TANADA vs TUVERA
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication
G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
government officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementation and administrative orders. The
petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on matters of
public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). The
petitioners are also invoking that for laws to be valid and
enforceable, they must be published in the Official Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal standing
to carry out such petition since they are not personally and
directly prejudiced by the non-publication of the issuances in
question. Respondents also contended that the publication in
the Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which
provide their own effectivity date. Since the issuances in
question contain the date of effectivity, publication is not
necessary.
ISSUES:
Whether publication is necessary for laws which have its own
effectivity date.
HELD:
The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states
that:
“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided.”
Publication is indispensable because without such publication,
there would be no adequate notice to the general public of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conducts
as citizens. It would render injustice to punish or burden a
citizen for the transgression of law which he had no notice.
It is the respondent officials’ duty to enforce the Constitutional
rights of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern. Thus, the publication of all presidential issuances of
“public nature” or of general applicability” is mandated by law.
Unless so published, laws shall have no binding force or effect.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on
Public Information
G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped
communication of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.
With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
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however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page,
invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is a substantial compliance of
the constitutional requirement of publication.
RULING:
NO.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors Of the Department of Justice
G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations
(persons), Powers of the Ombudsman (consti), concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigation (consti)
Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art.
2 Civil Code
Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo
Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military
personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan, II
On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and
presided by Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan,
Metro Manila
Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in
behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a
public statement aired on national television, stating their
withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and
the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing
 to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda
(NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only
program that would solve the ills of society.
Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:
June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting
where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed
struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be
constituted which will run the new government. They had a
blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat
made by Senator Honasan when he said “Kung kaya nating
pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa
mga kasamahang magtataksil.”
July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes,
Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others
who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having
a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood
Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the
banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their
blood compact wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the
DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office by a group of public
officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the
Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members,
CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of
September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground
that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation
Issues:
Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is
ineffective on the ground that it was not published
Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit
No.
In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954).
The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for
its violation should be published before becoming effective.
In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453
(1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so called letters of instructions
issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance
of their duties.
 OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal
circular between the DOJ and the office of the
Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities
among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It
does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general.
Republic v. Miller
FACTS:
Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air Force assigned
at Clark AirBase, and his wife, Jumrus Miller, both US citizens
but residing in Angeles City, filed w/ RTC a verified petition to
adopt minor Michael Magno Madayag. Poverty and deep
concern for his future prompted Michael’s
natural parents to give the irrevocable consent to the
adoption. RTC granted petition for adoption finding
petitioners to possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for adoption. Michael was
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freed from all obligation of obedience and support w/ respect
to natural parents. He was then declared child of the
Millers by adoption. His surname was to be changed from
“Madayag” to “Miller”.
ISSUE: W ON the Court may allow aliens to adopt
a Filipino child despite the prohibition under FC, effective
on Aug 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was filed before
FC, on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, w/c allowed aliens to adopt.
HELD: Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the right of
alien respondents to adopt a Fil child because the right
has become vested at the time of filing of the petition
for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A
vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does
not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. Adoption statues,
being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill the noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
6. Manuel vs People of the Philippines
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005
FACTS:
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to
Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former,
was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and
was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met
Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21
years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without
Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the
course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he
married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against
Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his
declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera
was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to
go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10
months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral
damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged
that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the
petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten
years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally
presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided
for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
RULING:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is
presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of
fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice
or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent
for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have
to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of
the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the
petitioner.
7. Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBcom) v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 112024. January 28, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner PBcom paid its quarterly income tax for the first and
second quarters of 1985 totalling to Php5,016,954.00.
Subsequently, PBcom suffered losses so that when it filed its
Annual Income Tax for the year- ended December 31, 1986, it
reported a net loss and declared no tax payable for the year.
Petitioner also earned rental income for both 1985 and 1986
and the corresponding tax thereof was
withheld and remitted by the lessees to the BIR. On August 7,
1987 or after more than two years from payment of taxes,
PBcom filed for a tax refund. Pending investigation of the BIR,
petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals. The CTA denied the tax refund on the ground that
application for refund must be made within two years from the
payment of tax as provided by the National Internal Revenue
Code. Petitioner contended that the two year period has been
changed to ten years upon a memorandum issued by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Court of Appeal
affirmed
in toto the ruling of the CTA.
ISSUE:
Did the CTA erred in denying the plea for tax refund on the
ground of prescription?
RULING:
No. The relaxation of revenue regulation by a memorandum
issued by the BIR is not warranted as it disregards the two
year period set by law. Section 230 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 provides for the two year period for
filing a claim for refund or credit. When the Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a memorandum
changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years,
such
circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of
Section 230 of NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply
interpret the law, rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the
statute.
8. LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, G.R.
No. 136921. April 17, 2001.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent
Zosimo Pesca, a seaman, got married March 1975 after a
whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in
1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was emotionally
immature and irresponsible. Respondent became violent. On
March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a
complaint and respondent was convicted by the MTC of
Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11 days
of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological
incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided in favour of the
petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, stating
that petitioner had failed to establish that (1) respondent
showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be
incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article
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68 of the Family Code (2) that incapacity is grave, (3) preceded
the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is
psychological (6) that the root cause has been identified
medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by an expert (8)
that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner
argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA
(promulgated on January 1995), as well as the guidelines set
out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have
no retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should at least only
warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and
Molina cases apply to the case at bar?
RULING:
The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” ordained in
Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim –
“legis interpretado legis vimobtinet” – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law.
The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute was
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favour of the
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith in accordance therewith (“lex prospicit, non
respicit”). Petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations and in
her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of
the respondent.
9. Ferrer vs. Diaz
FACTS:
Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazes, represents to
obtain loan to petitioner, Atty. Ferrer. The loan was secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner further claimed
that prior to said loan, Comandante, for a valuable
consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the
abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an
instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diazes, however,
reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite
repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to
settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection
of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract
against the Diazes and Comandante.
ISSUE:
Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by
a future heir while the parents are still living valid?
RULING:
No. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the
Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For
the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must
not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract
may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance,
prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where
the following requisites concur:(1) That the succession has not
yet been opened. (2) That the object of the contract forms part
of the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with
respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution
of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of
her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of
them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites,
both are likewise present considering that the property subject
matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the
properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their
death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts,
is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing,
it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied
in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
10. Isabelo C. Dela Cruz, Petitioner, vs. Lucilla C. Dela Cruz,
Respondent
G.R NO. 192383; December 4, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Dela Cruz and his
sisters/respondents Lucila and Cornelia were co-owners of a
240-square meter land in Las Pinas which they bought on
installment from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia
paid for the down payment and religiously paid for the monthly
amortizations.
Upon Lucia’s plea to help out a financially distressed cousin
(Corazon), the siblings agreed to make use of the lot as
collateral and security for a loan from the Philippine Veterans
Bank. In order to make this possible, Lucia paid the P8,000
outstanding balance to Gatchalian Realty and had the deed of
title registered in her name. The title was then mortgaged for
Corazon’s benefit. However, Corazon was not able to pay for
the loan and the mortgaged lot was then foreclosed by the
bank. The foreclosed lot was however redeemed by Lucia.
In 2002, Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing all
her share, interest and participation to her brother Isabelo and
her niece Emelinda. Isabelo then filed an action for partition
seeking the segregation of his portion of said lot and the
corresponding title in his name. This action was, however,
contested by Lucila claiming that the waiver she executed
ceding ownership of her share to Isabelo was subject to a
condition that their family problems would be resolved. She
claims that this condition did not happen and that she had
every right to revoke the waiver. This was made evident by the
revocation she made through an affidavit dated September 24,
2004. The RTC ruled in favor of Lucia and this was affirmed
by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Lucila’s
cession of the property through waiver did not have the effect
of making Isabelo part owner thereof.
Ruling: In deciding this case, the SC considered the wordings
used by Lucila in her waiver. The court noted that the phrase
used “ To put everything in order, I hereby waive all my share,
interest and participation…” means that the intention of Lucila
was to waive her right to the property, irreversibly divesting
herself of her existing right to it. It disagreed with the lower
court’s interpretation that such wordings intends a precondition
of waiver for if such was the intent, the phrase containing
words such as “ subject to the condition that everything is put
in order” would have been used. Therefore, the SC ruled that
the affidavit of waiver executed by Lucila makes Isabelo and
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Emelinda co-owners of the waived share of Lucila. Isabelo
then has the right to demand partition.
Heirs of Reyes v. Calumpang
Facts:
The instant case involves a lot which was originally
owned by a certain Isidro Reyes, who sired eight children, viz:
Victoriana Reyes Manaban, Telesfora Reyes Manaban,
Leonardo Reyes, Juan Reyes, Eduarda Reyes, Miguel Reyes,
Eleuteria Reyes, and Hermogenes Reyes. The protagonists
are the descendants, specifically the grandchildren, of the
three eldest children of Isidro Reyes, namely, Victoriana,
Telesfora and Leonardo.
Among Isidros children, it was Leonardo Reyes, in
behalf of his seven (7) siblings, who managed the properties of
their father. a cadastral survey was conducted pursuant to Act
No. 2259. Leonardo, through his representative, Angel
Calumpang, filed an answer in the cadastral court naming all
eight children of Isidro Reyes as claimants of the said lot.
However, on July 10, 1949, a certain Dominador Agir filed
another claim over the disputed lot, this time naming some
grandchildren of Leonardo Reyes. The nine (9) registered co-
owners, however, did not take actual possession of the said
lot, and it was Victorino and Cipriano Reyes who paid the land
taxes, built their housed and planted sugar canes in the land.
Sometime in 1972, respondent Agapito Agala
(grandson of Victoriana Reyes Manaban) was informed by his
cousin Victorino Reyes, one of the petitioners and registered
co-owner of Lot No. 3880, that there was already a title over
the said lot. This prompted respondent Agapito Agala and the
other heirs of Telesfora and Victoriana to seek advice from a
judge who suggested that they request the registered co-
owners to sign a quitclaim over the said lot.
A conference was allegedly held on December 27,
1972, where three (3) of the registered co-owners Victorino,
Luis, and Jovito all surnamed Reyes signed a Deed of
Quitclaim, where, for a consideration of one peso (P1.00), they
agreed to release, relinquish and quitclaim all their rights over
the land in favor of the legal heirs of the late Victoriana Reyes
and Telesfora Reyes.
The Deed of Quitclaim was annotated on the back of
OCT No. OV-227. Thereafter, respondent Agapito Agala had
the then Police Constabulary (PC) summon the other
registered co-owners, namely: Cipriano, Ricardo, Daylinda,
Guillermo, and Beatriz, to sign another deed of quitclaim. But
the latter allegedly ignored the call, prompting the heirs of
Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes to file a Civil Case for
Reconveyance of Real Property, Cancellation of Certificate of
Title and Damages against the registered co-owners of the
disputed lot who did not sign a deed of quitclaim and
Dominador Agir, who filed the amended answer in the
cadastral proceedings in 1949.
Issue:
Can a party who lost rights of ownership in a parcel of land due
to laches be allowed to regain such ownership when one who
benefited from the delay waives such benefit?
Held:
On the issue of the rights of the heirs of Victoriana
and Telesfora Reyes being barred by the indefeasibility of
petitioners Torrens Title over subject lot, we qualify. While it is
true that the indefeasibility of petitioners title on the ground of
laches bars the rights or interests of the heirs of Victoriana and
Telesfora Reyes over the disputed lot, still, the indefeasible
rights of a holder of a Torrens Title may be waived in favor of
another whose equitable rights may have been barred by
laches.
However, the equitable rights barred by laches still
subsist and are not otherwise extinguished. Thus, parties guilty
of laches retains equitable rights albeit in an empty manner as
they cannot assert their rights judicially. However, such
equitable rights may be revived or activated by the waiver of
those whose right has ripened due to laches, and can be
exercised to the extent of the right waived.
In the case at bar, petitioners title over Lot No. 3880
had become indefeasible due to the laches of the heirs of
Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. However, like any rights over
immovable property, titleholders may convey, dispose, or
encumber their right or interest. Thus, through the waiver and
quitclaim, the rights of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes were acknowledged, revived, and activated to the
extent of the rights waived by titleholders Victorino, Luis, and
Jovito Reyes. Clearly, the quitclaim executed by titleholders
Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes waived and conveyed their
rights over the said lot in favor of the heirs of Victoriana and
Telesfora Reyes, whose equitable rights were barred by
laches.
In this light, we note that both trial and appellate
courts in Civil Case No. 6238 did not categorically pronounce
