G.R. No.

L-60403 August 3, 1983

ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS (AGW); PNB-FEMA BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA
MANGAGAWA AT KAWANI NG MWSS (AGW); BALARA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); GSIS WORKERS ASSOCIATION (AGW); SSS
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); PVTA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS AND OFFICE
WORKERS (AGW); , petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB); METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS and
SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS); GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS); SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS); PHILIPPINE
VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (PVTA) PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE (PNC); POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PUP), respondents.

The Solicitor General for MOLE, PNB, SSS, PNC and PUP.

Oliver Gesmundo for petitioners.

Jesus C. Gentiles for petitioner SSSEA-AGW.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations included
among the 4 "employers"" under Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay an their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than
P1,000.00 a month, a thirteenth (13th) month pay not later than December 24 of every year?

Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from
among the employees of the following offices, schools, or government owned or controlled corporations:

1. Philippine National Bank (PNB) Escolta Street, Manila

2. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City

3. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Arroceros Street, Manila

4. Social Security System (SSS) East Avenue, Quezon City

5. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) Consolacion Building, Cubao, Quezon City

6. Philippine Normal College (PNC) Ayala Boulevard, Manila

7. Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) Hippodromo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila

On February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a motion to come in as an additional petitioner.

Presidential Decree No. 851 provides in its entirety:

WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real f wages from the ravage of world-wide inflation;

WHEREAS, there has been no increase case in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970;

WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern for the plight of the working masses so they
may properly celebrate Christmas and New Year.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby decree as
follows:

SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than Pl,000 a month,
regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year.

SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree.

SECTION 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of December 1975.
According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their employees with one sole exception found in Section
2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. " The petitioners
contend that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 included other types of employers not exempted by the
decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types of employers
from the requirement.

Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 provides:

Section 3. Employers covered — The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:

a) Distressed employers, such as (1) those which are currently incurring substantial losses or 112) in the case of non-profit
institutions and organizations, where their income, whether from donations, contributions, grants and other earnings from any
source, has consistently declined by more than forty (40%) per cent of their normal income for the last two (2) )years, subject to the
provision of Section 7 of this issuance.

b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except)t those
corporation, operating essentially as private, ,subsidiaries of the government;

c) Employers already paying their employees 13th-month pay or more in a calendar year or its equivalent at the of this issuance;

d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation to such workers: and

e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis and those who are paid a fixed for performing a
specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid an piece- rate basis
in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance :insofar ab such workers are concerned ...

The petitioners assail this rule as ultra vires and void. Citing Philippine Apparel Workers'Union v. NIRC et al., (106 SCRA 444); Teoxon v. Members of
the Board of' Administators (33 SCRA 585); Santos u. Hon. Estenzo et al., (109 Phil. 419); Hilado u. Collector of Internal Revenue (100 Phil. 288),
and Olsen & Co. Inc. v. Aldanese and Trinidad(43 Phil. 259), the petitioners argue that regulations adopted under legislative authority must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. They state that a legislative act cannot be
amended by a rule and an administrative officer cannot change the law. Section 3 is challenged as a substantial modification by rule of a Presidential
Decree and an unlawful exercise of legislative power.

Our initial reaction was to deny due course to the petition in a minute resolution, however, considering the important issues propounded and the fact,
that constitutional principles are involved, we have now decided to give due course to the petition, to consider the various comments as answers and to
resolve the questions raised through a full length decision in the exercise of this Court's symbolic function as an aspect of the power of judicial review.

At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory relief, an action not embraced within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Remotigue v. Osmena,, Jr., 21 SCRA 837; Rural Bank of Olongapo v. Commission of Land Registration, 102 SCRA
794; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294). There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for the petitioners' statement that the Supreme Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are involved. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The petitioners have not
pointed to any provision of the Constitution or statute which sustains their sweeping assertion. On this ground alone, the petition could have been
dismissed outright.

Following similar action taken in Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista (85 Phil. 101) and Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275) we have,
however, decided to treat the petition as one for mandamus. The petition has far reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved.
Have the respondents unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the use and enjoyment of rights to which they are entitled under the law?

An analysis of the "whereases" of P.D. No. 851 shows that the President had in mind only workers in private employment when he issued the decree.
There was no intention to cover persons working in the government service. The decree states:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, there has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970;

xxx xxx xxx

As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment for the Minister of Labor and Employment, the Social Security System the Philippine Normal
College, and Polytechnic University, the contention that govermment owned and controlled corporations and state colleges and universities are covered
by the term "all employers" is belied by the nature of the 13- month pay and the intent behind the decree.

The Solicitor General states:

"Presidential Decree No. 851 is a labor standard law which requires covered employers to pay their employees receiving not more than P1,000.00 a
month an additional thirteenth-month pay. Its purpose is to increase the real wage of the worker (Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Ople, 105 SCRA 75; and
National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982) as explained in the'whereas'clause which read:

WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real wages from the ravage of world-wide inflation;
 WHEREAS, there has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970; 11

WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern for the plight of the
working masses so they may celebrate the Christmas and New Year.

xxx xxx xxx

What the P.D. No. 851 intended to cover, as explained in the prefatory statement of the Decree, are only those in the private sector
whose real wages require protection from world-wide inflation. This is emphasized by the "whereas" clause which states that 'there
has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970'. This could only refer to the private sector, and not to those in
the government service because at the time of the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 851 in 1975, only the employees in the
private sector had not been given any increase in their minimum wage. The employees in the government service had already been
granted in 1974 a ten percent across-the-board increase on their salaries as stated in P.D. No. 525, Section 4.

Moreover, where employees in the government service were to benefit from labor standard laws, their coverage is explicitly stated in
the statute or presidential enactment. This is evident in (a) Presidential Decree No. 390, Sec. 1 which granted emergency cost of
living allowance to employees in the national government; (b) Republic Act No. 6111, Sec. 10 on medicare benefits; (c) Presidential
Decree No -442, Title II, Article 97 on the applicable minimum wage rates; (d) Presidential Decree No. 442, Title 11, Article 167 (g)
on workmen's compensation; (e) Presidential Decree No. 1123 which provides for increases in emergency allowance to employees
in the private sector and in salary to government employees in Section 2 thereof; and (f) Executive Order No. 752 granting
government employees a year-end bonus equivalent to one week's pay. Thus, had the intention been to include government
employees under the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 851, said Decree should have expressly so provided and there should
have been accompanying yearly appropriation measures to implement the same. That no such express provision was provided and
no accompanying appropriation measure to was passed clearly show the intent to exclude government employees from the
coverage of P. D. No. 85 1.

We agree.

It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts which impose burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights and
interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. (See Dollar Savings Bank v.
United States, 19 Wall (U.S.) 227; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 265). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign,
cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

The issue raised in this petition, however, is more basic and fundamental than a mere ascertainment of intent or a construction of statutory provisions. It
is concerned with a revisiting of the traditional classification of government employment into governmental functions and proprietary functions and of the
many ramifications that this dichotomous treatment presents in the handling of concerted activities, collective bargaining, and strikes by government
employees to wrest concessions in compensation, fringe benefits, hiring and firing, and other terms and conditions of employment.

The workers in the respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the heads of their respective offices nor their representatives in the Batasang
Pambansa. They have acted through a labor federation and its affiliated unions. In other words, the workers and employees of these state firms, college,
and university are taking collective action through a labor federation which uses the bargaining power of organized labor to secure increased
compensation for its members.

Under the present state of the law and pursuant to the express language of the Constitution, this resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat
of a strike can no longer be allowed.

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D.
No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in
the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.

At the same time, the old Industrial Peace Act excepted employees and workers in proprietary functions of government from the above compulsion of
law. Thus, in the past, government employees performing proprietary functions could belong to labor organizations imposing the obligation to join in
strikes or engage in other concerted action. (Section 11, R.A. 875, as amended). They could and they did engage in concerted activities and various
strikes against government owned and controlled corporations and other government institutions discharging proprietary functions. Among the
institutions as falling under the exception in Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act were respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSISEA v.
Alvendia, 108 Phil. 505) and Social Security System (SSSEA v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016). And this Court has supported labor completely in the various
strikes and concerted activities in firms and agencies discharging proprietary functions because the Constitution and the laws allowed these activities.

The exception, however belongs to the past.

The petitioners state in their counter comment filed July 23, 1982 that the 1973 Constitution is categorical about the grant of the rights to self-
organization and collective bargaining to all workers and that no amount of stretched interpretation of lesser laws like the Labor Code and the Civil
Service Act can overturn the clear message of the Constitution with respect to these rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.
These statements of the petitioners are error insofar as government workers are now concerned.

Under the present Constitution, govemment-owned or controlled corporations are specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil service. (Section 1,
Article XII-B, Constitution). The inclusion of the clause "including every government owned or controlled corporation" in the 1973 amendments to the
Constitution was a deliberate amendment for an express purpose. There may be those who disagree with the intent of the framers of the amendment but
because it is fundamental law, we are all bound by it. The amendment was intended to correct the situation where more favored employees of the
government could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. They were protected by the laws governing government employment. They could also engage in
collective bargaining and join in strikes to secure higher wages and fringe benefits which equally hardworking employees engaged in government
functions could only envy but not enjoy.

Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines has implemented the 1973 Constitutional amendment. It is categorical about the
inclusion of personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations in the civil service and their being subject to civil service requirements:

SECTION 56. Government- owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel.—All permanent personnel of government- owned or
controlled corporations whose positions are now embraced in the civil service shall continue in the service until they have been
given a chance to qualify in an appropriate examination, but in the meantime, those who do not possess the appropriate civil service
eligibility shall not be promoted until they qualify in an appropriate civil service examination. Services of temporary personnel ma be
y terminated any time.

Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the civil service. It would not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted
activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from Government even as other civil service personnel such as the hundreds of thousands of public
school teachers, soldiers, policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are denied the right to engage in similar activities.

To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the Government and all its agencies, instrumentalities, and government-owned or
controlled corporations would also result in nightmarish budgetary problems.

For instance, the Supreme Court is trying its best to alleviate the financial difficulties of courts, judges, and court personnel in the entire country but it can
do so only within the limits of budgetary appropriations. Public school teachers have been resorting to what was formerly unthinkable, to mass leaves
and demonstrations, to get not a 13th-month pay but promised increases in basic salaries and small allowances for school uniforms. The budget of the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports has to be supplemented every now and then for this purpose. The point is, salaries and fringe benefits of those
embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. Any increases must come from law, from appropriations or savings under the law, and not from concerted
activity.

The Government Corporate Counsel, Justice Manuel Lazaro, in his consolidated comment * for respondents GSIS, MWSS, and PVTA gives the
background of the amendment which includes every government-owned or controlled corporation in the embrace of the civil service:

Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the deliberations held relative to what is now Section 1(1) Article XII-
B, supra the issue of the inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations figured prominently.

The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader, vehemently objected to the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations in the Civil Service. He argued that such inclusion would put asunder the right of workers in government
corporations, recognized in jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution, to form and join labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining with their employers in the same manner as in the private section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional Convention).

In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention enlightened the members of the Committee on
Labor on the divergent situation of government workers under the 1935 Constitution, and called for its rectification. Thus, in a
Position Paper dated November-22, 1971, submitted to the Committee on Labor, 1971 Constitutional Convention, then Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service Epi Rev Pangramuyen declared:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar
character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as
not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interests of all people in the public service, and that accordingly,
such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ.

Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision of the management of the public
service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is further emphasized that government agencies in the
performance of their duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers and must always
maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It would be highly
incompatible with these requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders from union leaders or put
solidarity with members of the working class above solidarity with the Government. This would be inimical to the
public interest.

Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by joining labor unions may be compelled to support objectives
which are political in nature and thus jeopardize the fundamental principle that the governmental machinery
must be impartial and non-political in the sense of party politics.' (see: Records of 1971 Constitutional
Convention).
 Similarly, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing support for the inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations in the
Civil Service, argued:

It is meretricious to contend that because Govermnent owned or controlled corporations yield profits, their
employees are entitled to better wages and fringe benefits than employees of Government other than
Government- owned and controlled cor orations which are not making profits. There is no gainsaying the fact
that the capital they use is the people's (see Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention).

Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of Government owned or controlled
corporations, Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila University Professional School of Law, stated that government-
owned corporations came under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in the
various branches of government, while the capital of these corporations belongs to the Government and government money is
pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should therefore come under the strick surveillance of the Civil
Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524).

The Government Corporate Counsel cites the precedent setting decision in Agricultural- Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA v.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offtces CUGCO et al., 30 SCRA 649) as giving the rationale for coverage of government-
owned or controlled corporations by the civil service. We stated ACCFA v. CUGCO that:

... The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be
strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from 'ministrant'), [Bacani vs. National Coconut
Corporation, G.R. No. L-9657, Nov. 29,1956, 53 O.G. p. 2800] such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of
the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals," (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippines, pp. 19-20; Bacani vs. National Coconut
Corporation, supra) continue to lose their well- defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces, Here of course this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

Chief Justice Fernando, then an Associate Justice of this Court, observed in a concurring opinion that the traditional classification into constituent and
ministrant functions reflects the primacy at that time of the now discredited and repudiated laissez faire concept carried over into government. He stated:

The influence exerted by American constitutional doctrines unavoidable when the Philippines was still under American rule
notwithstanding, an influence that has not altogether vanished even after independence, the laissez faire principle never found fun
acceptance in this jurisdiction, even during the period of its full flowering in the United States. Moreover, to erase any doubts, the
Constitutional Convention saw to it that our fundamental law embodies a policy of the responsibility thrust on government to cope
with social and economic problems and an earnest and sincere commitment to the promotion of the general welfare through state
action. It would thus follow that the force of any legal objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights or to
statutes organizing public corporations that may engage in competition with private enterprise has been blunted. Unless there be a
clear showing of any invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, their validity is a foregone conclusion. No fear need be
entertained that thereby spheres hitherto deemed outside government domain have been encroached upon. With our explicit
disavowal of the 'constituent-ministrant' test, the ghost of the laissez-faire concept no longer stalks the juridical stage."

Our dismissal of this petiti/n should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that workers in government-owned and controlled corporations or in state
colleges and universities may not enjoy freedom of association. The workers whom the petitioners purport to represent have the right, which may not be
abridged, to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. (Constitution, Article IV, Section 7). This is a right which share with all public
officers and employees and, in fact, by everybody living in this country. But they may not join associations which impose the obligation to engage in
concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different fr•m that provided by law and regulation.

The very Labor Code, P.D. No. 442 as amended,, which governs the registration and provides for the rights of legitimate labor organizations states:

ART. 277. Government employees.— The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees
of government-owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries
shall be standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the new constitution. However, there shall be no reduction of
existing wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of this
code.

Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why the government employees represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment
in matters of salaries different from that extended to all others government personnel. The provision states:

SEC. 6. The National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to,
and the qualifications required for the positions concerned.
It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not the collective bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by
labor unions from management that determine how much the workers in government-owned or controlled corporations may receive in terms of salaries,
13th month pay, and other conditions or terms of employment. There are government institutions which can afford to pay two weeks, three weeks, or
even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their budgetary appropriations. However, these payments must be pursuant to law or regulation.
Presidential Decree No. 985 as amended provides:

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.— It is hereby declared to be the policy, of the national government to provide equal pay for
substantially, equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in private
industry for comparable work. For this purpose, there is hereby established a system of compensation standardization and position
classification in the national government for all departments, bureaus, agencies, and officers including government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions: Provided, That notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all
employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporations and financial institutions for their
employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in
critical government agencies.

The Solicitor-General correctly points out that to interpret P.D. No. 851 as including government employees would upset the compensation levels of
government employees in violation of those fixed according to P.D. No. 985.

Here as in other countries, government salaries and wages have always been lower than salaries, wages, and bonuses in the private sector. However,
civil servants have no cause for despair. Service in the government may at times be a sacrifice but it is also a welcome privilege. Apart from the
emotional and psychic satisfactions, there are various material advantages. The security of tenure guaranteed to those in the civil service by the
Constitution and statutes, the knowledge that one is working for the most stable of employers and not for private persons, the merit system in
appointments and promotions, the scheme of vacation, sick, and maternity leave privileges, and the prestige and dignity associated with public office are
only a few of the joys of government employment.

Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 is, therefore, a correct interpretation of the decree. It has been
implemented and enforced from December 22, 1975 to the present, The petitioners have shown no valid reason why it should be nullified because of
their petition filed six and a half years after the issuance and implementation of the rule.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146528.February 6, 2001]

JAIME SORIANO, et al. vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 6 2001.

G.R. No. 146528(Jaime N. Soriano, Philip Emmanuel C. Penaflor, Cesar B. Chavez, Sal G. Dumabok, Samuel Julius B. Garcia, Sandra P. Torresyap,
Cherrie B. Belmonte, Mario S. Araos, Rodylyn Tingzon-Manzano, Fidelino A. Austria, Angelito M. Villanueva, Isabelo M. Banez III, Paul Y. Chua and
Cesar C. Villariba, all officers and members of the Movement for National Security Advancement (MNSA), vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada.)

G.R. No. 146549 (In the Matter of the Declaration of her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the constitutionally instituted 14th President of the
Republic of the Philippines; Eduardo B. Inlayo, petitioner.)

G.R. No. 146579 (Concerned Citizens for effective and responsible Government, Inc.; SulongBayan Movement Foundation, Inc.; Institute of Continuing
Legal Studies and Education Inc.; Eliseo P. Ocampo; Editha A. Santos; and Armando A. Ricarte, Jr., petitioners.)

G.R. No. 146631 (Oliver O. Lozano vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.)

These cases pertain to the oath-taking on 20 January 2001 of then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines.The Court
ordered these consolidation because they involve the same subject matter.

In G.R. No. 146528, petitioners Jaime N. Soriano, et al., ask the Court to enjoin Joseph Ejercito Estrada "from exercising the powers and authority of the
President under the Constitution" and "to yield the Presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo."

In G.R. No. 146549, petitioner Eduardo Inlayo prays that the Court declare that "the occupation of the office of [the President] of the Philippines by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional and legal with the full support of the Filipino people and other foreign countries."
In G.R. No. 146579, petitioner ask the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on whether or not Joseph Estrada is still the President" and is "exempt from all
criminal suits."

In G.R. No. 146631, petitioner Oliver Lozano prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame Arroyo" be declared null and void or that she be
"declared acting President and President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave."

All four Petitions are plainly without merit.

First, the four Petitions are essentially for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction. 1 Remotigue v. Osmeña, 21
SCRA 837 [1967]; Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. v. Commissioner of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794 [1981]; Sundiang v. Estrada and the Philippine
Senate, G.R. No. 146131, 16 January 2001.Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this special civil action falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts and is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 2 Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983].

Although the Petition in G.R. No. 146528 is captioned as a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus," it fails to allege, much less show, lack or excess
jurisdiction, or grave abuse of jurisdiction on the part of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, which Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires to be alleged and proved before the extraordinary writ of prohibition may be
issued.Neither have petitioner sufficiently alleged, much less shown, that respondent or anyone else unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty, to entitle them to the writ of mandamus.In any case, petitioners themselves admit that their plea is really one for
declaratory relief, (par. 6.1. of Petition) and that they "fully understand the well-settled doctrine that this Honorable Court is bereft of jurisdiction to
entertain cases for declaratory relief."

Second, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits.They have not shown any direct and personal injury as a result of President Arroyo's oath-
taking. 3 See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 562-563 [1995]; Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603 [1999].Specifically, Petitioner Lozano's
alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition, i.e., to nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and declare Estrada
as "President-on-leave." The other petitioners have not even alleged, not to say shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify them as proper
parties.Kibitzers, however well-meaning, have no locus standi.

Third, none of the Petitioners can be treated as actions for quo warranto.Under Rule 66 of the rules of Court, a plea for quo warranto may be
commenced by (1) the solicitor general, (2) a public prosecutor, or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by another.None of the petitioners qualify in law to commence the action.Their Petitioner do not even remotely allege that they are.

At bottom, the Court stands by its Resolution in A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC, promulgated on 22 January 2001, which reads as follows:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC. - In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the
Philippines before the ChiefJustice. - Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as
an administrative matter, the Court resolved unanimously to CONFIRM the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the
Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the Oath of Office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of
January 20, 2001.

This Resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case which may be filed by a proper party.

