[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

MONSERATE)] PUBOFF

Table of Contents
Debulgado v. CSC ...................................................................................... 1 Debulgado v. CSC
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PEDRO O. 26 September 1994
DACOYCOY .............................................................................................. 2 Feliciano, J.
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR
Facts:
M. VIARI, Petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON ................................ 5
1. Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Mayo of San Carlos City,
FELIMON LUEGO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and Negros Occidental.
FELICULA TUOZO................................................................................ 12 2. He appointed his wife Victoria as General Services Officer of the
Regis vs Osmena ...................................................................................... 14 City Government.
3. Before her promotion, she had been in the service of the City
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO vs CATALINO MACARAIG and RUBEN
D. TORRES ............................................................................................. 15 Government for 32 years.
4. Congressman Carmona questioned the appointment.
Province of Camsur vs CA, Tito Dato ...................................................... 17
GLORIA v. HON. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, ROSARIO CERILLO, Issue/Held:
and 20 other ppl ........................................................................................ 18 1. WON the appointment is valid. NO.
PLM v. IAC .............................................................................................. 19
Ratio:
Dr. Emily Marohombsar v. Ahmad Alonto Jr. (President of Mindanao 1. The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is
State Univ.) and Corazon Batara (1991).................................................... 22 set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code
MATIBAG v BENIPAYO ........................................................................ 23 of 1987 (also known as E.O. No. 292). 1
Padilla v. CSC ........................................................................................... 25 The prohibition is comprehensive. It refers to “all
appointments” whether original or promotional. Firstly, it
CSC vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ [2004] .......................................... 26 explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA ................ 27 distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments.
Corpuz v. CA Digest By LA Celebrado .................................................... 28
LAPINID V. CSC (1991) ........................................................................... 29 1
Sec. 59. Nepotism — (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
General Manager of PPA, and Anino v. Monserate ................................. 30 governmentsor in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or
of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him,
are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

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Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch
or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or
controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set
out in Section 59 itself (persons employed in a confidential
capacity, teachers, physicians, and members of the AFP). The list
appears to us to be a closed one, at least closed until lengthened
or shortened by Congress.
To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to
the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into
government service, and to insulate appointments subsequently
issued would be to render the prohibition meaningless and
toothless.
[G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.
Facts
• [November 29, 1995] George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime
Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed
with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint
against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness,
misconduct and nepotism
• Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found
a prima facie case against respondent and issued the
corresponding formal charge against him.
• After a formal investigation, the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its resolution finding respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of
the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as
driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the
Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of
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Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
• [February 25, 1997] respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for
reconsideration; this was denied.
• CA: reversed the decision and set aside the decision of the
CSC
Issue
1. WON Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism? Yes.
• The law defines nepotism[9] as follows:
o Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the
national, provincial, city and municipal governments
or in any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the
chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
exercising immediate supervision over him, are
hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word relative and
members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of
affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations
of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians,
and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Provided, however, That in each
particular instance full report of such appointment
shall be made to the Commission.
• Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if
an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
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c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
• In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who
the appointing or recommending authority is. To
constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.
• The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite
obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate
of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend
the appointment of first level employees under his
immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended
the appointment of respondents two sons and placed
them under respondents immediate supervision serving
as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions
are career positions. The unseen but obvious hand of
respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two
sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
• The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service
Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced. Debulgado
never even impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on
nepotism to only the appointing or recommending
authority for appointing a relative. In Debulgado, we
stressed that [T]he basic purpose or objective of the
prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates
that the prohibition was intended to be a
comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict
and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very
broad and comprehensive. If not within the exceptions, it
is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or
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bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As
we said in an earlier case what we need now is not only
to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding
civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and
potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict
compliance with existing legal procedures in order to
abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law.
2. Who may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
holding Dacoycoy not guilty of nepotism? It is the CSC itself,
not Dacoycoy or George P. Suan, the witness for the
government.
• The Civil Service Commission has become the
party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously
prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved
party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly
abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the
phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to
the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action. In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding
that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale
v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service
Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and
more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.
Separate Opinions (with respect to who may appeal; not syllabus issue)
Puno (Concurring)
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“As Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of Appeals
ordered that the Civil Service Commission should also be impleaded as
party respondent. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Commission
as it cleared Dacoycoy from the charge of nepotism. The question
therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded from reviewing the
decision of the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule
45. Again, I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this
review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has
even been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government.”
“But even without Suan, I submit that the nature of the issue in the
case at bar and its impact on the effectiveness of government give
the Civil Service Commission the standing to pursue this appeal. The
issue in the case at bar is basically a legal one, i.e., the proper
interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly,
this Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws. “
“According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase party
adversely affected by the decision refers alone to the respondent
government official or employee against whom the administrative case
is filed. They excluded from its compass the party complainant whose
charge is dismissed. Hence, when the respondent government official or
employee is exonerated, the decision is deemed final as the party
complainant is precluded from appealing.
I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation which is not
only too narrow but is subversive of the essence of our civil service
law…The critical question, therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent
the violation of this law and protect public interest? I submit that a
taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an
interest that appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness x x x. A taxpayer has a right to good
government and good government cannot result from appointments
determined by bloodlines…The general rule is that one who has a
right to be heard has standing to seek review of any ruling adverse
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to him. Hence, if a private citizen has the right to file an administrative
complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his
complaint, unless the law clearly precludes his right of appeal for
indubitable policy reasons.”
“There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the doctrine
of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating government officials from
charges of nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly favors officials
charged with nepotism, for while we allow further review of their
conviction, we disallow review of their exoneration, regardless of the
errors. This distorted rule contravenes our distaste against nepotism, a
practice whose continuance can fatally erode faith in government. For
another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be extirpated
wherever found, can never be the intent of our legislators who crafted
our Civil Service Law. For still another, completely cutting off access
to judicial review goes against the spirit of the 1987 Constitution
expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up borders of non-
reviewability weakens the judiciarys checking power. Indeed,
shielding abusive administrative actions and decisions from
judicial oversight will ultimately erode the rule of law. “
Romero (Dissenting)
“Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear
before the Commission, thus:
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate
officer or employee by the following officials and employees:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other
Person.[6] (Underscoring supplied)
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Consequently, the complaint can either be the Secretary of
department, head of office of equivalent rank, head of a local government
unit, chief of agency, regional director or any other person or party. The
phrase any other party has been understood to be a complainant other
than the head of department or office of equivalent rank or head of local
government or chiefs of agencies or regional directors.[7] As further
illustrated in Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807:
x x x . A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee x x x.
The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or
employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly, in Section
34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292, the Commission as one of the parties, either as complainant or
respondent in an administrative case. Logically and by necessary
implication, it cannot considered either a complainant or a
respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express
mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion
of all others.[8] Based on the foregoing, there is no other conclusion but
that the Civil Service Commission is not a party to an administrative
proceeding brought before it… An aggrieved party in an
administrative case is the government employee against whom an
administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service Commission is
definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an agency
against whom an administrative charge is filed. While it may be
argued that, in a sense, the government is an aggrieved party in
administrative proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is not
the aggrieved party contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service
Law.
