238

CHAPTER - 7
Practice and Procedure of the Central Administrative Tribunal

7.1 General Features of the Tribunal Procedure

One of the main objectives intended to be achieved by the
establishment of Tribunals under the Administrative Tribunals
Act is "to provide to the persons covered by the Administrative
Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances" . For
the effective realisation of this objective great emphasis has
to be laid upon the procedure, not only at the stage of actual
trial or hearing but also before and after it. Because it is a
generally acknowledged fact that the highly complex and
technical rules of procedure which are ritualistically adhered
to by the ordinary courts contribute, in a great measure, to
the delays in the dispenation of justice by them (the Courts),
whereas the procedural simplicity and informality constitutes a
major beneficial feature of administration of justice by the
tribunals, in general. Accordingly, the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, ensures sufficient freedom of action to a
Tribunal constituted thereunder to regulate its proceedings.
The general features of the Tribunals' procedure, as reflected
in the provisions of the Act, may be outlined under the
following four broad headings.

7.11 Informality and Flexibility

A Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure or of evidence laid down in the Code of Civil

1. See, the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Act

 239

Procedure, 1908 and the Evidence Act of 1872 but, is guided by

the abstract principles of natural justice and subject to the
provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder by the
Central Government, The Tribunal can regulate its own
2
procedure . Thus, it enjoys a great deal of flexibility in
adopting simpler and less formal approach and methods.
Considering the complex tangles of Court procedure, the
techniques of legal profession, and the mythically formal air
of a Court room, procedural simplicity and informality of the
Tribunal is no mean advantage.
The Tribunal, being free from the procedural fetters of a
Court, is capable of reaching the heart of a matter.
Simplicity in procedural matters; absence of rigorous legal
categories, guagmires and pitfals of legal finesses; and the
assuring air of informality help it to render justice not only
according to law and the facts which are on the record of the
case, but also according to the facts which actually happened
in the case . This not only enhances the justice being actually
done, but also ensures that the justice is appeared to have
been done. Moreover, the flexibility, informality and
simplicity of the Tribunal procedure help in the expeditions
dispensation of justice. For, much of the valuable time which
is lost in the guagmires of legal finesses of the Court, can
easily be saved by the Tribunal by adopting comparatively much
simpler and more informal rules of evidence and procedure.
T. Section 22(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
3. Singh,M.M., Justice by Tribunals (1973) 305-7.
 240

7.12 -Power of the Central Government to make Rules of

Procedure

Though there are certain inherent advantages in the

procedural informality of the Tribunal but, informality is not
an overriding necessity or virtue. As rightly observed in the
Franks Committee Report^ "informality without rules of
procedure may be positively Inimical to right adjudication,
since the proceedings may well asume an unordered character
which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the
Tribunal to properly sift the facts and weigh the evidence".
Hence, a combination of a formal procedure with an informal
atmosphere would invariably constitute an ideal arrangement. In
other words, there ought to be such prescription of procedure
as makes the proceedings clear and orderly without impairing
the desired informality of atmosphere.
Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
accordingly, aims at securing the twin objectives of orderly
procedure and informality of atmosphere before the Tribunals
constituted under the Act. With a view to introduce a certain
element of certainty and uniformity and to ensure orderly
5
conduct of the Tribunal proceedings, the Act^ empowers the
Central Government to prescribe rules of procedure. But, at the
same time, subject to the rules thus framed by the Central
Government the Tribunal is at liberty to regulate its own
procedure. In doing so, it shall, however, be guided by the

4. The Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries,U.K. (1957) 15i
5. Section 22(1) read with Section 35(e).
 241

principles of natural justice .

The rule making power of the Central Government is laid
down mainly, in section 35 of the Act. Whereas-, sub-section (1)
of this section confers power on the Central Government, in
general and wide terms, to make rules for the purposes of
carrying out the provisions of the Act but, the sub-section (2)
contains a specific enumeration of certain matters [under
clauses (a) to (e) ] in respect of which the rules may be so
made. However, this enumeration can only be treated as
illustrative and not exhaustive. In fact, the last clause (f)
is residuary in nature and embraces "any other matter which
may be prescribed or in respect of which rules are required to
be made by the Central Government".

It may be noticed that under clause (e) of this

sub-section the Central Government is expressly empowered to
make "rules subject to which a Tribunal shall have power to
regulate its own procedure under sub-section (.1) of section. 22"
and for "any additional matters in respect of which a Tribunal
may exercise the powers of a civil Court under clause (i) of
sub-section (3) of section 22". The Central Government may
exercise its powers of making procedural rules for the Tribunal
subject to the provisions of chapter IV of the Act dealing with
the "Procedure". The provisions of this chapter lay down broad
principles or guidelines subject to which rules may be
prescribed by the Government.

6. Ibid.
 242

The Act, however, does not contemplate laying down an

exhaustive code of procedure for the Tribunal. The rule-making
power of the Central Government, in this regard, is intended to
be exercised, in a restricted manner, to prescribe broad
guidelines or general principles governing procedure so as to
ensure some uniformity and certainty in the conduct of its
proceedings by the Tribunal. For, as already observed, in the
absence of any such prescription of rules, the Tribunal's
proceedings may assume an unordered character, which would not
only affect the quality of justice, to be rendered by it but,
may also shake the confidence of the litigating parties in the
very system of the administration of justice by the Tribunals.
Yet, at the same time, the Tribunal must be allowed some
freedom of action in evolving its own procedure, unhampered by
any rules, so that its proceedings do not assume mythical air
of extreme formalism to be found to exist in a Court room.

7.13 Power of the Tribunal to Regulate its Own Procedure

As already observed one of the main beneficial features
of the administration of justice by Tribunals, is the
simplicity or informality of their procedure. The
Administrative Tribunals set up under the Administrative
Tribunals Act of 1985 are not bound to follow the technical
rules of procedure and evidence contained in the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Subject
to the provisions of the Act and the rules framed by the
 243

Centfal Government in this regard, the Tribunal can regulate

its own procedure.
The Tribunal can, for example, base its decision not only
on the facts which are on the record of the case but, also on
facts which actually happened in the case. The Tribunal, is, by
and large, free to rely on any information it may receive,
provided it discloses the information, to provide the party
concerned an opportunity to rebute the validity of the
7
information against him. In Y.K.Gupta Vs. Engineer-in- Chief
it was held by the Tribunal that its procedure need not
necessarily be adversary but, may even be inquisitorial. But,
in any case the requirements of the natural justice must always
be met with by the Tribunal in the conduct of. its proceedings.

7.1^ Requirements of the Principles of Natural Justice

By making the principles of natural justice applicable to
the Tribunal proceedings the Act merely emphasises the fact of
the non-applicability of the highly complicated and technical
rules of procedure and evidence followed by the ordinary
Courts. For, even in the absence of any express provision to
that effect the Tribunal, being a purely judicial body,
exercising adjudicatory functions only, would have been bound
to follow the principles of natural justice in such procedural
matters in respect of which there do not exist any express

7. (1986) 1 ATC 457 (N. Delhi).

 244

provisions either in the Act or the rules made by the Central

Government.

Natural justice has been a concept with variable contents

in different periods of time and under different systems of
law. It has developed with the growth of civilization and the
content thereof is often considered as a proper measure of the
level of civilization and rule of law prevailing in the
o

community . Natural justice has been used synonymously with

the Divine Law (Jus Divinium), Universal Law (Jus Gentium),
Eternal law (Lex Aeterna), Natural Law (Jus Naturalia) or the
Law of the Reason.
The modern concept of natural justice has been developed
by the English common law. It represents higher procedural
norms, developed by the judges, which every administrative
agency must follow in taking any decision adversely affecting
the rights of a private individual. The principles of natural
justice as developed through the various decisions of the
Courts can be easily proclaimed or ascertained but, as rightly
observed by Lord Evershed,M.R., their precise extent is far
less easy to define. In Russel Vs. Duke of Norfolk , it was
observed by Tucker,J. that the "requirements of natural
justice must depend upon the circumstances of the case, the
nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is
acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so
forth".
8. K.I.Shephard Vs. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 431 at p.448, per R.N.MIsra, J.
9. Abbot Vs. Sullivan (1952) 1 K.B. 189 at p. 195.
10. (1949) 1 All E.R. 109, at p. 118.
 245

Similarly, the Courts in India have also taken the view

that the principles of natural Justice yield to and change with

the exigencies of different situations and do not apply in the

same manner to situations which are not alike . They are

neither cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in legal

straight jacket; they are not immutable but, flexible and can

be adopted, modified or excluded by statutes and and statutory

rules as also by the Constitution of the Tribunal which has to

decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal

12
is governed . In essence, the concept of natural justice

entails the idea of "fairness of procedure" or 'fair trial'. It

is simple or elementary justice as distinct from complex or

technical justice. The attempt is to keep the hearing procedure

less formal consistent, however, with the minimal fundamental

concepts of procedural due process so as to promote justice and

fair play *.
Though the concept of natural justice is very flexible
and elastic but, it embodies two broad fundamental norms,
namely, (i) nemo judex in cause sua, i.e., no one should be
made a judge in his own cause, or the rule against bias, and
(ii) audi alteram partiern i.e. hear the other party or the
rule that no one should be condemned unheard, or the rule of
fair hearing. The various components of these two fundamental
rules are briefly discussed below.

11. See, Satyavlr Singh Vs. Union of India AIR 1986 S.C. 555, at p. 561.
12. Ibid.
13. Ja1n,M.P. and Jaln.S.N., Principles of Administrative Law (1986) 220.
 246

7.l4l Rule against bias

An essential element of adjudicatory process is that the
adjudicatory authority/body must be impartial and neutral and
be in a position to apply its mind objectively to the dispute
before it. Proceedings would be vitiated if the adjudicatory
authority is biased. Bias, in the context, means an operative
prejudice whether conscious or unconscious in relation to
14
party or an issue . Therefore, the rule against bias strikes
against those factors which may influence an adjudicator to
improperly favour one party at the cost of the other party in
arriving at a decision in any particular case.
The rule against bias is applied not only to avoid the
possibility of a partial decision but also to ensure public
confidence in the impartiality of the adjudicatory process.
For, just as it is important that justice is actually done to
the parties, it is also equally important that justice is
mainfestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. Therefore, where
the proceedings in any case suffer from the vice of bias, the
resultant decision arrived at in that case would be a
nullity15.
Bias may take various forms in affecting a decision.
These can be grouped into the three broad categories: (a)
personal bias, (b) pecuniary bias, and (c) subject-matter bias.

H. Hassey.I.P., Administrative Law (1990) 151.

15. Ranjlt Thakur Vs. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 6 1 1 .
 247

7.l4ll Personal bias

Personal bias arises from a certain relationship equation
between the deciding authority and the parties which incline
him unfavourably or otherwise on the side of one of the parties
before him . Such equation may develop out of varied forms of
personal or professional friendship, affinity or hostility.
Simple and crude examples of personal
bias are: when the
17
adjudicator is a relation of one of the parties ' , or when a
person sits on the selection board to select candidates for a
1o
post for which he himself is one of the applicants , or when a
person sits on a grampanchayat Bench to hear appeal against his
19
conviction ^ or when the manager of a factory himself conducts
an inquiry against the workman who are alleged to have
assaulted him
In order to challenge a decision on the ground of
personal bias, it is essential to prove that there is a
"reasonable suspicion of bias" or a "real likelihood of bias"-*.
The "reasonable suspicion" test looks mainly to outward
appearance, "real likelihood" test focuses on the Court's own
21
evaluation of the probabilities . Though in most cases the
22
result may be the same, whichever formulation is applied ,
but, the "reasonable suspicion" test appears to be more in
16. Supra note 14, at p. 151.
17. Amolak Chand Vs. S.D.O., AIR 1962 Ass.80.
18. A.K.Kalrapak Vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 S.C. 150. Also see, D.K.Khanna V s . Union of
India, AIR 1973 H.P. 3 0 , where the selection committee Included the son-in-law of a
selected candidate, as a Member, the proceeding were held to be vitiated on account of
personal bias.
19. Ramjag Singh Vs. State of Bihar, AIR, 1958 Pat. 7.
20. Meenglass Tea Estate Vs. Workmen, AIR 1963 S.C. 1719.
21. De Smith; Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1980) 262.
22. In S.Parthasarthy V s . Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1973 S.C. 2701, the Court has, however,
characterised both the tests as Inconsistent with each other.
 248

favour, with the Courts and, in essence, the suspicion test

seems to be broader than the "real likelihood" test .
In any case, in this area of bias the real question is
not whether a person was biased. For, it is difficult to prove
the state of mind of a person. Therefore, in deciding the
question of bias the Court takes into consideration the human
possibilities and the ordinary course of human conduct. The
likelihood or apprehension of bias must be judged from a
healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on vague
24
suspicion of whimsical, capracious and unreasonable people

7.1412 Pecuniary bias

The judicial approach is unanimous and decisive on the
point that any pecuniary interest, howsoever small or
insignificant it may be, will disqualy a person from acting
25
as an adjudicator .

