184 SCRA 220

G.R. No.L-63630 6 Apr 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO,

defendant-appellant.

Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

Facts: In the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting
surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel
Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and
there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The trial court found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue: Whether or not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Held: No, 1rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant arrest a
person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be
therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency
on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling
the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there
was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging six years and one day to twelve years
and a fine of six thousand pesos.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, CJ., Chairman, Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Judgment AFFIRMED but MODIFIED.

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 195 SCRA 388

G.R. No. 93239 18 Mar 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.

Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of the accused
and he was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was
monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times and these activities are reported through radio
to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as
Ronnie Macabante,from that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept, Macabante was intercepted at
Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a
tea bag of marijuana on the ground, though Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front
of the chapel the police team intercepted and arrested Sucro at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag
from Macabante.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Held: 1) YES, Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute 1Rule 126,
Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
2) YES, 2The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However,
warrantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of
the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are
regularly in performance of their duties.

Premises considered, this court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the
offense charged. The trial court’s decision must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, CJ., Chaiman, Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed.

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Pg. 396
 206 SCRA 138

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,vs. The COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. BENJAMIN

V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.; and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Feliciano, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle and he got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness
of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who
subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in
the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him, and subsequently a criminal charge
was brought against him. He posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his
right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken
and files for a preliminary investigation.
Issue:
1) Whether or not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
2) Whether or not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held: 1) YES, 1Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however
constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was
no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not
actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding
petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

2)YES, Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the
prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor
made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal
charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct
preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary
investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of one
hundred thousand pesos. This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court
may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion
of preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to cost. This decision is immediately executor.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, CJ., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., Join the dissent of Justice Aquino.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur but am adding few remarks.
Cruz, J., see separate concurrence.
Padilla and Davide, Jr., JJ., Join Mme. Justice Aquino in her dissenting opinion.
Grino-Aquino, J., Please see my separate dissenting opinion.
Regalado, J., I join Justice Aquino in her dissent.

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 75 Phil. 612
G.R. No. L-22 December 20, 1945

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. BENIDICTO JOSE y SANTOS,
defendant-appellee.

Feria, J.:
Facts: Benidicto Jose was convicted on April 19, 1944, for a violation of Sec. 3 (b) and 2 (b) of the act
no. 65 of the National assembly and the court sentenced the accused to 10 years of imprisonment. After
serving about six months of his sentenced the accused was granted a conditional pardon on October 15,
1944 by the President of the Philippines. On condition is that he should not again violate any Penal laws
and he duly accepted it. On prior to April 5, 1945, the said accused committed a crime of qualified theft
by violating the conditional pardon that was given to him by the President of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the conditional pardon given to the accused are valid under so-called Republic of
the Philippines.
Held: 1NO, the conditional pardon was granted by the President of the Philippines are null and void and
without legal affect with the rule of the Japanese army in our political power. But the court has the power
to uphold the criminals who violates the law of the land. In this case a conditional pardon has the effect of
suspending the enforcement of the sentence, or exempting the accused from serving unexpired portion of
the penalty, if the culprit does not violate the conditions of under which pardon was granted. But the
sentence is still valid. It was confirmed in Art 36 of the RPC which provides the pardon shall in no case
exempt the culprit from the payment of civil indemnities imposed upon him by the sentence. 2The
punitive sentence had not therefore, become null and void before the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government by the pardon, but only upon restoration of said government by virtue of the right of
postliniminium. Consequently, if a culprit violates the condition of pardon, this is resolved or set aside by
the court. But if the said sentence is no longer good and valid and cannot be enforced, the accused cannot
be criminally prosecuted for the violation of conditional pardon.

For the foregoing reasons, the resolution appealed is affirmed, without costs. SO ORDERED.

Moran, CJ., Jarantilla, De Joya, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

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2
Pg.621
 80 Phil. 43

G.R. No. L-1809 January 23, 1948

NARCISO ALVAREZ y CORTES, petitioner vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.

Feria, J.:
Facts: The accused Narciso Alvarez while serving his sentence of reclusion perpetua for the crime of
murder, he was escaped from prison on October 15, 1945, and for said evasion he was prosecuted and
sentenced of March 22, 1946, by the Court of First Instance, to three years and six months and twenty
days of prision coreccional. That on April 8, 1946, the petitioner again escaped and evaded his sentenced
and for his second evasion, he was sentenced on August 20, 1946, to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional. And that on May 24, 1946 the accused was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearm was convicted and sentenced by the CIF Manila, to six months of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of three hundred pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The accused will serve total
of six years, four months and twenty one days of imprisonment in New Bilibid Prison, commencing with
the date of his pardon of the crime of murder.
Issue: Whether or not he has to serve the said two sentences committed by the accused

Held: YES, 1The penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of sentence have not been
affected by the absolute pardon granted to him remitting the un-served penalty to which he was finally
sentenced for the crime of murder; because petitioner was convicted of evasions of sentence before the
pardon and while he was serving said sentence of conviction of murder, which was then in full force.
Petition therefore is denied. SO ORDERED.

Moran, CJ., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuazon, JJ., concur.

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 40 Phil. 385
G.R. No. 14476 November 6, 1919

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant and appellant.

Street, J.:
Facts: On June 6, 1916, Jose Baluyot a Governor candidate at that time accused by one his competitors
Conrando Lerma, Governor of said province of Bataan, due to his personal rancor was developed in mind
of Baluyot and became fully imbued with the idea that Governor Lerma persecuting him. In year 1918
Baluyot committed estafa connection loan of money which had been negotiated at the Philippine National
Bank. But the decision was imminent by the judge, and with the organization of National Guard, Baluyot
became a captain in that body, but his reputation was damage due to his estafa case and he leaves the
organization. August 2, 1918, the defendant went to Orion, Bataan taking with him a revolver, on August
3, 1918, he shipped to manila to Orion a piano belonging to his wife, at 8 am, went to Balanga to inquired
for Governor Lerma, upon his arriving the Governor is not there yet in his office on sometime between 11
am, Governor Lerma arrived and they greeted each other for an interview in his office, for a about 5
minutes and Governor said to the accused to confer with Antonino Aranjuez, another caller, the accused
went outside to give way to the Antonino Aranjuez, for about minute passed Aranjuez went outside and
the accused entered the office again. Baluyot approached the desk of the Governor, he spoke certain
words which were heard by other witnesses, immediately upon asking the governor his revolver,
discovering that the Governor was unarmed and then Baluyot drew his revolver and fired.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of attacking upon a person in authority

Held: YES, 1In this case the accused is convicted with two crimes, that the homicide is to be
characterized as murder attempt and that, an attack was in the same act made upon in person in authority
while exercising his duties of his office, as charged in the complaint, since the deceased was, as an
provincial governor, an authority in person within the meaning of Art 249 of the Penal Code. This cause
has been brought to the Supreme Court upon an appeal prosecuted by Jose I. Baluyot from a judgment of
the CFI of the Province of Bataan, convicting him of the crime of murder, committed August 3, 1918 to
the person of Conrado Lerma, Governor of said province, and sentencing him to undergo death penalty,
but the Justices of the court is not imposition of death penalty. Because conformity with the requirement
of Act No. 2726 of the Philippine Legislature. The court decides it should be reduced from death to
cadena penalty with the accessory penalties prescribed in Art 54 of the Penal Code. As thus modified the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.

Arrellano, CJ., Torres, Johnson, and Avancena, JJ., concur.

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