that the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes had no rights
over the disputed lot. Their pronouncements were to the effect
that whatever equitable rights the heirs of Victoriana and
Telesfora Reyes may have had over the subject lot had been
barred by laches. Thus, the voluntary waiver of Victorino, Luis,
and Jovito Reyes revived and activated the equitable rights of
the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes over Lot No. 3880.
But such revived and activated rights over Lot No. 3880
correspond only to the extent of the rights of Victorino, Luis,
and Jovito Reyes waived in their favor.
INENG vs VEGA
FACTS:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez
(Rafaela), is the owner of a parcel of land (subject property) in
Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
(24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died
without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who
are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion
Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega
(Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived
by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M.
Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the
substituted respondents. Herein petitioners, except for Ramon
Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are
Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six
children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores
Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and
Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea,
Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry
Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon,
Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero.
Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora
Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo),
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Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.),
Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo
Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa
Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As
for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to
the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the
partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed
his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court
action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole
ownership of the property; that portions of the property were
sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be
collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to
Gregoria’s heirs
Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo
claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them;
that they have become the sole owners of the subject property
through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by
sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the
same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that
they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and
exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they
have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s
claim is barred by estoppel and laches.
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that
Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943 and his
possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-
ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and
acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of
time operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s
successorsin-interest – the benefits of acquisitive prescription
which proceeded from the repudiation.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35
that – For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted
that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this
case for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in
cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of
pleadings served to the offices concern [sic] where said order
[sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in
violation to [sic] the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to
the Honorable Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be
taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and
other papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out in
this paragraph.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Prescription sets in
HELD:
The Court denies the Petition. The finding that Leon
did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled
and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus,
the property remained part of Leon’s estate. One issue
submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is
whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr. The trial court,
examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez
and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded
that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place.
Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently,
any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled.
Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of
the property to reinforce their claim over the property must be
ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place,
the subject property clearly remained part of Leon’s estate
upon his passing in 1962.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the
property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s
heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property
upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code,
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of death. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the
subject property. Thus, having succeeded to the property as
heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents
became coowners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the
property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights. They
have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or
mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Finally, no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the
others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be
done by a co-owner. Time and again, it has been held that "a
co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that
the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within
which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in
1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and
against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation
to the other co-owners.
De Borja vs Borja
Facts:
This case is compilation of three cases including:
CASE A: G.R. No. L-28040 – appeal by Tasiana Vda. de de
Borja from approval of compromise agreement by CFI Rizal
CASE B: G.R. No L-28568 – appeal Jose de Borja from the
disapproval of compromise agreement by CFI Nueva Ecija
CASE C: G.R. No. L-28611 – appeal by Jose de Borja from the
decision of CFI Rizal that the main object of the compromise
agreement is a separate and exclusive property of Francisco
de Borja and not a conjugal asset
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of
the will of her wife Josefa Tangco upon her death (CFI Rizal).
6
He was appointed executor and administrator while Jose de
Borja (their son) was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died, Jose became sole administrator Francisco had
taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died and she instituted
testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death
and was appointed special administatrix.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and
Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits
and counter-suits. Thus, Jose and Tasiana entered into a
compromise agreement to put an end to all of the pending
litigations. However, Tasiana argues that compromise
agreement was not valid, because the heirs cannot enter into
such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will
was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija
Issue:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of
Francisco has not yet been probated
Held:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000
as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of
Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate
of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual
share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation
as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted
or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such
causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Leal vs IAC
Facts:
A Document entitled "Compraventa," written entirely
in the Spanish language, involving three parcels of land, was
executed by the private respondent's predecessors-in-interest,
Vicente Santiago and his brother, Luis Santiago, in favor of
Cirilio Leal the deceased father of some of the petitioners.
When Cirilo died on December 10, 1959, the subject
lands were inherited by his six children, who are among the
petitioners, and who caused the consolidation and subdivision
of the properties among themselves. Between the years 1960
and 1965, the properties were either mortgaged or leased by
the petitioners-children of Cirilo Leal — to their co-petitioners.
Sometime before the agricultural year 1966-1967,
Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and offered
repurchase the subject properties. Petitioners, however,
refused the offer. Consequently, Vicente Santiago instituted a
complaint for specific performance before the then Court of
First Instance of Quezon City.
The trial court dismissed the petition of respondent
and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but when there was
reorganization of courts and the records was been lodged
within the Intermediate Appellate Court it made a reversal of
the decision made by the Court of Appeals which now allowed
the specific performance of the repurchase underlying on the
annotation on the instrument which states that:
“"they shall not sell to others these three lots but only
to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors"
which is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots
described in the "Compraventa" to third persons or strangers to
the contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the said clause is void or not
Held:
Contracts are generally binding between the parties,
their assigns and heirs; however, under Art. 1255 of the Civil
Code of Spain, which is applicable in this instance, pacts,
clauses, and conditions which are contrary to public order are
null and void, thus, without any binding effect.
Parenthetically, the equivalent provision in the Civil
Code of the Philippines is that of Art. 1306, which states: "That
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. Public order signifies the public weal —
public policy. Essentially, therefore, public order and public
policy mean one and the same thing. Public policy is simply the
English equivalent of "order publico" in Art. 1255 of the Civil
Code of Spain.
One such condition which is contrary to public policy
is the present prohibition to self to third parties, because the
same virtually amounts to a perpetual restriction to the right of
ownership, specifically the owner's right to freely dispose of his
properties. This, we hold that any such prohibition, indefinite
and stated as to time, so much so that it shall continue to be
applicable even beyond the lifetime of the original parties to the
contract, is, without doubt, a nullity. In the light of this
pronouncement, we grant the petitioners' prayer for the
cancellation of the annotations of this prohibition at the back of
their Transfer Certificates 'Title.
Cui vs Arrellano University
Facts:
Plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-
1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of the fourth
year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying
law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother
of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law
and legal counsel of the defendant university.
Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law
studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition
fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having
severed his connection with defendant and having accepted
the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad
Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and
enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the
college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from
the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the
time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral
tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester
7
and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The
whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and
refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law
or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law
from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed
the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University.
Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back
the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above
stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those
transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from
defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship
grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following
contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by
the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another
school without having refunded to the University (defendant)
the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
Issue:
Whether or not the waiver made by the Plaintiff was
valid.
Held:
The Court is on the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void.
In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings
Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In
determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a
consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the
statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take
more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of
the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It
has been consistently held in America that under the principles
relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of
contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is
calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound
morality or to civic honest.
'In order to declare a contract void as against public
policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or
the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or
tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.
It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social
and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not
good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which
implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with
reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children,
does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding
value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So
also with the leading colleges and universities of the United
States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to
attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in
whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia;
that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by
her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?
RULING:
YES. The use of surname is fixed by law:
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a
voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that
she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the
guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
shall continue using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname
as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the
younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name
or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used
8
only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
REPUBLIC vs ORBECIDO III
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City on May 24, 1981. Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley and that her wife, Stanley and her child
currently live in California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The Solicitor General assails the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, and its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration. The lower court a
quo had declared that Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.
Orbecido admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his
case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a
divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES?
RULING:
On its face, Art 26, par 2 of the Family Code does not appear
to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita
v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
9
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO
FACTS:
> Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States.
> They were married in Hongkong, that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines.
> The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
> Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
> Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property".
> Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to
exercise control over such disputed property?
RULING:
NO. For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary
to determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
LLORENTE vs CA and LLORENTE
FACTS:
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the
U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in
Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He
discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino
Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a
son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to
give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula
agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if
the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo.
Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in
California. Paula was represented by an American counsel.
The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became
final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married
Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he
10
left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula).
In 1983, he went to court for the will’s probate and to have
Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the
probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later,
Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate.
The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void
because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court
ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not
applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be
recognized.
HELD:
Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo
became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he
obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an
American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating
to family rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable to
him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must
be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as
for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to the
successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be
respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws on
succession. However, since the will was submitted to our
courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower
court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove
the validity of the will.
PILAPIL vs IBAY-SOMERA
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in Germany to
private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany on January 1983.The divorce decree
was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner.
Six months after the divorce was granted private respondent
filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair
with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE:
Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy after a
divorce decree was already issued?
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in
this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended
spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country and
said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines.
In the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
21
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,1987.They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, an Australian family court issued a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen,
as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson
only in November, 1997.
DECISION OF LOWER COURT:
(1) Regional Trial Court: declares the marriage between Grace
J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12,
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and
(2) Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated
to marry petitioner.
RULING:
(1) No.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other
facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
 The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
11
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
(2) No.
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.
The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured
by respondent. The legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.
 As it is, however, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred
in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
The most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground
of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.
22
G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic
chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after
the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already
estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the
same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final
and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California,
had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against

Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage,
and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine
Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was
bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts
of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United
States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and
finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on
the basis of adultery.
23
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r ,- versus-
CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t
FACTS:
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by
Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American,
with whom she eventually had a child. At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68,
70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05
June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her American
12
husband was legal because now being an American citizen,
the law of her present nationality shall govern her status.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC – Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the
basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:
Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid
and subsisting
RULING:
YES.
At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy,
give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer
to every individual problem.
I. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained.
II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
is not applicable to the case at bar.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws
III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf
of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is
elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate
courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
24
G.R. No. 155635
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, vs THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, vs VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

FACTS:
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years
old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. On
November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca
gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel.
DECISION OF COURTS:
(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic -
ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving
them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but
giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. On March
21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to
Dismiss on,inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for
supportpendente lite
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the
above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a
petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the
time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what
are its consequent legal effects?
RULING:
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This
Case. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One. From the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not
have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a
Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and
Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage
between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free
to remarry after completing the legal requirements."
The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.
Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided
the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a
Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996.
In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.
13
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying
petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence
attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.
25
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner vs. FELICIDAD
SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20,
1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee
was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who
was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering
that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. While
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of
his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving
a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
 Therefore,
this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
ELMAR O. PEREZ v. CA, GR NO. 162580, 2006-01-27
Facts:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez
Catindig[5] twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage
ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took place
at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems
that they decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of
a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a
joint petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil
court in the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual
consent of Tristan and Lily.
14
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of
properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in
the State of Virginia in the United States[7] and both lived as
husband and wife until October 2001.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce
decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
was deemed void under Philippine... law.
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File
Intervention[10] claiming that she has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation
Issue:
W/N Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case...
between Tristan and Lily.
Ruling:
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that
Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never
dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that
laws relating to family rights and... duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.[19]
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or
she will be governed by Philippine laws with... respect to his or
her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition
and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether
he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce
decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage
was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code[21] which
took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v.
Escano[22] we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party... by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign
decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis
added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if
their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit.
Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife
upon which her motion for intervention is based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or
she will be governed by Philippine laws with... respect to his or
her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition
and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether
he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce
decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.
Ando vs DFA
G.R. No. 195432 – Civil Law – Persons and Family Relations –
Foreign Divorce; how recognized
Remedial Law – Evidence – Foreign Divorce; Must be proven
as a matter of fact
In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen
named Yuichiro Kobayashi. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a
divorce decree against Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi later
married someone else.
In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen
named Masatomi Ando.
Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time
she wanted to use her married name – she wanted to use
Ando’s name. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) told her that same cannot be issued to her until she can
prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her
said husband Masatomi Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she
insists that she should be issued a passport bearing her
married name even without a judicial declaration that her
marriage with Ando is valid because, according to the law, void
and voidable marriages enjoy the presumption of validity until
proven otherwise. And also on that juncture, she prayed that
the court recognize her second marriage as valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief should
prosper.
HELD No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced. Edelina
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. When her request
for renewal of passport under her married name was denied,
she should have appealed the denial to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs – pursuant to the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act).
Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be “honored”
is not proper. The proper remedy is for her to file a petition for
the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first
husband.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna
Full title: SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA
and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
Reference: G.R. No. 171914 / July 23, 2014
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J
Nature: The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision, whereby the CA
affirmed the decision RTC.
Topic: NCC 15
Facts:
 ATTY. LUNA,
o a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in
the law firm Sycip Law Offices
o at that time when he was living with his first wife,
herein Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA),
whom he married in a civil ceremony conducted
by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque and
later solemnized in a church ceremony at the
Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan.
o they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina
Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria
L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio
Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and
Cesar Antonio Luna.
o After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA
and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart
from each other and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.
15
 ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of
the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of
Dominican Republic.
o on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
o Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned
to the Philippines and lived together as husband
and wife until 1987.
 ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
 LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor
of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Makati City. Said condominium unit was to be used
as law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed
which was registered bearing the following names:
o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married
to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
 Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100
share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium
unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x
x x"
 LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still
registered in common.
o The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY.
LUNA over the condominium unit would be
25/100 share.
o ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed
another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela
Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
 After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture
and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
o Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his
father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who
established his own law firm named Renato G.
De la Cruz & Associates.
 The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture
and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed
by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the
RTC.
o The complaint alleged that the subject properties
were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the
extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½
share in the said properties plus her ½ share in
the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA
through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD
from her share in the subject properties.
 The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts ruling that the 24/100 pro-indiviso
share in the condominium unit is adjudged to have been
acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry with
respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
 Both parties appealed to the CA.
 The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The
absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage
with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first
marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15.
Held:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the
time of his death.
Ratio:
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10,
1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect
that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the
only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited
to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment
of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted
up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding
conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as
an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for
the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only
upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
Adolfo Aznar vs Helen Christensen Garcia
7 SCRA 95 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Law –
Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to
California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he
came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until
his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural
16
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir,
but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the
estate. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied;
that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred
that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should be applied in determining the successional rights of his
heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more
successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies
to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be
followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings – the determination of the successional rights
under Philippine law only.
Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second
wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills,
apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his
seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived
of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted
his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus
the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the
determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in
Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his
national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then
his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes,
is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not
entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
national law of the deceased.
Medina vs. Koike Case Digest
FACTS:
Medina was married to Koike on on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Their union bore two children. On June 14, 2012, Medina and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on
even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. Seeking to
have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on
file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7,
2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry. At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose
the petition. On the other hand, Medina presented several foreign
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" etc. RTC denied Medina's
petition, ruling that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented were
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless
fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence
of the law on divorce.
Medina’s testimony was insufficient since she was not presented a qualified
expert witness nor was shown to have.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce.
RULING:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. Considering
that the validity of the divorce decree between Medina and Michiyuki, as well
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially
factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact
binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals
taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867
FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will
which one of the clauses states that the law of the Philippines
shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and
that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the
dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of
such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was
thus excluded because, by his action of having opposed the
partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued
contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law
which provides that the will shall be probated according to the
laws of the nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?
HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Said
condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will
is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as
to the herein oppositor.
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK
G. R. No. 2935 March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered
into a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by
which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the
service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be
17
paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the
said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said
period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of
its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the
Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the
one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was
paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the
Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover
from Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff
claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in
traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract
that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered
the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into
and was therefore not responsible under the law. the lower
court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the
Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the
contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had
amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and
No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The
legislative department of the Government is expressly
prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from
altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which
the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No.
224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said
laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of
the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were
enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he
was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced
against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract
was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under
the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank
claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they
had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands
governed.
It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted —
that at the time and place of the making of the contract in
question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No
rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined b the law of the place where the contract is made.
Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting
a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of
the place where the suit is brought.
DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM G.R. No.
193707 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage
bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son
came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst
made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent
remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines
particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his
minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support
his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
18
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if
the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262)
because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines and
committed the offense here.
CARPIO v. VALMONTE GR No. 151866 September 9, 2004
FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church weddinng on October 10, 1996. At
about 4:30 pm on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel
and when she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were
already there including Soledad Carpio, the aunt of the bride.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to
go to the reception hall to give the meal allowance to the band
and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte
noticed the people staring at her and it was at this juncture that
Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It turned out that after Valmonte left
the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the
pieces of jewelry which she placed ins i de the comfort room in
a paper bag were lost and these include diamond rings,
earrings, bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of
about 1M pesos. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched,
interrogated and trailed by the police officers, but the pe titioner
kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.”
Valmonte’s car was also searched but the search yielded
nothing.
Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from
Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she
wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests
to redeem her smeared reputation but the petitioner did not
respond. Valmonte filed a suit for damages.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that when
sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely
exercising her right and if damage results from a person
exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added
that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that
petitioner acted maliciously and in bad fai th in pointing to her
as the culprit.
The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has
clearly established that she was singled out by the petitioner as
the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the
court find no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual
damages.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of
actual and moral damages
HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral
damages but not to actual damages.
In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the
fundamental precepts is the principle known as “abuse of
rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find existence of
an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: 1)
there is legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3)
for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her
own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and
amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case,
she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitve but outrightly accusatory. By
openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out
of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all
the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner
which is contrary to morals and good customs. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 20 for which she should be held accountable.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN VS REYES
452 SCRA 532 – Civil Law – Human Relations – Abuse of
Rights – Volenti Non Fit Injuria
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being
held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was being
held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge
at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive
secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed
Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was
not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who
invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained that the host
celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told
the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the
party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at
Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the
party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for
damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by another
party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he
was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered
him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim
he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for
Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of
the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However,
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim
abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated
humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask
Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it
respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more
credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more than 20
years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times.
It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was
managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified
in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very close
to him – so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves
that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that
she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from
hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra
bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence
on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know each
19
other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully
especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he
incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself
to the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed.
The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even
shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the
party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even
present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims.
Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko
Hotel can be held liable for damages.
Ardiente vs. Javier, et al
[Civil Law: human relations; principle of abuse of rights; Article
19 of the Civil Code]
Every person must, in the exercise of his right, and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Art. 19. New
Ciivil Code of the Philippines)
Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro Water District and
Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013
Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then
decision of the RTC regarding its judgment sums of money for
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The
decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water
supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as
requested by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of
property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to
Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as
other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which was
never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became
delinquent in paying the water bill.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with
Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off the water supply of
Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already
conveyed ownership of property to Pastorfide.
Ruling: No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which
violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water
supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at
least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle
of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
Sesbreno vs CA et. al. G.R. No. 160689 March 26,
2014
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H.
Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreño accused the
violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the
Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter
with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential
premises. But RTC, Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered
judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim; 1 and the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10,
2003.2
ISSUE:
HELD:
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the
respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the
concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not
use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be
liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the
concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability
of social order.21Moreover, according to a commentator,22 "the
exercise of right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right
when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the
Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise
of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely:
(a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to
observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights – that in the exercise of the
rights, the standards under Article 19 must be observed. 24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise
should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is
performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that
liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the
following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of
a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 25 There is
no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The
resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each
case.
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIÑONES G.R. No. 175822
(October 23, 2013)
FACTS:
Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a ticketing agent of Cebu
Pacific Air, bought a pair of
black jeans worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA Boutique. While
she was on her way to Mercury Drug
Store, a Guess employee approached her and said that she
failed to pay for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she presented
an official receipt and suggested that they should talk about the
matter in the Cebu Pacific Office located within the mall. While
they were in the office, the Guess employees allegedly
humiliated her in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly
demanded payment and even searched the respondent’s
wallet to check how much money she had. Another argument
ensued and after that, respondent went home. The Guess
employees submitted two letters to the Director of Cebu Pacific
narrating the incident but the said letters were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners, California Clothing, Inc., Excelsis Villagonzalo,
Imelda Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due to
the incident, she suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights,
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and humiliation. She demanded
payment for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Petitioners stated
that they approached the respondent to clarify whether or not
payment was made and that they approached and talked to the
respondent in a gentle and polite manner. They sought
payment for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses as counterclaim. The Regional Trial
Court dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim stating
that the petitioners acted in good faith and the respondent was
the one who put herself in that situation by inviting the Guess
employees to the Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the
issue of payment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that there
was preponderance of evidence showing the petitioners acted
in bad faith but, Hawayon and Villagonzalo were absolved from
liability due to good faith. Since petitioners acted in bad faith,
respondent was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which
resulted to the Court of Appeals awarding
moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent, Shirley G.
Quiñones.
20
RULING: Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for
moral damages and attorney’s
fees to respondent was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The principle of abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil
Code is present in the case. Respondent complained when
petitioners embarrassed her and insisted that she did not pay
for the black jeans despite the issuance of an official receipt in
her favor. The court cited the case of Carpio vs. Valmonte
in which the elements of abuse of rights were enumerated.
“The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which isexercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements
stated are complete in the present case. First, petitioners
continued to insist that there was no payment made when
respondent already presented the black jeans with the original
receipt. Second, they accused the respondent that not only did
she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it
and quickly left the shop. Third, the letters sent to the
respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask for
assistance in collection of the payment but also to ruin the
respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be
in accordance with the purpose of its establishment and not
abused. Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
PATROCINIA RAVINA and WILFREDO RAVINA vs. MARY ANN
VILLA-ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of
INGRID D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,INGREMARK D’WIGHT
VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA
ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009
FACTS:
In 1982, during the marriage of respondent Mary Ann Pasaol
Villa Abrille and Pedro, Villa Abrille, they acquired a parcel of
land in Davao City (Lot 7)registered in their names. This lot is
adjacent to another land (Lot 8), Pedro’s separate property.
When Pedro had a mistress in 1991 and neglected his family,
Mary Ann sold/mortgaged their movables to support the family
and the studies of her children. Pedro, by himself, offered to
sell the house and the two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann
objected and notified the petitioners of such objection, but in
June 1991, Pedro still sold the house and lots without her
consent. Later, Pedro, with armed members of the CAFGU and
in connivance with the petitioners, surreptitiously transferred all
their (Mary Ann+children) belongings from the house to an
apartment. Mary Ann and her children were also stopped from
entering the house.
Mary Ann and her children (respondents) filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and
Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against Pedro and the Ravinas. During trial Pedro claimed that
the house was built with his own money. Petitioners assert that
Lot 7 was Pedro’s exclusive property, acquired by him through
barter or exchange. They also claim that Wilfredo Ravina
examined the titles when they bought the property from Pedro.
TC ruled that the sale of the house and the lots 7 & 8 were
valid as to the half of the share of Pedro and void as to the
other half of the share of Mary Ann.
CA modified, ruling that the sale of lot 8 is valid, while the sale
of lot 7 is void. CA also ordered Pedro to return the value of the
consideration for lot 7 and the house to Sps Ravina.
Respondents were also given the option to exercise their rights
under Art. 450 NCC with respect to the improvements
introduced by Sps Ravina.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or
conjugal property
(2) Whether the sale of Lot 7 was valid considering the
absence of Mary Ann’s consent
(3) Whether the petitioners are buyers in good faith, hence,
entitled toreimbursement of their payment
RULING:
1. Conjugal Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during Pedro and
Mary Ann’s marriage.
No evidence was adduced to show that the property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence
of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro. Likewise, the house built on Lot
7 is conjugal property, having been constructed through the
joint efforts of the spouses, who had obtained a loan from DBP
to construct the house.
2.)Sale was VOID.
Under Art. 124 of the FC, disposition of a conjugal property
is void if done a)without the consent of both the husband and
wife, or b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the
court. Here, Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of
sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of
the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only
to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot
covered by Lot 8, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro
and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s
consent.
3.) Buyers in bad faith; no reimbursement
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property
of another without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice
of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. To
establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person
dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by
the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the
seller’s certificate of title.
For a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller whose capacity is restricted, such as
Arts. 166/173/124 of the FC, to establish status as a buyer in
GF, he must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to
sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good
faith. Here, the property is registered in Pedro and Mary Ann’s
names.
Also, petitioners were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her
objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase
the property without Mary Ann’swritten consent. Moreover, the
respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public
possession of the property at the time the transaction was
being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that
Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and
yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of
sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith.
SPOUSES HING VS. CHOACHUY
FACTS:
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that
the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it
would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the
application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences
for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two
video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their
employees even took pictures of the said construction of the
fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for
violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC
issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO
and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video
surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed
the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s decision was
annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video
surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to
privacy.
HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the
Hing’s under Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into the
privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business office
21
and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access.
VIVARES VS. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE (STC)
FACTS:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to
their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her
students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed
the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate
action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s
handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary
restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the
school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies,
STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the
other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school. They argued, among others,
that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts
was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot
be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded
upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the
copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit
with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and
have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the children’s right to privacy was
violated.
HELD: No.
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site
(ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes
use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is).
Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students
concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would
show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published
as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that the skull x-
view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page): ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:30am of March 2,