7.1413 Subject-matter bias

The varied types of cases covered under this category
include: (a) where there exists some close and direct
connection between the adjudicating authority and the issue in
controversy , (li) where the adjudicating authority, as a

23. For detailed analysis of the subject see, Jain and 0a1n, supra note 13, at pp. 221-225.
24. B.B.Rajwanshl Vs. State ,of II.P. (1988) 2 SCC 415.
25. Annamalal V s . State of Madras, AIR 1957, A.P. 739; A1r Corporation Employees Vs. Vyas
(1962) L.L.J. 31; Jeejeebhoy Vs. Assistant Collector, Thane, AIR 1965 S.C. 1096.
26. And"hra Scientific Co. Vs. Seshaglri Rao, AIR 1967 S.C. 408; Blaze and Central (P) Ltd.
Vs. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant. 186; Kam1n1 Kumar V s . West Bengal, AIR 1972 S.C.
2060.
 249

member- of the department concerned, has shown too much personal

involvement in framing and upholding a particular departmental

policy challenged by the parties ', (iii) where the adjudicat-

ing authority acts under dictation or with pre-conceived

notions so as to close its mind to the actual merits of the

28
case

It may be pointed that in cases falling under this

category mere involvement with the subject-matter would not

vitiate the proceedings unless there is a real likelihood of

bias in the manner already explained. A decision is liable to

be quashed on ground of bias where the adjudicating authority

is proved to have acted with closed mind due to his extreme

involvement or partiality with the issues or on pre-conceived

notions, and is not, thus expected (in the eyes of a reasonable

man) to act objectively.

7.1^2 The Rule of fair hearing

It is the first principle of civilised jurisprudence that

a person against whom any action is sought to be taken, or
whose right or interest is being adversely affected, should be
given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, or in other
words, a fair hearing must be held, in such a case, before any
action is taken against the person concerned. But, the real
problem arises in determining the norms of "fair hearing" or of

27. Gu 1 lapa11 Nageswara Rao Vs. A.P.State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1959 S.C. 308; See
also the second Gullapalli case, AIR 1959 S.C. 1376; Har1 V s . Deputy Cortimlssloner of
Police, AIR 1956 S.C. 559.
28. Mahadayal Pren Chandra V s . Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1958 S.C. 667; Prem Chand Jain
Vs. Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966, H.P. 117.
 250

the 'reasonableness of the opportunity of being heard' in

defenc'e. It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any

fixed standard of fairness or reasonableness in hearing

procedure, which can be uniformly and universally applied to

all situations. Not only do the norms of fair hearing vary from

body to body but, may also vary from case to case in relation

to the same body. Hearing involves a number of stages and the

problem may be conveniently examined with respect to each of

these.

7.1421 Notice

Notice is the starting point of any hearing. It is a

basic principle of natural justice that before adjudication

starts, the authority concerned must give to the affected party

a notice of the case against him so that he may adequately

defend himself . It is not enough that the notice in a case be

given, but it must be adequate also. Though the adequacy of

notice is a relative term and depends upon the facts and

circumstances of each case but, it must contain sufficient

information and material so as to enable the person concerned

30
-
to put up an effective defence ' .

29. Tanka Nath Dahal Vs. Union of India
of India 1991(1) SLJ 362 (CAT).
30. Where, however, the concerned party
of notice cannot be 1nst1sted upon
Vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 S.C.
1991(1) SLJ 253 (CAT); Banklm Ch&udhary Vs. Union
clearly knows the case against him, the.requirement
as a mere technical formal1ty,Keshav Mills Co.Ltd.
389.
 251

7.1^22 Hearing
The opportunity to be heard may be given either through
written representation or by personal hearing, depending upon,
the facts and circumstances of the case . However, for a
hearing to be fair and in conformity with the requirement of
natural justice it must fulfil several conditions.
In the first place, the adjudicating authority must
afford reasonable opportunity to the party to present all the
relevant material and evidence in support of his case. This can
be done through writing and/or orally, at the discretion of the
authority, unless the statute under which the authority is
functioning, directs otherwise^ .
In the second place, the adjudicating authority should
disclose all information, evidence or material which it wishes
to use against the individual concerned in arriving at its
decision. The extent of disclosure may, however, vary from case
to case, depending upon the facts of each case. If the gist of
the documents against the party affected has been brought to
his notice, then the non-supply of the copies of the same may
not violate natural justice-' . But, in certain cases the supply
of the copies may be insisted upon as a requirement of natural
Justice.

31. In respect of the Tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
Section 22(3), as amended 1n 1986 makes It obligatory for a Tribunal to hear such oral
arguments as may be adduced.
32. C H y Corner Vs. P.A. to Collector, AIR 1976 S.C. 143; Dewan Singh Vs. State of Haryana,
AIR 1976 S.C. 1921.
33. Ramnath Narslnha Na1k Vs. Under Secretary to the Government of India, 1990(3) SLJ 421
(CAT); S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, 1991(1) SLJ l ( S . C ) .
 252

In the third place, the adjudicating authority should

give to the party concerned an opportunity to rebut such
information, material or evidence which is sought to be- used
against him. Cross-examination is one of the most effective
device to elicit and establish truth. However, right to cross-
examination is not an indispensable requirement of natural
justice. But, where the circumstances of the case are such
that in the absence of it, an individual cannot put up an
effective defence, this right is regarded as an essential
Ik
element of natural justice^ . Beside cross-examination,
representation is another device that may be used by a party to
rebut the evidence against him. Representation may be made
either through a lawyer or otherwise. Here again, right to
representation through a lawyer is regarded as an essential
requirement of natural justice if a denial of such right would
greatly prejudice the party concerned in defending the case. It
may be noticed here that the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985
expressly confers upon a person the right to take assistance
of a legal practitioner of his choice to present his case
before the Tribunal^-*.

7.1423 The Decision

Until a few years back, reasoned decision or a speaking
order was not regarded as an essential requirement of natural
justice. As such, adjudicatory bodies were not obligated to

34. State of Jammu & Kashmir Vs. Bakshl Ghulam Mohammed, AIR 1952 S.C. 2 2 1 .
35. Section 23 of the Act.
 253

give reasons in support of their decisions. But, in the past

few years a change has come about in this regard. In England,

the Franks Committee insisted that 'if Tribunal proceedings are

to be fair to the citizen reasons should be given to the

of.

fullest practicable extend'-5 . The Committee was of the opinion

that a decision is apt to be better if the reasons for it have

to be set out in writing because the reasons are then more

likely to have been thought out. Further, a reasoned decision

is essential in order that, where there is a right of appeal,

the applicant can assess whether he has good grounds for

appeal.

This suggestion was incorporated in section 12 of the

Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 (now Act of 1971) which makes

it obligatory for a Tribunal (listed in the First Schedule to

the Act) to give written or oral reasons for its decision if so

requested by the parties, unless grounds of national security

require to the contrary. It may, however, be pointed that in

cases falling beyond the scope of this Act it is still the rule

that giving of reasons is not a part of natural justice-" .

In India, the proposition is now firmly established that

an adjudicatory authority must give reasons for its decision-* .

In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. Vs. Union of

India"^ the Supreme Court reiterated the principle with an

36. Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957) 24.
37. R,Vs.Gam1ng Board, ex-p. Benalm (1970) 2 All E.R. 528; McHrnes Vs. Onslow Fane,(1978)3
All E.R. 211, 219. "
38. For Instance, see, Mahablr Prasad Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1970 S.C. 1302; State of
Gujarat Vs. Krishna Cinema, AIR 1971 S.C. 1650; Narayan Dass Vs. State of M.P., AIR
1972 S.C. 2086; Siemens Engg. and Mfg.Co. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 S.C. 1785.
39. AIR 1976 S.C. 1785.
 254

emphasis that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support

of an order is a basic principle of natural justice which must
inform the quasi judicial process. The Court has insisted that
this requirement should be observed in its proper spirit and
"mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the
requirements of law".
It may be observed that the requirement to give reasoned
decisions may also be implied from the Constitutional
provisions (Articles 32,136,226 and 227) concerning judicial
review. For, in the absence of a speaking order or a reasoned
decision the Courts will be at a loss of understand the working
of the mind of the concerned body, and so it would not be
possible to decide whether there is any legitimate ground for
40
the Court to interfere with the decision of the body
Though giving of reasons is regarded as an essential
element of natural justice but, the judicial approach is not
consistent on the effect of the non-observance of this
requirement. As a general rule, it may be said that the Court
4l
would quash a non-speaking order . But, in certain situations
the Court may take a lenient view of the lapse and refuse to
quash a decision where the revisional or appellate authority
42
merely affirms a decision , or where there is a delayed or

40. Nagendranath Bora Vs. Commissioner Hills Division, AIR 1958 S.C. 398; Bhagat Raja Vs.
Union of India, AIR 1967 S.C. 1606, 1610.
41. Bhagat Raja case, AIR 1967 S.C. 1606; Chowgule and Co. V s . Union of India, AIR 1971
S.C. 2021; Travancore Rayons Vs. Union of India, AIR S.C. 862.
42. H.P.Industries Vs. Union of India, AIR 1966 S.C. 671. cf. Bhagat Raja case, Supra note
41. 1971.
 ?ss

non-pommunication of reasons which are on record . It may be

pointed here that neither the Administrative Tribunals Act,

1985 nor the rules framed by the Central Government thereunder,

contain any express provision requiring the Tribunal to make

speaking orders. But, the obligation may be spelled out both,

from the natural justice and the constitutional provisions of

Article 136.

The foregoing discussion about the general features of

the Tribunal procedure has to be followed by a study of the

specific rules of procedure made by the Government in this

regard and also the rules evolved by the Tribunal itself. This

study has been made under the three main heads: (i) Pre-trial

procedure, (ii) trial procedure, and (iii) post-trial

procedure.

7.2 Pre-Trial Procedure

Before the actual trial or hearing of a base commences

there are certain procedural requirements which must be

complied with. The Tribunal has to ensure itself that the

subject-matter of the dispute brought before it lies within its

jurisdictional purview; the applicant has a validly genuine

cause of action*, the application has been properly filed with

all the necessary documents annexed thereto; replies by the

respondent(s) have been received; and notice of the hearing is

43. Ahmedabad Municipality Vs. Raman Lai, AIR 1975 S.C. 1187; J.M.A. Industries Vs. Union of
India, AIR 1980 Del. 200, cf. Ajantha Industries Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes,
AIR 1967 S.C. 437.
 256

properly served on all the concerned parties. For the sake of

convenience, the various procedural matters of importance
involved at this preliminary stage nay be discussed under the
four broad hearings, namely (1) conditions to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, (ii) filing of application, (iii)
replies by the respondents and (iv) notice of hearing.

7.21 Conditions to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

The most important requirement at the preliminary stage
is that the Tribunal must, on the basis of the matters
discussed below, satisfy itself that it is legally competent to
take cognizance of the case and can, therefore, proceed with
the trial or hearing of the case.

7.211 Dispute relating to service-matters

In the first place, the Tribunal can assume jurisdiction
to try, and adjudicate upon a case only if it deals with any
service matter in respect of the specified categories of
employees . The question whether a particular dispute or
controversy related to any service matter has to be decided on
the basis of the definition of the term "service-matter" given
in section 3(q) of the Act. Since this aspect of the problem
J
has already been discussed at length, a further discussion on
the point is uncalled for. Yet, by way of an example,

44. Under Section 14 of the Act.

45. Chapter VI, at pp.
 257

reference may be made here to the case of SC and ST Employees

46
Welfare Association Vs. Union of India . In this case it was

alleged by the applicant that the respondent No.3 (Shri

M.S.Mann, Laboratory Technician) was negligent in his duties

and was responsible for the death of a patient. It was prayed

that, to avoid immediate danger to the health and life of the

public, he should be removed from that post and further that he

should be directed to pay compensation to the family of the

deceased patient. The Tribunal dismissed the petition, inter-

alia, on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate

47
on the issues raised in the application '.

7.212 Locus-Standi

Another important matter which has to be decided by the

Tribunal at the preliminary stage of trial relates to the locus

standi. It has to be considered whether it is legally

permissible for the applicant to move the Tribunal under

Section 19 of the Act. The relevant provision of Section 19 in

this regard, provides that "a person aggrieved by any order

pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal

may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of

48
his grievances" . In the light of this provision the question
as to who can move the Tribunal by filing an application, would
be discussed under the four sub-headings mentioned below.

46. 1990(2) SLR 610 (CAT - P.B.)

47. Ibid. , at p. 614.
48. Clause (1) of the Section.
 258

7.2121 Person aggrieved

It may be pointed that section 19 of the Act uses the

expression "person aggrieved" for the purpose of determining

the question of locus standi. This expression, in its

narrowest possible sense, means a person who has been denied or

deprived of something to which he is legally entitled. It

implies infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some

legal interest, inhering in the applicant. Thus understood, the

right to move the Tribunal is restricted only to such cases

where some personal and individual right of the applicant

himself has been violated. But, for the reasons discussed

below, it would be wrong to give such a narrow meaning to the

expression.

