SPECIAL ARTICLE
Quran as Discourse
Engineer’s Case for a Politics of Liberation
Nazeer A Majeed
In his reading of the Quran, Asghar Ali Engineer
emphasises the egalitarian promise of politics in Islam. A
truly Islamic politics is defined in terms of liberation of
the underprivileged masses which, according to him, is
part of the Quranic project. He has critiqued the global
politics of Islamic revivalism from this perspective and
sought cooperation across Islamic and secular
ideological lines in maximisation of justice and human
progress. In this article, his championing of this
alternative “Islamic” politics, which is universally relevant
and can also be supported by rights groups who, rather
than getting alarmed, may find enough reasons to make
common cause with, is discussed.
Nazeer A Majeed (nazeermajeed@gmail.com) is with Aligarh Muslim
University, Aligarh.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 11, 2014 vol xlix no 41
A
sghar Ali Engineer (1939-2013) is best known for his
documentation and analysis of Hindu-Muslim communal
riots. As a writer and activist, he is also known as a
man of multiple discourses (secularism, interfaith relations,
gender jihad, and liberation theology).1 However, his champi-
oning of an alternative Islamic politics of liberation still re-
mains a lesser known, and least discussed, aspect of his intel-
lectual career. He not only envisaged alliances of underprivi-
leged Muslims, Christians, and Hindus (dalits and tribals)
“within the country” and of anti-imperialist forces “outside the
country” for this politics, but also laboured to demonstrate, in
a cosmopolitan and non-sectarian language, its urgency (espe-
cially in the years following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in
Iran) and universal applicability. He had good knowledge of
Arabic and Persian and was trained in traditional Islamic sci-
ences by his father who was a religious leader of the Bohra
community. While arguing his case on the basis of the Quran,
Hadith, and reason, he also enlisted the most authoritative
sources of mainstream Sunni Islam – Shafi’i, Ibn Hazm, Ghaz-
ali, Shatibi, and Ibn Taymiyyah, among others – in his sup-
port.2 His main source, in any case, was his own reading of the
Quran in a social perspective, which he called a socio-theolog-
ical reading because ideals uprooted from social complexes
become abstract concepts or unrealisable goals put on a pedes-
tal to pay homage to (Engineer 1985: 81).
Engineer was a perceptive observer of the “resurgent”
Islamic world, and the most persistent and consistent critic in
India, and perhaps in the world, of the worldwide politics of
Islamisation. He consistently critiqued Islamic revivalist move-
ments around the globe mainly for one reason – their medie-
valism. They are fond of the structures and institutions that
evolved in medieval Islam, while, according to him, religion
comprises values, not institutions. Their romance with medie-
val Islam, which is feudalistic and hierarchical, and lacking in
the most important aspect of the prophetic religion, egalitari-
anism and social justice, makes them, as revolutionaries of
god, avoid the “mundane” politics of the masses, neglecting
their material condition. The Quran elucidates the concept of a
just social order, irrespective of the nature of the state struc-
ture, and to implement Quranic punishments without fully im-
plementing a just social system is in itself zulm (oppression).
However, the priority of Islamists, as politicians of god, is to
Islamise states by covering up the womenfolk, chopping off the
hands of petty thieves, and flogging (or stoning) adulterers.
Punitive measures that do not disturb the status quo, rather
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than egalitarianism, are upheld as the central concern of
Islamic politics. From India to Pakistan, to Iran and other parts
of the Islamic world, the most obvious sign that the so-called
Islamic revolutionaries’ support the feudal status quo is that
social justice is absent from their agenda, and that the upper
strata of society has a hegemony on their leadership. Yet the
Quran promises egalitarianism, and the leadership of the
meek and oppressed of the earth (Engineer 1985: 27, 2008:
134, 2012: 128).
To claim that the Quran is one’s constitution, in a positive
sense as the Islamists do, is naïve. Islam, as a religion, provides
us with a set of norms and values. An Islamic state in a norma-
tive sense is a valid concept. However, it is difficult to accept this
concept in a positive sense, “scientifically speaking”. Keeping
this distinction between the normative and positive in view,
Engineer maintains that Islamic teachings and doctrines are
normative, and do not constitute any positive science. Shura
(consultation), a Quranic normative value, for example, cannot
be the equivalent (or “superior”) of democracy in a positive
sense, as the Islamists claim. Even values evolve, and “to be in
the spirit of the Quran”, they have to be rethought. The concept
of justice, for example, has greatly expanded in modern times,
including human rights as well. It was only after the advent of
socialism and socialist philosophy that justice to the weaker sec-
tions became important. Engineer complains that the Islamic
world is today far removed from the Quranic ideal of justice.
Most Muslim countries are still wallowing in feudal and semi-feudal
eras where the concept of justice tends to be feudal in orientation. (One
reason why what goes in the name of the Muslim personal law in India
is no more just.) Human rights is treated with contempt and denounced
as ‘Western’ in origin and not acceptable to Islam (1989: 159-60).
Engineer’s reading of the Quran is a modernist and socialist
one. We need to evolve, he maintains, a “socio-theological
approach” to the Quranic verses, revealed to a Meccan society
with a mercantile economy where disparities of wealth were
fast developing, to understand their correct import. Mecca, the
birthplace of Islam, was then a centre of international com-
merce. There had emerged a social class of powerful mer-
chants specialising in complex international financial opera-
tions and commercial transactions. The rich merchants had
formed intertribal corporations to monopolise trade with
regions of the Byzantine Empire and accumulated large prof-
its, never distributing a part of it to the poor and needy of their
tribes. The mercantile capitalism of Mecca was, in a sense, the
prototype of modern industrial capitalism. Feudalism was a
later development in Arabia (Engineer 1984: 25, 1985: 164,
1989: 154-55, 2012: 127-28, 178-79).
The Quran warned rich Meccans, and through them all
humanity, in less of a theological and more of a secular idiom,
that a town gets destroyed when its rich (those leading easy
lives) transgress all limits in consumption. Only distributive
justice can prevent such a disaster (17: 16). Accumulation of
wealth was disapproved of, and believers were advised to give
away in the way of Allah (that is, to the poor and needy) what
was left after meeting their basic needs – “They ask thee how
much they are to spend; say afw” (what is beyond your needs)
60
(2: 219). The poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal even saw
traces of the concept of Islamic communism in this Quranic
doctrine of afw (superfluous). It is an integral part of Quranic
theology that wealth should not remain concentrated in the
hands of the rich – “(Let wealth) not circulate between the rich
among you” (57: 7). The Quran makes it clear that the right to
property or wealth is subject to a share for the weaker sections
of society – “And in their wealth the beggar and the deprived
(who does not beg) have their due share” (51: 19).
