JOSE A.

ANGARA, petitioner, (8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"
vs. alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.. member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by
Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first
assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23,
1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National
Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters
involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
[No. 8]

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES
of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3
NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
(should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean,
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission
como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
interposing the following special defenses:

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage
of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the
last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within
its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules
and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that
in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and
hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral
Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own
rules:
 (c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the
following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no
existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should
be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of
the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the
Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the
last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over
the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a
writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its
members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to
deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial
functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of
the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States)
has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance
of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing
upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of
the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of
jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would
hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither
would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction
squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill
may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the
case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever
he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent
through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other
than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would
be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . .
the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to
pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and
court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein
petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no
effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to
the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said
date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican
government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is
thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose,
namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does
not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental
law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound
to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall
have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if
the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be
in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret,
so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine
whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and
history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may
properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the
assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5,
Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the
Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature
was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional
Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of
Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the
vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the
Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be
designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is
also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the
Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in
awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September
24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any
of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members
elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of
1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship
Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral
legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
 (6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by
the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party
having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the
whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled
and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made
on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph
6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is
not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I
arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page
11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to
elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the
phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the
sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing
to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the
assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of
those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the
assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives
confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the
matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay. Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it
makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends
there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its
there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries members?
to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man
who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question. Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the
question before the Electoral Commission.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its
first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested.
the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When
there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass
upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by
Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft
and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la
eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien
razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the
election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido
protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation
also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la
Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal
Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como
los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by
a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the
minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation
to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus
maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over
by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to
effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase
"judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in
the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of
the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in
the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of
controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement
of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and
investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with
their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee
they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with
their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house.
The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case
was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select
committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of
the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been
tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending
factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his
government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher
importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons,
undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament."
In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following
terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their
private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of
the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the
discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members
of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
 parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they
should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the
approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law
since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for
the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many
of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the
leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected
to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk
of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of
Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has
become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions
Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p.
408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House
of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all
protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of
the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National
Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July
1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no
means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral
votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229),
creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House
of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The
decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much
of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field,
who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and
its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.),
the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years
and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the
world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with
the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a
composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the
Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution
of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of
the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the
power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining
the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters
will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and
necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government
and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission
in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation
of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating
to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative
authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the
members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is
no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an
Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary.
We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the
exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases
entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes,
and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the
with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record —
cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction. First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable character
Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478,
that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government
must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to
was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its
herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings
members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the
confirmation.
Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election
protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had Summarizing, we conclude:
actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into
Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the
National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the
barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode delimitation of the powers granted.
and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could
not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests allocate constitutional boundaries.
had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the
initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and
election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to
the source of all authority.
its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution of the governments.
before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935). (f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is
neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and
the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of
office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in
order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges'
decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being
informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such
directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or
decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and
manner of filing protests.

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time ( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ
when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec.
 devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house
of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been
filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to
prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for
filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and
as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine
whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and
516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO
vs. BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
vs. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, vs.
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs. vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE,
JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA,
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL- EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO
HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY- LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES
AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, x---------------------------------------------------------x

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

x---------------------------------------------------------x
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003 REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, x---------------------------------------------------------x
MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY
HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents. NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF
x---------------------------------------------------------x
THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003 VENECIA, respondents.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, x---------------------------------------------------------x

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents. VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
x---------------------------------------------------------x
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

x---------------------------------------------------------x

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents. IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY.
DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-
RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
vs. power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
x---------------------------------------------------------x
ARTICLE XI
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
Accountability of Public Officers
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP,
CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP,
modest lives.
INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L.
JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
CHAPTER, petitioners, trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
vs. impeachment.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may
appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship
among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which
has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments
thereon.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
conscience.
year.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds
to, not departure from, the Constitution.
of all the Members of the Senate.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
sovereign people.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant
between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
RULE V
are deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
distinctions
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same official.
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No (Italics in the original; emphasis and
impeachment proceedings shall be underscoring supplied)
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one (1)
RULE V year.
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3
Section 16. – Impeachment On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first impeachment complaint) against
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
In cases where a Member of the betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
House files a verified complaint of B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 8 in
impeachment or a citizen files a accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
verified complaint that is endorsed
of by a Member of the House through a
resolution of endorsement against Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
an impeachable officer, by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
impeachment proceedings against Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
such official are deemed initiated on Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
the day the Committee on Justice session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
finds that the verified complaint consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
and/or resolution against such
official, as the case may be, is The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but
sufficient in substance, or on the voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the Committee Report to this
date the House votes to overturn or effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
case may be, is not sufficient in House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary General of
substance. the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
In cases where a verified complaint Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
or a resolution of impeachment is
filed or endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
Members of the the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
House, impeachment proceedings that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
are deemed initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of
complaint or resolution of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
impeachment with the Secretary for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
General. and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that
his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with
Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
Within a period of one (1) year from records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
the date impeachment proceedings permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case
are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and
for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding
with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of
public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ
of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring
petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as
members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment
proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of
senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and
the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying
and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner
Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what
its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16
and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction
which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding
generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the
second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of
the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition
are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and
substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents
Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to
do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have
an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue
"which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit
thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be
prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment
by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they
have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed
before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought
similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives
adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed
on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate
the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on
the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-
respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under
the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying
that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c)
include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating
that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time
of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal
issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground
that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave
of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued
by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at
what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them
to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission 23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice
Laurel discoursed:
 x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill
of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly,
the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution,
such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it
was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review
was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of
checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican
form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x
x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
 The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain. light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, it declared:
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people,
but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this
Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
xxx
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.When
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty
to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared: render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45 (Emphasis supplied)

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case
but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for
beyond the reach of judicial review.47 writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49 in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review,
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation
legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise
in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member
grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the of the National Assembly.
Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the
umbilical cord."
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
Standing
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils
of judicial willfulness and pride."56
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining
questions.69
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the
Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded
standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his
rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept
of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. 74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it
behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or
in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have
been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives
as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous
to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all
members of the class whether or not they were before the court. 89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365
as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will
stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro
U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency
or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can
take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in
G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on
the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R.
No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority
members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310
were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention
with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a
point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to
fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer,
he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition
do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 94 (Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a
member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it
is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the
alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied
with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being
the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice
of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines
that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even
assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by
way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself,
cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of
the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with
the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or
otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its
stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the
political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the
political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it
being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases
during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this
Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest
among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary
has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after
all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the
President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes
cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the
presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up
by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
case.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

xxx
I suppose nobody can question it.

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been
notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there
had been no referendum.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question"
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon
the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
xxx
regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on
the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is
22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that judicial power? What is a political question?
the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law
was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of
any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them
rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced
in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely
wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them,
agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some
but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
human dignity."
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on
which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with or enforceable . . .
such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion
 Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial
power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to
whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale
of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of
cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to
decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 108 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The
American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
 clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These
standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the
conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under
the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. 113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high
crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other
high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even
a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon
such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and
32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question
is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of
the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the
related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint
is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary. 121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader
than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners
have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited.
Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
 investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled
to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the
"verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the
exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same
merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states
that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x" 124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been
calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that
the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional
issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of
the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional
ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made
easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court,
has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review
includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not
assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125But this argument
is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the
House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may
not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon
the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested
party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable
duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions.
For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person,
interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This
Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that
no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when
once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme
or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
 disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. benefits.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone
States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction 3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the original)
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial
review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows: As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not
the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question
of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment
can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by
its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge
to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts
v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on
behalf of all its citizens.
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to
avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to
remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also
 political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's
prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to
grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the
way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would
behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet
there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social
upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by
law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes
the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does
not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one
year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore,
in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became
an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it
twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the
first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments
of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a
middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of
those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation
is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated
but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction
there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings,
copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution
covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing
of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts
on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style
could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with
me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration
will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from
lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and
insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
 "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United
States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always
carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will
mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping
with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings"
as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however,
that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of
all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It
takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either
by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted
to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate
for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is
the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,
because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding,
not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3
(1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a
misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it
is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint
to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing
and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid
in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so
absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's
balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this
Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice
Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and
proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only
it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that
it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice
Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination
of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire
into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree
that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even
in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court.
It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It
appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a
quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported
to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence
of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this
rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum,
nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length
of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it
did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers. 154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
 xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline
to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character,
the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to
upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the
1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations
not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case
at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We
will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword
that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not
the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide
on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal
Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing
more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the
US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive
power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our
individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course
this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks
have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business,
retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the
official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically
asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were
knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that
may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court
found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial
review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental
law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.
Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be
had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a
regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive
and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society
upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on
said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power
to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed
justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations
or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be
trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the
limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a
case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men
before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of
legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and
neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in
law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to
what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have
found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic
process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this
court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal
red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps
were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is
sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits
that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue
to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or
persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used
with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent
Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in
excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in
excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and
Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the
respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which
provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of
adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the
history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the
estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris
between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the
constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country
we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath
to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general
welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded
to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to
religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended
thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is
by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code).
Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental
laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions
of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME
AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE
COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the
authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the
Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other
expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to
dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps
with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have
been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the
respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if
the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to
determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation,
use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case,
however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears
from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials
concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and
its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9,
1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead
of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while
the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are
of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs.
Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of
church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the
scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is
done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular
religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052
grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse
postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume
that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a
gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional
inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, G.R No. 187167 MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA

AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,

HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. Present: MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT

ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY

THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF CORONA, C.J., RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,

LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA CARPIO, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE

BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE VELASCO, JR., ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA

ALFERES, CZARINA MAY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE

ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, BRION, TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,

SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR PERALTA, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and

BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, BERSAMIN, MARCELINO VELOSO III,

ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE DEL CASTILLO, Petitioners,

PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN ABAD,

- versus -
MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN VILLARAMA, JR.,
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PEREZ,
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON MENDOZA, and
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, SERENO, JJ.
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO,
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY
KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,
HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
RESOURCE INFORMATION security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.13
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution,
DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah
and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE Shoal.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case
or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated: the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, the Philippines claim over Sabah.

