Tarog CrimPro CaseDigest 8.24.18

[G.R. No. 149357.
March 04, 2005]

MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 149403. March 04, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions: a petition for review on certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No.
149403 of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 which reversed its decision and granted the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus filed by respondent Hajime Umezawa; and the petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 149357 filed by petitioner
Mobilia Products, Inc. (MPI), the intervenor in the CA, assailing the same Resolution of the appellate court.
The Antecedents
The antecedents were amply summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the petition at bar, to wit:
Mobilia Products, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture which caters only to the purchase orders booked and
placed through Mobilia Products Japan, the mother company which does all the marketing and booking. After orders from customers are booked at the
mother company in Japan, the same are coursed through Mobilia Philippines for implementation and production, after which, the ordered items are
shipped to Japan through the mother company.
Mobilia Products Japan sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to head Mobilia Products, Inc. as President and General Manager. To qualify
him as such and as a Board Director, he was entrusted with one nominal share of stock.
Sometime in the last week of January 1995, Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., organized another company
with his wife Kimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines Corporation, without the knowledge of the Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer Susumo Kodaira and the other members of the Board of Directors of Mobilia.
The said company would be engaged in the same business as Mobilia. Spouses Umezawa recruited Justin Legaspi, former Production Manager of
Mobilia, to act as Manager and one Yoshikazu Hayano of Phoenix Marble Corporation to serve as investors [sic].
Pending formal organization, Spouses Umezawa, Justin Legaspi and Yoshikazu Hayano wanted to accelerate the market potentials of Astem by
participating in the International Furniture Fair 1995 held at the Word Trade Centre of Singapore on March 6 to 10, 1995.
One of the requirements of such Fair was that the furniture exhibits must arrive and be received at Singapore not later than February 23, 1995. Pressed
for time, with less than one month to prepare and while Astem had yet no equipment and machinery, no staff and no ready personnel, Umezawa, with
grave abuse of the confidence reposed on him as President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., and in conspiracy with his wife, his sister
Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin Legaspi, all with intent to gain for themselves and for their company Astem Philippines Corporation, stole
prototype furniture from petitioner Mobilia so that the said pieces of furniture would be presented and exhibited as belonging to Astem in the International
Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore.
In order to avoid detection, Umezawa contacted Henry Chua, the owner of Dew Foam, one of the suppliers of Mobilia, for that the latter to load several
pieces of prototype furniture into a Dew Foam truck and store them at the Dew Foam warehouse. The first batch of furniture was stolen on February 8,
1995, when Mr. Henry Chua, upon the request of respondent Umezawa, caused to be loaded into his Dew Foam truck two prototype sofa models
worth P500,000.00, after which, the same were spirited from the Mobilia compound, then transported and stored in Henry Chuas warehouse.
Again, on February 18, 1995, Umezawa, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of his position as President and General Manager,
unlawfully stole expensive furniture from Mobilias factory worth P2,964,875.00. In order to avoid detection, the said furniture were loaded in the truck
belonging to Dew Foam, with respondent Umezawa personally supervising the loading, the carting and spiriting away of the said furniture. Thus, taking
advantage of his position as General Manager, he managed to have the said furniture taken out of the company premises and passed the company guard
without any problem and difficulty.
Further, on February 19, 1995, around 1 oclock in the afternoon, respondent Umezawa again loaded into his motor vehicle, and took away from company
premises under the same irregular and unlawful circumstances, an expensive three-seater sofa worth P255,000.00.
The taking out of the said furniture was effected in violation of the standard procedures established by petitioner corporation which requires that every
shipment or taking out of the furniture be checked and reviewed by Mobilias Production, Planning, Inventory Costing and Control (PPICC) Division. All the
foregoing furniture were transported to and stored at Henry Chuas warehouse. After sometime, the foregoing furniture were photographed for slide photos
at Photo Folio at the Reclamation Area, Cebu City and then finally catalogued for use in the Singapore Fair for the use of Astem and its supposed
owners, namely: spouses Umezawa, Hayano and Legaspi. The foregoing furniture models were finally shipped for exhibition at the International Furniture
Fair 95 in Singapore as furniture belonging to Astem Philippines Corporation.
Sometime in March 1995, based on orders booked for Astem, Umezawa, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed on him as the President
and General Manager of petitioner Mobilia, ordered and caused the manufacture of eighty-nine (89) pieces of furniture with a total value
of P17,108,500.00. The said pieces of furniture were made with Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as with Mobilia time and personnel,
all of which were under the administration and control of Umezawa as President and General Manager. The said materials and supplies, the time and
labor, were supposed to be used for the manufacture and production of quality furniture for the EXCLUSIVE USE of Mobilia. However, Umezawa, in
violation of his duty to apply the same for the use of Mobilia and the duty to account for the same, converted their use for the benefit of Astem or for the
use and benefit of Umezawa, his wife and sister, Yoshikazu Hayano and Legaspi, much to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products.
The same furniture could also have been taken out of the company premises by Umezawa and cohorts for shipment and delivery to Astem customers had
it not been for the timely discovery of the previous theft. [2]
The Board of Directors of MPI, consisting of its Chairman Susumo Kodaira and members Yasushi Kato and Rolando Nonato, approved a
Resolution on May 2, 1995 authorizing the filing of a complaint against Umezawa for two counts of qualified theft allegedly committed on February 18 and
19, 1995. Attached to the complaint was the Joint Affidavit of Danilo Lallaban, George del Rio and Yasushi Kato. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 95-
275.
On May 15, 1995, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft against Umezawa with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu
City. The accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013231-L, reads:
That during or about the period comprised between the 18th and 19th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, while being then the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of furniture, holding office and doing business in the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with grave abuse of the
confidence reposed upon him by his employer, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from
the corporations factory in Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, expensive pieces of furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 3, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 208,125.00
8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2,
Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 93,750.00
10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal
No. 6, Italian marble pedestal, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 150,000.00
11) 1 piece, Model Column
Standard No. 11, Italian marble worth - - - - - - - - - - - - P 93,750.00
13) 1 piece, Model High Table
No. 10, Italian marble, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 187,500.00
15) 1 piece, Model Table No. 7
16) 1 piece, Model Table No. 5
18) 3-seater sofa, worth- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 255,000.00
with an aggregate value of P3,219,875.00, Philippine currency, without the consent of his employer, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc., in the said amount of P3,219,875.00.
Contrary to law.[3]
On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment covering the properties of Umezawa.
Umezawa then filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the information filed against him, the discharge of the writ of attachment issued by the trial court,
and to set the case for preliminary investigation. MPI, the private complainant therein, opposed the motion.
In the meantime on July 21, 1995, MPI filed another criminal complaint for qualified theft against Umezawa, his wife Kimiko Umezawa, Mitsuyo
Yaguchi, Justin Legaspi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Henry Chua allegedly committed in March 1995, with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The case was
docketed as I.S. No. 95-442.
On July 25, 1995, the trial court issued an Order in Criminal Case No. 013231-L denying the omnibus motion. On joint motion of Umezawa and the
public prosecutor, the trial court ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Conformably, the public prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation of Criminal Case
No. 013231-L jointly with I.S. No. 95-442.
On September 25, 1995, Umezawa filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 002919, for
the nullification of the Resolution issued by the three alleged members of MPI Board of Directors, authorizing the filing of criminal complaints against him
in behalf of the corporation.
On January 3, 1996, the public prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause for qualified theft and one count of estafa against
Umezawa, and dismissing the case against the other accused. The Prosecutor maintained his finding of probable cause against Umezawa in Criminal
Case No. 013231-L.
On February 20, 1996, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City against Umezawa, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013423-L. The accusatory portion reads:
That on the 8th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while being the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture, whose
principal place of business is at the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with intent to gain, without the consent of his employer, and with
grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the corporations factory the following
expensive pieces of furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater German
leather sofa, all valued at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 225,000.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater German
leather sofa, all valued at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 275,000.00
with an aggregate value of P500,000.00 Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Another Information for estafa was thereafter filed against the same accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013424-L. The accusatory portion
reads:
That sometime in March 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed upon him as the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of Seventeen Million One Hundred Eight Thousand
Five Hundred (P17,108,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, which was the total value of the furnitures ordered and manufactured by the accused or at
his instance using Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as time and personnel which were supposed to be for the exclusive use of Mobilia
Products, Inc. but were converted for the use and benefit of the accused and Astem Philippines Corporation, a company or firm engaged in the same
business as that of Mobilia Products, Inc., which is, [in] the manufacture and production of quality furniture for export, owned by the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On April 25, 1996, Umezawa filed a motion for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of his petition with the SEC in
Case No. 002919. The trial court, however, issued an Order on May 21, 1996, denying the said motion. It held that the filing and the pendency of a
petition before the SEC did not warrant a suspension of the criminal cases.
On September 25, 1998, Umezawa was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On September 30, 1998, Umezawa filed anew a Joint Motion to Quash the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 013231-L and 013423-L, on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the felony of qualified theft. Umezawa claimed that based on the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for
the prosecution submitted during the preliminary investigation, Yasushi Kato and George del Rio, MPI Vice-President and the head of the Upholstery
Department, respectively, the appropriate charge should be estafa and not qualified theft. Umezawa further claimed that for their failure to object to and
resist his alleged delictual acts, the said witnesses were as guilty as he was and should have been included in the Information. He also asserted that
there was, likewise, no allegation in the Informations as to who was the owner of the articles stolen; hence, there was no offended party. He noted that
the Informations merely alleged that MPI was his employer. He further posited that there was no valid charge against him because the resolution
authorizing the filing of the cases against him was approved by a mere minority of the members of the MPI Board of Directors. [6]
Umezawa, likewise, filed a Motion to Quash [7] the Information in Criminal Case No. 013424-L on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information
did not constitute the felony of estafa. He posited that the Information did not contain any allegation that any demand was made for him to return the
goods. Furthermore, the owner of the said articles was not specified. He noted that as gleaned from the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for the
prosecution, there was no lawful private complainant. He reiterated that the MPI board resolution authorizing the filing of the charge against him was not
approved by the majority of the members of its board of directors. Umezawa also alleged that the charge for estafa with abuse of confidence was already
included in the charge for qualified theft, where it was alleged that he committed theft with abuse of confidence; hence, the charge for estafa should be
quashed, otherwise, he would be placed in double jeopardy. The motion was duly opposed by the prosecution.
On January 29, 1999, the trial court issued a Joint Order[8] dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the dispute between the private
complainant and the accused over the ownership of the properties subject of the charges is intra-corporate in nature, and was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. It ruled that Umezawa, as a member of the board of directors and president of MPI, was also a stockholder thereof. While
Umezawa claimed to be the bona fide owner of the properties subject of the Informations which he appropriated for himself, the private complainant
disputes the same; hence, according to the trial court, the conflicting claims of the parties should be resolved by the SEC. The private and public
prosecutors received their respective copies of the Joint Order on February 2, 1999.
The MPI, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the court and for the reinstatement of the cases on
February 15, 1999. The MPI relied on the following grounds:
a. The Honorable Court has jurisdiction and must exercise it over these cases;
b. The above-entitled case is not an intra-corporate controversy;
and
c. The accused could not claim ownership nor co-ownership of the properties of private complainant corporation.[9]
The MPI maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the cases and cited Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, which provides
the rules on cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the motion was served on the public prosecutor for his approval.
However, the public prosecutor did not affix his conformity to the motion, and instead opted to appear before the trial court during the hearing of the same.
During the hearing, both the public and private prosecutors appeared. In support of his motion, the private prosecutor argued that the trial of the case
must be done in the presence of and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. [10]
The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated April 19, 1999. It held that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. It also ruled that the motion of the private complainant was pro forma, it appearing that the public prosecutor had not approved the same.
The public prosecutor received a copy of the Order on April 20, 1999. On April 26, 1999, the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA against Presiding Judge Rumuldo R. Fernandez and Umezawa, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52440.
The CA allowed the MPI to intervene as petitioner, and admitted its petition- in-intervention.
The People of the Philippines, as the petitioner therein, raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE LEGAL AND MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE AND JURISDICTION
OF THESE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
RESPONDENT HAJIME UMEZAWA;
III
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASES AND DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[11]
The People asserted that the controversy involving the criminal cases was not between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI, but one
between him as the accused therein and the People of the Philippines. It averred that under Section 20(b) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the RTC
has exclusive jurisdiction over the cases against Umezawa. It also alleged that in dismissing the criminal cases against Umezawa on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction over the crimes charged, the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
On September 2, 1999, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and nullifying the assailed Orders of the RTC. It ruled that the issue of
ownership of the properties subject of the Informations was not an intra-corporate dispute. It held that Umezawa, although president and general manager
of the MPI and a stockholder thereof, was not a joint owner or co-owner of the personal properties subject of the charges. It also held that the dispute
between a private corporation and any of its stockholders relative to the ownership of properties does not ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the criminal cases under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It also declared that the material averments of the Informations sufficiently charged qualified
theft and estafa.
Umezawa filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. In a complete volte face, the appellate court issued a Resolution on
August 8, 2001, granting the motion and reversing its decision. It affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the dispute between Umezawa and the other
stockholders and officers over the implementation of the MPIs standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the SEC. Citing Section 5(a)(b) of P.D. No. 902-A, and the ruling of this Court in Alleje v. Court of Appeals,[12] the appellate court ruled that based on the
material allegations of the Solicitor General in the petition before the CA, the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction over the conflicting claims of the parties. It
likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the absence of any allegation in the Information that the MPI was the owner of the properties subject of the
Information is fatal.
The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST UMEZAWA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND ESTAFA ARE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATIONS.
III
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE THE CORRECT RULING IS NOT TO DISMISS
THE CASE BUT TO ORDER AMENDMENT.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL.

