Response to Keith Swanwick

Author(s): Thomas A. Regelski

Source: Philosophy of Music Education Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 10-13
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25666161
Accessed: 23-02-2016 14:17 UTC

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 PHILOSOPHYOF MUSIC EDUCATIONNEWSLETTER

Music Curriculum Development and the Concept of Features

by

Keith Swanwick

When music is abstracted from everyday life in schools and colleges, decisions are made as towhat
music is included or excluded and how teaching and learning is to be managed. Through the selection of
subj ect content and the organization of the learning environment-the processes of classification and framing
schools and colleges are themakers and guardians of knowledge boundaries.

The formulation ofmusical "concepts" inmusic curriculum design is part of this boundary making
activity. Concepts inmusic
usually turn out to be either parcels of information (knowing that), or they are
the specification of skills (knowing how). If aesthetic experience is essentially our intuitive perception of
the unique in a totality, (knowing this) as Croce would assert, then identifying concepts may be in conflict
with the aims of aesthetic education. Students may come to imagine that this iswhat music is all about and
teachers might tend towork to concepts, looking formusic which exemplifies them rather than attending to
music intuitively and holistically.

To refrain from the reduction ofmusic to generalizations but to avoid also the charge of aimlessness
in teaching, I propose substituting for the notion of concept the idea of "feature," which is a distinctive and
distinguishing element. A concept draws attention towhat is commonplace; a feature strikes us with what
is unique in its context. Features can be found on three different levels ofmusical response: the use of sound
materials; expressive characterization; structure. It is this attention to the particularity of music that
distinguishes thework of good music teachers.

Keith Swanwick isProfessor and Chair of theMusic Department at the Institute of Education, University
of London.

Response to Keith Swanwick

by

Thomas A. Regelski

Professor Swanwick approvingly quotes Christopher Small that "the syllabus narrows the student's
vision at the edges of knowledge and cuts him [sic] off from precisely those fuzzy areas at the edges of

subjects that are themost interesting." This neutralizing of musical experience through institutionalizing
curricular boundaries need not be the case. That there is always more to teach than time or means to teach
it does not necessarily dictate that fuzzy, interesting knowledge be left out.

The major issue is axiological: "Of all that could be taught, what is most worth teaching?" My
answer follows the pragmatic criterion: Promote the knowledge and skills that have the greatest likelihood
of providing an active lifelong involvement with music that is enriching and rewarding in a way and to a
degree thatwould not otherwise be possible without formal instruction. This is not so much a matter of

teaching what is good music but of teaching what music is good for.

The problem, then, is to determine, then tomodel (i.e., teach in terms of actions) why music exists,
and how it tangibly benefits humanity, especially the individual. Thus ifwe are going to teach "it" and need
to decide what "music" is most worth including, we need a working ontology that is explicit as to what
"music" IS. What, for example, "is" Beethoven's Fifth Symphony? Is "it" the score, a given performance,
the phenomenological experience of such a labeled aural event by given listener on a given occasion, or
a
an ideal instantiation that includes all three dimensions and thus results in a "musical work" that varies

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 PHILOSOPHYOF MUSIC EDUCATIONNEWSLETTER

according to the instance?

According to Professor Swanwick's characterization, each possibility has its implications for
decisions involving weak or strong classification and the degree of framing exerted by the teacher. A
teacher's tacit assumption thatmusic is "in" or "is" the score, for example, can lead to a preoccupation with:
(a) teaching music reading; (b) score analysis and study, particularly of scores that have been thereby
identified as manifestations of "the Good and the Beautiful"; (c) a hierarchy ofmusics rather than a search
for relative standard of value within certain styles and types of musical idiom; (d) an absolute and
unchanging conception of what a score conveys that results in teaching "the correct performance" of that
score; (e) Perenialist conceptions of musical value that teach only the traditional repertoire; and (f) a
Reconstructionist approach that promotes "good taste."

An assumption by a teacher thatmusic is "in" or "is" the performance can dictate an emphasis on:

(a) rote-imitative-observational learning of certain current fashions and paradigms of performance, or on

teaching how the teacher has learned to play a given piece; (b) teaching for technical virtuosity-a practice
that leaves unanswered the question a saxophone lesson and a music lesson; (c)
of the difference between
high standards of performance as themain vehicle
of, or as the equivalent of a quality musical education;
(d) an elitism that advances the needs of the select few; (e) merely "covering" a repertoire of presumedly
"good" music; and (f) putting ensemble performers in the position of being mindless functionaries of the
conductor's musicianship and musicality.

