Republic of the Philippines 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
SUPREME COURT 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-
492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544,
549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50,
51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private
or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
1
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual,
as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports
the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of
this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous
to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind
the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances
the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding,
it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of
said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide
for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While
the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo
la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in
the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
2
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior
to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-
with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right
of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before
said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same
shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question
would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence
of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that
such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That
is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive
3
act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would,
for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute
or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this
case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if
it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact
date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the
jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior
thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise.
Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such
an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive
act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto
character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive
on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully
invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could
arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule
as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It
does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of
Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published
and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject
to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to
obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on
due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for
the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where
they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official
Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the
Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that
has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due
process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides
otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the
date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by
4
the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination. elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it such publication being in the Official Gazette.
will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights. I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that
the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in
the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply
to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it
shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for
their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An
Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines
its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the
Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in
the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that
not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that
publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when
and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.

5
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 21943 September 15, 1924
ASKAY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO A. COSALAN, defendant-appellee.
A. de Guzman for appellant.
Camus & Delgado and Pio Duran for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years
of age, residing in the municipal district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various
time has been the owner of mining property. The defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the
nephew by marriage of Askay, and municipal president of Tublay, who likewise has
been interested along with his uncle in mining enterprises.
About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in
Tublay, Benguet. On November 23, 1914, if we are to accept defendant's Exhibit 1,
Askay sold this claim to Cosalan. Nine years later, in 1923, Askay instituted action in the
Court of First Instance of Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim
adhered null, to secure possession of the mineral claim, and to obtain damages from the
defendant in the amount of P10,500. Following the presentation of various pleadings
including the answer of the defendant, and following trial before Judge of First Instance
Harvey, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant
from the same, with costs against the plaintiff. On being informed of the judgment of
the trial court, plaintiff attacked it on two grounds: The first, jurisdiction, and the
second, formal. Both motions were denied and an appeal was perfected.
Two questions are suggested by the assignments of error. The first is whether
Judge George R. Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case. The second is whether the
plaintiff has established his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence.
I. On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of
Justice authorized and instructed the Honorable George R. Harvey, Judge of First
Instance of the Ninth Judicial District, to hold a special term of court in the City of
Baguio, Mountain Province, beginning May 2, 1923. (Administrative Order No. 43, 21
Off. Gaz., p. 893.) Acting under the authority granted by the order of the Secretary of
Justice, Judge Harvey proceeded to hear the case of Askay vs. Cosalan, without protest
from anyone until after an adverse decision for the plaintiff and until after Judge Harvey
had left the district.
The point which plaintiff now presses is that Act No. 3107, amendatory of
section 155 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes a Judge of First Instance to be
detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for a period which shall in no
case exceed six months, in a district or province other than his own, for the purpose of
trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, was not in force until
fifteen days after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette,
or not until August 3, 1923. Plaintiff relies on section 11 of the Administrative Code,
which in part reads: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall, in the absence of
special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of
the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded."
Now turning to Act No. 3107, its final section provides that "This Act shall take effect
on its approval." The Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Obviously, therefore, there
being a special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general
provision contained in the Administrative Code.
Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March, 17, 1923,
and that it was subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized
to hold court at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant's argument along this
line is found to be without persuasive merit. We pass to the material issue which is one
of fact.
II. Plaintiff contends that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was
accomplished through fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff may be
right but in our judgment he has failed to established his claim. Fraud must be both
alleged and proved.
One facts exists in plaintiff's favor, and this is the age and ignorance of the
plaintiff who could be easily duped by the defendant, a man of greater intelligence.
Another fact is the inadequacy of the consideration for the transfer which, according to
the conveyance, consisted of P1 and other valuable consideration, and which, according
to the oral testimony, in reality consisted of P107 in cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one cow,
and two carabaos. Gross inadequacy naturally suggests fraud and is some evidence
thereof, so that it may be sufficient to show it when taken in connection with other
circumstances, such as ignorance or the fact that one of the parties has an advantage
over the other. But the fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere
inadequacy of price when both parties are in a position to form an independent
judgment concerning the transaction, is not a sufficient ground for the cancellation of a
contract.
Against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, we have the document
itself executed in the presence of witnesses and before a notary public and filed with the
mining recorder. The notary public, Nicanor Sison, and one of the attesting witnesses,
Apolonio Ramos, testified to the effect that in the presence of the plaintiff and the
defendant and of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses, the deed of sale was
interpreted to the plaintiff and that thereupon he placed his thumb mark on the
document. Two finger print experts, Dr. Charles S. Banks and A. Simkus, have declared
in depositions that the thumb mark on Exhibit 1 is that of Askay. No less than four
other witnesses testified that at various times Askay had admitted to them that he had
sold the Pet Kel Mine to Fernando A. Cosalan.
Having in mind all of these circumstances, how can the plaintiff expect the
courts to nullify the deed of sale on mere suspicion? Having waited nine years from the
date when the deed was executed, nine years from the time Fernando A. Cosalan started
developing the mine, nine years from the time Askay himself had been deprived of the
possession of the mine, and nine years permitting of a third party to obtain a contract of
lease from Cosalan, how can this court overlook plaintiff's silent acquiescence in the
legal rights of the defendant? On the facts of record, the trial judge could have done
nothing less than dismiss the action.
6
We conclude therefore, that Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case, that his
findings of fact are in accordance with the evidence, that no prejudicial error was
committed in the trial, and that the complaint was properly dismissed. As a result,
judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

7
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992
REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON. JOSE U.
ONG, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents.
G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992
RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL
D. UNGOS, BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D. FLORES, JR.,
EVELYN G. VILLEGAS, DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON,
PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS NORMAN C.
CERRADA, petitioners,
vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Rene B. Gorospe, Leighton R. Siazon, Manuel M. Sunga, Bienvinido T. Jamoralin, Jr and Paul D.
Ungos for petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
These consolidated cases are petitions for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon the
following undisputed facts:
Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC
PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY
THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29,
PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides
as follows:
Sec. (1). The first paragraph of item (1), paragraph (1) of Section 29
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals –– (1) Basic
personal exemption as follows:
For single individual or married individual
judicially decreed as legally separated with no
qualified dependents P9,000
For head of a family P12,000
For married individual P18,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax
separately shall be entitled to a personal exemption of P9,000 each.
Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A), paragraph (1) of Section 29
of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
(2) Additional exemption.
(a) Taxpayers with dependents. –– A married individual or a head of
family shall be allowed an additional exemption of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of
dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not
exceed four dependents: Provided, further, That an additional
exemption of One Thousand Pesos (1,000) shall be allowed for each
child who otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1,
1980: Provided, finally, That the additional exemption for dependents
shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in case of married
individuals electing to compute their income tax liabilities separately.
Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved. 1
The said act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and
published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Sec. 1. SCOPE –– Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72 of the National
Internal Revenue Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7167, these
Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing the collection at
source of income tax on compensation income paid on or after
January 1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding Tax Tables (ANNEX
"A") which take into account the increase of personal and additional
exemptions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 is amended by
Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Section 8. –– Right to claim the following
exemptions. . . .
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the
following amount of exemption with respect to
compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. –– These regulations shall take effect on
compensation income from January 1, 1992.
On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of
Gitnang Bayan Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for mandamus for himself
and in behalf all individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the respondents to
implement Rep. Act 7167 with respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers earned
or received on or after 1 January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. 104069 likewise filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition on their behalf as well as for those other individual
taxpayers who might be similarly situated, to compel the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes in regard to
8
income earned or received in 1991, and to enjoin the respondents from implementing
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.
In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these two (2) cases were consolidated.
Respondents were required to comment on the petitions, which they did within the
prescribed period.
The principal issues to be resolved in these cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167
took effect upon its approval by the President on 19 December 1991, or on 30 January
1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the
"Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took
effect on 30 January 1992, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that the Court in its resolution in Caltex
(Phils.), Inc. vs. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 97282, 26 June 1991 ––
which is on all fours with this case as to the first issue –– held:
The central issue presented in the instant petition is the effectivity of
R.A. 6965 entitled "An Act Revising The Form of Taxation on
Petroleum Products from Ad Valorem to Specific, Amending For the
Purpose Section 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, As
amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty Seven Hundred Sixty
Seven."
Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which provides.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval"
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was published in
the Philippine Journal, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an
implementing regulation was issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Revenue Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating that R.A.
6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception
thereof and argued that the law took effect on September 20, 1990
instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by Executive
Order No. 200) which provides:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication
either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . .
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146
SCRA 446, 452) we construed Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid
down the rule:
. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. . . .
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and
neither can it become effective upon its approval notwithstanding its
express statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen
days after September 20, 1990, or specifically, on October 5, 1990.
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which
is after fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act
7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during
calendar year 1991.
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,
provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President
shall automatically adjust not more often than once every three years,
the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among
others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum
wages, and bare subsistence levels.
As the personal and additional exemptions of individual taxpayers were last
adjusted in 1986, the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
could have adjusted the personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by increasing the
same even without any legislation providing for such adjustment. But the President did
not.
However, House Bill 28970, which was subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act
7167, was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1989 although its passage was
delayed and it did not become effective law until 30 January 1992. A perusal, however,
of the sponsorship remarks of Congressman Hernando B. Perez, Chairman of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill 28970, provides an indication of
the intent of Congress in enacting Rep. Act 7167. The pertinent legislative journal
contains the following:
At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill Provides for increased
personal additional exemptions to individuals in view of the higher
standard of living.
The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income of individuals subject
to income tax to enable them to spend for basic necessities and have
more disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the basic necessities and that
it had been three years since the last exemption adjustment in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
9
 Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity of passing the measure
to mitigate the effects of the current inflation and of the
implementation of the salary standardization law. Stating that it is
imperative for the government to take measures to ease the burden
of the individual income tax filers, Mr. Perez then cited specific
examples of how the measure can help assuage the burden to the
taxpayers.
He then reiterated that the increase in the prices of commodities has
eroded the purchasing power of the peso despite the recent salary
increases and emphasized that the Bill will serve to compensate the
adverse effects of inflation on the taxpayers. . . . (Journal of the
House of Representatives, May 23, 1990, pp. 32-33).
It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167 speaks of the adjustments that it
provides for, as adjustments "to the poverty threshold level." Certainly, "the poverty
threshold level" is the poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by
Congress, not poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be need of
further adjustments in personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of
the fact that these personal and additional exemptions are fixed amounts to which an
individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the devastating effects of high
prices and a depreciated purchasing power of the currency. In the end, it is the lower-
income and the middle-income groups of taxpayers (not the high-income taxpayers)
who stand to benefit most from the increase of personal and additional exemptions
provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To that extent, the act is a social legislation intended to
alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers. It is
intended to remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal and additional
exemptions for individual taxpayers.
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it
provides for shall be available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have
become effective. In other words, these exemptions are available upon the filing of
personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code, done
not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep.
Act 7167, which became effective, as aforestated, on 30 January 1992, the increased
exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 (though not before 30 January
1992). But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of
compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as
available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the
tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid, by 15
April 1991 and by 15 July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not been enacted. To
make Rep. Act 7167 refer back to income received during 1990 would require language
explicitly retroactive in purport and effect, language that would have to authorize the
payment of refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such language is
simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as
available only in respect of compensation income received during 1992, as the
implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide. Revenue Regulations
No. 1-92 would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1
January-15 April 1993, and thus literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1
January 1993. Thus, the implementing regulations collide frontally with Section 3 of
Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval." The
objective of the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167
is, of course, entirely understandable –– to defer to 1993 the reduction of governmental
tax revenues which irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167. But the
law-making authority has spoken and the Court can not refuse to apply the law-maker's
words. Whether or not the government can afford the drop in tax revenues resulting
from such increased exemptions was for Congress (not this Court) to decide.
WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 which
provide that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income earned or
received from 1 January 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. They should take effect on
compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled
to the increased exemptions on compensation income earned during calendar year 1991
who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15 April 1992 (later extended
to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased exemptions, are entitled to the
corresponding tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are ordered to effect such
refunds and/or credits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned in this case by Justice Teodoro
Padilla, because I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in the law should be
effective already with respect to the income earned for the year 1991. After all, even if
We say that the law became effective only in 1992, still this can refer only to the income
obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be filed in 1992 is the income tax return of
the income earned in 1991.
However, I wish to dissent from the part of the decision which affirms the obiter
dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect that
a law becomes effective not on the date expressly provided for in said law, but on the
date after fifteen (15) days from the publication in the Official Gazette or any national
newspaper of general circulation. I say obiter dictum because the doctrine mentioned is
not the actual issue in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (supra). In that case, several
presidential decrees of President Marcos were issued, but they were never published in
the Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of general circulation. The real issue
therefore in said case was whether or not said presidential decrees ever became
effective. The Court ruled with respect to this issue (and not any other issue –– since
there was no other issue whatsoever), that said presidential decrees never became
effective. In other words, the ratio decidendi in that case was the ruling that without
10
publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the statement as to which should be applied ––
"after fifteen (15) days from publication" or "unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2,
Civil Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling in the resolution dated June 26, 1991
in Caltex, Inc. vs. Com. of Internal Revenue cannot likewise apply because it was based
on the aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera (supra). In the instant tax exemptions case, the
law says effective upon approval, therefore, since this law was approved by the President in
December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code
is actually immaterial.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
It is very clear and needs no interpretation or construction.
CRUZ. J., concurring:
As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, I should like to make these brief
observations on my brother Paras's separate opinion. He says that "the ratio decidendi in
that case was the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity." Yet, while
accepting this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A. 7167 became effective upon
approval (i.e., even without publication). He adds that "since this law was approved by
the President in December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of
the Civil Code is actually immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.
on the aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera (supra). In the instant tax exemptions case, the
law says effective upon approval, therefore, since this law was approved by the President in
December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code
is actually immaterial.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
It is very clear and needs no interpretation or construction.