V
WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA IS PRO FORMA.[13]

The People of the Philippines filed a separate petition for review on certiorari, contending that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION
FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND INJUNCTION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THAT PETITIONER HAS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL;
2. THE COURT OF APEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND
ESTAFA ARE PRESENT;
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED BLATANT AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN FINDING THAT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (SEC) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PRO-FORMA MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA.[14]
The two petitions were consolidated in the Second Division of the Court.
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the petition for certiorari of the People of the Philippines in the CA assailing
the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court was time-barred; (b) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crimes charged in the said Informations;
(c) whether the Informations sufficiently charge the felonies of qualified theft and estafa; and (d) if in the affirmative, whether all the elements of qualified
theft and estafa are alleged in the Informations.
On the first issue, the CA held that the Public Prosecutor failed to file a motion for the reconsideration of the trial courts January 29, 1999 Joint
Order dismissing the cases, that is, within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the said order on February 2, 1999; neither did the People appeal the said
Order within the period therefor. Thus, according to the CA, the People filed its petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the January 29,
1999 Joint Order of the trial court only on April 26, 1999, well beyond the 60-day period therefor. The appellate court, likewise, held that the filing of the
motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Order by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor did not toll the period for the
People to file its motion for reconsideration thereof, or to appeal therefrom, or to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It ruled that, having
lost its right to appeal in due course, the People was proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The CA declared that the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner MPI of the Joint Order of the RTC is pro forma, the public prosecutor not having signified his written
conformity thereto.
On the other hand, the petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the public prosecutor did not expressly conform to the motion for
reconsideration of the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor, through the public prosecutors presence during the
hearing of the said motion, his supervision and control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing, he in effect adopted and conformed to the said
motion for reconsideration.
In his comment on the petitions, respondent Umezawa maintains that the motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court filed by the
private prosecutor did not interrupt the period within which the People could appeal, citing the ruling of this Court in Cabral v. Puno.[15] The respondent
posits that the finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, that the public prosecutor did not conform to the motion for reconsideration of the
private prosecutor, is binding on this Court. The respondent also avers that the petitioner has no personality to file the petition. Moreover, he insists that
whether the public prosecutor conformed to the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration is a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari.
The Courts Ruling

