EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
Leonardo Paat vs CA G.R. no. 111107 (266 SCRA 167)
Facts:
· May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
because the driver of the truck was not able to produce the required
documents for the forest products.
· Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the
owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit an
explanation and the order of the CENRO was enforced.
· The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the
owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s
decision
Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction?
Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
Lopez v. City of Manila (GR No. 127139; Feb. 19, 1999)
FACTS:
Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of
1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property.
The revision of real property assessments prescribed therein was not yet
enforced in the City of Manila. Upon receipt of Memorandum Circular No. 04-
95 from the Bureau of Local Government Finance relating to the failure of most
of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including the City of
Manila, to conduct the general revision of real property and after obtaining the
necessary funds from the City Council, the City Assessor began the process of
general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties.
The City Assessor’s Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market
values to the City Council for its appropriate action. The council then enacted
Manila Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved. With the implementation of
the ordinance, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increase hence
he filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila
Ordinance No. 7894 for being “unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.”
Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter, reducing by fifty percent
(50%) the assessment levels (depending on the use of property, e.g.,
residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. The new ordinance
amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74, paragraph (A) of
Manila Ordinance No. 7794..
Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the
controversy proceeded.
The trial court dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to exhaust
administrative remedies.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
dispensed with in the instant case
HELD: NO. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against
the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be
sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the
presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its
mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it
properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts,
not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter
by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
courts.
“One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers
which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters coming primarily within the competence of other department. x x x
There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed
with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal, (2) when
the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5)
when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong
public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is private land;
and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted).
In the court’s opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of
the exceptions above-mentioned.
LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
GOVERNING BOARD, and JOSEFEL P. GRAJEDA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 100579. June 6, 2001] THIRD DIVISION
FACTS:
On 18 October 1988, the Philippine Coconut Authority Governing Board passed
Resolution No. 109-88, creating an "Investigation Committee" which would
look into the complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner, then
administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority. Subsequently, the
Committee found a “prima facie” case for the formal charge of dishonesty,
falsification of official document, grave misconduct and violation of RA 3019,
Sec. 3e, f and j. Therefore Garcia was placed under preventive suspension for
90 days.
Due to several and various reasons, Garcia postponed the filing of his Answer
and did not attend the scheduled hearings until the period 90 days elapsed.
Garcia then claimed that the 90-day period had already elapsed hence he
should be reinstated. The PCA argued otherwise by issuing a Resolution stating
that the delay in the disposition of the case resulting from the
petitions/requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of the
scheduled hearings and related requests filed by Garcia should not be included
in the counting of the 90-day suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of the PCA Board is valid?
HELD: Yes.
RULING EXPLAINED:
"`The question before this Court is whether due process was violated by
respondents in the course of arriving at their resolution. The power of the
Court on this question is explicit in Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution that,
`Judicial power includes whether or not these has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.'
The issue of alleged violation by the PCA of administrative due process must
also be dealt with against petitioner. The factual scenario of the case,
heretofore narrated, would indicate that petitioner was afforded ample
opportunity to submit his case at the administrative level. He filed an answer to
the administrative complaint and his refusal to attend the scheduled hearings,
despite due notice, was at his own peril. The essence of due process to him was
that opportunity to be heard.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot deny that he has been able to effectively, if
not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the administrative case against him
due to his repeated requests for extension of time to file answer and his
inexcusable refusal to attend the scheduled hearings thereon despite due
notice. Petitioner's invocation that his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should be EXCEPTED by the fact that irreparable damage would
ensue upon his overdue suspension and illegal ouster from office cannot thus
be countenanced.
The observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a sound practice and policy which should not be ignored. The
doctrine insures an orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until
the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course.
Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have
been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse
must be held to be inappropriate and impermissible.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Apex Investment
[G.R. No. 149422. April 10, 2003.]
FACTS: In 1994, pursuant to RA 6657, compulsory acquisition proceedings over
several lots owned by respondent were initiated by the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO). Copies of these notices were sent to respondent’s
office. Respondent, however, denied having received these Notice of Coverage
and Notice of Acquisition. They learned of a lot (TCT No. T-90476) has been
placed under the compulsory acquisition program, only from “Balita” and filed
a Protest on the ground that their lots were classified as residential even before
the effectivity of the law, thus, are not covered by R.A. No. 6657.
