Rule 103 Change of Name

G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.

Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special
Proceeding No. R-481, Capote as Giovanni’s guardian ad litem averred:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon

P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to
the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname
of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and
[Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate
registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];

6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up
to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial,
physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovanni’s pleas] for attention along
that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of
name on Giovanni’s birth certificate. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in
form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Since there was no
opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her
evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner which lower court granted
the motion.

After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change
of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.

From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in
a summary proceeding.

Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.

In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties. Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador and
claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected
by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the
proceeding adversarial.

We deny the petition.

The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here,
the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, a separate and distinct proceeding
from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually
dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).

The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a
quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is whether the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.

Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the reason
for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal
with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name,
meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights. Such issues are ventilated only in
adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded and due process
is observed.

When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family
Code of the Philippines), the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his
use of a surname, read:

Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use
the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural
child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis
ours)

Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s surname from birth.
The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s putative father
to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed,
among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)

Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall
use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which
case they may bear the father’s surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies
him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name
and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or
an acknowledged child.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it
will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States.
This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner in support of its position
deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding separate
and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with
the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this case was
correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and
have no bearing on respondent’s case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the
proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the
proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the
CA correctly ruled:

The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical
errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding.
There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that
the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief
sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although
by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the
entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote
complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower
court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came
forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed
the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does
it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected
to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not
merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither
opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave
notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all
interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the
judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a
copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial
were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the
OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
G.R. No. 160597 July 20, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS
BOLANTE, respondent.

Respondent filed a petition for change of name from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante
to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante on October 18, 2000.

In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:

2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued,
Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as
far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante;

3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other
public and private records; and

Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed
to conform to the name she has always carried and used.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered
respondent, as petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of
notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001.
At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order
giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to
establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26,
2001. In the afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for
Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts."

On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's express March
26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing.
Following another resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing was, after
notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held. At that session,
respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents without any
objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra.

Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case,
respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to
have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the
years. She also categorically stated she had not been accused of any crime under
either her registered name or her present correct name.

An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republic's petition

which cited the decision of the trial court:

At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante] testified, among
others, that she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr. and presently residing at
Bliss Angad, Bangued, Abra since 1995 but before she resided in Zone 4,
Bangued, Abra since birth. She presented her birth certificate and was marked
as Exhibit J to establish such fact of birth and to effect that the name Roselie
Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and correct name but instead
Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during her school days, while
being a government employee, and in all her public and private records.

She presented her professional license issued by the Professional Regulation

Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute of Certified Public
Accountant and a 'Quick Count' document all issued in her name Maria Eloisa
B. Marbella. She likewise marked her marriage license as Exhibit N to prove
her marriage xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she wanted to
secure a passport and wanted that the same be issued in her correct name
and that she would not have filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport.
 On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the
petition is her realization that there will be a complication upon her
retirement.2 (Words in bracket added.)

On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition.

In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision of October
21, 2003,4 the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court.

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v.
Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,5 citing pertinent jurisprudence,6 non-
compliance with these requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower
court to hear and determine a petition for change of name. The provisions adverted to
are pertinently quoted hereunder:

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order
be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive
weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province,
…. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
(Underscoring added.)

On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be
set within four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing,
petitioner submits at the threshold that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case for want or defective publication.

We are not persuaded.

As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on
October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on
November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was published in the November 23, and
30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the
last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled
on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed
under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA,7 must emphasize,
however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting
the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due
notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling
for September 25, 2001.
It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25,
2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect
since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the
Republic would state – and correctly so – that the in rem nature of a change of name
proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements,
particularly on publication, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover.

The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to
the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make an objection of any and against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a
party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following
requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and
place for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a
week for three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being
heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice of the hearing.

It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested

person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor
General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government. The government, as
an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General,
who appears on behalf of the government, effectively represents the public. In this
case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose
of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra
was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no
actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing.

Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing
which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules,
the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness,
authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the
jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the
petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing
demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.

On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by

decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a
privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name
appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence
has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these
are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name will prejudice public interest.13

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue
of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be
the best evidence available.14 What is involved in special proceedings for change of
name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making
such determination being lodged in the courts."