The contention of the petitioner People of the Philippines is not correct. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. [16] When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the offense. [17] In Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,[18] we held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further
delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish
the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.[19]
The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the
public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-
bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more
adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination.[20] The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the
resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused. [21] Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely
as a matter of tolerance.[22]
The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over
the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if
he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control. [23]
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal
may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in
the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration
or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.[24] However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal
or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.[25] In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not
secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or
file a petition for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of
appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the
case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the trial courts Joint Order dated January 29,
1999, praying for the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. The public prosecutor did not approve nor conform to the
said motion. Although petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public prosecutor, the latter did not do so; he merely appeared
during the hearing of the said motion with the private prosecutor when the latter presented his oral arguments in support of the said motion.
The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however, does not mean that the same is pro forma. It must be stressed that
the propriety and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned, is not dependent upon the conformity of the public
prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the period for petitioner MPI to assail the joint
order in the CA via an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to the motion of petitioner MPI,
insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned, the period for the State to assail the said joint order was not suspended. Only the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of the cases could have tolled the period within which the State could appeal,
insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was concerned. The bare fact that the public prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his adoption of the said motion as that of the State. As ruled by this Court
in Cabral v. Puno:[26]
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-
day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for
reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only
the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. [27]
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner People of the Philippines with the CA on April 26, 1999 was
filed beyond the 60-day period as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[28] it appearing that the public prosecutor received a copy of the
joint order of the trial court on February 2, 1999, and, thus, had only until April 3, 1999 within which to file the said petition.
Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the People of the Philippines simply because the public prosecutor
erred in not himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on his perception that by being present during the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of the States. The settled rule is that the State is not estopped by
the mistakes of its officers and employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court declared:
Estoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly mistaken acts or omissions of its agents. As we declared in People v. Castaeda,
there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the
statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.
The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:[30]
While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. [31]
On the second issue, the petitioners assert that the CA erred in holding that the dispute between it and the respondent is intra-corporate in nature;
hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned from the material allegations of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimes charged. Petitioner MPI further avers that even if there is no allegation in the Informations identifying it as the owner of the personal properties
described in the Informations, its ownership of the properties can be inferred from the other allegations. The petitioners maintain that even if the
Informations are deficient, the remedy is the amendment of the Informations and not the dismissal of the cases.
For his part, the respondent avers that the assailed Resolution of the CA is correct, and that it is the appellate courts decision which is erroneous.
We agree with the petitioners.
According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129
SEC. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 32 thereof was later amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691, as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Case law has it that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint or Information must be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and
where the said Information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after trial. [32] Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law in force at the time of the filing of the Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation.
Indeed, in People v. Purisima,[33] this Court held that:
In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation
charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the
complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
In Criminal Case No. 013231-L, the value of the properties subject of qualified theft is P3,219,875.00, while in Criminal Case No. 013423-L, the
value of the property was pegged at P255,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for theft when the value of the stolen
property exceeds P22,000.00 is as follows:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 20,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph and
one year of each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code further provides for the penalty for qualified theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 013424-L for estafa, the amount of the fraud involved is P500,000.00, and under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for such crime is
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations in the three cases, the court a quo had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes
charged.
The bare fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the petitioner corporation when the crimes charged were allegedly
committed and was then a stockholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a quo of its exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. The property
of the corporation is not the property of the stockholders or members or of its officers who are stockholders. [34] As the Court held in an avuncular case:[35]
... Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. While shares of stock
constitute personal property, they do not represent property of the corporation. The corporation has property of its own which consists chiefly of real
estate (Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa, 1, 123 N.W. 743). A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the
corporations property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal,
173 Ala., 398, 56 So. 235), but its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation (Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is he
entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v. Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The
stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate property (Harton v. Johnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So., 992) [36]
As early as the case of Fisher v. Trinidad,[37] the Court already declared that [t]he distinction between the title of a corporation, and the interest of its
members or stockholders in the property of the corporation, is familiar and well-settled. The ownership of that property is in the corporation, and not in the
holders of shares of its stock. The interest of each stockholder consists in the right to a proportionate part of the profits whenever dividends are declared
by the corporation, during its existence, under its charter, and to a like proportion of the property remaining, upon the termination or dissolution of the
corporation, after payment of its debts.[38]
We also agree with the ruling of the CA in its decision that the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) had no jurisdiction over the cases filed in the
court a quo. The appellate courts reliance in the assailed Resolution issued by the Board of Directors of the petitioner corporation, on Section 5(b) of P.D.
No. 902, has no factual and legal basis.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A provides that the SEC[39] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
(a) devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of association or organizations
registered with the Commission, and
(b) controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively.
In Fabia v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court explained that Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A should be taken in conjunction with Section 6 of the law. It then
proceeded to explain:
In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-A mandates that cases involving fraudulent actions and devices which are detrimental to the interest of stockholders,
members or associates and directors of the corporation are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Taken in conjunction with Sec. 6 of
the same law, it will be gathered that the fraudulent acts/schemes which the SEC shall exclusively investigate and prosecute are those in violation of any
law or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission alone. This investigative and prosecutorial powers of the SEC are further
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of The Revised Penal Code.
From the foregoing, it can thus be concluded that the filing of the civil/intra-corporate case before the SEC does not preclude the simultaneous and
concomitant filing of a criminal action before the regular courts; such that, a fraudulent act may give rise to liability for violation of the rules and regulations
of the SEC cognizable by the SEC itself, as well as criminal liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code cognizable by the regular courts, both charges
to be filed and proceeded independently, and may be simultaneously with the other.[41]
Thus, the filing of a petition in the SEC for the nullification of the Resolution of May 2, 1995 issued by the Chairman and two members of the Board
of Directors of petitioner MPI, which authorized the filing of criminal cases against respondent Umezawa, was not a bar to his prosecution for estafa and
qualified theft for his alleged fraudulent and delictual acts. The relationship of the party-litigants with each other or the position held by petitioner as a
corporate officer in respondent MPI during the time he committed the crime becomes merely incidental and holds no bearing on jurisdiction. What is
essential is that the fraudulent acts are likewise of a criminal nature and hence cognizable by the regular courts. [42] Thus, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent Umezawa was the president and general manager of petitioner MPI and a stockholder thereof, the latter may still be prosecuted for the crimes
charged. The alleged fraudulent acts of respondent Umezawa in this case constitute the element of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and
damage under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa. [43]
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the CA in its decision, to wit:
A dispute involving the corporation and its stockholders is not necessarily an intra-corporate dispute cognizable only by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Nor does it ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject cases. The Supreme Court citing the case of Viray
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 92481, 191 SCRA 308 [1990]) in Torio v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107293, March 2, 1994, 230 SCRA 626) held:
It should be obvious that not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders involves corporate matters that only the SEC can resolve in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
As the Supreme Court further ruled in the Torio case that a contrary interpretation would distort the meaning and intent of P.D. 902-A, the law re-
organizing the Securities and Exchange Commission. The better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not
only the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the questions raised in the subject of the controversy. [44]
On the last issue, we find and so hold that the Informations state all the essential elements of estafa and qualified theft. It was adequately alleged
that respondent Umezawa, being the President and General Manager of petitioner MPI, stole and misappropriated the properties of his employer, more
specifically, petitioner MPI. As expostulated by the CA in its decision:
In any event, the allegations in the informations, if hypothetically admitted, are sufficient to bind Umezawa to the charges of qualified theft and estafa. As
aptly ruled by the court a quo in its Order of July 25, 1995, all the elements of the offense of qualified theft are present. There is no basis for claiming
otherwise. Furthermore, the private offended party, as well as the subject matter of the felonious taking and the ownership thereof, have been adequately
indicated or identified leaving no room for any doubt on these matters. Considering that the motions to quash of September 30, 1998 are fundamentally
rehash of the motion to quash filed on May 29, 1995 and the culpable acts subject of the new informations are virtually the same as the first information
filed against Umezawa, there is no conceivable reason why the court a quo abandoned its previous stand and controverted itself in regard the sufficiency
of the informations.
In our considered view, and as the court a quo had correctly held in its Order of May 26, 1996, even a SEC ruling voiding the resolution authorizing the
filing of criminal charges versus the accused Hajime Umezawa can have no bearing on the validity of the informations filed in these three criminal cases
as pointed out by private complainant, the public offenses of qualified theft and estafa can [be] prosecuted de officio. The resolution of the office of the
prosecutor on the preliminary investigation as well as the re-investigation conducted on the letter-complaint filed by private complainant company
sufficiently established prima facie case against the accused and the legality or illegality of the constitution of the board which authorized the filing of the
complaint does not materially affect either the informations filed against Umezawa or the pending criminal proceedings. As petitioners contend, the action
is now between the People of the Philippines and herein private respondent.[45]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 dated August
8, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 2, 1999 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135554-56. June 21, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO DELA CRUZ y CARIZZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision dated August 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R and 15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of
lasciviousness.
On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant in the RTC of Baguio City. The informations alleged:
Criminal Case No. 15163-R -
That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 11
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