Only after more than one year from said Protest was it forwarded to the DAR.
In the meantime, respondent’s title had been cancelled and a new one issued
to another. Thus, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals, but petitioner contended that respondent failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: WON respondent corporation violated the principle of exhaustion of
remedies
HELD: NO.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; WHEN
IGNORED. — This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the
administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Records show that the PARO did not take immediate action on respondent’s
Protest filed on January 12, 1998. It was only on February 15, 1999, or after
more than one year, that it forwarded the same to petitioner DAR. Since then,
what petitioner has done was to require respondent every now and then to
submit copies of supporting documents which were already attached to its
Protest. In the meantime, respondent found that the PARO had caused the
cancellation of its title and that a new one was issued to an alleged farmer-
beneficiary
In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 6 we held that the
aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their
letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to
judicial process. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances
could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and protect
their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the
DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In the same vein, respondent here
could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before
seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate
respondent’s lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of
Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this
case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
SMART Communications Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission
G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the
billing of telecommunications services and on measures in minimizing, if not
eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit. Isla
Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel)
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars,
alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods as
stated in the subject memorandum circulars. Such jurisdiction belongs to the
DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines. Soon thereafter, Globe
Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to
intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention. This was granted by the trial
court.
The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs. NTC
filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The defendant's MD is denied for lack of merit. NTC
filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial court. The CA, upon NTC's filing
of a special action for certiorari and prohibition, reversed the decision of the
lower court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to
exhaust administrative remedies?
RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are
the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions
of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.
This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis
for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases
involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after
an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the
claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial
power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
ESTRADA ET AL V. CA (BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION)
442 SCRA 117
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; NOV 11, 2004
FACTS
Estrada, Canilang and Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed on July 31,
1996, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for
Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing
Port, Inc. (WFPI), Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Molina as Mayor of Subic,
Zambales, and Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
- The complaint alleges that: WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into
an illegal lease contract, which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor
of BCC; the sub-lease between WFPI and BCC is a violation of the first lease
because the cement plant, which BCC intended to operate in Wawandue,
Subic, Zambales, is not related to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCC’s
cement plant is a nuisance because it will cause pollution, endanger the health,
life and limb of the residents and deprive them of the full use and enjoyment of
their properties. The plaintiffs prayed that an order be issued: to restrain and
prohibit BCC from opening, commissioning, or otherwise operating its cement
plant; and to require the defendants to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiffs
P205,000.00 by way of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
- Defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC filed separate motions to dismiss, both
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action. BCC, in its motion, added
that: the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court; that the complaint was premature; and that the RTC has no jurisdiction
on the matter. Respondent Serrano of the DENR also filed a motion to dismiss
stating that there was no cause of action insofar as he is concerned since there
was nothing in the complaint that shows any dereliction of duty on his part.
- On December 6, 1996, Judge Ubiadas of RTC Olongapo City, Branch 72, issued
an order denying respondents’ motions to dismiss and granting the prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Pertinent portions of the order read as follows:
- The powers vested by law under Executive Order 192, Republic Act 3931 and
Presidential Decree 984 are regulatory merely and for the purpose of
determining whether pollution exists.
- However, under the laws above-mentioned, the powers granted to the DENR
thru the Pollution Adjudication Board did not expressly exclude the Courts
which under the law are empowered to try both questions of facts and law to
determine whether pollution which maybe nuisance per se or by accidents (sic)
exist or likely to exist. Under the Constitution, the courts are imbued the
inherent power of general jurisdiction to resolve these issues. While it maybe
(sic) true that petitioners might have first to seek relief thru the DENR’s
Pollution Adjudication Board a resort to the remedy provided under the
Pollution Adjudication Board is rendered useless and ineffective in the light of
the urgency that the said pollution be restrained outright in lieu of the
impending risk described in the petition. It will be noted that the DENR did not
have the power either in Executive Order 192, Republic Act 3931 and
Presidential Decree 984 to issue a writ of injunction. The argument therefore
for the exhaustion of administrative remedy and lack of jurisdiction does not
warrant the dismissal of this petition against Bacnotan Cement Corporation.