If Moses was the liberator of the Israelites, Muhammad was
the liberator of all humankind through liberating the weak
among them. The Communist Manifesto talks of the “dictator-
ship of the proletariat”, but the Quran, more than 1,400 years
ago, talked of the leadership of the weaker sections of society,
though not of dictatorship, and recognised that absolute power
could easily lead to injustice – “And We desired to show favour
unto those who were oppressed in the earth, and to make them
leaders and to make them the inheritors of the earth” (28: 5).3
Politicians of God
The fundamentals of an Islamic polity as laid down in the
Quran, in Engineer’s reading, are very different from what
was and what is being enacted in its name by the powerful
vested interests in Islamic countries. In an Islamic revolution,
the differences between the weak and powerful ought to be
urgently addressed, as the first caliph Abu Bakr maintained in
his first speech as the political successor to the Prophet. Ali,
the fourth caliph, described the concept very succinctly when
he said an Islamic revolution would go on “until the lowliest of
you would become the highest in status and the highest among
you would become the lowliest among you and those left
behind would surpass those who had left them behind”. Islam,
during the Prophet’s lifetime and a little later, was an ideolo-
gical force challenging the status quo everywhere. The early
Muslims also believed in exporting revolution to the most
powerful empires of the day – Byzantine and Sassanid. Umar
issued instructions that all the estates left behind by Roman
and Persian nobles in conquered lands be returned to the
native cultivators. He strictly forbade the Muslim army from
distributing these lands among soldiers as booty, and rejected
requests by the army officers who wanted to purchase and cul-
tivate them. But, perhaps, historical forces were not ripe enough
to let this progressive land-tenure policy last long, and the Isla-
mic state could not have altered the productive forces outside
Arabia that eventually overcame the Islamic revolution.4
In modern times, Islamic revivalists and revolutionaries have
occasionally invoked this egalitarian and anti-status quo prom-
ise of politics in Islam. It is interesting to note that in countries
such as Algeria and Egypt the middle and the upper class elites
support the military regime, while the poorer masses support
Islamic militants. However, contrary to the expectations of the
masses, it is the “politics of the ruling classes that dominates
Islam and not vice versa”. Even Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-
Americanism is not to be misunderstood as anti-capitalism, as
he was no less determined to keep Islam medievalised in the
interests of the status quo. When pressed for economic reforms
october 11, 2014 vol xlix no 41 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

after the revolution, Khomeini said that Iran’s revolution was
essentially for God’s sake, not for the economy’s. “Our Muslim
nation did not revolt for melon”, said Khomeini. It is interesting
to note that this statement came in the wake of a serious eco-
nomic crisis in Iran. There was a high rate of inflation and seri-
ous unemployment. (The prices of some commodities had risen
by 30% to 150% and the unemployment rate was as high as
17%.) But the Iranian patriarch’s priority was the “spread of Is-
lam” (including fighting with another Muslim country) even if
it meant economic hardships for the people.5
Khomeini’s assertion that the Iranian people did not revolt for
melon, nonetheless, is not to be taken uncritically. His own radi-
cal posturing during and after the revolution was to the con-
trary. For example, the radical Children of the War mobilised
masses of people to fight on the Iran-Iraq war front. Khomeini
favoured them. When the ulama (scholars who are recognised
as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theol-
ogy) asked him for permission to preach in favour of the sanctity
of private property “as laid down in Islam”, Khomeini replied
that doing so during the war would discourage young people
from volunteering for martyrdom. He then said to them, I do
not need you; I need volunteers who can go and fight.
This posturing is indeed very intriguing. It shows that the
volunteers and martyrs, as well as the poor masses they be-
longed to, were originally inspired and mobilised by the power
of ideas of intellectuals such as Ayatollah Taleghani and Ali
Shariati, and organisations such as the Mojahidin-e-Khalq, an
Islamic revolutionary party under whose pressure even Kho-
meini had, before the revolution, theorised that the god of the
Quran was on the side of the weak, as in Egypt (28: 5), so in
Mecca (4: 148) and in Iran or anywhere in the world in the
struggle against powerful oppressors. He frequently quoted
the verse of the Quran that promises leadership and power to
the weak and oppressed in the land (28: 5) in his support.
However, like other ulama and Islamists, Khomeini too was a
champion of medieval Islam. That is why, after the revolution,
when pressed for revolutionary Islamic measures, he resorted
to conservatism, banning music and putting women under the
chador (veil), for example, and came down heavily on the
Mojahedin and the leftist groups, who shared with him the
Islamic faith as well as his, by now forsaken, Quranic vision,
and also were his allies and partners in the revolution.
After assuming power, Khomeini declared a 14-point pro-
gramme, which had only one point related to the weaker
sections of Iranian society. According to this, the country’s
underprivileged would be provided with “free water and elec-
tricity”. When Khomeini died in early June 1989, there were
several issues of an urgent nature debated by the clergy in
Iran. Among these were whether the effort to export the
revolution should continue; whether economic policy should
take a leftward tilt, leading to land reforms and the redistribution
of the land to the tiller; and whether foreign trade should be
nationalised. A year after, there were food riots in Tehran.6
Sometimes people are attracted to Islamists for the “promise”
of a moral alternative in politics. The poorer masses, sick of cor-
ruption, think that Islam will provide it. However, the Iranian
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
experience speaks otherwise. Even a revolutionary Islamic re-
gime cannot ensure cleaner and corruption-free politics. The
Islamic Republic of Iran today, Engineer says, is hardly any dif-
ferent from other Islamic countries. It is dogged with economic
problems, it is rife with corruption, and it can hardly claim to be
morally superior to any other country. Of course, it is an “Islamic
republic”, but only to the extent that there is prohibition there;
there are some public performances of Islamic rituals; and
women have to stick to a certain dress code.7
A general belief of Islamists is that western materialism is a
major source of corruption in the Muslim world. Instead, Engi-
neer says, concentration of wealth, as of power, is the real cul-
prit. A perceptive observer of human society can never agree
with the naïve assertions of Islamists. While in any society
integrity of human character and scrupulousness of conduct is
a must, they cannot be ensured without establishing an egali-
tarian and just society. Vast differentials in income, as they
exist today, are a major source of corruption as well as social
tension and class conflict in almost all Islamic countries. How-
ever, the orthodox proponents of Islamic states, “be he
Maududi of Pakistan, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia or Ayatollah
Khomeini of Iran”, knowingly or unknowingly – more probably
knowingly – try to deceptively assume a simple position – that
it is Western materialism that has brought about moral degen-
eration and things can be set right only if the provisions of the
Islamic sharia (canonical law) are strictly enforced, and reli-
gion and spiritualism become dominant in life.