7.2122 Government as applicant

In the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Shrl T.

Doraiswami , an application was filed on behalf of the

Government to direct the respondent, an Income Tax Officer to

pay Rs. 7031 which had been wrongly paid to him by way of

encashment of unavailed earned leave. Objection was raised that

the Government cannot file an application, being not a 'person

aggrieved' by order. While overruling the preliminary
SO
objection the Tribunal observed-^ that it would lead to
anamolous consequences to accept the objection. The Tribunal
while referring to the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 47 of the

49. 1989(1) SLJ 285 (CAT - Mad.)

50. Ibid., para 4, at p.287.
 259

Code of Civil Procedure, which confers upon any 'person

aggrieved' by a decree or order, to file an application for

review observed that 'if it is held that Government or its

departments do not fall within 'a person' the result will that

in no case can Government or its department file an application

for review. Since under section 22(3) of the Act the Tribunal

has been given the powers of a civil Court regarding review of

its decision, obviously, it can also exercise its power at the

instance of Government or its department, both, at the initial

stage of filing an application and at the stage of review.

The Tribunal also looked at the problem from another

angle, it was pointed that it is section 14 which contains the

substantive provision conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal,

whereas section 19 of the Act deals only with the procedure to

be followed. Thus, no doubt, it is stated in section 19 that a

person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any matter within

the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the

Tribunal for the redressal of his grievances but, this

provision cannot be read so as to take away the jurisdiction

that has been conferred on the Tribunal by the substantive

provision enacted under section Ik of the Act^ . In other

words, the question relating to locus standi has to be answered

not only on the basis of the provision of section 19 but, more

appropriately, on the basis of the substantive provisions of

section 14, which confer the jurisdiction, powers and

authority on the Tribunal to the same extent and manner as were

51. Ibid. , para 3 at p. 287.

 260

hitherto exercised by all all the Courts except the Supreme

Court.

In an interesting case of Ayodhya Prasad Vs. Union of

India, through Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Other-*- , the
Principal Bench of the Tribunal was faced with the question:
whether one wing of Union of India can seek redress against
another wing of the Union of India by filing an application
under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 19^5 ?

Briefly stated, the facts of the case were that the

Ministry of Labour referred a dispute of a daily rated
labourer, employed in the applicant's office, to the Centre
Government Industrial Tribunal. The applicant (a Chief
Engineer), in his official capacity, moved the Tribunal praying
for quashing the reference.
While dismissing the application on the ground that the
grievance was not concerning any service matter of the
applicant personally, the Principal Bench of the Tribunal
51B
observed^ that "it is inconceivable that one wing of the same
Union of India approaches a legal forum to resolve its dispute
with another wing of Union of India".

7.2123 Representative application

An important question that arises in this context is
whether a representative application by one or more persons or
by an association, union or other organisation of public

51A 1991(1) SLO 485 (CAT - P.B.)

51-B Ibid., para 3.
 261

servant' is maintainable or not. It may be noticed that the

provision of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code,

relating to representative suits does not, in terms, apply to

applications under the Act. However, Rule 4 of the Central

Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, contains

provision in this regard.

Sub-clause (b) of clause (5) of Rule 4 provides for the

filing of a representative application by an association with

the permission of the Tribunal. Such permission may be granted

to an association representing the persons desirous of joining

in a single application provided, that the application

discloses the class/grade/categories of persons on whose behalf

it has been filed and further that at least one of such

affected persons joins such an application or is impleaded as

one of the applicants. In the wheel and Axle Plant Karmikare

Sangh and Another Vs. The Management of Wheel and Axle Plant,
52
Indian Railways and Another^ an application filed by a

registered association, on behalf of its members, seeking

relief for all the members was held maintainable by the

Tribunal. It was held by the Tribunal that the application need

not specify the names of all the members on whose behalf it

has been filed-* . The application should disclose the class,

grade and category of persons on whose behalf it has been

filed and at least one

affected of the persons, who is a
54
member, should join as an applicant .
~ST. 1991(1) SIR 299 (CAT - Bang.)
53. Ibid., at p. 301.
54. The latter condition was added by Notification No. G.S.R. 1000(E) dated 11.10.1988
(w.e.f. 24.10.1988).
 262

Similarly, under sub-clause (a) of clause (5) of this

Rule a representative application may be filed by a group of

individuals having common interest in the matter in dispute.

From a reading of Rule 4(5)(a) three conditions may be spelled

out, the existence of which are essential for filing a single

application jointly by several persons. Firstly, the names of

several persons desirous of joining together must be specified

in the application. Secondly, there should be a community of

interest. That means having regard to both the cause of action

and the nature of relief prayed for, all of them must have same

interest in the service-matter in dispute. Lastly, the

applicants must have obtained the Tribunal's permission.

It may be observed that this rule is an enabling

provision which entitles more than one person to join together

to file a single application where there is a common cause of

action and community of interest; but it does not vest any

right on any person or group of persons, or it does not force

any one to be represented in a joint application. Each one of

the several persons, by himself, has a right to file an

application. The rule under this provision has been made solely

on grounds of practical convenience. For, convenience,

requires that in cases where there is a community of interest

amongst a large number of persons, a joint application may be

allowed so that trouble and expense may be saved.

7.2124 Public interest litigation

Although there has been a tendency in the recent years to

expand the concept of locus standi in so far as writ petitions

 263

filed in public Interest are concerned , yet, it will be

contrary to the concept of limited jurisdiction of statutory

Tribunals to apply those principles to adjudication of

complaints and disputes by such Tribunals. The question of

maintaniability of a public interest litigation was

specifically discussed by the Madras Bench of the Tribunal in

S.Balaguru Vs. The General Manager, Telecommunications,

56
Telephone House, Madras . The applicant in this case (who was

not a civil servant) alleged that the respondent No.3, who was

working as a Telegraphist at the Telegraph Office, T.Nagar,

Madras had availed leave on production of a false medical

certificates and, therefore, prayed that the respondents 1 and

2 be directed to take action against the third respondent for

having submitted false medicial certificates.

It was urged on behalf of the applicant that though the

applicant was not personally aggrieved but, he may be allowed

to maintain the application in public interest, for it is in

public interest that the administration is conducted properly.

57
While rejecting the application it was observed ' by the
Tribunal that it was not open to this Tribunal, constituted for
a specific purpose, under the Act, to entertain any complaint
from any citizen as a public interest litigation and only such
persons who have been appointed to public services can approach
this Tribunal for adjudication of any complaints in respect of
their recruitment or conditions of service.
55. For detailed analysis of the matter see, Massey.I.P., supra note 14, at pp.253-77.
56. 1989(2) SLJ 122 (CAT-Mad.). Also see, Shr1 Khraad Noor-Mohammad Vs. Union of India
1991(2) SLJ 92 (CAT-Ahm.).
57. Ibid., at page 122.
 264

7-213 Exhaustion of remedies

The Act^ provides that the Tribunal shall not,

ordinarily, admit an application unless it is satisfied that

the applicant has availed of all the remedies available to him

under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.

However, for this purpose, a person is deemed to have availed

of all the remedies, firstly, where after filing the appeal/

representation under the relevant service rules, it has been

decided and he is still an aggrieved person; and, secondly,

where the said appeal or representation has not been decided

for a period of six months .

It is imperative for every applicant to exhaust the

remedy of statutory appeal/representation for redressal of his

grievances before he comes to the Tribunal under Section 19 of

the Act . However, the use of the word "ordinarily" in section

20(1) connotes a discretionary power in the Tribunal to waive

this requirement. The word "ordinarily", as judicially

interpreted , signifies that the power has to be exercised in

rare and exceptional cases and not usually and casually . For

instance, in Shri Subhash Chandra Vs. Union of India the

Tribunal did not insist on the requirement of exhaustion of

remedies by the applicant whose pension had been withheld for

58. Section 20(1).

59. Section 20(2)(a) and ( b ) .
60. B.Parmeshwara Rao Vs. The Divisional Engineer, 1990(2) SLJ 525 (CAT-Hyd.) V.B.Gupta,
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Union of India, 1990(3) SLJ 396 (CAT-New Delhi).
61. See, e.g., re Putta Ranganayakulu and others, M R 1956 A.P. 161; Kall&sh Chandra V s .
Union of India, AIR 1961 S . C 1346.
62. B.Parmeshwara Rao case, supra note 60, at p. 535.
63. 1990C3) SLJ 335 ( CAT-N.Delhi).
 265

the last one year. It was felt by the Tribunal that directing
the applicant to make a representation to the higher
administrative authority might not meet the ends of justice and
fair play. Similarly, in the case of Shri Basant Lai and
64
others Vs. Union of India , the Tribunal waived off the
requirement of exhausting alternative remedy under the
Industrial Disputes Act, due to the existence of special
circumstances. The Tribunal found that the remedy before the
Administrative Tribunal was more efficacious and quicker and
the applicants, the casual labours were poor, illiterate,
residing in villages and could not come for conciliation etc.
It may, however, be pointed that the decision of the
Tribunal to the effect that the remedies available under the
Industrial Disputes Act amount to alternative remedies within
the meaning of Section 20 of the Act stands overruled. In
6s
A.Padmaralley and Others Vs. C.P.W.D. and TELECOM J, a Full
Bench of five Members, after a thorough analysis of the
provisions of Section 20 and Section 3(r) (the latter Section
defines the expression "service rules as to redressal of
grievances"), concluded that "the remedies contemplated under
the Industrial Disputes Act could not be construed as
alternative remedies for the purposes of Section 20. Therefore,
a person who has an amphibious status, that is to say, that of
a workman and a Government servant, cannot be said to come
within the mischief of Section 20 of the Act. Yet, this does
64. 1990(3) SLJ 1 (CAT - N.Delhi).
65. 1990(3) SLJ 544 (CAT-Hyd.).
66. Ibid. , at p. 563.
 266

not lead to the further conclusion that an applicant has a

right to approach the Administrative Tribunal, directly,

without first, having recourse to the remedies available under

the Industrial Disputes Act.

It was held that ' that the Administrative Tribunals

constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act are not

substitutes for the authorities constituted under the Industrial

Disputes Act and as such the Administrative Tribunal does not

exercise concurrent jurisdiction with those authorities in

regard to matters covered by that Act. Hence, all matters over

which the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal or other

authorities had jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act

do not automatically become vested in the Administrative

Tribunal for adjudication. Because of this reason an applicant

seeking a relief under the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act must ordinarily exhaust the remedies available

under the Act. The power of the Administrative Tribunal, in

this regard, are the same as that of a High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution and the exercise of that power would

depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as well as

on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of

Rohtas Industries Ltd. Vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union

Thus, the Administrative Tribunal can entertain a direct

application filed on behalf of a workman in such exceptional

cases, where, from the facts apparent on the face of the record

67. Ibid., at p. 567.

68. AIR 1976 S.C. 425.
 267

there •' is a clear violation of any provisions of the

69
Constitution, or any statute or the rules of natural justice .
70
In Shankar Baruah and Others Vs. Union of India , it was

held by the Tribunal that if the fact of non-exhaustion of

remedies was not put on record or brought to the notice of the

Tribunal at the time of admission, then a belated plea at any

subsequent stage would not be entertained to dismiss an

application.

A public servant may also submit a memorial to the

President or the Governor or any other functionary but, its

entertainment is purely discretionary. It is for this reason

that it has been provided that the public servant is not bound

to file a memorial, for, that is not an adequate or

71
efficacious remedy' . But, if he elects to avail of this remedy

he will be bound by his choice and hence cannot approach the

Tribunal during the pendency of the memorial unless, of

course, a period of six months has expired as provided in

section 20(2)(b) of the Act.

7.214 Limitation
Broadly speaking, the period of limitation, allowed by
the Act, for filing an application before the Tribunal, is one
year. This period is to be computed from the date on which a
final order has been made by the concerned
administrative
72
authority on the applicant's appeal/representation' . And,
69. See, ibid., at pp.431-32.
70. 1991(1) SLJ 322 (CAT-Guwahat1), para 12.
71. Section 20(3). See also, B.R.Anand Vs. Union of India, 1990(3) SLJ 532 (CAT-Chd.).
72. Section 21(l)(a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act.
 268

where no such final order has been made by the competent

administrative authority, then the period of limitation (of one

year) is to be computed from the date of the expiry of six

months after filing the appeal/representation'--5.

Where, however, the cause of action had arisen by reason

of any order made at any time during the period of three years

immediately before the date of the establishment of the

Tribunal (i.e. prior to l.H.1985), and the period of

limitation, as described above, has expired, then, an

application to challenge the impugned order shall lie within a

period of six months from the date of the establishment of the

Tribunal 7 .

In Bamadev Vs. Union of India , it was pointed by the

Tribunal that in computing the period of limitation the time

commences to run from the date of the communication of the

(appellate/revisional) order and not from the date on which it

is passed.

