin P.C. ‘Openness and the rule of law’ address by the Honorable Chief Justice to the
Annual International Rule of Law Lecture (8 January 2014), available at
http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/270848/jan_8__2014_-_12_pt.__rule_of_law_-
_annual_international_rule_of_law_lecture.pdf , accessed 25 January 2016.
99
A. G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175.
100
Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417.
101
Supra note 75.
102
Russell v. Russell, (1976) 134 C.L.R. 495, 520.
103
See Claire Baylis, ‘Justice done and Justice Seen to be Done – The Public Administration of Justice’, (1991)
21 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 177.
27
S.327 of the Uparganj Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, declares that the place where a trial
is held must be deemed an open court in which all persons have a right to be present, subject
to there being sufficient accommodation. The presiding judge, in his wisdom may disallow
the public generally, or a particular person from attending the proceedings. This is allowed
only in exceptional circumstances to allow proper administration of justice where the very
purpose of truth finding would be defeated if the witnesses are required to give evidence
subject to public gaze.104
It may also be allowed to uphold the Government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of
sensitive information, protection of victims of sex crimes from embarrassment, 105 protection
of the privacy of persons not before the court.106
The Constitution declares that the judgments of the Supreme Court shall be delivered only in
open court.107 Publicity is the authentic hall-mark of judicial (as distinct from administrative)
procedure, the criminal trial or enquiry is not an exception. 108
Thus, it has been recognised that the doors of the Courts of Uparganj must open to the public
at every stage.

B. Open Court cannot be denied on the grounds of inconvenience.

The High Court’s order restricts access to the proceedings where Maia is present on the
grounds of inconvenience that might be suffered. The right of access to courts can be
interfered with only in special circumstances, and the restriction must be narrowly tailored to
serve only those interests.109
The anticipated danger for restricting free speech and expression should only be on the
grounds of Art. 19(2).110 The anticipated danger must not be remote, conjectural or far-
fetched. It should be equivalent of a ‘spark in the powder tag’.111
The power of the court to order in-camera trial does not mean that the court has the discretion
to order it.112 For instance, when the court is concerned with the issues of safety and security
of the parties, it allows shift of the venue of the trial or beefs up the security, instead of
ordering complete ouster of access to Court proceedings by the members of the public. 113
Under the general rule, though the rape trial is to be held in-camera 114 considering the privacy

104
Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 1 S.C.C. 797 ¶ 20, 21, 30.
105
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
106
Waller v. Georgia, (1984) 467 U.S. 39 (45-48).
107
Supra note 62, at Art. 145(4).
108
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883.
109
Supra note 105.
110
Supra note 62, at Art. 19(2).
111
Durga Das Basu, 2 Commentary on the Constitution of India 2423 (8th ed. 2008).
112
Hinds v. R., (1976) 1 All E.R. 353.
113
Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu Muiahid v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 S.C.C. 234.
114
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 327(2).
28
of the victims, the Court made an exception from the rule to account for the searing public
interest.115
The inherent power of the Court to hold a trial in camera must be exercised with great
caution, only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice would be defeated
if the case is tried in open court.116 Mere inconvenience suffered due to the presence of a large
number of persons, who cannot be accommodated is not a reasonable or just excuse for
preventing public access. It has been held in Chatisgarh Mukti Morcha v. State of M.P.117, that
such an order cannot be sustained. The court room is a temple of justice, and every person has
a right of access.
The ouster of the public from the trial of Maia thus interferes with their right to know and
access court proceedings without regard to the tests of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’
referred to by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.118
Hence, the order of the High Court for an in-camera trial must be revoked as being
unreasonable and disproportionate to the requirements of the case.
IV. AV recordings of the court proceedings further the fundamental principles of
justice.
Applications requesting for AV recordings of the present matter were received by the High
Court, which were rejected. However, the order of the High Court was not justified and
should be set aside. It is contended that AV recordings enhance openness in trail [A.] and do
not hamper administration of justice [B.].