Respondents. July 16, 2011 Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the
United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area
drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

DECISION

The Issues
CARPIO, J.:

The petition raises the following issues:

The case

1. Preliminarily
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA 9522)
adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
The Antecedents
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
(UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which,
however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS
II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in
North Borneo. The Ruling of the Court

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare
III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, RA 9522 unconstitutional.
and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of On the Threshold Issues
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges
neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of
RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution
of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed,
owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Testthe Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners.18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 20 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon
the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional , RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory 21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of
national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any
treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the
time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-
use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours
could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would
still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in
conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago.24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure
the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. 27 Petitioners add that the
KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square
nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the configuration of the
baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a
reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie
this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust
the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046,
as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago.
This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of
the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded
both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total
maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as
shown in the table below:29
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046,Extent of maritime area using
as amended, taking into account theRA 9522, taking into account
Treaty of Paris delimitation (in squareUNCLOS III (in square nautical
nautical miles) miles)
Internal or
archipelagic

waters
166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive
Economic Zone
382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive
economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do
not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the
Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we
might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng
ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin
masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our
own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the
orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa
itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines
para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the
outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article
47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some
technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06
nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III],
which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per
cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum
length of 125 nautical miles.
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey
methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan
were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as
prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is
also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal
waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS
III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS
III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of
their bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well
as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the
archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and
sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis--viscontinental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial
sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic
waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more
than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under
UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. 49 Article II provisions serve
as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as
an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions
petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51) and subsistence fishermen
(Article XIII, Section 752), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation
binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space
the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the
prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes
at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured.
This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor
beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of
them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in
favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following
the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare
of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the
former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is
with the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if
the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of
the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance
the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such
responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " 1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child,
Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed
on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and
instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid
to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond
required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of
the insurance policy.2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the
proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former
provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance."3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may
acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or
mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; ... 4
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant 7 to blunt the force of legal
commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered.
What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that
Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event
that there is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added
circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision
arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that
infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa,
commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El
derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y
de la presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro
Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la
sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia
suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis
adelante."8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that
the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their
respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It
is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot
remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case, 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If,
as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even
if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to
decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.

Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to
the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor
lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property,
therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the
usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is
in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor,
Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to
raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."5

It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be
disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning
is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical
language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application. 6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed
decision.
 part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in
the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined." 7

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly
provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
vs.
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
Diego,9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State
OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT,
gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
CORPORATION, respondents.
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
FERNANDO, J.: corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt
respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and on that score. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although
executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One
issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. As reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is
outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to
acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified. the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 12
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3,
1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the grievance.
amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province,
Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary
Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks,
particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and Barredo, J, took no part.
for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP
Controller,..."2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the
Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." 3 In the answer filed by
respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only
qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.4

The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What
was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the

PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First
Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE, ET AL., respondents.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For the purposes of this decision, the following facts gathered from and based on the pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs
named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings
situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments located
at 1131 M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and 1188 A. Mabini Streets, respectively.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor
of the United States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia
Apartment, and P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be "for the duration of the war
and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United States of America." The apartment buildings were used for
billeting and quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding General, United
States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, was
said to control the occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United States Government to
assign officers of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the
Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of defendant Moore
was in direct charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman
themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime
in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the
apartment buildings to them, but were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11,
1946, said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease
contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. The
predecessors in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute new leases but advised that "it is
contemplated that the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947." Not being in conformity with
the continuance of the old leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally
requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to
comply with the request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U.S. Government would vacate the
premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the
monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to
cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the
three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon
defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then
occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per
month per apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said
apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the
event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The thirty-day period having expired without any of the defendants
having complied with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the
form of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying apartments in the
three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each occupants to pay P300 a month for his particular
apartment from January 1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit plaintiffs access
to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants;
that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on said property; and that in
the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the defendants
Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment from January 1,
1947 to March 19, 1947, inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman
be permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action, because the real party
in interest was the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that the complaint did not
state a cause of action, the municipal court of Manila in an order dated April 29, 1947, found that the war between the United
States of America and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet terminated and, consequently,
the period or term of the three leases had not yet expired; that under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign
government like the United States Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that it was
clear from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of America has not been named therein as
defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United
States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government. The
municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a citizen of the
Philippines, who feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right to demand that the Philippine
Government study his claim and if found meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may be necessary for the vindication of
rights of that citizen, and that the matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject matter of representations
between the Government of the Government of the United States of America and the Philippines. Not being satisfied with the
order, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12, 1947, affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint. It conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196 and affirmed in
the case of Tindal vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204 ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over cases where private parties sue to recover
possession of property being held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S. Government even though no suit can be
brought against the Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this action against officers
and agents of the U. S. Government not only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses supposedly being held
illegally by them in the name of their government, but also to collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease
contracts entered into by the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say nothing of the damages claimed, as a
result of which, a judgment in these proceedings may become a charge against the U. S. Treasury, then under the rule laid
down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be regarded as one against the United States
Government itself, which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by citizens of another country.
The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order the
Municipal Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case. On October 30, 1947, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez,
Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. The case was orally argued on November 26, 1947.
On March 4, 1948, petitioners filed a petition which, among other things, informed this Court that the North Syquia Apartments,
the South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on February 29, March 31, and May
31, 1948, respectively. As a matter of fact, said apartments were actually vacated on the dates already mentioned and were
received by the plaintiff-owners.
On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the three apartment houses to the owners, counsel for respondents
Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a petition to dismiss the present case on the ground that it is moot. Counsel
for the petitioners answering the motion, claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners possession of the three apartment houses,
reserving all of their rights against respondents including the right to collect rents and damages; that they have not been paid
rents since January 1, 1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109,895 in rentals due and owing to petitioners;
that should this case be now dismissed, the petitioners will be unable to enforce collection; that the question of law involved in
this case may again come up before the courts when conflicts arise between Filipino civilian property owners and the U.S.
Army authorities concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines between said Filipinos and the U.S. Government.
Consequently, this Court, according to the petitioners, far from dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the question of
jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1949, through a "petition to amend complaint" counsel for the petitioners informed this court that petitioners had
already received the U. S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of P109,895 as rentals for the three apartments, but
with the reservation that said acceptance should not be construed as jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners in the case now
pending in the courts of the Philippines or their rights against the U. S. Government with respect to the three apartment
houses. In view of this last petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both respondent Moore and Tillman had long left the
Islands for other Army assignments, and now that both the possession of the three apartments in question as well as the
rentals for their occupation have already been received by the petitioners renew their motion for dismissal on the ground that
this case has now become moot.
The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court was to recover the possession of the three apartment houses in
question. The recovery of rentals as submitted by the very counsel for the petitioner was merely incidental to the main action.
Because the prime purpose of the action had been achieved, namely, the recovery of the possession of the premises, apart
from the fact that the rentals amounting to P109,895 had been paid to the petitioners and accepted by them though under
reservations, this Court may now well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the questions involved therein have
become academic and moot. Counsel for the petitioners however, insists that a decision be rendered on the merits, particularly
on the question of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the original action, not only for the satisfaction of the parties involved
but also to serve as a guide in future cases involving cases of similar nature such as contracts of lease entered into between
the Government of the United States of America on one side and Filipino citizens on the other regarding properties of the latter.
We accept the suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to discuss the facts and law involved and rule upon them.
We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance, that following the doctrine laid down in the cases of U. S. vs.
Lee and U. S. vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to recover
possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally witholding
the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government, and the court
may entertain such a suit altho the Government itself is not included as a party-defendant. Of course, the Government is not
bound or concluded by the decision. The philosophy of this ruling is that unless the courts are permitted to take cognizance
and to assume jurisdiction over such a case, a private citizen would be helpless and without redress and protection of his rights
which may have been invaded by the officers of the government professing to act in its name. In such a case the officials or
agents asserting rightful possession must prove and justify their claim before the courts, when it is made to appear in the suit
against them that the title and right of possession is in the private citizen. However, and this is important, where the judgment in
such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge
against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government. (See case
of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209.)
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts involved therein as well as those of public knowledge of which we take
judicial cognizance, we are convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of
America. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement
themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The considerations or rentals was always paid by
the U. S. Government. The original action in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease contracts and it
is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government
not only because, as already stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the
premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the terminations of hostilities.
We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman could be held individually responsible for the
payments of rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question. Both of these army officials
had no intervention whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of
which were effected thru the intervention of and at the instance of their predecessors in office. The original request made by
the petitioners for the return of the apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the leases, was made to, and denied
not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office. The notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact
continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and Tillman but by predecessors in office. The refusal to renegotiate
the leases as requested by the petitioners was made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according to the very
complaint filed in the municipal court. The assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to February 29, 1947,
was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was Chief, Real State Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S.
Army, and was in direct charge and control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the
command of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to
occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order or direction from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held
personally liable for the payment of rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have been suffered by the plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in Manila, these lease agreement had already
been negotiated and executed and were in actual operation. The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers
assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to
apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes in station. He found these apartment buildings occupied
by his government and devoted to the use and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his command, and he had
reasons to believe that he could continue holding and using the premises theretofore assigned for that purpose and under
contracts previously entered into by his government, as long as and until orders to the contrary were received by him. It is even
to be presumed that when demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of increased rentals or for vacating the three
apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier, must have consulted and sought the advise of
his legal department, and that his action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the three
buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position to pay
increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements, without the approval of his government, unless he
personally assumed financial responsibility therefor. Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that defendant
Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back or increased rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable
for rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that these army officers when coming to
their station in Manila were not given the choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment
buildings in question. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as orders, and all that those officers did was to obey
them, and, accordingly, occupied the rooms assigned to them. Under such circumstances, can it be supposed or conceived
that such army officers would first inquire whether the rental being paid by the government for the rooms or apartments
assigned to them by order of their superior officer was fair and reasonable or not, and whether the period of lease between
their government and the owners of the premises had expired, and whether their occupancy of their rooms or apartments was
legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these seemingly idle speculations, assuming that they ever entered their minds, and
continued to live in their apartments unless and until orders to the contrary were received by them, could they later be held
personally liable for any back rentals which their government may have failed to pay to the owners of the building, or for any
damages to the premises incident to all leases of property, specially in the absence of proof that such damages to property had
been caused by them and not by the previous occupants, also army officers who are not now parties defendant to this suit?
Incidentally it may be stated that both defendants Moore and Tillman have long left these Islands to assume other commands
or assignments and in all probability none of their 64 co-defendants is still within this jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the
Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid
not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. S. Government. On the basis of the ruling
in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one
against the U. S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the
very beginning of the action. The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against
her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the
latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which
renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of the law behind this rule are so
elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.
In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and
that the Court of First Instance acted correctly in affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. Case dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the
"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police
narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have
been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one
of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for
damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The
Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of
the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian
Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff
became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance
Movement in the Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain
Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of
Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the
Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his
interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling
caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini
government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the
plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the
back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant’s own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a
countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their
conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see
plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted
to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he
requested the restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him
the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant
wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the
reason that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The following
day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of
carpets.1awphi1.nét
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to
the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the
bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The
defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while
so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in
his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an
American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers
with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by
the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came
out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attaché case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff.
They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was
playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being handcuffed
and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone.
In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless
told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened
where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe
together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his
release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his
TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was,
therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in
Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in
Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were
detained for three days without food and water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time
to file an answer pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the
defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to
quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was
beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the
filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to
service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary
appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving
the United States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to
the need (1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to
refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for
reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a
decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then
elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was
denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the
appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file
a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion
to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for
pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of
Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties
as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo
interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990,
addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul
Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled
"Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered
dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of
07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of
Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed
G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242),
appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for
trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for
lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b)
that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity
and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity
could not be taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it
adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully
established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of
P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the
unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant.’" 2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent
entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed
outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of
Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal
and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court
of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled
to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment,
2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits,
and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No.
97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune
from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant
petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this
observation -
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally
states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff
and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of
his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to
dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity." 4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him
absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as
"conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs
being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make
the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents -
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27
June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through
Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court. 5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive
Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic
mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States
Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant
to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged
the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other
documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department,
recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status
and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign
Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports
of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration
of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to
the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel 6 to show (a) that the United
States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on
May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the
mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed
as being an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government
of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs
Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on
narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host
country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving
international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its
ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the
peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the
herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct. 7 By the end of
the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly
established as a rule of customary international law.8Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was
undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign
secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more
prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the
Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the
sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the
heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs 12 accredited
to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative
staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the
members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless,
with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are
vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads
of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear
stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain
administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and
administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly
for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick
in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of
diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission
and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic
establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of
attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who
are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial,
agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their
respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. 14 These
officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having
diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem
motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to
alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case
No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is
clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue
of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private
respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a
Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and
Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could
secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is
authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing
supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have
sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse.
It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose
authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is
arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the
Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to
10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited
diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the
belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World
Health Organization vs. Aquino, 15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied.
Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of
courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that
should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from
the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has
formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status
to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." 17 Supplementary
criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a
diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant
visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. 18 Diplomatic
missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties
performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category. 19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he
worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities
within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his
assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under
the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international
law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit 20 and, with the emergence of democratic
states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim
- par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 22 The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must
be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 23
In United States of America vs. Guinto, 24 involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this
Court has ruled -
well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can
be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic,
is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It
cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later
testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on
behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who
were] responsible for their acts."25