Clearly, the herein Petitions have miserably failed to present justiciable controversies brought by the proper parties to deserve further considerations by
this Court.The appropriate case for the resolution of the issues raised by petitioners may be G.R. Nos. 146710-15 entitled H.E. Joseph E. Estrada vs.
Honorable Aniano Desierto, etc., et al., filed on 05 February 2001.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions at bar are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

[G. R. No. 135913. November 4, 1999]

VICTORIANO B. TIROL, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICES CIPRIANO A. DEL ROSARIO, NARCISO S. NARIO, and
ANACLETO D. BADOY (SB 3rd Division), HON. SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LEONARDO P. TAMAYO, HON. PROSECUTOR PELAGIO S.
APOSTOL, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Region VIII, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, LEYTE GOVERNMENT CENTER,
CANDAHUG, PALO, LEYTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the following orders of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

1. Order dated September 22, 1998 denying petitioners motion to suspend trial in SB Criminal Case No. 23785; [1] and
2. Order dated October 13, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said denial. [2]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In May 1993, based on a complaint filed by members of two groups, the Federated PTA Organization and the Teachers and Employees Union, the
Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a general audit of the transactions of the Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, Borongan, Eastern Samar
between January 1, 1990 and April 30, 1993. On October 19, 1993, the COA audit team reported that the acquisition of equipment costing P80,000.00
was made through negotiated contract, and not by public bidding in violation of COA Circular 85-55A, and resulted in overpricing amounting to
P35,100.00. On December 1, 1994, COA Regional Director Santos M. Alquizalas recommended to Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) Arturo C. Mojica the
filing of criminal and administrative charges against the responsible personnel, namely: petitioner Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr., Conchita C. Devora and Maria
A. Alvero.

The three accused participated in the transaction as follows: Conchita C. Devora, a Secondary School Principal I, approved the transaction,
countersigned the check and requisitioned the items; Maria A. Alvero, as Bookkeeper, signed box no. 4 of the voucher; petitioner Tirol, as Director III,
signed the checks and approved the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV).

After conducting preliminary investigation, on March 20, 1997, Graft Investigation Officer III Virginia Palanca-Santiago, with the approval of Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica and Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, found the existence of probable cause for the indictment of petitioner Tirol, now Regional
Director, DECS V, Legaspi City, and his two co-accused for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. On the same date, March
20, 1997, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an information for violation of Section 3 (g) of R. A. No. 3019 against the three accused.

Upon motion of petitioner Tirol for permission to travel abroad on official business, on September 17, 1997, the Sandiganbayan conditionally
arraigned Tirol, without prejudice to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman. Petitioner Tirol, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty.

On January 2, 1998, petitioner Tirol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for leave to seek reconsideration/reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman. On January 5, 1998, the Sandiganbayan ordered all the accused to file with the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, their motion for reconsideration of the finding of probable cause, within ten (10) days therefrom. The court directed the prosecutor to re-
evaluate his findings and conclusions within thirty (30) days from receipt of the motion.

On March 5, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration. On May 22, 1998, the
Ombudsman approved the recommendation.

On July 17, 1998, petitioner Tirol filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari,[3] pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989).Petitioner averred that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in concluding that the approval of the requisition
and issue voucher (RIV) and signature in the check made petitioner liable for the overpricing.

Upon arraignment on August 24, 1998, accused Devora and Alvero pleaded not guilty to the information.

On September 2, 1998, petitioner Tirol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to reset trial and manifestation. He sought to reset the scheduled
hearing on September 17 and 18, 1998, pending resolution of the petition for review on certiorari (G. R. No. 133954) filed with the Supreme Court.

On September 4, 1998, the Sandiganbayan in open court denied the motion to reset trial. On September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan reduced
the ruling in writing by an order nunc pro tunc. The court ordered the pretrial conference to proceed as scheduled. The Sandiganbayan ruled that an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, refers only to administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman, and
not to judicial cases filed with the court.

On September 14, 1998, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the court denied in an order dated October 13, 1998.

Hence, this petition.[4]

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his
motion to defer/suspend the trial in SB Criminal Case No. 23785, pending the disposition of the earlier petition for review filed with this Court. Petitioner
avers that continuing with the trial in Criminal Case No. 23785, without awaiting the decision in the aforesaid petition would render the petition moot and
academic. Petitioner cites Section 27, R. A. No. 6770, which provides that:

x x x. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision of denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner avers that all orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in both administrative and criminal cases are appealable to the
Supreme Court. Petitioner submits that to restrict the applicability of review or appeal to administrative cases, and afford no relief of appeal by certiorari
in criminal cases, is absurd and illogical considering that criminal cases are more afflictive to the concerned individual.

At the same time, petitioner contends that limiting the applicability of Section 27 to administrative cases would restrict the power of judicial review
by the Supreme Court of all acts by government agencies which are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that Section 27, R.A. No. 6770, providing an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, applies
only to administrative cases. The Solicitor General invokes the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,[5] which states that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
involved only when an appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45, is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.

The Solicitor General also contends that, contrary to petitioners averment, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is available to petitioner whenever
he believes that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in his determination of the existence of probable cause.

However, in this case, since all the accused have been properly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case has passed the pre-trial stage and is
ready for trial, the remedy available now to the accused is to proceed to trial, await judgment and appeal the decision in the event that it is unfavorable to
them.

We resolve to dismiss the petition.

 Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the
Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian v. Desierto,[6] we declared that Section 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded the
Supreme Courts jurisdiction, without its advice and consent, in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all appeals from decision of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

True, the law is silent on remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-
administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We have held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. [7] Hence, there must be a law expressly
granting such privilege The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such
right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict
accused persons.

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

At any rate, it should be stressed that there is pending before this Court a petition for review under Rule 45 questioning the finding of probable
cause by the Ombudsman. What is at issue in this petition for certiorari is the propriety of the Sandiganbayans denial of the motion to suspend trial
pending resolution of the certiorari case.

We find that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suspend trial in SB Criminal Case No.
23785. We have held that as a rule, criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final [8]. While we recognized
exceptions to this rule in Brocka v. Enrile,[9] we find that this case does not fall within the exceptions to warrant restraining the criminal prosecution.

Consequently, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion to
suspend trial.

WHEREFORE, the court hereby DISMISSES the petition.

[G.R. Nos. L-52872-52997. January 30, 1987.]

ROLANDO R. MANGUBAT, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS AND EX POST FACTO CLAUSES; NOT VIOLATED BY DECREE CREATING
SANDIGANBAYAN. — The decree creating the Sandiganbayan is constitutional and it does not violate the equal protection, due process and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution. This doctrine was reiterated in the cases of Calubaquib v. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-54272-73, September 30, 1982, 117
SCRA 493; De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337; Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659; Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 126 SCRA 383; Alviar v.
Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; DEFRAUDATION WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF ALL ACCUSED. —
Petitioner’s allegation that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding the existence of conspiracy must fail. No doubt the defraudation of the government would
not have been possible were it not for the cooperation respectively extended by all the accused, including herein petitioner. The scheme involved both
officials and employees from the Regional Office. Some made the falsifications, others worked to cover-up the same to consummate the crime herein
charged. Petitioner’s role was indubitably an essential ingredient especially so because it was he who issued the false LAAs, which as previously
mentioned initiated the commission of the crime. When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other
performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently independent, were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in
concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

Between March 1 to April 4, 1979, one hundred twenty six (126) cases were filed by the Tanodbayan with the respondent Sandiganbayan, charging
certain officials of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways, one of whom is the herein petitioner Rolando Mangubat as the then Chief Accountant I,
together with certain officials and employees of the Danao City Highways Engineering District (hereinafter called "Danao HED" for brevity) and certain
contractors and suppliers, with having committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.

All the 126 informations are identically worded except as to persons, dates, amounts and materials/supplies involved, They alleged that on several
occasions, covered by the period from January 1 to July 3, 1978, the accused government officials, namely: Bagasao, Asst. Director, Region VII,
Ministry of Public Highways; Escano, Finance Officer; Mangubat, Chief Accountant; Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant, all of the same office;
Sabarre, District Engineer of the Danao City Highway Engineering District; Sucalit, Asst. District Engineer; Neis, Assistant District Engineer; Andrino,
Senior Civil Engineer; Alberio, Civil Engineer: Masecampo; Administrative Officer; Pisao, Chief Accountant; Lucenas, Property Custodian, all of the
same office and Toledo, District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA, for short) assigned to the Danao City Highway Engineering District, taking
advantage of their official positions and conniving with the private suppliers who are their co-accused in the informations pertaining to them, namely:
Gabison, Jariol, Nuñez and Delos Angeles, committed estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents in Danao City, by willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously falsifying the following public documents, namely: Letters of Advice of Allotment which will hereinafter be referred to as LAAs, Requests
for Obligation of Allotment, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, Purchase Orders, Delivery Receipts, Reports of Inspection and General Vouchers, by making
it appear that Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued LAAs to the Danao City Highways Engineering District for the purchase of
gravel surface course, except Case No. 069 which is for the delivery of 33 pails of reflectorized traffic paint and 24 pieces of bridge approach warning
devices for the repair or shoulder repair of the Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf Road which will hereinafter be called the Wharf Road, that the Requests for
Obligation of Allotment were prepared in favor of the lowest bidder and that the ordered construction materials were duly delivered and inspected when,
in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the foregoing were false and incorrect, and that because of these falsifications the accused were able to
collect from the Danao City Highway Engineering District the amounts alleged in the informations totalling P6,277,018.00 in payment of the non-existent
deliveries and, once in possession of said amounts, the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the said amounts for their own personal
needs to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount of P6,277,018.00.

By agreement of the parties, all these 126 cases, with the exception of four (4), were jointly heard.

On November 29, 1979, a single decision in all the 126 cases was promulgated by the Sandiganbayan. Except for the two accused, Milagros Pisao and
Dulcisimo Lucenas, who were discharged to become state witnesses and accused Rocilo Neis, Rafael Alberio and Enestorio Sabarre who were
acquitted of the charges against them, the rest of the accused, including herein petitioner, were convicted in all the cases they were respectively charged
and were sentenced in each case to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, to pay a fine of P3,500.00 and to indemnify the government
of the amounts defrauded.

From this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but same was denied, hence the instant petition impugning the decision on both legal and
factual grounds.

On the legal issue, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law creating the Sandiganbayan contending that the same violates his rights under the
equal protection, due process and ex post facto clauses of the constitution.

Petitioner’s aforesaid contention is devoid of merit. These are the same legal issues raised in the case of Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-50581-
50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433, which was the first case to put to the most severe test the constitutionality of the decree creating the
Sandiganbayan. Speaking thru former Chief Justice Fernando, this Court held that The decree creating the Sandiganbayan is constitutional and it does
not violate the equal protection, due process and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. This doctrine was reiterated in the cases of Calubaquib v.
Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-54272-73, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 493; De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337; Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120
SCRA 659; Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 126 SCRA 383; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.

The question of fact refers to the sufficiency of evidence upon which petitioner was convicted.

For a better understanding of the cases in question, it is necessary to have a background of the procedure for the funding of the different regions of the
Ministry of Public Highways.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

At the beginning of each quarter, the Ministry of the Budget issues to various national government offices — the Ministry of Public Highways being one
of them — their respective advice of allotment (AA), which is the authority to obligate, and the Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC) which is the authority to
disburse. In turn, the national offices concerned, in this particular case, the Ministry of Public Highways, issues sub-advices of allotments (SAA) to the
various regional offices, and the corresponding advices of cash disbursements ceilings (ACD). The regional offices then issue letters of advice of
allotment (LAA) to the various districts to enable the district offices to incur obligations, and the corresponding sub-advises of Cash Disbursement
Ceilings (ACD). The LAAs are prepared in the Budget Section of the Accounting and Finance Division of the Regional Office, forwarded to the Finance
Officer for signature and the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative for counter-signature. Thereafter, they are brought back to the
Budget Section for proper release.

With the receipt of the LAAs and the CDCs, the district is now equipped with authority to incur obligations and authority to disburse. However, as a
matter of procedure, a Requisition for Supplies or Equipment (RSE) is prepared by the property custodian where the district accountant certifies as to the
availability of funds. The project engineer also prepares a "Request for Obligation of Allotment" (ROA) which is likewise certified by the district
accountant as to the availability of funds. The RSE, together with the program of work, is transmitted to the Regional Director for approval, after which it
is returned to the district. Thereafter, canvass bid forms are sent to the different contractors or suppliers for quotation of prices for the materials or
supplies called for in the approved RSE. After all bid forms are submitted, they are opened on specified dates and the determination of the lowest bidder
is made. This is indicated in the Abstract of Sealed Quotations. A purchase order is then made in favor of the winning bidder or contractor. Deliveries are
made by the contractor and, thereafter, a General Voucher, supported by delivery receipts and inspection reports and other supporting documents, is
processed for the payment of the delivered materials or supplies. Finally, the corresponding check is prepared and released to the contractor.

At the end of each month, the District Accountants of the various districts prepare several reports including the Report of Obligations Incurred (ROI) and
the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (RCIDDO) which are submitted to the region. These reports form the basis for the
preparation of the monthly trial balance. This trial balance is prepared in the Regional Office and submitted to the Central Office on or before the 5th of
every month for final consolidation by the Central office in a single trial balance for the entire Ministry of Public Highways which balance is then
submitted to the Commission on Audit. The ROIs submitted by the various districts to the regional office at the end of each month are summarized and
consolidated by the Chief Accountant of the Region in a Journal Voucher, which is then approved by the Finance Officer of the region. The monthly trial
balance is likewise prepared and signed by the Chief Accountant of the region, recommended for approval by the Finance Officer thereof, and finally
approved by the Regional Director before it is submitted to the Central Office.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

During the period from January to June 1978, the Regional Office of Region VII issued to Danao HED eleven (11) LAAs, amounting to P292,432.46, as
recorded in the logbook of the Accounting and Finance Division. However, in addition, one hundred nineteen (119) LAAs were released to Danao HED
with a total amount of more than P6 million. (These are the LAAs which are the subject of the 126 cases filed with respondent court). All of these 119
LAAs were signed by petitioner Rolando Mangubat as Chief Accountant. The accompanying CDCs were likewise signed by him.

Petitioner’s conviction was based on the following findings of the respondent court —

"Mangubat started the whole scheme by causing the issuance of the Letters of Advice of Allotment in question which were pointed out before as fake for
there was no Sub-Advice of Allotment from which they were taken. This is shown in the rubber stamp mark on the face, left side, middle portion of the
Letters of Advice of Allotment in question wherein he filled up all the spaces in said rubber stamp mark like the space for Allotment Available and signed
below thereof as Chief Accountant I. He certified to the correctness of the Journal Vouchers (Exhibits "N-1" to "N-7") which negated certain transactions
covered by the Letters of Advice of Allotment in order to conceal and at the same time approved them for and in behalf of Escano who was not shown to
be absent on the day said vouchers were prepared. He again certified to the correctness of the Journal Vouchers (Exhibits "T-5" to "T-8") which as
stated before were all wrong because the total amount of obligations was very much higher than the total of the breakdown per district. He also signed
the fake Sub-Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (Exhibits "RR," "RR-1" to "RR-16") to enable payment of fake obligations addressed to the City
Engineer of the Danao City HED.
His persistence to execute his part of the conspiracy becomes more eloquent when on April 14, 1978, he was detailed by Minister Baltazar Aquino of the
Ministry of Public Highways to the Financial and Management Services of said Ministry, effective May 1, 1978 (Exhibit "U"). In brazen disregard of said
letter-order, he still signed Letters of Advice of Allotment from May 2, 1978 (Exhibits "R-62" to "R-118"), the Sub-Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
from May 16, 1978 (Exhibits "RR-11" to "RR-16") and the Journal Vouchers from May 25, 1978 (Exhibits "N-4" to "N-7"). These actuations of his,
prompted Region VII Director Manuel de Veyra to send a wire to the Highway District Engineer of the Cebu First, Cebu City and Danao City HEDs telling
them that "Effective immediately all the allotments and cash disbursement ceilings to district and cities to be signed only by Finance Officer Angelina
Escano and countersigned only by Regional Director Manuel de Veyra . . ." (Exhibit "DDD").

Mangubat also certified on his official oath that the trial balances for January 25, 1978 to May 25, 1978 (Exhibits "H-1" to "H-5") "are true and complete
statement of all totals and balances of all accounts" for the period stated in each trial balance when such was not the fact, for the manipulations in the
Journal Vouchers (Exhibits "N-1" to "N-7" ; Exhibits "T", "T-1" to "T-8") were carried in said trial balances.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Mangubat was not able to give any satisfactory explanation especially in the matter of the correctness of the Journal Vouchers (Exhibits "T-5" to "T-8")
which on their face appear to be utterly wrong, it being a matter of addition.

Mangubat is liable for all of the one hundred twenty-six cases because all the documents he signed were the bases thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, petitioner’s indispensable role in the irregularities in question is clear. He was the chief accountant of the Ministry of Public Highways, Region VII.
He signed all the fake LAAs and also the fake CDCs. The issuance of these fake LAAs initiated the commission of the crime.

Of course, Petitioner’s allegation that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding the existence of conspiracy must fail. No doubt the defraudation of the
government would not have been possible were it not for the cooperation respectively extended by all the accused, including herein petitioner. The
scheme involved both officials and employees from the Regional Office. Some made the falsifications, others worked to cover-up the same to
consummate the crime herein charged. Petitioner’s role was indubitably an essential ingredient especially so because it was he who issued the false
LAAs, which as previously mentioned initiated the commission of the crime. When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing
one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the
court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed decision of respondent Sandiganbayan with respect to petitioner Rolando
Mangubat is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP FRANCISCO CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO, BISHOP JESUS
VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP TEOTIMO PACIS, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., SERGIO OSMEÑA, III, ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO
MIRANDA, RAUL GONZALES, JOKER ARROYO, and EMILIO DE PERALTA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Renato E. Tañada and Wigberto E. Tañada for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza &
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

This petition for prohibition, which was filed on January 21, 1975, seeks the nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A, calling a referendum
for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the
referendum questions, as well as other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said referendum.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comment on January 28, 1975. After the oral argument of over 7 hours on January 30, 1975,
the Court resolved to consider the comment as answer and the case submitted for decision.

The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful
authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and
orders. This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings,
the appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the courts. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title
to the same office can legally file such a quo warranto petition. The petitioners do not claim such right to the office and not one of them is the incumbent
Solicitor General. Hence, they have no personality to file the suit (Castro vs. Del Rosario, Jan. 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 197; City of Manila & Antonio Villegas
vs. Abelardo Subido, et. al., May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 231-232, 235-236; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; and Nacionalista Party vs. Vera,
85 Phil. 127). It is established jurisprudence that the legality of the appointment or election of a public officer cannot be questioned collaterally through a
petition for prohibition which assails the validity of his official acts.
The foregoing governing legal principles on public officers are re-stated in order to avert any misapprehension that they have been eroded by Our
resolution in the instant petition.

Because of the far-reaching implications of the herein petition, the Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised.

II

This Court already ruled in the Ratification Cases "that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."
As Chief Justice Makalintal stressed in the Habeas Corpus cases, the issue as to its effectivity "has been laid to rest by Our decision in Javellana versus
Executive Secretary (L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 141), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs
and in our relation with countries" (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile and 8 companion cases, L-35546, L-35538-40, L-35538-40, L-35547, L-35556, L-35571 and
L-35573, Sept. 17, 1971, 59 SCRA 183, 241).

III

In the aforesaid Habeas Corpus cases, We affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by President
Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution that the factual bases had not
disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the question is to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the
ratification of this Constitution ..."; and that "any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the
proclamation of Martial Law, has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question
propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want
President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms be initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of those who cast their
ballots, including citizens beyond 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential
power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the President
in the beginning — whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of
the sovereign." (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, supra, 59 SCRA 183,
240-242).

Under the 1935 Constitution, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was duly reelected by the vote of the sovereign people in the Presidential elections of 1969
by an overwhelming vote of over 5,000,000 electors as against 3,000,000 votes for his rival, garnering a majority of from about 896,498 to 1,436,118
(Osmeña vs. Marcos, Presidential Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973). While his term of office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on
December 30, 1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond
1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated
under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom "sovereignty resides ... and all government authority emanates
...," it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, et. al., supra, p. 242).

The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.

IV

The next issue is whether he is the incumbent President of the Philippines within the purview of Section 3 of Article XVII on the transitory provisions of
the new or 1973 Constitution. As heretofore stated, by virtue of his reelection in 1969, the term of President Marcos tinder the 1935 Constitution was to
terminate on December 30, 1973. The new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972, still during his
incumbency. Being the only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time of the approval of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Convention,
the Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except President Ferdinand E. Marcos who shall initially convene the interim Assembly. It was the
incumbent President Marcos alone who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 on September 22, 1972 and issued orders and decrees as well as
instructions and performed other acts as President prior to the approval on November 30, 1972 of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Convention
and prior to its ratification on January 17, 1973 by the people. Consequently, since President Marcos was the only incumbent President at the time,
because his term under the 1935 Constitution has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional Convention, in approving the new Constitution,
had in mind only him when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution it provided "that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and
acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even
after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."

The term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in Section 9 of the same Article XVII likewise could only refer to President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. .

This conclusion is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same Article XVII which provides that "the incumbent members of the Judiciary may continue
in office until they reach the age of 70 years unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section hereof." There can be no dispute that the
phrase "incumbent members of the Judiciary" can only refer to those members of the Judiciary who were already Justices and Judges of the various
courts of the country at the time the Constitutional Convention approved the new Constitution on November 30, 1972 and when it was ratified.

Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution, he
can "continue to exercise the powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five Constitution and the powers vested in the President
and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime
Minister, who shall then exercise their legislative powers vested by this Constitution (Sec. 3[l], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution).