A. AV recordings enhance openness in trial.

AV recordings enable more citizens to follow the proceedings of the court, thus enhancing
and completely transforming the principle of open justice. There have been various
precedents in different countries where such recordings were allowed and proved beneficial
for the people.
The South African court, allowed live broadcast of the Pistorius trial119, in public interest. The
court observed that not allowing cameras in the courtrooms would entrench the workings of
the justice system away from the public domain. Court proceedings are in fact public and this
objective must be recognized.120 This would allow the people who are unable to access the
justice system to have a first-hand account of the proceedings.121

115
Vijay Singhal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2013 S.C.C. Online Del 1221.
116
Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2012) 10 S.C.C.
603.
117
Chatisgarh Mukti Morcha v. State of M.P., 1996 Cr.L.J. 2239 (M.P.).
118
Supra note 116.
119
Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v. Oscar Leonard Pistorius, (2015) Z.A.S.C.A. 204.
120
Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd. & Ors. v. National Prosecuting Authority, (2014) 2 All S.A. 446 (GP), ¶ 22.
121
Id., ¶ 27.
29
Australia publishes an account of the AV recordings of its court proceedings on its website, in
a bid to improve public access to its hearings. 122 On a similar note, the US Supreme Court
website provides access to audio recordings of all oral arguments before it.123
The SC-eCommittee, for the formulation of national policy for computerization of Indian
judiciary, has been keen on introducing AV- recordings on a pilot basis in India.124 Only a
small segment of the community should not be the only one to access the court proceedings.
Calcutta High Court allowed Video recording of the court proceedings 125 in a civil case in
July 2015, on an application by Mr Deepak Khosla. The provisions allowing recording of
trials have already been adopted by many European countries, in an attempt to increase
transparency.126
The present trial should be made open, and the scope of its openness should be widened by
allowing the cameras in the courtroom. It shall enhance the transparency in judicial system,
and all segments of the society shall get access to the trial, without causing practical
inconvenience to the court.

B. AV recordings do not hamper the administration of justice.

Cameras rarely hurt judicial proceedings; moreover their presence at a criminal trial can
hardly be a denial of judicial proceedings. Contrary to the claims of the respondents, AV
recordings do not interfere with the administration of justice.
Various pilot projects carried out in the US and UK, have shown us that presence of cameras
in the court has been beneficial. 127 One unobtrusive camera or even live audio streaming
could bring hundreds of citizens of Uparganj into the courtroom for these momentous
arguments. It has been observed that South Africans are better informed about the workings
of the court, after the live streaming of the Pistorius trial.128
As a relief, the heightened attention that this trial has garnered is sought to be accommodated
through the means of AV recording. It shall not obstruct the administration of justice in the
present matter.