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view 1988, Logmao developed generalized seizures and was

the photo; managed by the neuro-surgeon resident on-duty; that the

(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and
their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the
photo;
condition of Logmao progressively deteriorated and he was
intubated and ambu-bagging support was provided; that
admission to the ICU and mechanical ventilation support
became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and
all the ventilation units were being used by other patients; that

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends a resident physician of NKTI, who was rotating at EAMC,
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and suggested that Logmao be transferred to NKTI; and that after
arrangements were made, Logamo was transferred to NKTI at
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
10:10am. At the NKTI, the name Angelito Logmao was
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some
recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately
privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If
attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As
it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject
Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, transplant
of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as
coordinator was asked to locate his family by enlisting police
they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able
and media assistance. Dr. Enrique Ona, chairman of the
to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was
Department of Surgery, observed that severity of the brain
their classmates who informed and showed their teacher,
injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He
Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan
requested the laboratory section to conduct tissue typing and
et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they
tissue cross-matching examination, so that should Lugmoso
have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of
them scantily clad. expire despite the necessary care and medical management
and he would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner
family would consent to organ donation, the organs thus
which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered
donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to any
illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
compatible beneficiary. The identity of Lugmoso was verified
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
by Misa from EAMC and she was furnished the patient’s data
recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper
sheet. She then contacted several radio and television stations
school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of
discipline their students according to the standards of the
Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong who was
school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the
confined at NKTI with severe head injury after allegedly falling
first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children
there). from the Cubao overpass, as well as police station no. 5
Eastern Police District. Lugmoso was pronounced brain dead
on March 3, 1988 7:00am. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was
informed that EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing thereby
Alano vs Magud-Logmao
confirming his brain death. He was found to be a suitable
GR No. 1755540 April 7, 2014
donor of the heart, kidneys, pancreas, and liver, and after the
extensive search, no relatives were found. Dr. Ona then
Facts: At around 9:50pm of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao
requested the removal of the specific organs of Lugmoso from
then 18 y/o, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center
the herein petitioners, Dr. Alano, the director of NKTI who
(EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who
thereafter issued a memorandum stating that only after the
allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the
requirements of RA 349 as amended by PD 856 was complied,
Farmer’s Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The patient’s data
they can remove the specified organs of Lugmoso. Lugmoso’s
sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave.,
remains was brought at La Funeraria Oro. A press release
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr.
made by NKTI announcing a double organ transplant led to the
Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the
findings of the relatives of Lugmoso.
emergency room of EAMC, stated the patient is Angelito
Logmao. Dr. Cabrera reported that Logmao was drowsy with