G.R. No. 175352
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and
SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
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vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
Facts:
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as
having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari
are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that:
- by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC, respondent has ceased
to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of
the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
- The Consti prohibition applies based on Camporedondo v.
NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC.
- Under Flores v. Drilon, incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
- This is a taxpayer’s suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of
funds (salaries/compensation) considering that Gordon is not
entitled to his office.
Gordon asserts that:
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- Petitioners have no standing in this petition. This appears to be a quo
warranto action, however, the petitioners do not claim to be entitled
to the Senate office of respondent.
- Assuming it is QW, the petition is barred by prescription. Section 11,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be
commenced within one year after the cause of the public officer’s
forfeiture of office. ICAB, Gordon has been working as a Red Cross
volunteer for the past 40 years and was already Chairman when he
was elected Senator in May 2004. He was first elected Chairman in
2003 and re-elected in 2005.
- Assuming this is a taxpayer’s suit, petitioners failed to show that they
suffered some actual damage or threatened injury. Furthermore, no
disbursement of public funds is alleged.
- Assuming this is for declaratory relief, original jurisdiction vests in
the RTC.
- Lastly, PNRC is not a GOCC, therefore the Consti prohibition does not
apply - volunteer services is neither an office nor employment.
Issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government- owned or controlled corporation - NO
2. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a
Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution - NO
Ruling:
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,
otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-
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funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring
timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion,
gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six major
services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
1. The Philippines established the PNRC for the purpose contemplated
in the 1929 Geneva Convention 2. In order to be recognized as a
National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate
in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement
(humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service,
unity, and universality).
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by
warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or
internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as
belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where
there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion,
the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and
neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government
personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the
insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies
when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the
displaced civilians in conflict areas.
2. The Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does
not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation
from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained
2 Convention of Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick of Armies in the Field (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross Convention)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International
Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies).
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through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors,
as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter. 3
3. The government does not control the PNRC.
1.1. Under the PNRC Charter 4, only six of the thirty members of the
PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President.
Of the twenty-four members, eighteen are elected by the
chapter delegates, and six are elected by the twenty-four
members already chosen — a select group where the private
sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an
overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are
elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.
Furthermore, the PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all
corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and
all other officers of the PNRC.
1.2. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any
subordinate government official. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is
not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the
3 SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be
financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year
which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their
respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations.
4 SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed of thirty
members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter
delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the Board
already chosen. x x x.
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obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such,
does not hold a government office or employment
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch
whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under Section
16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in
rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or
boards (Rufino v. Endriga):
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers. The first
group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of
lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may
by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary,
acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked
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officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the
power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be
preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission,
the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board,
the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last
three situations, the law may not also authorize officers
other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board
to appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of
the specified offices, and in no other person. The word
"heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or
boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
1.3. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals,
particularly the PNRC Board. Decisions or actions of the PNRC
Board are not reviewable by the President. The President
cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again
that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a
government office.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the
President exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of
the President, then such office is not part of the Executive
branch (Rufino v. Endriga):
The power of control means the power to revise or reverse
the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion.
4. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
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The vast majority of PNRC members are private individuals,
including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to
the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in
the PNRC for one year. Any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be
a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even
foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC.
5. The previous ruling in Camporedondo v. NLRC failed to consider the
definition of a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 5. In ruling that the
PNRC is a GOCC, the simple test used was whether the corporation
was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public
function or by incorporation under the general corporation law.
Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then
ruled that it is a government corporation.
However, based on the Administrative Code, a GOCC must be owned
by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a
majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In
the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of
the members must be government officials holding such
membership by appointment or designation by the government.
5 SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled
corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
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Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does
not own or control PNRC.
On the 2nd issue, considering that PNRC is not a GOCC, Section 13,
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution does not apply.
Other issues:
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription
against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was
created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations,
unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by
general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the
PNRC as a "body corporate and politic," thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the
Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon
a National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this
Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis
supplied)
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with
a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Only
corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations.
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The Court in Feliciano v. COA gave the rationale for this constitution
provision - to ban private corporations created by special charters,
which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
The PNRC was created through a special charter. However, the elements
of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC.
Thus, it cannot be considered a GOCC in the absence of the essential
elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the
PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation
of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even
for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter 6, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional.
The other provisions of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be
considered as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is
the local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and
privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the
PNRC Charter implement the Philippine Government’s treaty obligations
under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National
Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by the legal government of
its country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national
legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities
in the humanitarian field."
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
The petition is an action for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in
the petition, it is action for usurpation of public office against a public
6Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,304(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the
PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
officer who committed an act which constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his public office.
Sec 1 Rule 66 ROC:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the
usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by
a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision
of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
As a rule, QW is commenced by the Government. However, under Sec. 5
Rule 66, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be
entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case
he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be
entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no
standing to file the present petition.
Petition likewise fails even if treated as a tax payer’s suit as PNRC is a
private organization performing public functions.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar
as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
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Nachura Dissent:
PNRC is a GOCC
- Gave a different interpretation of Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution - that since private corporations cannot have special
charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with
special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.
The PNRC was incorporated under R.A. No 95, a special law. Following
this logic, it cannot be anything but a GOCC.
- Upheld the ruling in Camporendondo:
Rather, crucial in the definition of GOCCC is the reference to the
corporation being "vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary." When we relate this to the PNRC
Charter, as amended, we note that Section 1 of the charter starts with the
phrase, "(T)here is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a
body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially
designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions x x x". It is beyond cavil
that the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines set forth in the
Geneva Conventions are public or governmental in character. If the
PNRC is "officially designated to assist the Republic," then the PNRC is,
perforce, engaged in the performance of the government’s public
functions.
PNRC is, at the very least,
a government instrumentality
Administrative Code of 1987 Section 2(10)
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government
not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The PNRC is vested with the special function of assisting the Republic of
the Philippines in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions. It is endowed with corporate powers. It administers special
funds—the contributions of its members, the aid given by the
government, the support extended to it by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) in terms of allotment of lottery draws. It
enjoys operational autonomy, as emphasized by Justice Carpio himself.
And all these attributes exist by virtue of its charter.
The PNRC Charter does not violate
the constitutional proscription
against the creation of private
corporations by special law
Considering that the PNRC is not a private corporation, but a GOCC or a
government instrumentality, then its charter does not violate the
constitutional provision that Congress cannot, except by a general law,
provide for the formation, organization or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government.
The respondent holds two
incompatible offices
in violation of the Constitution
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly provides that "no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including [GOCCs] or their subsidiaries, during
his term without forfeiting his seat."
A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the
benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such
regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot
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complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office." It is therefore of no avail to petitioner
that the system of government in other states allows a local elective
official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time.