7.-2l4l Application filed during pendency of appeal or

representation
There existed a conflict of opinion amongst the different
Benches of the Tribunal on the question or maintainability of

an application filed during the pendency of an appeal or

representation, without waiting for the disposal of such appeal

73. Section 21(1) (b) of the Act.

74. Section 21(2).
75. (1988) 8 ATC 387; B.C.Lakshm1naras1mha1ah Vs. Chairman, Railway Board (1989) 11 ATC
137.
 269

or representation or the expiry of the stipulated period of

six-months. For example, the Chandigarh Bench' had taken the

view that such an application is maintainable, while a contrary

77
view was taken by the Guwahati Bench . This controversy now
stands settled by the Full Bench decision in B.Parameshwara
yO

Rao Vs. Divisional Engineer , by holding that normally such an

application was liable to be rejected as pre-mature. However,

where a Tribunal has exercised its discretion in treating a

case to be exceptional or extra-ordinary one, as constrasted

to ordinary ones, it may admit an application which might,

otherwise, be pre-mature due to non-exhaustion of remedies. It

is submitted that in cases of compulsory retirement, an

application should be maintainable without insisting upon the

aggrieved party to, first, have recourse to the remedies by way

of administrative appeal/representation. In the alternative, an

aggrieved party should be deemed to have availed of alternative

remedy where a period of 30 days have elapsed after filing the

administrative appeal/representation.

7-2142 Application filed without making any appeal for

representation

There may be cases where an applicant has either totally

neglected to avail of the departmental remedy, or makes a

belated appeal/representation after it has become time barred

according to the provisions of the relevant service rules. In

76. Sltal Singh Vs. Union of India, (1989) ATLT 150 (Chd.).
77. Jananda Sarma Pathak Vs. Union of India (1987)2 ATC 657.
78. (1990)13 ATC 778, 1990(2) SLJ 525 (CAT-Hyd.).
 270

either case, subject to the discretion of the Tribunal under

section 20 of the Act, not to entertain his application at all,

an application to challenge the impugned order may lie within a

period of one year from the date of its passing (that is, the
79
date when the cause of action first arose1-7. In case, however,

the aggrieved public servant/applicant is able to explain the

delay in filing the appeal/representation to the satisfaction

of the appellate/revisional authority, then, the period of

limitation would start to run afresh

the according to
fin
provisions of section 21(1)(a) and (b), as already explained .

7.2143 Repeated Representations

It may be pointed that the 'representation' contemplated

by section 20 includes even a non-statutory representation for

O-i

the purpose of computation of limitation . In B.Kumar Vs.

82
Union of India , the relevant service rules provided for

administrative appeal only. But, the Tribunal opined that since

representation to higher authorities was a recognised mode of

redressal of grievances in service matters, a fresh period of

limitation would start thereafter.

However, once a final decision is given by a competent
authority, repeated representations cannot extend the period of
limitation . But, where a subsequent representation is
79. The application would be maintainable only 1f the Tribunal finds the case not to be an
'ordinary' one and waives off the requirement of availing other remedies.
80. See, e.g., Shr1 A.Kanare Vs. Union of India, 1990(3) SLJ 235 (CAT-Ahm.).
81. Ordinance Clothing Factor Workers' Union Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Defence (1990)12 ATC
296 (Mad.).
82. 1989(1) SLJ 97 (CAT-P.B.).
83. Shr1 H.V.Dhruva Rao V s . The P.M.G.Bangalore, 1990(4) SLR 549 (CAT-Bang.); also see,
Lakshmlnaraslmhahalah case, supra note 75.
 271

considered on merit and rejected then, the new order will

84
furnish a fresh cause of action . Similarly, a subsequent
order partly allowing a representation may furnish a cause of
85
action even in respect of the original order . However, a

mere reiteration of an earlier order by the competent authority

in response to repeated representations without reconsideration

on merits does not amount to passing a fresh order or giving a

new lease of life for purposes of limitation.

7-2144 Continuing wrong

In G.K.Shenava and Others Vs. Union of India and

others , it was observed by the Bangalore Bench of the
Tribunal that when there is a challenge to a law, enacted by

the Legislature or Government, the requirement of an 'order'

and 'representation', as contemplated by section 21 of the Act,

will not arise. Furthermore, the wrong sought to be redressed

in such a case has to be treated as a continuing one operating

everyday and,infact, every moment. Consequently, the period of

limitation is renewed with every passing day .

00
Similarly, in another case , the services of some casual
labourers, including the applicant, were terminated on account

of shortage of vacancies. Subsequently, some of them though

junior to the applicant, were re-engaged, ignoring the

84. A . N . G a m b M r Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources, (1988)8 ATC 249 (N.Delhi).
85. Ram Nath Chadha Vs. Union of India (1988)6 ATC 380.
86. 1989(1) SLJ 1 (CAT-Bang.).
87. Ibid., para 35.
88. O.Lakshralnarayana Vs. O.P.O. (1990) 12 ATC 162.
 272

applicant. While considering the question of limitation, it

was observed by the Court that the claim of the applicant was

against a continuing wrong or a continuing cause of action.

7.2145 Condonation of delay

Under sub-section (3) of section 21 of the Act, an

application may be admitted even after the expiry of period of

limitation if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had

sufficient cause for not making the application within such

period. It may be noticed that this provision is in pari

materia with section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and

accordingly, the case-law on that section can usefully be

applied by the Tribunal in determining the scope and ambit of

8Q
its power of condonation under section 21(3) of the Act .
QO
The Supreme Court has expressed the opinion^ that

section 5 of the Limitation Act had been enacted in order to

enable the Courts to do substantial justice to the parties and

to apply the law in a mainingful manner and, therefore, the

Courts should take a liberal view on the question of limitation

where no negligence or any inaction or want of bonafides is

imputable to the party. Thus, broadly speaking, when

substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted

against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be

preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have a vested

91
right in injustice being done because of non deliberate delay^
89. Ban1 Singh Vs. Union of India (1989)9 ATC 849 (Para 4 ) .
90. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Kat1j1 and others, AIR 1987
S.C. 1353.
91. Ibid., para 3, cited 1n Banklm Choudhary and Others Vs. Union of India, 1991(1) SLJ 362
(CAT-Guwahati).
 273

Delay.in filing petition/application caused on account of wrong

advice of counsel" , or honest mistake^ , such as forgetful or

oversight of his counsel, have been held to constitute a

sufficient cause justifying condonation. Similarly, where the

impugned order is manifestly illegal, Tribunal may not allow it

to remain in the field on the technical ground of limitation

and condonation may be granted7 . However, mere financial

stringency or the ignorance of law would not afford any

jurisdiction or sufficient cause, within the meaning of section

21(3), to condone delay in filing application" .

7.2146 Laches and delay

In view of the specific provision in the Act governing

limitation, the doctrine of laches, as applied by the Supreme

Court and the High Courts, while dealing with writ petitions,

does not apply to the Tribunal proceedings. However, in one

96
case-' , an application was rejected by the Tribunal on account

of laches though it was filed within the period of limitation

allowed under the Act. The applicant, in this case, was

promoted one year after the respondents promotion. He acquiesed

in the matter and did not question his supersession. However,

after a further delay of two years, the applicant filed a

representation for precedence over the respondent in matter of

seniority
92.
and promotion. The representation
State of West Bengal Vs. Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 S.C. 749.
was rejected
93. Concord of India Insurance Co. Vs. Nirmala (1979)4 SCC 365.
94. Banklm Choudhary case, supra note 9 1 .
95. Onkar Nath Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1989) 10 ATC 4 8 9 .
96. Suresh Kumar Joshl V s . Union of India, 1988(1) SLJ 405 (CAT-Jab.) (Para 4 ) . See also
Upendra Ra1 Tr1path1 Vs. Union of India, 1990(2) SLJ 416 (CAT-Jab.).
 274

(on merit). He filed an application impugning the rejection

within a year thereafter. The same was rejected on the ground

of laches.

Thus, even if on account of a representation, a matter

is within limitation; if the Tribunal considers that the

subject matter is one dating back to several years, the

Tribunal may dismiss the application for laches"'.

It is, finally, observed that the Act lays down a period

of limitation shorter than the period of limitation for suit,

but longer than normally observed for writ petitions. For writ

petitions, though there is no fixed period of limitation, but

under the rule of laches applied by the Courts a delay of more

than ninety days in filing a writ petition is normally regarded

as undue which may prove to be fatal unless satisfactorily

explained^ .

It is further submitted that, in view of the provision of

section 21 of the Act, which apply to every kind of application

filed before the Tribunal, it would be wrong and improper on

the part of the Tribunal to invoke the doctrine of laches in

rejecting an application filed within the statutory period of

limitation. This not only is beyond the powers of the Tribunal

but, would also introduce an element of uncertainty and

confusion on the subject.

97. C f . Ordinance Clothing Factory W o r k e r s ' Union V s . Secretary, Ministry of Defence

(1990)12 ATC 296 ( M a d . ) ; See also, C.R.Madhvan V s . Regional Director, ESI Corporation
(1990)13 ATC 89 ( E r n a k . h
98. Justice K . N . G o y a l ; Administrative Tribunals A c t , 1985, (1990) 3 4 0 .
 275

7.247 Limitation against ab-initio order

qq
In a case decided by the Principal Bench of the

Tribunal it was held that if an order is void an-initio, any

such application challenging such order will not be hit by the

bar of limitation. But a contrary view was taken by the New

Bombay Bench of the Tribunal by holding that there cannot be a

distinction between an illegal order and an irregular order for

the purposes of limitation . In view of this conflict of

decisions amongst the different Benches of fhe Tribunal, the

matter has been referred to be decided by a Full Bench . It

is however, submitted that it is neither in conformity with the

provisions of section 21 of the Act, nor justifiable, in

principle, to maintain any distinction, between illful and

irregular orders for the purpose of invoking the rules of

limitation.

7-22 Procedure for Filing an Application

The-, procedure for filin~ an application, under section 19

of the Act, is regulated mainly, by th?; rule:.: framed by tho

Central Government. The relevant rules, in this regard, provide

as below.

99. Shjree Beer Singh V s . Union of India (1990) 1 ATJ 577; Also see, Ram Lai Thakur V s .
Union Territory of Chandigarh (199<^12 ATC 786 (Chd.).
100. Dr.(Kum.) Padmavalley Vs. Union of India (1988)7 ATC 557. Also see, Ahmed Miya Vs.
Union of India (1988)2 ATR 2 6 8 .
101. See, Dhlru Mohan Vs. Union of India (1991) (2) SLJ 43 (CAT.).
 276

7-221.Method and contents

An application to the Tribunal has to be presented in a

102
prescribed form , by the applicant in person, or by an agent

or by a duly authorised legal practitioner to the Registrar or

to any other person authorised by the Registrar to receive the

applications or may be sent by registered post with

acknowledgement due addressed to the Registrar of the Bench

103
concerned . Though normally an application should conform to

the prescribed form, but this requirement cannot be treated as

a mandatory one and any deviation or defect which is formal in

104
nature would not be fatal

By amendment of Rule k in 1988 Registrar's power to

decline to register an application has been taken away.

The application has to be presented in three complete

sets in a paper book form alongwith the impugned order and all

other documents and annexures referred to in the application.

Where the number of respondents is more than one, extra copies

of the application, keeping in view the number of respondents,

105
have to be provided by the applicant . However, if the number

of respondents is more than five, the Registrar may permit the

applicant to file the extra copies of application at the time

of issue of notice to the respondents

102. Form I, Appendix A , to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
103. Rule 4 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedural) Rules, 1987.
104. See, Sub-Rules (3) and (4) of Rule 5.
105. Rule 4 ( 2 ) .
106. Proviso to Rule 4 ( 3 ) .
 277

The applicant may also attach to and present with his

application a receipt slip in the prescribed form (II) which

shall be signed by the Registrar or the Officer receiving the

application on behalf of the Registrar, in acknowledgement of

the receipt of the application.

7-222 Place of filing an application

Under the old Rule 6 an application could be filed only

before the bench within whose jurisdiction the applicant was

posted for the time being. But, now, the provisions of this

rule have been modified on the lines of section 20 of the Civil

Procedure Code arid it has been provided that, at the option of

the applicant, an application could also be filed before the

Bench within whose jurisdiction the cause of action has arisen.

A person who has ceased to be in service by reason of

retirement, dismissal or termination of service has got an

additional option to file the application with the Registrar of

the Bench within whose jurisdiction he is ordinarily residing

at the time of the filing of the application.

A person may with the leave of the Chairman, file an

107
application with the Registrar of the Principal Bench '. It
will, then, be open to the Chairman to exercise his power of
transfer under section 25 of the Act. The implication is that
the Chairman may, if he so likes, retain the application for
disposal by the Principal Bench itself or send it for disposal
to the Bench having jurisdiction over the matter
107. Proviso to Rule 6 ( 1 ) .
108. Justice K.N.Goyal, o p . d t . , supra note 98, at p. 472.
 278

An employee under transfer orders may, during his joining

time file an application before the Bench having territorial

jurisdiction over his erstwhile place of posting but not where

10Q
he is required to join but has not actually joined .