- Respondents’ motions for reconsideration were likewise denied by the trial
court in an order dated May 13, 1997. Respondent BCC then went to the Court
of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking to reverse and set aside
the orders dated December 6, 1996 and May 13, 1997 as well as to lift the writ
of preliminary injunction dated December 11, 1996.
- On April 6, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, granting BCC’s
petition. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
on February 24, 1999.
ISSUE
WON the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to
administrative agencies need not be made before going to court.
HELD
NO.
- The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be
first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of
justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still
available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to
decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going
to court. A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the
complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.
- The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with.
- As we explained in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, the thrust of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass
upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience
prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by
administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
- While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and
may be disregarded in certain instances, such as:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention,
(12) when no administrative review is provided by law,
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.
- the case does not fall under any of the exceptional circumstances.
- Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the
DENR first, is justified because they are in danger of suffering grave and
irreparable injury from the operation of respondent’s cement repacking plant
and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are
praying for.
- RA 3931, An Act Creating the National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission, was passed on June 18, 1964 to maintain reasonable standards of
purity for the waters and air of the country with their utilization for domestic,
agricultural, industrial and other legitimate purposes. It created the NPCC
which had the power, to issue, renew, or deny permits, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution.
- In 1976, Presidential Decree No. 984 was enacted to strengthen the NPCC
giving it, among others, the following:
Sec. 6. Powers and Functions – xxx
(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of
this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice
and hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must
be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine
to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the
discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of
sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof…
xxx
(j) serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of
the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
- P.D. No. 984 also empowered the commission to issue ex parte orders
directing the discontinuance or temporary suspension or cessation of operation
of an establishment or person generating sewage or wastes without the
necessity of prior public hearing whenever it finds a prima facie evidence that
the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceed the allowable standards
set by the commission.
- In 1987, Executive Order No. 192 was passed, reorganizing the DENR. It
transferred the power of the NPCC to the Environmental Management Bureau
and created the PAB, under the Office of the Secretary, which assumed the
powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution
cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984.
- In Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals, the PAB is the very
agency of the government with the task of determining whether the effluents
of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-
pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. We also recognized its power to
issue, ex parte, cease and desist orders. As a general rule, the adjudication of
pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.
Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Sciences and Technology 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
She comes from a very poor family and she was only able to go to school by
means of financial support from her relatives.
During her second semester of school year 2001-2002, she was enrolled in logic
and statistics subjects under Repondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad (her teachers)
It was in February 2002 that the college arranged a fund raising campaign
called “Rave Party and Dance Revolution”. The proceeds of this dance will be
used to construct the school’s tennis and volleyball courts.
Everyone was required to buy at least two tickets priced at 100 pesos each.
People who bought the tickets will be given additional points in their test
scores but those who did not buy will not be allowed to take the final exams.
Khristine, having no money and religious restrictions, refused to buy the
tickets.
Thus on the examination dates, she was not allowed by her two teachers,
Gamurot and Balalad, to take her final exam on statistics and logic.
The next day, the teacher announced to the whole class that khristine and
another student was not permitted to take the exam because of the failure to
buy the tickets then subsequently ejected the two from class.
Khristine continued to plead with the teachers to allow her but they kept their
stand and defended their position saying that they were complying with PCST’s
policy.
Khristine filed in the RTC as a pauper litigant against PCST and her two teachers
for damages.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the khristine’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies as they are contending that the case
should’ve been filed in the CHED (commission of higher education) and not in
the RTC
Khristine on the other hand says that prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in
nature, but one purely for damages arising from respondents breach of the
laws on human relations
RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint for the lack of cause of action. It said that
considering the case was between a school, two teachers and a student, CHED
has jurisdiction over the case and not RTC. And it dismissed the case for the
lack of cause of action without explaining their ground.
ISSUE/s:
W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
HELD:
Yes
The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies has no bearing on the present case because the petitioner was not
asking for the reversal of the policies of the PCST neither was she demanding
that the school allow her to take the final examinations (considering that she
was already enrolled in a different school). The acts of the respondent can no
longer be reversed and even if it was reversed, it would not be adequate to
redress her grievances
The Supreme Court also held that the doctrine can only be applied when there
is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of. Thus in the case at bar, the CHED does not have the power to
award damages to the petitioner.