Under the 1935 Constitution, the President is empowered to proclaim martial law. Under the 1973 Constitution, it is the Prime Minister who is vested with
such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX, 1973 Constitution).
WE affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can
promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense
of the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the
threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly
developed countries (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 Ed., pp. 7, 303; see also Chief Justice Stone's Concurring Opinion in Duncan vs.
Kahanamoku, 327 US 304).

To dissipate all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the
New Constitution expressly affirms that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts he promulgated, issued or did prior to the approval
by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972 and prior to the ratification by the people on January 17, 1973 of the new Constitution, are "part
of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and specifically modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."

The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent
President during the period of Martial Law.

Dr. Jose M. Aruego, noted authority in Constitutional Law as well as delegate to the 1935 and 1971 Constitutional Conventions, shares this view, when
he states thus:

108. ... — These Presidential Proclamations, order, decrees, instructions, etc. had been issued by the incumbent President in the
exercise of what he consider to be his powers under martial law, in the same manner that the lawmaking body had enacted several
thousand statutes in the exercise of what it consider to be its power under the Organic Laws. Both these classes of rules of law —
by the President and by the lawmaking body — were, under general principles of constitutional law, presumed to be constitutional
until declared unconstitutional by the agency charged with the power and function to pass upon constitutional law question — the
Judiciary, at the apex of which is the Supreme Court. Hence, the inclusion of both group of rules — President rules and legislative
rules — in the new Constitution for the people to approve or disapprove in the scheduled plebiscite. (Aruego, The New Constitution,
1973 Ed., p. 230).

Delegate Arturo Pacificador, a Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, in explaining Section 3(2) of Article XVII, underscores this recognition
of the legislative power of the incumbent President as Commander-in-Chief during martial Law, thus:

The second paragraph sets forth the understanding of the Convention of the nature, extent and scope of the powers of the
incumbent President of the Philippines, under martial law. It expressly recognizes that the commander-in-chief, under martial law,
can exercise all necessary powers to meet the perils of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. This provision
complements Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution that "all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly."

The second paragraph is an express recognition on the part of the framers of the new Constitution of the wisdom of the
proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions by the incumbent President in the light of the prevailing conditions obtaining in the
country. (Montejo, New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314, emphasis supplied).

The power under the second clause of Section 3(2) is not limited merely to modifying, revoking or superseding all his proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts promulgated, issued or done prior to the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. But even if the scope of his legislative authority
thereunder is to be limited to the subject matter of his previous proclamations, orders, decrees or instructions or acts, the challenged Proclamations Nos.
1366 and 1366-A, as well as Presidential Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637 and 637-A are analogous to the referenda of January, 1973 and July 27-28, 1973.

The actions of the incumbent President are not without historical precedents. It should be recalled that the American Federal Constitution, unlike the
1935 or 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, does not confer expressly on the American President the power to proclaim Martial Law or to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus. And yet President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and President Roosevelt during the Second World War, without express
constitutional or statutory authority, created agencies and offices and appropriated public funds therefor in connection with the prosecution of the war.
Nobody raised a finger to oppose the same. In the case of President Roosevelt, the theater of war was not in the United States. It was thousands of
miles away, in the continents of Europe and Africa and in the Far East. In the Philippines, military engagements between the government forces and the
rebels and secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of the peril to the safety of the Republic itself. There is therefore greater reason to
affirm this law-making authority in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.

Petitioners further argue that the President should call the interim National Assembly as required of him by Section 3(1) of Article XVII, which National
Assembly alone can exercise legislative powers during the period of transition.

It should be stressed that there is a distinction between the existence of the interim Assembly and its organization as well as its functioning.
The interim Assembly already existed from the time the new Constitution was ratified; because Section 1 of Article XVII states that "there shall be
an interim National Assembly which shall exist immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall continue until the members of the regular
National Assembly shall have been elected and shall have assumed office ..." However, it cannot function until it is convened and thereafter duly
organized with the election of its interim speaker and other officials. This distinction was clearly delineated in the case of Mejia, et. al. vs. Balolong, et. al.
where We held that from the phrase "the City of Dagupan, which is hereby created, ...," Dagupan City came into existence as a legal entity upon the
approval of its Charter; but the date of the organization of the city government was to be fixed by the President of the Philippines, and necessarily was
subsequent to the approval of its organic law (81 Phil. 486, 490-492).

Petitioners likewise urge that the President should have convened the interim Assembly before the expiration of his term on December 30, 1973. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. This was revealed by no less than Delegate Jose M. Aruego himself, who
stated:
 109. Convening the interim National Assembly. — The Constitutional Convention could have fixed the date when
the interim National Assembly should convene itself as it did with respect to the regular National Assembly. There would not have
been any need for any Presidential call as there is none, with respect to the regular National Assembly.

But considering that the country had been already placed under martial law rule the success of which was conditioned upon the
unity not only of planning but also in the execution of plans, many delegates felt that the incumbent President should be given the
discretion to decide when the interim National Assembly should be convened because he would need its counsel and help in the
administration of the affairs of the country.

And in the event that it should convene, why did the interim National Assembly not fix its tenure, and state expressly when the
election of the members of the regular National Assembly should be called? Many of the delegates felt that they could not be sure
even of the proximate date when the general conditions of peace and order would make possible orderly elections, ... (The New
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, 1973 Ed., p. 230).

This was also disclosed by Delegate Arturo F. Pacificador, who affirmed:

Under the first paragraph of this section, the incumbent President is mandated to initially convene the interim National Assembly.

Note that the word used is "shall" to indicate the mandatory nature of the desire of the Constitutional Convention that
the interim National Assembly shall be convened by the incumbent President. The Constitutional Convention, however, did not fix
any definite time at which the incumbent President shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. This decision was
deliberate to allow the incumbent President enough latitude of discretion to decide whether in the light of the emergency situation
now prevailing, conditions have already normalized to permit the convening of the interim National Assembly. (Montejo, The New
Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314).

It is thus patent that the President is given the discretion as to when he shall convene the interim National Assembly after determining whether the
conditions warrant the same.

His decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by the sovereign people at the referendum in January, 1973
when the people voted to postpone the convening of the interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the new
Constitution. And the reason why the same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted at the referendum on February 27, 1975, is that
even some members of the Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who are already ipso factomembers of the interim National
Assembly, are against such inclusion; because the issue was already decided in the January, 1973 referendum by the sovereign people indicating
thereby their disenchantment with any Assembly as the former Congress failed to institutionalize the reforms they demanded and had wasted public
funds through the endless debates without relieving the suffering of the general mass of citizenry.

Petitioners likewise impugn the scheduled referendum on the ground that there can be no true expression of the people's will due to the climate of fear
generated by Martial Law and that the period of free discussion and debate is limited to two weeks from February 7 to 21, without right of rebuttal from
February 22 until the day of the referendum.

The first objection is not tenable because during the senatorial elections in 1951 and 1971, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended,
during which period of suspension there was fear of arrest and detention. Yet the election was so free that a majority of the senatorial candidates of the
opposition party were elected and there was no reprisal against or harrassment of any voter thereafter. The same thing was true in the referendum of
July 27-28, 1973, which was done also through secret ballot. There was no Army, PC, or police truck, bus or other mode of transportation utilized to
transport the voters to the various precincts of the country. There was no PC, Army or police personnel assigned to each election precinct or voting
booth. And such assignment would be impossible; because the combined membership of the police, PC, and Army was then as now very much less
than the number of precincts, let alone the number of voting booths. And no one would be left to fight the rebels or to maintain peace and order. And as
heretofore stated, the voting was done in secrecy. Only one voter at a time entered the voting booth. The voting was orderly. There was no buying of
votes or buying the right not to vote. And as opined by the Solicitor General, every qualified voter who fails to register or go to the polling place on
referendum day is subject to prosecution; but failure to fill up the ballot is not penalized.

In the Habeas Corpus cases, We declared that the result of the referendum on July 27-28, 1973 was a decision by the sovereign people which cannot
be reviewed by this Court. Then again, it is too late now for petitioners to challenge the validity of said referendum.

Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the previous referenda of January and July, 1973, were a lot more free than the elections under the Old
Society previous to the proclamation of Martial Law, where the will of the voter was subverted through "guns, goons and gold", as well as through fraud.
All modes of transportation were utilized by the candidates and their leaders to transport the voters to the precinct. The voters were likewise wined and
dined and so prostituted that they refused to vote until the required monetary persuasion was proffered, if they were not being subjected to various forms
of intimidation. In some areas, the ballots were filled up and the election returns were accomplished before election day. Even animals and dead persons
voted. The decisions in the electoral contests filed after every election under the Old Society attest to this very unflattering fact in our history.

The second objection that the two-week period for free debate is too short, is addressed to the wisdom of the President who may still amend the
proclamation to extend the period of free discussion.

At any rate, such a brief period of discussion has its counterpart in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Under the Old Society, 15 days
were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the
scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski
Act of the US Federal Congress to the 1935 Constitution was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act No. 492). For the 1940 constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President
and Vice-President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed
(Com. Act No. 517).And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73).

The period of 14 days for free discussion can compare favorably with the period required for publication of the proposed amendments under the Old
Society.

WHEREFORE, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS IS HEREBY DECLARED DE JURE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATIONS NOS. 1366 AND 1366-A AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREES NOS. 629,630, 637 AND 637-A ARE HEREBY DECLARED VALID, AND
THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITHOUT COSTS.

[G.R. No. 134102. July 6, 2000]

ENGR. TEODOTO B. ABBOT, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HILARIO I. MAPAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 19, Digos, Davao del Sur and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

We are tasked to resolve in this petition the issue of which tribunal - the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals - has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition filed by petitioner Teodoto B. Abbot in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claims that jurisdiction is vested in the Court of
Appeals; on the other hand, the Court of Appeals together with the Office of the Solicitor General holds that the Petition for Certiorari with
Prohibition falls properly within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Teodoto B. Abbot, Chief of the Irrigation System, Mal-River Project, National Irrigation Administration, Manga, Matanao, Davao del Sur, was
charged with Malversation Thru Falsification of Public Document. In an Information[1] lodged before the Sandiganbayan, it was alleged that Abbot
falsified the Viability Incentive Grant payroll by making it appear that each of the seven (7) complaining witnesses received P4,500.00 when in fact four
(4) of them received only P1,500.00 each while the other three (3) received P2,000.00 each, thereby enabling petitioner to obtain P19,500.00 which he
misappropriated to his personal use.

The case was eventually transferred to the Regional Trial Court by virtue of RA 7975. [2] On arraignment petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the trial
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that there was no malversation to speak of because the money supposed
to have been misappropriated ceased to be part of the public fund when cashier Catalino P. Cordero indorsed the check to petitioner who thereafter
encashed and received the proceeds thereof for payment to the intended beneficiaries. [3]

On 29 October 1996 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 19, Digos, Davao del Sur, denied the Omnibus Motion.[4] On 12 February 1997 petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.[5]

Petitioner assailed the 29 October 1996 and 12 February 1997 orders of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Certiorari with Prohibition[6] arguing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss
the Information filed against him. He insisted that the Information was patently quashable on its face as the facts stated therein did not constitute an
offense and the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial rendered the case dismissible.

The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting on the petition, opined that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for
Certiorari with Prohibition as jurisdiction thereof was already vested in the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of
the Solicitor General and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, [7] and likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.[8] Hence, this Petition
for Review on Certiorari with petitioner insisting that the Court of Appeals and not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari with
Prohibition.

PD 1606[9] created the Sandiganbayan. In Sec. 4 thereof the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is delineated -

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdictions; (2) By petition for review, from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdictions x x x x

This law was applied in Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] where the principal issue was the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over special civil actions for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto. This Court held that the Sandiganbayan was a court with only special and limited jurisdiction, hence, could
not exercise jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto filed by petitioner; thus -
 It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which
must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. In Garcia v. De Jesus, this Court stated: In the Philippine setting, the
authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority
has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction
is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of
certiorari is in some instances conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which
have such power are expressly designated.

Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant
or legislative enactments. To enumerate: (1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such
jurisdiction; (2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court); (3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to the Regional Trial Courts; (4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No.
6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created Shariah Appellate Court; and, (5)
Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shariah District
Courts.

With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction over them is expressly conferred in this Court by
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution and to the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts by Section 9(1) and Section
21(1), respectively, of B.P. Blg. 129.

In the absence then of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court
with only special and limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus, and quo
warranto filed by petitioner.[11]

After the promulgation of the Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan decision herein cited, Congress enacted RA 7975, An Act to Strengthen the Functional and
Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, which took effect 6 May 1995. In
Sec. 4(c) thereof, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded to include petitions for the issuance of writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus -

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - (c) x x x The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibitions, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction: Provided: That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

In effect, our ruling in Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[12] was supplanted in RA 7975 which was the law already in force at the time of the commission of
the offense charged. Hence, both the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General are correct in concluding that it is
the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the questioned Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition. No grave abuse of discretion could therefore be
imputed to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of the oft-mentioned Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11 November 1997 dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition as well as its Resolution dated 14 May 1998 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-63271-74 August 30, 1983

PEÑAFLOR PEÑAVERDE, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-63833-36 August 30, 1983

MELECIO C. HERMITA petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

L-63271-74:

Reus Juan Lagunzad & Fajardo Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

L-63833-36:

Luis P. Bisaria Sr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RESOLUTION
RELOVA, J.:

Petitioners Peñaflor Peñaverde and Melecio Hermits seek to set aside the decision of respondent Sandiganbayan, convicting them of the crimes of
falsification of public documents and malversation of public funds on three (3) counts. The informations filed against them read, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2135— For

Falsification of Public Document

That on or about November 18, 1978, in the Municipality of Minalabac Camarines Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Penaflor Penaverde, a public officer and discharging his official functions as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Manapao Minalabac, Camarines Sur and accused Melecio C. Hermits, likewise a public officer discharging his official function as
Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, taking advantage of their official positions and committing and
said acts in relation to their office, conspiring, conniving and confederating with each other, in order to conceal their misappropriation
of the amount of P500.00 earmarked for labor expenses, then and there wilfully my. unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Certificate
of Project Completion and Turn-Over by making it appear that the Foot-Path Project of Barangay Manapao was completed and
turned over to the barangay people on said date when in truth and in fact it was not so which fully knew thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the public service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2136—For

Malversation of Public Funds

That on or about October 7, 1978, in the Municipality of Minalabac, Camarines Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Penaflor V. Penaverde being then a public officer and discharging his official function as the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur and therefore accountable for Barangay Improvement and Development Assistance
(BIDA) funds collected and received by him by reason of such position and accused Melecio C. Hermita, likewise a public officer
then Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac Camarines Sur, taking advantage of their official positions and conspiring,
conniving and confederating with each other, did then and there y, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently misappropriate, embezzle
and take away from said funds for winch they are both accountable, the total sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00),
Philippine Currency, which they appropriated and converted to their own personal use and benefit, which amount represents a part
of the BIDA funds allotted for Barangay Manapao to the damage and prejudice of the government t in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2137 — For

Malversation of Public Funds

That on or about December 27, 1978, in the Municipality of Minalabac Camarines Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Penaflor V. Penaverde being then a public officer and discharging his official function as the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Manapao Minalabac Camarines Sur and therefore accountable for Barangay Improvement and Development Assistance
(BIDA) funds collected and received by him by reason of such position and accused Melecio Hermits, likewise a public officer then
Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, taking advantage of their official positions and conspiring,
conniving and confederating with each other, did then and there y, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently misappropriate, embezzle
and take away from said funds for which they are both accountable, the total sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), Philippine
Currency which they appropriated and converted to their own personal use and benefit, which amount represents part of the BIDA
funds allotted for Barangay Manapao, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2138-For

Malversation of Public Funds

That on or about October 11, 1978 in the Municipality of Minalabac, Camarines Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Penaflor V. Penaverde being then a public officer and discharging his official function as the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur and therefore accountable for Barangay Improvement and Development Assistance
(BIDA) funds collected and received by him by reason of such position and accused Melecio C. Hermits, likewise a public officer
then Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, taking advantage of their official positions and conspiring,
conniving and confederating with each other, did then and there y, unlawfully, feloniously and' fraudulently misappropriate,
embezzle and take away from said funds for which they are both accountable, the total sum of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN PESOS (P1,897.00), Philippine Currency, winch they appropriated and converted to their own personal
use and benefit, which amount represents a part of the BIDA funds allotted for Barangay Manapao, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (pp. 89-91, Rollo)

After trial, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision in the four (4) cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the two accused Penaflor V. Penaverde and Melecio C. Hermits, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Falsification of Public Document, in Criminal Case No. 2135, and in three counts of Malversation of Public Funds in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2136, 2137, and 2138, without mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the following penalties.

1. In Criminal Case No. 2135 for Falsification of Public Document, each of them shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TWO
(2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prison mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 2136 for Malversation of Public Funds involving the amount of P300.00, each of them shall suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision orreccional, as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify jointly and severally the Barangay of Manapao,
Minalabac, Camarines Sur, the amount of P300.00 representing the amount malversed and not restituted;

3. In Criminal Case No. 2137, for Malversation of Public Funds involving the amount of P11500.00, each of the two accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prison
correccional, as maximum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify jointly and
severally the Barangay of Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, the amount of P500.00 which is the amount embezzled and not
restituted;

4. In Criminal Case No. 2138, for Malversation of Public funds involving the amount of P1,897.00, each of the two accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prison
correccional, as minimum, to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor, as maximum, and to
indemnify jointly and severally the Barangay of Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, the sum of P1,897.00 which is the amount
malversed and not restituted; and

5. With accessory penalties provided by law.

The accused are entitled to full credit of the preventive imprisonment they have undergone, if any, in accordance with Art. 29, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6127, of the Revised Penal Code.

With costs against the two accused in all cases.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 10-11, Rollo)

Petitioners filed separate motions for was, which, however, were denied. Hence, the present petitioners alleging that respondent Sandiganbayan
committed reversible errors in convicting petitioners Peñaverde and Hermita of the cranes charged and presenting for resolution the following issues:

(1) Whether or not serious doubts exist as to the probability of the commission of the offenses imputed to herein petitioners.

(2) Whether or not there is conspiracy between petitioner Peñaflor Peñaverde and his co-accused Melecio C. Hermits to commit the offenses.

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that Peñaflor V. Peñaverde as Barangay Captain of Manapao Minalabac Camarines Sur, is not an accountable
officer; that the BIDA finds in the amount of P5,000.00 to which Barangay Manapao is entitled was not entrusted to his custody but to the custody and
control of Provincial Development Officer Adolfo Badiola, who issued the checks for the purchase of construction materials and for the cost of labor; and
that since Badiola is the accountable officer and not petitioner Peñaverde he (Peñaverde) cannot therefore be guilty of the crane of malversation of
public funds. Further, they argue that assuming, without admitting, that there was malversation of public funds, the taking of the amount from the
P5,000.00 in three (3) different occasions constitutes one (1) crime only.

In his comment to instant petitions, the Solicitor General admits that petitioners may not be convicted of malversation because they were not
accountable officers. Adolfo Badiola, the Provincial Development Officer, admitted that he has been the accountable officer for the BIDA funds.

Q Do I understand Mr. Badiola that you were the one who issued these Exhibits A and A-1, these checks?

A Yes, sir.

Q You were the one who issued these checks because you were the one in charge of disbursing this amount of
P5,000.00 BIDA finds in your capacity as Provincial Development Officer?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you are the accountable officer insofar as that fund is concerned?

A Yes, sir. (tsn. p. 28, May 14, 1981)

However, the Solicitor General alleged that in Criminal Cases Nos. 2136 and 2138 petitioners conspired to induce Rito Sultan, the owner of the Sulu
Hardware which was granted the award for materials, to part with the remaining balance of P4,500.00, in the amount of P300.00 and P1,897.00, on two
(2) different occasions on the pretext that the said amount was for the repair of the school. After receiving the balance, they misappropriated it. Thus,
they were properly charged in two separate guilty of Estafa a lesser offense (Delfin vs. Court of Appeals, 13 SCRA 366).

Again, in Criminal Case No. 2137, petitioners conspired to induce Municipal Development Officer Filomeno Olano to give them a check for P500.00, the
amount allegedly awarded for labor, by misrepresenting through a picture that the footpath project was already completed. They eventually encashed
the check and misappropriated it, for the third occasion, to the damage of the government.

With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in concluding that petitioners conspired in the commission of
the offense, suffice it to say that the basis of its finding was the credibility of witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, in relation
to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only questions of laws may be
raised to the Supreme Court. Besides, well settled is the rule that the findings of trial court on credibility of witnesses win not be disturbed unless such
findings overlook certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect results of case.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 2136, 2137 and 2138, We find that the crimes committed by the herein petitioners are estafa, not malversation as charged in the
information.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioners by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2135 is hereby AFFIRMED. However, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2136,2137 and 2138, petitioners Peñaflor Peñaverde and Melecio C. Hermits are guilty of estafa and each is sentenced as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2136 - one(1)month and one(1) day of arrests mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2137 - one (1) month and one (1) day of arrests mayor, as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum; and

3. In Criminal Case No. 2138 - one (1) month and one (1) day of arrests mayor, as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21727 May 29, 1970

CRISPINA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ, and DAMASO MENDOZA, respondents.