An ideology, Islamic or otherwise, can certainly provide
valuable guidelines and a framework of values, but by itself it
can never become the “final solution”. But Islamic militants do
not take the human (aspect of the) problem into account and,
taking for granted an Islamic society of morally perfect human
beings, claim that “Islam is the only solution”. This is how
Maududi dogmatically refuses to take into account various
interests and how they influence the policies of a modern state.
He thinks that in an Islamic society there is no conflict be-
tween capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, and
the rulers and the ruled. It is quite obvious that he considers
religious conflict as the basic conflict even in a modern polity,
thus betraying a very superficial understanding of religion and
the motive forces of human society. Religion, even in its most
abstract and universal form, cannot be fully segregated from
its concrete social milieu. Even a medieval thinker such as Ibn
Khaldun had no difficulty in appreciating this.8
Politics of Islamisation
Engineer introduced the politics of liberation for the first time
in contemporary Islamic discourse, and he was followed by a
much-hyped South African professor, Farid Esack who, never-
theless, does not offer a critique of worldwide Islamist politics
in Quran, Liberation and Pluralism (Esack 1997). This makes
his case more contextual than universal. Seyyed Vali Reza
Nasr in Islamic Leviathan (Nasr 2001) shares with him a
general criticism of the politics of Islamisation: It was used by
postcolonial Muslim states to legitimise power, and avoid the
urgent tasks of rationalisation of the state and politics through
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socio-economic and political reforms (democratisation, gen-
der and land reform). For its thoroughness, Engineer’s critique
of worldwide Islamist politics is unique.
Debunking the religious politics of Islamic rulers, Engineer
quotes Karl Marx who dubbed any state claiming to be Christian
(or Jewish) a hypocritical state.
Marx has said in ‘On the Jewish Question’ that one must distinguish be-
tween religious attitude to politics and political attitude to religion. It
would not be difficult to establish that the rulers have adopted political
attitude towards religion throughout the Islamic countries. Religion is
being used by these rulers to strengthen the forces of status quo.9
The Quranic revelation, as is “very clear” from the early his-
tory of Islam, was not meant to sanctify the status quo but to
change it for the better and establish justice and equality. How-
ever, as Engineer finds it, the ulama, as a class, are feudal; as
in Iran, so in Pakistan, and India. In a conference held in Mecca
in Saudi Arabia in 1976, the ulama categorically rejected the
concept of a public sector or nationalisation as “un-Islamic” as
it would deprive Muslims (that is, monarchs and feudal lords)
of their “Islamic right” to hold property.10
Making observations about Muslim politics in colonial India,
B R Ambedkar said that Muslim tenants would never join Hindu
tenants to prevent the tyranny of a landlord, and that Muslim
labourers would not join Hindu labourers in the fight of labour
against capital for the simple reason that it might harm a Mus-
lim landlord or capitalist, which would result in weakening the
community in its fight against Hindus.11 In Ambedkar’s time, it
was the Hindus, in the postcolonial Muslim world, it was the
communists. The ulama in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (in-
cluding Islamic theorists), in their rush to “protect” the Muslim
masses from falling prey to communism, emphasised the “God-
given right” of Muslim feudal lords to private property, as if
there was no Islamic ground to hold on between the devil and
the deep sea (feudalism and communism).
The concept of property, therefore, was treated as an abstrac-
tion, without distinguishing between property in the form of
means of production, which is used for exploiting the labour of
others, and personal property meant for direct consumption.
According to Engineer, socialist concepts and institutions come
much nearer to the Quranic spirit of social justice. It is clearly
stated in the Quran that no bearer of burden shall bear the bur-
den of others (35: 18). Though the context is that of divine jus-
tice on the day of judgment, it nevertheless implies that no one
in this world shall work for the comforts and luxuries of others.
This verse is a clear denial of the “right” to extract labour with-
out fully compensating for it, which the feudal or capitalist sys-
tems sanction in one form or the other. The Quran says, again
in the context of divine justice, that man shall get what he
strives for (50: 39). This is a clear enunciation of the principle
of ownership of wealth based on one’s work or labour. A property
acquired by exploitation, speculation, or by any means (feudal,
for example) other than by one’s own labour, cannot have any
sanction in Islam. It is in this Quranic spirit that the Prophet
prohibited sharecropping or owning land that is not cultivated
by the owner himself. And it is in this spirit that speculation and
future trading in commodities have been banned in Islam.12
62
It is not only motives, but also a simplistic understanding of
the feudal and capitalist systems that is indicted by Engineer’s
criticism of the Islamist perpetrators of the status quo. In third
world countries, there can be no solution to the problem of
poverty without implementing land reforms. However, it is
hardly on the agenda of any Islamic country publicising its
“Islamisation” programme. Pakistan, for example, badly needs
implementation of land reforms. The committee of expert
economists for Islamisation set up by Zia-ul-Haq stressed the
urgent need for such reforms. One may object that there were
no ulama on the committee, and that the modernists or eco-
nomic experts have no right to talk about an Islamic economic
system. “Nothing could be more misleading than this”, Engi-
neer says. “The ulama are no less ignorant of modern econom-
ics. They have no right to talk about it.” The only economic
reform that the ulama and Islamic theorists supported under
Zia’s Islamisation programme was to establish “interest-free
banks”, which in no way harmed the powerful landlords res-
ponsible for perpetuating poverty. This not only clearly
betrayed the class character of the Zia regime, but also the
ulama’s poor understanding of modern economics.13
Zakat (payment made annually on certain kinds of property
and used for charitable and religious purposes), they believe,
is the final solution to all problems even in a modern economy.
They have no idea of social health and distributive justice.
Zakat, which was fixed at 2.5%, even when it was paid hon-
estly and collected and redistributed by the government, was
not sufficient to check aggravating disparities of income and
concentration of wealth when the productive forces were not
yet feudalised. The modern industrial capitalist economy is a
different thing altogether.14
What Riba Must Include
The concept of riba (usury) is no less misunderstood, says
Engineer. In the politics of Islamisation, from Iran to Pakistan,
bank interest was interpreted as riba. But the “crassest form of
exploitation”, that is rural moneylenders, who in many cases
happened to be big landlords, taking interest from poor peas-
ants was completely ignored. The rate of usury on such lend-
ing, during the height of Zia’s Islamisation programme, was
said to be as high as 100% a year.