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals26 elaborates:

"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al.,
vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not
a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for
this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

"x x x x x x x x x

"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established
that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of
basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States,
stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar
agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to
conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the
Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts
heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR.,
Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON.
RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D.,
Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA,
THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding
Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of
National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE
ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN
EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces
of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013
Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship
USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means "long reef
exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie
Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are
considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City,
Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine
reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for
internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an
important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-
going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance. 2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park
(TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural,
educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and
penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise
created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting
body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in
the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and
to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 4 On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F.
del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." 6 By March
30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization
and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry
G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno
S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del
Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary
Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag
Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren
Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the
"Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to
cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the
grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry
(Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to
the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the Guardian
grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined
under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian in
light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and accountability
such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;

c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;
guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume
responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage under the Visiting
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of Environment
Forces Agreement in particular.
and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether
their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for damages
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial which follow from any violation of those rights;
activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and an
additional buffer zone;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas of
TRNP;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation: Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of
nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against
erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and equitable
under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S.
personnel under the circumstances of this case;
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment 8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and
motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.9
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for
damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;

In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders,
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production
respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait
of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the grounding of the
accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and
Guardian;
substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition of all cases, the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
The Court's Ruling
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or
plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
by the Honorable Court;

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local Government
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and
Code and R.A. 10067;
"calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens
have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future
generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the
"rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now
enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules
"collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction
over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, 17is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II,
Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in
the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission
to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S.
349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of
local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law
then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic
states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim
-par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must
be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, 23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air
Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually
dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed
by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against
the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot
be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure
imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. 24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs.
Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials
or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from
suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that
the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control
and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that
while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates
an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can
be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United
States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the
sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international
law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans." 28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was
opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into
force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle
of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). 29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary
principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the
high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. 31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS
and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign
warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's
leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted
against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part
XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the
succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the
revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI
implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton,
each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required
for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress
continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international institutions.
Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate
consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th
Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will
"recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the
rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states", and
President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional
uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the
oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio
postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu
Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly
owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on
navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS,
as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote
"common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. 36 The
invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes
involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:

The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including a
maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights;
works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms
sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the US to assert its
sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea
Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized
the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the
filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the
VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond
the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental
law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
"international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

Article 197
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
rehabilitate or restore the environment;

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
with the decision and orders of the court;
consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports
on the execution of the final judgment; and
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the
immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
Article 31. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the US
under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort claims,
petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage
operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this
Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine
habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and
Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused
by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-governmental
assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation. organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39

Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following
provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods
are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they have settled
the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of
court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled
date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following
purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained
under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation
expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of
which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the
court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context
of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a
matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. 42 The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy
to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of
Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they shall No pronouncement as to costs.
remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.

SO ORDERED.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a
consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to
protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.

xxxx

SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in accordance with
law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground
about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring
the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef
damage caused by the grounding.38

To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team
which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha,
based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation
 Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC resolution.

II

Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that decisions of the NLRC are final and executory.
Thus, they may only be questioned through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA
37 [1993]).

ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR, FLORENTINO ESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN
BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL, DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON
LOYOLA, JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R. ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its
operations manager, DR. KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT,
Commissioners of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING
PETILLA, Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant petition. Moreover, the petition
lacks any explanation for such omission, which may merit its being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to
the necessity of filing such motion.
Notwithstanding, we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because of the implications of the issue in our international
relations.
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international
agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity,
petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of
employment with petitioners.

Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Resolution dated January 25, 1993
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City.

The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity.
We dismiss the petition.
Private respondent is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations:

I
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly
involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the organization.
Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. SRAB 10-03-00067-91 to 10-03-00078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91
for illegal dismissal and damages.
Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations, to which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621). We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article
In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it III thereof:
enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In
support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which
Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held
acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have
United Nations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the
expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any
Philippine Government was an original signatory (Rollo, p. 21).
measure of execution (Emphasis supplied).

On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the
respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated
specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search,
September 10, 1991.
requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive,
administrative, judicial or legislative action (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of
the complaints in its Resolution dated January 25, 1993.
As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
SO ORDERED.
adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force
and effect of law.

In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242, (1972), we had occasion to rule that:

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty
of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the
settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that
"in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and
will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction (Emphasis supplied).

We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture,
science and technology and environment. It is not surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of international
immunities. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations, its officials and
functionaries is to secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks, International Immunities 17
[1961]).

Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of
member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" (International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).

In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, we held that there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the
State to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations.
Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the international organizations to guarantee the smooth
discharge of their functions.

The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled
to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, supra).

Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case
at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project
entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to
exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of
petitioners.

This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes
of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a
party."

ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner,
vs.INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Did the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?
We rule in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition.
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to December 14, 1990. On February 11,
1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development
Department Manager in a Memorandum dated March 5, 1990. 1 In view of the aforesaid findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to your supervisors the failure of your vehicle to
start because of a problem with the car battery which, you alleged, required you to overstay in Manila for
more than six (6) hours, whereas, had you reported the matter to IRRI, Los Baños by telephone, your
problem could have been solved within one or two hours;
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of your duties. 2
In a Memorandum dated March 9, 1990, petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. 3After
evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December
7, 1990. 4
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys
immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic
immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. 6
7
IRRI likewise wrote in the same tenor to the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute on August 13,
1991 to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," 8 and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The dispositive portion of the Labor arbiter's decision
dated October 31, 1991, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to reinstate
complainant to his former position without loss or (sic) seniority rights and privileges within five (5) days
from receipt hereof and to pay his full backwages from March 7, 1990 to October 31, 1991, in the total
amount of P83,048.75 computed on the basis of his last monthly salary. 9
The NLRC found merit in private respondent' s appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid
decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. 10
Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its
Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620." 11
It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through
which he can seek redress. He further states that since the investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI
Employees and Management (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due process.
We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.
IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.
Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
In the case of International Catholic Migration Commission v. Hon. Calleja, et al. and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa
IRRI v. Secretary of Labor and Employment and IRRI, 12 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. After the
Court noted the letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor dated June 17, 1987, where the
immunity of IRRI from the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment was sustained, the Court stated that this
opinion constituted "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that . . . IRRI enjoy(s) immunities
accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government. 13 We cited the Court's earlier pronouncement in WHO
v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, et al., 14 to wit:
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty
of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that
courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this)
government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction. 15
Further, we held that "(t)he raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by The 1983 . . . is an internal memo addressed to Personnel and Legal Office and was issued for its
the agencies concerned. guidance in handling those cases where IRRI opts to waive its immunity. It is not a declaration of waiver
for all cases. This is apparent from the use of the permissive term "may" rather than the mandatory term
"shall" in the last paragraph of the memo. Certainly the memo cannot be considered as the express waiver
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to . . . and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international
by the Director General as contemplated by P.D. 1620, especially since the memo was issued by a former
character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
Director-General. At the very least, the express declaration of the incumbent Director-general supersedes
the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these
the 1983 memo and should be accorded greater respect. It would be equally important to point out that the
instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
Personnel and Legal Office has been non-existent since 1988 as a result of major reorganization of the
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host
IRRI. Cases of IRRI before DOLE are handled by an external Legal Counsel as in this particular
country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered the
case. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
performance of their functions. 16

The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct division of the IRRI, was meant for internal
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which
circulation and not as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI's letter to the
it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
Labor Arbiter in the case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no intention of waiving its immunity, at the very least,
supplants any pronouncement of alleged waiver issued in previous cases.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote
the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place,
Petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process is unfounded and has no basis.
petitioner's reliance on the Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620"
dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced. The Memorandum reads, in part:
It is not denied that he was informed of the findings and charges resulting from an investigation conducted of his case in
accordance with IRRI policies and procedures. He had a chance to comment thereon in a Memorandum he submitted to the
Time and again the Institute has reiterated that it will not use its immunity under P.D. 1620 for the purpose
Manager of the Human Resource and Development Department. Therefore, he was given proper notice and adequate
of terminating the services of any of its employees. Despite continuing efforts on the part of IRRI to live up
opportunity to refute the charges and findings, hereby fulfilling the basic requirements of due process.
to this undertaking, there appears to be apprehension in the minds of some IRRI employees. To help allay
these fears the following guidelines will be followed hereafter by the Personnel/Legal Office while handling
cases of dismissed employees. Finally, on the issue of referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), petitioner similarly fails to persuade
the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court, in the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI case, 19 held:
2. Notification/manifestation to MOLE or labor arbiter
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there
had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation
If and when a dismissed employee files a complaint against the Institute contesting the legality of dismissal, IRRI's answer to
of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees
the complaint will:
were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI
and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres.
1. Indicate in the identification of IRRI that it is an international organization operating under the laws of the Decree No. Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an international
Philippines including P.D. 1620. and organization, deprives its employees of the right to self-organization.
2. Base the defense on the merits and facts of the case as well as the legality of the cause or causes for
termination.
We have earlier concluded that petitioner was not denied due process, and this, notwithstanding the non-referral to the Council
of IRRI Employees and Management. Private respondent correctly pointed out that petitioner, having opted not to seek the help
3) Waiving immunity under P.D. 1620 of the CIEM Grievance Committee, prepared his answer by his own self. 20 He cannot now fault the Institute for not referring his
case to the CIEM.
If the plaintiff's attorney or the arbiter, asks if IRRI will waive its immunity we may reply that the Institute will
be happy to do so, as it has in the past in the formal manner required thereby reaffirming our commitment IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
to abide by the laws of the Philippines and our full faith in the integrity and impartially of the legal
system. 17 (Emphasis in this paragraphs ours)
SO ORDERED.