And lastly, the doctrine cannot be applied when the issue is purely legal and
well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The petitioner’s action for
damages calls for the application of the Civil Code which falls within the
jurisdiction of the courts.
Flores vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan 2005
MAYOR EDGARDO G. FLORES, petitioner vs. SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA, GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID OF
PAMPANGA, MUNICIPAL COUNCILORS VANZALON F. TIZON, ROMULO N.
MANDAP, EDGARDO P. YAMBAO, JEROME M. TONGOL, MARCIANO L.
SACDALAN, and RICKY Y. NARCISO, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
72958 and its Resolution[2] dated June 27, 2003.
On December 19, 2001, an administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross
misconduct against then Mayor Edgardo G. Flores of Minalin, Pampanga,
petitioner, was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the same province,
one of the respondents herein. The complainants were the municipal
councilors of Minalin, namely: Vanzalon F. Tizon, Romulo N. Mandap, Edgardo
P. Yambao, Jerome M. Tongol, Marciano L. Sacdalan, and Ricky Y. Narciso, now
respondents.
The administrative complaint against petitioner alleged that on August 1, 2001,
he executed Purchase Request No. 1 for the acquisition of a communication
equipment amounting to P293,000.00 without any Resolution or Ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalin. The winning bidder was one Kai
Electronics. On August 6, 2001, or while the bidding was still being conducted,
Kai Electronics delivered the communication equipment to the municipality of
Minalin. The Notice of Award of Bid to Kai Electronics states that the bidding
took place also on August 1, 2001 when respondent executed the Purchase
Request No. 1. The communication equipment delivered by Kai Electronics was
overpriced by more than one hundred percent (100%) or in the amount
of P129,600.00.
On September 9, 2002, respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an Order
recommending to Governor Manuel M. Lapid of Pampanga, also a respondent,
that petitioner be preventively suspended from office for a period of sixty (60)
days.
Without seeking a reconsideration of the Order of respondent Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, petitioner sent a letter dated September 12, 2002 to respondent
Governor Lapid requesting him to veto the same.
Also, without waiting for respondent Governor Lapids action on his letter,
petitioner, on September 24, 2002, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari,[3] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72958. He contended that
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Order of preventive suspension, hence, the same should be
nullified.
On February 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed Order dated September 9, 2002 issued by
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga in Administrative Case
No. 02-2001 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In ruling against the petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that he failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies before going to court. Moreover,
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it issued the challenged Order considering that the allegation
of overpricing is supported by documentary evidence. There is also sufficient
evidence to prove that the bidding and the awarding of the contract to Kai
Electronics were done under questionable circumstances.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the
Appellate Court in its Resolution dated June 27, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition.
The pivotal issue here is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 72958 was prematurely filed as petitioner failed to
exhaust first all administrative remedies.
Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991)
partly provides:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint
against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
x x x;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed
before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the
Office of the President; and
x x x. (underscoring ours)
The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga in accordance with the
above provision. After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang
Panlalawigan preventively suspending him from office, petitioner should have
filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the latter the opportunity to
correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine
qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.[5]Section 1 of the same Rule requires that
petitioner must not only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in
issuing the questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[6] We have held that the plain and adequate remedy
referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Order or Resolution.[7] Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or
not.[8] To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing
so.[9] This, petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
petitioner should have first interposed a motion for reconsideration of the
questioned Order issued by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
We must add that petitioner, before filing with the Court of Appeals his
petition for certiorari, should have waited for respondent Governor Lapids
action on the recommendation of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan that
he be preventively suspended from office; and on his letter requesting the
Governor to veto the questioned Order, considering that the latter is the one
empowered by law to impose preventive suspension upon him. Section 63 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 partly provides:
SEC 63. Preventive Suspension.
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a
highly urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city
or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
x x x. (underscoring ours)
Petitioner has not shown any valid and compelling reason why, without waiting
for the Governors action on the matter, he immediately filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari. By doing so, petitioner effectively deprived the
Governor of his duty to take appropriate action on the controversy.