The ulama take riba to mean usury and bank interest, and
nothing more, ignoring that the prohibition of riba is integrally
connected to the concepts of adl and ihsan (justice and equity).
Some modernists like Fazlur Rahman contend that riba is only
usury, and should not be interpreted as bank interest. Neither
of the two views is truly representative of the Quranic spirit.
Given the modern economic system, riba, according to Engi-
neer, must be understood as exploitative profit and not merely
a fixed rate of interest. Profit in an industrial economy that is
production oriented is highly exploitative. Consumption, pro-
duction, and distribution form an integrated whole in the mod-
ern capitalist economy. Riba has to be viewed as a part of this
complex whole. It would not do to set up interest-free banks on
a profit-sharing basis within the capitalist framework. The
actual purpose of the prohibition of riba cannot be realised
october 11, 2014 vol xlix no 41 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

without ending exploitation in all forms. The concept of riba,
in Engineer’s opinion, must also include the “quick and easy
profit” through investments made in certain areas to the
exclusion of others, ignoring acutely felt social needs.
Moreover, in a modern capitalist economy, one has to take
cognisance of inflation. In an inflationary economy, interest-
free banking creates its own problems. In a modern economy
that is integrated with the global economy, based mainly on
interest, it is small depositors who lose out and capitalist bor-
rowers investing in high profit-seeking areas who gain tremen-
dously, thus leading to more intense exploitation. It constitutes
riba in that the borrowers benefit at the cost of those who save
(small depositors). (Among other things, any Islamic economic
theory will have to answer the question of how to control infla-
tion without the manipulation of rates of interest.)15
In a volume edited by him, Engineer has included an interest-
ing story from the Islamisation programme carried out in Iran.
As revolutionaries of god, the revolutionary committees in every
town forced usurers to “compensate” their debtors with the
interest they had taken from them before the revolution. It was
a comic opera. The customers of the usurers were rich farmers,
industrialists, and merchants who needed money to run their
businesses to make more money. They were “compensated” by
the amount of interest they had been paid before and this made
them still richer. Workers and peasants, who could see the “Is-
lamic face” of justice in this transfer of money from one section
of the rich to the other, looked on in bewilderment.16
For Engineer, the abiding value of Marxism lies in the
insights that it gives into the exploitative system of capitalism.
The Pakistan committee for Islamisation seemed to be in full
agreement with him. It pointed out “very significantly” that
The Islamic injunction against riba constitutes a rejection of the entire
capitalist system. It is in fact a signal for a complete restructuring of the
entire economic system along Islamic lines. The Islamic principle of al-
Adl wal-Ehsan (justice and equity) must be reflected in the basic con-
sumption, production and distribution relationships. To think of abol-
ishing riba without reference to the totality of the Islamic economic sys-
tem is to put cart before the horse. In fact there is a real danger that the
abolition of riba and its replacement by the profit-sharing system will
increase the level of economic exploitation of the poor by the rich,
thereby negating the basic Islamic principle of al-Adl wal-Ehsan.17
However, in the writings of the ideologues of a superior
Islamic economic system, Engineer finds “no traces” of a grasp
of the critique of industrial capitalism by Marx (for example,
his theory of surplus value which, according to Engineer, forms
the basis of exploitation of labour in the capitalist system, or
his forecast about the diminishing return of profit with the
change in the organic composition of capital, or his denuncia-
tion of the bourgeois concept of equality in his celebrated
critique of the Gotha programme). Let alone traditional schol-
ars like Maududi and Baqir al-Sadr who can hardly be ex-
pected to know much about the modern social sciences, even
the Islamists “who have acquired modern qualifications” in
these sciences do not show much evidence of a thorough grasp
of modern economics, and, while earnestly establishing what
they claim to be a superior economic system, none of them has
attempted (as Marx has) any thorough analysis of modern
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capitalism or an informed critique of Marxist socialism, except
repeating certain clichés of the moral imperative without its
proper sociological concept.18
New Generation of Muslims
Engineer is convinced that Islam, if reinterpreted, would certainly
enthuse poor and downtrodden Muslims.19 He was developing
a theology of liberation in Islam not merely as an academic dis-
cipline; but championing the cause of the underprivileged very
seriously. And that is why he was not satisfied with the response
he received. Speaking about this, he says, “Some attempt (to
formulate a theology of liberation in Islam) has been made by
the writer of these lines but there is not adequate response and
it does not seem to be very likely in near future.”20
Engineer feels confident of the career, and historical role, of
Islam in India, “Islam has been, since the colonial days, a rally-
ing point for the Muslims to fight against foreign domination
and exploitation … Islam now, therefore, needs to be used as a
revolutionary force against internal enemies (vested interests
nearer home supporting the status quo).” However, he is not
very confident of the role of Muslim intellectual leaders in the
task, least of all the ulama, “It appears that the ulama have thrown
their lot with the perpetrators of status quo. Now it is for the
Muslim intelligentsia to take lead. Will they prove any different?
Though I am not very hopeful I wish I am proved wrong.”21 He,
nonetheless, sees, or foresees, in the “new generation of Muslims”,
leaders capable and worthy of their role both as intellectual and
political leaders, not only in India, but in the world at large.
Indian Muslims have not produced a single leader with future vision
who could give new direction and infuse dynamism into them. Let us
hope the new generation of Muslims will throw up such leadership
capable of solving more down to earth problems facing the Indian
Muslims … It is my fervent desire that the new generation of Muslims
should not be content with mere rethinking defenses of medieval
Islam. It should rather boldly face the new problems thrown up by the
modern society and rethink the doctrinal structure of Islam so as to
make its value-structure more meaningful in a concrete sense.22
And as he was not a religious or ideological fanatic, he even
sought, with all sincerity and earnestness, cooperation across
ideological boundaries, and a critical engagement with secu-
lar ideologies, “This revolutionary theology would not reject
but cooperate with any secular ideology which strives towards
maximisation of social justice and human progress.”23 Other
than democracy, human rights, and secularism, he names
socialism, humanism, and modernism in this context. Huma-
nism with all its philosophical implications may not be accept-
able to Muslims, but many of its important implications are not
repugnant to Islam. On the contrary, they are in basic accord
with it. It is now a question of emphasis and assimilation. Mod-
ernism, unfortunately, has been preached among Muslims by
the upper classes and the issues raised by the advocates of
modernism do not directly concern the poor masses. A new
reformer will have to reject both the revivalism of the ulama
and modernism subservient to the needs of upper classes. He
is essentially confronted with the task of developing a compre-
hensive modern revolutionary theology, with an ideology for
progress and change in the material conditions of poor and
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downtrodden Muslims in keeping with modern conditions.