From the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation, it is clear that in cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may
waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

We agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered the
express waiver by the Director-General. Respondent Commission has quoted IRRI's reply thus:

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by
herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992,
granting an application for a Writ of replevin..[2] h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of
illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain]
Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety
seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ".[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus,
the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. .[4] Seizure receipts
were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts. .[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case
No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code.[6] Mis sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR,
prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The
complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of
DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar.
It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No.
3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code..[8]
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary
criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it. .[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein
petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ
in an Order dated April 24, 1992..[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO,
enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private
respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners.
The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a
secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the
Supreme Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate
court for appropriate disposition..[13]
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle
pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place
said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his
duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance
used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter,
added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court
said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of
offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give
a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary.
Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was
confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle
and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject
vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis..[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit
against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property
sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover,
according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be
considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of
the property of another..[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly
seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings. .[17] Their petition was found without merit.[18] Rtc
spped
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE
PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277
DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE
FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE
DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit
against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of
Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Codeslx
mis
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful
and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit
evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were
deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facieviolation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as
found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section
78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows: Sc
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as
follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of
any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found
spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of
the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative
such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR
are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized
military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and
their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field
officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may
be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or
right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78
and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was
justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of
the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the
impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and
impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken
by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. .[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves
property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to
violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such
property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of
seizure. The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return,
and wait for the judges instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy
Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:
 ". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier
taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of
the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law
otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the
simple devise of a writ of replevin...".[21] Scslx

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for
replevin, a suit against the State?

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. .[22] And a suit against a public officer for his
official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. .[23] However, the protection
afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and
without willfulness, malice or corruption. [24] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. [25] In
implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no
malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the States consent.

Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time
possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. .[26] If not invoked
at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try
it.[27] Mesm

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191
is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of
replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan,
Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody
of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his
appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority stockholders of the Allied Technologists,
Inc., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, Secretary of National Defense, Col. NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineer Group,
Office of the Secretary of National Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the Department of National Defense, the
AUDITOR of the Department of the National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED TECHNOLOGISTS
INC., defendants-appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiffs' amended complaint.
The facts upon which plaintiffs' first cause of action are based are allowed as follows:
On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the Allied Technologists, Inc., to furnish the
architectural and engineering services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700. The plans,
specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and other architectural requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists
through thereof its architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were approved by the United
States Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of the technical objection to the capacity of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part
of the Allied Technologists, Inc. by E.J.L. Ruiz as President and P.D. Panlilio as Architect. When the defendants-officials paid
the Allied Technologists the contract price for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the sum due,
for the reason that defendant Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the
exclusion of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez. Unless defendants are prevented
from recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole architect of the contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs will
be deprived of the monetary value of their professional services and their professional prestige and standing would be
seriously impaired.
Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title II of the contract entered into between plaintiffs
and the Secretary of National Defense, at any time prior to six months after completion and acceptance of the work under Title
I, the Government may direct the Allied Technologists, Inc. to perform the services specified in said Title II. But notwithstanding
such completion or acceptance, the Government has refused to direct the plaintiffs to perform the work, entrusting such work to
a group of inexperienced and unqualified engineers.
The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from recognizing Panlilio as the sole and only architect
of the Veterans Hospital and from paying him 15 per cent retained as above indicated, and that after hearing Ruiz, Herrera and
Panlilio be recognized as the architects of the Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action it is prayed that the
defendants be directed to turn over the supervision called for by Title II of the contract.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is one against the Government, which may not
sued without its consent. It is held that as the majority of the stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc. have not joined in the
action, the minority suit does not lie. It dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that the optional services under
Title II have already been performed.
On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND
THEREFORE CANNOT BE VALIDLY ENTERTAINED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3038, AS AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH
ACT 327 ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE; IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN
FILED WITH THE AUDITOR GENERAL.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS UNTENABLE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INJUNCTION.
Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the second cause of action. So, the appeal has relation to
the first cause of action only.
A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses the following facts and circumstances: The contract
price for the architectural engineering services rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc. and the plaintiffs is P231,600. All of
that sum has been set aside for payment to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except the sum of P34,740,
representing 15 per cent of the total costs, which has been retained by the defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of
the Philippines is concerned, the full amount of the contract price has been set aside and said full amount authorized to be
paid. The Government does not any longer have any interest in the amount, which the defendants-officials have retained and
have refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to which it should be paid. And the plaintiffs do not seek to sue
the Government to require it to pay the amount or involve it in the litigation. The defendant Jimenez is claimed to have "aided
and abetted defendant Panlilio in depriving the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its two architects (Ruiz and Herrera) of the honor
and benefit due to them under the contract Annex `C` thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs that the defendant-officials are
about to recognize Panlilio as the sole architect and are about to pay him the 15 per cent which they had retained, and thus
deprive plaintiffs of their right to share therein and in the honor consequent to the recognition of their right. The suit, therefore,
is properly directed against the officials and against them alone, not against the Government, which does nor have any interest
in the outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio on the other. The suit is between these
alone, to determine who is entitled to the amount retained by the officials; and if the latter did aid and abet Panlilio in his
pretense, to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiffs, it is natural that they alone, and not the Government, should be the
subject of the suit. He said officials chosen not to take sides in the controversy between the architects, and had disclaimed
interest in said controversy, the suit would have been converted into one of interpleader. But they have acted to favor one side,
and have abetted him in his effort to obtain payment to him of the sum remaining unpaid and credit for the work, to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit.1âwphïl.nêt
We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not be a party in this and parallel cases.
 There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political
subdivision cannot be sued in the courts except upon the statutory consent of the state. Numerous decisions of this
court to that effect may be cited; but it is enough to note that this court, in banc in a recent case, State vs. Woodruff
(Miss.), 150 So. 760, Hasso held; and therein overruled a previous decision which had adjudicated that such consent
could be worked out of a statute by implication, when express consent was absent from the terms of that statute.

But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually made a party upon the record, or is actually
necessary to be made a party in order to furnish the relief demanded by the suit. It does not apply when the suit is
against an officer or agent of the state, and the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative discharge of any
obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made
defendants disclaim any personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to act only by virtue of a title of the state
and as its agents and servants.

Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said, that nearly all the cases wherein the rule of
immunity from suit against the state or a subdivision thereof, has been applied and upheld, are those which
demanded a money judgment, and wherein the discharge of the judgment, if obtained, would require the
appropriation or an expenditure therefrom, which being legislative in its character is a province exclusively of the
political departments of the state. And in the less frequent number of cases where no money judgment is demanded,
and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it will be found in them that the relief demanded would be, nevertheless, to
require of the state or its political subdivision the affirmative performance of some asserted obligation, belong to the
state in its political capacity.

When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting officially and not as individuals, seize the private
property of a citizen, the state having no valid right or title thereto, or trespass upon that property or damage it, the
jurisdiction of the courts to eject the officers or agents, is as well settled in the jurisprudence of this country as is the
general rule first above mentioned; for in such a suit no relief is demanded which requires any affirmative action on
the part of the state. Such a suit is only to the end that the officers and agents of the state stay off the property of the
citizen and cease to damage that property, the state having no right or title thereto." (State Mineral Lease
Commission vs. Lawrence [1934], 157 So. 897, 898-899.).

We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amendment complaint, which should be taken on its face value,
the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the
credit for the work done. The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.1âwphïl.nêt
 During the pendency of the appeal, however, this Court handed down its decision in the case of Belman Cia, Inc. v. Central
Bank, G.R. No. L-15044, May 30, 1960, expressly ruling (in the Resolution to a Motion for reconsideration filed thereto by the
same Central Bank herein) that the prescriptive period is six (6) years.

Plaintiff-appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that this action was still timely because, it is argued,
the period of prescription applicable to the case is ten (10) years from date of payment. To support this contention,
Article 1144, paragraph (2) is cited, which provides:

"ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:

FRANCISCO S. OLIZON, plaintiff-appellee, (1) ...

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.
(2) Upon an obligation created by law.

REGALA, J.:
since, it is claimed, the payment here was made by reason of a mistake in the interpretation of Republic Act 601, the
obligation to return arises by virtue of Article 2155, in relation to Article 2154 of the New Civil Code and is, therefore,
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, rendered in Case No. 40215, ordering the appellant one created by law.
Central Bank to refund to the herein appellee the sum of P9,713.94 plus interest, cost and attorney's fees.
Movant-appellee is partly correct. However, Articles 2154 and 2155 relied upon, specifically refer to obligations of the
The facts giving rise to this suit, as recited in the lower court decision and borne by the records transmitted to Us, are as nature of solutio indebiti which are expressway classified as quasi-contracts under Section 2, Chapter I of Title XVII
follows: Of the New Civil Code. Consequently, the law regarding prescription applicable to the action herein involved is not
Article 1144 (2) cited by the movant, but Article 1145 (2) of the New Civil Code providing:
... . The defendant on March 21, 1952, December 4, 1952, November 25, 1953, and January 4, 1955, collected from
the plaintiff (herein appellee) the amounts of P3,186.24, P840.65, P2,488.98, and P2,734.53, under Central Bank (1) "ART. 1145. The following actions mug be commenced within six years:
Official Receipts Nos. 047895, 052279, 491743, and 663339, respectively, in payment of Special Excise Tax on
Foreign Exchange covering transactions, the details of which are described in said receipts, that those amounts, as
(2) ...
admitted by the defendant, were collected pursuant to its Monetary Board Resolution No. 286, dated May 3, 1951
(Answer to Request for Admission, par. 7); That on March 10, 1958, plaintiff requested the defendant to refund to him
the amounts abovestated, plus the sum of P463.54, which is supported by a statement from the Philippine National (3) Upon a quasi-contract."
Bank; subsequently, requests were made by the plaintiff citing various rulings of the Supreme Court in support
thereof but the Central Bank refused to accede to these requests.
In view of the ruling in the above-mentioned the Central Bank filed a memorandum conceding the refundability of all the claims
except for the amount of P436.54. The Bank claims that "there is no way to determine whether the action for refund of this
The Central Bank concedes the illegality of the resolution under which it made the levy. It expressly adverts to the cases amount has already prescribed or not" as the papers necessary for its proper processing were no longer available or have
of PNB v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-7271, August 30, 1957, 55 O.G. pp. 222-231 and PNB and Central Bank v. Union Books, Inc. been lost. Further more, however, of the claims it concedes to have been filed within the prescriptive period and of which it
G.R. No. L-8490, August 30, 1957 and says that "there was no longer any necessity for this Honorable Court (the lower court) accepts the obligation to refund, the Bank asserts "should be refunded" only "upon presentation of satisfactory proof."
to declare Monetary Board Resolution No. 286 dated May 3, 1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about this."
We do not understand just what exactly the appellant Bank means by the "presentation of satisfactory proof." It admits it
Despite the above admission, however, the Bank still refused to grant the refund on the ground that the claim for the same had received from the appellee the of P9,713.94.
already prescribed. It vigorously argued the theory that "for purposes of recovering a tax paid illegally or erroneously ..., the
action should be filed within five (5) years, from the date of payment of the tax." It arrived at the said period on the reasoning
On various dates and under Central Bank Official receipts hereunder indicated, plaintiff-appellee paid as 17% special
that since the tax code does not provide for the same, the deficiency should be governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code
excise tax through the Philippine National Bank, in settlement of various collection bills, due to foreign suppliers from
which says:
plaintiff-appellee the total sum of P9,713.94, itemized as follows: (Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief, p. 5.)
(Emphasis supplied)
All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the
time the right by action accrues.
It likewise admits that the Monetary Board Resolution on the authority of which it exacted the said amount is illegal.