The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It
provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the
above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that
within the purely parliamentary system of government no
incompatibility exists in the nature of the two offices under
consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the
incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the
constitution itself.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any
other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition
but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. x x x
xxxx
x x x x The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It
refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act
done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that
conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one who
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment. x x x
xxxx
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The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of
the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to
receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. x x x
The chairmanship of PNRC is not an ex officio capacity.
Nowhere does it say in the law that a member of the Senate can sit in an
ex officio capacity as chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Chairmanship of the PNRC Board is neither an extension of the
legislative position nor is it in aid of legislative duties. Likewise, the
position is neither derived from one being a member of the Senate nor is
it annexed to the Senatorial position. Stated differently, the PNRC
chairmanship does not flow from one’s election as Senator of the
Republic.
The fact that the PNRC Chairman of the Board is not appointed by the
President and the fact that the former does not receive any
compensation do not at all give the said position an ex officio character
such that the occupant thereof becomes exempt from the constitutional
proscription on the holding of multiple offices.
Hence, Senator Gordon, in assuming the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors while being a member of the Senate, is clearly
violating Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. While we can only
hypothesize on the extent of the incompatibility between the two
offices—as stated in petitioners’ memorandum, Senator Gordon’s
holding of both offices may result in a divided focus of his legislative
functions, and in a conflict of interest as when a possible amendment of
the PNRC Charter is lobbied in Congress or when the PNRC and its
officials become subjects of legislative inquiries. Let it be stressed that,
as in Adaza, the incompatibility herein present is one created by no less
than the Constitution itself.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition.
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FELIMON LUEGO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO
By Ron San Juan
Facts:
The petitioner Luegowas appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of
the City Mayor, by Cebu City Mayor Solon. The appointment was
described in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, as
“permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as
"temporary," subject to the following: (1) final action taken in the
protest filed by the private respondent Tuozo and another employee,
and (2) that there was no pending administrative case against the
appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision
by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment.
The Civil Service Commission found the Tuozo better qualified than the
Luego for the contested position and, accordingly, directed that Tuozo be
appointed to the position in place of Luego, revoking the latter’s
appointment in the process. Tuozo was later on appointed by the new
mayor.
Issue #1: Was the appointment of the petitioner temporary or
permanent? (Permanent)
The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent
and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority
(Mayor Solon) indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do
so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it
temporary. What was temporary was the approval of the
appointment, not the appointment itself. And what made
the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of
the appointee to the position.
Issue # 2: Whether or not the is CSC authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter? (NO)
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Under the Civil Service Law, the
Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the
appointing official on the nature or kind of the appointment to be
extended.
Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is,
of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has
been named. Such attestation is required merely as a check to assure
compliance with Civil Service Laws.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.
It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the
appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like the
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Commission on Appointments. In such cases, the confirmation by that
body was then considered part of the appointing process, which was
held complete only after such confirmation. No similar arrangement is
provided for in the Civil Service Decree.
Significantly, the CSC acknowledged that both the petitioner and the
private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That
recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it
from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the
said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent
was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on
the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
Issue # 3: What is the correct interpretation of the words “approve”
and “disapprove” in Section 9(h), Article V of the Civil Service Decree? 7
A full reading of the provision will make it clear that all the Commission
is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses
the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If
he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved.
Issue #4: Whether or not the next-in-rank rule 8 under the Civil Service
Rules was applicable. (NO)
7 9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in the civil service, except
those presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces,
firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications. (emphasis supplied)
8 "whenever there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to
the employee who is most competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service
eligibility."
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This rule is inapplicable because neither of the claimants is next in rank.
Moreover, the rule is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree allows
vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
re-employment, or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate
eligibility.
Regis vs Osmena
Davide, Jr. J.
Facts:
• This is a petition for Mandamus to compel respondents to
reinstate petitioner to his former position as driver.
• In 1958, petitioner was appointed as driver in the Motorized
Division of the Cebu Police Department. In the next 5 years,
petitioner was re-appointed as “Driver” or “Driver, Civilian
Employee” with increases in salary.
• Through a termination letter In 1964, he was removed from his
position without prior investigation or hearing. The letter stated:
“There being no more need for your service as Driver in the Cebu
Police Department, your provisional appointment thereto is
hereby terminated “
• Petitioner is a civil service eligible, having passed the patrolman
and/or detective (qualified) civil service examination on July 20,
1963 with a rating of 76.85%. The position of the petitioner, after
his removal, was filled up by the respondent City Mayor with the
appointment of Eduardo Gabiana, a non-civil service eligible.
• After his removal, he wrote letters to the Office of the President
and to the CSC protesting his removal and demanding his
reinstatement. He was not reinstated by the time this action was
filed.
CFI of Cebu: Dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner's
questioned appointment was temporary in nature and, therefore,
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power
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Issue: W/N petitioner’s dismissal was valid? NO.
Petitioner: His removal on the ground that there was "no more need for
your service" was not real and true but a mere pretext, for after his
ouster one Eduardo Gabiana, a non-civil service eligible. In the
succeeding budget of the City of Cebu more positions of driver were
created His removal was not for cause, and it was done without due
process.
Petitioner further argues that his last appointment of 7 November 1963
was approved under Section 24(c) of R.A. No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of
1959); therefore, it was a provisional and not a temporary appointment.
According to him, his appointment was provisional because at the time it
was extended he was not yet a civil service eligible. He was still awaiting
for the results of the examination for patrolman-detective. When he
became eligible upon the publication of the results of the exam, the City
Mayor should have extended to him a permanent appointment.
Respondent: Court did not cite any argument of respondent.
Court: We agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in holding
that his appointment is temporary in nature. Obviously, the trial court
failed to appreciate the clear distinction between a temporary
appointment and a provisional appointment. R.A. No. 2260, Sec 24 (c)
and (d):
(c) Provisional appointments — A provisional
appointment may be issued upon prior authorization of
the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of
the Act and the rules and standards promulgated in
pursuance thereto to a person who has not qualified in an
appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the
requirements for appointment to a regular position in the
competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the
filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service
and there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the
time of appointment.
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(d) Temporary appointment. — A person may receive a
temporary appointment to a position needed only for a
limited period not exceeding six months, provided that a
preference in filling such position be given to persons on
appropriate eligible lists.
Whereas a temporary appointment is designed to fill "a position needed
only for a limited period not exceeding six months, a provisional
appointment, on the other hand, is intended for the contingency that "a
vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the
service and there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of
appointment."
A provisional appointment may be extended only to "a person who has
not qualified in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets
the requirements for appointment to a regular position in the
competitive service," meaning one who must anyway be a civil service
eligible. On the other hand, again, in the case of a temporary
appointment, all that the law enjoins is that "preference in filling such
position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists." And merely
giving preference, of course, presupposes that even a non-eligible may
be appointed. As a matter of fact, under this provision, even if the
appointee has the required civil service eligibility, his appointment is
still temporary, simply because such is the nature of the work to be
done.