Without thorough economic transformation, it is not possible
to overcome social backwardness, and it also is a prerequisite
for realisation of a rich spiritual life:
The static medieval-oriented Islamic theology has reduced spiritualism
to sheer sterility thus robbing it of all its creative potentialities. This
revolutionary theory will have to be dynamic and change-oriented, its only
goal being realisation of rich spiritual life on sound material conditions.24
Engineer envisages a common front of the two religious
minorities in India (Muslims and Christians) to be forged in an
alliance with other oppressed people, especially the dalits,
tribals, and other poorer sections of Indian society to emanci-
pate themselves from the powerful clutches of hegemonic
vested interests. Keeping in view the globality of Islam and the
universality of the case for a politics of liberation, his liberation
theology would urge upon “every Muslim” in the world to fight
against exploiters and oppressors “within the country they be-
long to” and outside the country by joining hands with all anti-
imperialist forces. Writing in the years following the Islamic
Revolution in Iran (1979), which “inspired” Muslim youth world-
wide, he felt the need to underline the urgency of the task,
Muslim masses will have to be awakened. Their exploitative rulers
and leaders have cast spell of medieval decadent religion on them and
have trampled their rights. This spell will have to be broken…This
task cannot be deferred any longer. I have thrown these ideas for the
possible takers.25
Muslim Politics in India
Engineer spoke even more critically about Muslim politics in
India. If it was Marx who helped him critique a worldwide
Islamist politics (anti-US without anti-capitalism), it was
Ambedkar who did the same with regard to Muslim politics in
India. Complaining about “the stagnation in social and political
life of the Muslim community of India,” and claiming that
Muslim society is “even more full of social evils” than Hindu
society, Ambedkar observed that Muslims had no interest in pol-
itics as such, with their predominant interest being religion.26
Speaking from his own Quranic perspective, Engineer says
that Islam never emphasised individual salvation; it is a seri-
ous project for social change. Social health, and not the per-
sonal law, according to him, is the goal of the Quranic revela-
tion. The Muslim leadership has totally failed Muslim masses
in sorting out the basic, “first category” problems (poverty,
education, share in economic development, and jobs in the
public and private sectors) confronting Indian Muslims.
Problems like religio-cultural identity, which can be included
in the second category, have engaged the better part of its
attention. Muslim leaders, coming from the upper classes, find
it very easy to climb up the leadership hierarchy by overem-
phasising highly emotional issues that suit their politics.27
This was the story of the movement for Pakistan, which was
led by the big landlords who dreaded democracy and land
reform. When Muhammad Iqbal drew Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s
attention to the “problem of grinding poverty among the Mus-
lim masses”, he was simply ignored by the leader who was too
shrewd to strike the feudal interests whose support was so
vital for him in his campaign for Pakistan. The whole charter
64
of the 14 demands drawn up by the Muslim League did not
include a single demand pertaining to poor Muslim peasants or
toiling Muslim workers and artisans. It was a party represent-
ing feudal and upper-class interests (reservation of seats for
Muslims in the central and provincial legislatures, reservation
of jobs in the top echelons of the administration, and so on).28
Even in precolonial India, Engineer claims, the plight of the
Muslim masses never did bother Muslim reformers. The two
famous reform movements of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-
1624) and Shah Waliullah Dehlavi (1703-62) were only con-
cerned with rectifying Hindu influences on the formal aspects
of religion, invoking the purity of early Islam without its spirit
of revolutionary change, social justice, and egalitarianism. A
feudal and hierarchical caste system, short of (in most cases,
but not all) untouchability, ruled the roost. Let alone feuda-
lism, no movement of Islamic reform in India ever attempted
to rectify even the social practices of Muslims in the country in
keeping with the egalitarian promise of the Quranic project,
which inspired the early Islamic community.
For evaluating any reform movement, it is important to
examine which aspects of Islamic teachings are being empha-
sised. Without doubting Sirhindi’s intentions, if we only try to
evaluate the implications of his reform movement, for exam-
ple, for different social classes, we can say that he was a sup-
porter of the status quo. Not a single demand of the many
Sirhindi made on Jahangir as a condition for meeting him tou-
ched on the spirit of social justice and equality that form the
central part of the vision of Islam.
Shah Waliullah, whom some Muslims naively describe as a
precursor of Marx for Indian Muslims, no doubt, had some deep
insights into the socio-economic forces that bring about politi-
cal changes in society. He was convinced that traders should be
given greater freedom and the burden of taxation should not be
too high on them; the khalsa jagirs reserved for the royalty and
their families should not be too extensive; the exploitation of
the peasantry should be reduced, and so on and so forth. How-
ever, it would be wrong to describe him as a revolutionary
thinker who wanted to emphasise the concepts of social justice
and equality in Islam. His main concern was not the poor and
downtrodden Muslim masses, who along with the poor of other
communities, were being ground down by an oppressive feudal
system, but to save the Islamic empire from the depredations of
the Marathas. He only concerned himself with arresting its de-
cline by proposing some marginal reforms, but never rejected
the feudal system as such. European Christian reform leader
Thomas Muntzer (1490-1525), who preceded him by some 200
years, was far ahead of his times. In his kingdom of god there
were no masters and no slaves. A former colleague of Martin
Luther, Muntzer led the peasant war of 1525 in Germany, with
the objective of making “the common lands, waters, woods and
forests that the lords have taken to themselves” common again.29
Social Reform sans Social Justice
As for the much-celebrated social reformer of modern India
Syed Ahmad Khan, his reform movement was too divorced from
the ideals of social justice and egalitarianism to be considered a
october 11, 2014 vol xlix no 41 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

movement for social reform. His liberal reinterpretation of reli-
gion, along with his support for the British empire, served his
own class interests and had hardly any appeal for the toiling
masses. Far from offering them an opportunity for modern edu-
cation, the “exploitative imperialist rule had put their very
survival at stake”. Although Engineer is highly appreciative of
Ahmad Khan’s project of reinterpreting religion, he criticises
him for missing the point which, according to him, had to con-
stitute the central vision of reform.