CRUZ. J., concurring:
As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, I should like to make these brief
observations on my brother Paras's separate opinion. He says that "the ratio decidendi in
that case was the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity." Yet, while
accepting this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A. 7167 became effective upon
approval (i.e., even without publication). He adds that "since this law was approved by
the President in December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of
the Civil Code is actually immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned in this case by Justice Teodoro
Padilla, because I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in the law should be
effective already with respect to the income earned for the year 1991. After all, even if
We say that the law became effective only in 1992, still this can refer only to the income
obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be filed in 1992 is the income tax return of
the income earned in 1991.
However, I wish to dissent from the part of the decision which affirms the obiter
dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect that
a law becomes effective not on the date expressly provided for in said law, but on the
date after fifteen (15) days from the publication in the Official Gazette or any national
newspaper of general circulation. I say obiter dictum because the doctrine mentioned is
not the actual issue in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (supra). In that case, several
presidential decrees of President Marcos were issued, but they were never published in
the Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of general circulation. The real issue
therefore in said case was whether or not said presidential decrees ever became
effective. The Court ruled with respect to this issue (and not any other issue –– since
there was no other issue whatsoever), that said presidential decrees never became
effective. In other words, the ratio decidendi in that case was the ruling that without
publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the statement as to which should be applied ––
"after fifteen (15) days from publication" or "unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2,
Civil Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling in the resolution dated June 26, 1991
in Caltex, Inc. vs. Com. of Internal Revenue cannot likewise apply because it was based

11
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285 February 24, 1960
WILLIAM POMEROY and CELIA MARIANO POMEROY, petitioners-
appellees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN,respondents-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot, Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and
Solicitor Pacific P. de Castro for appellants.
Cipriano Manansala for appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by the state from a decision of the Court First Instance of Rizal
in habeas corpus proceedings instituted by William Pomeroy and his wife Celia Mariano,
directing that both prisoners be released from custody.
On June 7, 1952, William Pomeroy and Celia Mariano were charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 19166) with the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, arson and robbery committed in pursuance of the rebellion. Arraigned on
June 18, 1952, the accused entered a plea of guilty, whereupon the court found them
guilty as charged and sentenced both to reclusion perpetua. On the same day, both
prisoners entered prison and began serving their sentence.
On August 18, 1958, the spouses filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus,
invoking the decisions of this Court in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil., 515; 52 Off.
Gaz., (12) 5506; People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz.,(1) 68; and People vs.
Togonon, 101 Phil., 804; 54 Off. Gaz., (36) 8237, wherein this Court declared that the
acts of violence committed in pursuance of rebellion did not give rise to a complex
crime, but only to simple rebellion punishable under Article 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision mayor and a fine of not more than 20,000 pesos. They averred
that according to the decisions cited, the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
power to sentence them to reclusion perpetua; that in view of their plea of guilty, they
could, at most, be sentenced toprision mayor in its minimum degree; that in so far as it
exceeded said penalty, the sentence imposed upon them is void; that they had served the
minimum of prision mayor, after the deductions for good conduct provided by law; and
prayed for their release.
Notwithstanding the vigorous objection of the Solicitor General, in
representation of the Director of Prisons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, by
decision of August 27, 1958, found that the petitioning prisoners had served 6 years, 2
months and 9 days to date; that crediting them with the corresponding good conduct
time allowance and one-half of the preventive imprisonment, starting from their arrest
on April 1, 1952 until the day the two began to serve sentence on June 17, 1952,
the Court is of the opinion that petitioners have already served more than the
full period of imprisonment which could be lawfully imposed upon them and
therefore are entitled to be released.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the release of the petitioners unless
there exist any other legal and valid cause for their further detention. Without
costs.
From that decision the State attorneys resorted to this Court assigning the following
errors:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding itself without jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for habeas corpus.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that habeas corpus is a proper remedy in
this case.
3. The court a quo erred in finding that the petitioners-appellees have already
served their lawful sentence.
4. The court a quo erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus and ordering the
release of the appellees.
Upon appellant's petition, we issued a preliminary injunction.
With reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the
writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and
can not function as a writ of error. Hence, the writ will not lie to correct mere mistakes
of fact or of law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of
its functions, if the court has jurisdiction over the crime and over the person of the
defendant (Talabon vs. Prov. Warden, 78 Phil., 599; Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58
Phil., 271; Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140; Trono Felipe vs. Director of
Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; U.S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90; McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U.S. 99;
41 Phil., 971).
In the case at bar, the applicant prisoners do not question the jurisdiction of
the court to take cognizance of the various crimes of rebellion, murder, arson, etc.,
alleged in the information to which they pleaded guilty. Nor do they question that the
Court of First Instance could have properly sentenced them for the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, arson, etc. if such crimes could properly be deemed as
constituting one single complex offense. Their precise contention (upheld by the court
below) is that since rebellion can not form a complex with common crimes, because the
latter are either absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent
offenses (as subsequently decided by this court), the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted
out to them is excessive and void in so far as it goes beyond the prision mayor and fine
not exceeding P20,000 prescribed by Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
It will be seen that the prisoners' stand assumes that doctrines and rulings of the
Supreme Court operate retrospectively, and that they can claim the benefit of our
decisions in People vs. Hernandez, People vs. Geronimo, and People vs. Togonon (ante),
promulgated four or more years after the prisoner applicants had been convicted by
final judgment and started serving sentence. However, the rule adopted by this Court
(and by the Federal Supreme Court) is that judicial doctrines have only prospective
operation and do not apply to cases previously decided (People vs. Pinuila, 103 Phil.,
992; 55 Off. Gaz., [23] 4228).
The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of
dismissal, holding that said appeal did not place the appellants, including
Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six Justices as
12
 against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in
the year 1962, has long become the law of the case. It may be erroneous,
judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently interpreted by this same
Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent
interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an
old one finally and conclusively determined. As already stated, the majority
opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Warring vs.
Colpoys, 136 A. L. R. 1025, considered the same question and arrived at the same result.
Said the Court:
All of the loose ends presented in this discussion on the effect of altering the
law can be pretty well tied together when it is realized that law is not a pure
science, that law loses its vital meaning if it is not correlated to the organic
society in which it lives, that law is a present and prospective force, that law
needs some stability of administration, that the law is all the law there is, that
law is more for the parties than for the courts, that people will rely upon and
adjust their behavior in accordance with all the law be it legislative or judicial
or both.
These considerations should guide the lawmakers and the law appliers in
making their determinations in respect of whether a change in the law is to be
effective only for the future or also for the past, and if the latter, to what
extent.1 And these considerations should be applicable to both sides of a
potential litigation, civil or criminal, so that we may have our rules of the game
as we go. The Supreme Court in the Nye case applied its new law to the
litigation then before it. Inasmuch as personal liberty was involved and the
courts usually apply law this much after the fact, such a result was meritorious.