Jaime L. Guerrero and Renato B. Bercades for petitioner.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon and Jose P. Santillan for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Civil Case No. 2269) in favor of the plaintiff, Crispina Salazar, now petitioner; on
appeal by the defendants, Guillermo Gutierrez and Damaso Mendoza, the Court of Appeals reversed (CA-G.R. No. 19489-R); and the plaintiff elevated
the case to us for review by certiorari.

Crispina Salazar is owner of a piece of land (Lot 436 of the Cadastral Survey of Balanga) situated in Tuyo, Balanga, Bataan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title 1578 issued by the Register of Deeds of the said province, and acquired by her from the Municipality of Balanga on May 4, 1949. The
lot is bounded on the northeast by Lot 361, on the southeast by Sapang Tuyo, on the southwest by Lot 435, and on the northwest by Lot 433.

Lot 433 was registered under the Torrens system on July 23, 1923, with Original Certificate of Title 2162. Ownership passed to respondent Guillermo
Gutierrez by inheritance in 1927, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1059 was issued in his name on June 11, 1928. No annotation of any lien or
encumbrance affecting the land appears on either title.

Before the present controversy arose, Lot 436 and some of the surrounding estates, including Lot 433, were irrigated with water from Sapang Tuyo, a
public stream, flowing through a dike that traversed Lots 431, 434, 433 and 461. The portion of this dike that passed through Lot 433 branched near the
boundary between this lot and Lot 434 into a canal which ran across the rest of Lot 433 up to Lot 436. It was with the water flowing through this canal
that Lot 436 used to be irrigated.

On February 24, 1953 respondent Damaso Mendoza, a lessee of Lot 433, demolished the said canal, thereby stopping the flow of the water and
depriving Crispina Salazar's Lot 436 of the irrigation facilities which it had formerly enjoyed. Her requests that the canal be rebuilt and the water flow
restored having been turned down, Salazar commenced the present suit on March 2, 1953, praying that these reliefs be granted her by the Court and
that the defendants be ordered to pay her actual damages in the sum of P900, moral damages in the sum of P5,000, and P1,000 for attorney's fees,
plus costs.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to restore the demolished portion of the canal
and to refrain from again demolishing the same pending trial, but the writ was dissolved on March 9, 1953, upon a counterbond filed by the defendants.
The latter answered with their own counterclaim for damages, denied the substantial averments of the complaint and put up a number of affirmative
defenses.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bataan, finding that the demolished canal had been in existence for more than thirty years and that the big dike
from which it extended had been constructed for the use of Lot 436 as well as several other lots belonging to different owners, rendered judgment on
April 10, 1956, ordering the defendants to restore at their expense the canal in question, to connect it with the canal found in Lot 436 and to cause the
corresponding annotation of the encumbrance on Transfer Certificate of Title 1059 covering Lot 433; and ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,360 annually beginning the agricultural year 1956-1957 until the restoration of the canal, P4,700 as actual damages, P5,000 as moral
damages and P1,000 as attorney's fees, plus costs.

On July 26, 1963, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and held that since the easement of aqueduct over Lot 433
for the benefit of Lot 436 was a voluntary one, the same was extinguished when Lot 433 was registered on July 23, 1923 and the corresponding
certificate of title was issued without the annotation of said easement as a subsisting encumbrance.

The respondents have raised a preliminary procedural question, alleging that Section 1 of Rule 46 (now Section 1 of Rule 45), requiring proof of service
of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals, was not complied with. Such omission, however, is not of jurisdictional import. In an appeal
by certiorari upon a question of law, as distinguished from an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court of Appeals is merely a nominal party
respondent. The original parties in the trial court are the same parties in the appeal.

The main issue as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals is the nature of the easement of aqueduct claimed by the petitioner. If voluntary,
according to the said Court, the easement was extinguished upon the registration of Lot 433 in 1923, pursuant to Section 39 of Act No. 496, which
provides:

But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be
registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure and shall be held to pass with the
land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner. (Emphasis supplied).

In arriving at the conclusion that the easement in question was voluntary and not legal or compulsory, the Court of Appeals took into consideration the
provisions of Articles 557 and 558 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Articles 642 and 643 of the new Civil Code respectively, as follows:

ART. 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he can dispose shall have the right to make it
flow through the intervening estates, with the obligation to indemnify their owners, as well as the owners of the lower estates upon
which the waters may filter or descend.

ART. 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:

(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended;

(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third persons;

(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and regulations.

Specifically the appellate court held that there is no evidence to show that the petitioner has complied with the three requisites laid down in Article 643 in
order to entitle her to claim a legal easement of aqueduct under Article 642. It bears repeating that the finding thus made, although apparently factual in
character, is premised upon supposed absence of evidence, and therefore is reviewed by this Court if the premise is clearly contradicted by the record
or unjustified upon other considerations which logically lead to a different conclusion, but which the decision under review did not take into account.

On the first requisite of Article 643 — that the petitioner must prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is
intended — there is the statement of the trial court that the disputed canal had been in existence since the Spanish regime, or at least prior to the
original registration of Lot 433 in 1923, and that of the Court of Appeals itself confirmatory of this second alternative finding. If, as thus found, the
petitioner had been using water from Sapang Tuyo to irrigate Lot 436 since she acquired said lot in 1949, as the Municipality of Balanga had been doing
before her, and that such use had lasted continuously for at least thirty years, it is a fair presumption that she had a right to do so and that the water she
could dispose of was sufficient for the purpose. Indeed it would be a superfluity to require her to produce a permit from the proper authorities, for even
without it the right had already become vested both under Article 194 of the Spanish Law of Waters and under Article 504 of the Civil Code, which
respectively state:

ART. 194. Any person who has enjoyed the use of public waters for a term of twenty years without objection on the part of the
authorities or of any third person, shall continue in its enjoyment, even though he may not be able to show that he secured proper
permission.

ART. 504. The use of public waters is acquired:

(1) By administrative concession;

(2) By prescription for ten years.

The extent of the rights and obligations of the use shall be that established, in the first case, by the terms of the concession, and, in the second case, by
the manner and form, in which the waters have been used.

The third requisite of Article 643 of the Civil Code refers to the matter of indemnity to the owner of the servient estate. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioner it would be nigh impossible now to present actual proof that such indemnity has been paid, considering the number of years that have elapsed
since the easement had first come into existence and the subsequent changes in ownership of the lots involved. It stands to reason, however, that if the
easement had continued for so long in fact, not only before Lot 433 was registered in 1923 but for thirty years thereafter, until cut off by the respondents
in 1953 the legal requirement in question must have been complied with.

The other requisite of Article 643 is that "the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third persons." The Court of Appeals
stated that the petitioner has not established this fact, and that "her own evidence reveals that her lot is abutting Sapang Tuyo on its southern boundary,
where from she can easily and directly draw the water necessary to irrigate her land." This statement is an oversimplification. Proximity or abutment of a
piece of land to a stream does not necessarily carry with it the conclusion that water may conveniently be drawn directly therefrom for irrigation. In the
first place, the petitioner has pointed out in her brief, without contradiction by the respondents, that the portion of her land which abuts Sapang Tuyo is
precipice. Secondly, the trial court made an ocular inspection of the premises and observed that the eastern and northeastern portions of Lot 436 are
lower than the southwestern, western and northwestern (the point where Lot 436 adjoins Lot 433) portions of the same. Finally, it would appear from the
observation made by the same court that the demolished canal is part of a system of conduits used to irrigate the lands of the petitioner and the
respondents as well as the surrounding estates belonging to other owners, and that this system of conduits is of a permanent nature. The trial court's
description bears repeating:

At the ocular inspection conducted on September 22, 1953, it was found that the eastern and northeastern portions of Lot No. 436
are lower than the southern, western and northwestern portions of the same; that about one-fourth (¼) only of the lot is planted to
palay and this palay is yellowish, scarce and could hardly merit attention to produce any substantial quantity of palay; that this palay
is planted in the eastern portion of the same; that the palay planted on the land of defendant Gutierrez and on the lot east of the land
of the plaintiff is luxuriant green and had all the earmarks of producing a good harvest; that the "pinitak" on the northwestern portion
of the land of the plaintiff is higher than the rest of the land; that on this portion is found a canal about one and a half (1-½) meters
deep which canal runs south and parallel to the boundary line of Lot 436 owned by the plaintiff and Lot No. 435 and is one and a
half (1-½) meters from this boundary; that along the southern boundary of Lot No. 433 that separates it from Lot No. 436 is a
"minangon" or a dike and water flows continuously from one 'pinitak' to another of said Lot No. 433 up to a point between points "15"
and "14" of said lot as shown on Exhibit "A" ... that this water passes from one "pinitak" to another through openings made on the
"pilapils" or small dikes that separate the several "pinitaks" on this Lot No. 433; that the western side of the canal that was
demolished is located on the boundary line of Lots Nos. 433 and 434 and this boundary line is higher and some trees are found
therein; that the new canal ... is short and the old canal from point "13" to about point "7" of Lot No. 433 on this exhibit is still in use
although it is not clean; that Lot No. 434 owned by Antonio Mendoza is irrigated by two (2) pipes coming from Lot No. 431 and by a
canal that comes from Lot No. 431 and by a canal that comes from the main irrigation canal located on the boundary line of these
two (2) lots 431 and 434; that this main irrigation canal is the canal that goes through Lot No. 443 ... which canal ends farther east of
Lot 448 ...; that this canal begins from the dam farther west of these Lots Nos. 431, 434, 433 and 436.

xxx xxx xxx

The boundary line of the two (2) lots Nos. 433 and 434 shows that it is a "minangon", a dike. It is extraordinarily high. From this
situation, it can be concluded that the canal along this boundary line must be big. To irrigate the southern part of Lot No. 433 would
not require a big and permanent canal if the same was used to irrigate the southern part of Lot No. 433. Canal marked "W" which is
a substitute canal is small and shallow. From the remnants of the old and demolished canal, it is safe to assume that the canal has
been in existence for a long time as shown by some big trees on the high "minangon." If it were to water only the southern part of
the lot as claimed by defendants, it would have been the same in size as the new canal mark "W" on Exhibit "A." The construction of
the new canal marked 'W' on the exhibit is a feeble attempt to justify the alleged purpose of the old canal, but this attempt at
coverage is laid bare by the existence of the old canal that crossed Lot No. 433 ... Considering that the southern portion of said lot is
lower than the rest of the same, the Court believes that the openings on the dike of the old canal would be sufficient to let water flow
to the southern portions of this lot. The western portion of this lot could have been watered from the old canal ("X") or from the
existing canal ("Z") on Exhibit "A". That being so, there is only one explanation why the old canal ("X") is in existence and that is for
the use of Lot No. 436 and other lots farther east of Lot No. 436.

It is a reasonable conclusion from the foregoing that the demolished canal supplying water to Lot 436 of the petitioner was merely extension of the
system of conduits established long ago, considering that in view of the topography of the area and the proximity of the said lot to the main dike in Lot
433 it was more convenient to make the connection therewith than to draw water directly from Sapang Tuyo. Article 118 of the Spanish Law of Waters
allows the creation of a compulsory easement of aqueduct for the purpose of establishing or extending an irrigation system, and there is nothing to the
contrary in the Civil Code.

In any case the respondents are hardly in a position to avail of the registration of Lot 433 in 1923 without the corresponding registration of the easement
on the title as an excuse to summarily terminate it thirty years thereafter. The original registered owner allowed the easement to continue in spite of such
non-registration: the least that can be said is that he either recognized its existence as a compulsory servitude on his estate or voluntarily agreed to its
establishment and continuance. And the respondent Guillermo Gutierrez, as the successor-in-interest to the, said owner by inheritance, is not an
innocent third person who could plead the absence of annotation on the title. Not only was he aware of the existence of the easement when he inherited
the property in 1927, but he likewise allowed it to continue for twenty-six years after he acquired title. He is bound both by the act of his predecessor and
by his own.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside, and that of the Court of First Instance of Bataan affirmed, with costs against the
respondents.

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining
the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because
there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the
Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been
fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the
Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing
death penalty has become nil, to wit:

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659
which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive
powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose
jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all
the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was
imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court
in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of
Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of
the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no
longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord
with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is
not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that
became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act
No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17
contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and
(b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice,
and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
 accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act
No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G.

DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21,
1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October
28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and
Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that
R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No.
8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also
daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment
cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the
court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final
facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court
has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal
cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its
jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event
that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by
having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in
the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no
power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted
as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle
that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor
can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By
command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of
the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the
(court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to
law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is
that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to
enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects
of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so.
Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
 simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision
in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or
on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of
Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the
contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and
Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting
the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution
deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as
renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern,
and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the
exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter
8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code,
insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules
relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the
exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e.,
postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence
of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the
prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date
at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and
the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may beprovided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature,
the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of
the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA
530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on
December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public
respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This
Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not
a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief.
The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of
the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the
authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted
by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due
process of law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension
of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the
same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend
R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no
stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to
commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been
enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they
infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted
especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about
11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of
Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino
Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13)
other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death
penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35)
other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then,
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion.
The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the
Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises.
They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of
judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659)
and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was
hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in
session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights
stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it
needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no
less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review
capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will
repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman
Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the
reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this
matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed
by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative
with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No.
25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he
will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the
Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and
will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the
debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro
and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is
healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority
rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan
reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach
of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when
we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of
the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can
be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for
execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA
C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO
TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh
labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their
struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was
the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in
the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like
Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more
than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for
a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the
specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice
and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following
words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on
August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own
deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was
the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions. 4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case
will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as
qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI,
Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the
President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 andManotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation
contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due
process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored
judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are
deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v.
Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just
compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does
not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their
property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do
not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event
their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just
compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the
same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR
was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment
of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments
have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee,
Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and
not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to
enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly
exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process,
and equal protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS
(P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the
receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be
considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money
needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in
full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the
Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of
current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with
interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be
prescribed or approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is
no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in
the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been
violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least
20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona,
et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of
uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty
billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount
has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.

Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the
powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government
assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately
pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also
justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites
to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of
private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation.
There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian
Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional
amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to
the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:

(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation,
placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall
and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was
denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were
issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process
or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that
may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding
as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the
provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for
the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with
other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian
Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article
XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.

On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land
was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of
the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long
as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are
actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such
time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has
so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own
other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they
derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27
have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying
Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-
81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners
are now barred from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the
President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion
which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of
the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of
agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force
because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for
the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless
vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the
reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in
striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to
sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure
that the Constitution would not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of
the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by
judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry
into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained
of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued
by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not
hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies
that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's
pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16

The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.

II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures involved in these petitions.

The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over
legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987,
and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures
ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By
the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as
she possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has
specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said
measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by
reference in the CARP Law. 18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in
the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the
treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular
reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the
exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as
required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in
fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or
private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only
short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law
because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474
could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held
in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and
effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated
November 29,1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control
the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs,
if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the
duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will
require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide
a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the
law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23

III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks
systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the
property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at
least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too
far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was
resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee
assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis
filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction
imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights
of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social
conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used
as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As
for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally
speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be
available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of
preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support
of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the
pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land
use, the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954
decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's
standard of "public purpose." 27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police
power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
 Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.

28
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks
Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the
Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The
problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area
could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights
accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called
it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:

In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized
but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story
building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed,
theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more
profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess
of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses.

The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and
dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally
agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other
claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be
made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with
particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court
finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the
lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State
and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to
a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under
Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner
enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV
 Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield
to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare
of the people is the supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has
evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit
of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say
that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event,
the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in
the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As
explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the
courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their
views may not coincide with ours.

The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the
distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court
sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it
to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the American bank and
the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the
purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation
proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for
agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits.
The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the
necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by
this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police
power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its
beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
 Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act,
the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to
the qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of
judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the
government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days
from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or
official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just
compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the
owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for
the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private
property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the
strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The
court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for
the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which
contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just
compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong.
And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after
evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees
constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed
an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not
by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right
to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed
upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
 (1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned —
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent
(30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified
investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the
face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth
(10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion,
whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the
following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the
Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial
institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid
are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares

of stock owned by the government in private corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or
for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of
the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium-
scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these
bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance
of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the
percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated
properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite
jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which
should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:

 It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond
that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained,
which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land
taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money
which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just
compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but
money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money
at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to,
there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in
cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of
compensation. 48

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a
reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations,
bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49(Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has
just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent
domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for
a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not
cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as
beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten
that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that
have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under
the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated,
which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were
aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they
wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for
by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D.
No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be
given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine
tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should
be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-
subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was
reached by the Commission. 50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of
the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations
of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this
issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the
nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in
the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner
at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this
cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance
and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive
goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of
the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but
does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city
assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in
its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:

Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered
and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the
Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51

... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until
payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was
held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State"
albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes
was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was
complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is
complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner
without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method
of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of
a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also
had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and
full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the
landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered
as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him
even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead."

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has
already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial
action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI
474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under
P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal
than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings
of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-
examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the
pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The
CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we
learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true
freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will
be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair,
now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark
resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections
raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective
owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by
R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 107921. July 1, 1993.]

POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task
Force on Demolition and/or in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD and NATIONAL MAPPING RESOURCES INFORMATION AUTHORITY, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES;
CASE AT BAR. — It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a
law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional
question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger or sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites
are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he
has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other
parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICY OF COURTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF ACTS OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS;
BASIS. — We do not, as well, find an indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge. As this Court said through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Garcia
v. Executive Secretary: "On the merits, We find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground
for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally enacted."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS; PETITIONER NOT A "PROPER PARTY" IN CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner
is not likewise a "proper party." As a consultant of the DPWH under the "Contract for Consultancy . . .," he is not vested with any authority to demolish
obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on private lands. The consultancy contract limits his duties to the
following:" (a) to organize and train selected DPWH personnel for the different Engineering Districts in the NCR in the techniques and methods of
removing/demolishing illegal structures/stalls, etc., as well as in crowd control, self-defense and security procedures . . .; (b) to provide advice to the
Secretary and other DPWH officials regarding prioritization of areas to be cleared of obstructions and encroachments; (c) to conduct field inspection from
time to time of areas recommended for clearing; (d) to provide advice in developing appropriate standard and techniques in cost effective
implementation of the removal and demolition of obstructions and encroachments . . .; and (e) to develop operational procedures that will institutionalize
demolition processes." Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and the petitioner has not manifested that he obtained a
renewal or extension thereof. Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the
challenged provisions of R.A. No. 7279.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAXPAYER’S SUIT; SUPREME COURT NOT DEVOID OF DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SUIT SHOULD BE
ENTERTAINED. — Although the petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not mean, however, that in each
and every instance where such a ground is invoked, this Court is left with no alternative except to hear the parties. In Tan v. Macapagal, we clarified that
"as far as a taxpayer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES; NOT WITHIN ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SUPREME
COURT; WHEN ACTION TREATED BY SUPREME COURT AS PETITION FOR PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS. — In reality, his petition is one for
declaratory relief as he prays therein that "his rights as well as those of private landowners be clearly defined and his duties under the Constitution and
the pertinent laws be clearly stated with respect to the demolition of illegal structures on public and private lands." Even so, it is still not viable since
among the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are that: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse and (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy. Furthermore, an
action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. True, we have
said that such a petition may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus if it has farreaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved; but the exercise of such discretion presupposes, at the outset, that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locus standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed
immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said
Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal
structures" ; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in
the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed." 2

Republic Act No. 7279 was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992 issue of the Official Gazette. 3 The challenged provisions
therein read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under
the following situations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

(1) Notice upon the affected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of resettlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected
communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families
consent otherwise;

(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials;

(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance
control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order
involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which
period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the
amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government
unit concerned.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.

x x x

SEC. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. — There shall be a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of
their houses or dwelling units for a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall not apply to those
persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property without due process of law and without compensation;

(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as unlawful acts;

(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one’s property to be given to plain interlopers;

(d) They sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and

(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders." 4

On 10 December 1992, we required the respondents to comment on the petition.

In its Comment 5 filed on 15 January 1993, respondent National Mapping and Resource Information Authority alleges that the implementation of the
assailed sections of the Act does not belong to or fall within its jurisdiction. It disagrees with the petitioner’s stand that the said sections are
unconstitutional and avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian approach" towards the less privileged citizens and does not in fact
prohibit but merely discourages eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers program beneficiaries.

On 15 January 1993, the Realty Owners Association of the Philippines, Inc. filed a motion to intervene 6 alleging that it has a legal interest in the
success of the petition and is in full accord with it. This Court required the parties to comment thereon.