It is equally important to determine the priorities in keeping with the
aspirations of the people at large and not merely a tiny minority con-
stituting the upper classes. Indian Muslims are extremely poor and
backward. Any reform or re-interpretation of Islam would have to
keep this fact in mind. In other words, social justice (adl) will have to
be re-emphasised as constituting the central vision of Islam.30
As far as modernity and theological creativity are concerned,
Engineer ranks Ahmad Khan as the tallest of Muslim intellec-
tual leaders and reformers in India, even above Muhammad
Iqbal, the author of The Reconstuction of Religious Thought in
Islam. (“Let no one grudge at this tribute to him”.)31 However,
as for the plight of the overwhelming majority of Muslims was
concerned, who, in colonial India, were either landless peas-
ants, petty artisans, or hangers on of the Muslim nobility, one or
even many Ahmad Khans would not be relevant. Soon after his
autobiography, A Living Faith: My Quest for Peace, Harmony and
Social Change, was released by Vice President M Hamid Ansari
in 2011, Engineer said, in an interview to Live Mint, “We had a
Sir Syed, we need an Ambedkar. Ambedkar worked for the poo-
rest of the poor. Muslims now need to produce an Ambedkar.”32
Ambedkarite Critique of Muslim Reservation
Engineer had discovered very early in his intellectual career
Ambedkar’s insights into the reality of Muslim society in India.
From 1975 to 2006, and later, he consistently challenged the
claims of upper-caste Muslim leaders that the Muslim commu-
nity is an egalitarian monolith.33 He also maintained that an
overwhelming majority of Muslims came from socially back-
ward castes and that their economic backwardness was rooted
in history, two reasons why reservations were provided in the
Constitution on a caste basis, and not on the basis of religion.
Most of the Muslims in India are converts from various dalit, other
backward classes (OBC) and artisan castes. They were poor before
conversion and remained poor after conversion. Even the ruling class
Muslims during medieval ages had absolutely no sympathy with these
low caste Muslims. They were referred to as ajlaf or kamin zaten
(Muslims of lowly origin) and shunned. These low caste Muslims nev-
er acquired higher status in the caste-ridden society of India. Short of
untouchability every other evil was there. Thus one reason for their
low economic status is historical in nature.34
Writing as early as in 1985, Engineer noted that even British
colonial rule and Indian nationalism (which supported big
mill owners in the name of swadeshi (making goods in India
from materials that have also been produced here)) made mat-
ters worse for the artisan communities, a vast majority of
whom were Muslims. The Muslim leaders have hardly ever
bothered to organise these starving artisans into cooperatives.
Today, the fast expanding modern industrial sector (and lately
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 11, 2014 vol xlix no 41
SPECIAL ARTICLE
the liberalisation and globalisation) has driven many petty
artisans out of business. They are swelling the ranks of the
unemployed in the urban areas working as petty traders,
hawkers, mechanics, coolies, rickshaw pullers, taxi drivers,
beedi workers, iron smiths, butchers and masons, etc. It can be
safely said that, as against the national average of 40%, 60%
to 70% Muslims live below the poverty line. Muslim masses
are by and large as economically backward as the scheduled
castes and consequently they are backward in the field of edu-
cation too. But the Muslim leaders, in sharp contrast to the
Christian missions, have hardly done anything to promote
modern education among the poor masses of the community.35
Worse, unlike the Hindu OBCs and dalits, the so-called
Muslim lower castes are yet to have a voice of their own for self-
representation. (Until recently, in independent India, all the
benefits of parliamentary seats and government jobs have gone
to only the so-called Ashraf.) The Muslim leadership (both sec-
ular and religious) is monopolised by upper-caste leaders who
are “totally feudal in their outlook”. They just cannot think of
the formidable economic problems facing the Muslim masses.
Most of them are demagogues, rather than sincere leaders with
a vision for the future. In October 1977, in a period of two
weeks, two conventions were held, one in Delhi and the other
in Ranchi, ostensibly “to discuss various problems confronting
Indian Muslims”. Surprisingly, six of the seven resolutions passed
pertained, in one way or the other, to the Muslim personal law
(at the time, there was no move from the government or any
section of society to enforce changes to the status quo), but no
concern was expressed over the plight of Muslim artisans and
weavers in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra,
and Andhra Pradesh who were then on the verge of starvation.36
Engineer’s position on the question of Muslim reservation, tho-
ugh articulated variously, was nonetheless consistent with the
early realisation of a caste hierarchy among Muslims. Writing as
early as in 1985, he says, “The social milieu of Indian Muslims is
caste-based. It is a mass of heterogeneous groups who have differ-
ent economic, social, political and educational interests. It would
be wrong to treat Indian Muslims as a monolithic group even for
the purposes of reservation of jobs or other similar schemes”.37
In 2006, when the Sachar Committee report was being
debated, Engineer very cautiously ruled out reservations even
for dalit Muslims (“it will be politically unwise, it is resented even
in the case of Hindu OBCs and dalits”) and suggested setting up an
equal opportunity commission, as recommended by the Sachar
Committee. He also suggested that Muslim artisans be given low-
interest loans by nationalised banks, and that Muslim children
be provided additional facilities for education and coaching.38
About a year later, however, Engineer changed his position,
supporting reservations for most backward caste and dalit
Muslims (a general reservation for Muslims on the basis of
economic backwardness was unconstitutional, and it would
benefit only the Ashraf classes) not only in the public sector,
but also in the private sector. “Either the private sector will
have to come forward voluntarily with some scheme to include
these low castes and tribes in offering jobs, or government
may have to take steps”.39
65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Quran as Discourse: Hermeneutics of Change
The hermeneutics in Engineer’s work can be termed a herme-
neutics of change. He invariably invokes change as an Islamic,
or more specifically, Quranic, obligation. Quoting Roger
Garaudy (a French philosopher who later converted to Islam)
from The Alternative Future: A Vision of Christian Marxism,
Engineer says that objective conditions are not inert meta-
physical “givens” but the work of men, human projects achi-
eved historically, and, consequently, historically modifiable.