Criminal Case No. 15164-R -
That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE
ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 16 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information stated:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as
a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15368-R.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the three cases. When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of
not guilty to each of the charges. Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jeannie Ann dela Cruz; Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation-Cordillera Administrative Region (NBI-CAR); Mrs. Jean dela Cruz, mother of complainant and spouse of accused-appellant; and
SPO2 Melchor Ong of the Baguio City Police.
The prosecution established that accused-appellant married Jean dela Cruz in civil rites on 14 April 1977 and again in Catholic rites on 27
December 1978. They begot four children, namely: Jeanie Ann (the private complainant), Divine Grace, Daniel Jay and Gerard Nio.[4]
Accused-appellant, a teacher, worked at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. He transferred to the Don Bosco
Elementary School in Baguio City sometime in 1986 and taught there until the following year. In 1987, he worked at the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City
until his dismissal therefrom in 1993. Accused-appellant again taught at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1993 until his arrest in August
1997.[5] While working there, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac on weekdays and went home every 15 days or every payday. They would
go home to Baguio City, where the rest of their family stayed, on Friday evening and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.[6]
Jeannie Ann dela Cruz (Jeannie Ann) testified that she was born to accused-appellant and Jean Aqui-dela Cruz on April 18, 1979 in Tarlac,
Tarlac. Not long after her birth, her family transferred to the house of her maternal grandmother in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City. Her family lived in
an extension of her grandmothers house which had a basement, a second floor and an attic. The second floor had four rooms and a stairs leading to the
attic, which served as a stockroom. Jeannie Anns parents and her two brothers, Daniel and Nio, stayed in the basement while she and her sister, Divine
stayed in the second floor.[7]
Jeannie Ann revealed that accused-appellant started molesting her when she was seven years old. While he helped do her homework at night,
accused-appellant would on occasion make her hold his penis and masturbate him. There were also instances when he would put his penis inside her
mouth and withdraw the same when a white liquid came out. [8] Accused-appellant warned Jeannie Ann not to tell her mother what he was doing to her
and told her that it was a normal thing between father and daughter. He further warned Jeannie Ann that her mother might kill them should she learn
about the things that they did. Jeannie Ann believed accused-appellant and did not tell anyone about the sexual acts he performed on her. As she was
growing up, accused-appellant continued to engage in the aforementioned sexual activities with her, and continuously threatened to hurt her, her siblings
or her mother if she did not give in to his desires. Jeannie Ann still refrained from complaining because she was convinced by the accused-appellant that
the sexual activities which he performed on her were proper.[9] She recounted before the trial court three particular occasions when accused-appellant
molested her.
Jeannie Ann said that sometime in September 1990, she was sexually abused by accused-appellant in their house in No. 37 Leonard Wood Road,
Baguio City. She was only 11 years old then. According to Jeannie Ann, their family had moved to said house when her grandmothers house in
Sumulong St. was destroyed in the July 16, 1990 earthquake that hit Baguio City. [10] They occupied the basement of the house in Leonard Wood Road.
The basement had two bedrooms, a comfort room and a living room. Nobody stayed in the second floor thereof but during the day they stayed in the main
house.[11] Sometime that month, Jeannie Ann, her three year-old brother Nio and accused-appellant were left in the house while her mother and her sister
Divine went to market. She was in the living room with Nio when her father undressed her. Her father removed his pants and she was made to lie down
on a cushion. Her father played with her genitalia and rubbed his penis against her private part until a white liquid came out of his penis. Jeannie Ann said
that after said incident, she felt pain in her vagina whenever she would urinate (mahapdi). She did not resist because she thought that what her father
was doing to her was a normal act.[12]
Jeannie Ann narrated that accused-appellant again abused her one night in July 1995 when she was 16 years old. She was watching television with
her siblings in the living room. At that time, their mother was attending a meeting in church. Accused-appellant called her three times but she refused to
respond to his call as she was watching television. Exasperated, accused-appellant pulled her inside one of the bedrooms and asked her to lie down on
the bed saying, "This is only for a while." Accused-appellant then undressed her, removed his pants and underwear, inserted his finger inside her vagina,
mashed her breasts and licked her vagina. Accused-appellant proceeded to rub his penis against her vagina and thereafter inserted his penis therein and
kept it there until his semen started to come out. Accused-appellant placed his penis on Jeannie Anns stomach where he made his semen flow. While all
this was happening, Jeannie Ann could only cry, as she was afraid of accused-appellant, because he threatened her that he would kill her or her mother
and siblings.[13]
The third incident recounted by Jeannie Ann occurred in their house in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City on August 2, 1997. She was then 18
years old. When she came home at around 10:30 in the morning after her classes at Saint Louis University, she saw accused-appellant at the door. He
told her to proceed to the attic shortly. She ignored him and went directly to her room and started cleaning the same. While she was cleaning the outer
portion of her room, she saw accused-appellant go up the attic. While he was there, he repeatedly called her and asked her to go there. When Jeannie
Ann remembered that her mother had earlier instructed her to clean the attic, she went up when she was done cleaning her room.[14]
Accused-appellant lay on the bed in the attic as Jeannie Ann swept the floor. When she was done, accused-appellant asked her to join him on the
bed. He went near her and again asked her to sit on the bed when she refused to heed his call. Accused-appellant whispered to her that he was running
out of time. He talked in whispers so that the other people in the house at that time would not be able to hear what he said. Sensing that accused-
appellant would again molest her, Jeannie Ann became nervous and started to cry. He told her to stop crying and to relax, as what he was about to do
would only take a while. Accused-appellant then lifted Jeannie Anns t-shirt and brassier, mashed her breasts with his left hand and inserted his right hand
inside her pants. Jeannie Ann resisted, but accused-appellant proceeded to insert a finger of his right hand inside her vagina. While he performed the
aforementioned acts on his daughter, accused-appellant told her, I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only one who will do this to you. [15]
Accused-appellant only stopped what he was doing when he heard Aileen, a boarder in their house, calling Jeannie Ann. He immediately fixed her
clothes and hair, then moved away from her. Accused-appellant instructed Jeannie Ann not to go down and to keep quiet about the incident. When
accused-appellant noticed that Aileen had left because Jeannie Ann did not respond to her, accused-appellant embraced Jeannie Ann and said: "Please
cooperate with me and trust me. I have given you my life. Promise that I will be the only one who will touch you." Accused-appellant began touching her
again. He inserted his fingers inside her vagina. As he touched her, he said, Please cooperate with me and trust me. This is for your own good and for the
good of our family. If you will not follow me, you might regret it. I want you to have a bright future. And after you finish, I can already die and you will no
longer have any problem.[16] Although Aileen, Divine, Nio and Rogel, another boarder in their house were also there at the time of the incident, Jeannie
Ann did not have the courage to call for help because she was very much afraid of accused-appellant, and she saw anger in his eyes.[17]
When accused-appellant was done with her, Jeannie Ann insisted on going down. She cried as she returned to her room to fix herself. Thereafter,
she went out of the house to deal with what had just happened to her. While walking outside toward the bridge, she saw a white L-300 van belonging to
the police. She flagged down the vehicle and narrated to the two police officers riding therein, SPO2 Bravo and SPO2 Ong, what accused-appellant had
just done to her. The policemen accompanied her back to their house where they met accused-appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person who
had raped her. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with the policemen to the Baguio City Police Station.[18]
When they arrived at the Baguio City Police Station, Jeannie Ann narrated her experience to the police officer stationed at the Womens Desk. In her
statement, Jeannie Ann described what accused-appellant did to her on August 2, 1997.[19]
Jeannie Ann also denied accused-appellants claim that she had sexual relations with her boyfriend Charles, and that she accused her father of rape
to get back at him for causing her breakup with Charles.[20]
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the NBI-CAR medico-legal officer who conducted a physical examination of Jeannie Ann on August 8, 1997, testified that
he found two old healed lacerations at 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions on Jeannie Anns hymen. He said that the lacerations could have been inflicted
more than three months prior to the date of the examination and considering the proximity of their location, could have been inflicted at the same time. A
hard rigid instrument like an erect male organ, a rigid wood or a finger could have caused these lacerations. Dr. Bandonill also opined that the positions of
the lacerations did not rule out the possibility that the victim had sexual intercourse less than three months prior to his examination of her, since
intercourse would not create further lacerations when done in the same position. He likewise noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the vaginal
rugosities were slightly flattened and smoothed. The victim's hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.4 cm. in diameter with ease. Dr. Bandonill said it was
possible that penetration happened several times. He further testified that the frequent insertion of a finger or other rigid object, with a diameter of more
than an inch, could cause the lacerations as well as the lax condition of vaginal walls.[21]
Jean dela Cruz (Mrs. dela Cruz), Jeannie Anns mother and wife of accused-appellant, testified that she learned that accused-appellant had sexually
abused their daughter Jeannie Ann on August 2, 1997 when she arrived at home after her marketing chores. She was told by her daughter Divine that
accused-appellant was picked up by the police. Mrs. dela Cruz followed accused-appellant to the police station and found Jeanie Ann crying while the
latter was reporting what had happened to her at the Women's Desk. Upon seeing her daughter, Mrs. dela Cruz hugged her and they cried together.[22]
Mrs. dela Cruz further stated that she was shocked upon hearing Jeannie Anns statement before the police that accused-appellant had been
performing oral sex on their daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter was seven years old, as it was the first time that she learned about it. In her anger, she
rushed to the other room where the accused-appellant was being questioned and slapped him, kicked him and scratched his face. She said accused-
appellant denied all the accusations against him. When accused-appellant was already incarcerated, Mrs. dela Cruz received several letters[23] from him
asking for forgiveness from her and from Jeannie Ann.[24] She also informed the trial court that after accused-appellants incarceration, she went to Tarlac
to get her husband's things since he usually stayed there on weekdays while he taught at Don Bosco. [25] She discovered several love letters by a certain
Emily addressed to accused-appellant,[26] Emilys photograph[27] and accused-appellants draft love letters to Emily, dated March 21, 1995,[28] September 4,
1995,[29] and March 7, 1996.[30] Mrs. dela Cruz also found a letter from a certain Maureen telling accused-appellant that he had a chance of winning her
heart,[31] and a photograph of Maureen.[32] She said that the tenor of the letters indicated that accused-appellant was having relations with other
women.[33] Mrs. dela Cruz also denied accused-appellants claims that she had a paramour and that she helped Jeannie Ann file the complaints against
him because she (Mrs. dela Cruz) wanted to get back at him for being unfaithful to her.[34]
SPO2 Melchor Ong, the police officer assigned to the Baguio City Mobile Group, also testified that on August 2, 1997, between 11:30 a.m. and
12:00 noon, while he and his companion inside an L-300 van of the Baguio City police were passing along Sumulong St., Baguio City, they saw Jeannie
Ann walking towards them. The latter stopped them and tearfully reported to them that her father had just sexually molested her. They accompanied
Jeannie Ann to her house and there the latter pointed to accused-appellant as the person who mashed her breasts and inserted his finger inside her
vagina. SPO2 Ong and his companion approached accused-appellant, introduced themselves as policemen and invited him to the police station. He said
that accused-appellant readily agreed to go with them to the police station.[35]
The defense presented as witnesses the accused-appellant, Camilo Estepa, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, Fr. Exequiel
Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute, and Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City.
Accused-appellant testified that he was a teacher at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. In 1987, he transferred
to Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City and worked there for a year. From 1988 to 1993, he taught also in Saint Louis School Center. In 1994, he went
back to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac and had taught there until his incarceration in August 1997. [36] On weekdays, he and his son
Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac, Tarlac and they would go home to their family in Baguio City every 15 th and 30th of each month to give his salary to
his wife. When these dates fell on a weekday, they would go home to Baguio City the following Friday and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.[37]
He denied all the accusations hurled against him by his daughter Jeannie Ann. [38] According to him, he tried to provide for the needs of his family,
especially his wife whom he loved very much. He maintained that even when he was already in jail, he asked his mother and his sister to support his
daughter's education.
He admitted to having gone home to Baguio City in the evening of August 1, 1997, which he recalled was a Friday. That night, his wife asked him to
clean the attic the following day as there was a dead rat therein.[39]
The following day, August 2, 1997, accused-appellant removed the decomposing body of the rat from the attic as requested by his wife. He called
his daughter Jeannie Ann who was cleaning her room on the second floor of the house to come to the attic and help him. It took a while before Jeannie
Ann heeded his call. When she finally went up, she merely swept one third of the floor area of the attic, away from where the dead rat was. When she was
done sweeping the floor, accused-appellant asked her to come near him, as he wanted to apologize for having scolded her earlier and to remind her that
she should not have ignored him when he commanded her to go up the attic, or to at least tell him that she could not obey his command
immediately. While he was talking to her, they heard someone calling her name. Jeannie Ann told accused-appellant that that person was her
classmate. She then went down while accused-appellant stayed on to fix the things in the attic. Not long afterwards, his daughter Divine informed him that
they had some visitors downstairs. On his way down from the attic, he looked out of the window and saw Jeannie Ann walking beyond the bridge.[40]
Accused-appellant went down to meet the visitors who were looking for Rogel, one of their boarders. After leading these visitors to Rogel, two
policemen arrived in their house with Jeannie Ann. Accused-appellant identified the policemen as SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo and SPO2 Melchor
Ong. The former asked for accused-appellants name and thereafter invited him to the police station. He freely went with them, without asking the purpose
of the invitation.[41]
At the station, SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed accused-appellant. The interview was reduced to writing and he was asked to sign the
same. He did not read the document, as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time. At first, accused-appellant refused to sign the document
without the presence of his counsel. SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo, however, told him that his refusal to sign the document may be interpreted as a sign of
resistance on his part. Accused-appellant thereafter decided to sign the document.[42]
Accused-appellant admitted that he transferred to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac because he was dismissed from the Saint
Louis Center in Baguio City. He acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a student named Freda Miguel filed a case [43] against him
because accused-appellant allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in the Science Laboratory Room of the school, and that he signed an amicable settlement of
the complaint. However, he denied the truth of that complaint against him and said that the filing thereof was not the cause of his dismissal from Saint
Louis Center.[44]
He also admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen addressed to him were his but insisted that they were only his friends, and that Emilys
reference to him as her boyfriend in one of her letters[45] was only a joke.
Accused-appellant claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann conspired to file the cases against him because they had resentments against him. He
said Jeannie Ann blamed him for having caused her breakup with her boyfriend Charles. His wife, on the other hand, wanted him out of her life because
she had a paramour. According to him, his wife admitted to him that she had an illicit relationship with a man named Alfredo dela Cruz, a namesake of his
brother. His wife had a second relationship with a person named Alfredo Aquino against whom he filed a case before the barangay.[46]
Camilo Estepa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, told the trial court that sometime in 1993, accused-appellant filed a case
for malicious mischief against a certain Alfredo or Federico Aquino, a boarder in the house of Mrs. Aqui, the mother of Mrs. dela Cruz. Accused-appellant
alleged that Aquino was courting his wife. However, the case was settled amicably when Aquino agreed to leave the boarding house of Mrs. Aqui. [47]
Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1994 to 1998, testified that he had known accused-appellant since
1994 and was not aware of any untoward incident involving the latter. He said that accused-appellant and his son Daniel would go home to his family in
Baguio City every weekend and returned to Tarlac either on Sunday evening or Monday morning. He would come to school on time and attended the flag
ceremony regularly. Fr. Veloso said that none of the lady teachers ever complained about accused-appellant.[48]
Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary School in Trancoville, Baguio City, testified that accused-appellant was a very
competent teacher in Science and had a very good relationship with the other teachers. He said he regretted that accused-appellant left his teaching job
at the Don Bosco Elementary School after only one year.[49]
On August 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Rape (committed in September 1990) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under paragraph No. 3 of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (Statutory Rape) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the offended
party, Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
incest rape (committed in July 1995) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under Section 11 of Republic Act 7659 (Heinous
Crime Law) which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death to
be implemented in accordance with law; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral
Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code instead of violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse
Law) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him, applying the indeterminate sentence law, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P5,000 as Moral Damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Law.
SO ORDERED.[50]
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jeannie Ann and in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. He alleges that Jeannie Anns testimony was fabricated and inconsistent.[51]
Accused-appellant points out that Jeannie Ann failed to immediately notify the authorities, or at least her mother, of her harrowing
experience. Notwithstanding the fact that he was often away from their home because he stayed in Tarlac where he worked on weekdays, and Jeannie
Ann was with her mother in Baguio City, it took her eleven years to disclose the sexual abuses which accused-appellant allegedly committed against
her.[52] Moreover, he claims that considering Jeannie Anns tender age at the time he allegedly raped her, she must have suffered great pain and should
have complained about it to her mother or told the latter what accused-appellant had been doing to her. Accused-appellant argues that the delay in the
reporting of the sexual acts he performed on his daughter is not normal and is indicative of the untruthfulness of complainants charges.[53]
The Court finds that the trial court did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his daughter Jeannie Ann in
September 1990 and July 1995.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined the crime of Rape prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-Rape Law of
1997), and which is the applicable law for the rape incidents of September 1990 and July 1995, states:
When and how rape is committed. --Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx
In reviewing the cases at bar, the Court observed the following guidelines it had previously formulated for the review of rape cases: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is difficult to prove, and even more difficult for the accused to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.[54]
In rape cases, the issue invariably boils down to the credibility of the victims testimony. The trial courts evaluation of the credibility of the victims
statements is accorded great weight because it has the unique opportunity of hearing the witnesses testify and observing their deportment and manner of
testifying. The trial court judge is indisputably in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the complainants testimony. Thus, unless it is shown
that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of
the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.[55]
The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a woman who states under oath that she has been raped meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, and who remains consistent, is a credible witness.[56]
In the cases at bar, the trial court found Jeannie Anns testimony to be "natural, coherent and touching as she recounted her harrowing experience
in the hands of her father,"[57] as follows:
xxx
q Now, sometime in the month of July, 1995, Madame Witness, do you remember if there was anything unusual which took place again in
your house at Sumulong St., Baguio City?
a There was, sir.
q What was that incident?
[a] On that night I was watching TV with my brothers and sisters. While I was watching TV my father was calling me but I did not heed his call
because I said I was watching TV. So, three times he called me and I know that he was already angry. Then he went near me and
pulled me into the other room. And in that other room, he did bad things that I cannot imagine.
q Now, you said that you and your brothers and sisters were watching TV on that night of July, 1995. Where was your mother at that time?
a She was not in the house at that time because she attended a meeting in our church.
COURT: (to witness)
q That is why we already excluded the public. Dont let the Court speculate. Will you tell us straight. What did your father actually do which you