It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has available
remedies within the administrative machinery against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, the intervention of the courts can be
resorted to by him only after having exhausted all such remedies. [10] The
rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption that the administrative body,
if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a
given matter and decide it properly. The strict application of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies will also prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court.[11] We cannot countenance petitioners utter
disregard of this procedural norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining a just,
speedy, inexpensive and orderly judicial proceedings.
We likewise find untenable petitioners contention that
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan acted capriciously and arbitrarily by
reason of passion and personal hostility when it issued the challenged Order
without constituting itself into a Committee of the Whole, as required by its
rules of procedure, x x x and without a Committee Report having been
prepared yet x x x.[12] Suffice it to say that this issue involves an examination of
factual matters and could have been properly raised by petitioner in a motion
for reconsideration of the questioned Order before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Pampanga, the proper forum. But he did not do so. He thus
forfeited such an important procedural remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision dated February 17,
2003 and Resolution dated June 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72958 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
482 SCRA 233 (2005)
FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002
(GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains
that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30.
CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground
of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for
mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for
fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the
extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
Petitioner contends that the application of the no report, no release policy
upon independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the
principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It
contends that first, petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies as it
could have sought clarification from respondents Secretary regarding the
extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second, even
assuming that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no
exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition
with this Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts.
On the merits, respondent, glossing over the issue raised by petitioner on the
constitutionality of enforcing the no report, no release policy, denies having
strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with fiscal autonomy, it claiming
that it has applied by extension to these offices the Resolution of this Court in
A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC(Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal
Autonomy) issued on June 3, 1993, [3] particularly one of the guiding principles
established therein governing the budget of the Judiciary, to wit:
5. The Supreme Court may submit to the Department of Budget and
Management reports of operation and income, current plantilla of personnel,
work and financial plans and similar reports only for recording purposes. The
submission thereof concerning funds previously released shall not be a
condition precedent for subsequent fund releases. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Respondent proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of
petitioners budget was not on account of any failure on petitioners part to
submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. [4]
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent
applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such
administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. [5] As
petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary
of Budget and Management prior to filing the present action, its failure to do so
does not call for the application of the rule.
As for the rule on hierarchy of courts, it is not absolute. A direct invocation of
this Court's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.[6] Petitioner justifies its direct filing of the petition with this Court as
the matter involves the concept of fiscal autonomy granted to [it] as well as
other constitutional bodies, a legal question not heretofore determined and
which only the Honorable Supreme Court can decide with authority and
finality.[7] To this Court, such justification suffices for allowing the petition.
Now on the substantive issues.
That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be
enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX
(A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
In Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[8] this Court, in construing the phrase
automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reading:
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them,
held:
Websters Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary
either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely
negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of
an automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in an automatic
manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus,
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the
LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to
them from the national coffers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[9]
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations
to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy,
should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may
be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993
Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no
report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted
fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.[10]
Respecting respondents justification for the withholding of funds from
petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first
place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even
assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-
compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution.
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs teaches that [a]n
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.[11]
If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be
suspended every year, or even every month [12] that there is a shortfall in
revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering
insignificant altogether, such mandate.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to
the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and
the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent,
place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal
footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby
reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should
thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all
other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
Significantly, the Year 2002 GAA itself distinguished between two types of
public institutions in the matter of fund releases. With respect to government
agencies in general, the pertinent General Provisions of the GAA read as
follows:
Sec. 62. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No
appropriations authorized in this Act shall be impounded through deduction or
retention, unless in accordance with the guidelines for the imposition and
release of reserves and the rules and regulations for deduction, retention or
deferral of releases shall have been issued by the DBM in coordination with the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance.
Accordingly, all the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects
and activities authorized in this Act, except those covered by Special Provision
No. 1 of the Unprogrammed
Fund shall be regularly and automatically released in accordance with the
established allotment period and system by the DBM without any deduction,
retention or imposition of reserves. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or
reduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases
where there is unmanageable national government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall
be construed to mean that the actual national government budget deficit
has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year
target deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress
pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear
economic indications of an impending occurrence of such condition, as
determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and
approved by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA,
which specifically applied to offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this
Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on Human
Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections shall be automatically
and regularly released. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is
generally allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year
2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the
appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming
that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold
full release of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but
also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also
states as a guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys
Fiscal Autonomy that:
4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be
automatically and regularly released subject to availability of
funds. (Underscoring supplied)
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the
present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding.