On 16 February 1993, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) filed a comment 7 for the respondent National Housing Authority (NHA)
informing this Court that "in a letter of respondent NHA addressed to the office of the undersigned counsel, dated 29 January 1993, . . ., the former
categorically expressed as its official stand on the instant petition that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 are indeed unconstitutional," and
that "after a circumspect evaluation of the petition We find no cogent reason not to support the position heretofore taken by respondent NHA." Said office
then prays that the instant petition be given due course.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with
the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or
controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the
proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionally infirm.

Up to this time, no comment has been submitted by the parties on the motion to intervene. Considering, however, that the issues are clear and simple
enough, this Court dispenses with the need for a comment on the said motion, denies the same and, after deliberating on the issues raised and the
arguments adduced by the parties in the petition and comments, declares this petition to be without merit.

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that
question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence
of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a
proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger or sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts
or measures complained of. 10

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner
does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a
consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the
said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."
11

In reality, his petition is one for declaratory relief as he prays therein that "his rights as well as those of private landowners be clearly defined and his
duties under the Constitution and the pertinent laws be clearly stated with respect to the demolition of illegal structures on public and private lands." 12
Even so, it is still not viable since among the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are that: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy, (b)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse and (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy. 13 Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of
law are involved. 14 True, we have said that such a petition may be treated as one for prohibition 15 or mandamus 16 if it has farreaching implications
and raises questions that need to be resolved; but the exercise of such discretion presupposes, at the outset, that the petition is otherwise viable or
meritorious.

The petitioner is not likewise a "proper party." As a consultant of the DPWH under the "Contract for Consultancy . . .," he is not vested with any authority
to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on private lands. The consultancy contract limits his duties to
the following:" (a) to organize and train selected DPWH personnel for the different Engineering Districts in the NCR in the techniques and methods of
removing/demolishing illegal structures/stalls, etc., as well as in crowd control, self-defense and security procedures . . .; (b) to provide advice to the
Secretary and other DPWH officials regarding prioritization of areas to be cleared of obstructions and encroachments; (c) to conduct field inspection from
time to time of areas recommended for clearing; (d) to provide advice in developing appropriate standard and techniques in cost effective
implementation of the removal and demolition of obstructions and encroachments . . .; and (e) to develop operational procedures that will institutionalize
demolition processes." 17 Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and the petitioner has not manifested that he obtained a
renewal or extension thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions of R.A.
No. 7279.

Although the petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not mean, however, that in each and every instance
where such a ground is invoked, this Court is left with no alternative except to hear the parties. In Tan v. Macapagal, 18 we clarified that "as far as a
taxpayer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not, as well, find an indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge. As this Court said through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary: 19

"On the merits, We find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a
necessity to resolve it. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress
and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted."cralaw virtua1aw library

We cannot end this resolution without a few words on the comment of the OGCC for public respondent National Housing Authority wherein the OGCC
merely adopted the stand of the officer-in-charge of the Legal Department of the said Authority that the challenged sections of R.A. No. 7279 are
unconstitutional. On its own, the OGCC did not even attempt to reason out why this petition should be granted or denied. It has obviously treated this
case without the circumspection and seriousness expected of it especially in the light of the functions, duties and responsibilities of the NHA under the
challenged Act. The OGCC should not have cursorily adopted the opinion of the officer-in-charge who acted on his own and who, apparently, did not
even refer his opinion to the Board of Directors of the NHA.chanrobles law library

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91500 October 18, 1990

ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.

Yulo, Aliling & Macamay for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 576-A with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

The allegations of the petition are that on January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct,
maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting
stations all over the country. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to provide adequate public service which enabled the government
to reach the population on important public issues, and assist the government in programs relating to public information and education. Its radio stations
have never been used for the broadcasting of obscene or indecent language or speech, or for the dissemination of misleading information or willful
misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public health, or to incite, encourage or assist in subversion or treasonable acts.

Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the
Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..."
On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations
And For Other Purposes" was issued and duly published in the December 2, 1974 supplemental issue of the Official Gazette. 1

Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Decree provide as follows:

Sec. 3. No person or corporation may own, operate, or manage more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city;
nor more than five AM and FM radio stations; nor more than five television channels in the entire country, and no radio or television
station shall be utilized by any single-interest group to disseminate information or otherwise influence the public or the government
to serve or support the ends of such group.

Sec. 4. Any person or corporation which owns more than the number of radio or television stations authorized in the preceding
section shall divest itself of the excess stations or channels. Any excess station shall be sold through the Board of Communications.

The divestiture provided herein shall be made not later than December 31, 1981. Thereafter, a person or corporation shall make
such divestiture within one year from the discovery of the offense.

Sec. 5. Failure to divest as provided in the foregoing section shall, in addition to the penalties provided in Section 6, subject the
person or corporation guilty of such failure to cancellation of the franchise of every excess station and to confiscation of the station
and its facilities without compensation.

Sec. 6. All franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting
systems shall terminate on December 31, 1981. Thereafter, irrespective of any franchise, grant, license, permit, certificate or other
forms of authority to operate granted by any office, agency or person, no radio or television station shall be authorized to operate
without the authority of the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications or their successors
who have the right and authority to assign to qualified parties frequencies, channels or other means of Identifying broadcast
systems; Provided, however, that any conflict over, or disagreement with, a decision of the aforementioned authorities may be
appealed finally to the Office of the President within fifteen days from the date the decision is received by the party in interest.

Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television
broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked
effective December 31, 1981.

Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City.

Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable damage, because — (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due process
of law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio
broadcasting stations in other cities or municipalities of the country; 2 (c) it deprived petitioner of its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing loan
availments from any bank or financial institution in order to expand and continue the operation of its radio broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner
suffered loss of income.

Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. The grounds of the petition are as follows:

I THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 576-A SUMMARILY TERMINATING THE PETITIONER'S FRANCHISE OR
PERMIT ON DECEMBER 31, 1981 CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DEPRIVATION OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
(FRANCHISE OR PERMIT) OF PETITIONER WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND/OR PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION;

II. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED THE PETITIONER TO DlVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS RADIO
STATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION AND IMPAIRMENT
OF PETITIONER'S OR THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT OR FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND/OR OF THE PRESS;

III. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED THE PETITIONER TO DIVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS RADIO
STATIONS AND THE ARBITRARY TERMINATION OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL
IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PETITIONER; AND

IV. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE RESTRICTING PETITIONER OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY TO
OPERATE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF RADIO OR TELEVISION STATIONS IN ONE CITY OR MUNICIPALITY, OR IN THE ENTIRE
COUNTRY FOR THAT MATTER, AND FURTHER TERMINATING THE CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE OF PETITIONER
CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF TRADE; 3

Without giving due course to the petition, the respondents were required to submit their comment thereto within ten (10) days from notice. After the
comment of the respondents was submitted, the petitioner was required to file a reply thereto. As said reply was filed the Court required respondents to
submit their rejoinder. The rejoinder of respondents had been duly submitted so the case is now due for resolution.

After a careful deliberation on the petition, the Court finds the same to be devoid of merit.

The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking
declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme
Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
involved. 4

Thus, the present petition should be dismissed on this score.

Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the
restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under
said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his
rights. All that petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under Republic Act No. 3001.

Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." 5

The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. 6 The power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 7

Petitioner alleges that it used to maintain and operate at least ten (10) radio broadcasting stations but pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 576-A it divested itself of the "excess stations" thus leaving it with three (3) radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City.
Petitioner did not allege that it challenged the constitutionality of the decree at any time since it took effect on December 31, 1981. It does not appear
that petitioner's compliance was made under protest. In view of its acquiescence with Presidential Decree No. 576-A, the petitioner is now estopped
from challenging the same under the principle of estoppel that "one who sleeps on his rights shall not be heard to complain."

The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition
cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or
person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. 8

In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest.
Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast license which is about to be denied under Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of an application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of the
restrictions imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is premature.

Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise. Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and cannot be secured through a writ
of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It cannot correct an act that is a fait accompli. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,

vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS
SHELL CORPORATION, respondents.

Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of
the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989,
where this Court issued a decision, ordering the BOI as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for
registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and
amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation,
excluding, however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, and (3) to set for
 hearing the petitioner's opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his
possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing
shall not exceed a period of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by personal service to
the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10)
days without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-
451)

However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign
investor's claim of right of final choice of plant site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this
Court on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the Limay site should be the only petrochemical
zone in the country, nor prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in
Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.

Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site
may change it simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by
his failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment.
On this ground, the motion for partial reconsideration was denied.

A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve the basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has
the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory;
and that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI.

In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:

Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments
Code is there such a 'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and approval or
disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus Investments Code). By submitting its application and amended application to the
BOI for approval, the investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or disapprove
the same after determining whether its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. By asking that his
opposition to the LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the
investor, has the last word or the "final choice" on the matter.

Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the BOI may not be 'final', for supervening
circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that
the project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit only when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)

Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.

A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted to grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the
hearing set by the BOI was premature as the decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court must
first rule on whether or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a useless
exercise; that in the October 19, 1989 resolution, the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has
the final choice; that they agree with the observation of the majority that "the investor has no final choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the
Omnibus Investments Code and that it is the BOI who decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted to give him the
chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard look at the matter.

Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of
final choice under the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code.

Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical
Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
naphtha.

Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was
the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with
PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.

BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the
entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of
earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad
valoremtax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-
442)

However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary
Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing
the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in
Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a
conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the
amendments. Its application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the production
capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25)

Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the
proposed amendment with its attachments which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's
petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.)

BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of the Senate asserted that:

The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, as this would
provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for
the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view
that the BOI or the government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project should be located. The BOI recognizes
and respect the principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk
capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)

This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present petition.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its
feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC,
now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final
choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding.

We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the paramount issue. We grant the petition.

First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the
name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There
is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any
covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor
reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these
were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the contrary.

Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as
feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need
to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking
purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred petrochemical
plant.

Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino
but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by
both Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock
from naphtha to LPG.

Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.

In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national economy in consonance with the principles and objectives
of economic nationalism" is the set goal of government.

Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the project from local sources by way of loan which led to the
so-called "petroscam scandal", the capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its
feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government which
shall have a participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a
near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain
murky to say the least.

And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.

Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

xxx xxx xxx

Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural
resources, the State's full control over the development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and
priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or
even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical
industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by
controlling the upstream or cracker facility.

In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among them:

(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an eligible relending credit or relending facility worth
US $50 million and a debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US $80 million which at current
exchange rates is around P2080 million.

(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated
loan, to be given by both government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in common parlance, a case of
'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.'

(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.'

(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian Development Bank portfolio because of the
petrochemical firm's massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).

but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion
of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.

The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from
Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the
investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a
repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for
the national interest.

One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one
subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do
with our heritage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of
registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET
ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha as
the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 131012. April 21, 1999]

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs staged by public school teachers on different dates in September and October
1990. The illegality of the strikes was declared in our 1991 decision in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,[1] but many incidents of
those strikes are still to be resolved. At issue in this case is the right to back salaries of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they
did not report for work but who were eventually ordered reinstated because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike, although
reprimanded for being absent without leave.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report
for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law
Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the
lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from the
service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six
months effective December 4, 1990.[2]

Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) which found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and imposed on him a six-month suspension.[3] The other respondents also appealed to the MSPB, but their appeal was
dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal memorandum on time. [4]

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad,
Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of absence and,
therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former positions.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in this Court. Pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the case was referred
to the Court of Appeals which, on September 3, 1996, rendered a decision (1) affirming the decision of the CSC with respect to Amparo Abad, Virgilia
Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang but (2) reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the suspension of Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court found him
guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations only and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand. [5]

Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending that they should be exonerated of all charges against them and that they be
paid salaries during their suspension. In its resolution, dated July 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals, while maintaining its finding that private respondents
were guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to
the payment of salaries during their suspension beyond ninety (90) days. Accordingly, the appellate court amended the dispositive portion of its decision
to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petition is hereby DENIED. CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2302 dated June 24, 1993 and 93-3124 dated
August 10, 1993 (In re: Amparo Abad), CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2304 dated June 24, 1993 and 93-3227 dated August 17, 1993 (In re: Virgilia Bandigas)
and CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2301 undated and 93-3125 dated August 10, 1993 (In re: Elizabeth Somebang) are hereby AFFIRMED while CSC
Resolution Nos. 93-2211 dated June 21, 1993 are hereby MODIFIED finding petitioner Nicanor Margallo guilty of a lesser offense of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations and meting upon him the penalty of reprimand. Respondent DECS is ordered to pay petitioners Amparo Abad,
Virgilia Bandigas, Elizabeth Somebang and Nicanor Margallo their salaries, allowances and other benefits during the period of their
suspension/dismissal beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension. No pronouncement as to costs.[6]

Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the Court of
Appeals ordered the payment of private respondents salaries during the period of their appeal. [7] His motion was, however, denied by the appellate court
in its resolution of October 6, 1997.[8] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the administrative investigation of respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of preventive suspension, implying
that the continued suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal, hence, the government should not be held answerable for payment of their
salaries. Moreover, petitioner lays so much store by the fact that, under the law, private respondents are considered under preventive suspension during
the period of their appeal and, for this reason, are not entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension. [9]

Petitioners contentions have no merit.

I. Preventive Suspension and the Right to Compensation in Case of Exoneration

The present Civil Service Law is found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292). So far as pertinent to the
questions in this case, the law provides:

SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -

....

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head
is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

....

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (47(4)).

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. [10] It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges
against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a
decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.

A. No Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation Even if Employee is Exonerated

Is he entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of suspension? As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private
respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension. In other words, no compensation was due
for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the
employee is exonerated.

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban argues that the employee concerned should be paid his salaries after his suspension.

The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment of such salaries in case of exoneration. Sec. 35 read:

Sec. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position
with full pay for the period of suspension.[11]

However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service
Decree (P.D. No. 807) read:

Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

This provision was reproduced in 52 of the present Civil Service Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) categorically
provides that preventive suspension shall be without pay. Sec. 24 reads:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay
in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. This conclusion is in accord with
the rule of statutory construction that -
As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the
statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. The
amended statute should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment. [12]

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heed to the evident legislative intent to deny payment of salaries for the preventive
suspension pending investigation.

First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of preventive suspension would be to reverse the course of decisions ordering the payment
of salaries for such period.However, the cases [13] cited are based either on the former rule which expressly provided that if the respondent officer or
employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension [14] or that upon subsequent reinstatement of the
suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid, [15] or on cases which
do not really support the proposition advanced.

Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employees who have been preventively suspended is proof that there was no reason at all to
suspend them and thus makes their preventive suspension a penalty.

The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechems A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices
and Officers as follows:

864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to
compensation for the period during which he was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended
was insufficient. The reason given is that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who
could not lawfully perform such services.[16]

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case
of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work
may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified. [17]

The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized
by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified, even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to
the employee concerned. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90)
days unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is not finished,
the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated.

Third, it is argued in the separate opinion that to deny employees salaries on the frivolous ground that the law does not provide for their payment
would be to provide a tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though innocent, may be falsely charged of grave or less grave administrative
offenses. Indeed, the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the recognition of the existence of power. As Justice Story aptly put it, It is always a
doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse. . . . [For] from the very nature of things, the absolute
right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere - wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse.[18] It may be added that if and when such
abuse occurs, that would be the time for the courts to exercise their nay-saying function. Until then, however, the public interest in an upright civil service
must be upheld.

Finally, it is argued that even in the private sector, the law provides that employees who are unjustly dismissed are entitled to reinstatement with
full pay. But that is because R.A. No. 6715 expressly provides for the payment to such employees of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and . . .
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.[19] In the case of the public sector, as has been noted, the provision for payment of salaries during the preventive suspension pending
investigation has been deleted.

B. Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal if Employee is Exonerated

But although we hold that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if
they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent.

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to
conduct an unhampered investigation.On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay
for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) states that respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal.

It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in the event he is
exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even
after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended.Indeed, to sustain the governments theory would be to make the
administrative decision not only executory but final and executory. The fact is that 47(2) and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pending appeal
under Rule 39, 2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, 5 provides that in the event the executed judgment is reversed, there shall be restitution or reparation of
damages as equity and justice may require.

Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrative decision meting out the penalty of suspension or dismissal shall be immediately
executory and that if the respondent appeals he shall be considered as being merely under preventive suspension if eventually he prevails is taken from
37 of the Civil Service Decree of 1975 (P.D. No. 807). There was no similar provision in the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), although under it
the Commissioner of Civil Service could order the immediate execution of an administrative decision in the interest of the public service.[20] Nor was there
provision for immediate execution of administrative decisions ordering dismissal or suspension in 695 of the Administrative Code of 1917, as amended
by C.A. No. 598, 1.[21] Nonetheless, under R.A. No. 2260 the payment of salaries was ordered in cases in which employees were found to be innocent of
the charges[22] or their suspension was held to be unjustified, because the penalty of suspension or dismissal was executed without a finding by the Civil
Service Commissioner that it was necessary in the interest of the public service. [23] On the other hand, payment of back salaries was denied where it was
shown that the employee concerned was guilty as charged and the immediate execution of the decision was ordered by the Civil Service Commissioner
in the interest of the public service.[24]

Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the reason for denying salaries for the period of preventive suspension. We have said
that an employee who is exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salaries because his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot be
unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only be found innocent of the charges but his suspension must likewise be
unjustified. But though an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his suspension
is unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is
illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstatement with full pay. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the
equivalent of five years pay at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed.[25]

II. Private Respondents Entitled to Back Salaries Although Found Guilty of Violation of Office Rules and Regulations and Reprimanded

Private respondents were exonerated of all charges against them for acts connected with the teachers strike of September and October
1990. Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike. For being absent without leave, they were held liable for violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand. Their case thus falls squarely within ruling in Bangalisan, which likewise
involved a teacher found guilty of having violated reasonable office rules and regulations. Explaining the grant of salaries during their suspension despite
the fact that they were meted out reprimand, this Court stated:

With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his backwages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the Civil Service Commission will show
that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found
guilty of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal
to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without official leave, for his
participation in the mass actions on September 18, 20 and 21, 1990. It was his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis of his
preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.

However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questioned resolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved in the mass actions but was absent
because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the
same was for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school of his intended absence and neither did he
file an application for leave covering such absences.

Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in violations of reasonable office
rules and regulations, the first offense is punishable by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would be
tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which caused his dismissal from the service. [26]

In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,[27] a public school teacher who was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having
been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes.

Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that respondents Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letter in which they admitted
having taken part in the mass action. This question cannot be raised now. The Civil Service Commission gave no weight to this letter in view of individual
letters written by the three citing reasons for their absences, to wit: Abad, because she decided to stay home to correct student papers; Bandigas,
because she had to accompany her brother to the Commission on Immigration, and Somebang because of economic reasons. Petitioner did not appeal
from this ruling. Hence, he is bound by the factual findings of the CSC and the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as amended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October 6, 1997, of the Court of
Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their
dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990

REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROMEO L. SANTOS, respondents.

Virgilio P. Robles for and in his own behalf.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein private respondent's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated
January 26, 1989, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in
the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.

On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan
City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during
the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320
contested precincts (pp. 16-20, Rollo).

On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of
protestant and the late filing of his protest.

On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and
directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77, Rollo).

On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated.

On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on
the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo).

No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by respondent HRET
when on September 14,1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On September 19, 1988,
Robles opposed Santos' motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to
Motion to Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted Santos' urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The said resolution states:

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos vs. Virgilio P. Robles). Three pleadings are submitted
for consideration by the Tribunal: (a) Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision," dated September 8, 1988; (b) Protestant's
"Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing," dated September 12, 1988; and (c)
Protestant's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14, 1988.

Upon the filing of Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest, the revision of ballots was stopped and such revision remains suspended
until now. In view of such suspension, there is no need to act on Protestee's Motion.

The "Motion to Withdraw Protest," has been withdrawn by Protestant's later motion, and therefore need not be acted upon.

WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The
'Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' is GRANTED.

The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to schedule the resumption of the revision on September 26, 1988 and to send out the
necessary notices for this purpose. (p. 84, Rollo).

On September 20,1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation praying that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion to
Recall dated September 19, 1988 be treated as a Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988 (pp. 92-94, Rollo).

On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on Robles' "Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition
to Motion to Recall Withdrawal" and ordered the suspension of the resumption of revision scheduled for September 26, 1988.

On January 26,1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal denied Robles' Motion for Reconsideration (pp. 109-111, Rollo). Hence, the
instant petition was filed on February 1, 1989 (pp. 1-14, Rollo).

On February 2, 1989, We required the respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice of the petition (p. 118, Rollo). On February 9, 1989,
petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion Reiterating Prayer for Injunction or Restraining Order (pp. 119-120, Rollo) which We Noted on February 16,
1989. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was granted in the same resolution of February 16,1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner
filed a Supplemental Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning respondent HRET's February 16, 1989 resolution denying petitioner's motion to defer
or reset revision until this Court has finally disposed of the instant petition and declaring that a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules was had with private respondent Santos making a recovery of 267 votes (see Annex "C" of Supplemental
Petition, p. 138, Rollo).