With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is
with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling,
used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie
Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in
government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional license as a
certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and
the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used
practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But
beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to
avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so
without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. 16

The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that the
requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any
entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a
police and NBI clearance or like certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the
OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of one's good moral character or compelling
evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive or
fraudulent intent. Respondent's open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and
for which she was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime
under her registered name or under her present name (name that she is using) had
convinced the trial court of the bona fides of her request for change of name. As the
CA correctly ratiocinated:
 In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered
name in order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This
is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that
the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and most convenient way to
set her records straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that

the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to
present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect that she has no
derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it
does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact that a
petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon
the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is
not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any
oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in
a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove
that the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we
see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant.
(Word in bracket added).

At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic
petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The
trial court appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the
petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus taken.
G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016

EMELITA BASILIO GAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia
Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is
a Filipino citizen. The petitioner's birth certificate, which was registered in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full
name is Emelita Basilio.

On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full
name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."
She claimed that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school
records from elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and
other government records.

On July 15, 2010, the RTC issued an Order, which noted that the petition filed sought
not merely a correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of name.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the petitioner to make the necessary amendment to her
petition to conform to the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.7chanrobleslaw

The petitioner filed with the RTC an Amended Petition dated August 3, 2010 for change
of name. The amended petition contained substantially the same allegations as in the
petition for correction of entry in the birth certificate. On August 10, 2010, the RTC set
the initial hearing of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent),
filed its notice of appearance. The OSG authorized the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Libmanan, Camarines Sur to appear and assist the OSG in the
proceedings before the RTC.

On July 19, 2011, after due proceedings; the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch
29, issued an Order granting the petition for change of name. The RTC, thus, directed
the LCR of Libmanan, Camarines Sur to change the petitioner's name in her birth
certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." The RTC opined that, from
the evidence presented, the said petition was filed solely to put into order the records
of the petitioner and that changing her name in her birth certificate into Emelita Basilio
Gan would avoid confusion in her personal records.

The respondent sought a reconsideration of the RTC Order dated July 19, 2011,
alleging that the petitioner, who is an illegitimate child, failed to adduce evidence that
she was duly recognized by her father, which would have allowed her to use the
surname of her father. On October 17, 2011, the RTC issued an Order denying the
respondent's motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated April 26, 2013, reversed and set aside the RTC
Orders dated July 19, 2011 and October 17, 2011. The CA opined that pursuant to
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, the petitioner,
as an illegitimate child, may only use the surname of her mother; she may only use the
surname of her father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by her father. The
CA pointed out that the petitioner has not adduced any evidence showing that her father
had recognized her as his illegitimate child and, thus, she may not use the surname of
her father.

In this petition for review, the petitioner maintains that the RTC correctly granted her
petition since she only sought to have her name indicated in her birth certificate
changed to avoid confusion as regards to her personal records. She insists that her
failure to present evidence that her father recognized her as his illegitimate child is
immaterial; a change of name is reasonable and warranted, if it is necessary to avoid
confusion.

The petition is denied.

After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that
the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that
she has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a
sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in
1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's use of surname provide:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally

use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a
natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the
surname of the mother.
In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was
born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural
child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's birth,
either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the
surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may
use the surname of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.

However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed
was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her
birth certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage
contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she
is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on
using her father's surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have
allowed the petitioner to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio
Gan."

In Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines, the name of the petitioner therein which
appeared in her birth certificate was Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was
a legitimate child of her father and mother. She filed a petition for change of name,
seeking that she be allowed to use the surname "Alfon," her mother's surname, instead
of "Duterte." The trial court denied the petition, ratiocinating that under Article 364 of
the Civil Code, legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the father. The
Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname of her mother since Article 364
of the Civil Code used the word "principally" and not "exclusively" and, hence, there is
no legal obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the mother's surname to
which he or she is legally entitled.

In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or
a natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the
father. Thus, the petitioner cannot insist that she is allowed to use the surname of her
father.

Finally, Republic of the Philippines v. Lim, likewise finds no application in this case.
In Lim, the petition that was filed was for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; the petition sought, among others, is the correction of the surname of
the respondent therein from "Yo" to "Yu." Further, the respondent therein, although an
illegitimate child, had long been using the surname of her father. It bears stressing that
the birth certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her surname was the same
as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a correction of entry in her birth certificate is
appropriate.

Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition
for correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner's birth certificate
indicated that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.
G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M.
OGA, Respondent.

On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly
constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given
name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).

Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case
may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the
correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied" and removes "correction or changing of clerical
errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for
the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries
of the civil register.

The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the
correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not
yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for
corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048."

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as
Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court
of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-
3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid

grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations;
(h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation;
(n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring
supplied]

Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order setting the
date for hearing and to comply with jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic of
the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case only
on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on
September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera
moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the
City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence
for Mercadera.

On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents
were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the
name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. On September 26, 2005,
the RTC issued an order admitting Exhibits "A" to "I" and their submarkings, as relevant
to the resolution of the case.

In its September 28, 2005 Decision, the RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and directed
the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in
her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao
Mercadera.

The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the
RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the
remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief filed with the CA, the OSG argued
that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for
correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and
hearsay testimony of Oga.

For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem
innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or
increase substantive rights." What the lower court actually allowed was a change of
Mercadera’s given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under
Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute
one for the other for purposes of expediency." Further, because Mercadera failed to
invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower court’s order in effect
allowed the change of one’s name in the civil registry without basis.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, the appellate court
affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA assessed
the controversy in this wise:

Appellant’s insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not entertain any doubt
that the petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in
petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which she sought to change her
name.

That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the
Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof—

On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed its Comment on July 3, 2009. The OSG declined to
file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive discussion on the
assigned errors.

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname,
or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for
an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving
his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the
"designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known." When granted, a person’s identity and interactions are affected as he
bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing
him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name
aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.

The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of
the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to
oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties
impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all
who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it."

Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing
family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status. However, "there could be instances where the change applied
for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the
applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but
because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public
mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter
of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in
the event of its grant x x x."

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before,
only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil
registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule.

In Republic v. Valencia, even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be

corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is
merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the
correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
the civil status from may legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect
the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and
proof to the contrary admitted x x x." "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will
not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous
entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution."

In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to
"MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive
rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the
procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can
be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of
name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the
person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section
2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled
name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name
are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule
108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the
correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As
explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in
other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108
provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule
108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." 35

A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSG’s
assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. In the same
vein, no concrete contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers
sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are
attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera
to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever since,
discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might
arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full
compliance with the publication requirement.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as
it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to
make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower
court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and
"to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It
does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply
correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy
allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which
the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the
petition was clear in stating:

7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her
Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true and
correct given name that she had been using and had been known within the
community x x x.

8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City and requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of Live Birth,
however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction
unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this Honorable Court
because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent
appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before
 their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this petition.
[Emphases supplied]

In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i,"
so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a
name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well
be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth until her
adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.

The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember.

It is worthy to note that the OSG’s reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez is flawed. In that
case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial matter" and that it
"cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect render it a
mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding." While this Court stands
true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was stated in a different
tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely
different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a
corresponding change in the adoptee’s given name because "it would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence
of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at law." In the present case, the issue is
the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can
in fact be granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera
to render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez.

Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot
be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding
before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil
Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed
the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the
OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when
it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower
court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further
discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court
especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by
Mercadera.
G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.

Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng

Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on
July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change
his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed
as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National

Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its]
National Indices of Marriage." Respondent also submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the
birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998,
2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon
City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section
2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the
newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13,
2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was
entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.

By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to make the corresponding changes. :

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the
[respondent] to "COSETENG";
 3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the
[respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of
the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the
original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the
present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing
his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of
marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth
certificate,1 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with
respondent’s prayer

Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil
Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of
the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing;
the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf
of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on
the scheduled hearing.

The petition is impressed with merit.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using
valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot
be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the

Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the
name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did
not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her
mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held
that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance
of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case,
however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be
filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that
of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where
his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned
title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar
of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote in support of his claim that his
change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

Republic v. Belmonte, illuminates, however:

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole
purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the
Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the
civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and
underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule
108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or change
of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as
all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his
parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.

Labayo-Rowe highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a

petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations.

x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable
parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any,
as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who
may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best
ascertained under an adversary system of justice.