7.223 Joinder of Remedies

Rule 10 provides that only one cause of action shall be

the subject of an application though more than one reliefs may

be claimed in respect of that cause of action, provided they

are consequential to one another. If there are several causes

of action, then, it is always open to the applicant to file

different applications, and thereafter, if the Tribunal finds

it convenient and just to both the parties, it may consolidate

the two (or more than two) applications or at any rate hear

them together even though it may dispose them of by different

orders.

In Sri Nathaniel Bernard Toppo Vs. Union of India , the

applicant claimed the reliefs of seniority, promotion and
arrears of back wages. These were held to be interconnected.
Questions of promotion and arrears were held to be
consequential that flow from the main remedy of seniority.
However, reliefs against transfer and Illegality in enquiry
proceedings have been held not to be inter-connected but
arising under different causes of action

109. T.A.Pawadal Vs. Union of India (1988)7 ATC 720; S.K.Sarkar Vs. Union of India (1987)2
ATC 576.
110. 1990(3) SLJ 174 (CAT-Cutt.).
111. Lacchman Dass Garg Vs. Union of India 1990(2) SLJ 500 (CAT-New Delhi).
 279

Similarly, reliefs against termination, transfer, non-

placement and non-absorption cannot be claimed in one

, . ., 112
application

7.224 Joinder of Parties

It has already been observed that the Tribunal may permit

more than one person to join together, and file a single

application if it is satisfied, having regard to the cause of

action and the nature of relief prayed for, that there exists a

community of interest in the matter. Where, however, several

parties join together to file an application claiming relief

for different incidents or causes of action which are not

consequential to each other the application is liable to be

11^
rejected on the ground of misjoinder of parties . Permission

may also be granted to any Union or Association, representing

the persons desirous of joining in a single application on

their behalf provided at least one affected person joins such

an application. The latter requirement is in line with the

practice relating to writ petitions, the underlying reason

being that an association as such cannot claim to have been

deprived of any right requiring to be vindicated and

accordingly cannot, strictly speaking, be considered to be a

"person aggrieved".

112. Anurudh Singh Vs. Union of India (1988)7 ATC 925.

113. Ram Pat1 Yadav Vs. G.M.Gun Carriage Factory and Other 1987(1) SLJ 157 ( C A T - J a b . ) .
 280

It may be pointed that though the provisions of order 1

Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are not, as such, applicable

to the applications filed under the Act but, on the considera-

tion of expendiency these provisions may be followed by the

Tribunal and the applicant should be directed to take steps on

the ' lines of 0.1, R. 8 » so that its decision becomes

binding on all the members of the applicant association.

7.23 Filing of Reply by the Respondent

Soon after an application is duly registered notices are

served to the respondents to file reply to the application.

Every such notice issued by the Tribunal has to be accompanied

by a copy of the application and a copy of the impugned order.

In the reply filed by it, the respondent must specifically

admit, deny or explain the facts stated by the applicant in

his application and may also state such additional facts as may

be found necessary for the just decision of the case.

The reply has to be filed, in triplicate, alongwith all

the documents relied upon. A copy of the reply, alongwith the

documents, should also be served on the applicant or his

counsel, if any, and the proof of such service should be filed

in the Registry. The Act or the Rules do not contain any

provision for the service of reply by the Registrar to the

applicant. The reply must be signed and verified as a written

statement by the respondents or any other person duly

authorised by him in writing in the same manner as provided

for in order VI, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

 281

Though a reply is required to be filed within a period of

one month of the service of notice on the respondent but, the

Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow further time if the same

is not field within the specified period of one month. It may

be pointed that the discretion conferred upon the Tribunal in

this regard, is a judicial discretion and should not be

exercised casually or arbitrarly. An application for extension

of time need not always be in writing. The Tribunal may even

entertain an oral request made in that behalf by the respondent

himself or his consel.

It is significant to note that the Tribunal can extend

the time to file a reply only after the expiry of the initial

time of one month. However, it has been found that this

discretion is, quite often, exercised at the initial stage, by

allowing more than one month's time. It is, therefore,

submitted that the provisions of Rule 12(1) and (5) should be

strictly complied with and further that in case a party seeks

extension for more than second time the same may be allowed on

payment of cost to the applicant. This will discourage the

practice of seeking frequent extension and would, thereby, help

in avoiding unnecessary delays in disposal.

The object of filing applications and replies (pleadings)

is two fold: (i) to narrow down the parties to definite issues

and to confine the trial within due limits so as to save time

and expenses which might otherwise be needlessly wasted, and

(il) to prevent the other party from being cought by surprise.

In this connection it may be pointed that there does not exist

 282

any provision, in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, for

the amendment of pleadings as provided for in Order 6, Rules

16, 17 and 18 and Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code,

Under these provisions the Court may allow or direct any

amendment in a party's own pleadings or his opponents

pleadings where it is necessary for the determination of real

questions in issue; or where it finds any matter in any

pleading unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or tending to

prejudice, embrass or delay the fair trial of the suit; or

where it finds it necessary and expedient so to do for complete

and effective adjudication. Amendment of pleadings may be

allowed or ordered at any stage of the proceedings provided it

does not work injustice to the other party.

It is submitted that in the absence of any express

provisions to these effects, the Tribunal may exercise the

powers to direct or permit amendments in the pleadings under

section 22(1) of the Act, which, inter-alla, empowers the

Tribunal, "to regulate its own procedure".

7.24 Notice of Hearing

Before the actual trial or hearing begins the Tribunal

must serve notices to all the parties specifying the date and
place of hearing. Under Rule 13 of the Central Administrative
Tribunal (Procedural) Rules, 1987, the Chairman is empowered to
direct the manner in which notices are to be issued to the
parties. An intimation to the cousel or other agent, as
 283

defined in Rule 2(b) of the Procedural Rules, is regarded as a

sufficient notice to the party concerned.

7-3 Trial Procedure

The main features of the Trial Procedure, as specifically

provided in the Act and the Rules framed by the Central

Government as well as those evolved by the Tribunal itself, are

discussed below.

7.31 Non-appearance of Parties

The first point for consideration is whether the Tribunal

can proceed with the Trial of a case in the absence of one or

both the parties. It may be argued, on the one hand, that

hearing by the Tribunal should take place in the presence of

both or all parties concerned but, on the other hand, a

literal adoption of this principle would enable one party to

hold up the course of justice indefinility by absenting himself

from the hearing. The position, in this regard, may be

examined under the following three sub-heads.

7.311 Absence of the Applicant

According to the provisions of Rule 15 of the Procedural
Rules of 1987, where on the date fixed for hearing of the
application or on any other date to which such hearing has been
adjourned, the applicant fails to appear at the hearing, the
Tribunal may in its discretion, either dismiss the application
 284

for default or hear and decide it on merit. It may be

pointed that under the comparable provisions of Order IX of the

Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has no power to decide a

suit on merit if the plaintiff absents himself at the hearing

on the date fixed in the summons. But, if the plaintiff fails'

to appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit had been

adjourned, a civil Court may proceed to dispose of the suit on

merit

Where an application is dismissed for default, the

applicant may, within a period of 30 days from the date of

dismissal, file an application for its restoration , and if the

Tribunal is satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for the

applicant's non-appearance, it shall make an order setting

aside the Order of dismissal.

Where, however, an application is disposed of on merits,

an application for its restoration will not lie. In such a

case, the remedy of review is available under the rules

But, in the exercise of its inherent power, the Tribunal can

re-open the proceedings in which it has proceeded exparte, in

the absence of the applicant, if the applicant's absence was

due to the non-issuance of notice by the Tribunal. For, the

decision reached behind the back of a party to whom notice must

be sent, is not binding on such a party and the Court/Tribunal

in such a case may re-open the proceedings to give the party a

117
chance to state its case
114. See, Clause (g) to sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Act. It may be noticed that the
word "representation" used In this clause Is not appropriate which should be substituted
by the word "application".
115. Order XVII, Rule 2 and 3 of C.P.C., 1908.
116. Proviso to Rule 15(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedural) Rules, 1987.
117. S.D.O. Vs. N.P.Singh, AIR 1966 S.C. 1164.
 285

7.312 Absence of respondent

According to the provision of Rule 16(1) of the

Procedural Rules of 1987, where on the date fixed for hearing

of the application or on any other date to which such hearing

has been adjourned, the respondent fails to appear, the

Tribunal may, in its discretion, either adjourn the hearing or

it may hear and decide the application ex-parte. The provision

of this Rules may be compared to those of Order IX, Rule 11, of

the Civil Procedure Code.

The respondent may, however, move an application for

setting aside the ex-parte order and the restoration of the

proceedings and if the Tribunal is satisfied that the notice

was not duly served on the respondent or he or they were

prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing, it may

accordingly, pass on order of restoration on such terms as it

thinks fit. It may be noticed that Rule 16 does not lay down

any specific period within which a respondent may move an

application for the purpose of setting aside an ex-parte order.

But, it may safely be assumed that the period of 30 days or

such further period as the Tribunal may allow to an applicant

for the restoration of an application which has been dismissed

under similar circumstances, may equally apply to the

respondent's application in this regard.

It may be seen that under Rule 11(8) the Tribunal may, on

being satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to serve

all the respondents, direct that the application shall be heard

even though some of the respondents (not being a Government or

 286

other employing authority) have not been served provided,

however, that the interest of the unserved respondents were

adequately and sufficiently represented by the served

respondents. In view of this provision, it has been made clear

in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule l6 that the Tribunal

shall not set-aside the ex-parte order merely on the ground

that it was not served upon a particular respondent(s), unless

the unserved respondent satisfies the Tribunal that his

interests were not. in fact adequately and sufficiently

represented by the respondents who had been served.

7.313 Absence of both parties

Neither the Act nor the Rules framed by the Central

Government provide for a situation where both or all the

parties are absent on the date of hearing. Guidance may, in

such a case, be had under the provisions of the Code of Civil

Procedure. Accordingly, on the lines of Order IX, Rule 3 of

C.P.C. the Tribunal may dismiss the application for

non-appearance of both parties. In such an event the

applicant may either file a fresh application (subject to the

rules of limitation) or move an application for setting-aside

the order of dismissal.

7.32 Right to Hearing

Hearing may be conducted in public or in private; the

right to hearing may be exercised either in person (oral

arguments) or through written arguments; a party may exercise

 287

this right himself by presenting his case personally or he

may be represented through an agent or a legal practitioner.

The relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed

thereunder provide as under.

7.321 Public and Private Hearing

The Franks Committee, in England, regarded openness as

one of three essential features of the satisfactory working of

lift
the Tribunal and one of the most important constituents of

openness is that the proceedings should be held in public. In

fact, if the adjudicating bodies, whether Courts or Tribunals,

are to inspire that confidence in the administration or justice

which is a condition of civil liberty they should, in general,

sit in public- In certain exceptional cases, however,

hearings may be held in camera. In this regard, Courts have

inherent power to exclude the public from any particular

hearing and/or to restrict publication of its proceedings in

the press, if considered necessary in the public interest, or

for maintenance of order in the Court room; or to ensure

maintenance of State or official or trade secrets; or to

safeguard the reputation of the parties; or that witness may

119
not be victimised and their confidence may not be destroyed

Section 22(1) of the Act leaves it to the discretion of

the Tribunal to decide whether, in a particular case the

proceedings or any part of the proceedings, should be held in

118. The other two features are: fairness and Impartiality; See, the Report of the Committee
on Administrative Tribunals and Enqulrls (1957)5.
119. See, Justice K.N.Goyal, supra note 98, at p. 371.
 288

public or in private. The decision to hold camera

proceedings, in service disputes may, however, be taken in

exceptional cases only where, for example, state secrets

relating to defence or trade secrets of a public Corporation

are required to be protected. It may be pointed that the power

of the Tribunal to sit in private also implies the power to

direct the press not to publish any proceedings of a case

without the permission of the Tribunal and any disobedience of

120
such direction may be punishable as contempt

7.322 Oral hearing and hearing through written representations

The regular Courts do not generally, favour written

arguments which are often confused, disjointed and prolix. It

is easier for a judge to control oral arguments within the

required permissible limits in order to reach at the crux of

the matter in dispute. However, very often lengthy and

repetitive arguments are addressed without much advantage to

the party on whose behalf they are advanced. This calls for

some limitation on oral arguments. In the Supreme Court of

U.S.A. there is a time limit of half an hour for oral arguments

121
on each side . This has been made possible because the
written 'briefs' filed in the Court are prepared by big law
corporations with immense research facilities and computerised
service available to them, and those written briefs are

120. See, e.g., Naresh Shrldhar Mlrajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra (1966)3 SCR 744; R. Vs.
Socialist Worker, 1975 Q.B. 637 (1975) All E.R. 142.
121. Justice K.N.Goyal, o p . d t , supra note 98, at pp. 484-5.
 289

scrutinized by brilliant research assistants attached to the

Judges, and the Judges confer among themselves before the case
is set for oral hearing.