But the Court did not indicate whether its new law was to be applied to cases
decided under the old law previous to its decision. That question is now for us,
another court.
We believe that appellant is not entitled to discharge upon habeas corpus writ.
The District Court had the power to sentence him in a criminal contempt
proceeding in 1939. The Nye case of 1941 should not be applied so as to
sweep away that power as of 1939. This collateral attack, then, is unavailing.
We reject the idea that if a court was considered to have the power in 1939 to
do a certain thing under existing statutory construction, and in 1941 that
construction is changed so that it no longer has the power to do that thing, it
should be concluded that it never had the power in 1939. It has often been
said that the living should not be governed by the dead, for the would be to
close our eyes to the changing conditions which time imposes. It seems
sounder to say that the living should not be governed by their posterity, for
that, in turn, would be downright chaotic.
It is thus apparent that it cannot be properly said that the sentence meted out
to the applicants Pomeroy was erroneous and beyond the court's jurisdiction. But,
assuming that it was error for the Court to consider that the murders and other
common crimes charged against the prisoners could be "complexed" with the rebellion
and warranted imposition of a penalty beyond prision mayor, there remains the issue
whether the mistake was or may be considered jurisdictional. We think not.
In providing for complex crimes, the Revised Penal Code did not set up a category of
crimes independent of the component ones, but only for an aggravated form thereof.
This rule was impelled by the desire to impose only one penalty for all offenses resulting
from one and the same criminal impulse. Whether or not the offenses are so related as
to constitute one single punishable violation evidently depends upon the Court's
appreciation the facts of the case and the applicable law, and not upon its jurisdiction,
since it is not contested that the various component crimes were within the Court's
power to try and adjudicate. Granting that the sentencing court's estimate of the facts
and its conclusion as to the governing law were erroneous, the mistake did not render it
powerless to act upon the premises nor deprive it of authority to impose the penalty
that in its view of the case was appropriate. The view it had taken was not such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion as would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since at that time the Supreme Court had
affirmed convictions for the complex crime of treason with murder and other
offenses.2 As a matter of fact, the existence of the "complexed" rebellion is still upheld
to this day by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this
Court. Hence the error committed was correctible only by seasonable appeal, not by
attack on the jurisdiction of the sentencing Court.
While this court has also ruled that an excessive sentence or penalty imposed
by final judgment may be corrected by habeas corpus, the cases where such ruling was
applied involved penalties that could not be imposed under any circumstances for the
crime for which the prisoner was convicted (subsidiary imprisonment for violation of
special acts, in Cruz vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil., 269; imprisonment for contempt
by refusal to execute a conveyance, instead of having the conveyance executed as
provided by sec. 10 of Rule 39, in Caluag vs. Potenciano Pecson, 82 Phil., 8). In the
present case, there is no question that the sentence meted out was the one provided by
law for the complex crime of which herein applicants were indicted and convicted.
The situation of petitioners Pomeroy is not unique in our judicial annals. A previously
adjudicated case, similar in all essential respects, is Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57
Phil., 140. There a prisoner, convicted of robbery, was sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment, plus an additional five years for habitual delinquency in view of his four
previous convictions for analogous offenses. He contested the additional penalty for
habitual delinquency, on the strength of a subsequent doctrine of this Court that all
crimes committed prior to the first conviction should be counted as only one for the
purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency; and applied for a
writ of habeas corpus, seeking his release after serving the principal term of imprisonment.
This Court denied the writ, saying (cas. cit., pp. 143-144):
In the present case the petitioner does not invoke the benefit of article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code, giving retroactive effect to penal provisions so far as
they are favorable to the accused, provided he is not a habitual criminal, but
seeks the review of a sentence which has proved erroneous in view of a
subsequent doctrine laid down by this court the error consisting in that,
instead of counting the various convictions as one only, due to the proximity
13
 and almost simultaneity of the commission of the several crimes of which the
petitioner was convicted, the same were considered as separate convictions for
the purposes of the law establishing habitual delinquency. This error could
have been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not
an undue exercise of judicial powers which vitiates and nullifies the
proceeding. This court has repeatedly held that mere errors of fact or law
which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its
functions, having jurisdiction over the crime and over defendant, cannot be
corrected through the special remedy of habeas corpus (Trono Felipe vs.
Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; U.S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90; McMicking vs.
Schields, 238 U.S., 99; 41 Phil., 971.)
The case of Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons ( 24 Phil., 121 ) may also be cited.
There the prisoner applied for habeas corpus and release, on the ground that he was
erroneously convicted and sentenced for abduction with consent of a virgin above 18
years of age, when according to a subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court the woman
abducted should be leas than 18 years old. This Court again denied the release (cas. cit.,
pp. 123-124), ruling that the error was not jurisdictional:
We agree with counsel for the petitioners that under the doctrine laid down in
the Fideldia case, judgment of conviction was erroneously entered by the trial
court and erroneously affirmed by us, if the allegations of the petitioners are
true, and if it is a fact that the record in the case in which these petitioners
were convicted and sentenced does not disclose that the woman whom they
were charged with having abducted was less than 18 years of age at the time
when the alleged crime was committed. But such an error, if in fact it was
committed, in no wise affected the jurisdiction of the court below to render judgment of
conviction and to sentence the petitioners for the crime of which they were convicted.
Throughout the entire course of those proceedings in the trial court, that court
had jurisdiction of both of the persons of the accused and of the crime with
which they were charged, and it did not and could not lose that jurisdiction as a
consequence of mistake or error committed by the trial judge in his finding of fact as to
the age of the woman, or in his conclusions of law as to the bearing of the woman's
age upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused of the crime
with which they were charged. (emphasis supplied).
In consonance with the foregoing precedents, we find that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal erred in ordering the release of the prisoners William Pomeroy and
Celia Mariano. While the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them by final
judgment is considerably longer than that imposed by us in subsequent similar cases, the
remedy lies in the hands of the Chief Executive and not in the Courts.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the petition for habeas corpus
is ordered dismissed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
This petition for habeas corpus was presented in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on
the strength of the petitioners' reliance that the decisions of the Supreme Court will be
enforced.
The petitioners in the court below, who are now appellees, were sentenced to a penalty
of reclusion perpetua after entering a plea of guilty to an information charging them with
the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies and kidnappings.
We have held in People vs. Hernandez et al., 99 Phil., 515; 52 Off. Gaz., (12) 5506, that
rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. We have adhered to and
reiterated this ruling in People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., (1) 68;
People vs. Togonon, 101 Phil., 804; 54 Off. Gaz., (36) 8237, People vs. Romagosa, 103
Phil., 20; 52 Off. Gaz., [14] 2946 and People vs. Santos, 104 Phil., 551; 56 Off. Gaz., [19]
3546. And the Revised Code penalizes rebellion with prision mayor (Art. 135).
Following the doctrine laid down in the Hernandez case and consistently repeated in
our decisions, the maximum penalty to which the appellees could have been sentenced,
upon their plea of guilty, was the minimum period ofprision mayor which ranges from 6
years and 1 day to 8 years.