said (sic) he did things which you cannot imagine?
a When we were in the room he let me sit on the bed. And he asked me to lie down. And he said, This is only for a while. And after that
he put down my pants and my underwear. Then he undressed, lowered his pants and removed his brief. Then he started touching my
vabina (sic).
COURT:
Continue from there. Make it of record that at this point the witness is crying.
PROS. CENTENO:
q Now after your father had removed your pants and your underwear as you said, and he also removed his pants and his brief and started
holding your vagina, what else happened?
a He fingered my vagina and also mashed mybreasts (sic). And with his tongue he licked my vagina. After that he used his penis and rubbed
it into my vagina. And he played with my vagina.
q What did you do when your father was doing that to you?
a I was just crying, sir.
q Did you not fight back?
a No sir, because I was afraid of my father.
q Why are you afraid of your father?
a Because when I was still young, one time he told me that either I will be killed or our family will be killed.
q On what occasion was that when your father old (sic) you that it is either you or the family that will be killed?
a I cannot remember, sir. But that was when I was still young.
q Now, aside from rubbing his penis to your vagina, what else did your father do?
a When he was rubbing his penis against my vagina there was a white liquid that came out. And when that white liquid came out he placed
his penis on my stomach where the white liquid was placed.
COURT: (to witness)
q Will you tell us what you mean by his rubbing his penis to your vagina? What was being done actually?
a I felt that half of the head of his penis was inside my vagina. That is what I felt. (At this point the witness again broke into tears)
COURT:
Continue.
PROS. CENTENO:
q Now, when you felt that as you said half of the penis of your father was inside your vagina, what did you do?
a None, sir.
q Why did you not do anything?
a Because I didnt know what to do, sir.
q Did you not try to fight your father?
a No, sir, because I am really afraid of my father. Because when he gets mad at my mother, my brothers and sisters would be involved.
q Now, before July 1995, Madame Witness, particularly in September of 1990, several months after the earthquake of July 16, 1990, will you
tell us where you were residing?
a We were residing then at No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, sir.
q How old were you?
a I was 11 years old.
xxx
q When you were staying at Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City, together with your father, your mother, your sister and your brothers in
September of 1990, do you remember if there was any unusual incident which happened to you?
a Yes, sir.
q What was that incident?
a I was with my father and brother Nio at the sala. And at the sala he undressed me and did the same. He removed his pants. Then he took a
cushion from the sala and asked me to lie down. And there he played with my vagina. Then he rubbed his penis against my vagina. Nio
was still a baby at that time.
q Where was your mother at that time?
a My mother was not in the house at that time. What I know is that she went to the market.
q How about you sister Divine?
a She was with my mother, sir.
COURT: (to witness)
q Again, in this incident will you describe actually to us the motions that took place with the rubbing of his penis into your vagina?
a It is like this, sir. For example this is my vagina (witness showing her left hand, palms up) and this is his penis (witness demonstrating with
her right forefinger), he made a push and pull movement on my vagina.
PROS. CENTENO:
q What did you feel while your father was doing that to you which you term as rubbing his penis into your vagina?
a I felt pain, sir.
PROS. CENTENO:
May we put the word mahapdi which was the term used by the witness, in the record.
(to witness)
q How long did your father rub his penis into your vagina?
a It was for quite a long time until a white liquid came out.
q Did you not fight back when your father did that to you?
a No, sir.
q Why did you not fight back?
a Because I thought that what he was doing to me was a normal act.
xxx[58]
The trial court judge saw "from the face of the victim the anguish and the pain and the shame and the embarrassment as she broke down and cried
several times in the course of her testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable acts of her father." [59]
Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination of her private parts and endure the humiliation of a public trial
where she would be forced to recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not really been raped. This is especially true in cases of
incestuous rape, as in these cases where Jeannie Ann accused her own father of abusing her, since reverence and respect for ones parents and other
elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children.[60]
The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the victim where the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear
instilled by the threats of bodily harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral ascendancy over the victim. It is not uncommon for a
young girl to conceal for sometime the assault on her virtue because of the rapists threat on her life, or on the life of the other members of her family. [61]
In the cases at bar, Jeannie Ann repeatedly explained that accused-appellant threatened to hurt her, her mother or her siblings if she did not give in
to his desires.[62] Her fear of what accused-appellant would do to her, her mother and siblings if she revealed his evil deeds was what compelled her to
suffer in silence for a long time. In People v. Nicolas,[63] the Court stated:
The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in virtually all cases that have
reached this Court. It is through this fear that the perpetrator hopes to create a climax of extreme psychological terror which would, he hopes, numb his
victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. The relationship of the victim and the perpetrator magnifies this
terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. [64]
On the other hand, the trial court found accused-appellant to be evasive in his narration of his story. All that he offered in his defense were his bare
denials. Denial, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime. A mere denial constitutes negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a
credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.[65]
Accused-appellant's assertion that his daughter made up the charges against him to get back at him for causing her breakup with her boyfriend
Charles is likewise unbelievable. It is not likely that a complainant in a rape case would fabricate a story of defloration against her own father and put to
shame not only herself but her whole family as well, unless it was the plain truth and her motive was purely to obtain justice.[66] Neither does the Court
believe accused-appellant's claim that his wife urged their daughter to file rape charges against him because she (his wife) wanted to get him out of the
way of her extra-marital relationship. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject them to
embarrassment and even stigma.[67] No mother would have the courage to expose an ignominious act of her husband that could lead to a breakup of the
family unless she was prompted by a desire to obtain justice for her daughter.[68]
The trial court committed no error in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape he committed in September
1990, since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law).[69]
However, the Court finds that the lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him for the rape committed in July 1995. R.A.
No. 7659, which was already in force at that time, requires that the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must
concur for the death penalty to be imposable. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 provides:
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx
The Court has previously explained that the circumstances of minority and relationship are considered as special qualifying circumstances because
they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus warrant the imposition of the death penalty. These circumstances must be alleged in the information
and established during trial for the court to be able to impose the death penalty. [70] It was, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfactorily
prove both circumstances of minority and relationship.
In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the father-daughter relationship was alleged in the information and proven in the course of the trial. However,
Jeannie Anns minority, although likewise alleged in the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that was offered to establish her age was her bare
testimony that she was born on April 18, 1979. The prosecution failed to present her birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, other documentary evidence such
as her baptismal certificate, school records which would have aided the court in verifying her claim that she was a minor when she was raped by accused-
appellant in July 1995.
In the absence of adequate proof of Jeannie Anns minority, the penalty imposable for the offense in Criminal Case No. 15164-R is reclusion
perpetua.[71]
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No.
15368-R, which charges accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act), either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness.[72]
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite which among the
numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.[73] Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions
constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure. Section 8,
Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann]
either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required under Section
8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts.[74] The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the accused-
appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [75]
Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this Court regarding the defects of the information in Criminal Case
No. 15368-R, the Court may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its ruling in Suy Sui vs. People,[76] because the information is
a patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of the basic principles of due
process. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such
errors as might be found in the appealed decision, whether these errors are assigned or not.
It is likewise necessary to increase the award of damages by the trial court. The lower court in its decision ordered accused-appellant to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) only in each of the cases, representing moral damages. It failed to award the
prescribed amounts for civil indemnity, the award of which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[77] This civil liability ex delicto is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[78] It is not to be confused with moral damages, which is awarded upon a showing that the victim endured
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.[79]
Under prevailing jurisprudence, when the penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
should be awarded as civil indemnity to the rape victim.[80]Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for each count of rape is proper.
In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages are automatically granted to the victim in rape cases without need of proof for it is assumed that the
private complainant has sustained mental, physical and psychological suffering. [81] The Court affirms the award by the trial court of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, since said amounts are in accord with its current rulings.[82]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6 in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is declared null and void for being violative of the accused-appellant's constitutionally-guaranteed
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case against him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official business.
Quisumbing, J., no part in deliberations.
G.R. No. 188217, July 03, 2013
FERNANDO M. ESPINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated 24 February 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106, which affirmed
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-01226 to 31 convicting the accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a); and
the CA Resolution3 dated 25 May 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused in the same case.
The RTC decided on the basis of the following facts:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. (KN Inc.).4 His duties
included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators. 5
On 14 October 2002, the Fiscal�s Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly
rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the company�s import coordinators.6
During trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the fact that the endorsements of the payee on six checks were forged, 7 and that the
checks were rediscounted by the accused�s aunt-in-law.8 She later testified to her participation in the rediscounting and encashment of the checks.9
The accused testified for himself, claiming that what precipitated the charges was his employer�s discontent after he had allegedly lost an account for
the company.10 He was eventually forced to resign and asked to settle some special arrangements with complainant.11 Alongside being made to submit
the resignation, he was also asked to sign a sheet of paper that only had numbers written on it. 12 He complied with these demands under duress, as
pressure was exerted upon him by complainants.13 Later on, he filed a case for illegal dismissal,14 in which he denied having forged the signature of Mr.
Banaag at the dorsal portion of the checks.15
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of the aunt-in-law of the accused, to prove that the accused had called her to ask if she could
rediscount some checks, and that she agreed to do so upon his assurance that he knew the owner of those checks. 16
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a).17 In response, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 arguing that
the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which was different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under
which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no evidence to support his conviction. 19 Thus, he contended that his right to due process of
law was thereby violated.20
In turn, the prosecution argued that jurisprudence had established that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined by the facts alleged
in the information, and not by a reference to any particular section of the law. 21 Subsequently, the RTC denied the Motion.22
The accused then elevated the case to the CA23 on the same grounds that he cited in his Motion, but it denied his appeal,24 stating that the alleged facts
sufficiently comprise the elements of estafa as enumerated in Article 315, paragraph 2(a).25 His subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
dismissed.
The accused thus filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In the present Petition, the accused raises his right to due process. 26 Specifically, he claims that he was denied due process when he was convicted
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).27 He
argues that the elements constituting both modes of estafa are different, and that this difference should be reflected in the Information.28 According to him,
a charge under paragraph 1(b) would not merit a conviction under paragraph 2(a). 29 Thus, he emphasizes the alleged failure to inform him of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.30
The issue that must be determined is whether a conviction for estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible.
Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be �informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him� in order to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the
offense by its formal name in the law. As explained by the Court in People v. Manalili:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that �what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.� x x x. (Emphasis supplied) 31
This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and
conviction for estafa.
First, while the fiscal mentioned Article 315 and specified paragraph 1(b), the controlling words of the Information are found in its body. Accordingly, the
Court explained the doctrine in Flores v. Layosa as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense
given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the
designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually
determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Court�s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is
instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the characterization of the
crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must
determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x. (Emphases supplied)32
Clearly, the fiscal�s statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC,33 did not bind the trial
court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The statement never limited the RTC�s discretion to read the
Information in the context of the facts alleged. The Court further explains the rationale behind this discretion in this manner:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and
embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved in
the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which
he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of
no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law
made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he
need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights... If he performed the acts alleged,
in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say
what the crime is or what it is named x x x. (Emphases supplied)34
Any doubt regarding the matter should end with the Court�s conclusion:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in the Information (which states that petitioners
committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under Article 318) and the absence
of the words �fraud� or �deceit� in the Information,the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual allegations therein
sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general committed through
the offense of falsification of public document. As the Sandiganbayan correctly held:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to the definition and the essentials
of the specific crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for him to suitably prepare his defense since he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not necessary, however, that the imputations be in the
language of the statute. What is important is that the crime is described in intelligible and reasonable certainty. (Emphasis supplied)35
Moreover, the Court declared that in an information for estafa, the use of certain technical and legal words such as �fraud� or �deceit,� is not
necessary to make a proper allegation thereof.36
Thus, the only important question left to be answered is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which the accused was
convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting him of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) instead of paragraph 1(b)? The answer to
this question, however, requires further reflection.
The crime charged was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Its elements are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other
personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt
thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on
the offender.37
However, the crime the accused was convicted of was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a). The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) that there is
a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means is made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party relies on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he is
induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.38
The six Informations are all similar in content except in the amounts and the check numbers. One of them reads as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That on or about the 17th day of July, 2000, in the City of Paranaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the Senior Sales Executive of the complainant Kuehne and Nagel Inc. herein represented by Honesto Raquipiso, tasked with
liasoning with the import coordinators of the complainant�s various clients including the delivery of their commissions, said accused received in trust
from the complainant Metrobank check no. 1640443816 in the amount of P12,675.00 payable to Mr. Florante Banaag, import coordinator of Europlay,
with the obligation to deliver the same but said accused failed to deliver said check in the amount of P12,675.00 and instead, once in possession of the
same, forged the signature of Mr. Banaag and had the check rediscounted and far from complying with his obligation, despite demands to account and/or
remit the same, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the proceeds thereof to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant, in the amount of P12,675.00.39
Are the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a) present in the above-quoted Information? Arguably so, because the accused represented to the injured
party that he would be delivering the commission to Mr. Banaag; and because of this representation, KN Inc. turned over checks payable to Mr. Banaag
to the accused. In turn, the accused rediscounted the checks for money, to the detriment of both Mr. Banaag and KN Inc. However, this set of facts
seems to miss the precision required of a criminal conviction. Estafa under paragraph 2(a) is swindling by means of false pretense, and the words of the
law bear this out:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Article 315.
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits. x x x.
In this case, there was no use of a fictitious name, or a false pretense of power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business. At the
most, the situation could be likened to an imaginary transaction, although the accused was already trusted with the authority to deliver commissions to Mr.
Banaag. The pretense was in representing to the injured party that there was a deliverable commission to Mr. Banaag, when in fact there was none.
Instead of unduly stretching this point, the Court deems it wiser to give the offense its true, formal name � that of estafa through abuse of confidence
under paragraph 1(b).
Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property. This at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Informations.
First, personal property in the form of the checks was received by the offender in trust or on commission, with the duty to deliver it to Mr. Banaag. Even
though the accused misrepresented the existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was obliged by KN Inc., the injured party, to deliver the
check and account for it. Second, the accused rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this rediscounting resulted in the wrongful encashment of
the checks by someone who was not the payee and therefore not lawfully authorized to do so. Finally, this wrongful encashment prejudiced KN Inc.,
which lost the proceeds of the check. When accounting was demanded from the accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse.
His series of acts precisely constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).
Nevertheless, this Court need not make such a detailed and narrow analysis. In Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, it stated that estafa can be committed by
means of both modes of commission in the following way:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x[E]stafa can be committed with the attendance of both modes of commission, that is, abuse of confidence and deceit employed against the
same victim and causing damage to him. Thus, where an agent deliberately misrepresented to the landowner the real position of the prospective buyer
of the land in order to induce said owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent sold the land for the higher amount which was actually agreed
upon by him and the buyer, and he then clandestinely misappropriated the excess, the crime of estafa was committed under both modes and he could
be charged under either. (Emphases supplied)40
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under
paragraph 1(b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, 41 all the
more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present Petition cannot withstand the tests for review as provided by
jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of the circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise, there is no reason
for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower
courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 24 February 2009 and Resolution dated 25
May 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004]