122
Recent AV recordings, available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/recent-av-recordings, accessed 25 January
2016.
123
Audio arguments of the U.S. Supreme Court, available at,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio.aspx, accessed 25 January 2016.
124
Cameras in Court will transform Indian Judiciary, available at, http://www.dailyo.in/politics/supreme-court-
calcutta-hc-audio-video-recordings-court-proceedings-ecourts-project/story/1/5868.html, accessed 25 January
2016.
125
Angelo Brothers Ltd. v. Official Liquidator, 2015 S.C.C. OnLine Cal. 2036.
126
The transparency of Court proceedings in comparative jurisprudence, available at,
http://www.yihr.org/uploads/reports/eng/11.pdf, accessed 25 January 2016.
127
Overview of the cameras in courts pilot, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/cameras-
courts/history-cameras-courts, accessed 25 January 2016.
128
After Pistorius, South African media won’t be the same again, available at http://theconversation.com/after-
pistorius-south-african-media-wont-be-the-same-again-25421 , accessed 25 January 2016.
30
CONTENTION 4: MAIA IS NOT LIABLE FOR ALLEGED OFFENCE OF ABETMENT
OF SUICIDE.
The Sessions judge framed charges against Maia under the offence of abetment to suicide
under Sec.306 of the UPC, after the investigation by the police into the suicide of Dr Ahtme.
Mr Kasra filed a revision petition against the decision in the High Court.
The petitioner contends that Maia is incapable of standing trial for abetment of suicide [I.].
Arguendo, Dr Ahtme had a right to die, which is why the trial for abetment of suicide has no
basis [II.]. Arguendo, actions of Maia do not amount to abetment of suicide under Sec.306 of
the UPC [III.]
I. Maia is incapable of standing the trial for abetment of suicide.
Maia was charged with allegedly committing offence of abetment of suicide. However, being
an artificially intelligent legal entity it is incapable for standing the trial and cannot be framed
with the charges because this does not serve the end of criminal justice.
One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just
and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the
manner in which the crime is done. 129 In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra130,
the Apex Court held that sentencing was an important task in the matters of crime. The courts
have evolved certain principles: about objective of the sentencing policy being deterrence and
correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive
for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances.131
In Trop v. Dulles132, J. of the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized the deterrent
end of punishment. It also added that rehabilitation was but one of the several purposes of the
penal law along with deterrence of the wrongful act from the society.
Both these principles fail to deliver in the imprisonment of Maia. Punishing Artificial
Intelligence by physically restraining in custody is an example of futile effort at
miscomprehended implementation of criminal jurisprudence. As contested before, Maia
being an artificial intelligence would to respond to the effects of imprisonment, unlike usual
human mind and behaviour.
Thus, the arrest of Maia is not in accordance with law in addition to being logically incorrect
and it should be remedied. Maia is in incapable of standing the trial and should not be put in
custody.

129
Raj Bala vs State of Haryana & Ors. , S.C. Criminal Appeal nos. 1049-1050/2015 18.08.2015.
130
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 S.C.C. 648.
131
Id., ¶ 69.
132
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
31
 II. Arguendo, Dr Ahtme had a right to die.
Sec.309 of the UPC criminalizing attempt to suicide is obsolete. Dr Ahtme had a right to live
till the end of her life with dignity, and hence the right to die with dignity. Hence, Maia is not
criminally liable under Sec.306.
With knowledge of a terminal stomach cancer, Dr Ahtme decided to give up her life by
commanding Maia to reduce her food and water. She so acted to avoid undergoing trauma of
treatment and pain of corrosive drugs.133
S.309 UPC is oppressive and do not conform to the modern thinking. It deserves to be
effaced from the statute book to humanize our penal laws. It is a cruel and irrational
provision, as it may result in punishing a person again who has suffered agony and would be
undergoing ignominy because of his failure to commit suicide. 134 Committing suicide is a
personal choice, a psychiatric problem and not a manifestation of criminal instinct. A law, so
broadly drawn that it targets some individuals in a way that bears no relation to its purpose is
overbroad.135 Law, which excessively invades the right, cannot be said to be reasonable.136
The Right to life is a natural right embodied in Art.21 of the Constitution. 137 The right to life
is also phrased by Art.6 of the ICCPR as “Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”. 138 The
right to life given in these Articles is not a guarantee or protection against death, which is
both inevitable and often unpreventable. An element of choice can be inferred from the right,
as an obligatory requirement to live cannot be interpreted from it. It can therefore be implied
that it does not curb the right to choose whether to continue living or not. The use word
‘arbitrarily’ recognizes situations where choice or judgment is applicable to the continuation
of life.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the State’s interest in protecting life does not take
precedence in case of persons so terminally ill.139 The petitioner seeks an expansion of the
already existing right.
Dr Ahtme had a considered, rational and persistent wish to end her life, and she did so in a
manner of her choosing. Dr Ahtme stated in her letter to her family and the news editors
mentioned that she was suffering from a terminal stomach cancer. She decided to choose a
peaceful death instead of attempt to prolong her life with drugs. Thus, right to life of Dr