In Cruz vs. The Director of Prisons, 17 Phil., 269-73, this Court has held that when a
sentence imposed punishment in excess of the power of the court, the sentence is void
as to such excess and a prisoner confined thereunder is entitled to be released on a writ
of habeas corpus if he has served so much of the sentence that could have been lawfully
imposed.
Again, in Caluag vs. Pecson (82 Phil., 8; 46 Off. Gaz., (2) 514, 516) this Court said:
A sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a
penalty different from or in excess of the maximum which the court is
authorized by law to impose for the offense of which the defendant was
convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction, as to the excess in the
latter case. And a judgement of imprisonment which the court has no
constitutional or statutory power to impose, as in the present case, may also be
collaterally attacked for want or rather in excess of jurisdiction.
Considering that at this time, by crediting their good conduct time allowance and one-
half of the period of their preventive imprisonment, the appellees have served the
maximum period of imprisonment that could have been lawfully imposed upon them,
they are entitled to the writ prayed for.
Some members of the Court would prefer to adhere to their dissenting opinion in the
rebellion cases above cited to the effect that there exists in our legal system the complex
crime of rebellion, notwithstanding the settled doctrine of this Court on the matter
which has precipitated a move in the Congress of the Philippines after the promulgation
of the Hernandez and Geronimo cases to amend the penal code so as to make the crime
of rebellion a capital offense. Other members of the Court believe that the remedy of
appellees, if any, would be an application for pardon, thus making the right to liberty of
an accused under similar circumstances dependent upon the discretion of the Chief
Executive and depriving him of his remedy in courts of justice. From the different
opinions of the members of the Court, I regret to dissent and express my vote to give
effect to the doctrines enunciated in our decisions which are relied upon by the
appellees.
14
It is unfortunate that the majority cites as authority the case of People vs. Pinuila, et al.,
103 Phil., 992; 55 Off. Gaz., [23] 4228, promulgated on May 30, 1958. I would like to
point out that when this Court interpreted Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, we
simply meant that our interpretation was the law since the Code's enactment. Rooted on
this notion, I now quote the dissenting opinion, of Mr. Justice Felix in the Pinuila case,
as follows:
I concur in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice and make mine his
reasons in support of his contention. I wish, however, to add another reason
which, I know, may be more realistic than juridical.
There is no dispute among the member of the Court that the decision We
rendered in this case when it was first brought up to Us, was errouneous
because by that time, the defendant had already been placed in double
jeopardy. Nonetheless, this Tribunal ruled that lower court had jurisdiction
over the case and remanded same to the lower Court for further proceedings.
Needless to say that when this case was elevated to Us for the second time and
despite our previous ruling aforementioned, the defendant had not ceased to
be in double jeopardy, and it is may considered opinion that We cannot
sanction or approve our said under the theory that it was then the law of the case.
Once Aristotle said that he was "amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas", and in
paraphrasing this statement that history passed on to us and sanctioned with
its approval, I may say that although I am prone to follow the principle of stare
decisis and maintain the law of the case, as already stated, yet I am always more
determined to uphold the TRUTH and recognize an error that this Court may
have previously committed.

15
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132170. April 20, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRIQUE
LABAYNE y AGUILAR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an automatic review from the decision rendered by Branch 76 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, finding the accused-appellant, Enrique Labayne y Aguilar,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and nine (9) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases as
follows:
1. Finding herein accused Enrique Labayne y Aguilar GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape as defined in and penalized under Article 3354 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to the penalty of death, to
indemnify complainant Mary Rose S. Daligdig in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and to pay costs.
2 Finding herein accused Enrique Labayne y Aguilar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of nine (9) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness as defined in and penalized under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer six (6) years imprisonment
for each count, to indemnify complainant Mary Rose S. Daligdig in the amount of
P20,000.00 for each count, as moral damages, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The records reveal that on December 2, 1996, complainant Mary Rose
Daligdig, nine (9) years of age, assisted by her mother Angelina Daligdig, filed a criminal
complaint for Rape against the accused. Subsequently, the public prosecutor filed the
following information:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1996 in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd designs and by means of force, threat and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
MARY ROSE DALIGDIG Y SABINO, a nine (9) years old girl, against her will and
consent.[2]
When arraigned on February 7, 1997, appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded Not Guilty to the aforesaid charge.
Thereafter, nine (9) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness were also filed by the same
complainant against herein appellant. Nine (9) separate informations were subsequently
filed. The information, dated 3 February 1997 in Criminal Case No. 3136-97-SM reads as
follows:
That on or about the 8th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force, coercion and intimidation, with the use of a
knife and with lewd design and intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire, abused,
humiliated and degraded complainant MARY ROSE DALIGDIG Y SABINO, a nine
(9) year old girl, having moral ascendancy over her being her acknowledged step-father
(sic), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon said complainant his acknowledged stepdaughter by then and there
ordering her to hold and suck his penis which she did, and at the same time said accused
kissed her lips, neck and vagina, against her will and consent.[3]
The other eight (8) informations for acts of lasciviousness are virtual reproductions
of the above-quoted information; they only differ as to the dates of the alleged acts of
lasciviousness. These cases were consolidated with the rape case.
When arraigned on March 12, 1997, Enrique Labayne entered a plea of Not Guilty
to all nine (9) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness. Joint trial on the merits ensued
henceforth.
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution.
The first was the victim Mary Rose Daligdig. She testified that she was born on May
27, 1987 to Angelina V. Sabino and Arthur A. Daligdig.[4] Mary Rose used to live with her
grandparents until she was six (6) years of age when she moved in with her mother and
her stepfather, herein appellant, at No. 66 B. Mariano St., Sta. Ana, San Mateo,
Rizal.[5] After the alleged raped occurred, she transferred back to her grandmothers house
at Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
According to Mary Rose, the first incident took place on October 4, 1996 at around
3:00 in the afternoon. She was taking her nap in the bedroom of their home in San Mateo,
Rizal when appellant Enrique Labayne woke her up. Her mother was not at home. He
told her to go to the door of the kitchen. She asked him why but he did not respond. She
first went to the bathroom and then proceeded to the kitchen where she saw the appellant
holding a knife. He told her not to make any noise or else he would kill her, thus: tutuluyan
daw po niya ako.[6] He then held the knife at her right neck and told her to remove his shorts
and brief, suck his penis, and to move her hand back and forth as if in the act of
masturbation.After ejaculating appellant kissed her on the lips, neck and vagina. She cried
and when the sexual advances ended, she proceeded back to the place where she was
sleeping. She then encircled the date on the calendar but did not tell her mother about
that incident. She was afraid the accused would carry out his threats to kill her.