After the dispute was tried in the lower court, the trial judge rejected the appellant's theory and ruled that the prescriptive period
We respectfully contend that there was no longer any necessity for this Honorable Court (the lower court) to declare
was ten (10) years, holding that the obligation to refund was one created by law and which, therefore, under Article 1144 of the
Monetary Board Res. 286 dated May 3, 1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about this. No allegation can be found in
Civil Code, prescribed in ten years. Hence, this appeal.
defendant's pleadings (Answer to Request for Admission, and Answer to Interrogatories) to the effect that defendant
still upholds the validity of said resolution. ... (pp. 239-240, Record on Appeal)
Lastly, it admits its obligation to refund as well as the timeliness of the claim of the same.

As shown by the letter of the Philippine National Bank to the Legal Counsel of the Central Bank dated June 15, 1959,
the remittances of the foreign exchange involved in the collection bills with respect to the seven items were made on
various dates between August 23, 1949 and November 28, 1949. If the dollar proceeds for the account of Francisco
Olizon were all in 1949, before the effectivity of the special excise tax law (March 28, 1951), therefore, the
assessment and collection of the exchange taxes in question were erroneous and illegal. In accordance with Arts.
2154 and 2155 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, there would be an obligation on the part of defendant
Central Bank to refund the said amounts received by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a
doubtful question of law (p. 6, Memorandum in lieu of Oral Argument.)

It has been verified from the Foreign Department, Philippine National Bank, that all foreign exchange (U.S. dollars)
involved in said collection bills were remitted to the United States on the various dates between August 28, 1949 and
November 28, 1949, before March 28, 1951, when the Exchange Tax Law took effect. (pp. 6-7, Statement of Facts,
Appellant's Brief). (Emphasis in the above two paragraphs supplied.)

In the face of all these admissions, We do not see what else needs be proved. This case was submitted on the issue of
prescription the appellant contending that the period was five (5) years. It now admits its error and accepts the correct period to
be six years. Therefore, insofar as this suit is concerned, the inquiry need not go beyond determining whether the claim, for
refund was filed within the six-year period or not. And, since the Bank explicitly and unequivocably confirms that the claims
were made within that time, it ought not be too technical, but, on the contrary, it should earnestly endeavor to remove or
overcome the minor technicalities that might stand in the way of a prompt refund.

It is next urged that inasmuch as the amounts here involved have already been turned over to the national treasury the present
action may no longer be maintained since it would, in effect, be a suit against the State without its consent.1äwphï1.ñët

We cannot agree to the proposition. This suit is brought against the Central Bank of the Philippines, an entity authorized by its
charter to sue and be sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. As We said in the case
of Central Azucarera San Pedro v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-7713, September 29, 1958, in suits for refund, "being a
corporation that may sue and be sued, the Central Bank is the proper party defendant pursuant to section 5 of Republic Act No.
601, which provides that "the refund of taxes pursuant to sections two and three of this Act shall be made by the Central Bank
of the Philippines."

In the memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument, the appellant Bank represented for the first time that the plaintiff-
appellee has an outstanding liability of P4,963.62 by way of unpaid 17% special excise tax on the remittance of foreign
exchange to import cotton goods and gladiolus bulbs." It then urged that whatever term this Court should order to be refunded
should be set off against the said "outstanding liability" of the appellee.

The representation impresses Us as untenable. The matter of appellee's outstanding unpaid accounts with the Bank is a fit
subject for a counter-claim and the Rules of Court provide for the manner by which they may be impleaded or raised in this
suit. These rules were devised not only to provide a more adequate and elastic procedure for the prompt dispatch of litigation,
but more importantly, to fully protect the rights of the parties. Verily, therefore, the public policy involved in the observance of
those rules should not be lightly estimated. Within the perspective of the foregoing discussion therefore, it would seem that the
appellant has not only withheld proper deference for the rules; it has been unfair to the appellee as well. For in raising a
counterclaim at so late a stage in the proceeding as the period for oral argument, it denies to the appellee full and complete
protection of his rights since by then the proceedings in the court have practically terminated and the appellee would hardly
have time to explain or defend himself from the countersuit.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from and the awards made thereunder are hereby affirmed. Costs
against the appellant.

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA,
PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico
Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court
against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and
Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing
particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an
discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of
unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents
Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an
administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing
has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the
purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a
preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on
the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge
of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions
of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal.
Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this Court
through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such
instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President,
and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the
National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of
Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence,
and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the
Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees
are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the
service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid,
but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be
the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes
for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the
requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing,
with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of
these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and for printing of checks of
private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to
use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary
stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per
cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit because it is not allowed
to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is
thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function,
and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said
proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent
Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line
of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed
against institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is
so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between
employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the
Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-
13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.)
.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.
(Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a
suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs.
Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the
respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative
charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees,
of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of
Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For
the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive
officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such
functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside
and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court.

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The
Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus
other damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law,
defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs
Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the
arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties.—Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to
be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are
merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81,
Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under
Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It
follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical
persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly
authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not
governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant would put defendants under the third category of
"entities authorized by law" to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law expressly authorizing the
Bureau of Customs to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre service at the
Port of Manila, which it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective
June 1, 1957), and it states:
SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles.—The Bureau of Customs shall have exclusive
supervision and control over the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers at all
ports of entry and in the exercise of its functions it is hereby authorized to acquire, take over, operate and
superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of
articles, and the convenience and comfort of passengers and the handling of baggage; as well as to acquire fire
protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided, That whenever in his judgment the receiving, handling, custody
and delivery of articles can be carried on by private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after
public bidding and subject to the approval of the department head, contract with any private party for the service of
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale or lease of
government-owned equipment and facilities used in such service.
In Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397, resolution of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held
"that the foregoing statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said arrastre
services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function." The issue in
said case, however, was whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in the
Government employed in governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the effect
that "employees in the Government . . . shall not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike," which prohibition "shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of
the Government . . . .
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not
that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on
the personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over
the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as
respondents of the public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its
being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. This is the doctrine recognized in Bureau of
Printing, et al. vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of
the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by
law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . . ." (Sec. 1644, Rev.
Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act.
Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not engaged
in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is
thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
 function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of
performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies,
functions. Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785). From the provision
authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau
in the instances where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of
xxx xxx xxx
the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect,
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz.
2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December
28, 1957.)

The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81,
Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties,
fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical
reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship
agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs
authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up
requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said
customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.1

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable
to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign
immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on
which appellant would rely. For there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration was found have for its prime reason for existence not
a governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was not a mere incidental function:

Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute contracts of any
kind, to purchase property, and to grant concessions rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on
sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its
management.

These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The
power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it
was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run
what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public. . . .

Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its
consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
 is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the
Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with now respondent
Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the
contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.

1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. The lower court was unmindful of the
fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It is
apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged
balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such
claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific
performance ... . Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment,
is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State ... . In
other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act
327 ... which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be
LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways, Cebu First Engineering District; CORNELIO filed ...."5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or
FORNIER, as Regional Supervising Auditor, Eastern Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON, ADVENTOR claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive
FERNANDEZ, MANUEL S. LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and TEODULFO REGIS, petitioners, of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices,
vs. or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is
FELIPE SINGSON, as sole owner and proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, respondent. received by
him."6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the
FERNANDO, J.: settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the
President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity." 7
The real party in interest before this Court in this certiorari proceeding to review a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu is the Republic of the Philippines, although the petitioners are the public officials who were named as respondents 1 in
a mandamus suit below. Such is the contention of the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix V. Makasiar, 2 for as 2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision defies explanation. It would
he did point out, what is involved is a money claim against the government, predicated on a contract. The basic doctrine of be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may
non-suability of the government without its consent is thus decisive of the controversy. There is a governing statute that is be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
controlling.3 Respondent Felipe Singson, the claimant, for reasons known to him, did not choose to abide by its terms. That proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal
was a fatal misstep. The lower court, however, did not see it that way. We cannot affirm its decision. would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court
to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What
transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.
As found by the lower court, the facts are the following: "In January, 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned
various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer, ... . The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was signed by the District
Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of September 4, 1968 is reversed and set aside, and the suit
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This for mandamus filed against petitioners, respondents below, is dismissed. With costs against respondent Felipe Singson.
is an exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass
or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service
[owned by respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue,
Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would appear that a
purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the
Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit.
He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division
Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that
the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of
V.M. Secarro a representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of
P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. ... His reason for withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00
was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher ... was paid on
June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner [respondent Singson]. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson
received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which
states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted
this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it
would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar
tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of
the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement
of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." 4 What

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of
said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the
wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal
construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot
which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th
Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the
President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of
the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation
of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and
interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with
the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if
any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's
fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that
inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue,
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to
receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground
that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the
government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no
question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land
used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that
where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there said: .
... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to
be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would
have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to
the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land
so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is
unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the
government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when
the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is
neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is
for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the
time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for
attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination
of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to
costs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO.,
INC., respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the
defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair
to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from
the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids
because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding
practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners
herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic
Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M,
the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all
members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to
perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the
subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of
the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants
moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants'
(now petitioners) motion: " A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its
private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's
considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function
altho it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the
case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:
It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state
can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied
that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. ...
xxx xxx xxx
We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its agency
at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within
the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for
any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial court, therefore,
has jurisdiction to entertain this case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The court
granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and
(b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this
Court for review.
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI of
the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, stated
 differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government, the lower
court acted properly in dismissing this case.(At p. 598.)