Finally, the assumption that music is "in" the ear of the listener can direct instruction to: (a)
relativistic conceptions of value that all but eliminate any need for a formal education inmusic perception
and understanding; (b) general music classes that stress subjective listening responses, to the detriment of
developing skills for recreational performance or in composition; (c) child-centered (child-dictated) rather
than action-focused (pragmatic) choices of curricular content. And, itmust be noted that the tacit philosophy
(theory) of music that the learner holds-all the more so the older the listener-has important tangible
implications for the pragmatic implementation of curricular classification and framing decisions by teachers.

Swanwick's discussion of classification and framing, and of musical features, then, is useful in

helping curriculum writers to clarify exactly these kinds of issues. In addition, I would stress that all
curricular decisions ultimately amount to philosophical theories what
of, first, music "is," secondly, how
it comes into being and, finally, why it exists-which is to say, what value it can contribute to the individual
and thuswhy it should be included in general education. Therefore, these issues must be addressed before
curricular decisions of classification and framing can be made intelligently. Classification and framing
decisions, made systematically with cognizance of relevant philosophical considerations, amount to an
articulated philosophy of music, and thus should be at the center ofmusic teaching and teacher preparation
since such decisions are at the heart of themusic curriculum.

Unfortunately, this standard is contrary to the currently popular narrow focus in teacher training on
"method." I know of no "method" that does not beg the question (petitio principii) concerning such
philosophical issues. Thus all name-brand "methods" promulgate the how of teaching music before explicitly
clarifying the questions of what is worth learning and why. For example, the pedagogical necessity of
teaching musical concepts is taken for granted by such methods and is reified in curricular planning
predicated on the existence, and therefore the presumed value of teaching the so-called "elements ofmusic."
As Swanwick notes, I have inveighed against this elsewhere.1 Let me stress here that the atomistic
reductionist approach to teaching musical concepts that dominates the profession today amounts to a tacit
philosophy ofmusic thatwarrants serious philosophical criticism. The philosophical literature simply does
not point strongly towards such a theory ofmusical ontology or epistemology.

Critical analysis of the taken-for-granted conceptual approach to the so-called "elements ofmusic"
is also needed because virtually all psychological research inmusic and music education seems to be

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 PHILOSOPHYOF MUSIC EDUCATIONNEWSLETTER

predicated on this same tacit philosophy ofmusic. This may account for the oft-cited problem of translating
research into practice: if the research begs the question of what music "is," itwill be difficult to bring such
results to bear on psychological researchers in music education, including those working in so-called
"empirical aesthetics."

Concept-teaching also brings about a need for philosophical clarification of the nature of
"experience." The research literature and methods texts of contemporary music education refer repeatedly
to using "experience" to teach concepts, to "experiencing" concepts, tomusic "experience" and the like.
Such vague and superficial thinking is usually philosophically naive, often fatuous, and always misleading
and pernicious in its consequences for practice. In opposition to this, for example, we would profit from

studying John Dewey's distinction between "an experience," which involves conscious awareness of and
therefore intentionality towards goals and desired ends, and "to experience," which is passive and something
thathappens to an individual with no similar teleological considerations. Similarly, we need to acknowledge
the distinction made in philosophy between an action, as intentional and goal oriented, and mere behavior
("activity"), which in comparison is passive. This difference between "action" and "activity" has ledme to
characterize concept-teaching as "the Pied Piper Approach" in comparison to "Action Learning" which made
the student's musical intentionality the criterion ofmusical experience.2 Professor Swanwick's analysis of
musical knowing, as illustrated in his "elements ofmusical experience," is exactly the kind of attention to
this issue that is needed, and makes a valuable contribution to an improved understanding of the
epistemology of music.

His delineation that stresses "features" as individualizing and particularizing, rather than "concepts"
which are generalizing and commonplace abstractions, is an approach to curriculum that points tomore
productive directions with regard to the literature of the philosophy of music. Similarly, his taxonomy of
musical development reflects an equally explicit analysis of musical experience per se. However, to the
a
degree that "feature" comes to be misunderstood as just a synonym for an attensive quality (by whatever
name) that is presumed to exist objectively and absolutely "in" themusic, the problem still remains ofwhat
and where "is" themusical work or aesthetic object inwhich the "feature" is purportedly to be found.