22

Issue: Whether or not the removal of Lugmoso’s organs were
valid.
Held: Yes. The internal organs of the deceased were removed
only after he had been declared brain dead; thus the emotional
pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot
be in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the court
find evidence or second to show that respondent’s emotional
suffering at the sight of the pitful state in which she found her
son’s lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner’s
conduct.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioners employed
reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to
reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that
remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allotted for notices to
reach the relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son’s
death because the notices did not properly state the name or
identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner’s
door. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the
EAMC, who recorded the wrong information regarding the
deceased’s identity to NKTI. The NKTI could not have obtained
the information about his name from the patient, because as
found by the lower courts, the deceased was already
unconscious by the time he was brought to NKTI.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F.
ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of
one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered
with the local civil register.
Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he
believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the
parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26
February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter
purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez
and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and
Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
23
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied
for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single,
that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States.
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal.
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell
Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings
at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed
a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties
were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified;
and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a
Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
ISSUE 1: W/N MARRIAGE WAS VALID DUE TO LACK OF
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage
are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
(Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a
formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of
said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No
marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of
one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good
faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the
validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;
Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here
that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop
of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her
original action for annulment and subsequently suing for
divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted
the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil
court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
ISSUE 2: W/N THE DIVORCE IS VALID AND
RECOGNIZABLE UNDER OUR JURISDICTION
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject
to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit
absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does
not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation
that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the
wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not
be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy
of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article
17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which
the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil
Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).
ISSUE 3: CAN THE PARENTS BE HELD LIABLE?
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The
law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest
himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of
24
rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However,
such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A
parent is liable for alienation of affections resulting from his
own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son
or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-
habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.
[G.R. No. 119107. March 18, 2005]
JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents.
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the
estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two
parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few
months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz
filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed
that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina
Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the
property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964.
One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent
to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased
to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would
answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay
Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease
contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was
allegedly renewed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started
remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her
estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop
collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself
as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals
from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter,
accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to
sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights
over it.
Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following
reasons why the Court should rule in his favor:
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner
liable for actual damages and attorneys fees, and;
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person
who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in
that provision is known as interference with contractual
relations.[7] The interference is penalized because it violates
the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits
that should result therefrom.[8]
The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of
the subject property, during the supposed existence of private
respondents lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi,
constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner should be
held liable for damages.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9]
laid down the elements of tortuous interference with
contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of
the contract and (c) interference of the third person without
legal justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping
Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his
grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without the
knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation,
prevented from using the premises for its business, sued So
Ping Bun for tortuous interference.
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract
must be duly established. To prove this, private respondent
presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease
renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly notarized,
the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due
execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents.
Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners
counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and
subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented
in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private
respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their
lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear,
strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise
to its execution and delivery.[11]
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be
knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists.
Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential
element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.[12]
A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not
necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be
aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry,
will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations
and rights of the parties in the contract.[14]
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the
lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi)
likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease
contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of
petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own personal
investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious
circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe
deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the
property. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no
indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even
the registry of property had no record of the same.[15]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the
contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him
liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third
element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may
be held liable only when there was no legal justification or
excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference,
the defendant must have acted with malice[17] or must have
been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In
other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.[18]
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of
private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers
to situations where a person causes another to choose one
course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The
records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own
volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence
their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable
25
to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in
purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous
interference was never established.
The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar.
In our view, petitioners purchase of the subject property was
merely an advancement of his financial or economic interests,
absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In
the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court
declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his
conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other
words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make
a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as
there is no malice or bad faith involved.
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to
hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present,
petitioner cannot be made to answer for private respondents
losses.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without
injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage
is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.[22] In
BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,,[23] the
Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder
whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation
after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can
be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In that instance, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone
since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed,
lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery
of damages.[25]
G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner, vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-
LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner
spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (hereinafter referred to
as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14,
1953. To them were born four children, all alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal
home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a
complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as
the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for
them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective
attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement
respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
property.
The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying
their amicable settlement, read as follows:
3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when
petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their conjugal home at
the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and
decided to reside in Manila.
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as
required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines —
the particular terms and conditions of their mutual agreement
being as follows:
(a) There will be separation of property — petitioner Carmen
San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and all claims for a share
in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since
they have acquired no property of any consequence.
(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy such separate estate as they may
acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings from
any profession, business or industry as may be derived by
each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner exclusively.
(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and
Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson
and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and
Ramon shall be awarded to petitioner Carmen San Jose-
Lacson.
(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San
Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of P300.00 for the support of
the children in her custody.
(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of
the children in the custody of the other at their respective
residences and, during the summer months, the two children in
the custody of each petitioner shall be given to the other
except that, for this year's summer months, all four children
shall be delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen San
Jose-Lacson until June 15, 1963 — on which date, she shall
return the two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa to
petitioner Alfonso Lacson — this judgment of course being
subject to enforcement by execution writ and contempt.
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law,"
the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez, presiding) issued an order
on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to
as the compromise judgment) approving and incorporating in
toto their compromise agreement. In compliance with
paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of the
compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse delivered all the
four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for
their support.
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a
motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into and signed
the ... Joint Petition as the only means by which she could
have immediate custody of the ... minor children who are all
below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she "be
considered relieved of the ... agreement pertaining to the
custody and visitation of her minor children ... and that since all
the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her
favor be confirmed pendente lite
After the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the
respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32608-R) wherein she raised, among
others, the issue of validity or legality of the compromise
agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor
children.
We now come to the question of the custody and support of
the children.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI
erred in depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of the
custody of the two older children (both then below the age of
7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence
of its article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from her
child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure." The rationale of this
new provision was explained by the Code Commission thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.
No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by
the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the
child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is
not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery,
the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree
will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her
moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is
as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 12).
The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code,
coupled with the observations made by the Code Commission
in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its
26
mandatory character. It prohibits in no uncertain: terms the
separation of a mother and her child below seven years,
unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons
as determined by a court.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it
awarded custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5
years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to
separate them from their mother. To that extent therefore, it
was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the
Civil Code.
If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the
minor children to the Court for incorporation in the final
judgment, they purposely suppressed the "compelling reasons
for such measure" from appearing in the public records. This is
for the sake and for the welfare of the minor children.".
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's
agreement regarding the custody of the children. 1äwphï1.ñët
Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or
guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his
physical, moral and intellectual development.
It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every
child rights which are not and should not be dependent solely
on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-
so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the
parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in
to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured
the right granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present
evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative.
G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in
accordance with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs
G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
petitioner, Vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was
so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago,
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to
have custody of her husband in consortium.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of
her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally
restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of
property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two
children were using their sick and frail father to sign away
Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by
Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired
as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine
Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his
position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones
controlling the corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the
hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16
Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his
children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to
seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position
that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound
to live together and care for each other. We agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" to enforce consortium.21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses
Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board
since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the
relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution.22
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE
CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on
January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived
together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the
home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint
are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the
plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and
indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and
deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different
parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any
means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the
obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to
live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and
the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each
other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The
wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when
he changes his domicile or residence, except when he
removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged
to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a
fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own
home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his
wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is
the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute?
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is
equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates
a determination of the question whether the wife has a good
and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and,
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in
the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must
also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the
assumption that the power to grant support in a separate
action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the
one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very
nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act
of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the
express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
27
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the
parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not
due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a
debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment
calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with
a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife;
as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife
and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not
an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far
only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving
the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in
any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion
and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is
an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation
with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City.
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the
time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant
started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987,
on which same day he went with her to her hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her
parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention
to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was
good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in
their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that
they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later
returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October,