It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of
the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the
United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the
ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been
vacated.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part
of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs
went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:

On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant
in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or Increased
rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants
but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited,
and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U.S.
Government. It is clear hat the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not , given its consent to the filing
of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and
of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p. 323.)

In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the States was not
deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure
gestionis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is
dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, * Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., took no part.

 In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base.

On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids
for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private
respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire
inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years; and Tanglao for 50 years.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a
bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its representatives,
petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been
awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession, then
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to
vs. August 31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only by the end
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. of June and the private respondents would be notified.
VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual
G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990 petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to
allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND litigation. 1
ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners,
vs. Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, maintain the status quo.
Benguet and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on
G.R. No. 80018 February 26, 1990 the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-
suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F. BOSTICK, petitioners,
vs. On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS
BAUTISTA, respondents.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding in part as follows:
G.R. No. 80258 February 26, 1990
From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the Court's attention is called by
the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the
BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT. THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET AL., petitioners, plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government. By virtue of said contract of
vs. concession it is the Court's understanding that neither the US Government nor the herein principal
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge, Branch 62 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, defendants would become the employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers
and RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES themselves of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated
SANGALANG, ET AL., respondents. percentage of commissions to the Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance would
become in effect when the Philippine Area Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the
Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners. questioned barber shop concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a commercial transaction
has been entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be entered between
the plaintiffs as well as the defendants.

The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover
CRUZ, J.: such kind of services falling under the concessionaireship, such as a barber shop concession. 2

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we
America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect issued a temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the court below. 3
suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose
Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager,
suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement
between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was
effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force
Base. Genove's reaction was to file Ms complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual petitioners. 4
On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that
Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him
in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be
sued.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an order which read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the complaint — which have been
hypothetically admitted by defendants upon the filing of their motion to dismiss — that although defendants
acted initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what their functions called for brought them out
of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning. Thus, the allegation
that the acts complained of were illegal, done. with extreme bad faith and with pre-conceived sinister plan
to harass and finally dismiss the plaintiff, gains significance. 5
The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base,
was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye
and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
(AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified
against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed. 6
During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro a special counsel assigned to the International Law Division,
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and moved for an
extension within which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings." His reason was that the Attorney General of the United
States had not yet designated counsel to represent the defendants, who were being sued for their official acts. Within the
extended period, the defendants, without the assistance of counsel or authority from the U.S. Department of Justice, filed their
answer. They alleged therein as affirmative defenses that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the
Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to represent the defendants, filed with leave of
court a motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was that the defendants were acting in
their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the
United States without its consent.
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed immunity
under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come under the
jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer.7
Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14,
1987, a temporary restraining order. 8
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the
United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There is a
conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this
and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest,
The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for
treatment of their wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the individually named defendants argued that the suit
was in effect a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The defendants were also immune
from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10, 1987, reading in part as follows:
The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they are immune from suit. The allegations, of the
complaint which is sought to be dismissed, had to be hypothetically admitted and whatever ground the
defendants may have, had to be ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits. The complaint alleged
criminal acts against the individually-named defendants and from the nature of said acts it could not be
said that they are Acts of State, for which immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos themselves are duty
bound to respect, obey and submit themselves to the laws of the country, with more reason, the members
of the United States Armed Forces who are being treated as guests of this country should respect, obey
and submit themselves to its laws. 10
and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer as required but subsequently filed their
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary restraining order on
October 27, 1987. 11
II
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II,
Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also
intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in
the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission
to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other practical reasons for
the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added
inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has
been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to
defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for
the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not
say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without
its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general
law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government
"consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 15 a special law
was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its
implied consent. 16 Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. 17
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium
of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its
non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. 19 As for the filing of a complaint by the
government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. 20
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more
specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases
which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the
control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space
adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate
for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with several other decisions, to support their position that they are
not suable in the cases below, the United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in
Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate.
More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a
1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American
army authorities, Justice Hilado speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was
explicitly declared: 'It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to
be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the place.' Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in
Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of the following authoritative
writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and Lauterpacht.
Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a
manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More
to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding General of the
United States Army in the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they
owned leased to the United States armed forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on the
ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent Judge. The matter was taken to this Court in a
mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that
the 4 action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor
continued: 'It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing
of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen firing an
action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and
of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof then
came Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, where respondent, a United
States Agency established to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was
held as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it would eventually be a charge against or
financial liability of the United States Government because ... , the Commission has no funds of its own for
the purpose of paying money judgments.' The Syquia ruling was again explicitly relied upon in Marquez
Lim v. Nelson, involving a complaint for the recovery of a motor launch, plus damages, the special defense
interposed being 'that the vessel belonged to the United States Government, that the defendants merely
acted as agents of said Government, and that the United States Government is therefore the real party in
interest.' So it was in Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, where it was held that a suit
against Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States involving vested property
under the Trading with the Enemy Act is in substance a suit against the United States. To the same effect
is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from the opinion of justice Tuazon clearly shows: 'It is a
widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section
3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or
its own courts without its consent.' Finally, there is Johnson v. Turner, an appeal by the defendant, then
Commanding General, Philippine Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision ordering
the return to plaintiff of the confiscated military payment certificates known as scrip money. In reversing the
lower court decision, this Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor, relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez,
explaining why it could not be sustained.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit
in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in UnitedStates of America v. Ruiz, 22 where
the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a
clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity
from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them —
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii The restrictive application
of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United kingdom and other states in Western
Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably
a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed
on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be
sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not
involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any authority whatsoever, appropriated private land and converted it
into public irrigation ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the suit was in effect against the Philippine government, which had not given its consent to be sued. This Court
sustained the denial of the motion and held that the doctrine of state immunity was not applicable. The director was being sued
in his private capacity for a personal tort.
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at hand.
III
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the
exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified
against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were
charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting
those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As
we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: 24
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were,
legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of
that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts.
The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special
agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the
United States government should be liable for their torts.
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are
synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable
if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant
is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first
allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar.
No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence,
applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge
Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v.
Purisima, 25 express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a
duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official
functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be
presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident
in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center, also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner
Lamachia is responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual income of $2 million. Under his executive
management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier
cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized warehouse which maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in
resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the United States government has
concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are
not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States.
Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are
available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for
this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary
restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for
profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the
damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of
the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government
itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be
dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed
on the strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined.
The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough investigation where it was established beyond
doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding
of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. This
board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's dismissal. There was nothing
arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after
committing his utterly disgusting offense.
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States
government are commercial enterprises operated by private person's. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for
the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military
organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee.
Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business,
presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under
the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the
exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court
below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of America v.
Ruiz case cannot be applied here.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as we have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for the
paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is
not before us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can
later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be
remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

IV

There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve the question of the immunity of the United States
from the jurisdiction of the Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional friendship between two
countries long allied in the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the so-called "irritants" in their relations will be resolved in a
spirit of mutual accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and asperity of litigation and always with justice to both
parties.

WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is
LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.

3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.

4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is
LIFTED.

All without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in
PHILIPPINES his name or under the names of corporations he owned or controlled.
represented by the
PRESIDENTIAL Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which
COMMISSION ON passed, sometime in October 1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted of assessing
GOOD GOVERNMENT a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more than
(PCGG), one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying monthly membership due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she
Petitioner, owned.

- versus - Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another resolution, this time increasing the monthly
membership due from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.

As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the corresponding monthly membership
SANDIGANBAYAN due thereon totaling P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed
(SECOND DIVISION) of in an auction sale.
and ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO, Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG
Respondents. G.R. No. 129406 filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5348.
The complaint, however, was dismissed, paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August
Present: 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.

PUNO, J., Chairperson, On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release clause [5] whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself
CORONA, to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging
AZCUNA, and that it was within private respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the
GARCIA, JJ. exercise of his profession.[6] Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock
could not have been ill-gotten.

In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered
Promulgated: judgment in accordance with its terms.

In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by
March 6, 2006 the Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein.

x----------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the March 28,
1995[1] and March 13, 1997[2] Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. 0034, insofar as said
resolutions ordered the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent Roberto S.
Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI)
at P150,000.00 per share, registered in the name of said private respondent or his corporations.
The facts:
Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or
unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent
Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14,[3] series of 1986.
On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of
Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock
be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise
Agreement in that case. In a Resolution [7] promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted Benedictos
aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the custody of its Clerk of Court, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said Motion for Release From Sequestration and
Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends is hereby GRANTED and it is directed that said
shares/dividends be delivered/placed under the custody of the Clerk of Court,
Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Courts disposition.
On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed Resolution,[8] which clarified its
aforementioned December 6, 1994 Resolution and directed the immediate implementation thereof by requiring PCGG, among
other things:
(b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] registered in the name of
nominees of ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default
thereof, to pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which can be deducted from [the
Republics] cash share in the Compromise Agreement. [Words in bracket added] (Emphasis
Supplied).

Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, [4] series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for
enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, Compliance dated July 25, 1995, followed by an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution dated February 12, 1996. Acting thereon,
or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and the Sandiganbayan promulgated yet another Resolution[9] on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading:
 WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early resolution and considering that, indeed, the
PCGG has not shown any justifiable ground as to why it has not complied with its obligation as set forth in
the Order of December 6, 1994 up to this date and which Order was issued pursuant to the Compromise
Agreement and has already become final and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission on
Good Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof within which to
comply with the Order of December 6, 1994 as stated hereinabove.
On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration,[10] praying for the setting aside of the Resolution
of February 23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private respondent Benedicto filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving
these two motions, the Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution[11] dated March 13, 1997, denied that portion of the
PCGGs Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted
Benedictos Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Second
Division, gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227
sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof.
The petition lacks merit.
To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares
of stock are concerned.[12] PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts
pertaining to the sequestered entity or property,[13] in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It contends, however, that
membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It
also claims to have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss through delinquency sale of the subject NOGCCI shares,
specifically inviting attention to the injunctive suit, i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the
foreclosure sale of the shares.
The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot plausibly tilt the balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind
of the Court, such filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It cannot be over-emphasized that it behooved the PCGGs
fiscal agents to preserve, like a responsible father of the family, the value of the shares of stock under their administration. But
far from acting as such father, what the fiscal agents did under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency to set in
before acting by embarking on a tedious process of going to court after the auction sale had been announced and scheduled.
The PCGGs posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the burden of paying the membership dues is
untenable. For one, it lost sight of the reality that such dues are basically obligations attached to the shares, which, in the final
analysis, shall be made liable, thru delinquency sale in case of default in payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as
sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as stressed earlier, duty bound to preserve the value of such shares. Needless to
state, adopting timely measures to obviate the loss of those shares forms part of such duty and due diligence.
The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding the PCGG liable for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI
shares. There can be no quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in its assailed and related resolutions respecting the
NOGCCI shares of stock, that PCGGs fiscal agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors agreed to the amendment
of the rule pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-
designated fiscal agents, no less, had a direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares through delinquency and their
eventual sale through public auction. While perhaps anti-climactic to so mention it at this stage, the unfortunate loss of the
shares ought not to have come to pass had those fiscal agents prudently not agreed to the passage of the NOGCCI board
resolutions charging membership dues on shares without playing representatives.
Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, PCGGs lament about public
respondent Sandiganbayan having erred or, worse still, having gravely abused its discretion in its determination as to who is at
fault for the loss of the shares in question can hardly be given cogency.
For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does not seem to be in this case, it is a well-settled rule
of jurisprudence that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily, errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari.[14] The extraordinary
writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. [15]
The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a
lack of jurisdiction.[16] The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. [17] Sadly, this is completely absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the
assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no more than to direct PCGG to comply with its part of the bargain under the
compromise agreement it freely entered into with private respondent Benedicto. Simply put, the assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact and in law.
Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in question had, as both public and private respondents asserted,
long become final and executory. Petitioners narration of facts in its present petition is even misleading as it conveniently fails
to make reference to two (2) resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that courts resolutions of December 6,
1994[18] and February 23, 1996[19] as well as several intervening pleadings which served as basis for the decisions reached
therein. As it were, the present petition questions only and focuses on the March 28, 1995[20] and March 13, 1997[21]resolutions,
which merely reiterated and clarified the graft courts underlying resolution of December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the
proper perspective, PCGGs failure to comply with the December 6, 1994 resolution prompted the issuance of the clarificatory
and/or reiteratory resolutions aforementioned.
In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. [22] As argued,
the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating
the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. [23] But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the
PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor,
as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be
effectively invoked.[24] For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual
and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. [25] PetitionerRepublics act of filing its
complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that
case, petitioner Republiccannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of
its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations
arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the
sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract,
[26]
breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034 envisaged the immediate recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth without further litigation by the government, and buying peace on the part of the aging Benedicto.
[27]
Sadly, that stated objective has come to naught as not only had the litigation continued to ensue, but, worse, private
respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15, 2000,[28] with the trial of Civil Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the
late Benedicto had to be substituted by the administratrix of his estate.[29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As
vs. a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant. of the building.