As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly
mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that
given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That
two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by
the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the
two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from
notice or from the last date of publication).

What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of
Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally
be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-
impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not
established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or
actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. 5

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the
entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their
respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio;

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 for being pro
forma and for lack of merit.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part
of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the
grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children. In resolving the
appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in
conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.

We find the present petition impressed with merit.

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is
the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate
child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255
is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname
of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before
a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish
the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as
Antonio.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of
her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and
there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic, this Court, upholding the best
interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a
child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best
possible situation considering his circumstances.
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and
REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.

On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well
as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed
minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the
change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the
name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he
has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when
he arrived at private respondents' residence.

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for
change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May
3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption
and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court
ruled in favor of herein private respondents.

The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as
follows. (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change
of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition
for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.

It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the
adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are
two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are
not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and
rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an
authority to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee, the respective
proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and
procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in
relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the
Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must
correspondingly be complied with.

Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of
the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of
one's legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly
be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name
in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of
its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice. Private respondents argue
otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the welfare
and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in
the instant proceeding. 15

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance.

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of
adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of
the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in
the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of
an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised
solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the
adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine
the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing
the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial
change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial
order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply
to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree
recording such change.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing
and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court
of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other
person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the
cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for
the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General
or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such
hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the
petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court
may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish
a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition
insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together
cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and
substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would
be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of
name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.

Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of
name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification
advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptee's baptism under the
name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to live with
private respondents.

Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant
of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and
designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the
baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so
they claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that
naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as
adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first
name of their adopted child.
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of
respondent judge and must thus set it aside.

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register.
The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in
the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil
register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is
through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For
purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and
correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the
true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for
change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest,
strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to
warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized
by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been
denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth,
baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact
that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it
constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A
name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which be is known in
the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial
and cannot be recognized as his real name.

The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of
long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the
change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron
Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the
name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends
from, the time he came to live with private respondents. Apart from suffusing their
pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds
for a change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The
legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as
unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his
baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented
by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by

his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of
name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed
a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang….

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine
who was born in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny
in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is,
they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition—that is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of
his middle name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled
that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has
an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience
of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right
to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial
court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then
decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) arguing that
the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the
Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to
Article 174 of the Family Code. It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid
reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue
embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his
social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also
alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name
until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to
previous cases decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and
reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply
seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks
to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions
for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only
a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name and none on
requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall
use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which
case they may bear the father’s surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument
that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname
as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires
that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname.

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this
would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on
his petition.

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases
of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their
petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their
discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for
change of name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner
cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of
majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the
Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the
best interests of the minor petitioner therein.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which

his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name
be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
Rule 108. Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate
of Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City.
She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of
Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is
"Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name
"Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering
that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all
her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.11

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and
citizenship which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.

On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said
Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and
the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information
and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication
requirement.

On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent.

The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the
government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and
"Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar
of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and
as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion.16

On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.17 As to whether the
petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her
siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated July 27, 2011.

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for
failure to implead indispensable parties.

In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate,
particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought
the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since
childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino"
instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they
touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy"
(which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her
mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in
changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and
obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.

It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines

"adversary proceeding" as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte

application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v.
Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to
implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded
as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her
petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was
affirmed in toto by the CA.

We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this
case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic
v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a
Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the
petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status
from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but
also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by
the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of
fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses.39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify
the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of
hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;42 or when a party is
inadvertently left out.43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe
Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching.
G.R. No. 211724

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF

FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS
APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE),
FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela."
However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to discover that he was registered as "Felipe
Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a Petition for Correction of
Entry in his NSO birth certificate before the RTC, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 1345.7

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan, Catanduanes
and is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor
of the said province, and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He
averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he has been known to his
family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname in all of
his official and legal documents, including his school records from elementary to
college, certificate of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) membership,
government service records, appointment as Provincial General Services Officer,
report of rating in the First Grade Entrance Examination of the Civil Service
Commission, Philippine Passport, Marriage Contract, and Certificate of Compensation
Payment/Tax Withheld. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan,
Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.