Accordingly, since there was no certificate of civil service eligibility
received by respondent City Mayor, the provisional appointment of
petitioner remained valid and subsisting. Prior to such receipt petitioner
may only be removed for cause as provided by law. That there was "no
more need" for his service was not a valid and lawful cause.
We agree, however, with the court below that the patrolman-detective
civil service eligibility of petitioner "is not intended for or appropriate to
the position of driver; hence, it did not convert his temporary [should be,
correctly,provisional] appointment of driver to a permanent one
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TOMAS D. ACHACOSO vs CATALINO MACARAIG
and RUBEN D. TORRES
FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the
Philippines to “all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, Bureau Heads,” and other government officials, he filed a
courtesy resignation.
This was accepted by the President, “with deep regrets.”
The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the
Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge.
he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his
office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in
obedience to the President’s directive.
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed
Administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner.
Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to
vacate his office.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. He then came
to this Court for relief.
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal
without legal cause. Achacoso contends that he is a member of the
Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which
is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from
the Non-Career Service. 1 Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary,
he says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree, which includes in the Career Service:
3.Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President.
His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the
above-named officials, it was “beyond the prerogatives of the President”
to require them to submit courtesy resignations. Such courtesy
resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having been
submitted “under duress,” as otherwise the President would have the
power to remove career officials at pleasure, even for capricious reasons
The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because he is
not a career official (the petitioner did not possess the necessary
qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of the POEA in
1987).
ISSUE: WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure clause
HELD: NO. The Court finds for the respondent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SECURITY OF TENURE;
PERMANENT APPOINTMENT ISSUED ONLY TO PERSONS QUALIFIED. —
A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does
not possess the required qualifications.
PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATION
DEEMED IN ACTING CAPACITY. — The mere fact that a position belongs
to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on
its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
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first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it
merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; PURPOSE. — The purpose of an acting or
temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official
functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the
selection of a permanent or another appointee.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON APPOINTEE. — The person
named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition
that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by the
appointing authority.
EXPIRATION OF TERM; METHOD OF TERMINATING TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT. — In these circumstances, the acting appointee is
separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law
of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at the
outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. When required to relinquish his office, he cannot
complain that he is being removed in violation of his security of tenure
because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the
expiration of his term. This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is
for cause as provided by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely
because his term has expired. Expiration of the term is not covered by
the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. —
The case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission is not applicable because
the facts of that case are different. The petitioner in Luego was qualified
and was extended a permanent appointment that could not be
withdrawn on the ground that it was merely temporary. In the case at
bar, the petitioner was not eligible and therefore could be appointed at
best only in a temporary capacity. The other cases he cites, viz.
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, and Dario v. Mison, are also not pertinent
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
because they also involved permanent appointees who could not be
removed because of their security of tenure.
Province of Camsur vs CA, Tito Dato
Facts: Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by governor of Camsur.
He was thereafter promoted to Assistant Provincial Warden but since he
had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, he
could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. Hence, what
was extended to him was a temporary appointment which was renewed
annually.
In 1974, then Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's
employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's
representation that he passed the civil service examination for
supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not
favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission. So he remained
on temporary appointment.
On March 16, 1976, Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by Governor
Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard
for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some
detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
On March 19, 1976, the CSC communicated to the Governor that the
status of private respondent Tito Dato has been changed from
temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for
Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made
retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and
deleted Tito Dato’s name from the petitioner's plantilla. Tito Dato was
subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he
requested the Governor for reinstatement and backwages. When his
request for reinstatement and backwages was not heeded, he filed an
action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court.
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Issue: Whether or not Tito Dato was a permanent employee of
petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended and
therefore entitled to reinstatement and backwages
Held: No. Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time
he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden in 1974, he had not yet
qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position.
Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary
and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the
pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent
obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having
passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto
convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such
as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment since a
permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary
appointment — these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority.
The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of
approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service
Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled that
CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before
it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct
the appointing authority to change the employment status of an
employee. The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person
chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it must so
attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC
is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its
participation in the appointment process ceases. In the case at bench,
CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of private
respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status
of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued
the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes
of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion
vested solely upon the latter.
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GLORIA v. HON. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN,
ROSARIO CERILLO, and 20 other ppl
J. Hermosisima, Jr.
G.R. No. 116183
October 6, 1995
Digest by Aaron Valdez
NOTE: Petitioner Ricardo Gloria was Secretary of Education, Culture,
and Sports, who took over for former Sec. Isidro Carino and Sec. Armand
Fabella. Petitioner Loleng was OIC of the PSCA.
FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force
College of Aeronautics (PAFCA), where the Board of Trustees is vested
with authority to appoint officials and employees of the college. The
Board of Trustees issued a resolution which decreed that all
faculty/administrative employees shall be subject to the required civil
service eligibilities in accordance with the civil service law. Such
resolution caused the Board of Trustees to issue temporary
appointments to respondents because they failed to meet qualification
standards for their respective positions.
One of these appointees was Rosario Cerillo, who was appointed Board
Secretary II, through a letter from the CSC which emphasized
appointments were good and renewable only up to 1992. PAFCA
relieved Cerillo because of loss of trust and confidence but was
designated as Coordinator for Extension Services.
RA 7605 converted PAFCA into a state college known as the Philippine
State College of Aeronautics (PSCA), with the Board of Trustees as the
governing body. On December 7, 1992, Col. Julian Loleng, the OIC,
informed private respondents they shall be deemed separated upon the
expiration of their appointments. Private respondents filed a case for
mandamus and reinstatement with the Pasay RTC against DECS
Secretary Armand Fabella (replaced by petitioner Ricardo Gloria) to fill
up positions in the Board of Trustees.
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Petitioners answered that mandamus will not lie to compel
reinstatement because reappointment is discretionary on the appointing
power and that respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent Judge De Guzman ordered the reinstatement of Rosario
Cerillo.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the reinstatement of Cerillo could have been the
subject of mandamus proceedings – NO
Cerillo was dismissed because of loss of confidence. The dismissal was
not contested nor appealed from by Cerillo. Her dismissal as Board
Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition
for mandamus and reinstatement filed before De Guzman. Cerillo's
assignment as "Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere
designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the
position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.
Even granting Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator for
Extension Services", her reinstatement would not be possible because
the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not
have made any valid appointment for an inexistent position. This could
be the reason she was merely designated as Coordinator. As a mere
designee, she could not have acquired any right to the position even if
the position existed. A mere "designation" does not confer upon the
designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in
an acting capacity only.
Whether or not reinstatement was proper in respect to Cerillo’s
former position as Board Secretary II – NO
Ms. Cerillo had been dismissed from this position for loss of confidence.
She did not contest the dismissal possibly because the position of Board
Secretary II is primarily confidential and the Board of Trustee found her
to be wanting in faithfulness and integrity dismissed her for that reason
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
alone. She accepted the dismissal and when designated as Coordinator
for Extension Services, she indicated acceptance by performing acts
called for by the designation.