It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and
Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET
subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.

We do not agree with petitioner.

It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken by
respondent HRET Contrary to petitioner's claim that the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only on September
19, 1988 when respondent HRET resolved said motion together with two other motions. The questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved
three (3) motions, namely: a) Protestee's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988; and c) Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard
Withdrawal of Protest," dated September 14, 1988. The resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The
"Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" is GRANTED.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not
by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).

We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held:

We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts" effectively
withdrew the precincts referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains
the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise
would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.

We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to
insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained.

Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts" had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was
recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts
were not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest"
did not amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and
however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28,1987,152 SCRA 378;
Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16,1987,148 SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose
independence as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra ,at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this
grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as
that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [ Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25
SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
"judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.

In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ
of certiorari will not issue.

Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to
withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the
essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This
is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the
popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities
or procedural play of words.

The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 282) relied upon by petitioner does not help to bolster his case because
the facts attendant therein are different from the case at bar. In the said case, the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution
thereon was questioned.

As regards petitioner's Supplemental Petition questioning respondent tribunal's resolution denying his motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining
seventy-five (75) per cent of the contested precincts, the same has become academic in view of the fact that the revision was resumed on February 20,
1989 and was terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo). This fact was not rebutted by petitioner.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the
HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has
likewise, no basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of which both
parties were properly represented.

It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing
what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good.

ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed
resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who
may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.

Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.

Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, change that party's
representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal
investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered
by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the
other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or
executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the
President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are
affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since
"a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished,
necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the
fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld"
(Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean
that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into
the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been
aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is —

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must
be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each
received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes

Difference...................................... 3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the
remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member

Congressman

1st District

Benguet LDP

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member

Congressman

1st District Palawan

LDP

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member

Congressman

2nd District Nueva Ecija

LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member

Congressman

1st District Davao del Sur

LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member

Congressman

4th District Batangas

LDP

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

Congressman

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

(formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP
members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with
the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP
Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and
to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested
ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-
Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice
was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on
February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman
Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having
invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but
also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the
House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March
13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,
the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:

13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session on 13
March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.

Thank you.

For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing
development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because —

By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET
Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its
 promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.

The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some
members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles,
is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E.
Calingasan, dissenting.

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the
Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal
and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the
unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the
performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.

In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is:
three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no
party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.

In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a
decisive role in the resolution of election contests.

We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so
designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit
in Tribunal deliberations.

There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera
v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the
Holy Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the
present congressional term.

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenary session held
on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No.
25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members
as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development undermines the
independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even
date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37,
Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to
their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal
 considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof,
upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial
judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof
should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their
membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS
its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the
members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be
terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal
in the first instance.

Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in
favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda,
Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura from
assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment5 on the petition within ten days from notice and
to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to
replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and
rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects
from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in
the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the
political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party;6 that a
Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not
removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;8 and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of
judicial review.10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet
been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable
party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because
the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What
he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura
as a member of the HRET.13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the
House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded
to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this
case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several
newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman
Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House
Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal
which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first
and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:

Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of
the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National
Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be
permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant
of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election
contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority
of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on the subject between
Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it
correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan
which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
 MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present
bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary;
but they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral
tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate
proceedings of these electoral tribunals.

MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of
controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which
takes care of this particular controversy.

Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we have an independent
electoral tribunal?

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and
the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal.
So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?

MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent when we still have six politicians
sitting in both tribunals?

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief
Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that
politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they
are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations. That is why I am asking
now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown
independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-
112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its
proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because
he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for
the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of
Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be
expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of
this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the
HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a
matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily
replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed,
however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove
Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of
absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the
Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the
Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for
Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of
Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to
exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform
its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio
Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause,
but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the
action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated
March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of
the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null
and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision
in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the
interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done
immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents.

Mauricio Law Office for petitioner.

Ongkiko, Bucoy, Dizon & Associates for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

The case before Us calls for a determination of whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. In connection therewith, two important questions are also put in issue, namely, whether or not the grant of executive clemency and
the reason therefore, are political questions beyond judicial review, and whether or not the questioned act was characterized by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the
Office of the President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac
and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this
petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive
clemency to respondent governor.

Sometime in 1989, petiotioner, together with Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified
complaint dated June 7, 1989 against respondent governor before the then Department of Local Government (DLG, for short), charging him with alleged
violation of Section 203(2) (f) 203(2) (p), and 208(w), of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and other
appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices ACt. Prior to that, petitoner filed with the Office of the Omdusman a verified
complainant dated November 10, 1988 against respondent governor for the latter's alleged viloation of Section 3-G of Republic Act. (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The complaint before the DLG, docketed as Administrative Case 10459, was subsequently tried, where both petitioner and respondent govemor
presented their respective evidence.

Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988, respondent governor, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor Tarlac, entered into and
executed a Loan Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the governor himself as chairman
and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan Agreement was never authorized and approved by
the Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the provisions of the Local Government Code; that the said Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the
Foundation and grossly inimical to the interest of the Provincial Government (because it did not provide for interest or for any type security and it did not
provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to control the safe disbursement of said loan); that a total amount of P20,000,000.00 was disbursed to
the aforesaid Foundation; that the transactions constitute a fraudulent scheme to defraud the Provincial Government; and that the said Agreement is
wholly unconstitutional, illegal, a immoral. (Annex "A", Petition)

On the other hand, it is the contention of respondent governor that "the funds were intended to generate livelihood project among the residents of Tarlac
and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and considered the best alternative as a matter of judgment." (pp. 12-13,
Appeal Memorandom); that he resigned from the said Foundation in order to forestall any suspicion that he would influence it; that it is not true that the
Loan Agreement did not provide for continuing audit by the Provincial Government because the Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise; and
that the Agreement is not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Provincial Government and respondent governor did not and would not profit
thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for repayment. (Annex "A", Petition)

After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government rendered a decision dated September 21, 1990, dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is, as he hereby found guilty of having violated Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which act amounts to serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, for which
tilp penalty of suspension from office for a period of ninety (90) days, effective upon the finality of this Decision, is hereby imposed upon him.
(p. 3, Petition)

Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolution imposed not a preventive suspension but a penalty of suspension.

Respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the abovequoted decision but the same was denied on October 19, 1990. Aggrieved, he appealed
the DLG decision dated September 21, 1990 and the order of denial dated October 19, 1990 to the Office of the President (O.P. Case No. 4480).

On February 26, 1991, herein public respondent Executive Secretary issued a Resolution dismissing respondent governor's appeal and affirming the
September 21, 1990 DLG decision.

Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in administrative
suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his oath
of office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order, petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date (March
1, 1991), respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which petitioner filed an opposition. From the
allegations of the petitioner in his petition, respondent govemor accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner.

To the surprise of petitioner, however, respondent govemor on March 19, 1991, issued an "administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in which the latter
signified his intention to "(continue, as I am bound to exercise my fimctions as govemor and shall hold office at my residence," in the belief that "the
pendency of my Motion for Reconsideration precludes the coming into finality as executory the DLG decision." (Annex "E", Petition; p. 10, Comment).
And, as categorically stated in the petition, the reassumption ceremony by respondent governor was held on May 21, 1991 (p. 8, Petition).

Without ruling on respondent governor's Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent issued a Resolution dated May 15, 1991, in O.P. Case No. 4480,
which reads:
 This refers to the petition of Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III of Tarlac for executive clemency, interposed in connection with the decision of the
Secretary of then Department of Local Governmen (DLG) dated 21 September 1990, as affirmed in a Resolution of this Office dated 26
February 1991, suspending petitioner from office for period of ninety (90) days upon the finality of said decision.

As will be recalled, the DLG Secretary imposed the penalty of suspension upon his finding that petitioner was guilty of serious neglect of duty
and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract — with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI) — grossly/manifestly
disadvantageous to Tarlac Province. In his letter-petition of 10 May 1991, thereby pleading for a thirty (30)-day reduction of his suspension,
petitioner invited attention to the DLG Secretary's decision clearing him of having personally benefitted from the questioned transaction. In the
same letter, petitioner manifests serving more than sixty (60) days of the ninety-day suspension. Previously, petitioner submitted documents
and letters from his constituents tending to show the relative success of his livelihood loan program pursue under the aegis of the LTFI and/or
the Foundation's credible loan repayment record. To cite some:

1. Certification of the Chairman,Tarlac Integrated Livelihood Cooperative, Inc., attesting to the full payment of its loan (P15.05 M) plus interest
with LTFI;

2. Certification of the Manager, Rural Bank of Geron (Tarlac), Inc., attesting to the gradual liquidation of the loan granted to family-borrowers
out of funds provided by LTFI;

3. Letter of Jover's Phil., expressing gratitude for the loan assistance extended for its export activities by LTFI;

4. Letter of the Tarlac Provincial Agricultural Officer i forming that the proceeds of the loan from LTFI have bee utilized in hybrid com
production; and

5. Letter of the President of the Federation of Tobacco Leaf Producers of Tarlac, Inc., informing of the payment of 76 of the amount
(P203,966.00) loaned to the Federation for tobacco production.

Petitioner's act, vis-a-vis the loan to LTFI, may have been promp by an over eagerness to accelerate the delivery of livelihood services to his
provincemates. As the truism goes, however, the end does not always justify the means. Be that as it may, but without belaboring the propriety
of the loan agreement aforementioned, some measure of leniency may be accorded petitioner as the purpose of his suspen sion may have
made its mark.

WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is hereby granted executive clemency in the sense that his ninety-day suspension is hereby
reduced to the period already served.

SO ORDERED.

(Annex "F", Petition; pp. 25-26, Rollo)

By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent governor reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly withou any notification made to the
petitioner.

Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was "whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction," (p. 6, petition) basically on the ground th executive clemency could be granted by the President only
in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. Petitioner also
contends that since respondent governor refused to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of the suspension
order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was so sudden
that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by public respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent
governor, the former failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the exftutive clemency granted
by public respondent was "the product of a hocus-pocus strategy" (p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because there was allegedly no real petition for
the grant of executive clemency filed by respondent govemor.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, ...

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense s warrants,
or when the continuance in office of the respondent coul influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity the records and
other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation the
proceedings against him until its termination. (Emphasis supplied)

It is admitted by petitioner that since March 1, 1991, he has assumed the governorship. A portion of the petition is hereon der quoted as follows:

7. [On February 28, 1991], and in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code (Sec. 66, Chapter 4, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337), to the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in an administrative suspension of local officials shall be immediately
 executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, Petitioner Llamas took his oath of office as acting govemor. Under the
administrative suspension order, Llamas had up to May 31 [sic 29] 1991 as acting governor;

8. A copy of this oath of office is attached and made a part hereof as Annex B;

9. Significantly, this oath of office was sworn to by Petitioner Llamas before Secretary Santos of the newly created Department Interior and
Local Government, as shown by the lower portion Annex B, and by a picture of the oathtaking itself, attached and mad a part hereof as Annex
B-1;

10. Subsequently, Petitioner Llamas and Respondent Ocampo met, where Ocampo was shown Llamas' oath of office. During meeting, held in
the presence of all department heads at the provi cial capitol and in the presence of various local government offici and representatives of the
media, Ocampo agreed to turn over reigns of the provincial government to Petitioner;

11. In fact, Ocampo had asked the department heads and all other officials of the provincial government of Tarlac to extend their cooperation
to Llamas, during the ninety days that the latter would assume the governorship;

12. And, as if this was not enough, Ocampo even made announcements in the media that he was allowing Petitioner Llamas to perform his
functions as acting governor at the Office of the Govern at the Capitol where he (Ocampo) used to hold office (true enough Ocampo has
subsequently allowed Llamas to hold office at the of the Governor, with Ocampo even escorting the acting therein last March 4, 1991);

l 3. An account of Ocampo's acceptance of his suspension and of his having turned over his office to Petitioner Llamas was published, front
page, in the March 5, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin. A copy of this news account is attached and made a part hereof as Annex C);

14. Furthermore, various other officials, President Aquino Rep. Jose Cojuangco included, have extended recognition to Petitions Llamas'
assumption of the governorship. Llamas met with President Aquino and Rep. Cojuangco and, during this meeting, the two highest officials of
the land have asked Llamas to discharge his duties acting governor;

15. Secretary Santos, for that matter, has issued a designation to Tarlac Senior Board Member Aganon, dated March 18, 1991, a pointing bim
as acting vice governor of the province, "in view of the suspension of Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III, and the assumption Vice Governor Rodolfo
Llamas as acting governor." A copy of this designation is attached and made a part hereof as Annex D;

xxx xxx xxx

30. ... [T]he reassumption ceremony by [Governor] Ocampo was held [in the] morning of May 21, 1991 ... (pp- 2-4 & 7, Petition; pp. 3-5 & 8,
Rollo)

It is prayed in the instant petition dated May 21, 1991 that:

b. In the meantime that this action is pending, and irnmediately upon the filing hereof, a temporary restraining order be issued stopping the
Respondents from enforcing, in any manner, the aforesaid contested resolution, and Respondent Ocampo, firom continuing with his
reassumption of the governorship. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, that a cease and desist order be issued against Respondent Ocampo stopping him
from continuing with hiii reassumption of the governorship.

Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction. Respondent govemor avers that since under the Constitution fiffl discretionary authority is granted to the
President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is beyond judicial review.

Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers
are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers
or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review
does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. In this
connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very enlightening, and We quote:

Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass
judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Consfitution or by
statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with
the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because
in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political
policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the
Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of
facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed
in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).

xxx xxx xxx

What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people
in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the goverrunent,
 with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L.R.A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Fan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. RA.
519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. CA 516, 30 L.R.A- 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 111, 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep.
220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the
people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters
which the people have by the Constitute delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from
judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable,
not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control.
But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the
people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary the department which is charged with the special duty of determinining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that the government may be
one of laws and not men" — words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document.

Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches
and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution).
"Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view" (Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives & Ong, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and
Balanquit vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives & Ong, G.R Nos. 92202-03, July 30, 1991).

In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the Constitution
the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of
executive clemency is subject to constitutional l'um'tations. We will merely check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance
with law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our power of
judicial review.

Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution
which reads:

Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro vided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commu tations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)

According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of
executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an administrative case," allegedly because the word "conviction" refers only to
criminal cases (par. 22-b, c, d, Petition). Petitioner, however, describes in his very own words, respondent governor as one who has been "convicted in
an administrative case" (par. 22-a, petition). Thus, petitioner concedes that the word "conviction" may be used either in a criminal case or in an
administrative case. In Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536, We ruled:

For misfeasance or malfeasance ... any [elective official] could ... be proceeded against administratively or ... criminally. In either case, his
culpability must be established ...

It is also important to note that respondent govemor's Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 1, 1991 was withdrawn in his petition for the grant of
executive clemency, which fact rendered the Resolution dated February 26, 1991 affirming the DLG Decision (which found respondent governor guilty of
neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority and which suspended him for ninety (90) days) final.

Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does
not distinguish, so We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It
is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the executive clemency in administrative cases.

Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, ..., the President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers
and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service."

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of deliberations was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as
follows: "However, the power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation."The Constitutional
Commission, however, voted to remove the amendment, since it was in derogation of the powers of the President. As Mr. Natividad stated:

I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society we
extend probation to them while in this case, they have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is
through this executive clemency extended to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse
than the murderers and the more vicious killers in our society ....
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to trust in the
discretion of Presidents and refrained from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers. (II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, 392,
418-419, 524-525)

It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of
coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution).
If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same
benefit.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the
President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of
evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust and
unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in
the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public. (p. 34, Comment of public respondent)

Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, Section I, Book III of
which provides:

SECTION 1. Power of Control. — The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special
relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific
law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. ...
(emphasis supplied)

The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and
Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and
control" power of the President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order, even "in the
sense" of granting executive clemency. "Control," within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to substitute one's own judgment for that of a
subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are
presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her (Vinena v. Secretary, 67 Phil. 451; Free Telephone Workers Union vs.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 108 SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the present case, the
President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate,
most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant
"executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts
alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public
interest. — "the relative success of . . . livelihood loan program." (pp. 39-40, Comment of public respondent)

We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative
cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

Noteworthy is the fact that on March 1, 1991, respondent governor filed a motion for reconsideration and the same may be regarded as implicitly
resolved, not only because of its withdrawal but also because of the executive clemency which in effect reduced the penalty, conformably with the power
of "control."

On petitioner's argument that private respondent's motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment
in O.P. Case No. 4480 (that is, there being no final judgment to speak of, the pardon granted was premature and of no effect, We reiterate the doctrine
that upon acceptance of a presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Thus, it was held that:

The commutation of the penalty is impressed with legal significance. That is an exercise of executive clemency embraced in the pardoning
power. According to the Constitution: "The President may except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit
fines and forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. "Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves
to put an end to this appeal." (Mansanto v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239, 170 SCRA 190. 196). (See also Peo v. Crisola, 129 SCRA 13)

Consequently, respondent governor's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the
subject decision final, that of the period already served.

Finally, petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is uruneritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though
official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. ..."
(Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed. 1988, pp. 239-240, citing U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 [U.S. 1833]). Thus, assuming that
petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. Besides, petitioner's claim that respondent governor has
not begun serve sentence is belied by his very own factual allegations in his petition, more particularly that he served as Acting Governor of Tarlac
effective from the date he took his Oath of Office on February 28, 1991 up to the time respondent govemor reassumed the governorship of Tarlac on
May 21, 1991 (par. 30 petition). It is, therefore, error to say that private respondent did not serve any portion of the 90-day suspension meted upon him.
We fail to see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction committed by public respondent.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) DECLARING that the President did not act arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the May 15, 1991 Resolution granting on the grounds mentioned therein, executive clemency to respondent governor and that,
accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional (without prejudice to criminal proceedings which have been filed or may be filed against respondent
governor), and (2) DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition for being unmeritorious, moot and academic. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The
sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February
22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.

ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of
these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162).
The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not
be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the
part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?

In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference
save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference
except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not
venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate
a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches
and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone
to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are,
in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 [1936])

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals
to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy
one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its
composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be
made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of
the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his
residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting
in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into
Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932
according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of
life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private
respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong
Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other
than that Laoang was their abode and home.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and
college education.

In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's
family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.

The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.

Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution
removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.

For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those
elections.

The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of greater service to his province
and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.

Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those
who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election
was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend
Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but
a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before
January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the
1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but
alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but
not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation
resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment
thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970])

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of
the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are
organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so
elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They
were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made
up of essentially the same similarly situated members.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which
then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or
not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before
January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason
is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the
life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a
sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of
Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time
to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves
formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries.
There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have
resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?

The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his
father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a
minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."
(Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can
go after the son.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose
Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of
the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie
to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."

The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET
committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through
the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he
came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election,
there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born
citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both
bodies.

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference
could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands
and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.

4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to
him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were
Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.

As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.

Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits
in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of
Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.

If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also
an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place.
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.

The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The
petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.

On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.

It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971
Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.

This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that
there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-
31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper
party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving
the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide
diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])

Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven
by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.

Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically
stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN,
February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary
session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among
them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr.
Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private
respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the
Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the
line between error and grave abuse.

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous
with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress
continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

 Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to
reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as
domicile.

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation,
Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was
constructed.

Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were
reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is
misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names
of his parents.

Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil.
893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The
Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution
that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no
intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had
the animus revertendi.

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a
continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part
Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily,
some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.

Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those
who qualify to share in its richness.

Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing
to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how
to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a
more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical
approach to citizenship problems is essential.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED.
Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY,
and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on
constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the
Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000[1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.[3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order
situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.[4] The President further stated that to
heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. [6] Finally, the President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved.[7]

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:

xxx

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in
Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security.

3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active
and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to
handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of
crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a
sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in
Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary
responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating
in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in
addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome
atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines
visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure,
and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.

xxx.[8]
 The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM
Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.[9]

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF
SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE
CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW
ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.[10]

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP
questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution, [11] dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his Comment
on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.

The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that
petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political
question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual
determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist
the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the
President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause of the Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [15]

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of
the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to
improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental
act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the
Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and
may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative
and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of
the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not
categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and
proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. [16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. [17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. [18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,
because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao
insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves
the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces,
particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the
aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It
contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment.[19]

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial
scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this
Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes
beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call
out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the
general welfare.[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy.Secondly, the
full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes
in Marcos v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

xxx[21]

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.

We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political
question, and thus, not justiciable.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. [22] It pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political
questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure
being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of
another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

As Taada v. Cuenco[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an
issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,[24] [p]rominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [25] Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General
that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being
one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. [27] When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. [28]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may
look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. [30] A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy.[31]

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom.This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be
called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own.However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation[32] before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to
sustain.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further
reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:

xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. [33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power
to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out
such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can
impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We
are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of
calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: The President may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: The
President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling
imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the
Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.[34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to
impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions
are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide
latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the
present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the
calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by
an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call
forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from
this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted
that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila... [35] We do not doubt the
veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement
and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article II [36] of the Constitution.

