Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics

of the Caspian Sea Region after the Cold War

Gregory Hall and Tiara Grant

In this essay we examine the interests and policies of Russia and China,
respectively, in the Caspian Sea region since the end of the Cold War. Rus-
sia is the world’s second-largest oil producer and exporter after Saudi Arabia
(China ranks sixth in proven reserves) and a top natural gas producer. Since
the beginning of the present century, Russia’s economy has rebounded, in
large part, due to increases in international oil prices. Russia’s own energy
resources, as well as its strategic location and control over most export routes
for Central Asian oil and gas, make the country the most important actor
regarding issues related to the outward flow of Caspian Sea Basin (CSB)
energy resources.
China is the world’s most populous country, connected to Northern, South-
ern, Central, and Eastern Asia. The urban coastal areas of the country have
experienced phenomenal economic expansion since the 1980s (often double-
digit growth). China is now the world’s second-largest economy after the
United States, and it has become a global trading power in a number of com-
modities (light manufacturing, steel, clothing, and others). The country main-
tains a very large, low-paid workforce, which largely explains why China (and
Asia itself) is able to mass produce commodities at significantly lower costs
than its counterparts in other regions can. China’s rapid economic expan-
sion, which is expected to continue into the foreseeable future, increasingly
impacts the international political economy. It is its seemingly insatiable

Gregory Hall is professor of political science at Morehouse College, Atlanta, Ga.

Tiara Grant is professor of government at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, N. Mex.

Mediterranean Quarterly 20:2  DOI 10.1215/10474552-2009-008

Copyright 2009 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.
114   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

appetite for oil (China is now the third-largest net importer behind the United
States and Japan) that, according to David Zweig, has compelled China to
embark on a global hunt for energy. Since the early 1990s, Chinese oil com-
panies have cemented large deals with producing states from Africa and the
Middle East to Latin America.1
Whereas Russia seeks primarily to expand its energy output, China, like
the United States, seeks more diverse energy sources to fuel the rapidly grow-
ing Chinese economy. On the surface, it would appear that the broad designs
of energy import and export policy for these three major powers would not be
in conflict. It would also appear that large exporters like Russia would be in
a position to meet US and Chinese energy needs. However, it is arguably the
spiraling demand in the United States and China (and in India, for that mat-
ter) for this exhaustible resource that makes them competitors in the energy-
security arena. When other actors, such as Iran, are added to the equation
(which invariably brings to the fore political and military security issues), the
conflict fault lines become clearer (for example, Russia’s military relation-
ship with Iran). When the conflict is played out in various regions, the diver-
gent interests of major players become even more stark and complex. Pipeline
politics in the CSB are illustrative. The United States, as a newer player,
seeks to conclude agreements that would weaken Russia’s traditional domi-
nance in the region, as well as undercut Iran’s influence. China cooperates
with Russia and other regional actors (for example, Kazakhstan) to achieve
its energy-security objectives, which include countering US influence in the
region. Both China and Russia cooperate with Iran in line with their respec-
tive energy-security strategies, but Russia works to curtail China’s growing
influence in the region.

Russia’s Involvement in Central Asia

Historical Overview

According to many observers, the so-called Great Game, the old contest for
control of Eurasia, has been renewed since the end of the Cold War, with spe-

1. Werner Draguhn and Robert Ash, China’s Economic Security (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999).
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   115

cial attention being focused on the vast oil and gas deposits of the Caspian
Sea Basin.2 Russia is the most important actor in this game, adjusting its
policy, where necessary, to accommodate the increased influence of counter-
parts like the United States and China, while at the same time maintaining
its position as the region’s most influential player in terms of the outward flow
of energy resources. Central Asia and the Caucasus region have historically
been important for Russian security and economic interests. And as in the
case of China, Russian leaders have long been concerned with support for
Islam within the country’s borders (notably, in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan)
and the “Muslim threat” from the south (notably, Iran, Turkey, and Afghani-
stan). In this regard, Central Asia has been viewed as an important buffer
zone for Russia. Also, the area was and is a hub for the country’s commercial
needs and a principal source for its energy imports.3 It is the dominant view
of Russians over time that their country has a special responsibility to foster
security in Central Asia and in the Caucasus region, and to maintain influ-
ence over energy resources therein.
Russian exploitation of Central Asian and Caucasian energy resources
started under the tsars, principally in the nineteenth century, and continued
into the twentieth century under the Bolsheviks as the communists waged
civil war (1918 to 1921) to consolidate their power and control over what
would become the constituent republics of the USSR. After World War II,
the trend continued under the Warsaw alliance. Armed with the claim that
communism, in theory and policy terms, emanated from Moscow (the Soviet
Politburo), the Communist Party of the Soviet Union established a system
both at home and abroad that ensured Moscow had final say over the domes-
tic and foreign affairs of its satellites.4 By extending party control throughout
the republics and satellite states, Moscow was in a position to manipulate the
politics, socioeconomic development, and exploitation of natural resources,

2. Rocco M. Paone, Evolving New World Order/Disorder: China-Russia-United States-NATO (Lan-

ham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001).
3. Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy (New
York: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1967); Robert McNeal, ed., International Relations among Socialist States (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
116   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

ostensibly without the involvement of external actors. Since the 1920s, the
ethnic Russian diaspora in the Baltic, Caucasian, and Central Asian regions
grew notably as Russians and their families relocated to these areas to work
as laborers and managers, building cities and infrastructure and mining
resources, principally to support the development plans of the Russian/Soviet
center.
With Caucasian and Central Asian oil and natural gas off limits to West-
ern governments and investors, communist leaders directed the development
of these resources through five-year plans. But beginning in the early 1950s,
Soviet leaders decided to substantially reduce the production of Caspian oil,
principally due to concerns stemming from World War II about Baku’s vul-
nerability to attack, as well as new oil discoveries in the Volga-Urals and
western Siberian areas. Additionally, financial and technological constraints
explained the underdevelopment of Caucasian and Central Asian energy sup-
plies during the Soviet period.5
The USSR was without peer in several natural resources, but its resource
prowess was never realized during the Soviet period. Essentially, the energy
resource base was both underutilized and mismanaged. The socialist econ-
omy (both domestic and international) that was established by the Commu-
nist Party was top-heavy, inefficient, and corrupt. The greatest significance
of the communist economic system was political, in that it was off limits to
the West; in turn, the capitalist economic system was off limits to the East-
ern Bloc.6 The two systems were essentially divorced from each other, and,
over time, Cold War military spending took a great toll on the Soviet econ-
omy. This was clearly evident in the fact that maintaining the Eastern Bloc
had become an economic burden for the USSR.7 Even before Mikhail Gor-
bachev, the last Soviet leader, came to power in 1985, the Soviet colossus
was in deep economic difficulty. Gorbachev’s reforms would merely serve to
encourage centrifugal forces (to include ethnonationalist conflicts in the non-

5. Bulent Gokay, The Politics of Caspian Oil (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 4 – 9; Gawdat Bahgat,
American Oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea (Freenville, Fla.: University
Press of Florida, 2003), 140.
6. Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations (Belmont,
Calif.: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003), 337 – 42.
7. Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990), 65.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   117

Russian areas) both inside the USSR and in the bloc; the political opposition
to these reforms, which was seen on the Left and Right, ensured their failure.
Beginning in the late 1980s, hostilities erupted in the Caucasus between
Armenia and oil-rich Azerbaijan, in the Baltics, and in Central Asia. At the
time of disbandment in late 1991, the USSR was a country adrift in political
and economic terms, increasingly unstable in terms of relations between the
nationalities, and on shaky ground in terms of guarantees between and within
the former republics on sharing power, resources, and responsibilities.

The Yeltsin Period

When Boris Yeltsin assumed power in late 1991, he took control of a country
that was geographically, socially, demographically, and politically fractured;
economically depleted; and militarily humiliated. Russia and its former
republics entered the 1990s confronted by radically changed international,
regional, and domestic environments, changed in ways that were without his-
torical parallel. The United States now stood as the world’s sole superpower,
with China in ascension as a potential global contender. The non-Russian
parts of the former USSR (even parts of the new Russian Federation) vocally
asserted their autonomy, and, in Russia itself and western former Soviet
republics (FSRs), democracy proponents clashed with communists and sup-
porters of the precommunist (tsarist) regimes. A new framework, the Com-
monwealth of Independent States, was hurried into place with the breakup of
the USSR to manage the myriad economic, financial, political, and military-
security aspects of the split.
Yeltsin and his initial leadership team came to power as strong support-
ers of democracy, the market economy, and a broad foreign policy orientation
that could be best described as Western. This grouping was known as the
Atlanticists and was led by the foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev. Against the
external backdrop of new programs propounded by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the European Union for expansion eastward, the Yeltsin
team implemented a Russian version of economic shock therapy and strug-
gled to maintain its traditionally dominant role in disputes within the federa-
tion itself and between FSRs. (Of note were the dispute with Ukraine over
the status of the Black Sea Fleet and conflicts with leaders in Chechnya and
118   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

Tatarstan over resources, revenues, and power sharing.) It was apparent dur-
ing these early years of Yeltsin’s tenure that Russia was a country in retreat,
both within and outside federation borders.8 This retreat was perhaps most
strategically significant in Central Asia, where Moscow’s Western-focused
foreign policy and apparent passiveness in the face of increasingly assertive
policies in the FSRs paved the way for more outside influence in the region
(China, Iran, Turkey, and the United States, the latter usually represented by
American oil companies).9
The tide of opinion began to shift in Russia in the mid-1990s, as economic
recession set in, made particularly difficult by the nature of the reforms and
the environment in which they were implemented. Russians became increas-
ingly disillusioned with their government and the country’s elites as corrup-
tion appeared to define the functioning of the state and economy. War in
Chechnya (and increased restlessness in other areas of the Russian Cau-
casus, such as Dagestan) stoked Russian fears about radical Islam and the
threat of terrorism within and on Russia’s borders, as well as fears about the
security of the country’s energy supplies. On the international front, Russians
felt further humiliated as their country mounted huge external debts, ethnic
discrimination increased in the FSRs, and a US-led coalition defeated Rus-
sian client Iraq in 1991 after Iraq had invaded Kuwait. But more than any-
thing, the process of NATO enlargement eastward and the intervention of the
alliance in the Balkan conflicts stirred anti-Western sentiments among Rus-
sians across the political spectrum. Russians felt encircled by the West, both
militarily and economically. By the mid-1990s, communists and nationalists
dominated the Duma. A consensus had emerged in Russian foreign policy
circles and in the Yeltsin team that Russian policy needed a new direction,
one that emphasized the non-Western parts of the former Soviet Union and
the advancement of Russian influence and interests.
In 1996, Yeltsin replaced Kozyrev with Yevgenii Primakov, signaling a
fundamental shift in Russian foreign policy. Primakov, an Orientalist by train-
ing with a background in intelligence, had worked in the Middle East. His
ascension reflected a move by Yeltsin toward a more pragmatic foreign policy,

8. Jonson, 43 – 4.
9. Ibid., 48.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   119

that is, a policy that focused less on the global activism that signified Soviet
foreign policy and more on promoting core Russian interests internationally
as well as in its sphere of influence, the so-called near abroad. Russian lead-
ers, including Yeltsin himself, began to openly criticize NATO’s enlargement
plans, as well as US and NATO involvement in the Balkans, especially the
alliance’s negative posture against the Serbian leadership. Additionally, Rus-
sian elites stepped up their criticisms about US and British policies in Iraq
and reiterated their support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Beginning
in the mid-1990s, Russia and China embarked on a course of friendlier rela-
tions that included work on the resolution of border issues and the establish-
ment of trade and political agreements, notably, the delivery of Russian mili-
tary equipment. This trend has continued to the present and could aptly be
called a strategic partnership. Closer to home, Russian leaders placed more
emphasis on issues such as the treatment of ethnic Russians in non-Russian
areas of the federation and in the FSRs, as well as Russian security vis-à-vis
the former republics. Generally, Russians now acknowledged that the coun-
try no longer held superpower status but that Russia would seek to maintain
(reclaim) its superordinate status in the near abroad.
Obviously, the energy resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia began
to assume renewed importance in post – Cold War Russian economic devel-
opment and foreign policy strategies. Oil is pivotal to both Russia’s economic
development and the country’s foreign trade. As Peter Rutland succinctly
states, “Oil is both an end (for the wealth it brings) and a means to an end
(the projection of Russian power and influence).”10 Russia’s energy prowess
and geostrategic position in Eurasia make the country a major player both in
the politics of the area and in global politics in terms of energy security. It
is in the Caucasus and in Central Asia especially that Russia operates as a
major power and is accepted as such by important counterparts like China
and the United States.11

10. David Lane, The Political Economy of Russian Oil (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999),
163.
11. Hareez Malik, The Roles of the United States, Russia and China in the New World Order (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 181 – 3; Gokay.
120   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

Russia and Central Asia during the Putin Era

In late 1999, President Yeltsin named Vladimir Putin to be his successor.

Putin, a former KGB intelligence officer who had served in Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe, was a political outsider before being called from St. Petersburg
to serve briefly as Russian prime minister. His selection was intended to rep-
resent a move toward energetic leadership in Russia but with strong patriotic
leanings. Putin came to power with an apparent mandate, first, to improve the
security situation within federation borders and, second, to bring order to and
revitalize the Russian economy.12 While problems outside Russia’s borders
(notably, conflict in Iraq, NATO enlargement, and the Kosovo war) were seen
as important to the country’s leaders, they were not perceived to be of higher
priority than Russia’s national security and economic development.
Terrorism, which for Russians was intrinsically tied to the war in Chech-
nya, became the number one security issue for the country. During the first
round of war in the Chechen Republic, which lasted from 1994 to 1996, Rus-
sians watched as the war became internationalized — Muslim fighters came
from other countries to fight alongside their brethren in Chechnya. A series
of events in summer 1999 would leave Russians feeling even more insecure
and help establish Putin’s credentials as an antiterrorist crusader. A series
of apartment building bombings in Moscow prompted Putin to order Russian
troops to return to the republic (Russian leaders blamed Chechen separatists
for these bombings). Additionally, in August, Chechen rebels invaded villages
in Dagestan, and Islamic separatists in Uzbekistan launched attacks into
south Kyrgyzstan from bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Putin responded
by identifying Islamic separatism inside and near federation borders with
the global terror campaign. He had made terrorism the number one issue for
Russia.13 The delegates at the 2000 summit of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States adopted an antiterrorism program, and the agenda of the June
2001 founding meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
focused on the fight against terrorism.14 The SCO, which is discussed below

12. Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2008).
13. Jonson, 63 – 4.
14. Ibid., 67.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   121

in more detail, presently functions more as a “debating club,” in the opinion

of Dmitri Simes, than as a security alliance. However, as Simes reports, some
Russian officials are lobbying for a military mechanism to be added to the
organization, as Russian-American relations worsen.15
By the time Putin assumed power in late 1999, the Russian economy was
in shambles. There was dysfunction at every level — reflected in rampant
inflation, a majority of the population living in deepening poverty, a weak-
ened ruble, mounting arrears in government payments, and increasing unem-
ployment and underemployment. However, bolstered by rising energy prices,
the economy began to rebound and has seen six consecutive years of growth.
Russian leaders have used this oil wealth (wealth from the country’s own
exports and from re-exporting supplies from Central Asian and Caucasian
states) to finance Putin’s economic development plans.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States radically
altered the geopolitical landscape for the countries of the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia. The US (and NATO) military and economic presence and influence
greatly expanded throughout these two areas, challenging Russia’s traditional
hegemonic role. Four broad interests can be identified for the United States in
Central Asia. First is the containment of Islamic fundamentalism. Since the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the US military has established bases in Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan, principally to support the war in Afghanistan. Second, the
United States seeks to foster energy export options for the FSRs in the region,
creating an antimonopoly policy by limiting the control of major players like
Russia, China, and Iran.16 Third, the United States, as well as China, seeks
diversification, by increasing its energy imports from Central Asia and fur-
ther lessening its dependence on Middle Eastern exports, especially those
from the Persian Gulf. Finally, the United States is interested in fostering
democratization and market economic development in Central Asia, on the
premise that such reforms are necessary for domestic and regional stability.

15. Dimitri Simes, “Losing Russia,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (2007): 36–52.
16. Subodh Atal, “Central Asian Geopolitics and U.S. Policy in the Region: The Post–11 Septem-
ber Era,” Mediterranean Quarterly 14, no. 2 (2003): 106 – 8; Catherine Belton, “Caspian Great
Game Back On,” Moscow Times, 5 May 2006; Ariel Cohen, Eurasia in Balance: The U.S. and
the Regional Power Shift (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005), 69 – 74; Jan H. Kalicki and David L.
Goldwyn, Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson Center, 2005), 134 – 6.
122   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

Russia’s policy response to this assertive American strategy, plainly, has

emphasized strategic cooperation with the United States where possible
(along with China) to help further Russia’s antiterror agenda while at the same
time asserting Russian influence over energy-security issues — the legal sta-
tus of the Caspian Sea, (proposed) pipeline routes, and so on.17 Putin, who
assumed the position of prime minister in 2008, in tandem with his succes-
sor president, Dmitri Medvedev, works strenuously to position his country
as the deciding factor in the energy politics of Central Asia, employing what
Marshall Goldman calls a “giant chess match” approach to ensure that the
CSB countries do not open a southern route for the flow of energy supplies
that would bypass Russia.18
Relations between the United States and Russia are suffering setback after
setback, with the two giants increasingly in a confrontational posture over a
range of issues, including Russia’s military support for actors such as China
and Iran, the US occupation of Iraq and America’s perceived general “unilat-
eralism” in world affairs, US and NATO plans to deploy missile defense sys-
tems in Poland and the Czech Republic, the progress of democratization in
Russia, and Russian support of separatist movements in Georgia. As Dimitri
Simes comments, Russian leaders are angry at what they see as the “crucial
error” on the part of American leaders to treat Russia as a defeated enemy
after the Cold War. They are also angry about American pressure on Geor-
gian leaders to participate in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project.
Western leaders, for their part, especially EU governments that depend on
energy exports that must pass through Ukraine and the Caucasus states, are
miffed at what they perceive to be Russia’s heavy-handed energy politics.19
While Western governments and oil interests have positioned themselves
after the Cold War as important players in the energy politics of the CSB,20
Russia, a new energy superpower, uses its presence in the region and lever-
age as a top energy resource producer and supplier to maintain a position of

17. Jonson, 85 – 7, 97 – 103, 149 – 51; Celeste A. Wallander, “Silk Road, Great Game or Soft Under-
belly?” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 93 – 4.
18. See Goldman; David L. Stern,, “Rice Denies U.S. Is Vying for ex-Soviet States,” New York
Times, 6 October 2008, A10.
19. Simes.
20. Mike Eckel, “Power Struggle Erupts in Turkmenistan,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 23
December 2006, A7.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   123

dominance.21 Moreover, Russia wields great political influence as a major

supplier of military arms, nuclear power plants, and space technology to
partners such as China, India, and Iran, all important players in the energy
politics of the CSB. It would appear that Russia is well positioned to main-
tain its leading role in Central Asian and CSB politics for the foreseeable
future. However, other actors such as China also have a vested interest in the
development of the CSB. China recognizes the importance of stability in the
region and has made an effort to become a major player in the race to develop
and benefit from the energy sources in the CSB. The promotion of closer
economic and trade ties with the CSB has been at the forefront of China’s
economic reforms.

China’s Involvement in Central Asia

Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping

Typical of most communist states, China emphasized self-reliance (and, until

Deng, centralized planning) in its economic development. Import substitution
strategies were the order of the day in all sectors, including energy. China
essentially laid the groundwork for its industrial development from within,
mobilizing its huge population under the direction of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) to develop natural resources and infrastructure in accordance
with its modernization program. Deng assumed power in 1976 and was China’s
most influential leader even after his “retirement” in 1992. He died in 1997.
These Deng reforms have had the overall effect of greatly expanding the
Chinese economy, mostly in the south and east. As personal incomes and
household savings have increased, so have consumption patterns, especially
for consumer goods like televisions, washing machines, and refrigerators.
And even though the CCP has maintained its traditional leading role in Chi-
nese society, materialism has replaced egalitarianism as the guiding value in
China, with the country’s leaders paving the way.22 The growth of the Chi-

21. See Nazila Fathi and C. J. Chivers, “Putin Says Caspian Area Is Off Limits to Attacks,” New
York Times, 16 October 2007; Andrew E. Kramer, “Central Asia on Front Line in Energy Battle,”
New York Times, 20 December 2007, C1. Also see Goldman, 14 – 5, 173 – 4, 194 – 8, who reports
that Putin appointees now run most of Russia’s major institutions.
22. Goldman, 98, 159 – 60, 179 – 87.
124   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

nese economy is dependent upon its access to energy, and thus, China’s lead-
ers are committed to developing an energy policy that will ensure its growth
for years to come.

China’s Energy-Security Policy

Although China is a top oil producer in relative terms, its energy infrastruc-
ture is still in development. Thanks to its vast coal deposits, China was able to
satisfy its energy needs until the early 1990s, when it became a net importer
of oil. At that point, the Chinese government directed its oil companies to
acquire interests abroad — the Middle East (particularly Iran and Iraq) and
Central Asia became the focus of these efforts.23
Since the mid-1990s, China’s biggest challenge has been to narrow the
growing gap between its demand for energy and the ability of domestic pro-
duction to keep pace with that demand. Arguably, this is the country’s num-
ber one energy-security problem. Since 1980, commercial energy consump-
tion has increased approximately 250 percent, and the government-energy
sector has struggled to keep pace with surging demand for automobiles and
other consumer energy-related goods. A combination of factors, including the
nature and location of most economic development initiatives (in the east,
farther away from the source of energy supplies), insufficient investment, and
poor management of energy infrastructure expansion, help to explain this
gap between energy demand and production.24 In 1998, the Chinese govern-
ment responded by initiating a major reorganization of the energy sector, with
the primary aim of encouraging competition to enhance efficiency in energy
resource production and acquisition. Elements of the Tenth Five-Year Plan
underscore the importance of China’s energy strategy for the country’s overall
economic development:
• Diversify sources of supply (increase imports from Russia and Central
Asia).

23. Philip Andrews-Speed, “China’s Energy Woes: Running on Empty,” Far East Economic Review
(June 2005): 28–33; Bahgat, 35 – 6; Draguhn and Ash, 122 – 4.
24. June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (New York: Paragon
House, 1993), 197 – 8, 92 – 103; Draguhn and Ash.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   125

• Enhance overseas energy investments by state oil companies.

• Increase investment in oil and gas infrastructure.

• Establish government-controlled strategic petroleum reserves.

• Adjust energy consumption structures and reduce dependence on oil

through coal gasification, liquefaction, and development of nuclear

power.
• Work to establish a regional energy-security system.25

China is determined to sustain its monumental economic growth, and a self-

interested foreign policy with the United States, Russia, or other CSB actors
could disrupt that growth, harm hundreds of millions of Chinese, and threaten
the Communist Party’s hold on power.26 According to former US ambassador
to China J. Stapleton Roy, the “Chinese leadership rejects the possibility that
they will become more assertive and domineering as they acquire wealth and
power . . . they wish to become strong to protect themselves against exploita-
tion by other powers, not so they can dominate others.”27
“The variance between Beijing’s aspiration to achieve hegemonic status
and the reality of the international order of today creates a considerable
scope for Chinese miscalculation . . . and possibly sets the stage for confron-
tational relationships with other nations.”28 Realist theory asserts that a mul-
tipolar international system will prove less stable than a bipolar form, since
according to theory, multipolarity brings about greater conflicts between
inter­dependent nation-states. Security for China is geared toward ensuring
access to adequate energy sources to ensure economic growth brought about
by stability in its nation and region.
As China’s economy grows, offensive realists would contend that China is
bound to “engage in an intense security competition with considerable poten-

25. Cohen, 160 – 4.

26. Li Ling, “Break Down Dual Urban-Rural Structure and Realize Society-Wide Equality,”
Red Flag Manuscripts Magazine 2005, netx.u-paris10.fr/actuelmarx/m4liling.htm, accessed 2
December 2007.
27. Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer, “Debate: Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy
(January/Febuary 2005): 47, 50.
28. Amitav Acharya, “International Relations Theory and Cross-Strait Relations” (paper delivered
at the International Forum on Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait, Taipei, Taiwan, 26–28 July
1999).
126   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

tial for war with the United States.”29 In theory, it would seem that the poten-
tial for war between China and the United States stems from conflicts that
would arise from the former’s increased economic growth. China will pursue
its security, in the anarchical, self-help international system, by enhancing
its military capabilities. It is assumed that China will help itself by means of
economic and military power. For realists, security is the supreme national
interest of the state; as China seeks to enhance its security, this will engen-
der insecurity vis-à-vis the United States and possibly Russia.
The root of possible misunderstandings among Russia, China and the
United States is fueled by American hegemony. John J. Mearsheimer and
Zbigniew Brzezinski’s offensive realist approach contends that the structure of
the international system is anarchic and that what accounts for the relentless
accumulation of power by the United States is the lack of a competing hege-
mon. This approach stresses that the principal goal of each state is to capital-
ize on its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of
other states.30 It is certain that the debate over whether or not China will rise
peacefully to power is reliant on a game of waiting and observation. China is
currently preoccupied with economic reforms, so military supremacy does
not seem to be a priority. The current policy for China’s military is a strategy
of self-sufficiency and the promotion of a defensive strategy. Many argue that
China’s military has no desire to be used for imperial purposes. China pre-
fers to interact with the United States and Russia for economic purposes with
the sole purpose of augmenting its socialist market economy. It is likely that
China cannot compete for global hegemonic status through military might
as a single sovereign entity, but it is possible that a coalition can be forged
between China and Russia and other actors against US hegemony. These
actors have the potential to “concentrate on building their economy to the
point where it is bigger than the US economy,”31 and do the same militarily.
Currently, there is no state or coalition of states or other international powers
that can militarily and economically challenge the United States, and thus,
no comparable balancing coalition has emerged or imminently threatens US

29. Ibid.
30. Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, 47.
31. Ibid., 50.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   127

hegemonic status like the emerging coalition between the globally influential
nations of China and Russia.
From a Chinese perspective, US geopolitical superiority has strengthened
since the decline of the Soviet Union. Western interests working through
NATO have established a political, military, and economic presence in Cen-
tral Asia. During the Cold War NATO focused solely on security concerns on
the central front in Europe. The disintegration in 1991 of the USSR and the
emergence of eight new states in Central Asia barely intruded initially on the
geopolitical consciousness of NATO.32 Western interest in Central Asia stems
from the region’s energy riches and the contest for influence over access to
them. The security dilemma that has emerged in the CSB has led to the
emergence of regional actors who contend with NATO’s presence.
It was only a matter of time before a regional organization would emerge
to counter NATO. The issue at hand is the amount of influence China and
Russia may have over such regional organizations and who is included. The
relationship between China and its strategic partner Russia has promulgated
a reaction among actors within close proximity to the CSB to join forces and
establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO will greatly
impact the region’s balance of power and challenge Western aspirations to
secure access to the CSB’s oil and gas reserves.
The SCO can be perceived as a regional organization to counter unilat-
eral US supremacy. It is taking part in a shift in international governance
toward a regionalized set of member nations. It is recognized that to counter
US supremacy, nations have to work collectively to contend with US politi-
cal, military, and economic influence in the world. Multilateral regional orga-
nizations such as the SCO and NATO can have a direct effect on security
and stability and stem the influence of external powers in the CSB region.
The changing geopolitical environment of the CSB has prompted both orga-
nizations to focus on the most serious challenges to security interests in the
post – Cold War era. The demise of the Soviet Union led to the bifurcation of
the Caucasus and CSB borders. To remedy this issue the SCO has outlined

32. Richard Sokolsky and Tanya Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security (Washington, DC:
RAND, 1999).
128   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

several agreements between the member nations to intervene militarily to

combat separatist and terrorist threats.
China’s border delineation issues are addressed through direct and indi-
rect involvement of the Central Asian states to aid China in combating sepa-
ratist movements among its ethnic minority population.33 In some respects
the SCO is perceived as a confidence-building mechanism to encourage posi-
tive regional relations for China’s management of the border area of Xinjiang
province. To China, a stable border will facilitate oil and gas development
and deter economic backlash from potential terrorist or separatist activities
in the CSB.
China faces economic stagnation if it does not properly confront its fuel
crisis. To this end, the country’s leaders have outlined a sustainable energy
program. It is asserted that this program, coupled with the cooperative efforts
of the SCO, will aid China in securing the energy that is necessary to ensure
sustainable economic growth.

The Geopolitical Situation in the CSB after the Cold War

The CSB has assumed greater importance in global politics since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The basin contains approximately 80 billion barrels of
oil, nearly 8 percent of the world’s remaining reserves. 34 It is inferred that
the CSB will emerge at some point as the world’s biggest energy-producing
region, as illustrated in table 1, second only to the Persian Gulf in impor-
tance, and could become a major supplier of energy resources to Europe and
Asia in the foreseeable future.
A major political and diplomatic battle is being waged by various coun-
tries for the exploitation and utilization of these potential resources and over
the pipeline and transportation routes to connect them with the consumer
markets of Europe, Russia, the United States, China, and Iran. As discussed
above, the CSB is of particular importance in ensuring the security of the

33. Timothy Craig, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Calif., September 2003).
34. Guangcheng Xing, “China and Central Asia,” in Central Asian Security: The New Interna-
tional Context, ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2001), 160.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   129

Table 1
Caspian Sea Basin Oil Reserves
Country Field Recoverable Resources
Azerbaijan Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli 5.4 billion
Shah Deniz 2.5 billion
Kazakhstan Tengiz Field 6–9 billion
Karachaganak Field 2.5 billion
Kashagan Field 13 billion
Kurmangazy Field 6–7 billion
Uzen Field 7 billion
Kumkol Field 0.1 billion
Zhanazhol Field 3 billion

Source: Wikipedia, “List of Oil Fields,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oil_fields, accessed 23

January 2008.

Russian heartland. To ensure control over the oil and gas resources of the
CSB, Moscow has limited the development of oil and gas pipelines, which
results in Central Asia’s largest oil producer, Kazakhstan, dependent upon
Moscow for transportation of its primary export. Russia retains a stronghold
in the CSB, but other actors, such as NATO and the SCO, have stepped in to
develop their own partnerships with these newly independent states.

NATO’s Presence in the CSB after the Cold War

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, eight new states of the
Soviet south declared their independence. The West initially perceived these
new states to be of little or no geopolitical significance. Western officials were
content to give Russia greater influence over the development of the region,
since most perceived it to have intractable problems. The instabilities of the
CSB region deterred any actors from investing in the development of Caspian
Sea energy resources. However, the mid-1990s brought about a dramatic
shift in perspective concerning the CSB when it became well known that
there were significant oil and gas reserves throughout the area. The rapidly
expanding presence and financial stake of Western oil companies, as well as
the growing perception that instability and conflict in the CSB could disrupt
development, led to NATO intervention.
NATO has expanded “military contacts with several Caspian states through
130   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program,” which is aiding these countries in
the reform of their armed forces. 35 According to NATO, the PfP’s purpose
was to increase stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and Central
Asia after the decline of the Soviet Union and to diminish threats to peace
and build security.36 The PfP nations aspire to construct relationships based
on practical cooperation and a commitment to democratic principles, which
underpin the alliance structure. The PfP focuses on defense-related coopera-
tion through which nations are committed to maintaining principles to stabi-
lize relations among its members.
During the Cold War, NATO’s mission emphasized territorial defense of
its member nations. However, after the Cold War, there is a growing aware-
ness that “conflict and instability in and beyond NATO’s borders represent
the most serious challenge to the security of its member nations.”37 Due to
the strategic transformation of NATO, the changing geopolitical environment
of the CSB in the post – Cold War era, and the desire of the CSB nations to
rely on NATO to counterbalance Russian influence, NATO has extended its
military presence in the region.38

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Western policy in the region has
emphasized democratic reform, the development of free market economic
systems, and the implementation of mechanisms to mitigate the root causes
of conflict and instability. The economic performance of CSB nations has
faltered, however, due to “large foreign debt, government corruption, and a
reluctance to implement market reforms.”39 NATO thus faces serious limita-
tions on its ability to “project influence in the region and solve the most diffi-
cult challenges facing the CSB.”40 China and Russia also voice concern over

35. Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley.

36. Martha Brill Olcott, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Changing the Playing Field
in Central Asia” (testimony before Helsinki Commission, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 26 September 2006), available at www.carnegieendowment.org/files/MBO0906.pdf.
37. Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley, x.
38. Ibid.
39. Craig.
40. Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley, xvii.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   131

instability in the CSB region, as they do not want to risk problems streaming
across their borders into Russia.41 The collapse of the Soviet empire led to
the establishment of independent Central Asian states, but it left a power
vacuum that was wrought with inefficient and unstable governments. The
SCO emerged to “protect and consolidate the peace, security and stability in
the region . . . and promote the economic, social and cultural development of
the organization’s member states.”42
The motivations for China and Russia to form the SCO differed greatly
from those of their CSB counterparts. The postcommunist nations of Central
Asia found themselves facing logistical limitations and looked to China and
Russia for aid to ensure the stability of their borders. The main provision of
the agreement states that the “military forces of the Parties deployed in the
border area, as an integral part of the military forces of the Parties, shall not
be used to attack another Party, conduct any military activity threatening
the other Party and upsetting calm and stability in the border area.”43 This
mutual nonaggression pact does not outline any mutual defense obligations
and thus is dissimilar from the NATO alliance. The SCO is an arrangement
that assists both China and Russia in working cooperatively to stabilize the
CSB and facilitate oil and gas development in the region.
China pushed for the establishment of the SCO not only to stabilize the
CSB region but also to promote closer economic and trade ties, especially in
the energy resource sector. China, the most populous nation in the world, has
become the second-largest energy consumer and the third-largest oil con-
sumer in the world. According to the CIA’s World Factbook, China consumes
7 million barrels per day of oil with increased consumption rates at approxi-
mately 4 percent per year.44 It is projected that by 2025, oil consumption in
China could be around 10.9 million barrels per day.45
The projected increase in the level of oil consumption has compelled China

41. Craig, 1.
42. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 June 2002, available at www.sectsco.org/EN/, accessed
2 December 2007.
43. “Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and
People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area,” avail-
able at www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/shanghai_19960426.html.
44. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2006, available at www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
45. Craig.
132   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

to forge close ties with its energy-rich neighbors of the CSB. The large proven
oil reserves in the CSB trump the unproven reserves within China’s borders,
which explains the eagerness of Chinese leaders to develop close economic
ties with the former Soviet republics and ensure stability in the only province
in China that has potential for oil and gas development: Xinjiang.46
The SCO has allowed China to develop close ties with its energy-rich
neighbors and has provided a political framework for its efforts to become
a major player in the race to develop and benefit from the energy sources
in the CSB. Chinese oil firms have invested considerably in Central Asia,
most prominently in Kazakhstan. One of the most noteworthy deals was the
acquisition by the China National Petroleum Corporation of a 60 percent
stake in the Kazakh oil firm Aktobemunaigaz.47 In addition to considerable
investments in Kazakh oil fields and companies, China has also proposed the
development of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China’s eastern coast.48
Development of the proposed pipeline has been delayed until a geological
survey of the Kazakh oil field has proven sufficient to make it economically
viable.
None of this would be possible without the establishment of the SCO.
Through this mechanism, China is able to pursue two of its major national
goals. First and foremost, China is effectively creating the security and
stability it needs on its western borders and in Xinjiang province. Second,
through the SCO, China has masterfully crafted economic and trade ties with
its neighbors in the CSB. This stability and cooperation allow for the further
development of China’s western region, most notably, Xinjiang, and provide a
secure environment for energy transportation links, including oil and natural
gas pipelines. The potential for economic backlash from terrorist activity on
China’s border has been mitigated due to the support from its counterparts
in the SCO. China will continue to support the organization as long as it
continues to provide economic benefits and facilitate cooperation among its
members.

46. Jonathan E. Sinton, Rachel E. Stern, Nathaniel T. Aden, and Mark D. Levine, “Evaluation of
China’s Energy Strategy Options,” report prepared for the China Sustainable Energy Program, May
2005, http://china.lbl.gov/files/china.files/nesp.pdf.
47. Craig, 1.
48. Ibid.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   133

The Crisis in Georgia

The Caucasus and Central Asia regions have long figured prominently in
Russia’s national security and development plans. Western, especially Amer-
ican, attempts after the Cold War to gain influence in these areas have been
greeted with suspicion and contempt by Russians. Indeed, efforts by NATO
to expand its influence in the former Soviet sphere, as well as efforts by West-
ern governments and energy companies to circumvent Russia by establishing
agreements with FSRs that bypass Russia with the outward flow of energy
resources from these areas, are viewed by many Russians as hostile actions.
Many Russians have concluded that some in the West, especially American
leaders, simply seek to “contain” and weaken Russia after the Cold War.
For many Russians, the 2008 crisis in Georgia, one that had been years
in the making, has been an important test of Russia’s resolve to maintain
predominant influence in the Caucasus region after the Cold War. They per-
ceive that the regime of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, by embrac-
ing the West through cooperation with NATO and with support for the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, works contrary to Russian regional interests. For
Georgians, Russia is an overbearing, meddlesome neighbor that, by a variety
of means, actively subverts the national government in Tbilisi with its sup-
port for separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.49 The situation
came to a head in early August 2008, when Georgian armed forces invaded
South Ossetia to battle Russian-backed separatists in the region. Russia
immediately responded with its own invasion of Georgia, resulting in a war
that lasted less than a week but that included shelling even of the capital
city. By the time the peace agreement brokered by French president Nicolas
Sarkozy was implemented, the Saakashvili regime had been greatly humili-
ated on the world stage.
While questions remain regarding who was actually responsible, Georgian
or Russian forces, the outcome (Georgia’s territorial fracturing) is quite clear.

49. Some Russian tactics include the issuance of Russian passports to citizens of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, military support for the peoples of these areas, the deployment of Russian “peace-
keepers,” breakdowns in the delivery of gas, and so forth. See Stephen Blank, “The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and the Georgian Crisis,” China Brief 8, no. 17 (Jamestown Founda-
tion) (September 2008): 45, www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]
=5134&tx_ttnews[backPid]=168&no_cache=1.
134   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

The August crisis served as an opportunity for Russia in pursuit of three

strategic goals regarding Georgia: (1) the destabilization (if not the removal)
of the Saakashvili regime, (2) the removal of the Georgian military presence
from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and (3) the rendering of Georgia as “unfit”
for NATO membership. Whether or not Russian leaders used Kosovo’s inde-
pendence from Serbia as a pretext for Russia’s military action in Georgia, it
is very clear that a Georgia that is free from NATO’s reach fits into Russia’s
resource and security calculus.50 Russian leaders are determined to exert
strong influence over Georgia’s relations with the West.
The same thing could be said for Ukraine, which is, for Russian analyst
Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s “real line in the sand” as regards the stationing of
foreign troops on Russia’s borders.51 To be sure, Ukrainian president Viktor
Yushchenko, along with some high-level American leaders such as former
vice president Richard Cheney and former secretary of state Condoleezza
Rice, has been very vocal about prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO
in the aftermath of the war in Georgia. At the same time, Russia has estab-
lished a greater degree of influence in areas of Ukraine (notably, the Crimea
region) than in the FSRs of the Caucasus and Central Asia and, in early
2006 and 2009, even wielded the energy weapon against its neighbor to the
west.52
Border delineation and terrorism are at the top of the SCO agenda, and
several agreements have been completed among members that address
security-related issues. One agreement among the member nations is to inter-
vene militarily to combat separatist and terrorist threats. However, the recent
events in Georgia have complicated relations in the organization.
Russia’s decision to recognize the two separatist regions (Abkhazia and
South Ossetia) of Georgia as sovereign nation-states clearly illustrates the
divergent geopolitical interests of SCO members. During the August crisis,
Russia petitioned the organization to secure backing for its move to recognize

50. See Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective,”
Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 3 (2008): 23 – 54; and Goldman. Another issue, discussed in some
detail by Blank, is the matter of whether Russian leaders have even come to accept the sovereignty
of its former republics.
51. Dimitri Trenin, “Where US and Russian Interests Overlap,” Current History 107, no. 709
(2008): 219 – 24.
52. Blank, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Georgian Crisis,” 41 – 2; Goldman.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   135

the independence of the two regions. The SCO did not condemn Russia’s
move, but it also did not condone its actions. The statements that emerged
from the SCO were ambiguous in nature — concerns were raised about the
situation — but Russia was praised for taking an active role in resolving the
conflict. In essence, the SCO did not recognize Russia’s move to recognize
the two breakaway regions as independent nation-states.
The SCO’s handling of the situation serves China’s interests well, since
China cannot support “a doctrine of intervention and of unilateral rearrang-
ing of sovereign states’ territories on the grounds of mistreatment of ethnic
or religious minorities.”53 China was, at that time (just prior to the com-
mencement of the Beijing Olympic Games), facing ethnic unrest in Xinjiang
province. To accede to Georgia’s dismemberment would contradict China’s
long-standing policy on separatist movements, as well as existing agreements
among SCO states.

Conclusion

There is not necessarily a warm relationship even among like-minded play-

ers in Central Asia. China’s leaders, especially in the military, express con-
cern about “excessive dependence” on Russian energy supplies.54 Perhaps
the most notable example of Russia blocking China’s influence in the CSB is
the failed 2003 China-Yukos oil pipeline agreement.55 While some observers
believe that the divergent interests of China and Russia in regards to proposed
pipeline routes from the CSB will inevitably bring these two major powers
into conflict, overall Russia tends to stand with Iran (and sometimes China)
“against” the United States and other Western governments (including NATO
member Turkey) and energy interests. The general perception among Rus-
sian observers is that the United States, along with Turkey and Western oil
companies and through an enlarging NATO, is attempting to “displace” Rus-
sia from the CSB and that the United States, with “hegemonic aspirations,”
strives to determine pipeline routes to the disadvantage of Russia and Iran.56

53. Blank, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Georgian Crisis,” 45.
54. Draguhn and Ash.
55. David Zweig, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 25 – 38.
56. Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (New
York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
136   Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2009

For these observers, the United States essentially has grown too powerful in
Central Asia. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as recent support for
Georgian unification, adds fuel to such allegations.57
There are as many proposed pipelines as there are actors involved in what
Geoffrey Kemp refers to as the “world class battle” that is taking place over
Caspian Sea energy resources — even Pakistan and Afghanistan have put
forward proposals that reflect their energy interests.58 But some observers
argue that this conflict is crystallizing into an essentially bipolar competition
that pits the United States and Turkey against Russia and Iran (sometimes
China is included in the latter axis).59 Alexander Shlyndov discusses Rus-
sia, Iran, and China in the context of their mutual energy needs (to include
Iran’s quest for nuclear energy) and the ways that they are able to assist each
other.60 Kemp argues that the “triangular” relationship among the United
States, Russia, and Iran could be the most important strategic factor in the
new Caspian geopolitical situation.61 And finally, Richard Thornton, in an
essay that considers the emerging post – Cold War order, opines that the
global situation is driven by the respective strategies of Russia, China, and
the United States.62
The myriad overlapping economic, political, and security cooperation
agreements entered into by interested parties reveal just how crowded the
CSB has become after the Cold War. International organizations involved in
the region include the following:
• United Nations;
• Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe;

• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;

• SCO;

• Central Asian Cooperation Organization;

• Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact;

57. Jonson; Alexander Shlyndov, “Certain Aspects of Russian-Chinese Collaboration in the Inter-
national Arena,” Far Eastern Affairs 34, no. 1 (2006).
58. Jonson, 145.
59. Sarah L. O’Hara, “Great Game or Grubby Game? The Struggle for Control of the Caspian,”
Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004): 151 – 2.
60. Shlyndov, 44 – 5.
61. Ebel and Menon, 160.
62. Malik, 221.
 Hall and Grant: Russia, China, and the Energy-Security Politics of the Caspian Sea   137

• Georgia,Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan Moldova alliance (GUUAM);

• Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO); and

• NATO (the involvement of which is principally through the PfP and

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC] mechanisms).

Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have entered into a collec-

tive security treaty, and in May 2003 Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan
reached an agreement on the division of CSB energy resources.63 As Lena
Jonson suggests, two broad, parallel security arrangements appear to be in
emergence in Central Asia: one led by Russia and the other led by the United
States.64
Nuclear-weapons proliferation could become an important factor in the
Central Asian equation over time. Michael Mandelbaum believes that with
the United States, Russia, and China already in possession of nuclear weap-
ons and Iran apparently determined to acquire them, the nature of CSB
affairs could be affected.65 This reasoning should not be discounted. Just as
nuclear weapons proliferation has further complicated the security situation
in Eastern and Southern Asia, we can expect the same for the Middle East
and Central Asia when Iran becomes a nuclear power. Moreover, this would
add another very significant element to the energy-security picture. There
would be many geopolitical and geoeconomic implications if nuclear politics
were to become a factor in the CSB equation.
Perhaps the situation is not so grave. China, Russia, and the United States
all emphasize stability in Central Asia as critical for their energy security.
China and Russia benefit from Western economic investments and technical
assistance in developing their energy infrastructure. The trilateral trade rela-
tionships have mutual benefit in political, economic, and/or military terms.
Iran, too, has much to gain from a stable CSB region. All four actors have
significant ties to the region, either as energy producers/exporters, as import-
ers, or both. So long as these actors can continue to find a way to manage the
more pressing issues among them (for example, Georgia’s internal stability,
antiterrorism, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear power aspirations), their com-
petition in Central Asia should not become destabilizing.
63. Jonson, 187 – 8.
64. Ibid., 97.
65. Ebel and Menon, 25.