The fact that Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after
the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel
her reappointment. Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole
factor for reappointment; other considerations are: performance, degree
of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more
importantly, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and
trust of the appointing power. The position of Board Secretary II, by its
nature, is primarily confidential, requiring "not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state." The choice of an
appointee from among those who possessed the required qualifications
is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of
wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can
best be made by the Head of the office concerned.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is
essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such
exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled
even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing
authority.
Whether or not private respondents were properly terminated -
YES
The termination of the services of private respondents was proper and
legal, it being the consequence of the Board of Trustees' power to
appoint. Either the employees' contracts lapsed or their temporary
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appointments were abrogated by circulars from the Civil Service
Commission. This is a necessary consequence of the transition from the
Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) to the Philippine
State College of Aeronautics (PSCA).
There was no termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt
act committed by a superior officer. At most, Col. Julian (Loleng) gave
notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their respective contracts.
Petitioners appointment or employment simply expired either by its
very own terms, or because it may not exceed one year, and because the
PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA. The notice given by
Loleng to the petitioners seems to have been misunderstood by them as
an act of dismissal which belongs to the Board of Trustees alone.
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees –
NO
There was merit in the petition, which bars respondents from claiming
AF. Further, this was not discussed nor justified in the body of the
assailed decision.
PLM v. IAC
GR No. L-65439 / 13 Nov 1985 / J. Gutierrez Jr.
FACTS
• Dr. Hernani Esteban was a permanent employee in the
government service for 25 years. He was officially connected with
the Philippine College of Commerce (now PUP) as it's VP for
academic affairs. The BOT abolished the position of VPAA but he
continued teaching at the said college until his transfer to the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) upon invitation of its
president, Dr. Consuelo Blanco.
• Dr. Esteban was initially extended an ad interim appointment as
the VP for Administration in 1973 by Dr. Blanco.
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
• The secretary of the Pamantasan handed him a 'Notification of
Confirmation of Temporary Appointment' making his appointment
extend until 30 Jun 1974. This was subsequently renewed by the
secretary two more times until 1975.
• In June 1975 Dr. Esteban received the same notification of
renewal of his temporary appointment until 1976, but in July of the
year he discovered that he was not included in the list of
employees recommended for permanent appointments. He wrote
to Dr. Blanco requesting the conversion of his temporary
appointment to a permanent one considering his two and a half
years of service.
• Dr. Blanco answered unfavorably to his request for reasons
unmentioned in the case.
• He received on August a 'Notification of Ad Interim Appointment'
that he was appointed as Professor III, and further designated him
as Director of the Institute of Continuing Education and
Community Service. A few days later Dr. Blanco issued a
memorandum terminating his appointment as VP for
Administration. His appointment effective until June 1976 has
been withdrawn before it could be confirmed by the Pamantasan
Board of Regents.
• Dr. Esteban appealed to the CSC for the protection of his tenure
at the Pamantasan.
CSC to the MSB - sadyang magulo dahil walang katapusang MR
• On 9 Oct 1975 the CSC ruled that the appointment was of a
temporary nature and thus may be terminated at any time at the
discretion of the appointing official.
• On MR the CSC reversed saying that Dr. Esteban was fully
qualified for the position of VP for Administration and certified
him for appointment under permanent status.
• On MR by the Pamantasan, the CSC then said that the
certification should not be interpreted as directing the
reinstatement of Dr. Esteban (confusing said the court)
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• MR by Dr. Esteban of this order was denied, but he asked for
another review of his termination after the denial, and also asked
for payment of his salaries. The Commission referred the payment
of salaries to the university treasurer but again modified its
resolution and said that the president did not have any authority to
extend an ad interim appointment as only the Board of Regents
was empowered to do that under the University Charter. Both
parties again filed MRs.
• In 1978 PD 1409 created a Merit Systems Board in the CSC to
hear and decide cases on personnel matters. The Board required
the Pamantasan to submit its complete records in appoitnment
and termination of Dr. Esteban as VP for Administration.
• The Pamantasan did not submit a copy of Board Reso 485 passed
20 June 1973 confiring the ad interim appointments of several
academic and non-academic personnel of said university, including
Dr. Esteban effective 21 May 1973. The Commissioner directed the
Pamantasan to submit any document directly showing that Dr.
Esteban was appointed in a permanent capacity, but despite the
existence of this resolution, the Pamantasan replied that "we
cannot find any document…"
• Because of this failure the Commission concluded that his
appointment as VP for Administration was approved as
permanent. It cited Governemnt of the Philippine Islands vs Martinez
that when a party has possession or power to produce the best
evidence and withholds it, the presumption is the evidence is
withheld for some sinister motive and production with thwart the
evil or fraudulent purpose. The Commission declared his
termination as illegal and directed the payment of full backwages.
• The Pamantasan filed an MR and submitted for the first time
Board Reso 485. The Commission denied the MR and said that
upon confirmation of the Board the ad interim appointment
became permanent.
The Courts, finally
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
• Pamantasan filed a petition for certiorari with the CFI. The CFI
reversed the CSC and adopted the earlier ruling holding that Dr.
Esteban's appointment was invalid (no authority by the president)
though he may be considered a de facto VP up to the date the
commission ruled that his appointment was temporary.
• On appeal, the IAC reversed the trial court, and ordered his
reinstatement with full backwages.
ISSUE
• W/N Dr. Esteban's appointment is temporary. NO
o But IAC decision modified, instead of full backwages, just
5 years, as is "just and equitable".
RATIO
• Dr. Esteban had been extended several ad-interim appointments.
But under Philippine law, the term ad interim does not mean the
usual "for the meantime". But that is not the meaning under
Philippine law. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which
said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the
Pamantasan in the meantime, while the BOR which is originally
vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is
unable to act.
• In Summers v. Ozaeta
" an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of
paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides that the President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.' lt is an appointment
permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character."
• Not only is the appointment in question an ad interim
appointment, but the same is also a confirmed ad interim
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appointment. In its Board Reso 485 the Pamantasan BOR verified
Dr. Esteban's appointment without condition nor limitation as to
tenure.
• The Pamantasan argues that all the notices of appointments and
renewals were temporary with fixed commencement and
termination dates "unless sooner terminated". However, the IAC
correctly held that In case of conflict between a notification issued
by the Secretary of the University which is supposed to reflect the
true content of a Board Resolution and the Resolution itself of said
Board of Regents of said University, the latter is controlling for
obvious reasons. The Secretary of the University has no authority
to alter or add something which is not provided for in the
Resolution of the Board of Regents
• If Dr. Esteban's appointment was intended to be temporary, it
should have been expressly stated. It cannot be made to rest on
inconclusive evidence, specially because a temporary appointment
divests the temporary appointee of the constitutional security of
tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil service
eligible.
• Further supporting Dr. Esteban's stand is the list of permanent
personnel which was submitted to the Commission by the
university president for recognition of their permanent status by
the Commission. The permanent status of private respondent's
appointment as VP for Administration was recognized by the CSC
in its first Indorsement
Quote:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities.