A few days later, in the afternoon of October 8, 1996, the appellant again woke up
Mary Rose. The same sexual abuse happened in the same place and in the same manner
with appellant again repeating his threats of death. Afterwards, she was told to go back to
the place where she was sleeping. Mary Rose encircled the date on the calendar again, so
that if my mother will find out what happened I will be able to say the date. [7] According
to Mary Rose the sexual abuse was repeated on the following dates: October 14, 16, 19,
November 4, 9, and 13. After each incident, she would encircle the date on her calendar.[8]
On November 24, 1996 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the accused again woke up
Mary Rose Daligdig. He told her to go to the door of the kitchen and held a knife to her
neck in the usual manner, threatening to kill her should she make any noise. He told her
to remove his shorts and brief, and thereafter to remove her own shorts and panty. This
time, however, he inserted his penis into her vagina. She told him it was painful. He then
told her to suck his penis and to hold it back and forth as if in the act of
masturbation. After ejaculating, he kissed her on the lips, neck and vagina, during which
time her mother suddenly walked into the room. Her mother asked appellant what he was
doing but he just left the house. Mary Rose then told her mother that appellant had asked
her to hold his penis. When appellant returned, Mary Rose's mother asked her to step out
of the house. After an hour, her mother fetched her and they proceeded to her
16
godmothers house. There, Mary Rose revealed all the sexual abuses she was subjected to
in the hands of her stepfather. She was thereafter brought by her mother to live at her
grandmothers house in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.[9]
Ms. Angelina Daligdig, the mother of Mary Rose, corroborated the above narration
of her daughter. She testified that on November 24, 1996, she was at their residence in
San Mateo, Rizal together with her daughter, Mary Rose and Enrique Labayne, her live-
in partner for more than six (6) years. At around 2:30 in the afternoon, she was sleeping
and she woke up to answer the call of nature. She stood up and saw Enrique Labayne and
her daughter Mary Rose at the back of the door of their kitchen. Angelina saw with her
own eyes her daughter sucking the penis of Enrique Labayne, and described it,
thus: Nakatayo si Enrique Labayne na nakababa ang short pants niya at brief at nakasubsob ang
mukha ng anak ko sa titi niya, at subo-subo iyon ng anak ko. She was shocked at what she saw
because she never expected that he would do such a thing to her daughter. She scolded
him and uttered invectives against him. She asked him why he did that to her daughter to
which Enrique Labayne responded, hindi naman aabot iyon sa iniisip ko. She talked to her
daughter who told her all that had happened. Her daughter was crying and pale because
of fright. When she asked Mary Rose why the latter did not disclose the abuses, Mary
Rose responded that she was afraid because Labayne threatened to kill them both. On
November 28, 1996, she brought her daughter to Camp Crame to report the incident and
have Mary Rose examined.
From the time Enrique Labayne was apprehended and incarcerated,
Angelina received letters from him asking for forgiveness, which she presented as
evidence. In a Letter dated December 12, 1997, the accused wrote:
Huwag mo sanang patigasin and iyong puso at kalooban. Isiping makapagpatawad. Kung Diyos ay
nakapagpatawad, ikaw pa kayang nilalang lang ang hindi makapagpatawadBigyan mo ako ng
pagkakataon, patawarin mo na ako, Ma.[10]
In yet another letter, he asked for forgiveness repeatedly:
Sana mapatawad mo na akoplease forgive meMa, sana mapatawad mo na ako at bigyan ng
pagkakataong makapagpanibagong buhay.[11]
Dr. Jaime Rodrigo Leal testified that on November 28, 1996, while working at the
PNP Crime Laboratory, he examined the complainant. His findings were reduced into
writing in the following report:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENTIAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts are
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an
elastic, fleshy-type and congested hymen with shallow healed laceration at 9
o'clock. External vaginal orifice admits tip of examiner's smallest finger." [12]
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for spermatoza.[13]
Dr. Leal explained during his testimony that congested means that there is redness
or swelling of the hymen as a result of the secretion of blood into the vaginal tissue. This
could have been caused by trauma, or the hymen could have come in contact with any
hard, blunt object, including the male organ, within seven (7) days from the time of
examination on November 29, 1996. He stated that it was, therefore, possible that the
congestion in the hymen was inflicted on November 24, 1996, which is within the seven
(7) day period.[14] On cross-examination, however, he said that, in rare cases of small
children or a woman who is not yet of adult size, the laceration of the hymen could be
caused by other factors such as by riding a bicycle, or could also be self-inflicted by using
the finger of a woman.[15]
The last witness for the prosecution was Sr. Police Officer Darlito Dar. He testified
that on November 29, 1996, he was assigned at the Criminal Investigation Division,
National Capital Regional Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City. On said date, he was able
to talk to Angelina Daligdig in connection with her complaint that her daughter, Mary
Rose Daligdig was sexually molested. As part of the team tasked to conduct a follow-up
investigation, he proceeded to Sta. Ana, San Mateo, Rizal together with Angelina Daligdig,
PO2 Osea and Romeo Calsetas to invite the suspect, Enrique Labayne, for
questioning. They went to the house of Enrique Labayne but the latter was not
there. Fortunately, they chanced upon the suspect while cruising along B. Mariano
St. They introduced themselves as policemen and informed him of the complaint filed by
Angelina Daligdig and invited him for questioning.Labayne voluntarily went with them
to Camp Crame. During the investigation, Mary Rose pointed to and positively identified
Enrique Labayne as the one who molested her.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi.
Felix Soller Segui testified that he was in front of his vulcanizing shop at
Resurreccion, San Mateo, Rizal, on November 18, 1996, when one of the alleged counts
of Acts of Lasciviousness took place. Between 11:45 a.m. and 12:00 noon, Enrique
Labayne met an accident near their shop. The motorcycle he was riding on turned to its
side. Appellant was hurt and suffered bruises on his right hand and knee. Segui invited
him into his house to be treated, after which Labayne and a neighbor waited for a
mechanic to arrive. The mechanic repaired the motorcycle while they were chatting in
front of the shop, about 10 to 15 meters away from the tricycle. Appellant Labayne bade
him goodbye at around 4:00 p.m.[16]
Another witness, Jose San Jose, testified that he was at home on November 18, 1996
between 2:30 to 3:00 in the afternoon, when a certain Eddie came and fetched him to
repair a motorbike. He proceeded to the corner of Resurreccion and General Luna St.,
Sta. Ana, San Mateo, Rizal, met an accident, at approximately 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. He saw
the motorcycle of Labayne lying on the ground. Labayne had injuries on his palm, right
elbow and right knee. San Jose repaired the motorcycle, and he and Labayne rode the
same to the Petron gas station, where he left the appellant at past 4 p.m.[17]
Pablito Macagaling testified that on November 24, 1996, between 2:00 to 3:00 in
the afternoon, he went to the house of Enrique Labayne in Sta. Ana, San Mateo,
Rizal. After calling for appellant, a voice of a woman answered him that Labayne was
taking a bath. Not long after, Labayne who was only covered in a towel peeped at the
door. Magcaling told Labayne that he learned that he (Labayne) knows someone who is
a jueteng operator. Labayne told him to wait at the Shoelander Restaurant near the plaza
17
so they could talk. At around 4:00 p.m., they met at the designated place and discussed
about seeing the jueteng operator the following week. They separated at approximately
4:30 p.m. They were not able to go to the jueteng operator as planned because he heard
that Mr. Labayne was picked up by the CIS operatives.[18]
The last witness for the defense was appellant himself. Enrique Labayne testified
that he and Angelina Daligdig, mother of the complainant, had been live-in partners since
May 27, 1991. He worked as a barangay secretary of Sta. Ana, San Mateo, Rizal, from
Mondays to Fridays, and was a jueteng operator at the same time. As a jueteng administrator,
which position he had held since September 1996, his duties required him to work every
day of the week, including Sundays. He would report to work at the barangay hall at 8:00
in the morning. Because of the nature of his work in both jobs, there was never a definite
time for him to go home. He could not recall where he was on October 4, 8, 14, 16 and
19, as well as on November 4, 9, 13, 1996.[19] According to appellant, he especially
remembers where he was on the 18th of November 1996 because of his near-death
experience that day.