TRENT, J.: As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved
the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical
calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for
had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000,
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months
and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his
complaint." The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award
awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the
first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that
P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually
the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it
confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly
be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for
incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days
the sum of P14,741.
while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find
that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour,
upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center
thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle
Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March
him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he
was entirely unconscious.
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if
any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was had
suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation,
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the
his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right leg was
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions
broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double
may be decided: Now, therefore,
and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.
Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the
apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
for mathematical calculations. entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the
same.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to
the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now
 Enacted, February 3, 1915. SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin,
to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and
determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the
agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the
plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or
Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of
extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely
voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of
its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or
which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was
that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It
due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the
did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government
immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to
is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have
done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the United
States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No.
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:
2457.

All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except
the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit
when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake
thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final
to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations
judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of
Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L.
Ed., 991.) And the court said:

In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries
received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the
purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the
industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by
the public school system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the
court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State,
86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73
Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either
fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the
bringing of this suit, read:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it was
held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before, but
merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted.
(Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth,
whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute the court,
in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized
class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be
adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction
of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger
remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or
servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers,
agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
 The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to,
caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court
preceding article shall be applicable. of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is
not such an agent.
based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the
state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we
service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts
its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can
arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting
obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)

That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and
whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an
act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the
following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations
of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such
relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to
proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases
when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are
found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an establishment
or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless
because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be
presumed to lie with the state.

That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all
the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by
branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external
expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of
damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his
powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which
they hold in sublease.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent(and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply
to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)