In the case of the Tribunal, the provisions of unamended

sub-section (2) of section 22 of the Act, read with Rule 14(1)
of the Central Administrative Tribunal (procedural) Rules,
1985, empowered the Tribunal to hear and dispose of the matters
on merits even in the absence of parties and it was not
obligatory for the Tribunal to hear oral arguments122. But,
J
after the amendment , the discretion of the Tribunal has been
taken away and it is required of it to hear "such oral
arguments as may be advanced" by the parties. However, this
should not mean to suggest that a party has got an absolute and
unlimited right to adduce any amount of oral arguments. The
Tribunal must possess an inherent right to control and limit
arguments within desired limits. Rule Ik of the Central
Administrative (Procedural) Rules, 1987, has accordingly, been
recast and under sub-Rule (3) the Tribunal has been given the
power to limit the time for oral arguments.

Reference may also be made, in this connection, to the

124
99th Report of the Law Commission of India wherein it was
recommended that while no hard and fast rule need be laid down
in regard to time limit for oral arguments, the matter may be
left to the good sense of the judge who can, after consulting
the counsel, fix the time before hand keeping in mind the
nature of the case and the issues to be argued.
122. The relevant provision of the Sub-section provided: "the Tribunal shall decide every
application... after hearing of oral arguments, 1f any, allowed by the Tribunal 1n the
circumstances of the case".
123. Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act 1 9 8 6 .
124. Report on Oral and Written Arguments 1n Higher Courts (1984).
 290

7.323 Personal appearance and representation through an agent

or a legal practitioner.

Under the provisions of section 23 of the Act, parties

may appear before the Tribunal either in person or through a

counsel. In case a party has appointed a counsel to represent

him, then the Tribunal would not ordinarily allow him to argue

his case in person. He may, however, be permitted by the

Tribunal to withdraw his power executed earlier in favour of

counsel and thereafter appear in person. He cannot, otherwise,

be allowed to argue the case partly in person and partly

through counsel because that would cause unnecessary confusion

and wastage of time of the Tribunal as well as of the other

parties or their counsels.

12S
J
It may be noticed that whereas the Act permits the
Government, or a local or other authority, or a corporation to
be represented either by a legal practitioner or by any of its
officers specially authorised for that purpose, but a private
party does not enjoy the option of being represented by a
fellow servant. The reason seems to the that while a private
party can exercise the option of appearing in person, the
Government or a local or other authority, or a corporation or a
society, are merely corporate personalities and, as such, it is
physically impossible for these bodies to appear in person.
Therefore, to permit an officer of a non-living body to make
submission on behalf of the body is like allowing any
individual litigant to argue in person
125. Sub-sect1on (2) of Section 2 3 .
126. See, for Instance, Engineers and Managers' Associations Vs. Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbltrarian Service and Another (No.l), (1979)3 All E.R. 223.
 291

7.33 Rules Relating to Evidence

While conducting a trial the Tribunal would, normally,

proceed in the same manner and exercises the same powers as are

vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, in respect of the matters discussed below.

7.331 Summoning and enforcing attendance of any person

After the pleadings (application and the reply) have been

filed, and the issues framed, evidence will have to be led

(unless the case is disposed off without issue). Although the

disputes in service matters, mainly, involve questions of

interpretation or constitutionally of various orders and

statutory rules, in respect of which no oral evidence is

normally required yet, the Tribunal has been vested with all

those powers which are exerciseable by a civil court, in this

regard, under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Order XVI of the Code deals with summoning and enforcing

attendance of witnesses. Though most of the provisions of this

order deal with matters of detail, which need not,

scrupulously, be observed by the Tribunal, but the main,

substantive provisions of the Order may be discussed in so far

as they are relevant in the context.

Firstly, a party may secure attendance of witness either

through the process of the Tribunal, or it is open to it to

127
produce a witness without obtaining any summons . Where an

127. Rule 1A, Order IX, CPC.

 292

application is made by a party to the Tribunal for the issuance

of a summons to a witness, the same cannot be rejected on the

128
ground that it has been made too late . The party is,

however, required to deposit expenses for summoning a witness.

But, if the process has not been served through the Court1 the

party can pay the expenses direct to the witness.

Secondly, a witness may be produced either to give

evidence or to produce a document. In any case, the purpose of

calling a witness must be stated in the application filed by a

party in this behalf, as well as in the summons issued by the

Tribunal. A person summoned merely to produce a document shall

be deemed to have complied with the summons if he causes such

document to be produced, instead of attending personally to

produce the same.

Thirdly, the Tribunal has the power to require any

person, present in the Tribunal, to give evidence or to produce

any document which might be in his possession, then and there

only. The Court is also empowered to summon, of its own accord,

any person (including a party to the suit) as a witness to

129
give evidence or to produce any documents in his possession
Fourthly, the Tribunal can exercise the coercive powers
of proclamation, fines, attachment and arrest enjoyed by a
Court under Rules 10 to 16 of Order XVI of the Code of Civil
Procedure. After issuing a warrant of arrest a Court cannot,
128. But, if the application 1s not bonaflde one the Court/Tribunal may refuse to Issue the
summons; Jaglr Singh Vs. Surjan Singh ILR (1965)2 Punj. 105, at p. 109.
129. Order XVI, Rule 14, C.P.C., 1908.
 293

however, issue a proclamation. The proclamation is the first

step and the warrant or the attachment are either concurrent or
succeeding steps. Further, a Court/the Tribunal is not
competent to issue the proclamation and attachment unless, it
is proved to its satisfaction that the evidence of the witness
130
is material, and that he is avoiding the summons .
Lastly, the Tribunal may also exercise the power of a
Court under Order XVI-A, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procadure,
to require attendance of any prisoner as witness.

7-331 Examination of Witnesses on oath

The Tribunal has been expressly empowered to administer
an oath to any person so as to bind him to state the truth
before it. Furthermore, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other
Members and the Officers and other employees (such as a
Registrar) provided for under section 13 to assist a Tribunal
in the discharge of its functions, have been declared, by the
131
Act •* to be public servants within the meaning of section 21
of the Indian Penal Code, i860. Hence, the penal consequences
132
provided under the various provisions of the Code •* for
refusing oath or affirmation or for making false statement on
oath, would be attracted.
It may be pointed that the Franks Committee was also of
the opinion that as an essential safeguard, all Tribunals
should have power to administer the oath when circumstances
130. M r a k a r Nath Wha1 Vs. Fifth Additional District Judge, Moradabad (1984)3 SCC 531.
131. Section 3 1 .
132. Such as Sections 178,161,191,193, etc.
 294

require and those Tribunals which are most akin to Courts of

133
law should always take evidence on oath J .

7-333 Discovery and production of documents

Discovery of documents must be distinguished from

production of documents. Discovery of documents relates to a

statement by a party, on oath, disclosing every document,

relating to matters in dispute, in his possession or power.

Under Order XI, Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code, a Court

may pass an order requiring discovery of documents by any

party if, after hearing the application filed by a party in

this behalf, it finds the document(s) to be, in any way,

relevant for the purpose of throwing light on the matter in

controversy. The party against whom such an order is made is

bound to make the disclosure of all the documents. If any

document is privileged from production it must be disclosed and

privilege claimed for it.

The production of a document may be obtained under Rules

14,15 and 18 of Order XI of the Code. Under Rule 14 the Court

may either suo motu or on an application made by a party, in

this behalf, order the production by any party of such of the

documents in his possession or power, relating to any matter in

question in the suit, as the Court thinks right. An order,

under this rule may be made, even though no order for discovery

had earlier been obtained from the Court/Tribunal. Where an

133. See, supra note 118, at p. 2 2 .

 295

order for production of documents is sought at the instance of

a party the Court/Tribunal has no discretion to refuse, unless,

the documents are privileged. Rule 15 enables a party to

require, by notice, any other party to produce any documents,

referred to in the pleadings and affadavits, for its

inspection. And if the the party served with such a notice

omits or neglects to do so, the Court/Tribunal may, on an

application by the interested party, pass an order for the

production of documents for inspection of the applicant

. 134
party u .
Where any party fails to comply with any order as to

discovery and production of documents, he shall, if a plaintif,

be liable to have his suit dismissed and, if a defendant, to

have his defence struck out. It is, however, only when the

default is wilful that the Court/Tribunal should dismiss the

135
suit or strike out the defence J .

7.33^ Receiving evidence on affidavits

Clause (c) of section 22(3) of the Act confers upon the

Tribunal the power of a Civil Court to receive evidence on
affidavit. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of order
XIX, Rules 1,2 and 3, the Tribunal may at any time* for
sufficient reason, order that any particular fact or facts may
be proved by affidavit. The Tribunal shall also have the power
to order the person filing an affidavit to appear before it for

134. Rule 18, Order XI, C.P.C., 1908.

135. Allahabad Bank Vs. Ganpat Rai (1921) A.L. 750.
 296

being cross examined by the opposite party. But, this power is

to be exercised only in exceptional cases. A person deposing

by affidavit must disclose the nature and source of his

knowledge with sufficient particularly .

7«335 Requisitioning any public record or document

As in the case of a Court, the Tribunal also has the

power to requisition any public record or a document or copy of

such record or document from any office. This is, however,

subject to the provisions of section 123 and 124 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872, which place certain restrictions against

disclosure of a document.

Under the provision of section 123 'no one shall be

permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished

official records relating to any affairs of State, except with

the permission of the officer at the head of the department

concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he

thinks fit 1 . Next, section 124 provides that 'no public

officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to

him in official confidence when he considers that the public

Interest would suffer by the disclosure'.

It may be noted that the provisions of these two sections

overlap in so far as evidence derived from unpublished official
records and consisting of communications made to a public
officer are concerned. But, while section 123 is confined to

136. Sukwlnder Pal B1pal Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 S.C. 6 5 .
 297

written communication, section 124 is not so confined. Further,

section 124 permits any public servant to claim privilege but,

under section 123 only the head of the department can claim

privilege. Yet, in either case, it is ultimately for the Court/

Tribunal to decide the validity of the claim to privilege.

In State of Punjab Vs. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh1^, while

explaining the scope of the privilege provisions it was

observed by the Court that the initial claim to the privilege

should be made through an affidavit generally by the Minister

concerned, if not by him, then by the Secretary of the

department. The affidavit should indicate, briefly, within

permissible limits, the reason why it is apprehended that

public interest would be injurred by the disclosure of the

document. And, in case the Court/Tribunal finds the affidavit

unsatisfactory then the person making the affidavit can be

summoned for cross-examination on the relevant points ^ .

Subsequently, in the Judges case ^ , it was observed by

the Supreme Court that while deciding a claim of privilege the

Court is not bound by the statement made by the Minister or the

head of the department in the affidavit and it retains the

power to balance the two competing aspects of public interest:

the public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation

or the public service by disclosure of certain documents; and

the public interest that the administration of justice shall

137. AIR 1961 S.C. 493 (Constitution Bench of 5 Judges).

138. lb 1 d., paras 23,24 and 105.
139. S.P.Gupta Vs. Union of India, 1981 Supp. SCC 87 (Constitution Bench of 7 Judges).
 298

not be frustrated by the withholding of documents which must be

produced if justice is to be done.

On the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court in

the above mentioned case, the Tribunal rejected the claim of

privilege in respect of the record of assessment made by the

members of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the

subsequent action taken by the Union Public Service Commission

i4o
regarding recommendations for appointment

It is pertinent to note here that where a claim of

privilege under section 123 is made the Court/Tribunal has no

power to inspect the document, but may take other collateral

evidence for the purpose of determining the validity of the

objection. However, if it is a claim of privilege under section

124, the Court/Tribunal may inspect the document in its

discretion.

7.336 Issuing Commission for the examination of witnesses or

documents
Under the provisions of clause (e) of section 22(3) the
Tribunal has been vested with the power of a civil Court to
issue Commissions for the examination of any witness or a
document.

The issue of Commission is essentially a discretionary

power of the Court which is exercised under the circumstances
defined in sectlons75 and 76 and subject to the conditions and

HO. P.Bannerjee Vs. Union of India (1986)1 SLO 8 , (CAT-Kev* D e l h i ) , pp.12-13.

 299

limitations laid down in the rules under Order XXVI of the Code

of Civil Procedure. A Court may issue a Commission either suo

moto or on an application of any party to the suit or of the

witness to be examined. Commissions may be issued, inter-alia

for the purposes: (a) to examine any person; (b) to make a

local investigation; (c) to examine or adjust accounts; (d) to

hold a scientific technical or expert investigation, etc.

Section 76 of the Code also empowers a Court to issue a

Commission for the examination of any person by any Court

situated in any other state and having jurisdiction in the

place in which the person to be examined resides.