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes
and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.[37]Under
the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. [38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines.[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers.[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of
the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military
in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. [41]

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement,
has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually
participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same.Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be
no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience
reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that
bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:

1. Elections;[42]

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43]

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;[44]

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;[45]

5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]

6. Conservation of natural resources;[47]

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;[48]

8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49]

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;[50]

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51]

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;[52]

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53]

13. Sanitary inspections;[54]

14. Conduct of census work;[55]

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56]

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;[57]

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units. [58]

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.[59] What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian
authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted,[60] and
whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is
allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act[61] of the
US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:

1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or
the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.[62]

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US courts[63] apply the
following standards, to wit:

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel
subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory[64] George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-
433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law
enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale
Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?

xxx
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the
Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those
claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in
civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the
Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:

3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the
soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,[66] 8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no
power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And
last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)[70] of Annex A, are all low impact and
defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a
handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement. [71]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place
in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed
forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law,
exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual
basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights
have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that
the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not
when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000]

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP
ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO
MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.

[G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000]

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as
Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.

[G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000]

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO
G. BIAZON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, respondents.

[G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000]

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I.
DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C. RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING THEIR
CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT
(VFA), respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an
agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces
Agreement.

The antecedents unfold.

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use
of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines
and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.[1]

In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. [2] With the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense
and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the
Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the
United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of
conferences and negotiations[3] that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA,
which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.[4]

On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,[5] the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President [6] and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings
were held by the two Committees.[7]

On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 [8] recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and
the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued.

On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote[9] of its members. Senate
Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.[10]

On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under
which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines, and is quoted in its full text, hereunder:

Article I
Definitions

As used in this Agreement, United States personnel means United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in
connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government.

Within this definition:

1. The term military personnel refers to military members of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
 2. The term civilian personnel refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, nor ordinary residents in the Philippines and who are
employed by the United States armed forces or who are accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the
American Red Cross and the United Services Organization.

Article II
Respect for Law

It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all
measures within its authority to ensure that this is done.

Article III
Entry and Departure

1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States personnel and their departure from the Philippines in
connection with activities covered by this agreement.

2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations upon entering and departing the Philippines.

3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required in respect of United States military personnel who enter
the Philippines:

(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full name, date of birth, rank or grade and service
number (if any), branch of service and photograph;

(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority, authorizing the travel or visit and identifying the
individual or group as United States military personnel; and

(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of health, and when required by the cognizant
representative of the Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel is
free from quarantinable diseases. Any quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall
be conducted by the United States commanding officer in accordance with the international health regulations as promulgated by the
World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.

4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present, upon demand, valid passports upon entry and
departure of the Philippines.

5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States personnel from its territory, the United States authorities
shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the
Philippines.

Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration

1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license issued by the appropriate United States authority to
United States personnel for the operation of military or official vehicles.

2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall have appropriate markings.

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

1. Subject to the provisions of this article:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines
and punishable under the law of the Philippines.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.

2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses
relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the United
States.

(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including
offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of
the Philippines.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security means:
(1) treason;

(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States personnel,
except in cases provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the
military law of the United States in relation to.

(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the property or person of United
States personnel; and

(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.

(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case.

(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their forces,
Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of
particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it
shall communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive
the United States request.

(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against United
states personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate
setting forth such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States military
authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any
information bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where
appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify
the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.

(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon
as possible.

(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which both the
authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.

4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and United States shall assist each other in the arrest of
United States personnel in the Philippines and in handling them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
the provisions of this article.

5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are
subject of Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the
arrest or detention of any United States personnel.

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United
States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available
to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged in
extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the
United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not include the time necessary to
appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States
authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary
investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of
evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.

8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article and have been acquitted or have been
convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned,
they may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States
military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which
constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.

9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all
procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:

(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;

(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a
defense;

(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;

(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
 (e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines;

(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and

(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have such authorities present at all
judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine laws, excludes persons who
have no role in the proceedings.

10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to
visits and material assistance.

11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.

Article VI
Claims

1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales letters of offer and acceptance and leases of military
equipment, both governments waive any and all claims against each other for damage, loss or destruction to property of each others
armed forces or for death or injury to their military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement applies.

2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which paragraph 1 applies, the United States
Government, in accordance with United States law regarding foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of
meritorious claims for damage, loss, personal injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or otherwise
incident to the non-combat activities of the United States forces.

Article VII
Importation and Exportation

1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf
of the United States armed forces in connection with activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine duties,
taxes and other similar charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property from the
Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also
extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon such property after importation into, or
acquisition within, the Philippines. Such property may be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that disposition
of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not entitled to exemption from applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to
payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of the Philippine Government.

2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the personal use of United States personnel may be
imported into and used in the Philippines free of all duties, taxes and other similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in
the Philippines. Transfers to persons or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made upon prior approval
of the appropriate Philippine authorities including payment by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property acquired in the Philippines by United States personnel shall
be free of all Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges.

Article VIII
Movement of Vessels and Aircraft

1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines
in accordance with procedures stipulated in implementing arrangements.

2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines.
The movement of vessels shall be in accordance with international custom and practice governing such vessels, and such agreed
implementing arrangements as necessary.

3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall not be subject to the payment of landing or port
fees, navigation or over flight charges, or tolls or other use charges, including light and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft
operated by or for the United States armed forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels
owned or operated by the United States solely on United States Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory
pilotage at Philippine ports.

Article IX
Duration and Termination

This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in writing through the diplomatic channel that they
have completed their constitutional requirements for entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the
date on which either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreement.

Via these consolidated[11] petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers
- assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following:

I
 Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

II

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

III

Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?

a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military personnel?

b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher?

IV

Does the VFA violate:

a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?

b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?

c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties for the equipment, materials supplies and other
properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?

LOCUS STANDI

At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown any interest in the case, and that
petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA.[12] Petitioners, on the other
hand, counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing.[13]

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.[14]

In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending powers.[15] On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. [16] Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. vs. Laron[17], we held:

x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a
real party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public
funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus
standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez,[18] sustained the legal standing of
a member of the Senate and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bull, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of any
direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.

Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more
apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed
however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.

In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National
President to commence the present action.[19]

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency
Powers Cases,[20] where we had occasion to rule:

x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they
were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper
parties and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). (Underscoring Supplied)

This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC,[21] Daza vs. Singson,[22] and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and
Gaming Corporation,[23] where we emphatically held:

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x

Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,[24] thisCourt ruled that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court may
relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
departments of the government a becoming respect for each others acts,[25] this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the
senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its
subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply
inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in
joint military exercises.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section
21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This
provision lays down the general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such
as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines,
regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These
constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21
opens with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the
Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence
under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is
crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter
of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the
instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue
and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed
hereunder.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat
generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include
what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within
its general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.[26]

In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27] we enunciated:

x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to a special legislation on the same subject,
and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA
139), that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38).

Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no
permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and
permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.

It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos.

In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely
foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being
established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent
subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word or clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the
enumeration,[28] such that, the provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases,
(b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent
with this interpretation:

MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner Bernas.

This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops or facilities. My first question is: If the country does enter into such kind of a
treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities-or could the treaty entered into cover only one or two?

FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one or it covers three, the requirement will be the same.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter into a treaty covering not bases but merely troops?

FR. BERNAS. Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter into a treaty covering only troops.

FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more, we will find some. We just want to cover everything.[29] (Underscoring
Supplied)

Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and
weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years
without returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also
of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.

At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its
concurrence to the VFA.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the
specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must
be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty
be duly concurred in by the Senate.

Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence
contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the
treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of
the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement,
be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article,
VII.

As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a
more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members
of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.

Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24) Senators.[30] Without a tinge of doubt, two-
thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite
number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was
made,[31] will not alter in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA,
even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the
24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the subject
treaty.
 Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the
requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.

Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and
consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by
the United States.

In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the United States
Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be
binding, must only be accepted as a treaty by the United States.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty.[32] To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate
for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, [33] is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.[34]

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. [35] To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation.[36] There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d
arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have
pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms
are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.[37]

Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without
prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State.

Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long
as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. [38] International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.[39]

In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or
Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,[40] we had occasion to pronounce:

x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

xxxxxxxxx

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without
Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255;
U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol.
15 pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law [revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418;
willoughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth,
International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Italics Supplied)(Emphasis Ours)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is enlightening and highly-instructive:

MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification of the other state is concerned, that is entirely their concern under their
own laws.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are
concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.[41]

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government
has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. [42] For as long as the united States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an
unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities
embodied thereunder.

Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which
the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. [43] A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of
the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the
negotiation.[44]

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. [45]
 With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United
States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,[46]declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international
relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its
government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As
an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international
obligation.[47] Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities
under international law.

Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every
State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in
its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.[48]

Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith. This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most
fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.[49]

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power and performing a task conferred upon him by the
Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties. Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases
impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.

On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [50]

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs
of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations foreign policy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded.[51] Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."[52]

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no
less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade
it.[53] Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly
struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.

It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the
confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion
and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence
under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to
the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement
embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to
the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead
of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse
of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.

For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations.[54] The High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective powerIt has no power
to look into what it thinks is apparent error.[55]

As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate[56] performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse
of power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be
similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; [57] the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own
erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of
discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the
principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a
democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks
and balances indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining
to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.

In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this Court- as the final arbiter of legal controversies and
staunch sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative
in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three
political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24756 October 31, 1968

CITY OF BAGUIO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FORTUNATO DE LEON, defendant-appellant.

The City Attorney for plaintiff-appellee.

Fortunato de Leon for and in his own behalf as defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

In this appeal, a lower court decision upholding the validity of an ordinance1 of the City of Baguio imposing a license fee on any person, firm, entity or
corporation doing business in the City of Baguio is assailed by defendant-appellant Fortunato de Leon. He was held liable as a real estate dealer with a
property therein worth more than P10,000, but not in excess of P50,000, and therefore obligated to pay under such ordinance the P50 annual fee. That
is the principal question. In addition, there has been a firm and unyielding insistence by defendant-appellant of the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of
Baguio, where the suit originated, a complaint having been filed against him by the City Attorney of Baguio for his failure to pay the amount of P300 as
license fee covering the period from the first quarter of 1958 to the fourth quarter of 1962, allegedly, inspite of repeated demands. Nor was defendant-
appellant agreeable to such a suit being instituted by the City Treasurer without the consent of the Mayor, which for him was indispensable. The lower
court was of a different mind.

In its decision of December 19, 1964, it declared the above ordinance as amended, valid and subsisting, and held defendant-appellant liable for the fees
therein prescribed as a real estate dealer. Hence, this appeal. Assume the validity of such ordinance, and there would be no question about the liability
of defendant-appellant for the above license fee, it being shown in the partial stipulation of facts, that he was "engaged in the rental of his property in
Baguio" deriving income therefrom during the period covered by the first quarter of 1958 to the fourth quarter of 1962.

The source of authority for the challenged ordinance is supplied by Republic Act No. 329, amending the city charter of Baguio2 empowering it to fix the
license fee and regulate "businesses, trades and occupations as may be established or practiced in the City."

Unless it can be shown then that such a grant of authority is not broad enough to justify the enactment of the ordinance now assailed, the decision
appealed from must be affirmed. The task confronting defendant-appellant, therefore, was far from easy. Why he failed is understandable, considering
that even a cursory reading of the above amendment readily discloses that the enactment of the ordinance in question finds support in the power thus
conferred.

Nor is the question raised by him as to the validity thereof novel in character. In Medina v. City of Baguio,3 the effect of the amendatory section insofar as
it would expand the previous power vested by the city charter was clarified in these terms: "Appellants apparently have in mind section 2553, paragraph
(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, which empowers the City of Baguio merely to impose a license fee for the purpose of rating the business that
may be established in the city. The power as thus conferred is indeed limited, as it does not include the power to levy a tax. But on July 15, 1948,
Republic Act No. 329 was enacted amending the charter of said city and adding to its power to license the power to tax and to regulate. And it is
precisely having in view this amendment that Ordinance No. 99 was approved in order to increase the revenues of the city. In our opinion, the
amendment above adverted to empowers the city council not only to impose a license fee but also to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, more so when
in amending section 2553 (b), the phrase 'as provided by law' has been removed by section 2 of Republic Act No. 329. The city council of Baguio,
therefore, has now the power to tax, to license and to regulate provided that the subjects affected be one of those included in the charter. In this sense,
the ordinance under consideration cannot be considered ultra vires whether its purpose be to levy a tax or impose a license fee. The terminology used is
of no consequence."

It would be an undue and unwarranted emasculation of the above power thus granted if defendant-appellant were to be sustained in his contention that
no such statutory authority for the enactment of the challenged ordinance could be discerned from the language used in the amendatory act. That is
about all that needs to be said in upholding the lower court, considering that the City of Baguio was not devoid of authority in enacting this particular
ordinance. As mentioned at the outset, however, defendant-appellant likewise alleged procedural missteps and asserted that the challenged ordinance
suffered from certain constitutional infirmities. To such points raised by him, we shall now turn.

1. Defendant-appellant makes much of the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio in the suit for the collection of the real estate dealer's
fee from him in the amount of P300. He contended before the lower court, and it is his contention now, that while the amount of P300 sought was within
the jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio where this action originated, since the principal issue was the legality and constitutionality of the challenged
ordinance, it is not such City Court but the Court of First Instance that has original jurisdiction.

There is here a misapprehension of the Judiciary Act. The City Court has jurisdiction. Only recently, on September 7, 1968 to be exact, we rejected a
contention similar in character in Nemenzo v. Sabillano.4 The plaintiff in that case filed a claim for the payment of his salary before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. The question of jurisdiction was raised; the defendant Mayor asserted that what was in issue was the
enforcement of the decision of the Commission of Civil Service; the Justice of the Peace Court was thus without jurisdiction to try the case. The above
plea was curtly dismissed by Us, as what was involved was "an ordinary money claim" and therefore "within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the
Peace Court where it was filed, considering the amount involved." Such is likewise the situation here.

Moreover, in City of Manila v. Bugsuk Lumber Co.,5 a suit to collect from a defendant this license fee corresponding to the years 1951 and 1952 was
filed with the Municipal Court of Manila, in view of the amount involved. The thought that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction apparently was not even
in the minds of the parties and did not receive any consideration by this Court.
Evidently, the fear is entertained by defendant-appellant that whenever a constitutional question is raised, it is the Court of First Instance that should
have original jurisdiction on the matter. It does not admit of doubt, however, that what confers jurisdiction is the amount set forth in the complaint. Here,
the sum sought to be recovered was clearly within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio.

Nor could it be plausibly maintained that the validity of such ordinance being open to question as a defense against its enforcement from one adversely
affected, the matter should be elevated to the Court of First Instance. For the City Court could rely on the presumption of the validity of such
ordinance,6 and the mere fact, however, that in the answer to such a complaint a constitutional question was raised did not suffice to oust the City Court
of its jurisdiction. The suit remains one for collection, the lack of validity being only a defense to such an attempt at recovery. Since the City Court is
possessed of judicial power and it is likewise axiomatic that the judicial power embraces the ascertainment of facts and the application of the law, the
Constitution as the highest law superseding any statute or ordinance in conflict therewith, it cannot be said that a City Court is bereft of competence to
proceed on the matter. In the exercise of such delicate power, however, the admonition of Cooley on inferior tribunals is well worth remembering. Thus:
"It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility."7 While it remains undoubted that such a power to pass on the validity of an ordinance alleged to infringe certain constitutional rights of a
litigant exists, still it should be exercised with due care and circumspection, considering not only the presumption of validity but also the relatively modest
rank of a city court in the judicial hierarchy.

2. To repeat the challenged ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires as there is more than ample statutory authority for the enactment thereof.
Nonetheless, its validity on constitutional grounds is challenged because of the allegation that it imposed double taxation, which is repugnant to the due
process clause, and that it violated the requirement of uniformity. We do not view the matter thus.

As to why double taxation is not violative of due process, Justice Holmes made clear in this language: "The objection to the taxation as double may be
laid down on one side. ... The 14th Amendment [the due process clause] no more forbids double taxation than it does doubling the amount of a tax, short
of confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grounds." 8With that decision rendered at a time when American sovereignty in the Philippines
was recognized, it possesses more than just a persuasive effect. To some, it delivered the coup de graceto the bogey of double taxation as a
constitutional bar to the exercise of the taxing power. It would seem though that in the United States, as with us, its ghost as noted by an eminent critic,
still stalks the juridical state. In a 1947 decision, however, 9 we quoted with approval this excerpt from a leading American decision: 10 "Where, as here,
Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results."

At any rate, it has been expressly affirmed by us that such an "argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the
state and the other is imposed by the city ..., it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or
taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof."11

The above would clearly indicate how lacking in merit is this argument based on double taxation.

Now, as to the claim that there was a violation of the rule of uniformity established by the constitution. According to the challenged ordinance, a real
estate dealer who leases property worth P50,000 or above must pay an annual fee of P100. If the property is worth P10,000 but not over P50,000, then
he pays P50 and P24 if the value is less than P10,000. On its face, therefore, the above ordinance cannot be assailed as violative of the constitutional
requirement of uniformity. In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,12 Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court, stated: "A tax is considered uniform when it
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found."

There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a constitutional requirement where there is a classification. The opportunity
came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso.13 Thus: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; ..."
About two years later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses Trainers Assn. v. De la Fuente14incorporated the above excerpt in
his opinion and continued: "Taking everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution."

To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another case decided two years later, 15 is that the statute or ordinance in question "applies
equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation." This Court is on record as accepting the view in a leading American case16 that
"inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation."17

It is thus apparent from the above that in much the same way that the plea of double taxation is unavailing, the allegation that there was a violation of the
principle of uniformity is inherently lacking in persuasiveness. There is no need to pass upon the other allegations to assail the validity of the above
ordinance, it being maintained that the license fees therein imposed "is excessive, unreasonable and oppressive" and that there is a failure to observe
the mandate of equal protection. A reading of the ordinance will readily disclose their inherent lack of plausibility.

3. That would dispose of all the errors assigned, except the last two, which would predicate a grievance on the complaint having been started by the City
Treasurer rather than the City Mayor of Baguio. These alleged errors, as was the case with the others assigned, lack merit.

In much the same way that an act of a department head of the national government, performed within the limits of his authority, is presumptively the act
of the President unless reprobated or disapproved,18 similarly the act of the City Treasurer, whose position is roughly analogous, may be assumed to
carry the seal of approval of the City Mayor unless repudiated or set aside. This should be the case considering that such city official is called upon to
see to it that revenues due the City are collected. When administrative steps are futile and unavailing, given the stubbornness and obduracy of a
taxpayer, convinced in good faith that no tax was due, judicial remedy may be resorted to by him. It would be a reflection on the state of the law if such
fidelity to duty would be met by condemnation rather than commendation.

So, much for the analytical approach. The conclusion thus reached has a reinforcement that comes to it from the functional and pragmatic test. If a city
treasurer has to await the nod from the city mayor before a municipal ordinance is enforced, then opportunity exists for favoritism and undue
discrimination to come into play. Whatever valid reason may exist as to why one taxpayer is to be accorded a treatment denied another, the suspicion is
unavoidable that such a manifestation of official favor could have been induced by unnamed but not unknown consideration. It would not be going too far
to assert that even defendant-appellant would find no satisfaction in such a sad state of affairs. The more desirable legal doctrine therefore, on the
assumption that a choice exists, is one that would do away with such temptation on the part of both taxpayer and public official alike.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of December 19, 1964, is hereby affirmed. Costs agains

[G.R. No. 128954. October 8, 1998]

AZUCENA GO and REGENA GLORIA SIONG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and STAR GROUP RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where the trial court abuses its discretion by indefinitely suspending summary proceedings involving ejectment cases, a petition for certiorari may
be entertained by the proper court to correct the blunder. In the interest of justice and in view of the procedural void on the subject, an appeal may be
treated as a petition for certiorari for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice.

The Case

The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to set aside and reverse the consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA) promulgated
on March 4, 1997, in CA-GR SP No. 37306 and CA-GR SP No. 39403, which disallowed the suspension of the ejectment proceedings, the decretal
portion of which reads:

It bears mentioning again, that due to petitioners apparent dilatory tactics prolonging both the ejectment and specific performance
proceedings, we are convinced beyond cavil that the ejectment case should proceed independently of the specific performance case.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 30, 1995 and October 17, 1995 issued by the respondent Regional Trial Court (Branch 34) of Iloilo
City in Civil Case No. 21713 are declared NULL and VOID on the sole ground of non-compliance with the mandate of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution.

The petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated January 27, 1995 and March 24, 1995 issued by the same respondent Regional Trial
Court (Branch 34) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 21713; and the supplemental petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated February 14,
1996 and March 1, 1996 issued by the respondent MTCC of Iloilo City (Branch 1) in Civil Case No. 332 (93) are DENIED for lack of merit.