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the ASSOCIATION
OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated June 9, 1999
in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was established in December 1973 and started its
actual operations in 1976. Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to establish a separate fund to
guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No. 340. [1] Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS
was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations,
gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever. [2] AFP-RSBS is a
government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) under Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002. It is
administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and Management Group. [3] Its funds are in the nature of public funds.[4]
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of the Province of
South Cotabato, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[5] with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate transactions
involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained
into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of
the AFP-RSBS,[6]together with twenty-seven (27) other persons[7] for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government
millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.[8]
On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate
Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133.[9] All were similarly worded, except for the names of the other
accused, the dates of the commission of the offense, and the property involved. Representative of the said Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No.
25122, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public officer
being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their official duties, taking advantage of their official positions and
committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring together and confederating with NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private
individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally execute and/or cause the execution of a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real
property located at General Santos City, by making it appear therein that the purchase price of the said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and,
in fact, agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative
to the sale of the subject lot in the amount of only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively, when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and other
taxes should have been P524,475.00 and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-changing and causing undue injury to the government through evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN and 50/100 PESOS
(P292,207.50), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations indicted the accused for Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145.[11] Save with respect to the names of the
other accused, the dates of the commission of the felonies, and the property involved in each case, the Informations were, likewise, similarly worded,
representative of which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low-ranking public
officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their duties, taking advantage of their official positions and
committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring and confederating with each other and with accused NILO FLAVIANO and JACK GUIWAN,
both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness and with malicious intent, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify a public
document by executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale for a 999-sq. m. property particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General
Santos City and stating therein a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN
THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said lot
is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS,
thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want
of jurisdiction.[13] He, likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings [14] on February 16, 1999, because of the pendency of his
motion for reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed the said motions. [15]
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a Notice of Appearance [16] as private
prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) [17] on March 9, 1999. The notice of
appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are
members thereof.
In a Resolution[18] dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit. Consequently, a warrant
of arrest against him was issued.[19] He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional liberty.[20]
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, contending that the charges
brought against him were purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil liability had arisen.[21] He argued
that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party may be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases
where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged. [22] He maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the
prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of
AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such members-contributors, they have been disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful investments and residual interest at
the AFP-RSBS through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases
involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in
collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.[23]
Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal cases involved. He posited that
AGFOI was neither a member nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering that it was funded partly by the national government and
individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never contributed a single centavo to the funds of the AFP-RSBS. He further averred that
AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the individual members who compose it.[24] Hence, it is of no moment if some
members of AGFOI are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation[25] with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his unresolved motion
for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be suspended and his arraignment deferred pending the resolution
of the reinvestigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to elevate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court
within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this authority from the Court for the prosecution to evaluate its evidence and take such appropriate action
as regards accused Ramiscals subject motion shall also include the case regarding all the accused.
SO ORDERED.[26]
In the meantime, in a Resolution[27] dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan made short shrift of the petitioners opposition and denied his plea for
the denial of the appearance of the law firm.[28] In justifying its resolution, the Sandiganbayan declared as follows:
Considering that the offended parties are members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented by the two (2) flag officers, and their right may be affected by the
action of the Court resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there appears a strong legal presumption that their appearance should not be
disturbed. After all, their appearance is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. [29]
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration[30] of the Sandiganbayans Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was opposed[31] by the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[32] denying the same on October 22, 1999.
The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and October 22, 1999
Resolutions of the graft court, and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND
ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE
PARTY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS
THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.[33]
In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same arguments he put forth before the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was improper
since the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and not final; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also argues that the petition is premature because the reinvestigation of the cases had
not yet been completed. On the merits of the petition, he posits that the AGFOI is a member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by the
outcome of the cases. He further alleged that the appearance of the private prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his recourse under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure was proper.
The Ruling of the Court

The Assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan are
Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is
not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[34] as follows:
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on
the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task
of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be
done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which, among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, final and executory.[35]
Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in this case.[36]
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by
having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal. [37]
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be
assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only.[38]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to allow the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, on
its finding that the AGFOI, represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who were, likewise, investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is the
offended party whose rights may be affected by the prosecution of the criminal and civil aspects of the cases and the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the
private prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on their
merits, more specifically, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities attendant to the commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the
Ombudsman would maintain the finding of probable cause against the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases, and, thereafter, the Sandiganbayan
would sustain the finding of probable cause against the petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the graft court would then have to proceed to trial,
receive the evidence of the parties and render judgment on the basis thereof. The petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to proceed to trial,
and, if convicted, file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, to nullify the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the said resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Dismissal of appeal
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the interest of justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a
special civil action on certiorari.[39] As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,[40] a petition which should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible rule. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the
merits.[41]
Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, nonetheless, the petitioner made the following averments: that the graft court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to be the offended party despite
the plain language of the Informations and the nature of the crimes charged; and that the graft court blatantly violated basic procedural rules, thereby
eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases. He, likewise, averred that the Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow the entry of a party,
through a private prosecutor, which has no right to the civil liabilities of the accused arising from the crimes charged, or where the accused has no civil
liabilities at all based on the nature of said crimes. The petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition thereto, in gross violation of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify the petition as one under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. As we held in People v. Court of Appeals:[42]
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where
the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[43]
Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits, other parties, like the private respondents herein, may, likewise, enter their
appearance as offended parties and participate in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of
the Law Firm Albano
& Associates
The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutor for AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of Commodore Aparri and Brig.
Gen. Navarro, quoted infra:
Atty. Antonio Albano

Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and other Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to have been disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful
investments and residual interest at the Retirement Separation Benefit System, AFP because of alleged plunder of the Systems Funds, Large Scale
Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)

(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)[44]
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the respondent law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was Commodore Aparri
and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star rank officers claiming to have residual interests in or to be
investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of the Informations against the petitioner. Moreover, there is no showing in the records that the
Board of Directors of the AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in the above
cases. Neither is there any resolution on record issued by the Board of Directors of the AGFOI authorizing Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to
secure the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law firm is the counsel of
Aparri and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore
Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to criminal liabilities in favor of any private
party. He asserts that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
offended party is the government because based on the deeds of sale executed in favor of the AFP-RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived of capital gains
and the documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for falsification of public document under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any allegation that the AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage caused by
the said falsifications. The petitioner further argues that absent any civil liability arising from the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be
considered the offended party entitled to participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this view conforms to
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if it were so, it would not sustain a
direct and material damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to any person similarly
situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of the cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI is entitled to intervene in the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan because it is a
member of the AFP-RSBS, whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the latter has a right to intervene, considering that such intervention would enable the
members of AGFOI to assert their rights to information and access to the official records, documents, and papers, a right granted by no less than
paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are impressed with public character because the government
provided for its initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary contributions of the incumbent AFP soldiers and officers.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties
envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110[45] of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct
supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted [46] and the offended party has not waived the civil action,
reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action
remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. [47] The prosecution of offenses is a public function.[48] Under Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for
the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only
prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be
avoided.[49] With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage
or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. [50] Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil
liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely
as a matter of tolerance.[51]
The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local governments or government-owned or controlled corporations,
such as the AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification. For instance,
in malversation of public funds or property under Article 217[52] of the Revised Penal Code, frauds under Article 213[53] of the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 705, as amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil
liabilities of the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,[54] any party, including the government, may be the offended party if such
party sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the government is to be represented by the public prosecutor for
the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right,
house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,[55] or that corporate entity which is
damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the
accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The
interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.[56]
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right
to intervene in the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such members to have access to the records of
AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must
be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the
AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is
the government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the
actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject
of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not
the offended party in the said cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public
documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the felony of falsification of public document, the
existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is
the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in
any way, have civil liability to a third person.[57]
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct
amount of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the government, the offenders thereby commit two crimes
(a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a
special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the government as the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for
falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes
and, thereafter, gave the correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the petitioner and his co-accused pocketed the
difference between the correct amount of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party
entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate Counsel. [58]
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-46656 June 26, 1940
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE MAGPALE, defendant-appellant.
Constancio Padilla and Zoilo P. Perlas for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Acting Assistant Attorney Roxas for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San Jose, Province of Nueva
Ecija, charging him with a violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
That, on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, feloniously, knowingly and
without lawful purpose, have in his possession, custody and control one brand of the municipal government of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, to wit:. . . ., with the intent of using it for falsifying the official brand of the said municipality of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit: Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to law.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace was marked by the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution and by the waiver of the defense to present any evidence in rebuttal. Convinced, from the evidence before him,
that there was reasonable ground to believe that the defendant committed the crime complained of, the justice of the peace
remanded the records of the case to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for further proceedings. In the latter court, the
defendant was informed against by the provincial fiscal as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I., and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named defendant, Felipe Magpale, did then and there voluntarily,
maliciously, illegal and criminally make an iron brand purported to be of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija,
with the intention of using it knowingly in the falsification of certificates of ownership of large cattle, said manufactured
brand having been found in the possession of said accused. All contrary to law.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision the dispositive part which reads:
Wherefore, the court finds the defendant Felipe Magpale guilty of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentences to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two
years, four months and one day of prison correccional, to pay a fine of P100 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, to the accessories of the law and to pay the costs.
The case is before this court on appeal by the defendant and appellant, who makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer interposed by the defendant that the said court has no jurisdiction
over the case on the ground that the accused is deprived of the right to preliminary investigation on the information
charged.
2. The lower court erred in finding the acts imputed to the defendant punishable, as coming within the purview of
article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged in the information, and in not acquitting him
of the same.
In varying phraseology, but conveying the same central thought, this court has set out the purposes of a preliminary
investigation as follows: "The object of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused
person is placed upon trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the
State from unless and expensive prosecutions." (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.) "Preliminary investigations are
intended to secure the right to every person charged which crime to be free from the inconvenience, expenses and burden of
defending himself in the course of a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has been passed upon in a more or
less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose; and that they are intended further to
guard the state from the burden of unnecessary expense involved in holding trials based on false, frivolous or groundless
charges." (U.S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil., 666.) "A preliminary investigation is not a trial or any part thereof and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused
guilty thereof." (U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209.) In the case at bar, it will be noted that the officer charged in the complaint
and that alleged in the information are defined and penalized by the same article 176 of the Revised Penal Code, and are so
related that an inquiry into one would have elicited substantially if not precisely the same facts that an inquiry into the other
would have brought into light. It will further be noted, that in the notices sent out by the justice of the peace in connection with
the preliminary investigation of the complaint, he did not specially refer to only one of said offenses but to both, as he
invariably spoke of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code, thus giving the appellant a chance, and putting him on
his guard, to defend himself not only against the charge of illegal possession of the iron brand but also against that of mak ing
or ordering the making thereof. But the appellant has seen fit to waive his right to present any evidence at said investigation,
and we cannot now entertain his last-minute defense that he should have been investigated anew for the crime alleged in the
information. To grant him such a belated remedy would not be in obedience to, but in disregarded of, the prime purposes for
which preliminary investigations are ordained by law and sanctioned of the decisions.
Granting, however, that he was entitled to a second preliminary investigation, still his right thereto was invoked after he
pleaded not guilty when arraigned. In People vs. Solon, (47 Phil., 443, 448), it was intimidated that "Whether said motion was
made or after the arraignment, is of some importance for the reason that if it was not made before the arraignment or before
the plea of the defendants was entered, it would indicated that they have waived their right to a preliminary examination, and
for that reason the court a quo would have been justified in denying the said motion." After his motion contesting the
jurisdiction of the trial Court was denied, the appellant should have brought the appropriate proceedings to compel the trial
court to grant him another preliminary investigation, this right being a substantial one. Instead, the appellant folded his arms
and went forward with the trial, at which the prosecution presented who brought in testimony, without any objection on the part
of the appellant, establishing the fact that the appellant was the one who ordered the making of the iron brand in question.
As to the last two assigned errors, article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall make or introduce into the Philippine Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or
implemented intended to be used in the commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the
preceding sections of this chapter.
Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he is criminally liable for the
making thereof. (Article 17, Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that the said brand is an exact imitation of that owned and
used by the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging to
its inhabitants.
The offense committed by the appellant under the aforecited article of the Revised Penal Code is penalized withprision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and a fine to exceed P10,000, imposable in its medium period (three years,
six months, and twenty-one days to four years, nine months, and ten days) because unattended by any modifying
circumstances. The judgment is thus modified and the defendant sentenced, under Act No. 4103, to an indeterminate penalty,
the minimum of which is four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the maximum three years, six months and twenty-
one days of prision correccional. As thus modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs to the defendant and
appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
DANTE HERNANDEZ DATU, G.R. No. 169718
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,* and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. December 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26159, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila,
Branch 38 dated August 28, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 95-144230 that found petitioner Dante Hernandez Datu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The full text of the Information filed against petitioner reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor upon sworn complaint of Rolando Registrado, complainant herein, in
representation of his daughter, Jerica Registrado, whose statement is hereto attached as Annex A, accuses DANTE
DATU Y HERNANDEZ of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable under RA 7610 otherwise known as the
Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed as follows:
That on or about February 24, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon JERICA REGISTRADO, 5
years of age, by then and there inserting his finger in the latters genitals, against her will and consent. [3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty; thus, trial ensued.
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of February 24, 1995, at about 7:00 a.m., Jerica,
aged 5, was playing with her friends Khamil and Neeca near the house of their neighbor Boyet Rama (or Boyet) situated
at the corner of a street in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila; that suddenly, [petitioner] grabbed Jerica and inserted his middle
finger in her vagina, after which, he warned her not to tell it to anyone; that immediately, Jerica ran to her house; that
while her mother was giving Jerica a bath, she found bloodstain in her (Jerica) panty and blood in her vagina; that upon
being informed of her mothers discovery, Rolando, Jericas father, looked at her vagina and found it swollen; and that
asked by her father who did it, Jerica disclosed that it was appellant.
On the same date, February 24, 1995, Jerica was brought to the NBI where she was examined by Dr. Villena,
whose findings are as follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated (sic). Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa,
congested. Contusion, purplish, peri-urethral area. Hymen, thin, short, intact. Hymenal orifice
measures 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and rugosities, cannot be reached by the examining finger.
CONCLUSION:
Physical Virginity Preserved.
Professing innocence, appellant claimed that commission of the alleged sexual molestation is highly improbable
as it supposedly took place in a busy street; that the charge was concocted upon inducement of David Escalo (or Escalo),
a friend of Jericas parents, as admitted by Escalo to Zaragosa during one of their drinking sprees; and that a case for oral
defamation was filed by him against Jericas parents for their false accusation.[4]
In the end, the trial court convicted petitioner of the crime charged in a Decision dated August 28, 2000, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610 and sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal together with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify private complainant
in the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of moral damages and to pay the costs. [5]
Taking issue with the said judgment, petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court merely affirmed the
assailed lower court ruling in a Decision dated March 31, 2005.
Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court[6] assailing the
aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision. This Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. However, in petitioners Memorandum, his counsel indicated that petitioner died on August 3, 2006. [7] As proof of petitioners
death, a certified photocopy of his Death Certificate with Registry No. 2006-859[8] was attached as Annex 1 of the said pleading.
In light of this supervening event which occurred while petitioners appeal of the judgment of his conviction was pending resolution before
this Court, we are constrained by both law and jurisprudence to dismiss the present case for the appeal has been rendered moot.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code instructs us that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the offender, to wit:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
In the seminal case of People v. Bayotas,[9] we formulated the following principles which guide this Court as regards to the
application of the foregoing penal provision, to wit:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
d) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.[10]
It is therefore evident from the foregoing discussion that venturing into the merits of petitioners appeal given the circumstance of
his untimely demise has become superfluous because, even assuming this Court would proceed to affirm the lower courts judgment of
conviction, such a ruling would be of no force and effect as the resultant criminal liability is totally extinguished by his
death. Consequently, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, is likewise extinguished by his death. Since
his appeal was still pending before this Court, there was no final judgment of conviction upon which an award of civil indemnity could be
based.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the death of petitioner extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated March 31, 2005, affirming petitioners
conviction by the trial court, had become ineffectual. [11] As a result thereof, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of petitioner Dante Hernandez Datu, the Decision dated March 31, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26159 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 95-144230 before the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Manila is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

ssociate Justice Associate Justice
OSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ssociate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

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[G.R. No. 149357.

March 04, 2005]

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL.

WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA IS PRO FORMA.[13]

The Courts Ruling

[G.R. Nos. 135554-56. June 21, 2002]

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 188217, July 03, 2013

FERNANDO M. ESPINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The RTC decided on the basis of the following facts:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004]

The Ruling of the Court

Atty. Antonio Albano

Dear Atty. Albano:

Thank you very much.

(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)

G.R. No. L-46656 June 26, 1940

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Constancio Padilla and Zoilo P. Perlas for appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty; thus, trial ensued.

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

Physical Virginity Preserved.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

OSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

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