As he was riding home from the barangay hall on November 18, 1996, Labayne met
an accident at around 12:00 noon at the corner of Juan Luna and Resurreccion Streets.
The roads were wet as the rain had just stopped. The wheel of his motorcycle slid and he
was thrown off his bike and suffered minor bruises. Ipeng Segui approached him and
treated his injuries for about 10 minutes. Pepe San Jose, a repairman, then came over and
attended to his motor until 4:00 p.m. Thereafter, they both went to Petron, and then
headed home separately. The rest of the events of that day were narrated as follows by
the appellant:
Q: What time did you reach home on that particular day, November 18, 1996?
A: Before 5:00 p.m., I was already in the house, sir.
Q: Now, complainants mother, Angelina Daligdig testified that she did not know of
any accident for which you were involved in a motorcycle on that particular
date, November 18, 1996, what can you say to the statement of Angelina
Daligdig?
A: She was telling a lie, sir.
Q: Why do you say that she was telling a lie?
A: Because when I reached our house, they were playing tongits and she suddenly
stood up when she saw me and asked me what happened, sir.
Q: And when she stood up and asked you what happened, what did you tell her?
A: I told her I was thrown off my motorcycle, sir.
Q: Now, at the time that she inquired what happened, what did you tell her?
A: I told her that I was thrown off my motorcycle, sir.
Q: Now, at the time that she inquired what happened, was (sic) your injuries still
visible?
A; Yes, sir.[20]
On November 24, 1996 at around 2:00 p.m., when the alleged rape occurred,
appellant testified that he was at home having just finished his lunch. Angelina was not
minding him since they had a quarrel that morning and because she was still angry with
him. Their quarrel stemmed from Angelinas interest in going to Japan. [21] He got angry
and uttered hurting words. He said, [S]ige magpunta ka ng Japan, gayahin mo ang ate mo,
magpunta kayong pareho doon ng marami kayong maipadalang lapad sa inyong magulang na mukhang
kuwarta. He even told her that he would go back to his legitimate family and bring his
daughter, Ican, because he did not want her to grow up to acquire their manners. He
added[P]arepareho kayong demonyo.[22]
After lunch, Labayne went to the bathroom to take a shower. Inside the
bathroom, he saw Mary Rose holding her vagina. He asked her where she learned to do
that. Mary Rose answered, [N]nakikita ko po sa inyo ni Mama.
Their conversation did not last long because someone outside called for him. He
heard Angelina answer that Labayne was in the bathroom. He went out of the bathroom
and sawthe defense witness, Pablito Macagaling, in front of their house. He told
Macagaling to meet him at the Shoelander Restaurant and the latter left. He was still
standing by the door with Mary Rose holding on to him by his hips, when he heard
Angelina get angry at her daughter. Angelina then whipped Mary Rose with her hands
and he tried to stop and pacify her.[23]
Appellant further testified that Mary Rose usually sleeps at the foot of their bed
(gawing paanan) and has no separate room of her own. According to appellant, his letters
to Angelina asking for forgiveness pertained to the bad words which he had uttered
against her and her family at the heat of their arguments, and not because he had sexually
abused her daughter Mary Rose, which fact he had always denied. He surmised that the
charges leveled against him by the complainant and her mother is only an offshoot of
their quarrel last November 24, 1996. During said quarrel, Angelina had told him, kung
hindi kita pakikinabangan, hindi ka na rin pakikinabangan ng pamilya mo. She also
warned, [L]uluhod ka rin sa akin.[24]
He also said that he was able to talk to Angelina during the preliminary investigation
at the Fiscals Office last May 1997 at the municipal hall. Inside the investigation room of
the police, he embraced and kissed Angelina, and the latter reciprocated. The rest of their
conversation, as narrated by the appellant, went as follows:
Q: What happened after you both embraced each other?
A: I kissed her and she let me kissed (sic) her, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: And he (sic) told me, Im sorry Papa, naliwanagan ko na ang lahat and then she
cried, sir."
Q: What was it that she was referring to na naliwanagan na ang lahat?
A: About these cases that they filed against me, sir.
Q: What about these cases filed against you, what is it all about?
A: They filed a case of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, sir.
Q: Did you come to know why she was sorry for filing the case?
A: No, sir. At first, she told me that ipakukulong lang niya ako dahil sa jueteng, sir.
Q: When was it that she told you that she wanted you to be jailed because of
jueteng?
A: When I was arrested on November 29, sir.
Q: Did you ask her why instead of charging you for jueteng, you have been charged
of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness?
A: The investigator told her that if the case will only be for jueteng, he could be
released immediately, sir.
18
 Q: Now, going back to your conference or your conversation and discussion when
you were inside the investigation room, how long did that discussion take
place?
A: 20 to 30 minutes, sir.
Q: And what were the other matters you talked about?
A: She told me to wait for the result because she cannot change it anymore dahil siya
ang mapapasama, sir.
Q: Aside from your statement where you said that she filed a case against you
because of hatred, do you know of any reason aside from hatred why the
complainant and her mother filed a case against you?
A: I do not know of any other reason, sir.
x x x [25]
As mentioned at the outset, appellant was found guilty by trial court of all the crimes
charged. Appellant now raises the following assignment of errors before this Court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES AND/OR CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT
COMPLAINANTS TESTIMONY IS REHEARSED AND ONLY A MAKE-
BELIEVE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED
LACERATION OF THE HYMEN OF THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT
CONSISTENT WITH THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.[26]
The first two assigned errors are interrelated, and hence, shall be discussed
jointly. Appellant argues that Mary Roses testimony is incredible and points to several
inconsistent statements. For one, Mary Rose testified that during the alleged sexual
molestation committed on October 4, 1996, her mother was not around and yet later on
claimed that her mother was present.[27] Appellant, likewise, points to the conflict between
Angelina Daligdig and complainants testimonies as to whether Mary Rose was sleeping in
the same or a separate room during the same October 4 incident.
It must be pointed out that the private-complainant is nine (9) years of age. She is
still very young and could have been easily confused by the series of examinations
conducted, not only because of her age but also because she was sexually assaulted
numerous times and on different dates. It is but natural, therefore, for her to make
mistakes and that there be some degree of inconsistency in her testimony. This Court has
held that inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness in minor details reinforce rather
than weaken credibility. Errorless testimony cannot be expected especially when the
witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience.[28] In rape cases, the lone
testimony of the offended party, if free from serious and material contradictions is
sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction.[29] A child of tender years, could not be
expected to give complete and perfect testimony. Hence, testimonies of rape victims who
are young and immature are credible.[30]
Besides, the alleged inconsistencies can be best explained by the fact that the mother
went out of the house on some occasions but not on others. Noteworthy is the fact that
the mother was soundly sleeping when appellant sexually assaulted the
complainant.[31] Even granting that the mother was present, such fact would not have
necessarily deterred the rape. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that among
poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. There is no rule that rape
can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter
of time and place.[32]
Appellant further argues that the complainant is not credible and is a rehearsed
witness, that it is unbelievable that Mary Rose did not shout for help at the time she was
allegedly raped and abused. Neither did she complain or tell anyone about the alleged
incidents. Unusual, too, is Mary Roses claim that she immediately slept after her stepfather
allegedly sexually molested her. If, indeed, Mary Rose had gone through a very harrowing
incident, she would not have been able to sleep right away. Further, despite the alleged
traumatic experience she was able to continue her studies and passed her course with a
high average.[33]
Appellants arguments are clearly bereft of any merit. That Mary Rose did not shout
for help is easily explained by the fact that appellant was holding a knife at her neck and
threatened to kill her if she make any noise. [34] She testified as follows:
Q: After that, what happened after you were awakened by your stepfather?
A: He told me to go down to the door of our kitchen, sir.
Q: And then, what did he do?
A: He took a knife, sir.
Q: Where did he get the knife?
A: At the container of our knife, sir.
Q: What did he do with the knife?
A: He pointed it on my right neck, sir.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told me not to make any noise because tutuluyan daw po niya ako, sir. [35]
It is not surprising that the complainant did not seek any help. A child of tender
years would blindly follow her stepfather who not only exercised strong, moral and
physical ascendancy over her, but who made explicit threats on her life should she make
any noise.
Neither is the fact that Mary Rose did not disclose the traumatic experience to
another person of any moment. Given that she was only nine years of age, it is possible
that she herself was not certain as to whether she was at fault and should feel ashamed. It
is also not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtue
because of the rapists threats on their lives.[36]
Anent the unusual reaction of the victim after being raped, this Court has held that
the lack of concrete evidence of any unusual behavior of the victim after the alleged rape
does not prove that there was in fact no such unusual behavior.[37] The victims emotional
and physical trauma need not be proven. The Court recognizes the fact that different
people act differently to a given type of situation, for there hardly can be cited any known
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling
experience.[38]Nobody can tell how a victim of sexual transgression is supposed to act or
19
behave after her ordeal. One should not expect a girl of complainant's age to act like a
mature woman under similar circumstances. At any rate, it is not farfetched that the victim
slept after she was raped for fear or because she wanted to forget the horror just
committed upon her chastity.
All told, appellants first two assigned errors relate to the credibility of Mary Rose as
a witness. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial
court as to the credibility of a witness. This is so because the trial court has a better vantage
point in observing the candor and behavior of the witness. We see no reason to overturn
the trial courts characterization of Mary Rose as a witness:
The victim has been firm and consistent in her narration of facts anent her ordeal in the
hands of the accused. Her candid and straightforward narration bears the earmarks of
credibility. (Peo. vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17)It is not difficult to give credence to herein
victims cause. Her detailed account of the incidents of her sexual molestation by
accused could not have been fabricated and rehearsed, proceeding as it did from a
doubtlessly immature individual, ignorant of the ways of the outside world. Her
testimony must, therefore, be given weight as it is credible (Peo. Vs. Espinosa, 247
SCRA 66) Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit (Peo. Vs. Digno,
Jr., 250 SCRA 237).
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the alleged
laceration of the hymen of the victim is consistent with the occurrence of the rape. He
points out that Dr. Leal testified that the shallow, healed laceration could have been
sustained more than seven days from the time of the examination. The examination was
conducted on November 29, 1996 while the rape was allegedly committed on November
24, 1996, or a span of only five days.
Such argument, too, is without merit. As this Court has previously pronounced, the
laceration of the hymen is not an element of the crime of rape. A woman might have had
previous sexual intercourse and yet the hymen remains unruptured, while others might
have experienced sexual relations, but with laceration of the hymen.[39] Consequently, it is
of no moment that the laceration of the hymen is not consistent with the occurrence of
the rape. What is vital is the fact that the victim categorically pointed to appellant as the
culprit who sexually abused her. It would be unlikely that a young girl would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert
herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire
to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[40]
In a strained effort to seek an acquittal, appellant argues that the rape charge against
him was triggered by the disagreement between himself and Angelina, the victims mother,
regarding his refusal to let her go to Japan. This incident is simply too flimsy to induce so
much resentment. Even when consumed with hatred or revenge, it takes nothing less than
psychological depravity for a mother to concoct a story too damaging to the welfare and
well-being of her own daughter.[41]
Thus, this Court affirms the finding of the trial court that the guilt of the appellant
for the crimes charged has been established beyond reasonable doubt. However, there
has been a misapplication of the proper penalty that must be rectified.
In order for the death penalty to be imposed for the crime of rape in accordance
with R.A. 7659, an allegation of the complainants age as well as filial relationship is
essential. Both minority and actual relationship between the parties must be both alleged
and proved; if not, it bars conviction of rape in its qualified form. The qualifying
circumstances which increase the penalty by degree rather than merely affect the period
of the penalty as in the case of aggravating circumstances, must be properly pleaded in
the information consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him. Consequently, there would be a denial of due process if after
being charged with simple rape, he is convicted of its qualified form punishable by
death.[42]
Undoubtedly, the fact that Mary Rose was only nine years old when she was raped
by appellant was alleged in the information and duly proven by the prosecution not only
through the testimonies of the victim and her mother but also through the presentation
in evidence of Mary Roses birth certificate. However, the attendant circumstance of
relationship which would qualify the offense was not alleged in the indictments on which
he was arraigned. For this reason the death penalty imposed on appellant for statutory
rape should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases
as follows:
1. Finding herein accused Enrique Labayne y Aguilar GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify complainant Mary Rose S. Daligdig in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
2. Finding herein accused Enrique Labayne y Aguilar GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of nine (9) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness as defined and penalized under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him for each count to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum, to indemnify complainant Mary Rose S. Daligdig in the amount of P20,000.00
for each count as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
20