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until
the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told
her that he could not do so because he was already married to
a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant,
went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer
who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay
tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he
already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing
for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of
16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not
appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she
was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant
and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In
fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise,
she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown
of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at
(sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees
of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.),
and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.).
Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love
affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which
she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her
job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of
good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where
he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City
but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It
is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff,
a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his
lust on her. 11
28
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And
as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly
against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even
gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning,
defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower
court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would
have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report
of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided
in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible
that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are
of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in
with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner
could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the seduction.
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out
of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission
of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in
all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female
sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the
petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty
and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a
woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed,
he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His
was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a
life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his obligations.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X.
VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and
hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse,
complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am
leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why —
That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following
telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
29
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which
acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and
defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned
to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged
against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code
the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-
narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in
a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated
modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to
as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as
natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having
ever promised to marry the complainant.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are
recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since
1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High
School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where
intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to
which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family
way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private
maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24,
1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the
present action, which was commenced on or about October 4,
1954.
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an
obligation to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any
complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private
instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of
the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of
the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one
who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to
reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may
have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the
foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the
Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,
866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money
or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The
Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed
Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change
the law thereon.
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's
seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love
for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the
provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219,
particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the
one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in
said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such
in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which
admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be
— when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy."
HEIRS OF NALA vs CABANSAG
Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses
Eugenio and Felisa, part of a 400-square meter lot registered
in the name of the Gomez spouses.
In October, 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty.
Alexander demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991
until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by
Purisima; failing which, civil and criminal charges will be
brought against him.
This demand letter was followed by another demand letter.
According to Artemio, the demand letter caused him damages
prompting him to file a complaint for damages against Purisima
and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander alleged
that he merely acted in behalf of his client Purisima, who
contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio. Purisima alleged
30
that the lot was part of an 800-sq. meter property owned by her
late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into two parts. The
400-square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by
virtue of a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will
be held in trust by the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and
Purisima) children.
Artemio is only renting the property which he occupies. She
only learned of the deed of sale by the Gomez spouses to
Artemio when the latter filed the case for damages against her
and Atty. Alexander.
The RTC ruled in favour of Artemio and held Atty. Alexander
and Purisima liable for damages, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed. The heirs of Purisima thereafter file a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nala acted in bad faith in sending the
demand letter?
RULING: NO
“Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to injure another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad
faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment
to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral
obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known
duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of
the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove
that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith
or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the
first place, there was ground for Nala’s actions since she
believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio
Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same.
She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion
of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed
the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such
sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the
property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending
of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent
any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice
could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying
to protect their interests over the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del
Prado’s acts were done with the sole intention of prejudicing
and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he
received the demand letters; however, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal
invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm
which results from the injury. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations
are often called damnum absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty.
Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the
necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over
the property occupied by respondent
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.
Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should
be borne solely by him.”
Tanjanco v. CA
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised
her marriage, she consented to his pleas for carnal knowledge.
As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition,
she had to resign from her work. Because she was unable to
support herself and the baby, and the Apolonio refused to
marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly
support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as
contemplated in Art. 21.?
Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or
a breach of promise to marry. It connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this
case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual
relations with the defendant, and such conduct is incompatible
with the idea of seduction. Plainly here there is voluntariness
and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia;
that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name
31
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by
her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?
RULING:
YES.
The use of surname is fixed by law:
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a
voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that
she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the
guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
shall continue using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname
as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the
younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name
or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used
only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
GELUZ vs CA
FACTS:
> Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz).
> She became pregnant by her present husband before they
were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from
her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had
herself aborted by the defendant.
> After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by the defendant.
> Less than two years later, she again became pregnant, she
again repaired to the defendant's clinic.
> It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis
in filing this action and award of damages.
> The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award
of damages upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same?
RULING:
NO. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in
fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person,
does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to
see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received,
no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents
or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on
that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke
the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified
in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any
damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted
directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation
of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally
be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art.
2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
32
should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found
any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because
the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife,
also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority
opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the
appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to
have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes
thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment, was clearly exaggerated.
68. Lauro G. Vizconde vs CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer.
Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses
Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas.
Estrellita purchased from his father, Rafael, a parcel
of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan and then sold such to
Spouses Chiu, for P3,405,612.00. Using a portion of the
proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property, she bought a new
parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF
Homes, Parañaque. The remaining amount of the proceeds
was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a
bank. The following year the unfortunate "Vizconde Massacre"
came about.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. On May 12,
1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud
G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their
legitime should come from the collation of all the properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon
stated that herein petitioner, Mr. Vizconde, is one of Rafael's
children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased
legitimate daughter of Estrellita."
Ramon also alleged that the transfer of the
Valenzuela property in favor of Estrellita by her father was
gratuitous and the subject property in Parañaque which was
purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the
property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita,
is subject to collation.
The Probate Court nullified the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita, and declaring the
Parañaque property as subject to collation, which was
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the order
of the Probate Court
RULING:
NO. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of
collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent
Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
FIRST
The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of
Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of
the Civil Code is clear on this point:
SECOND
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction
when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled
that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned
parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the
true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or
absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate
court's jurisdiction.
THIRD
The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque
property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the
intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We
find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of
Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.
FOURTH
The order of the probate court presupposes that the
Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to
Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque
property was conveyed for and in consideration of
P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael,
the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque
property is not one of Rafael's heirs.Moreover, Rafael, in a
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque
property.
FIFTH
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it
was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than
the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming
that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may still
not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has
long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any
determination by the probate court on the matter serves no
valid and binding purpose.
69. Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo GR No. L-17014, August
11, 1921
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910,
and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short
intervals of separation. On July 4,
defendant Dolores went away from their common home and
decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she
was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the
part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate
maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a
permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving
the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution
of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory
injunction
RULING:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home.
Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated.
The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was
present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to
provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this
recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible,
and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of
the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.
“When people understand that they must live together…they
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they
know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and
wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties
which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within
the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the
case of property rights, such an action may be maintained.
Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as
England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant
absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to
return. She is also not entitled to support.
1920,
70. MARIO J. MENDEZONA ,et al,petitioners, versus JULIO
H. OZAMIZ,et al, respondents
February 6, 2002
Facts:
A suit was instituted on September 25, 1991 by the petitioner
was spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona as
initial plaintiff and in the amended complaint filed on October 7,
33
1991, herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona joined
as co-plaintiff. In their compliant, the petitioners
as plaintiff therein alleged that petitioner spouses Mario J.
Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona and Luis J.
Mendezona and Maricar Mendezona own a parcel of land each
in Lahug, Cebu city with similar areas 3462, 3466 and 3468
square meters covered and described in TCT Nos
116834, 116835 and 116836. The petitioners ultimately traced
their titles of ownership over their respective properties from a
deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by Carmen
Ozamiz and in consideration of P 1,040,000. It appears than
on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for
guardianship with RTC Oroquieta, City alleging that Carmen
Ozamiz had become disoriented and could not recognize most
of her friends and could no longer take care of her properties
by reason pf weak mind and absentmindedness. As guardians
Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August
6, 1991 with the guardianship court their Inventories and
Accounts including the 10,369 square meters Lahug property.
Said Lahug property covered by deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of
petitioners. In their Answer, respondents opposed the claim of
ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles
issued to the petitioners are defective and illegal and the
ownership of said properties was acquired in bad faith and
without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is
grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further
alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already
ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and
that her properties having been placed in administration, she
was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. On
September 23, 1992, the Trial court rendered decision in favor
of petitioners. On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed its
decision and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989
was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove
that the consideration was actually paid.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in ruling that the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contact was not simulated.
Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the appellate court, a
simulated contract cannot be inferred from the mere non
production of checks. It was not the burden of the petitioner to
34
prove so. It is significant that the deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 28, 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged
before a notary public. As such, it is in favor of presumption of
regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution. Moreover, A person is not
incapacitated to contact merely because of advanced years or
by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or
infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent
her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting
her property rights is considered incapacitated.
71. KATIPUNAN VS. KATIPUNAN, JR.
G.R. No. 132415, January 30, 2002
Facts:
Respondent Braulio Katipunan Jr. is the registered
owner of a lot and a five-door apartment constructed thereon,
which were occupied by lessees. Respondent assisted by his
brother petitioner Miguel entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale
with brothers Edardo Balguma and Leopoldo Balguma, Jr. ( co-
petitioners), represented by their lawyer-father involving the
subject property for a consideration of P187,000.00. So, the
title was registered in the names of the Balguma brothers and
they started collecting rentals thereon.
Later, Braulio filed a complaint for annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, contending that his brother Miguel,
Atty. Balguma and Inocencio Valdez ( one of the petitioners)
convinced him to work abroad. Through insidious words and
machinations, they made him sign a document purportedly a
contract of employment, which document turned out to be a
Deed of Absolute Sale. He further alleged that he did not
receive the consideration stated in the contract. He claimed
that there was evident bad faith and conspiracy in taking
advantage of his ignorance, he being only a third grader.
The RTC dismissed the complaint because Braulio
failed to prove his cause of action since he admitted that he
obtained loans from the Balgumas, he signed the Deed of
Absolute Sale, and he acknowledged selling the property and
stopped collecting the rentals. But when the case was
elevated, the decision of RTC was reversed and it was held
that Braulio was incompetent, has very low I.Q., illiterate and
has a slow comprehension. The CA based its decision on
Arts.1332 and 1390 of NCC and Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the Rules
of Court, concerning the incompetence of a party in contract.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid contract of sale between
the parties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit.
There was a vitiated consent on the part of the respondent as