On the analogy of this provision of the Code a Bench of

the Central Administrative Tribunal may issue a commission to

any other Bench, situated in any other state; or to any State

Tribunal or a Bench thereof for the examination of any person

residing within the local limits of the concerned Bench/

Tribunal.

7.3^ The Decision

141
The Act provides for decision by the majority of the
Bench of the Tribunal hearing the case and if the Members of a
Bench are equally divided, they shall state the point or
points on which they differ, and make a reference to the
Chairman who may either hear the point or points, himself or
refer the case for hearing on such point(s) by one or more of
141. Section 26. The Provision of this section may be compared with those of Section 98 of
the Civil Procedure Code and Section 392 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
 300

the Members of the Tribunal. Ultimately, such point or points

shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of

the Members of the Tribunal who have heared the case,

including those who first heard it.

For pronouncement of the operative order, the case should

however, go back to the original Bench. But, there could be no

objection to the order being pronounced by a Bench having a

composition different from that of the original Bench because

of the retirement or non-availability of one or more of the

l42
Members of the original Bench . The Bench to which reference

is made on a question of law cannot go into the merits of the

case or behind the findings of fact arrived at by the original

Bench. Nor can the bench entertain a new point not included in

the order of reference .

7-341 Recording reasons for the decision

Though the Act does not, is express terms, lay down the

requirement of giving reasons for its decision by the Tribunal

but, the judicial opinion is well settled on the point that

every judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunal must make a reasoned

145
order, the more so where its order is amenable to appeal
As the Administrative Tribunal exercises justicial functions,
and, furthermore, its orders are appealable to the Supreme

142. Firm Ladhuram Vs. K.U.H. Samltl, AIR 1978 MP 10 (The observations 1n the case were
made In relation to the comparable provisions of Section 98 of the C P C ) .
143. J.Abdul Razak Vs. Director General E.S.I.C. (1987)4 ATC 968.
144. This aspect of the procedure has also been discussed earlier at length at p p ? . S 2 - 5 5
145. Supra note 38.
 301

Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, it is obligatory

for it to give reasons for its decisions. This conclusion is

further fortified if we look at the provisions of section

19(3) of the Act, which makes it obligatory for the Tribunal to

record reasons if an application is summarily dismissed. Thus,

if an order of summary dismissal is required by the Act to be a

speaking one, it would be an inescapable inference to hold this

requirement to be applicable to the final order or decision of

the Tribunal.

7.3^2 Doctrine of precedent

Article l4l of the Constitution declares that "the law

declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts

within the territory of India". Although this Article speaks of

"courts" (only), yet its provision may well be said to apply to

the Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals

Act, 1985, for, these are in the nature of specialised Courts

dealing exclusively with the task of trial and adjudication of

certain specified categories of cases.

145A

However, as already observed, having regard to the object

and scheme of the Act, in general, and the provision of
sections 14,15 and 28 in particular, it is doubtful if the
Tribunal can be said to be inferior to the High Court in
respect of the matters assigned to its exclusive jurisdiction.
It would, therefore, be improper as well as inexpedient to
subject the Tribunal to the precedents in respect of the High

145-A. See, supra chapter 6, pp. l^U-1,

 302

Courts' decisions. Such decisions would, of course, have great

persuasive force for the Tribunal.

Next, the Act does not contain any provision regarding

the binding effect of the decision of one Bench of the

Tribunal over another Bench. Yet, the general principles

governing the doctrine of precents should apply to the

Tribunal . Thus, it has repeatedly been laid ' by the

Supreme Court that the decision of the larger Bench prevails

over the decision of the smaller Benches. In Sri Bhagwan Vs.

148
Ram Chandra it was, however, observed by Gajendragadkar,

C.J. that if a single Judge is inclined to disagree with the

earlier decision of his own Court, whether of a Division Bench

or of a Single Judge, he should refer the matter to the Chief

Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine

the question. It is submitted that this is the proper way

which should govern the different Benches of the Tribunal as

well.

7.35 Execution of Orders of the Tribunal

Section 27 of the Act, which speaks of "execution" of

orders, does not provide any machinery for execution outside
the administration. In fact, the section introduces a novel
feature by providing that its orders shall be executed in the

146. Kshma Kapur Vs. Union of India (1987)4 ATC 329; Vljaya Kumar Srlvastava Vs. Union of
India (1988)6 ATC 469.
147. See, e.g., Ganapatl S U a r a m Balvalkar Vs. Waman Shrlpad Mage, AIR 1981 SC 1956; Union of
India Vs. K.S.Subramanlam, AIR 1976 S.C. 433; Mathulala Vs. Radhe Lai, AIR 1974 S.C.
1569.
148. AIR 1965 S.C. 1767, at p. 1773.
 303

same manner in which the impugned order, whether made or

threatened to be made, would have been executed. In other

words, the successful party need not apply to the Tribunal

afresh for the execution of the order passed by it. Rather the

Tribunal's order would be implemented or carried out in the

same manner as the order of the respondent authority itself had

J
been implemented. Indeed, as rightly pointed by Justice

Goyal,K.N.; the use of the word "execution" in this sense is

unusual and out of place. For, the provision of section 27,

in this regard, is by way of direction to the authorities

concerned to carry out faithfully the orders of the Tribunal

which will stand as substitutes for the orders of the executive

authorities themselves.

7.352 Sanctions behind the order

In order to ensure compliance by the authorities in

implementation of the orders passed by the Tribunal there must

exist some sanctions behind it. The provision of section 17 of

the Act, which confers upon the Tribunal the power to punish

for its contempt, provides sufficient sanctions in this regard.

For, any act of disobedience or wilful neglect to carry out the

order of the Tribunal would, undoubtedly, amount to civil

contempt punishable by the Tribunal.

It may, thus, be pointed that the legal sanction for

compliance with the orders of the Tribunal is similar to that

behind a writ, order or direction issued by a High Court under

149. Supra note 98, at p. 377.

 304

Article 226, or by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the

Constitution.

The Government of India has also, accordingly, issued

administrative instructions for strict and prompt compliance

150
with the orders of the Tribunal ^ . Though neither the Act nor

the administrative instructions issued by the Government

specifies any period within which order of the Tribunal should

be Implemented but a period of three to six months was

considered to be a reasonable period, by the Tribunal in this

151
regard •* . In cases where the Government has filed or intends

to file a special leave petition to the Supreme Court under

Article 136 of the Constitution, it was considered to be

desirable to, at least provisionally, implement the judgement

of the Tribunal 152 .

7.35^ Extension of time for implementation

Sometimes, due to any grave administrative reason(s), the

respondent authority may find it very difficult to Implement
the decision of the Tribunal with the required promptness.
Under such circumstances it may have to face the dangerous
consequences of punishment under the contempt proceedings by
the Tribunal unless, either the operation of the order of the
Tribunal is stayed or time for its implementation is extended.
But, the basic question that arises, in this context, is
whether the Tribunal is possessed of the power to entertain

150. See, Circular dated August 11, 1987 set out 1n (1988)6 ATC (Statutes Section), p. 36 at
Sr. No. 12.
151. B.B.Lai Vs. Union of India (1990)13 ATC 758.
152. Ibid., para 14.
 305

any such application ? This issue came for discussion before

the Tribunal in Union of India Vs. Sadhan Chandra Naskar . It
was observed by the Tribunal that under section 27 of the Act,
the order of the Tribunal finally disposing of an application
or an appeal, is final. It, therefore, follows that "the nexus
between the Tribunal and the application ceases when the
application is disposed of by a final judgement/order passed
by the Tribunal, and the Tribunal becomes functus officio in
respect of an application after it disposes of the same by a
J
final judgement/order" .

It is submitted that the Tribunal was right in holding

that it did not enjoy any power, under the Act, to stay or
modify the operation of its final order. This is, indeed, a
serious flaw and lacuna in the Act which should be removed by
conferring suitable powers on the Tribunal, in this regard,
through an amendment of the Act. However, till any such
amendment comes about in the Act, it is the duty of the
Tribunal to act with restraint in moving the contempt
proceedings against any authority who could not implement its
order with the desired promptness due to any genuinely
compelling reasons.

7*35^ Proper framing of order granting relief

It may be observed that the provision of the direct
implementation of the orders of the Tribunal would greatly help
in saving the time and expense which would, otherwise, have
153. 1991(1) SLJ 195 (CAT-Cal.).
154. Ibid., paras 6 and 7.
 306

been wasted in pursuing the separate execution proceedings. In

order, however, that this provision proves to be really

efficacious in giving expeditions justice to the parties, a

special responsibility is placed upon the Tribunal to frame an

order in the proper language while awarding any relief to the

parties. Having regard to the peculiar provision of section 27

it would be more appropriate for the Tribunal to pass such

orders as may be carried out by the officials concerned

without any formal order being needed to be issued in

compliance therewith. For, as experience shows, very often even

after a writ peition is allowed, Government departments take a

lot of time in issuing necessary order for carrying out the

direction of the Court.

Yet, at the same time, it is also equally important to

point out that the Tribunal must not, in its zeal, overstep the

legal bounds in awarding any relief to a party. In fact, one

may find it very difficult to uphold or support the judicial

activism exhibited by the Tribunal, in some cases, by awarding

unconventional reliefs which might not be legally justifiable.

For instance, in the case of Abdul Hakim Vs. Union of

155
India , the applicant - a Railway Driver was found guilty of
negligence resulting into the accident of the train. In that
accident he also lost his leg. The Tribunal, while upholding
the finding of guilt, not only reduced the penalty of removal
to compulsory retirement but, further directed the Railway to

155. (1987)2 ATC 223 (Cal.).

 307

provide artificial limp to the applicant at its expense.

J
Similarly, in another case , while upholding as legally valid

an order of reversion of an applicant, it was nonetheless

quashed on the ground that the applicant had only a few months

to go before his retirement. The Tribunal took the view that it

was harsh to revert him four months before retirement. It is

submitted that the Tribunal does not possess the plenary power

to award any relief or benefit merely on ground of sympathy

and hardship, for as observed by Justice Goyal,K.N. •>'; hard

cases make bad law. In fact in cases of disciplinary

proceedings resulting in imposition of a penalty, the Tribunal

should take a pragmatic view and interfere with the quantum of

punishment only where it finds that the punishment is arbitrary

and grossly disproportionate to the charge proved. Similarly,

the Tribunal cannot, legally speaking, issue an order directing

the authorities that an "application may be considered

158
favourably" . It is submitted with respect, that the Tribunal
is ill-advised to embark upon or adopt any populistic approach.

7.36 Miscellaneous Matters Regarding Procedure

Some of the other important matters concerning the

procedure of the Tribunal may be discussed as under.

156. Chitta Ranjan Chowdhary Vs. Union of India (1987)3 ATC 891.
157. Supra note 98, at p. 4 1 7 .
158. Joglnder Singh Vs. Union of India (1989)11 ATC 474.
 308

7.361 Adjournments

Rule 19 of the Central Administrative Tribunal

(Procedural) Rules, 1987, specifically empowers the Tribunal to

adjourn the hearing of an application at any stage of the

proceedings if sufficient cause for grant of time is shown by

the parties or any of them. Further, while allowing an

adjournment, the Tribunal has been empowered to make any order

as to costs occasioned by the adjournment.

It has been found that in practice the Tribunal is very

lenient in exercising its discretionary power to grant

adjournments, which, it is submitted, is not a healthy trend

because, frequent adjournments of a case not only lead to delay

in its disposal but, also cause unnecessary burden as well as

physical and mental harassment to the aggrieved party. Hence,

the Tribunal should be very strict in granting adjournments.

Adjournment may be granted where a party is able to show, to

the satisfaction of the Tribunal, the existence of sufficient

reasons justifying grant of time to him or where the Tribunal

is satisfied that it would be in the interest of justice to

grant adjournment.

Even in such cases where the Tribunal is satisfied about

the genuineness of the request for adjournment by a party, it

should, in appropriate cases, make necessary order with respect

to the costs occasioned by the adjournment. Because, the other

party will not only have the satisfaction of having been

monetarily compensated but, it will also discourage a party

from seeking unnecessary adjournments.

 309

It may be pointed that the old Rule 17, which

corresponds to new Rule 19 of the Procedural Rules of 1987,

gave the Tribunal the power to grant adjournment "on such terms

as it deems fit". Thus, under the provisions of the old Rule

the Tribunal could impose not merely terms with regard to

costs but, any other terms as well. It is, however, submitted

that even in its amended form Rule (19) does not prevent the

Tribunal from imposing any other terms, apart from costs, while

granting adjournment. As has been rightly observed by Justice

159
K.N.Goyal ^ , it is an inherent power of the Tribunal to impose
suitable conditions while granting a prayer for adjournment.