That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among
others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding
 THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and the AUDITOR GENERAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, sitting in Quezon
City, TESTATE ESTATE OF N. T. HASHIM (Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of First Instance of Manila)
represented by its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, TOMAS N. HASHIM, personally, and as Judicial
Administrator of the Estate of Hashim, Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of ]First instance of Manila, ALL
THE LEGAL OR TESTAMENTARY HEIRS of the Estate of Hashim, MANUELA C. FLORENDO, personally as Deputy
Clerk, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX, BENJAMIN GARCIA as "Special Sheriff" appointed by
respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, BENJAMIN V. CORUÑA, personally and as Chief Documentation Staff, Legal
Department, Philippine National Bank, and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and void the two questioned orders of respondent
Court levying upon funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the
fundamental precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
The background facts follow:
On or about November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal1 for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, with an area of 14,934 square meters,
needed to construct a public road, now known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. On November 25, 1940, the Government
took possession of the property upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the
provisional value of all the lots needed to construct the road, including Hashim's property. The records of the expropriation case
were destroyed and lost during the second world war, and neither party took any step thereafter to reconstitute the
proceedings.
In 1958, however, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, filed a money
claim with the Quezon City Engineer's Office in the sum of P522,620.00, alleging said amount to be the fair market value of the
property in question, now already converted and used as a public highway. Nothing having come out of its claim, respondent
estate filed on August 6, 1963, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, assigned to Branch IX, presided
by respondent judge,2 a complaint for the recovery of the fair market price of the said property in the sum of P672,030.00
against the Bureau of Public Highways, which complaint was amended on August 26, 1963, to include as additional
defendants, the Auditor General and the City Engineer of Quezon City. 3
The issues were joined in the case with the filing by then Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz of the State's answer, stating that
the Hashim estate was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time that the State
took possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interest thereon at 6% per annum, and that said amount had been
available and tendered by petitioner Bureau since 1958. The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement,
respondent estate having proposed on April 28, 1966, a payment of P14.00 per sq. m. for its 14,934 sq.m.-parcel of land or the
total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to the land's total assessed value, 4 which was confirmed, ratified and approved in
November, 1966 by the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. On
November 7, 1966, the Compromise Agreement subscribed by counsel for respondent estate and by then Solicitor General
Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court, was submitted to the lower Court and under date of November 8, 1966,
respondent judge, as prayed for, rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement and ordering petitioners, as
defendants therein, to pay respondent estate as plaintiff therein, the total sum of P209,076.00 for the expropriated lot.
On October 10, 1968, respondent estate filed with the lower Court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that
petitioners had failed to satisfy the judgment in its favor. It further filed on October 12, 1968, an ex-partemotion for the
appointment of respondent Benjamin Garcia as special sheriff to serve the writ of execution. No opposition having been filed by
the Solicitor General's office to the motion for execution at the hearing thereof on October 12, 1968, respondent judge, in an
order dated October 14, 1968, granted both motions.
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith served a Notice of Garnishment, together
with the writ of execution dated October 14, 1968, issued by respondent Manuela C. Florendo as Deputy Clerk of Court, on
respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying said bank that levy was thereby made upon funds of petitioners Bureau of
Public Highways and the Auditor General on deposit, with the bank to cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of
respondent estate, and requesting the bank to reply to the garnishment within five days. On October 16, 1968, three days
before the expiration of the five-day deadline, respondent Benjamin V. Coruña in his capacity as Chief, Documentation Staff, of
respondent bank's Legal Department, allegedly acting in excess of his authority and without the knowledge and consent of the
Board of Directors and other ranking officials of respondent bank, replied to the notice of garnishment that in compliance
therewith, the bank was holding the amount of P209,076.00 from the account of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways.
Respondent bank alleged that when it was served with Notice to Deliver Money signed by respondent Garcia, as special
sheriff, on October 17, 1968, it sent a letter to the officials of the Bureau of Public Highways notifying them of the notice of
garnishment.
Under date of October 16, 1968, respondent estate further filed with the lower Court an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
order ordering respondent bank to release and deliver to the special sheriff, respondent Garcia, the garnished amount of
P209,076.00 deposited under the account of petitioner Bureau, which motion was granted by respondent judge in an order of
October 18, 1968. On the same day, October 18, 1968, respondent Coruña allegedly taking advantage of his position,
authorized the issuance of a cashier's check of the bank in the amount of P209,076.00, taken out of the funds of petitioner
Bureau deposited in current account with the bank and paid the same to respondent estate, without notice to said petitioner.
Later on December 20, 1968, petitioners, through then Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, wrote respondent bank complaining
that the bank acted precipitately in having delivered such a substantial amount to the special sheriff without affording petitioner
Bureau a reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment, notwithstanding the bank's being charged with legal
knowledge that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment, and demanding that the bank credit the said
petitioner's account in the amount of P209,076.00, which the bank had allowed to be illegally garnished. Respondent bank
replied on January 6, 1969 that it was not liable for the said garnishment of government funds, alleging that it was not for the
bank to decide the question of legality of the garnishment order and that much as it wanted to wait until it heard from the
Bureau of Public Highways, it was "helpless to refuse delivery under the teeth" of the special order of October 18, 1968,
directing immediate delivery of the garnished amount.
Petitioners therefore filed on January 28, 1969 the present action against respondents, in their capacities as above stated in
the title of this case, praying for judgment declaring void the question orders of respondent Court. Petitioners also sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate reimbursement of the garnished sum of P209,076.00,
constituting funds of petitioner Bureau on deposit with the Philippine National Bank as official depository of Philippine
Government funds, to the said petitioner's account with the bank, so as to forestall the dissipation of said funds, which the
government had allocated to its public highways and infrastructure projects. The Court ordered on January 31, 1969 the
issuance of the writ against the principal respondents solidarily, including respondent judge therein so that she would take
forthwith all the necessary measures and processes to compel the immediate return of the said government funds to petitioner
Bureau's account with respondent bank.5
In compliance with the writ, respondent bank restored the garnished sum of P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau's account with
it.6 The primary responsibility for the reimbursement of said amount to petitioner Bureau's account with the respondent bank,
however, rested solely on respondent estate, since it is the judgment creditor that received the amount upon the questioned
execution.
Strangely enough, as appears now from respondent bank's memorandum in lieu of oral argument, 7 what respondent bank did,
acting through respondent Coruña as its counsel, was not to ask respondent estate to reimburse it in turn in the same amount,
but to file with the probate court with jurisdiction over respondent estate, 8 a motion for the estate to depositthe said amount with
it, purportedly in compliance with the writ. Respondent estate thereupon deposited with respondent bank as a savings
account the sum of P125,446.00, on which the bank presumably would pay the usual interest, besides. As to the balance of
P83,630.00, this sum had been in the interval paid as attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus B. Santos, counsel for the estate, by the
administrator, allegedly without authority of the probate court. 9 Accordingly, respondent estate has not reimbursed the
respondent bank either as to this last amount, and the bank has complacently not taken any steps in the lower court to require
such reimbursement.
The ancillary questions now belatedly raised by the State may readily be disposed of. Petitioners may not invoke the State's
immunity from suit, since the case below was but a continuation in effect of the pre-war expropriation proceedings instituted by
the State itself. The expropriation of the property, which now forms part of Epifanio, de los Santos Avenue, is a fait
accompli and is not questioned by the respondent state. The only question at issue was the amount of the just compensation
due to respondent estate in payment of the expropriated property, which properly pertained to the jurisdiction of the lower
court. 10 It is elementary that in expropriation proceedings, the State precisely submits to the Court's jurisdiction and asks the
Court to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its
complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid therefor.
Neither may the State impugn the validity of the compromise agreement executed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
State with the approval of the proper government officials, on the ground that it was executed only by the lawyer of respondent
estate, without any showing of having been specially authorized to bind the estate thereby, because such alleged lack of
authority may be questioned only by the principal or client, and respondent estate as such principal has on the contrary
confirmed and ratified the compromise agreement. 11 As a matter of fact, the Solicitor General, in representation of the State,
makes in the petition no prayer for the annulment of the compromise agreement or of the respondent court's decision
approving the same.
On the principal issue, the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders (1) for execution of the judgment, in
pursuance whereof respondent deputy clerk issued the corresponding writ of execution and respondent special sheriff issued
the notice of garnishment, and (2) for delivery of the garnished amount of P209,076.00 to respondent estate as judgment
creditor through respondent special sheriff, are null and void on the fundamental ground that government funds are not subject
to execution or garnishment.
1. As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its
payment of the award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to
the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution. 12The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature
to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award
determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
In another early case, where the government by an act of the Philippine Legislature, expressly consented to be sued by the
plaintiff in an action for damages and waived its immunity from suit, the Court adjudged the Government as not being legally
liable on the complaint, since the State under our laws would be liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agents' regular duties. We held that the plaintiff would have
to look to the legislature for another legislative enactment and appropriation of sufficient funds, if the Government intended
itself to be legally liable only for the damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of the negligent act of one of its employees. 13
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
Public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Thus, as pointed out by the Court in Belleng vs. Republic, 14 while the State has given its consent to be sued in compensation
cases, the pauper-claimant therein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Act for the corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the general law
waiving its immunity from suit "upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract express or implied," imposed the
limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of
the (Philippines) under the provisions of this Act;" and that otherwise, the claimant would have to prosecute his money claim
against the State under Commonwealth Act 327.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, 15 setting aside as null and void the order of
garnishment issued by the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ of execution on funds of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in
the account of the Government's Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court emphasized then and re-
emphasizes now that judgments against the State or its agencies and instrumentalities in cases where the State has
consented to be sued, operate merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may not be enforced by
writs of execution or garnishment and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding
appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.
2. Respondent bank and its Chief, Documentation Staff, respondent Coruña have advanced two specious arguments to justify
their wrongful delivery of the garnished public funds to respondent estate. Their first contention that the said government funds
by reason of their being deposited by petitioner Bureau under a current account subject to withdrawal by check, instead of
being deposited as special trust funds, "lost their kind and character as government funds," 16 is untenable. As the official
depositary of the Philippine Government, respondent bank and its officials should be the first ones to know that all government
funds deposited with it by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit,
remain government funds, since such government agencies or instrumentalities do not have any non-public or private funds of
their own.
Their second contention that said government funds lost their character as such "the moment they were deposited with the
respondent bank", 17 since the relation between a depositor and a depository bank is that of creditor and debtor, is just as
untenable, absolutely. Said respondents shockingly ignore the fact that said government funds were deposited with respondent
bank as the official depositary of the Philippine Government. Assuming for the nonce the creation of such relationship of
creditor and debtor, petitioner Bureau thereby held a credit against respondent bank whose obligation as debtor was to pay
upon demand of said petitioner-creditor the public funds thus deposited with it; even though title to the deposited funds passes
to the bank under this theory since the funds become mingled with other funds which the bank may employ in its ordinary
business, what was garnished was not the bank's own funds but the credit of petitioner bureau against the bank to receive
payment of its funds, as a consequence of which respondent bank delivered to respondent estate the garnished amount of
P209,076.00 belonging to said petitioner. Petitioner bureau's credit against respondent bank thereby never lost its character as
a credit representing government funds thus deposited. The moment the payment is made by respondent bank on such
deposit, what it pays out represents the public funds thus deposited which are not garnishable and may be expended only for
their legitimate objects as authorized by the corresponding legislative appropriation. Neither respondent bank nor respondent
Coruña are the duly authorized disbursing officers and auditors of the Government to authorize and cause payment of the
public funds of petitioner Bureau for the benefit or private persons, as they wrongfully did in this case.
3. Respondents bank and Coruña next pretend that refusal on their part to obey respondent judge's order to deliver the
garnished amount, "which is valid and binding unless annulled, would have exposed them for contempt of court." 18 They make
no excuse for not having asked the lower court for time and opportunity to consult petitioner Bureau or the Solicitor General
with regard to the garnishment and execution of said deposited public funds which were allocated to specific government
projects, or for not having simply replied to the sheriff that what they held on deposit for petitioner Bureau were non-
garnishable government funds. They have not given any cogent reason or explanation, — charged as they were with
knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment against government funds, for in the earlier case
of Republic vs. Palacio, supra, they had then prudently and timely notified the proper government officials of the attempted levy
on the funds of the Irrigation Service Unit deposited with it, thus enabling the Solicitor General to take the corresponding action
to annul the garnishment — for their failure to follow the same prudent course in this case. Indeed, the Court is appalled at the
improper haste and lack of circumspection with which respondent Coruña and other responsible officials of respondent bank
precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the large amount involved, all within the period of just four days, even
before the expiration of the five-day reglementary period to reply to the sheriff's notice of garnishment. Failure on the State's
part to oppose the issuance of the writ of execution, which was patently null and void as an execution against government
funds, could not relieve them of their own responsibility.
4. Respondents bank and Coruña further made common cause with respondent estate beyond the legal issues that should
solely concern them, by reason of their having wrongfully allowed the garnishment and delivery of government funds, instead
assailing petitioners for not having come to court with "clean hands" and asserting that in fairness, justice and equity,
petitioners should not impede, obstruct or in any way delay the payment of just compensation to the land owners for their
property that was occupied way back in 1940. This matter of payment of respondent estate's judgment credit is of no concern
to them as custodian and depositary of the public funds deposited with them, whereby they are charged with the obligation of
assuring that the funds are not illegally or wrongfully paid out.
Since they have gone into the records of the expropriation case, then it should be noted that they should have considered the None of the above contingencies having been shown to be present, respondent Court's order appointing respondent Garcia as
vital fact that at the time that the compromise agreement therein was executed in November, 1966, respondent estate was well "special sheriff" to serve the writ of execution was devoid of authority.
aware of the fact that the funds for the payment of the property in the amount of P209,076.00 still had to be released by the
Budget Commissioner and that at the time of the garnishment, respondent estate was still making the necessary
7. No civil liability attaches, however, to respondents special sheriff and deputy clerk, since they acted strictly pursuant to
representations for the corresponding release of such amount, pursuant to the Budget Commissioner's favorable
orders issued by respondent judge in the discharge of her judicial functions as presiding judge of the lower court, and
recommendation.19 And with regard to the merits of the case, they should have likewise considered that respondent estate
respondent judge's immunity from civil responsibility covers them, although the said orders are herein declared null and void. 20
could have no complaint against the fair attitude of the authorities in not having insisted on their original stand in their answer
that respondent estate was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time the State
took possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interests thereon, but rather agreed to pay therefor the greatly ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The respondent court's questioned Orders of October 14,
revised and increased amount of P209,076.00 at P14.00 per square meter, not to mention the consequential benefits derived and 18, 1968, are declared null and void, and all further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-7441 of the Court of First Instance of
by said respondent from the construction of the public highway with the resultant enhanced value of its remaining properties in Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX are abated. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made permanent,
the area. except as to respondent judge who is excluded therefrom, without prejudice to any cause of action that private respondents
may have, inter se. Respondent estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as prayed for by respondent Philippine National
Bank in its Answer, are ordered jointly and severally to reimburse said respondent bank in the amount of P209,076.00 with
5. The manner in which respondent bank's counsel and officials proceeded to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory
legal interest until the date of actual reimbursement. Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine National Bank and
injunction issued by the Court commanding respondent estate, its judicial administrator and respondents bank and Coruña, in
Benjamin Coruña are ordered jointly to pay treble costs.
solidum, to reimburse forthwith the account of petitioner Bureau in the garnished amount of P209,076.00, does not speak well
of their fidelity to the bank's interests. For while respondent bank had restored with its own funds the said amount of
P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau's account, it has not required respondent estate as the party primarily liable therefor as the The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copies of this decision to the Board of Directors and to the president of respondent
recipient of the garnished amount to reimburse it in turn in this same amount. Rather, said bank officials have allowed Philippine National Bank for their information and appropriate action. So ordered.
respondent estate to keep all this time the whole amount of P209,076.00 wrongfully garnished by it. For as stated above,
respondent bank allowed respondent estate merely to deposit with it as a savings account, of respondent estate, the lesser
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Villamor. JJ., concur. Barredo, J.,
sum of P125,446.00 on which the bank presumably has paid and continues paying respondent estate, besides the usual
took no part.
interest rates on such savings accounts, and neither has it taken any steps to require reimbursement to it from respondent
estate of the remainder of P83,630.00 which respondent estate of its own doing and responsibility paid by way of attorney's
fees.

It thus appears that all this time, respondent bank has not been reimbursed by respondent estate as the party primarily liable
for the whole amount of P209,076.00 wrongfully and illegally garnished and received by respondent estate. This grave breach
of trust and dereliction of duty on the part of respondent bank's officials should be brought to the attention of respondent bank's
Board of Directors and management for the appropriate administrative action and other remedial action for the bank to recover
the damages it has been made to incur thereby.

6. The Solicitor General has likewise questioned the legality of respondent Court's Order of October 14, 1968, appointing
respondent Garcia as "special sheriff" for the purpose of effecting service of the writ of execution, simply on respondent
estate's representation that it was desirable "for a speedy enforcement of the writ."

The Court finds this general practice of the lower courts of appointing "special sheriffs" for the service of writs of execution to
be unauthorized by law. The duty of executing all processes" of the courts in civil cases, particularly, writs of execution,
devolves upon the sheriff or his deputies, under Section 183 of the Revised Administrative Code and Rule 39, section 8 of the
Rules of Court. Unlike the service of summons which may be made, aside from the sheriff or other proper court officers, "for
special reasons by any person especially authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons" under Rule 14, section 5
of the Rules of Court, the law requires that the responsibility of serving writs of execution, which involve the taking delivery of
money or property in trust for the judgment creditor, should be carried out by regularly bonded sheriffs or other proper court
officers. (Sections 183 and 330, Revised Administrative Code). The bond required by law of the sheriff is conditioned inter alia,
"for the delivery or payment to the Government, or the persons entitled thereto, of all the property or sums of money that shall
officially come into his or their (his deputies') hands" (Section 330, idem), and thus avoids the risk of embezzlement of such
properties and moneys.

Section 185 of the Revised Administrative Code restrictively authorizes the judge of the Court issuing the process or writ to
deputize some suitable person only "when the sheriff is party to any action or proceeding or is otherwise incompetent to serve
process therein." The only other contingency provided by law is when the office of sheriff is vacant, and the judge is then
authorized, "in case of emergency, (to) make a temporary appointment to the office of sheriff ... pending the appointment and
qualification of the sheriff in due course; and he may appoint the deputy clerk of the court or other officer in the government
service to act in said capacity." (Section 189, idem).