133
Supra note 3, ¶ 8.
134
Law Commission of India, 210th Report on Humanization and Decriminalization of Attempt to Suicide
(October, 2008).
135
Carter v. Canada, 2015 S.C.C. 5.
136
Supra note 90.
137
Supra note 62, Art. 21.
138
Supra note 10, Art. 6.1.
139
Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 15 S.C.C. 480.
32
Ahtme also included her right to live with dignity till the end of her life, allowing her to
choose the manner of her death.
The right of Dr Ahtme to live her life the way she desired, thus ultimately causing her death,
makes the charges of abetment of suicide against Maia redundant since the death itself is not
criminal.
Mai is not liable for the alleged offence of abetment of suicide of Dr Ahtme and should be
freed from the charges and released with immediate effect.
III. Arguendo, actions of Maia do not amount to abetment of suicide as per Sec.306 of
the UPC.
On the order of Dr Ahtme, Maia gradually reduced the supply of food and water to her. This
eventually resulted in her death.140 The acts of Maia do not amount to the criminal offence of
abetment to suicide, since there was no mens rea on her part.
The Sec.306 of UPC describes the punishment for the act of abetment of suicide. It states that
if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission shall be liable for
imprisonment and fine.141 The word 'abetment' has been defined under the Sec.107 of UPC.
'Abetment of a thing' is defined by three parts, instigation of any person to do a particular
thing, engagement with other persons in conspiracy for an act or illegal omission or
intentionally aiding by any act or illegal omission.142 Sec.108 defines 'abettor' as a person who
abets an offence by another person with same intention and knowledge.143
The act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and
established by the prosecution before he can be convicted under Sec.306 of the UPC. 144 In
order to bring a case within the purview of Sec.306, there must be a case of suicide and in the
commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of
suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide. 145 The charges against Maia for abetting the suicide of
Dr Ahtme are unsustainable because no ingredients for the offence under Sec.306 can be
made out considering the facts and circumstances of this case.
Acts of Maia do not qualify for the act of abetment. Maia can be compared to a mere
instrument/ agency through which the act of suicide was executed however it is only liable as
much as a dog is when ordered to bark by its master. Maia in the case, only followed the

140
Supra note 3, ¶ 8.
141
Supra note 19, § 306.
142
Id. § 107.
143
Id. § 108.
144
Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 512.
145
Supra note 104.
33
orders given to it by Dr Ahtme. For constituting a crime, there must be actus reus as well as
mens rea146, meaning ‘guilty mind’.147
Here, the action to help Dr Ahtme commit suicide was there, but the consciousness or intent
to commit any crime was missing. The basic elements of a crime are not being fulfilled. Maia
merely brought the food for Ahtme, in the quantity that was asked of her. Maia didn’t have
the idea of reduction of food per day nor did it mix any substance in the food which could
expedite Doctor Ahtme’s death. It is illogical to punish Maia for Doctor Ahtme’s death.
Maia, through her actions, resembles parallel capabilities of a mentally limited person, like an
infant or an insane person. Her advanced capabilities of artificial intelligence fail in the
pragmatic test of her human abilities. Maia is not liable for the alleged offence of abetment of
suicide of Dr Ahtme and the charges against Maia should be dropped.

PRAYER
In light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly and respectfully pleaded before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Uparganj that it may
be pleased to:
1. Grant the writ of habeas corpus against the SP for the release of Maia into Mr Kasra’s
custody.
2. Grant the writ of certiorari against the prison authorities to quash the conditions in the
letter of permission and fresh permission for conducting the interview of Maia
according to the law and Constitution of Uparganj.
3. Set aside the order of the High Court for an in camera trial.
4. Allow the Audio Video recordings of the proceedings of the Court.
5. Drop the charges of abetment of suicide against Maia and release Maia.

And grant any other order that this court deems fit in the ends of justice, equity and good
conscience.

Counsel No: 27P

Counsel for the Petitioners

146
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 889 (5th ed. 1979).
147
Eugene J. Chesney, Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law 29, (Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 627,
1939).
34