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
lt is a prerogative of the appointing power that may be availed of
without liability, provided however, that it is exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid agreements, and
provided further, that such prerogatives are not exercised in a
malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out
of malice or spite.
Dr. Emily Marohombsar v. Ahmad Alonto Jr.
(President of Mindanao State Univ.) and Corazon
Batara (1991)
FACTS
(1) Petitioner is a career employee of Mindanao State University for
27 years. Prior to the controversy, she served as Vice President
of External Affairs.
(2) Jan 1989 – Petitioner’s position was merged with the Office of
the Vice Chancellor and she was “appointed” as Vice Chancellor
by the President (respondent Alonto) in an ACTING CAPACITY.
a. The MSU Board of Regents confirmed this designation in
a resolution.
b. Substantially all junior officers under the President were
likewise reassigned and designated merely in acting
capacities.
(3) Petitioner refused the offer of a different permanent position
offered by the President and chose to stay with the Office of the
Vice Chancellor. The President replaced her with respondent
Corazon Batara.
(4) Petitioner challenges her removal from the position.
(5) Side issue: there was a motion to cite the President in contempt
(denied by SC).
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ISSUE: WON petitioner can be removed from her position without cause
(i.e. was her right to security of tenure violated?)
SC: Security of Tenure violated. Petitioner to be reinstated to her
position as Vice Chancellor and made permanent until the end of her
three year term or until her tenure is otherwise validly terminated.
General Rule: A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is
essentially temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such
appointment may be removed without hearing or cause. Also, a person
who accepts such appointment waives the right to invoke security of
tenure as a ground for assailing his removal.
Exception: Where the appointment is not bona fide, i.e. it was
intentionally made to circumvent the petitioner’s right to security of
tenure. The court draws analogy with the rule that the head of office
cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions into confidential items
so he can freely fire or hire at his discretion. (Piñero v. Hechanova)
The Court may validly inquire into the true nature of an acting
appointment to determine if it is bona fide.
IN THIS CASE: Circumstances surrounding her appointment point to an
attempt to violate right to security of tenure
(1) MSU Code of Governance Sec 40.5 par 22 grants the President
the power to designate officers in an acting capacity but only for
a period of less than one year  in this case, it was indefinite.
(2) BoR had to confirm the appointment  this indicates that it was
an ad interim appointment made permanent by the confirmation,
and not merely a designation of OIC which does not require BoR
approval.
(3) Substantially all officers suffered the same fate. “to hold the
sword of Damocles over the head of all MSU employees and
officers”.
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
Another Argument from Respondent: Petitioner was already in the
position of PROFESSOR VI. This precludes her from becoming
permanent at the Vice Chancellor position.
(1) SC response: Comparing to Tapales v. President and BoR of
University of the Philippines  The fact that one is a permanent
professor does not detract from the permanent nature of an
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION. Especially if confirmed by the
Board of Regents, as was the case here.
Finally: The fact that she turned down an offer for a different
permanent position from the President does not support the latter’s case
because (a) the position offered was in effect a demotion even from her
prior Vice President position (b) she cannot be compelled to accept it (c)
there is no showing of any interest of the service that would be served by
forcing it upon her.
MATIBAG v BENIPAYO
FACTS
1. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on
Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation However, the
Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments.
2. On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same
positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on
February 2, 2008.They took their oaths of office for a second
time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001
their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation
3. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments
could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of
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Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. The Office of
the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to
the Commission on Appointments. They took their oaths of office
anew
4. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a
Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as
Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID,
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning
petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-
in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioners reassignment
in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the
COMELEC en banc.Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned
Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the
EID in the reassignment of petitione
5. On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider
her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department. Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding
heads of government offices that transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period beginning
January 2 until June 13, 2001. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, which states in part:
6. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively.
7. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments ofBenipayo,
Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman
and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department.
ISSUES
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the
President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution—NO
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until
such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can
no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The
fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly
without basis.
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In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint
permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were
extended permanent appointments during the recess of
Congress. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to
make appointments that take effect immediately.
2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the
first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad
interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office
to the same positions violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution;--NO
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor
by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad
interim appointment because the disapproval is final under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can
be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there
is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in
the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
3. Whether or not Benipayos removal of petitioner from her
position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to
the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having
been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a
collegial body;
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every
transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should
carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body.
Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such
concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since
the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel
transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly
useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what
it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of
personnel, without need of securing a second approval from
the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer
or reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized
by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The
person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo.
The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300,
approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayos order
reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department
does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election
Code. For the same reason, Benipayos order designating
Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable.
Padilla v. CSC
FACTS:
 Remedios Padilla (Padilla) assumed the permanent position of Clerk II
in the Ministry of Labor and Employment and was thereafter
promoted to the position of Labor Development Assistant, assuming
her new position without waiting for the approval of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
 The CSC disapproved Padilla's appointment on the ground that she
failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the position.
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 The Officer-in-Charge of the Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies,
sought reconsideration of CSC's ruling, pointing out Padilla's
satisfactory performance, which was denied.
 Padilla resigned from the service for personal reasons and took the
Career Service Examination (Professional Level), after passing which,
she re-applied at the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and was appointed as Casual Research Assistant.
 Following the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 (Salary
Standardization Act of 1989), casual items were abolished and Padilla
was offered the position of Clerk II, which she declined.
 Padilla was appointed Casual Clerk III, after the expiration of which,
she was no longer given any position.
 Padilla appealed her alleged termination as casual employee to the
CSC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time.
 Padilla filed a letter-complaint addressed to Department of Justice,
which was forwarded to the CSC, which dismissed the same.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC had the power to revoke the
appointment of a public officer whose qualification did not meet the
minimum requirements of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Padilla’s termination was legal.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
 Padilla voluntarily resigned after having occupied the permanent
position of Clerk II before the disapproval of her appointment for
Labor Development Assistant, a higher permanent position.
 After returning to the service, she occupied casual positions only,
despite passing the eligibility requirement for a permanent position.
 Like removal for just cause, voluntary resignation results in the
abdication of all present and future rights accorded to an employee
and in the severance of all work-related ties between the employer and
the employee.
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
 When she returned to work for the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), the same was not a continuation of her previous
service but the start of a new work slate.
 Padilla could no longer demand from DOLE her reinstatement to a
permanent position as she was never unjustly removed.
 When Padilla re-applied for, and was offered the position of Casual
Research Assistant and later Casual Technical, she readily and
unqualifiedly accepted the said offer, and, having accepted the position
of a casual employee, she should have known that she had no security
of tenure and could thus be separated from the service anytime.
 After finishing her contract as a Casual Technical, DOLE offered to her
the permanent position of Clerk II, for which the Selection Board
deemed her qualified, but she declined the offer in favor of another
casual position as Casual Clerk III.
 On the ground of estoppel, Padilla is barred from asserting her right to
a permanent position.
CSC vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ [2004]
facts
• Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office
as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.
• Prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office
(ATO).
• Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO
formally filed with the DOTC her protest against the promotional
appointment of respondent claiming that he did not meet the four-
year supervisory requirement for said position.
• DOTC Sec: protest without merit.
• Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Sec to the CSC-NCR.
• CSC-NCR: recalled the approval of respondents appointment
issue
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WON Saturnino met the minimum experience requirements as of the
date of the protestees appointment to the contested position. YES.
ratio
• The contested position requires
o four years of work experience in position/s involving
management
o AND/OR four years of experience in planning, organizing,
directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of
air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing,
rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and
regulation of the activities of flying schools
• The use of the term and/or means that the word and and the word or
are to be used interchangeably. The use of the disjunctive term or in
this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause
or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a
prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify.
• Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work
experience to qualify for the contested position if the managerial
standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. But,
the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of
his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the
second clause.
• Rapisora vs. CSC the rule that appointees must possess the
prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly
interpreted as to curtail an agencys discretionary power to appoint,
as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by
law.
• The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the
proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al., in the appointment or
promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only
their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education,
work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency
examinations and seniority. The appointing authority has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and
left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that
of the appointing authority.
• There is no reason to disapprove the appointment of respondent as
Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office considering that he is
fully qualified and evidently the choice of the appointing authority.
Between the Commission and the appointing authority, we sustain
the latter.
• But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent failed to
meet the experience requirement to qualify for the contested
position, we are still inclined to uphold the CAs approval of
respondents appointment. Petitioner itself has, on several occasions,
allowed the appointment of personnel who were initially lacking in
experience but subsequently obtained the same.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR.
DARANGINA - Buenaventura
FACTS:
1. Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in
the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA).
2. He was extended a temporary promotional appointment as
Director III, Plans and Policy Services.
3. CSC approved the temporary appointment.
4. New OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment,
ground: Not Career Executive Service Eligible.
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5. CSC disaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was al
so not eligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid
backwages until the expiration of his 1 yr temporary
appointment.
6. CA reinstated Darangina.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
HELD:
CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED.
No reinstatement & back wages, only salary from appointment until
termination. With the expiration of his term upon his replacement, there
is no longer any remaining term to be served. Administrative Code of
1987Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5Section 27.
Employment Status. – Appointment in the career service shall be
permanent or temporary. (1)Permanent Status. A permanent
appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed, including appropriate
eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and
standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and it
becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temp
appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate
civil service eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment shall
not exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a
qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
Corpuz v. CA Digest By LA Celebrado
Atty. David B. Corpuz vs.
Court of Appeals, and Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board
G.R. No. 123989 | January 26, 1998 | 1st Div. | Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
CORPUZ was appointed as the MTRCB’s Legal Counsel (approved by CSC
and designated as Attorney V under the Salary Standardization Law).
MTRCB passed Resolution No. 8-1-91 entitled “An Act to Declare the
Appointments of the Administrative and Subordinate Employees of this
Board as Null and Void.” This noted that the past and present Chairmen
of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the appointments of
administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB 9 before
forwarding them to the CSC; thus, considered invalid and MTRCB made
the holding of these positions in a holdover capacity in the meantime.
Then, Mendez was appointed MTRCB Chairman. New members of the
Board were likewise appointed. She was informed about Resolution No.
8-1-91. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members was then
constituted to look into the appointments extended by former Chairman
Morato. The Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the
approval of the appointments, except that of CORPUZ and seven others.
CORPUZ filed a complaint with the CSC requesting a formal investigation
and hearing.
9 Section 16. Organization Patterns; Personnel. -- The Board shall determine its organizational
structure and staffing pattern. It shall have the power to suspend or dismiss for cause any
employee and/or approve or disapprove the appointment, transfer or detail of employees. It shall
appoint the Secretary of the Board who shall be the official custodian of the records of the
meetings of the Board and who shall perform such other duties and functions as directed by the
Board.
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Mendez stated that she discovered that the appointments extended by
Morato were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval; hence to cure
the defect, she submitted the appointments to the MTRCB.
Afterwards, CSC promulgated a resolution granting the MTRCB authority
to fill up positions vacated in the agency due to appointments which
were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval.
However, in another Resolution, the CSC ruled in favor of CORPUZ,
because his appointment was signed by then Chair. Morato, as the duly
authorized signatory of MTRCB appointments. All the appointments
signed by Mr. Morato in his capacity as MTRCB Chairman are presumed
to have been made after complying with all the legal requirements
including the Board approval, whether express or implied.
In the meantime, CORPUZ became a permanent employee of the
Ombudsman.
The MTRCB filed petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals declared
null and void the said resolution of the CSC, since the appointment of
CORPUZ was not approved by the MTRCB. CORPUZ’s motion for
reconsideration is also denied by CA.
ISSUE:
WON CORPUZ’s appointment is valid? (NO)
HELD:
NO. There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB personnel,
other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by the Chairman
which is accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper 10; and
(b) approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment.
10 Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1986, the MTRCB is composed of a Chairman, a Vice-
Chairman and thirty (30) members, all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Section 5
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the
power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined
upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence
of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however,
the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the
commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when
such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment
becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is
performed. Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim no
vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure.
Hence, in the case of CORPUZ, since the last act required for the
completion of his appointment, viz., approval by the MTRCB itself, was
not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately disapproved it,
his appointment ceased to have effect, if at all, and his services were
properly terminated.
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials resulting
in non-observance of the requirements of law or rules to complete the
appointment does not render the requirements ineffective and
unenforceable.
A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete
appointment is merely a de facto officer for the duration of his
occupancy of the office for the reason that he assumed office under color
of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise. Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ
was such a de facto officer.
thereof enumerates the following functions, powers and duties of the Chairman as the Chief
Executive Officer of the MTRCB, to wit:
(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by
the BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and
recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate
personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically
lodged in the BOARD.
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LAPINID V. CSC (1991)
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.
The Facts:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine
Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the
Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988.
This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by
private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier
representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9,
1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee
dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated
terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view
of his preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case,
the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It is thus obvious
that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge
over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants
Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal
Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio
Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to
any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications,
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the
implementation hereof.
Decision:
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals,[2] this Court said:
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this
nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the Civil ServiceLaw, and when it finds the
appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been
otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by
the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified
for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and
prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of
the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment
simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for
that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the
appointing authority.