What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total
revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total
appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it
would be practically impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or
any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without
violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own
appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional
mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a
small portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme
circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the requirements
of such agencies. To illustrate, in the Year 2002 GAA the budget for agencies
vested with fiscal autonomy amounted only to P14,548,620,000.00, which is
2.53% of the total appropriations in the amount of P575,123,728,000.00.[13] In
Year 2003 GAA, which was re-enacted in 2004, the budget for the same
agencies was P13,807,932,000.00, which is 2.27% of the total appropriations
amounting to P609,614,730,000.00.[14] And in the Year 2005, the budget for the
same agencies was only P13,601,124,000.00, which is 2.28% of the total
appropriations amounting to P597,663,400,000.00.[15]
Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower
than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be
rejected.
For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution
explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically
and regularly released.[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to
Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of
appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article
IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such
reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress
is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional
Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing
discussions, GRANTED. Respondents act of withholding the subject funds from
petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Alta Vista Golf & Country Club v. The City of Cebu, Hon. Mayor Tomas R.
Osmeña, and Teresita C. Camarillo
G.R. No. 180235 January 20, 2016
FACTS:
Alta Vista Golf & Country Club is a non-stock and non-profit corporation
operating a golf course in Cebu City. Sometime in June 1993, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cebu enacted CTO No. LXIX known as the Revised Omnibus Tax
Ordinance. It stated therein that an amusement tax of 20% of gross receipts on
entrance, playing green, and/or admission fees will be charged on golf courses
and polo grounds. In 1998, Alta Vista Golf was assessed deficiency business
taxes, fees, and other charges amounting to P3,820,095.68, including
amusement tax on its golf course. Cebu repeatedly attempted to collect from
petitioner. However, the latter refused to pay the amusement tax arguing that
the imposition of said tax by Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance,
as amended, was irregular, improper, and illegal. Also, petitioner said that
amusement tax can be only imposed operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, or places where one seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a
show or performance.Teresita Camarillo sought to collect once more from Alta
Vista Golf but the latter still argued for the same reason.
After some time, Mayor Osmefia sent petitioner a Closure Order which states
that the latter committed violations of the laws and Cebu City Ordinances. This
prompted Alta Vista Golf to file with RTC a Petition for Injunction, Prohibition,
Mandamus, Declaration of Nullity of Closure Order, Declaration of Nullity of
Assessment, and Declaration of Nullity of Section 42 of Cebu City Tax
Ordinance, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against respondents alleging that said Closure Order was
unconstitutional. Also, it alleged that Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax
Ordinance, as amended, is null and void for being ultra vires or beyond the
taxing authority of respondent Cebu City, and consequently, the assessment
against petitioner for amusement tax for 1998 based on said Section 42 is
illegal and unconstitutional; and assuming arguendo that respondent Cebu City
has the power to impose amusement tax on petitioner, such tax for 1998
already prescribed and could no longer be enforced. On the contrary,
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds, lack of
jurisdiction of RTC, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, noncompliance
with sec. 187, 252 of Local Government Code and sec 75 of RA 3857. RTC
denied the prayer of Alta Vista Golf for issuance of TRO. Meanwhile, petitioner
paid respondent the assessed amusement tax including its penalties, interests
and surcharges.
RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss adjudging that when a taxpayer
questions the validity of a tax ordinance passed by a local government
legislative body, a different procedure directed in Section 187 is to be followed.
Thus, said provision is mandatory. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Alta
Vista Golf was denied. Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court
raising pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the power of Judicial Review over the validity of a local tax
ordinance has been restricted by section 187 of the Local Government Code
HELD:
The Court recognized exceptional circumstances that justify noncompliance by
a taxpayer with Section 187 of the Local Government Code. In the case of,
Ongsuco v. Malones, it stated that, it is true that the general rule is that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have
availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him or her. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
However, there are several exceptions to this rule. The rule on the exhaustion
of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case
where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence;
and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would
clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of
judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish.
Since the parties in this case raised the issue whether Municipal Ordinance No.
98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of
a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure
question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Moreover, Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly
establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the
original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or
validity of an ordinance. The Supreme Court is vested the power to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.