he signed the Deed of Absolute Sale without the remotest idea
of what it was and received no consideration thereof. The
contract entered into by the parties being voidable contract,
was correctly annulled on appeal.
A contract of sale is born from the moment there is a
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price. This meeting of minds speaks of
the intent of the parties in entering the contract respecting the
subject matter and the consideration thereof. Thus, the
elements of a contract of a sale are consent, object, and price
in money or its equivalent. Under Art. 1330 of NCC, consent
may be vitiated by any of the following: mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, and fraud. The presence of any
of these vices renders the contract voidable.
A contract where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent or where consent is vitiated by mistake, fraud,
or intimidation is not void ab initio but only voidable and is
binding upon the parties unless annulled proper court action.
The effect of annulment is to restore the parties to the status
quo ante insofar as legally and equitably possible---this much
is dictated by Art. 1398 provides that when the defect of the
contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the
incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution,
except when he has been benefited by the things or price
received by him. Thus, since the Deed of Absolute Sale
between respondent and Balguma brothers is voidable and
hereby annulled, then the restitution of the property and its
fruits to respondent is just and proper.
72. Santiago v. People
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
SERENO, C.J.:
*Article 34 – Marriage without a marriage license
FACTS:
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang, asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos.
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage, Leonila
G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for
bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit.
Petitioner asserted that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under
the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy,
his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first
wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged
that she had met petitioner on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied
this allegation and averred that she met Galang only or after
she had already married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner
married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was
35
denied. On appeal, the CA gave more weight to the
prosecution witnesses' narration.
ISSUE:
Is the second marriage of Santiago valid, for there to be a
conviction for bigamy?
RULING:
YES. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner and
Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of
this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of
Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption
from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have
actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to the celebration of their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of
this fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted
an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago,
contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they
were eligible to contract marriage without a license. Petitioner
now seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license
despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no
less than her marriage contract.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner
married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under
Article 34 of the Family Code. It will be the height of absurdity
for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape
criminal conviction.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State." It must be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In
keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court
affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
73. Anonuevo vs. Jalandoni
FACTS:
Rodolfo Jalandoni died. His brother filed at the RTC a petition
for Issuance of Letters of Administration for the property of
Rodolfo.
The petitioners intervened and said that their mother, Sylvia,
was the daughter of Isabel and John. Isabel who, at the time of
Rodolfo’s death, was actually legally married to the deceased
and is therefore entitled to a share in the latter’s property. The
proof of which is based on a marriage certificate between
Isabel and Rodolfo.
Both Sylvia and Isabel are dead at the time of the
manifestation. The petitioners pray that they may be allowed to
intervene on behalf of Isabel.
Rodolfo’s brother opposed their intervention because the birth
certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were married.
Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo was null and void.
Petitioners argue, however, that such statement in the birth
certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage
between Isabel and John. Further, it was only done to save
face and is customary.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have legal standing to intervene in the
proceedings?
RULING:
No, they do not have standing to intervene.
The Birth Certificate of Sylvia, which shows that she and John
were married, is sufficient proof that indeed they were married.
Although there were no marriage certificates given as proof, it
is not considered as the sole source of evidence marriage.
Sylvia’s birth certificate hold prima facie weight and the
petitioners showed no contrary evidence. The reason of ‘face
saving / customary’ holds no merit and the courts cannot take
judicial notice of a folkway.
Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at
the time of the marriage, Isabel was still married to John.
Thus, the descendants of Isabel have no share in the Estate of
Rodolfo.
74. Salgado vs. Anson
Sps. Salgado v. Luis Anson
GR 204494
Facts:
Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson.
They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa and she was wed to Gaston
Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous
relationship, Jo ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard
Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real properties
and according to him, since there was no marriage settlement,
the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without
his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral
Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann.
When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-
Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating
herself as the sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed a
complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps
Salgado and Sps Maya. The latter countered that they were
not aware of any marriage between Luis and their mother
Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple
and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and
married one Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that
divided their properties without court intervention, both Sps
claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive
properties of Severina.
Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is
valid and the subject lands as conjugal partnership
Ruling:
Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack
of marriage license. Luis asserted that their marriage was an
exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage
license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The
Partition agreement is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held
that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148
as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also, attesting that his
marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly
contracted to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court
finds such suspicious and fraudulent thereby tainting his
credibility.
75. Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil 252)
TRENT, J.:
Facts:
The parties were legally and immediately thereafter
established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where
they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
36
returned to the home of her parents.The defendant, one month
after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded
of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands
of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date
had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd
and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by wordand deed
and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of
her body; and that, asthe plaintiff was unable by any means to
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.This is an action by the wife against her husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile. It was urged in the
first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot
becompelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce
or separation from the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband be compelled to pay the pension
outside of the conjugal domicile?
Ruling:
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the
manner and with the solemnities established by General
Orders No. 68; in so far as its civil effects are concerned
requiring the consent of the parties. To this extent a marriage
partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is
something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law
whichdefines and prescribes those rights, duties, and
obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation
for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period
by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights
arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as
the law determines from time to time, and none other. When
the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the
state or government upon principlesof public policy for the
benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of
a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable
to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
76. Navarro vs. Damagtoy (259 SCRA 129)
July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa,
Surigaodel Norte filed this case to the Supreme Court against
respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency and ignorance of the law.
First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy
solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorja
despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated
from his wife. Second, he performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October
1994 at respondent judge’s residence in Dapa, SDN. As to the
first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit
issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that
Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost
seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage
contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil
status was “separated”.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage
of a husband who was merely separated from his wife for
almost seven years.
(2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his
residence.
HELD:
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides
that a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code
for the declaration of presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains to be married to Peñaranda. Wittingly
or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joind affidavit submitted by
Tagadan. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in
a bigamous and therefore void marriage.
(2) Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction xxx . Article 8, however, states that marriages shall
be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and
not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of
the Family Code, or where both parties in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge is the “authority of the solemnizing
officer”. Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
37
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction
may officiate in marriages only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for
demonstrating gross ignorance of the law.copies of the
certificates not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the
marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his
file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate.
There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. However, the records show that the loss
was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge’s part.
Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his
marriage to respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void on
the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed
respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which
point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started
dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that
he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to
be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity.
RULINGS:
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of
the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret
the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case
basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of
church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality
disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem
and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others' comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had
a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and
had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has
been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from
psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to
perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the
Court declared the marriage null and void.
LUIS UY v. SPS. JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA
Facts:
Uy filed with RTC Batangas a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against
Petra Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana. Uy alleged that he was the
lawful husband of Rosca, living together as husband and wife
from 1944 and 1973 (29 years) when they separated (because
of Uy’s alleged affair.)
Subject of this case is a piece of residential land
Rosca Bought form Sps. Manuel. This property, together with
the house of Rosca built was then subsequently sold to Sps.
Lacsamana. Uy allege that the property is part of the sale of
Rosca to Sps. Lacsamana was void for failure to obtain his
marital consent, the property being conjugal in nature. Uy then
filed a complaint, praying that the Deed of Sale (executed by
Rosca in favor of Sps. Lacsamana) be declared null and void
with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership and
damages. Upon Uy’s death, 2 daughters substituted. Upon
Rosca’s death and Sps. Lacsmana’s sale of the property to
Buena, Buena substituted. RTC: no valid marriage between Uy
and Rosca, Deed of Sale by Rosca in favor of Lacsamana was
valid; CA – affirmed RTC;
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone,
without Uy’s consent in favor of Sps. Lacsamana is valid.
Held:
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the
sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy
and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption
established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the
marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own
personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal
office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the
findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single
relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On
the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and
Rosca were not legally married to each other.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca
cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony
revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs.
Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in
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apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca
shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy
to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional
proof to show that they were legally married. He, however,
dismally failed to do so.
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was
legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies
when a couple living together were not incapacitated from
getting married. Uy did not present any proof to show that
Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale. Neither
did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or
testimonial, showing the fair market value of the property at the
time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was
unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned
by the appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on
April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth millions of
pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.
Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,
married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita
Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and
Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat,
with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia
and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in
1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage. The
children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second
marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of
Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and
grandchildren of the second marriage were illegitimate.
ISSUE:
W/N the children and grandchildren of the second
marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling them for the
partition of lands
HELD:
Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony
cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take
place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place
a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are
presumed married.
Presumption, thus: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true,
might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from
previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court
and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the
matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why
she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido
only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during
the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they)
got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar."
Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
Vda dela rosa vs heirs of Vda de damian
Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate
and without descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two
years. Petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The petition
for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to petitioners,
sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa.
Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as husband and
wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her
as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one
Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of
marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio
who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate.
But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was
admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status
of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because if
Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by
the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between
Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon.
Held:
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx (aa)
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof
that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport
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issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of
no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein
was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their
position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had
"lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but
strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It
was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried
("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in
its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage
of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage
are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of
things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation
of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the
law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage,
can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to
the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage
of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and
Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and
(2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"
(the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage.
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Manuel Reyes vs CA
Facts:
On Jan. 3, 1992. Torcuato Reyes executed his last
will and testament. He bequeathed all his prop to his wife
Asuncion (oning) and his brother Jose. The will consisted of
two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence
of three witnesses: Antonio Veleso, Gloria Borromeo, and
Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares. PR filed
a petition for probate of the will. The recognized natural
children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape
filed an opposition. The court declared that the will never
married to the deceased ( Hence, dospo made in will is
invalid). Julio Vivares filed an appeals before the CA with the
allegation that the oppositors failed to present ay comp.
evidence that Asuncion was legally married to another person.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but with the
modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the will was valid
Held:
As a general rule, Courts in probate proceedings are
limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due
execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge
the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic
validity is not proved and allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first
determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its
face and the probate of the will may become a useless
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a
will may be passed upon because “ practical consideration”
demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality.
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The Lower court was
not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provsions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator
that Asuncion “oning” Reyes was his wife did not have to be
scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of
the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devises/legatees
already involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which
need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno
vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In
the case aforesaid, the testator himself, acknowledged his illicit
relationship with the devisee, to wit: Art. IV. That since 1952, I
have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my
love an [sic] affection, for all the things which she has done for
me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has
with my full knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent
myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in
the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing of the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage. To remand the case would only be a waste of
time and money since the illegality or defect was already
patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case.
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was
bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his
wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an open
admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of
Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already
previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship
with the devisee.
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
Facts:
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This case involves a contest between two women
both claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11
November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
(Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a
marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar,
the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II.
Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his
family in 1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to
another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In
support of her claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the
ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates
to the fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the
legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September
1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979
and showed the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio.
Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over
the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a
presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot
four children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of
the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife
of Eustaquio?
RULING:
TECLA, While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without
the marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted. The
execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw
and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those
to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the
eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the
officiating priest. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. The starting
point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
GO-BANGAYAN vs BANGAYAN (2013)
FACTS:
> Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. Azucena left
for the United States of America. Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. In order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
> During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired some
real properties.
> The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when
Sally left for Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also
asked the trial court for the partition of the properties.
> Trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial court ruled
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
RULING:
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973
was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, the
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,
testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros further testified that the local civil
registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-
07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin
and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
It was also established before the trial court that the purported
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was
no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by
the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was
made only in jest" and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of
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Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In
short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that
Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which
stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982
while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which
also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982. Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the
birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and
that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which
are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void
from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-
existent.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the
concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage
is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage
shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being
no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license,
the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara
[CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under
Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not
bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring
and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that
her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the
same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and
Azucena.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations
of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions
Nollora v. People
FACTS:
Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage
was still subsisting when he contracted a 2nd marriage with
Rowena Geraldino, who is herself aware of his marriage with
Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage with him.
ISSUE:
W/N the 2nd marriage is bigamous and null and void ab initio?
HELD:
Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and
pursuant to Art 35 of the Family Code, it is void ab initio.
Nollora’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his
marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC
ruled that his two marriages were not conducted according to
the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be
used as a defense.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS vs PEOPLE
FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert,
in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman
Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two
wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio
(Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a
divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was
confirmedy the Shari'a Circuit District Court, which issued a
Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she
had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman,
Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her
subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked,
under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in
order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and
Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony
before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union
between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between
Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de
facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor
children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the
children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights
thereto.
42
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a
flurry of cases against Zamoranos including a petition for
annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and
disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City
Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a
resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos
liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy
was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De
Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?
HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the
ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous
marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final
and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'a
Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the
case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the
categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another
Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic
law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos'
divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in
authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident
that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature,
consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed
by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal
cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim,
and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law.
This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos'
Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the
accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one
still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the
proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a
Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been
dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the
Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and]
the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular
criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the
purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on
Muslim Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally
state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as
other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De
Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the
Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
MORIGO vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for
4 years, after which they lost contact with each other. They
reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts when
Lucia was in Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986.
They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went
back to Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed for divorce in
Canada which was granted by the court to take effect on Feb
17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was charged
with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his
conviction. He should not be faulted for relying in good faith
upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG
counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith in
relying on the divorce decree is negated by his act of filing a
petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether
his defense of good faith is valid.
HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has
not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he
contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void
ab initio, in accordance with the Family Code. What transpired
was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete.
Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith
or lack of criminal intent is now moot and academic.
CAPILI vs PEOPLE
In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But
then, just three months later in December 1999, he married
another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of
the second marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004,
Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
43
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action
filed by Karla Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with
Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage
between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to
dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the second
marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage
never took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to
speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy
case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second
marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy?
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are
present. The crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is
already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see
Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The
outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing
to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy
case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason
to believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply
contract a second marriage without having such first marriage
be judicially declared as void. The parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
VICTORIA S. JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164435, 29 September 2009, THIRD DIVISION
(Peralta, J.)
DOCTRINE:
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS:
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were
married in a civil wedding ceremony in Taguig, Rizal in 1974.
Both newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a
church ceremony, in 1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out
of the union, the spouses bore a daughter. Jarillo, however,
contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy celebrated through a civil ceremony. Thereafter,
Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church wedding in
Manila. In 1999, Uy filed a civil case for annulment against
Jarillo. On the basis of the foregoing, Jarillo was charged with
Bigamy before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in
2000. The trial court rendered the assailed decision, holding
Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
Jarillo posits, as defenses, that her marriage to
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still
married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, that her marriages to Alocillo and
Uy were both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and
that the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed the ruling of
the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a
civil case against Alocillo rendered judgement declaring
Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her
motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the trial court
as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. In a Resolution
by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
W/N the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy is right
despite the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had
been declared void.
HELD:
No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in
the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is
presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into
a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS. G.R. No. 198780; October 16, 2013.
FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen,
and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer,
alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never really
had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial
brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined
that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00
because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking.
ISSUE: Is a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
HELD: In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
44
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married.This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted
from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule
on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could
not be avoided erely because the marriage was entered into
for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage
was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A reely given consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal. GRANTED.
ARANES VS OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
Gross Ignorance of Law
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding
Judge of the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
alleges that respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her
late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations
which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner

HELD:
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge
is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act
of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara, the Court held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
BLAZA V REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 158298, AUGUST 11, 2010
Doctrine: It is clarified, however, that the absence of a
provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed
as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos
v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to
be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper
interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in
an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner
alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such
license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him
a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,
could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner is
not a party to the marriage. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil
Code. YES if he is a real party-in-interest.
RULES:
The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence,
the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force
at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed
by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the
issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-
10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took
effect on March 15, 2003.
45
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solelyby the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined
only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from
the limitation, to wit:
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity
date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2) Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of
the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
HELD:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable
law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity
of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and
when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the children were
allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license.
Salas vs. Aguila
Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr.
and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave birth to
their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left
their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
communicated with Aguila or their child.
On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no
conjugal properties whatsoever”.
On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further
provides the dissolution of their conjugal property, if any.
On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and
motion stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to
Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the
Discovered Properties in consideration of other properties
waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper
instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired
during the marriage of Salas and Aguila, thus a conjugal
property and subject for partition between them.
Ruling: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties
were acquired by Salas during the validity of their marriage.
The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner, Salas.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property
regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint
efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.
Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the
basis of co-ownership.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was
under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of
pride he married defendant-appellee; Wife
claimed that she suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties
were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Noel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically
Incapacitated.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded by reason
of the performance or non-performance
of marital obligations.
HELD: No. Moral and Exemplary damages are deleted.
RATIO:
The acts or omissions of petitioner constitute psychological
incapacity. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of
psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the
party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated,
not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice
by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the
regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in
the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for
declaration of nullity ofmarriage with the regional trial court
alleging that his marriage with respondent wasnull and void
due to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license.
46
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as
“bar by priorjudgment” or “estoppels by verdict,” which is
the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res
judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the
rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly
concealed the validity of their marriagecelebration, petitioner is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court
finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of
respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect
of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19,
2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity
of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for
Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously
set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions
were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of
Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and
too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously toenable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead,
every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that
no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
 In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed
with expertise in the field of psychology, must of
necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of
evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a
physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological
incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If
other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid
for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative
and without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to
psychological and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial
court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses
while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial
judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should
be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to
give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value
as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s
factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages,
for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the
courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect
of parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing
should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant
should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital
47
vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her
children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that
would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young
children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children
with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to
expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing
her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of
her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for
her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract.
After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded
to the house of the Chi Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept
together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of
their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night
of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other,
Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then
turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them that night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with
Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by
her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them
for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a
long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking
chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15,
1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did
not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that
Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s
examination was kept confidential up to this time.
Then Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had
observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only
married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in
the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man.
Chi’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina.
He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1)
that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his
part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chi is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage
entered into by Chi and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of
a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse,
although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is “to procreate children basedon the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and
fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed,
no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is
to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation
of family relations.
SANTOS VS. CA
FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on
September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S to
work as a nurse. She only called up Leouel seven months after
she left with promise to return after her contract expires on July
1989. She didn’t come back. Leouel had a military training in
the US and he looked for Julia but he never found her. In 1991,
Leoul filed a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article
36 of FC.
ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years
constitute psychological incapacity?
48
HELD: NO. Dismissed.
RATIO:
SC defined psychological incapacity as to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
For psychological incapacity to be proven, there must be a real
inability to commit oneself to the essential obligations of
marriage. Mere difficulty of assuming these obligations which
could be overcome by normal effort does not constitute
incapacity.
Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal gave 3
characteristics of psychological incapacity:
1.gravity that would really render one incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties in marriage
2. juridical antecedence means it should be rooted in history,
existing prior to the marriage
3. incurability including cure that is beyond the party’s means.
Circumstances of the case at bar do not amount to
psychological incapacity.
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April
1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early
stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend
time with his friends and squandering his money with them,
from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a
week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than
three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of
two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should
be construed as psychological incapacity
HELD:
 The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil
Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application
of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and
holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the
marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present
case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time
of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must
be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same
code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation
made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
VILLANUEVA VS CA
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in
Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the
marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress
forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving
phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the
service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to
threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by
claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he
now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the
marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage
and she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care
towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in
the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and
intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is
only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the
49
pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be
dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear
was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that
there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to
be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done
against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who
is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so
described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate
him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a
ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection
during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright
lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to
attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an
action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage.
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and
subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A child was
born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no
longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over
him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage
that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with
Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus
declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that
the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish
Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and,
generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on
the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of
the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects
as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to
live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in
proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before
she married him prove that her psychological incapacity was
have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her
unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the
Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio
tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.

MARCOS VS MARCOS

FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and

they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null
and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the
Court of Appeals

ISSUES:

1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of

the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case
show psychological incapacity.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity

of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition since qua non for such declaration.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects”
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.

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