The sooner this is realised by Muslim intellectuals, the bet-
ter.40 Unfortunately, the ulama and Muslim intellectuals, even
the so-called activists and revolutionary leaders, according to
Engineer, are perpetrators of the status quo. They want power
and domination “for Islam” and Muslims, but not liberation and
empowerment of the downtrodden, as promised by the Quran,
which is what change means. Ahmad Khan and Maulana Azad
are the only two laudable exceptions to this. (Even in Iqbal,
power, rather than social change, engages a better part of his
vision.) Their efforts to reinterpret a socially relevant Quranic
message in their creative theologies must be celebrated.41
Engineer’s hermeneutics of change can be compared with
Nasr Abu Zayd’s (1943-2010) humanistic hermeneutics, or
democratic hermeneutics of invoking the Quran as a discourse,
rather than reading it only as a text. Criticising Islamist writers
for producing absolute truths or “authoritative” and totali-
tarian meanings and interpretations, just like the learned
theologians of the medieval ages, and modernists for their
apologetics, both of whom read the Quran only as a “text”, Abu
Zayd says that it is time now to pay close attention to the Quran
as a discourse or discourses.
The Quran was the outcome of dialogue, debate, argument, accept-
ance and rejection. If we are serious and sincere in freeing religious
thought from power manipulation, whether political, social, or religious
in order to return the formulation of ‘meaning’ back to the community
of believers, we need to construct open democratic hermeneutics.42
Although the two scholars have very little in common, the
Quran as discourse may perhaps refer to what Engineer has in
mind in approaching the Quran as a divine project for humanity,
or what he calls a socio-theological approach to the Quran. Abu
Zayd’s contention that the Quran as only a text serves the “cul-
tures” of the elite, while the Quran as a discourse helps discover
its meaning in everyday life,43 would, in other words, mean that
the Quran as text, by allowing itself to be manipulated, serves
the status quo, while the Quran as a discourse supports change,
and, in this way, checks arbitrary readings. (To give an example
from Fazlur Rahman, the Quran only as a text emphasises pri-
vate virtues that, at best, produce saints and martyrs. The Quran
as a discourse will emphasise public virtues, or the collective
effort of the community to found an ethical, social, and political
order on earth on the basis of private virtues.)44 However, it can
also be alleged that this is another way of appropriating the text
and monopolising manipulation. Yoginder Sikand says,
This reading of core values (peace, justice, compassion, and equality)
into the Quran is, while not completely arbitrary, determined essen-
tially by Engineer’s own politics. It is quite conceivable that other Mus-
lims, pursuing other political agendas, could construct a completely
66
different set of core values and read them into the Quran, values such
as militancy, power, and domination. Similarly, his invoking the prin-
ciple of shura to legitimise political democracy is also inspired by his
own politics, and does not emanate directly from the Prophetic exam-
ple itself, for although the Quran advised the Prophet to consult his
followers, he was not bound by their advice.
In the ultimate analysis, Sikand says, all readings are arbi-
trary, human products that cannot claim to represent the di-
vine will in its entirety, and this applies to Engineer’s own un-
derstanding of the divine revelation as well.45
Although no reading, or methodology, can claim to be infal-
lible, it is viability of the discourse, in terms of its rationality
and the “spirit of the Quran” (or of the Islamic tradition) in-
voked invariably by Engineer, that makes the difference.46
Engineer cites a medieval religious authority stating the ratio-
nal principle of the viability of a discourse. Ibn Qayyim says
quoting Ibn Aqil from Funun that any act, process, or project
that ensures social justice must be accepted even if it had not
been clearly laid down by the Prophet or by the Quran.47
It is interesting to note that, thanks to the discourse of demo-
cracy, certain writers who are also well grounded in tradition
invalidate their own patriarch’s interpretation of the consulta-
tion verse (3: 159) that argued for monarchy and against de-
mocracy while convincingly explaining the Prophet’s conduct
in this regard.48 In another example, the Quran only as text
allowed learned theologians to interpret the verse of equality
(49: 13) to mean only spiritual equality “before god”, thus
affirming social hierarchy through the medieval ages.49 The
Quran as a discourse will make any such argument impossible,
keeping in view the viability of the modern discourse on egali-
tarianism and social equality.
Conclusions
Engineer is a very unique phenomenon in the history of Muslim
intelligentsia, especially for one reason – his cosmopolitanism.
Excommunicated by the Bohra priesthood, a subsect of the
Ismaili Muslims that he originally belonged to, he went on to
become a great communicator of ideas on mainstream (Sunni
and Shia) Islam and Muslims in our times.
His vision of an alternative Islamic politics is unique in em-
phasising, and prioritising, alleviation of the material condition
of the masses as a prerequisite of a rich and creative spiritual
life. It recognises all categories of Islamic politics – Islamic the-
ory, Islamic revolution, and the Islamic state – without atten-
dant nuances (the truth-claims of a medieval Shariah, universal
caliphate, “guardianship of the jurisconsult”, and so on). His main
contribution in this discourse is his emphasis on devising new
institutions in keeping with the demands of evolving concepts of
justice (as well as an ever-demanding radicalism of the Quran).50
By engaging with the ulama and Islamists on issues of pub-
lic policy in a modern state, he offers a vision of secularism
that does not banish religion-informed reason from public pol-
icy debates. This is a position defended by philosophers such
as Jurgen Habermas, post-Marxists such as Chantal Mouffe,
and religious pluralists such as Diana Eck and Miroslav Volf in
their arguments with secularists.
october 11, 2014 vol xlix no 41 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

In formulating the case of liberation as a religious imperative,
Engineer has some issues both with the Marxists and the Islam-
ists. With the Marxists, he takes the issue of social relevance of
religion. Religion must be studied as a serious intellectual, spir-
itual, and historical enterprise, rather than being brushed aside
as a spiritual fraud.51 With the Islamists, on the other hand, Engi-
neer has several issues; among them the issues of theological
creativity and a critical engagement with secular ideologies in
maximising justice and human progress. The idea, though use-
ful in the development of what he calls the “Islamic Theory”,
will most likely be ignored by the ulama for reasons of purity
and “religious” correctness.
The ulama and specially the Islamic theorists take pride in
“ideologising” Islam, that is, making their religion an ideology
that offers “final solutions”. The irony is that an ideology, religious
or secular, is always subject to revision and rethinking. But, as
Engineer says, ideologies fear being rethought, because rethink-
ing undermines their authority.52 However, the critical points
and rational elements in Engineer’s argument, if not particularly
his socialistic reading of the Quran, may go a long way in challeng-
ing the feudal innovations in the Islamic tradition and force
Islamic theorists as well as the ulama, the two classes he
invariably challenges, to review their positions or rethink
their defences.