According to the so-called "Blueberry Bush Fallacy" in the philosophy of science (unfortunately
succumbed to by most music research) "facts" are just "out there" in objective form ready and waiting to be
discovered and picked. The parallel inmusic assumes thatmusical "features" are "out there," "in" the
"music" in some absolute fashion, waiting to be discovered and perceived. Contrary to this discredited
"copy" or "correspondence" theory of perception, contemporary Cognitive Psychology, action theory in
philosophy and the social sciences, and various schools of psychological and philosophical phenomenology
consider that attensivity in the perception of "features" (as percepts) is influenced by intentionality and
therefore that perception is actively constructive rather than passivelyreceptive. Thus perceptual variation
is constituted between individuals and occasions with regard to, inmusic, the "same" acoustic properties.

Professor Swanwick's curricular orientation draws heavily on the actions of problem solving and
decision making by students. Ultimate outcomes are seen in terms ofmeta-cognitions concerning the value
of music-what it is good for. According to Swanwick, these meta-cognitions are realized at the individual
level (or, as Dewey described the process, are "psychologized"). In such respects Swanwick's thinking is
clearly rooted in the contemporary paradigms of Cognitive Psychology. At the same time, however, his
consideration of curriculum in terms of a philosophical analysis of music and his reliance on the cognitive
vogue are both out-of-step with predominant teaching theory and practice, at least in this country at the
present moment.

This the usefulness of his contribution to this Symposium. His analysis is at the leading
is precisely
edge of thinking music education today and is a model of precisely the kind of philosophical
in examination
of curriculum building that is rooted in carefully considered philosophy ofmusic-one that he articulates in

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 PHILOSOPHYOF MUSIC EDUCATIONNEWSLETTER

much greater depth in his recent book Music, Mind, and Education?

Professor Swanwick has provided the valuable service of demonstrating that doing curriculum, then
teaching with it, is doing philosophy\ In addition to its practical virtues, such articulate philosophical

investigation can be expected to inspire further valuable theoretical thinking.4 However, in general our
profession is insufficiently prepared at present to apply systematically the fruits of such philosophical
discourse and discipline to the praxis ofmusic education or to the psychological research needed to support
that praxis. I hope this conference is the first step towards improving awareness of the pragmatic importance
of philosophy to teaching and research. This conclusion is reinforced by thewisdom of the aphorism that
"Nothing is so practical as a good theory."

NOTES
1. T. A. Regelski, "Concept-Learning and Action Learning inMusic Education," British Journal ofMusic
Education, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1986); 185.

2 T. A. Regelski, "Action Learning versus the Pied Piper Approach," Music Educators Journal, Vol. 69, No.
8 (1983); 55.
3. New York: Routledge, 1988.

4. For such a critical extension of the specific ontological, epistemological and axiological dimensions of
Swanwick's philosophy and curricular recommendations, see the Book Review byWayne D. Bowman of
"Music, Mind, and Education," Philosophy ofMusic Education Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1990); 5.

Thomas A. Regelski isDistinguished Teaching Professor ofMusic Education at SUNY-Fredonia.

BOOK REVIEW

Harold E. Fiske. Music and Mind: Philosophical Essays on theCognition andMeaning ofMusic. Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.

136 pages; ISBN 0-88946-473-1

A Discussion by Charles P. Schmidt

Three axioms serve as organizing principles in this book: (1) Music cognition is a distinguishing
characteristic of the human species; (2) The function ofmusic cognition is the processing of auditory signals
defined by tonal-rhythmic patterns; (3) Music cognition requires time and effort. These axioms provide a
basis forthesix essayswhich comprisethebook: (1) IsMusic a (Meta) Language? (2) The Structureof the
MusicDecision-Making Process; (3) Three Problems in Pattern Equivalence; (4) Musical Meaning and
Communication; (5) Double Entendre; and, (6) Why Music isNot a Theory of Emotion.

Fiske raises several important issues for theory and research inmusic cognition. An apt distinction
ismade between theories of music and theories of music cognition. Fiske's cross-cultural perspective on
music perception and cognition has validity and is well thought out. Further, Fiske's discussion of the
decision-making process and problems of pattern equivalence is articulate.Importantly, a critique of
assumptions is undertaken for the "same-different" discrimination, categorical versus continuous variables,
tonal versus rhythmic pattern equivalency, and theoretical constructs versus behavioral measures. Questions
concerning commonly held assumptions, tendencies toward overgeneralization, and validity in each of these
areas are made explicit. For example, Fiske offers a useful discussion of same-different discrimination of

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