7.362 Interim orders

Section 24 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to make

interim orders, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any

other manner. The non-obstante clause with which this section

begins has apparently been inserted because of the wide terms

in which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal

have been defined in section 14 of the Act. As the Supreme

Court and a High Court enjoy planary inherent powers under

Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to pass interlocutory

orders; and as the ordinary civil courts possess fairly wide

tne
powers under order 39 of Code of Civil Procedure to issue

injunctions, it has been specifically provided that the

corresponding powers of the Tribunal shall be exercised only

subject to the conditions or limitations laid down in section

159. Supra note 98, at pp.490-91.

 310

24 of the Act.

The Act lays down two conditions subject to which the

Tribunal may make an interim order:

(i) The applicant must furnish all documents supporting his

plea for interim relief, alongwith a copy of the applica-

tion to the party/parties against whom such application

is made; and

(ii) an opportunity to be heard in the matter must be given to

such party.

Since in certain kinds of service disputes, such as those

relating to recruitment, promotion, seniority, transfer, etc.

the interests of rival candidates or other public servants are

invariably effected it, therefore, becomes necessary to give a

reasonable notice and hearing to them as well. Likewise, even

in many other cases of termination, compulsory retirement,

reversion, recall from deputation, etc., if another person is

appointed or promoted in place of the applicant, then that

person should also have a right to notice and also of

opportunity of being heard in the matter before any interim

order is passed.
It may be noticed that the Act lays down mere procedural
requirements which have to be observed before making an interim
order . Once these requirements are complied with it becomes
a matter of discretion for the Tribunal whether to make an

160. Even these requirements may be dispensed with 1n certain exceptional situations, see,
Infra, pp.313.-Z,
 311

interim order in a case or not. Yet, in the exercise of its

discretion the Tribunal cannot act arbitrarily but, it must be

guided by certain principles. As observed by the Chandigarh

Bench in Mr. N.S.Saravade Vs. Union of India , a request for

interim relief can sustain only if three conditions co-exists.

These are:

(i) The applicant has a prima-facie case;

(ii) balance of convenience lies in his favour; and

(iii) he will suffer an irreparable injury in case the request

for interim relief is not granted

If an application raises arguable issues of significance

and importance which merit serious consideration, it can be

safely said that the applicant has a prima-facie case. However,

it will not be open to the Tribunal to entertain an application

under section 19 of the Act merely for granting interim relief

if the application is not fit to be admitted because, as

required by section 20, other remedies have not been exhausted.

Similarly, an applicant, whose case falls within the

jurisdictional purview of industrial Tribunal, cannot come to

the Administrative Tribunal simply for the reason that the

industrial Tribunal cannot grant interim relief under the

Industrial law. Of course, the Administrative Tribunal would

161. 1990(2) SLJ 14 (CAT-Chd.).

162. Ibid., at p. 16.
 312

interfere in such matters when there is a case fit for

intervention but, that does not mean that the Tribunal should

interfere merely because it has the power of granting interim

relief 163 .

As regards the second ingredient, it is incumbent upon

the applicant to prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal

that he has been put to a great inconvenience or disadvantage

by the impuged order and if the interim relief, sought by him,

is granted by the Tribunal it would greatly tilt the scales of

convenience in his favour without causing any substantial

inconvenience to the other party/parties.

The last ingredient of irreparable Injury is of

fundamental Importance in this regard. In fact the proviso to

section 24 of the Act, which provides for the issue of interim

orders in exceptional cases, empowers the Tribunal to dispense

with the requirements of notice and hearing before making an

interim order in a case where it finds it necessary so to do

for preventing any loss being caused to the applicant which can

not be adequately compensated in terms of money. It may be

noticed that the ground for issuing an interim order under

exceptional situation is almost the same as is required to

exist in normal situation under the requirement of the third

ingredient of 'irreparable injury' laid down by the Tribunal in

164
the above mentioned Saravade's case . It was, perhaps, for
this obvious reason that the Guwahati Bench of the Tribunal,

163. A . A k M n l r a j Vs. Union of India, 1991(2) SLJ 77 (CAT-Had.) , para 2.

164. Supra note 161.
 313

J
in an earlier case had held that 'ordinarily1, in allowing

interim relief we would be guided by the same principle as laid

down in the proviso to section 2k of the Act for granting

interim relief in exceptional cases. Thus, the exceptional

clause may be invoked only in rare cases of grave nature

seriously affecting the interest of the applicant. It may,

however, be observed that a drastic interim order greatly

affecting any public interest or the interest of other parties,

should not, generally be passed without hearing the other

parties, even if the circumstances justify issuing such an

order.

It may be pointed that the Courts are very lenient and

liberal in granting interim reliefs. The Supreme Court has, in

many cases , taken a serious note of the practice of reckless

and indiscriminate grant of stay orders by the Courts.

It is submitted that the Tribunal must act with due

circumspection while exercising its power to grant interim

relief. The Tribunal must fully deliberate upon the issues

before making an interim order. Because, to grant interim

relief straightway and leave it to the other party to move the

Tribunal to vacate it may seriously jeopardise the public

interest. Moreover, it is notorious how if an interim order is

once made by a Court/Tribunal, parties employ every device and

tactic to ward off the final hearing of the application. In

165. Janananda Sarma Pathak, I.P.S. Vs. Union of India, 1987(1) SLJ 104 (CAT-Guwahat1), at
p.lll.
166. See, e.g., Union of India V s . Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd., AIR 1984 S.C. 1264; Asstt.
Collector of Central Excise Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985)1 SCC 260; State of Rajasthan
Vs. Swalka Properties (1985)3 SCC 2 1 7 .
 314

such a case the interim order has the effect of practically

allowing the application at the stage of admission without

going into the merits of the case.

Thus, there lies a heavy duty and responsibility on the

Tribunal to make judicious exercise of this power. The main

purpose of passing an interim order is to evolve a workable

formula or a workable arrangement to the extent deemed

necessary under the situation in order that no irreparable

injury is occasioned to the applicant. But, while doing so,

the Tribunal has to strike a delicate balance between the

public and private interests Involved.

Lastly, it may be pointed out that an interim order made

under the exceptional provision of section 24, without notice

and hearing, can remain in operation just for a period of 14

days unless, the requirements of notice and hearing are

complied with before the expiry of that period and the Tribunal

has continued the operation of the interim order. However, a

situation may arise when due to any vacancy, arising during

this intervening period of fourteen days, it may not be

possible to constitute a proper Bench at that place. In that

eventuality the interim order is bound to cease to have effect

as it would be impossible to give hearing to the parties. It

is, therefore, submitted that section 24 of the Act calls for a

suitable amendment to the effect that in the absence of the

formation of a regularly constituted Bench, the interim order

earlier passed shall remain operative till the constitution of

next Bench.
 315

7.363 Reviewing its decision

It is a well settled principle of law that apart from

correcting clerical mistakes or errors arising from an

accidential slip or omission, a judicial Tribunal has no

inherent power to review its decision . It can do so only if

it is authorised by law. It is because of this reason that

this power has been expressly conferred on the Tribunals

constituted under the Act. Though the Act does not specify the

conditions for the grant of review but, the corresponding

provision of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

which gives power to a civil Court to review its decisions, may

afford sufficient guidance to the Tribunal in this regard.

Accordingly, review of a decision is permissible on the

following grounds:

(i) On the ground of the discovery of new and important

matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due

deligence, was not within the knowledge of the party or

could not be produced by him at the time when the decree

was passed or order made;

(ii) on account of some mistake or any error apparent on the

face of the record; and

(iii) for any other sufficient reason.

167. Nathu Lai Vs. Collector, Sawal Jaipur, AIR 1952 Raj. 36; Sampu Gowda Vs. State of
Mysore, AIR 1953 Hys. 156 (F.B.). Anantha Raju Vs. Appu Hegade, AIR 1919 Mad. 244.
168. Section 22(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
 316

The expression "any other sufficient reason", which

constitutes as the third ground of review, has been construed
to mean and include a reason sufficiently analogous to those
I6Q
specified immediately previously . For instance, failure to
advert to a provision of law has been held to be a ground
170
analogous to error apparent on the face of the record
171
However, in the case of Union of India Vs. A.Joganandan the
Cuttak Bench of the Tribunal held that clarification can be a
ground for seeking review. In doing so reliance was placed on
the Supreme Court Judgement in Union of India Vs. Ranjit
Thakur172.
Normally, a review application can be made by a party to
the case in which the judgement in question was made. However,
this is not a mandatory condition for seeking review before the
Tribunal. In John Lucas Vs. Additional Chief Mechanical
,J
Engineer, S.C. Railways it was held that even a person
who was not a party to the earlier proceeding in which the
decision in question was rendered, may also seek a review of
174
the decision. The Full Bench observed ' that although the
Tribunal is vested with the powers of a Civil Court for
reviewing its decisions yet, it is at liberty to evolve its own
procedure and, as ordained by sub-section (1) of section 22
of Chhajju
169.
the Act, it has to be guided by the principles of
Ram Vs. N e M , AIR 1922 P.C. 112.
natural
170. Har1 Shankar Vs. Amar Nath, AIR 1949 F.C. 106.
171. 1990(1) SLJ 531 (CAT-Cutt.).
172. 1988(2) SCALE 1618 S.C.
173. 1987(2) SLJ 326 (CAT-Bang.).
174. Ibid., para 6.
 317

justice and is not constrained by the strict provision of the

Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, in the absence of any

provision to the contrary in the Act or any other law for the

time being in force, the Tribunal can entertain a review

petition even from a non-party feeling himself aggrieved. Not

only that, it was also held that the Tribunal may even review
175
its judgement suo-moto .
176
Under the Rules , a review petition must be filed
within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of

which the review is sought. In Nand Lai Nichani Vs. Union of

177
India it was observed by the Tribunal that as against a

review petitioner time commences to run from the date the order

in question is communicated. In this case the Full Bench of

the Tribunal also held that it has the power to condone delay

in the filing of a review petition where a sufficient cause is

made out to the satisfaction of the Bench concerned to condone

suchdelay ' .

In line with the practice obtaining in the Supreme Court

and the High Courts, the new Rule 17 of the Central

Administrative Tribunal (Procedural) Rules, 1987, provides that

a review petition should ordinarily be heard by the same Bench

which had passed the order in question. However, the Chairman

may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct a review

175. Ibid. , at p. 332.
176. Rule 17(1) of the Procedural Rules of 1987.
177. 1989(10) ATC 113.
178. Cf. Union of India Vs. Shri M.C.Sharma 1990(1) SLJ 10 (CAT-Jodb.), para 13.
179. As amended 1n 1988, vide Notification No. GSR 1000(E), dated 11.10.88.
 318

petition to be heard by any other Bench. For example, one of

the obvious reasons necessitating the constitution of a new

Bench for review may be the non-availability of a Member or

Members who has/have resigned or whose term has since expired.

It is submitted that if one of the Members in unavailable, the

reviewing Bench should have the other Members, in addition to

the new Member.

In Shri Raghavan Nadarajan Vs. Captain DGM (Admn) and

others the validity of Rule 17(iii), providing for the

disposal of a review petition by circulation, was challenged,

inter-alia, on the ground that it goes against the provision of

section 22(2) of the Act which requires that all applications

shall be disposed of after hearing oral arguments. While

upholding the validity of the said rule, it was observed by the

Tribunal that the provision of section 22(2) applies to

applications filed under section 19 of the Act and not to

review petition/application. It was pointed that even the

181
Supreme Court Rules, whose validity has already been upheld ,

also provide for disposal of a review petition by circulation.

However, in M.Ramachandran Vs. Director of Audit S.Railway,

-i O p

Madras , it was suggested by the Tribunal that dispensation

of oral hearing is permissible only at the initial stage while
considering the question whether to reject or grant review.
But, once an application for review is granted or admitted the
Tribunal should give oral hearing to the parties before it is
disposed of on merit
180. 1989(3) SLJ 199 (CAT-New Delhi); (1980)9 ATC 671.
181. P.N.Eswara Iyer Vs. Registrar, AIR 1980 S.C. 808.
182. 1990(1) SLJ 673 (CAT-Mad.) para 7.
183. Cf., P.A. Jayakar Vs. Union of India, 1990(2) SLJ 691 (CAT-N. Bombay), (para 8 . ) .
 319

It may be pointed, in the end, that the tendency of

moving review petitions against the final orders of the

Tribunal has been found to be very common. And in the majority

of the cases review petitions are filed by way of chance

without any merits. Though such petitions are bound to meet

the fate of rejection at the stage of the admission only but

in any case, the time of the Registry and the Bench is

unnecessarily wasted which, ultimately, not only leads to

delays in the final disposal of cases, but also causes

inconvenience to the parties. It is, therefore, suggested that

with a view to discourage the unhealthy practice of taking out

frivolous review petitions the Tribunal should take the bold

step of awarding heavy costs in cases where it finds a

deliberate misuse of this provision. Specific provision may

also be made in the rules framed by the Centre Government, in

this regard, authorising a Tribunal to impose heavy costs in

such cases. Moreover, it must also be clearly laid in the

rules that a review application may be made only against a

final decision of the Tribunal and not in case of other orders.