The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby LIFTED.[2]

The Facts

The undisputed facts as found by Respondent Court are reproduced hereunder:

Private respondent filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City (Branch 1) an ejectment case [docketed as Civil Case
No. 332(93)] against petitioners. Upon motion of petitioners, said court issued an Order dated November 29, 1993 holding in abeyance the
preliminary conference in said case until after the case for specific performance docketed as Civil Case No. 21142 likewise involving the
same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC of Iloilo City (Branch 37).

An appeal was taken by private respondent from the aforesaid Order which was assigned to herein public respondent RTC of Iloilo City
(Branch 34).

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the respondent RTC a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appealed order is interlocutory
and therefore not appealable. Said motion was denied by the respondent RTC (Branch 34) per its Order dated January 27, 1995.

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied per Order dated March 24, 1995.

Hence, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, docketed as SP No. 37306, raising the issue of whether or not the respondent
RTC (Branch 34) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss appeal.

Private respondent then filed with respondent RTC a Motion to Resume Proceedings. On August 30, 1995, respondent RTC issued an
Order granting said motion and directed the remand of the records of the case to the MTCC (Branch 1) of Iloilo City for further
proceedings. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification but the same was denied in the Order dated October 17, 1995.

Petitioners then filed with this Court the present petition for review, docketed as SP No. 39403, raising the issue of whether or not the same
respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the resumption of the proceedings in
the MTCC of Iloilo (Branch 1).
 On October 20, 1995, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent RTC from further proceeding with Civil Case No.
21713. Sometime after the restraining order lapsed, respondent court remanded the records to the MTCC.

Petitioners filed with the MTCC a motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings. In the Order dated February 14, 1996, the MTCC denied
the motion and set the case for preliminary conference. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order dated March
1, 1996.

Subsequently, petitioners filed their supplemental petition for review impleading the presiding Judge of the MTCC, raising the issue of
whether or not the respondent MTCC erred in resuming the proceedings in view of the timely filing of the petition for review, docketed as SP
No. 39403.

On May 29, 1996, we granted petitioners motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered herein private and public respondents to
refrain from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 332 (93) before the MTCC until the herein above-entitled petitions are
resolved by this Court.

The issues raised by petitioners in their pleadings are the following[:]

I. Whether or not the respondent RTC (Branch 34) gravely abused its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss an appeal from an interlocutory
order.

II. Whether or not the respondent RTC (Branch 34) gravely abused its discretion when it granted private respondents Motion to Resume Proceedings
and ordered the remand of the records to the MTCC (Branch 1).

III. Whether or not the respondent MTCC (Branch 1) erred when it resumed the ejectment proceedings despite the timely filing of the petition for review.

Respondent Courts Ruling

Recognizing the existence of a procedural void in the Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court of Appeals sustained the propriety of appeal as a
remedy to challenge the suspension of the ejectment suit by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City:

Verily, the respondent RTC was cognizant of the impropriety of an appeal from an interlocutory order. However, in denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal it considered the following circumstances: 1) the procedural void where the aggrieved party (herein private respondent)
will have no remedy for the ventilation of his rights; and 2) the fact that herein petitioners as plaintiffs in the case for specific performance
(Civil Case No. 21142) also filed a motion to hold in abeyance the pre-trial of said case.

We find that the respondent RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal. Neither did it act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.

First, it must be stated that the purpose of the Rule[s] on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of cases without regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, B.P. Blg. 129).

Apparently, the prohibition against petitions for certiorari involving interlocutory orders was included to forestall useless petitions and avoid
undue inconvenience and delays. In effect, a party is prevented from having to assail orders on incidental matters as they are issued by the
court. Instead, a party is obliged to contest all such expeditious resolution of the case.

However, in the case at bench, what the private respondent sought to be reviewed by way of appeal was a suspension order. An order
which to all intents and purposes runs counter to the summary nature of ejectment proceedings. Thus, the private respondent as plaintiff in
the ejectment proceeding should be given a remedy to question said order which the respondent court had judiciously provided for.

All told, inaction on the MTCCs order of suspension due to the procedural void created by Section 19 of the Rule[s] on Summary Procedure
and Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court will defeat rather than promote the thrust of the summary rules which is the speedy disposition
of cases.

After all, while technicalities have their uses, resort to them should not be encouraged when they serve only to impede the speedy and just
resolution of the case, least of all an ejectment case which, under the Rules, is supposed to be summary in nature (Top Rate International
Services, Inc. vs. CA, 170 SCRA 84). Further, actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer must be abated as promptly as possible
without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delay because they involve a disturbance of social order
(Co Keng Kian vs. IAC, 189 SCRA 112).

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise two issues:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in allowing the appeal of an interlocutory order. [3]

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not applying the exceptions provided for in the Vda. de Legaspi and Wilmon cases allowing the
suspension of the ejectment case based on strong reasons of equity or when the right of the private respondent to the property in question
is seriously placed in issue.[4]

In the main, the crux of this case is the propriety of an appeal as a remedy to challenge the suspension of proceedings in an ejectment suit.
 The Courts Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:
Remedy to Contest Interlocutory Orders
in Summary Proceedings

In affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, the Court of Appeals noted that there was a procedural void in the summary
proceedings before the MTCC. The undisputed facts illustrate that existing procedural rules do not provide an adequate remedy to herein private
respondent.

It may be recalled that the MTCC, acting on petitioners motion, held in abeyance the preliminary conference in the ejectment suit, until the
termination of a pending case for specific performance involving the same parties. In challenging the order of the MTCC, herein private respondent
appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the assailed order was interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to
appeal.

Indisputably, the appealed order is interlocutory, for it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the
merits of the case.[5] It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. [6] Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in
such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and
from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress.[7]

Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. -- The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by
this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.

Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught between Scylla and Charybdis in the procedural void observed by the Court of
Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of
speedy resolution of cases.

As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for
certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however,
private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.

Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on
Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules.

Private respondent herein filed an appeal to question the interlocutory order. This recourse was upheld by the RTC and the CA in order to fill a
procedural void. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We hold, however, that the appeal should instead be treated as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. An appeal ordinarily entails a longer process which negates an expeditious resolution.

Petitioners posit that if such procedural void exists, no remedy is sanctioned by law, and the courts thus have no power to provide one. Petitioners
aver that the defect lies in the law and can only be remedied by the legislature.

This argument is unacceptable. First, at issue in this case is not a law passed by the legislature, but procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, categorically allows the Court to lay down rules concerning, among others, procedure in all
courts. Second, courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice." [8] Thus, it has
been held that the power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from [their] operations whenever the purposes of justice
require it, cannot be questioned.[9]

Second issue:
 Suspension of Ejectment Cases

Petitioners likewise bewail the non-application of the doctrine enunciated by the Court in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendano,[10] subsequently
recognized in Wilmon Auto Supply v. Court of Appeals,[11] that an ejectment suit may be suspended if there are strong reasons of equity. In Vda. de
Legaspi,[12] the Court held:

Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the
premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and
disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects
of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession
should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have
superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without
resorting to the courts.

Thus, petitioners contend that they are entitled to the suspension of the ejectment case, because the right of the private respondent to the property
in question was seriously placed in issue in the specific performance case.

The argument is not persuasive. In Wilmon, the Court recognized that Vda. De Legaspi was an exception to the general rule against suspension of
an ejectment proceeding, viz.:

xxx [A]s regards the seemingly contrary ruling in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendano, 79 SCRA 135 (1977), this Court observed in Salinas v.
Navarro, 126 SCRA 167, 172-173 (1983), that the exception to the rule in this case of Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity
not found in the present petition. The right of the petitioner is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a
deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the
ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not present in this petition.[13]

The situation in Vda. de Legaspi, however, does not obtain in the case at bar. The resolution of the present ejectment suit will not result in the
demolition of the premises, an event which would thus entail a categorical, not merely provisional, ruling on the question of ownership. Indeed,
petitioners have not cited strong reasons of equity to support their prayer for the application of Vda. De Legaspi.

Accordingly, we reiterate the Wilmon ruling that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of
ownership xxx only to determine the issue of possession.[14] In this case, there is no need to suspend the ejectment suit, for the issue in litigation
involves purely physical and de facto possession, as it is well-settled that whatever pronouncement the court in the ejectment case makes on the issue
of ownership is provisional in nature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]

TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity
as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18,
1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges
for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and
president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor
V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged
in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.

Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking
advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private
respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private
respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the
charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
 On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.

Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private
respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration,
respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case
was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February
26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.

II

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) [1] pertinently provides that -

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when
a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits
that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by
Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that
she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can
"(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the
Supreme Court on pure question on law.

xxx

Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of
its powers, functions, and duties.

xxx

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with the due process. x x x

xxx

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.

Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of
procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or
non-avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.

Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as
"an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the
remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter
engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
 Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.[4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[5] was commenced by a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,[6] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,[9] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.[10] was initiated by
a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by
Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.[11] which was a special civil action for certiorari.

Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from
preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a
mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the
answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will
merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule
65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.

III

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered
before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by
Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the
Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.

It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been
elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet
systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid
possible conflicting decisions.

Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither
of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute
trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case
before them for judgement.[12]

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, [13] the rule has been recognized to
admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to
enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it
may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.[14]

Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below
or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. [15] The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed. [16] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]

The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional
question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among other."

It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and,
pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be
recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative diciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section
27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571,
October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration appear to
impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and
the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their
corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
 IV

The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any
submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which
authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this
Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of
the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said section 27does not increase this Court's
appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are
only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals
by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the
appellate court.[18] Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised
over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter,
any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are
what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure[19] preclude appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on
"Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:

SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).

This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in
statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the
appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former
Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the
courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies[20] are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .[21]

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the
Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition
thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an
independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.

Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of
fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary
actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve
the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can
we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*

The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as
"acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court
is not of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to,
including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.

Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be
decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the
constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can
rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised
any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary
for the resolution of the present case. [22]

It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional question. We appreciate
the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the
decision exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of
the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is
not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the
aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the
decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize
an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court [24]
 We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and
Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be
clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction.

Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court
without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September
26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No.
6770, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. [25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on
October 2, 1989 [26] and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the
Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-
author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice
and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

xxx

Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in
reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which
requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the
Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for
review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred
to this Court for its advice and consent .[28]

VI

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be
disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously,
however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of
the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's
rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. [29] It is
admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. [31]If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[32]

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review
of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the
law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that
litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules
of procedure which relate to the remedy.[34]

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal
because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive
power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to
administer that remedy.[35]

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely
and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect [36] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was
declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals
can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of
no further force and effect.

The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court
of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental
pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-50054 August 17, 1988

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESIDENTS OF BAESA, CALOOCAN CITY, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court which denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss the
respondent's appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion and the subsequent order which
denied the motion to reconsider the earlier order.

Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation (Eternal Gardens) applied for a certificate of clearance from the National Pollution
Control Commission (NPCC), to operate a memorial park at the former site of the Philippine Union College in Baesa, Caloocan City, Metro
Manila. The private respondents, "Residents of Baesa" opposed the application on the ground that the project would cause pollution of water
resources in the area.

While hearings were being conducted by the NPCC, the petitioner allowed an interment to take place in its cemetery. The private respondents
filed a telegram complaint with the NPCC requesting the latter to investigate and look into the legality of the said interment, The complaint
was incorporated with the original application for clearance filed by the petitioner.

Upon a finding that the objections raised by the respondents were not without remedy and that the project had been approved by the Metro
Manila Commission, the Regional Health Office No. 4 and the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, the NPCC issued an order granting the petitioner
a certificate of clearance to operate a memorial park at Baesa, Caloocan City subject to the condition that it submit the following: (1) A design
of its interment vaults duly certified by a registered structural engineer that such vaults will not crack from earthquakes with intensity No. 7
and above on the Richter Scale; and (2) A certification covering each interment vault to be used that the same has passed a rigid quality
control test according to the latest concept of interment to the effect that it is structurally sound, free from the tiniest crack, and waterproof
The said order was received by the respondents on April 20, 1978.

On May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 22, 1978, the NPCC denied the motion. However, it imposed a
fine of P1,000.00 on the petitioner for causing an interment to take place without any prior permit from the NPCC.

On September 8, 1978, the respondents filed a notice of appeal and an ex-parte urgent motion for extension of time to file appeal or petition
for review with the appellate court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days to perfect the appeal. The docket fee, however, was paid only
on October 2, 1978.

In a resolution dated October 4, 1978, the appellate court granted the respondents' motion, subject to the conditions that the same is filed
within the reglementary period and that the decision sought to be reviewed is appealable. Thereafter, the respondents filed the corresponding
appeal.

On November 21, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time. According to the
petitioner, since the respondents received the NPCC's order on April 20, 1978, they had up to May 5, 1978 or 15 days within which to perfect
their appeal, pursuant to section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. However, on May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, assumming that the said motion interrupted the period for filing their notice of appeal, respondents had only one (1)
day left within which to appeal, which was on August 26, 1978, one day after the respondents received the denial of their motion. Therefore,
since the respondents filed their appeal only on October 2, 1978, the same was filed out of time being 37 days late.

The respondents filed a motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the latter failed to state the
time and place for hearing in violation of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

The appellate court granted the respondents' motion on January 10, 1979. The petitioner moved to reconsider the court's order but the same
was denied on February 8, 1979. Consequently, it filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, alleging
that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its motion on the ground that said motion did not contain any
notice of hearing for such notice is not required in motions or pleadings filed with the appellate court.

While the petition was pending before this Court, the appellate court, on March 27,1979, issued motu proprio a resolution recalling its order
granting the respondents' motion to expunge petitioner's motion to dismiss. It considered the motion submitted for resolution.

On April 5, 1979, the appellate court issued another resolution granting the petitioner's motion to dismiss the respondents' appeal on the
ground that it was filed out of time.

In view of the aforementioned dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw the petition for certiorari
filed before this Court on the ground that it had become moot and academic.

On September 10, 1979, this Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents to comment on petitioner's manifestation and motion to
withdraw the petition. The Court of Appeals and the Division Clerk of said Court were also directed to explain why the appellate court issued
motu proprio its resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979, respectively, notwithstanding the said matters were no longer within its
jurisdiction by virtue of the pendency of the present petition in this Court wherein the petitioner has raised precisely the same issues for
determination, and to comment on the timeliness of respondents' appeal.
In their comment, the respondents averred that the petition should not be dismissed for being moot and academic because the resolutions in
question were not only violative of the respondents' right to due process of law but were also null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction.

The respondent appellate court, through its division clerk, filed a compliance contending that the present petition did not divest the said
court of jurisdiction to correct its processes and orders and, therefore, the questioned resolutions were issued within its lawful jurisdiction. It
stated that the petition filed with this Court was under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and not under Rule 45 thereof because there is
as yet no final determination and judgment of the case pending with the respondent court and what was actually elevated to this Court were
only interlocutory orders. Therefore, the main case still remaining with the appellate court, the latter had jurisdiction to correct such orders
unless restrained by this Court.

On the matter of the timeliness of respondents' appeal, the appellate court contended that although the respondents filed by registered mail
their ex parte motion for extension of time to file an appeal or petition for review on September 8, 1978, the Court did not consider such
motion as filed until after October 2, 1978 when respondents paid the docketing fee. Furthermore, even granting that the latter filed their
notice of appeal on September 8,1978, still, the same was filed outside the reglementary period to appeal because after the denial of
respondents motion for reconsideration on August 25, 1978, they had only two days left to perfect their appeal which was on August 27, 1978.

On November 16, 1979, this court issued a resolution dated November 14, 1979, giving due course to the petition and requiring both parties to
submit their respective memoranda on the basic issues of (1) whether or not respondents' appeal was timely submitted to the appellate court
and should be resolved on the merits and (2) whether the said court had jurisdiction to issue motu proprio its resolutions dated March 27 and
April 5, 1979 notwithstanding the pendency of the present petition filed with this Court on March 5, 1979.

With regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate court in issuing the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 respectively, the petitioner
argues that since it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which means that such a petition is a special civil action, the appellate court
did not lose its jurisdiction to correct interlocutory orders that may have been issued erroneously.

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that while under the Rules of Court, courts may amend, modify or revoke any decision or order
promulgated by them, such power of authority is not absolute. They state that among the limitations thereof are when a judgment has
become final and when an appeal has been interposed on time. Accordingly, while it is true that what is pending in the present case is neither
a final judgment nor an appeal by certiorari, the effect thereof would be the same. Therefore, out of respect and courtesy for the higher court,
the lower court should have suspended all pending proceedings in the elevated case as even without any restraining order, the lower court
had lost jurisdiction to further act on the case.

We agree with the respondents on this point.

Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any action with
regard to its resolutions respectively granting respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to discuss and
denying the latter's motion to reconsider such, order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling
thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of
the issuance of the above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot
exactly what was before this court. As we have ruled in the case of People v. Court of Appeals, (101 SCRA 450, 463 and 466):

... Thirdly, the statement that whatever rights the movants were allowed to exercise in the Supreme Court could be
exercised by them in the Court of Appeals' is clearly misplaced. It implies concurrence of jurisdiction between this
Tribunal and respondent Court, which is totally unacceptable. It would lead to the absurd situation where within the
reglementary period from finality of a Decision or Resolution, a party can simultaneously file a Petition for Review before
this Tribunal as well as a Motion for Reconsideration before respondent Court. This interpretation does havoc to the rules
on orderly procedure. A party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

We find the foregoing without merit. The Writ of certiorari is intended to keep a tribunal within the limits of its jurisdiction.
As explained above, respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it passed upon private respondents Fourth Motion for Reconsideration considering that its judgment of conviction
had already become final. And what is even more glaring, respondent Court acted on said Fourth Motion for
Reconsideration after this Tribunal had already denied private respondents' petition for Review on Certiorari, as well as the
reconsideration thereof. The attention of respondent Court, as explained heretofore, was called to such development. It
paid no heed. Although now, it is claimed that had it known, it would have stopped action or desisted from taking any at
any stage in which the fourth (4th) motion for reconsideration was found.

Applying the foregoing precedent, we rule that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the
resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 correcting its earlier erroneous orders which were already before us.

On the second issue of whether or not respondents perfected their appeal on time, the petitioner argues that clearly, the respondents appeal
was filed out of time since by their own admission, respondents filed their notice of appeal only on September 8, 1978, when they had only up
to August 27, 1978 to file the same.
Conversely, the respondents maintain that the period should be reckoned from August 25, 1978, the date when they received the second
order of the NPCC because said order amended or modified the order of August 18, 1978 and, therefore, since there was such an amendment,
the period to perfect the appeal commenced to again start from August 25, 1978.

We find the petitioner's contention well-taken.

It should be noted that when the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issued by the NPCC dated August 18, 1978, the
same was denied by the latter on August 22, 1978, Notice of the denial was received by the respondents on August 25, 1978. The dispositive
portion of the order of denial states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration of Complainants Oppositors is hereby denied.
Applicant-Respondent, through its President or managing head, is hereby Ordered to pay to the Government through this
Commission a fine of One Thousand (Pl,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Section 9 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 984 for
violation of Section 8 of the same decree.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 75)

It is clear from the above-quoted order that as far as the respondents are concemed there was no amendment of the NPCC's previous orders
which would justify the running anew of the period to appeal. The only modification found in the order did not pertain to the respondents but
to the petitioner which was fined for allowing an illegal interment. The respondents cannot allege that the order of August 22, 1978 was more
adverse to them since it was the petitioner which was fined. After the denial of the respondents' motion for reconsideration, they only had
one day to perfect their appeal which was on August 26, 1978. Therefore, their filing of an appeal on September 8, 1978 was definitely out of
time. We ruled in the case of Garcia v. Echiverri, (132 SCRA 631, 638):

Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory that deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. (Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA
309; Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. v. CA, 118 SCRA 49; Santos v. CA, 125 SCRA 22).

Even assuming arguendo that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal started anew on August 25, 1978, the day when respondents received the
order of August 22, 1978, still their appeal was perfected out of time since the perfection of the same should be reckoned not from the filing of
the notice of appeal but from the payment of docketing fees. The respondents paid the docket fees only on October 2, 1978. We stated in the
case of Aranas v. Endona, (117 SCRA 753, 758):

As early as November 16, 1932 this Court rendered a decision in Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres(57 Phil, 552) that full
payment of docket fees within the required period is an 'indispensable step' for the perfection of an appeal. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Payment of the full amount within the reglementary period was declared jurisdictional.

The jurisdictional nature of this requirement continues to the present ...

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as the respondents' appeal was perfected out of time, the appellate court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Consequently, its
appealed orders before this Court and all other orders it issued with regard to the present case are null and void.

We have carefully examined the records for any substantial considerations of equity which might warrant different conclusions on the basic
merits of the main case. We have found none.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the appellate court dated January 10, 1979, February 8, 1979, March 27, 1979 and
April 5, 1979 are annulled and set aside. Considering that the respondents' appeal was perfected long after the due date, the order of the
National Pollution Control Commission dated April 18, 1978 is hereby declared FINAL.

SO ORDERED.