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant
position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of
the Department Head or appointing authority and not in
the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in an office calls for
both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as
age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars
attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as
resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition,
prospects for the future, and best interests of the service. Given the
demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head
of the Office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are
satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard
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Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court
cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper
cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the
appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is
the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter
addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is
a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no
power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
respondent Civil ServiceCommission dated February 14, 1990,
May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
General Manager of PPA, and Anino v. Monserate
Facts:
- Julieta Monserate started as Bookkepper II in the Port
Management Office, Iloilo PPA
- She was promoted to Cashier II and then to Finance Officer
- In 1988, Monserate applied for the permanent position of
Manger II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division
- Dumlao, the General Manager of PPA, appointed Monserate; CSC
approved her appointment
- Ramon Anino, who ranked 2nd to respondent as per the
Comparative Data Sheet, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA
Appeals Board, protesting Monserate’s appointment
- The said board sustained the protest, and rendered ineffective
Monserate’s appointment based on “(1) CSC MC No. 5-1988, par
3; (2) CSC MC No. 10-1986, par a, 1.2 and par b; and (3) Civil
Service Eligibility” all of which were without further explanation
- She received a PPA Special Order which indicated that Anino was
Manager II and not her
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
- Monserate filed with the PPA Manager an appeal/request for
clarification, questioning her replacement, claiming that thte
proceedings before the Appeals Board were irregular
o There was no notice of hearing
o She was not furnished the Resolution of the Appeals
Board, nor the copy of the protest
o She was not informed of the reasons behind her
replacement
o Their Port Manager in Iloilo, who was then an official
member of the Board, was not included in the
proceedings
- Monserate received another PPA Special Order, reassigning her
to Administrative Officer (SG-15), which was Anino’s former
position, and was lower than her previous position as Finance
Officer (SG-16), prior to her botched appointment
- Due to the inaction of the General Manager, she filed with the
CSC precautionary appeal, manifesting that she was yet to
receive a copy of the Appeals Board resolution
- Thereafter, she received a copy of her appointment as Admin
Officer, which she has since been discharging the functions
thereof; she likewise learned that the General Manager had just
issued Anino’s appointment (both in contrast to the Special
Orders)
- In 1989, Monserate filed an appeal formally protesting against
Anino’s appointment, and the propriety of the Appeals Board
resolution
- After 6 years, CSC dismissed her appeal:
"It is well-established rule that an appointment, although
approved by this Commission, does not become final
until the protest filed against it is decided by the agency
or by the Commission. Although Monserate had already
assumed the position of RMD Manager II, the appointing
authority may still withdraw the same if a protest is
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seasonably filed. This is covered by Section 19, Rule VI of
the Omnibus Rules implementing EO 292 x x x.
"Monserate's claim that she is more qualified than Anino
is not relevant to the issue before this Commission. In
cases of protest filed or appealed to the Commission, the
main question to be resolved is whether or not the
appointee meets the qualification standard. x x x. The
Commission will not disturb the choice of the appointing
authority as long as the appointee meets the qualification
prescribed for the position in question."
- Monserate appealed to the CA which sustained her appeal:
o PPA Appeals Board resolution was not supported by
evidence
o Irregularity in the issuance of the resolution (lack of
proper notice)
o Reassignment from Manager II to Admin Officer was a
demotion violative of her right to security of tenure and
due process
- In 1997, Anino retired from the government service
- General Manager and Anino’s arguments:
o No demotion; demotion is in the nature of an
administrative penalty; since there was no such charge
and conviction, there is no demotion
o Displacement was due to the aftermath of PPA
reorganization
o Her appointment as Manager II did not become final until
the protest filed against her was favorably decided in her
favor by CSC, citing Admin Code, sec 19
o Head of agency, being the appointing authority, is the one
most knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the
functions of the office; he/she has a wide latitude of
choice subject only to the condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law
 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)] PUBOFF
Issue (1): "On eligibility, she has a Career Service Professional eligibility
while the private respondent only has a First Grade Civil Service
w/n Monserate’s right to due process was violated Eligibility.
Holding and Ratio: Yes. "She added that she was not aware of any proceeding on her
demotion as a Division Manager. As a matter of fact, it was only
The PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with her demotion. It
upon her initiative sometime during the latter part of November,
was precisely because of the reorganization that Monserate applied for
1988 that she was able to obtain a copy of the August 11, 1988
Division Manager II. The comparative data sheet, accomplished by the
Resolution of the Appeals Board. The resolution sustained the
PPA Reorganization Task Force, shows that she ranked first from among
private respondent's appointment as Division Manager even if on
6 contenders. It was only after such reorganization, and in fact nothing
August 11, 1988, he was not yet extended any appointment. As a
else but by virtue of the Resolution sustaining Anino’s protest that she
matter of fact, he was appointed only on October 1, 1988 (should
got demoted.
be October 21, 1988).
Moreover, the dispositive portion of the said Resolution appears
"Furthermore, she said that the resolution of the PPA Appeals
irregular. It “upholds” the appointment of Anino, when in fact, Anino was
Board appears irregular, if not null and void. She was never
yet not appointed as Manager II at that time; it was Monserate who was
notified of any proceeding; she was not furnished either a copy of
appointed. In any case, Anino’s official appointment was not issued until
the resolution. What she received instead was a Special Order
2 months after the said resolution. The PPA Appeals Board could not
dated September 29, 1988 already ordering her demotion. She
uphold an appointment which did not yet exist.
was not at all given the opportunity of defending herself before
Equally questionable are the grounds for sustaining the protest. The the Appeals Board.
enumeration is incomprehensible for lack of discussion by the Board to
"x x x.
enable Monserate to know the reasons for her demotion. CA was correct
in nullifying the resolution of the Appeals Board for lack of evidence and "In the case now before us, the petitioner did not receive or was
proper notice: not given a copy of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the
Appeals Board. She did not even know that she was demoted
“Of the CSC MC No. 5, the petitioner had no pending
until after she received a copy of the the Special Order No. 479-
administrative or criminal case at the time of her appointment as
88."
Manager. x x x.
Substantial and procedural irregularities attended Monserate’s
"With respect to the CSC MC No. 10, Par. A (1.2) and Par. B, the
demotion. It is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security
processing, review, evaluation and recommendation of her
of tenure and due process.
appointment as Manager II, passed several committees created
by the PPA. x x x. Moreover, she had a 1.9 average performance
rating compared to the private respondent who only got 2.03. x x
x.
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 [DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) – APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V. MONSERATE)]
In Aquino v. CSC, “once an appointment is issued and the moment the
appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the
position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of
the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing.”
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in
the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in
the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of
appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and
functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked
by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for
cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the
revocation.
Thus, CA merely restored her appointment to said position; position
never became vacant since her demotion was void. Consequently,
Anino’s appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null
and void ab initio.
Re: Anino’s incumbency:
Anino is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of
his incumbency. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office
and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or
election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular.
Re: backwages:
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during
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the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer)
occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de
facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and
must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he
received during the period of his wrongful tenure.
In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, SC
allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services
rendered but only when there is no de jure officer, thus:
"x x x in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer
who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office."
GR: Where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his
wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the
office, even if he occupied the office in good faith.
HOWEVER, rule cannot be applied squarely on the present case in view
of its peculiar circumstances. Monserate had assumed under protest the
position of Administrative Officer which position she currently holds.
Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments, salary and other
compensation attached to such office. While her assumption to said
lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments
cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful
office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the
period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only
to backpay differentials (difference between the salary rates for the
positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer) for the period
starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of
her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager.
The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time
he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of his
retirement on November 30, 1997.