In an Order dated January 10, 2011, the RTC initially dismissed the petition on the
ground that petitioner's recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was improper, as
the petition did not involve mere correction of clerical errors but a matter of filiation
which should, thus, be filed in accordance with Rule 103 of the same Rules.
Moreover, it found that a similar petition docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 1229 had
already been ruled upon and dismissed by the court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, maintaining that the issue of filiation is

immaterial since he was only seeking a correction of entry by including the surname
"Almojuela" to "Felipe Condeno," his first and middle names appearing on his birth
certificate with the NSO. He likewise insisted that the name "Jorge V. Almojuela" was
clearly indicated thereon as the name of his father. Finding merit in petitioner's
arguments, the RTC, in an Order dated February 9, 2011, reconsidered its earlier
disposition and allowed petitioner to present his evidence.1

During the proceedings, it was discovered that petitioner's name as registered in the
Book of Births in the custody of the Municipal Civil Registar of Pandan, Catanduanes
is "Felipe Condeno" and not "Felipe C. Almojuela," contrary to petitioner's allegation.

In a Decision1 dated October 6, 2011, the R TC granted the petition and accordingly,
directed the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pandan, Catanduanes to cause the correction
of entry of the facts of petitioner's birth by changing his surname from "Condeno" to
"Almojuela" and to furnish the Civil Registrar General with a copy of the corrected
birth certificate.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
moved for reconsideration, citing lack of jurisdiction due to defective publication and
contending that the caption or title of a petition for change of name should state: (a)
the alias or other name of petitioner; (b) the name he seeks to adopt; and (c) the
cause for the change of name, all of which were lacking in the petition filed before the
RTC. In an Order dated November 14, 2011, the RTC denied the OSG's motion and
reiterated its stance that based on the allegations thereon, the petition was only for
the correction of entry in the records of the NSO. As petitioner had established
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements therefor, the RTC had thus acquired
jurisdiction. Dissatisfied, the OSG appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated February 27, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed
RTC Decision and Order, and nullified the RTC's order for the correction of entry in
petitioner's birth certificate. It held that although petitioner correctly invoked Rule 108
of the Rules of Court in filing his petition, he, however, failed to strictly comply with the
requirements thereunder when he omitted to implead the Local Civil Registrar and his
half-siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for, as
parties. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court require that notice be sent
to persons named in the petition, as well as to those not named thereon but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. In petitioner's case, his
failure to imp lead and notify the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings as
mandated by the rules precluded the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

Moreover, the CA also found that the correction of entry sought by petitioner was not
merely clerical in nature, but necessarily involved a determination of his filiation. As
petitioner failed to show that his putative father, Jorge, recognized him as his child
through any of the means allowed under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9255, petitioner, therefore, cannot use "Almojuela" as his
sumame.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter before the Court through the instant
petition.1âwphi1

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. An
adversary proceeding is defined as one "having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it."

Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court state:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphases supplied)

A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to
potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction
of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as
well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local
Civil Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he claims that his half-siblings have
acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate
compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due process and to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the
subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to
implead and notify the affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts
were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the
parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party
is inadvertently left out, these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving
substantial and controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null
and void. In Republic v. CA, the Court held that the proceedings of the trial court were
null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil
registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of entry, viz.: >>

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As
he was not imp leaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is
void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.

xxxx

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an

indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
corrction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as
to party and as to the subject matter.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Consequently, the petition for correction of entry by petitioner must perforce be

dismissed.
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No

Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in
the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working
as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh,
who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for
her to obtain a passport. Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina
Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye
Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who
appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that
the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of the petitioner.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of
the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order.

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones
provided by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar
and are, in fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of
the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect,
declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by
respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding.17

We deny the petition.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If
the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves
of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be

dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in
Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it
mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would
be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered
into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared
that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in
Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified
of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate
in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself,
the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence.
With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The
court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria
Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office 24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words,
a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming
evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to
work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn,
but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
 spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to
be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute
the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him,
would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC.
In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
 (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose
the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording
to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to
what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s

legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the
decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries
in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must
be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage
did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of
the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently,
the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and
was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the
Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The
Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local
registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating
to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered
Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be
judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x
x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of
the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify
facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus,
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may
be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is
"to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the

anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the
Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy
as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute

their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on
the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the
foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a
citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between
the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive
and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi