RULE 114 – BAIL
accused were already released from detention. He further points out
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004]
PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant, vs.
Judge ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City,
Branch 72respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By a Sworn Complaint[1] dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial
Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta
(complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of
the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross
ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction,
on motion of the accused, by Order[2] of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No.
212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say Chaw, et al., for illegal
entry.
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97
[d]espite . . . the provision of P.D. 1599 which established the
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the apprehension of
the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone,
respondent virtually surrender[ed] our sovereignty and criminal
jurisdiction to the Chinese government. [3]
Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he
has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse
of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure,
complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires lower
courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months
or ninety days from date of submission.
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without
giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose
Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause
against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No.
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act). [4]
Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him
(complainant) from appearing in Crim Case No. 634-99, People v.
Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainants) designation to handle the
prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman.
By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000,[5] respondent
contends that petitioner has no personality to initiate the complaint
against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof.
On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-
97 were arrested within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal has not yet
been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the conflicting
claims thereover by the Philippines and China and the absence of an
inter-country agreement determining the common boundaries of the
Exclusive Economic Zone.[6]
As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July
9, 1997 Order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No. 212-
97, respondent points out that said motion was filed after the
that during the pendency of said motion, representatives of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed him that said office
was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it
was suggesting an amendment of the order. [7] Respondent explains
though that since the accused had already been released from
detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the DFA
was merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the motion
had already become academic.
As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition for
bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation,
which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a
copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set
by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4, 2000 during which
there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office; and that as
the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable
offense, respondent granted him bail.
As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No. 634-99,
respondent explains that he had already reconsidered the same
through his February 10, 2000 Order, [8] he having earlier failed to see
petitioners designation by the Ombudsman.
In its August 16, 2002 Report, [9] the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found, as to the first charge, that it was not shown that
respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith sufficient to
find him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared that
respondent based his dismissal order on his interpretation of a
provision of law. The OCA thus concluded that as respondents
conclusions in his assailed order are not without logic or reason, and
unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith,[10] he could
not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The OCA hastened to
add, however, that respondent is nonetheless required to act on the
motion for reconsideration.
As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of Court
requires a movant to serve notice of his motion on all parties
concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof,
hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without
hearing the prosecutions side.
Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents
explanations were fraught with inconsistencies since his allegation
that he failed to see complainants designation as Ombudsman-
Prosecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17,
2000 Order[11] wherein he noted that complainant was deputized by
the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA in fact
noted that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001 Order
reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was issued only after the
latter order had attained finality and the instant case was filed.
The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED in the
amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
By Resolution of February 26, 2003,[12] this Court noted the OCA
Report and required the parties to MANIFEST within twenty (20)
days from notice, whether they are submitting the case on the basis
of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003,[13] complainant proffered
additional charges against respondent and submitted in support
thereof, among other things an administrative complaint filed by one
Dr. Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders
issued by respondent. Dr. Rosetes complaint, which was addressed
to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, is both undated and
1
unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant
submitted the case for decision.
On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this Court
received an undated manifestation [14] of respondent stating that he
was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records
already filed in the case.
This Courts Findings
I. On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges
that, as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the
public and the legal profession to know the very law they are
supposed to apply to a given controversy. [15] They are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to
maintain the desired professional competence. [16]
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim.
Case No. 212-97 on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for
judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by
the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an
administrative complaint.[17]
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally
not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous. [18] Only in cases where the error is gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith may
administrative sanctions be imposed.[19] There is no showing that this
was the case here.
With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecutions Motion for
Reconsideration of the order of dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-
97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in his Reply
to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondents explanation in
this wise:
When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the
Chinese fishermen were not yet released from detention. It was
during the pendency of the motion that the Chinese fishermen were
allowed to leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our
representation that they should not be released from jail as another
case for illegal fishing was still pending investigation. . . . The
representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely wanted to convey to
Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of dismissal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity and
national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary Domingo
Siazon publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge
Ubiadas as evidenced of an article which appeared in the July 13,
1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said article is
hereto attached as Annex A and made integral part hereof.
There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no
longer interested in the setting aside of his Order of dismissal. In
fact, the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal
was already filed in his Court and he even issued an Order dated 18
July 1997 submitting the said Motion for resolution. Copy of said
Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto attached as Annex B and made
integral part hereof. Since the said Motion for Reconsideration of his
Order of dismissal was already considered by him as submitted for
resolution as of 18 July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should have resolved
one way or the other, the said motion. [20] (Underscoring supplied)
Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already
released at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration
did not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he even issued
an order stating that it was submitted for resolution.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges to dispose of their
cases promptly and within the prescribed periods, failing which they
are liable for gross inefficiency.[21]
To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of
judicial business are complied with, this Court laid down guidelines
in SC Administrative Circular No. 13[22] which provides, inter alia,
that:
Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article
VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all
cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months
from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other
lower courts are given a period of three months to do so.
(Underscoring supplied)
This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-
99[23] which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, failure to observe
which is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties
to speedy disposition of their cases. [24]
Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
is liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order which is a
less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
and which carries the penalty of suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months or a fine of more thanP10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
II. On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge
has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought.
[25]
So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca[26] instructs:
[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes
the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of
deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that
judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the
guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be
exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by
the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
[27]
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case
No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m.[28] Given the filing of the
petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said
that the prosecution was afforded reasonable
notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy
of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing
that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to
comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of
guilt is strong.[29]
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is
provided as it merely requires the court to give a reasonable notice
2
of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a
three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15
allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice,
there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call
for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of
each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense
committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in
the hands of the prosecution.
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec.
5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610,[30] which is punishable by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for
statutory rape[31] qualified by relationship which is punishable by
death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the
prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure [32] which is a serious charge
under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of
more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[33]
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge
is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled
to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without
being subject to punishment prior to conviction, [34] against the right
of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community
from dangerous elements.[35]
III. On the failure to recognize complainants special designation from
the Ombudsman in Crim. Case No. 634-99
The brushing aside by the OCA of respondents explanation on the
matter is well taken.
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, [36] the
Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the
government service for assistance.[37] Section 31 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero endorsed Case No. OMB-1-98-
2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant with the instruction to
file the Information and to prosecute the case.[38] The indorsement
included an order to submit a monthly report to the Office of the
Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the case.
Respondents December 17, 1999 Order[39] which states, inter alia, as
follows:
The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby
directed to designate any of the Assistant Prosecutors of the City
Prosecutors Office to take the place of Provincial Prosecutor
Dorentino Z. Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta appears to have
been deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute this
case, no special reason was given for such authority. Instead, it
appears that such designation was merely based on the premise that
the offense charged was committed in Subic municipality as
erroneously indicated in the original Information filed with this
Court.
Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of
Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows that the place of the commission
of the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor does not have the authority to continue
prosecuting this case for the People of the Philippines (Section 2,
Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For this reason, the
Office of the City Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch as the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged.[40] (Underscoring supplied),
shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation,
hence, belying his explanation that he must have overlooked the
same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited provision of the
Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special
reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of
any prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.
It would appear though from respondents above-quoted December
17, 1999 Order that he was of the belief that it was the City
Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had territorial
jurisdiction over the offense. It is in this light that he is given the
benefit of the doubt, absent any showing that he was motivated by
malice or bad faith.
With respect to the charges raised against respondent in
complainants April 1, 2003 Manifestation, by which complainant
submitted an unsigned and undated complaint by a certain Dr. Reino
Rosete and copies of respondents other assailed decisions: While
Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, allows the
institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous
complaint, the veracity of Rosetes complaint is doubtful as it does
not bear his signature. It is clearly not intended to be an anonymous
complaint.
Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court is
unable to pass upon them as complainant merely submitted
photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating clearly
and concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations
of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of
Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch 72, Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of undue
delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the law or
procedure in granting an application for bail without affording the
prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
________________________________________________
[A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ. November 26, 2004]
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant, vs. Judge
ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac,
Ilocos Norte,respondent.
3
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn
complaint[1] dated January 15, 2003 of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice, against Judge
Alejandrino C. Cabebe,[2] then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal
Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated
drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos
Norte against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed,
William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel
and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused,
assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with this Court a
petition for change of venue but was denied in a Resolution dated
August 13, 2001.[3] On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion
for reconsideration.[4] In the meantime, the proceedings before
respondents court were suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as
ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5,
2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order[5] granting bail
to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or
property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel
whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued
the Order without the accuseds application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] Instead of
acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself
from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did
was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be
disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment,[7] respondent denied the charges. While admitting
that he issued the Order dated November 5, 2002 granting bail to
the accused without any hearing, the same was premised on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There was delay
in the proceedings due to complainants frequent absences and
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court,
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did not
object to the grant of bail to the accused. [8] He added that the
administrative complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is
not the appropriate remedy to question his alleged erroneous Order.
Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of government
service, he prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P.
Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law
and recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution[9] dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and
required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties
submitted the required manifestations that they are submitting the
case for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,[10] we held that
jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity
of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of
bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a
matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion.[11] It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail
in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and
the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order
for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.[12] In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a
hearing should still be held.[13]
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the
accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as
follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced
at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside
the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail
under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of
the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation. (18a)
In Cortes vs. Catral,[14] we laid down the following rules outlining the
duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the
petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the courts
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. [15]
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure
enumerated in Cortes.[16] He did not conduct a hearing before he
granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective
of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and
thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The
4
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process
for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate
the grant or denial of bail.[17]
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its
recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail
to the accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for
not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,[18] we held that the failure to raise or the
absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an
application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail
hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection
to the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant
without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it,
against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount
of bail. Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail may
be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all
justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no
objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge
therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing
and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was
not in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was
also necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines
set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail, Only
after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements
have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to
grant bail.
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the
alleged absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the
grant of bail to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their
right to a speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without a hearing. He
blames the prosecution for the delay.
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in
the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was
delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is
utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has
been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and
the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very
nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his
duties. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly
rendering unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
We ruled that in order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad
faith, with malice or in willful disregard of the right of a litigant. [19] A
perusal of the records, specifically the assailed Order, hardly shows
that any of these incidents has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that to
constitute such infraction, it is not enough that the subject decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. [20] In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.[21] we categorically
held that good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. In Villanueva-
Fabella vs. Lee,[22] we ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order he renders.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a
judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it must be
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
motive. Complainant, having failed to present positive evidence to
show that respondent judge was so motivated in granting bail
without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the
same. It is merely based on complainants speculation. Mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove this charge. The only exception to
the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice, [23] which are not
present here.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court
Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the grant of bail. This administrative offense is
considered a less serious charge, punishable under Section 9(4) and
Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same Rules, thus:
Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
xxx
4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;
xxx
Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired,
is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby
fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
________________________________________________
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)
posted in CONLAW2 cases
Facts
5
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.
Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject
to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before
this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor
of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by
the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of
human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES,
JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks
the annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan,
promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners
motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be
utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994
denying the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition. [1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case,
respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-
Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was
a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several
instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present
recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent
Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the
Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved
and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate
of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action [2] for the
cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title
since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in
the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered
judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after finding that
respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the
subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury [5] was
filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
[6]
On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however,
directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal
of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the
proceedings were terminated.[7] In this criminal case, respondent
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent * Paredes was thereafter haled before the
Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by
using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and
6
induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet
was Paredes counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a
resolution[8] recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent
Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent,
moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in
this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants
before the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur,
went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the
same evidence x x x but said case after arraignment, was ordered
dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of
Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
therecommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto
attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case
of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x.[9] (Italics supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan[10] charging respondent Paredes with a violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a
motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991[11] and the case was
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had
initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes,
sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. [12] He
claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-
respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain
documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1,
1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during
the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. [13] These falsified
documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for
reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft
charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same
would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification
that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury
case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said
perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since
action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the
Department of Justice.[14]
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet
subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had
made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations
and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes
contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the
perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been
arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by
respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared
and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation
in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the
way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated
cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
approved the filing of falsification charges against all the herein
private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this
evaluative legal position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of
his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be
unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for
the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over
the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to
present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls
under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer
and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution [17] and,
ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he decided to file
separate informations for falsification of public documents against
each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each
of which named one of the three private respondents here as the
accused therein, were filed in the graft court.However, the same
were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27,
1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It
was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section
9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as
respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there
was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification
of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan,
hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by
the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents
in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish
that client and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and
Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in
the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding
the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by
accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his
professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on
the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is
privileged.[19]
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied,
[20]
the controversy was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in
an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar
actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the projected
testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as
a particeps criminis.
I
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the
lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein respondents
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts
7
surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been
disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet,
as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further
since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent. [21]
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege
cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations
of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For
a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep
aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent
court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that
Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified
documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to
him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred
to any communication, without distinction or qualification. [22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule
was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney.The privilege
is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the
client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. [23]
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering
their past and existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in
view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were
prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on
the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this
conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were
thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the
motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the
graft case before the Tanodbayan.[24]Also, the acts and words of the
parties during the period when the documents were being falsified
were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except
under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the
instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands
charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it
is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is
bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe
that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of
respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a
somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the
falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned,
those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his
lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has
theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot
be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same
privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future
and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a
crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such,
are privilegedcommunications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of
judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney
and client having to do with the clients contemplated criminal acts,
or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client.[25] (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he
and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications
thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with
his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for
purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the
pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission
of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada
concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in
order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a
lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
privilege from attaching. [26] In fact, it has also been pointed out to the
Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and
client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only
lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice.[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent
Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications intended
for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving
counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties
in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential
inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps
criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to
testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived
8
at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon
this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which
are now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall,
however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring
preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon
the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to
be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that
issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and
evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a
position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of
the ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to
resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial
court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private
respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It
will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the
Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for
falsification of public documents against all the respondents
herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to
obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each
of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the
same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the
deliberations in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr.
Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets
discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even
if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases
were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one
Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of
incidents, or involving common questions of law and
fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as
co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no
moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While
Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses
the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three
accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that
they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons
indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint
defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the
same vein, there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the
several actions lost their separate identities and became a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the
different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a
single action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation
(w)hen two or more persons are charged with the commission of a
certain offense was too broad and indefinite; hence the word joint
was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the
accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same
manner in point of commission and time. The word joint means
common to two or more, as involving the united activity of two or
more, or done or produced by two or more working together, or
shared by or affecting two or more.[30] Had it been intended that all
the accused should always be indicted in one and the same
information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not
so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case and the problems that may arise from amending the
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by
consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime
of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of
one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state
witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty. [31] not that
he must be the least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or
submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was
held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be
a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is
believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill
him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of
the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state
witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were
bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al.,[34] two conspirators
charged with five others in three separate informations for multiple
murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their
confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the
information charging him and two others with the crime of
estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most guilty as, being
a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-
accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the
commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate
court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not
be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is
untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or
nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged
compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in
law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly
articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we
quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy
the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state
witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could
satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant
asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is
equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other
witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which
resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but
even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second,
without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material
9
points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned
decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the
evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway
robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the
conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the law
prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused
who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty we mean
the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least
guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that
the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness
clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the
commission of the crime, which may or may not have been
perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez
was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the
occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be
said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his
discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
(Italics ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators
found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of
criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical
action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the
Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is
the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant
consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same
penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby
the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated
with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This
adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need
for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape,
and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused
regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify
truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying
criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a
judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other
requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness
are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual
commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending
before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the
formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest
their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for
the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that
purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and
has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance
of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material
points by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a
digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C.
Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur;
Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor
Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated
the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who
participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file
the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco
Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from
Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that
respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that
he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this
procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial
court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits
of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be
emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been
exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts
and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan
eventually assumed, after the retirement of two members of its
Second Division [37]and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely
anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995, as
required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the
chairman and new members thereof [39]declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March
7, 1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the
prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T.
Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice
Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed
and passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution,
however, after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-
General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully
beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are
amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant
the prosecutions motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as
state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for
the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted
SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the
present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and
given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.
________________________________________________
10
OKABE VS GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and
petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa.
Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted
Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the
petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door
delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the
petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first,
denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000
through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the
affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable
cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently
approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a
warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner
posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left
the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s
permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She
left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12,
2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex
parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court
approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for
estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor;
the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s
counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the
parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner
also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order
dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for
the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on
her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation
however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the
filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the
same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/
leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition
for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the
other motions were denied, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error
in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits
of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter’s
documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner.
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section
8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or
complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be
supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and
their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required
under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010
Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It
invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal,
that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by
the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of
procedural and substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals
indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of
the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority
in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
11
 Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except
when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application
for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of
two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing
the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity
and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as
“choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among
a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one
possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly
defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal
to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in
all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to
6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to
future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en
banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the
bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out
on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same
rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about
important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to
bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in
Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.”
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix
Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that:
(a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus
12
allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the
crime charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner
would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is
strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of
innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what
may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed
to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party,
review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting
fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in
Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility
of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
13
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age
of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and
capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

14