Notes
1 See, for example: Muhammad Agus Nuryatno
(2000) “Asghar Ali Engineer’s Views on Libera-
tion Theology and Women’s Issues in Islam: An
Analysis”, Master’s Thesis, Institute of Islamic
Studies McGill University Montreal Canada,
viewed on 19 August 2013, http://digitool.li-
brary.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full& ob-
ject_id=30194&local_base=GEN01-MCG02
2 Hadith: Collections of Bukhari, Muslim, Malik,
Ahmad, Abu Dawud, Nasai, Baihaqi, and
Tabarani.
3 Engineer (1980, 2006): The State in Islam:
Nature and Scope (Gurgaon: Hope India Publi-
cations), p 251; Religion and Liberation,
pp 143-44; Engineer (1984): p 17; Islam, Re-
structuring Theology, p 128.
4 Islam and Its Relevance to Our Age, p 37; Islam
and Revolution, p 180; The Islamic State,
pp 44-45.
5 The State in Islam, pp 153-54, 158-59; Islam and
Revolution, pp 3-4.
6 Engineer (1980, 1994): pp 177, 188-91, 202;
Islam and Revolution, p 4.
7 The State in Islam, pp 246-47.
8 Ibid, pp 202, 153-54, 158-59.
9 Islam and Muslims, p 16.
10 The State in Islam, p 202, Islam and Muslims,
p 164.
11 B R Ambedkar (Why there is no organised
movement of social reform among Indian Mus-
lims), viewed on 19 August 2013 (http://www.
columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/ 00ambed-
kar/ambedkar_partition/410.html).
12 Engineer (1990): p 121; Islam and Revolution,
pp 30-31.
13 Religion and Liberation, pp 165-66; Islam and
Revolution, pp 266-67.
14 Islam and Liberation Theology, p 98, The Islamic
State, pp 42-43.
15 Islam and Muslims, pp 55-56; The State in Islam,
pp 208, 250-21; Islam and Its Relevance to Our
Age, pp 13, 64-65.
16 Islam and Revolution, p 138.
17 Ibid, p 267.
18 The State in Islam, pp 169, 171.
19 Ibid, pp 164-65.
20 Ibid, pp 277-78.
21 The Islamic State, pp 205-06, 206 n 5.
22 Islam and Muslims, pp vii, 177-78.
23 Islam and Muslims, p 166.
24 Ibid, pp 92, 164-65.
25 Ibid, pp 16, 92, 166, 277-78; Islam and Its
Relevance to Our Age, p 121.
26 B R Ambedkar (Muslim Society is even more
full of social evils than Hindu Society is), viewed
on 19 August 2013, http://www. columbia.edu/
itc/mealac/pritchett/00ambedkar/ambedkar
_ partition/410.html
27 Islam and Muslims, pp 167, 171.
28 The Islamic State, p 151; Islam and Muslims,
pp 167-68.
29 Islam and Muslims, pp 157-61.
30 Ibid, pp 162-64.
31 Islam and Liberation Theology, p 203.
32 “Asghar Ali Engineer: We Had a Sir Syed, We
Need an Ambedkar”, 9 September 2011, Live
Mint, viewed on 19 August 2013, http://www.
livemint.com/Politics/dfPRud2EIgB8Xp2OX
k1WeO/Asghar-Ali-Engineer--We-had-a-Sir-
Syed-we-need-an-Ambedkar.html
33 Asghar Ali Engineer (1975): Islam, Muslims, In-
dia (Bombay: Lok Vangmaya Griha); Asghar
Ali Engineer: “Indian Muslims: Reservation or
No Reservation?”, 1-15 December 2006, viewed
on 7 July 2014, http://www.csss-isla.com/arch
%2077.htm
34 Asghar Ali Engineer: “Indian Muslims: Reser-
vation or No Reservation?”, 1-15 December
2006, viewed on 7 July 2014, http://www.csss-
isla.com/arch%2077.htm
35 Islam and Muslims, pp 170-71, 174-76; Asghar
Ali Engineer: Identity and Social Exclusion-
Inclusion: A Muslim Perspective (Part II), 16-31
October 2007, viewed on 7 July 2014, http://
www.csss-isla.com/arch%2057.htm
36 Islam and Muslims, pp 170-71; “On Reservation
for Muslims – Should or Should Not Be”, 1-15
August 2004, viewed on 7 July 2014, http://
www.csss-isla.com/arch%20130.htm
37 Islam and Muslims, pp 170-71.
38 “Indian Muslims: Reservation or No Reservation?”
1-15 December 2006, viewed on 7 July 2014,
http://www.csss-isla.com/arch% 2077.htm
39 Identity and Social Exclusion-Inclusion: A Mus-
lim Perspective (Part II), 16-31 October 2007,
viewed on 7 July 2014, http://www.csss-isla.
com/arch%2057.htm; On Reservation for Mus-
lim: Should or Should Not Be, 1-15 August
2004, viewed on 7 July 2014, http://www. csss
-isla.com/arch%20130.htm
40 Islam and Muslims, p 165.
41 Islam and Liberation Theology, p 203; Islam and
Muslims, p 82.
42 Abu Zayd, Nasr (2004): Rethinking the Quran:
Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics (Utrecht:
University of Humanistics Press). A shorter
version uploaded as Conference paper: Human
Rights and Renewing of Religious Discourse:
How Can the Arab World benefit from the Ex-
periences of the non-Arab Islamic World?
viewed on 7 July 2014, http://www.scribd.
com/doc/114840036/Rethinking-the-Qur-an-
Towards-a-Humanistic-Hermeneutics, pp 4, 16.
43 Ibid, pp 3-4.
44 Fazlur Rahman (2000): p 131.
45 Yoginder Sikand: “Asghar Ali Engineer’s Quest
for an Islamic Theology of Peace and Religious
Pluralism”, viewed on 7 July 2014, http://www.
svabhinava.org/meccabenares/Yoginder-
Sikand/AsgharAliEngineerIslamicTheology-
frame.php
46 For “Spirit of the Quran”, see for example: Islam
and Muslims, pp 13, 39, 56; for the spirit of the
tradition, see: Engineer (2000): pp 245-46.
47 The Islamic State, p 146.
48 Thanwi, Maulana Ashraf Ali (1427 A H),
pp 300-02, Cf, pp 183-87.
49 Marlow, Louise (1997, 2002), Hierarchy and
Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought (UK: Cam-
bridge University Press), pp 96-99, 114-16.
50 Islam and Muslims, p 39.
51 Religion and Liberation, pp 139, 141.
52 The State in Islam, pp 239-40.
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– (2000): Rational Approach to Islam (New Delhi:
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Ph: 0651-2205640

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