Layugan vs. IAC; Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck the road.

the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid
pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the
accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact
Facts:
that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,
his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff
record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not
and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which
sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial
was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that
Court given the facts established at the trial. The private respondent
defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the
or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where
thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive
he incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said
it.
injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said
injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and
Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in
Serrano [driver] averred that he knows his responsibilities as a driver
the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from
and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was
solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we
the proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked
concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed
his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did
by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of
not even put a warning sign.
evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum
of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant
directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's)
against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that
truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised
the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver,
plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to
Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in
the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of
order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent
their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for
damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer
damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to
treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the
amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since
no claim was made to it.
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the
decision, stating that it is the petitioners who were negligent since FACTS:
they did not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck
is park on the shoulder of the highway. Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from
her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon,
Issue:
to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC).
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
Hosaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But
Ruling: the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late
Yes! for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and
The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by
proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing
from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence
of Capitol Medical Center.
of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's
driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on
stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and
warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert
Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner. testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the
anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating”
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap
2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is
ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and
employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such fit to undergo surgery.
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently,
may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to
the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In
in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to
disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses
that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the
overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not
a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The
driving. surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and
severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the
decision of the Trial Court.
first place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities
because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on
ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and
thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for
the damages.
RATIO:
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case,
and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the
attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the
operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to the
private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her.
Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and
fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—
res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the
presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and
their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need
not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the
intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme
Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the
patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise
the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the
anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its
doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the one
in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these
consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls
on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which is
one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the
hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of
actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing.
Spouses Africa et al vs Caltex Philippines, Boquiren and the Court of
Appeals
16 SCRA 448 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Res Ipsa Loquitur
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing
gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire
broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned
several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad
Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while
gasoline was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no
evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can
be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and
the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall
to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for
damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res
ipsa loquitur (“the transaction speaks for itself”) which states: “where
the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant’s want of
care.” The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.
The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were
Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the
incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it.
However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of
proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the
one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury
complained of.
Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR No. L-21749,
September 29, 1967)
Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all
owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles
of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig
after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for
actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force
majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan
bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.
Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the
supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure.
Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees
of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso
fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they
exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ.
Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee
the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen
stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation
involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not
shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned
out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.
Dr. Victoria Batiquin, et. al vs Court of Appeals, et. Al
G.r. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
Facts:
Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the
latter's private patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the
morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other
physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation on Mrs.
Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the
hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and
complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so
she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for
her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She
then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho
suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery. When Dr. Kho
opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow
discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries
which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece
of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the
ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber
glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece
of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho
testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination.
Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the
piece of rubber is a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an
Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge
Summary.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable
Held:
Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes
a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The rule, when applicable
to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to
and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates
what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden
of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the
doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean
section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light,
the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual
culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into
private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not
occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since
aside from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas
underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending
piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such
could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed
by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving
behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and
for all the adverse effects thereof.
The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical
profession plays in the lives of the people and State's compelling
interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with
the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and
skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life
of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code
and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals,
in the general and members of the medical profession, in particular.
RODRIGUEZ VS. MANILA RAILROAD
This action was instituted jointly by Remigio Rodrigueza and three
others in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay to recover
a sum of money of the Manila Railroad Company as damages resulting
from a fire kindled by sparks from a locomotive engine under the
circumstances set out below. Upon hearing the cause upon the
complaint, answer and an agreed statement of facts, the trial judge
rendered judgment against the defendant company in favor of the
plaintiffs and awarded to them the following sums respectively as
damages, to wit, (1) to Remigio Rodrigueza, P3,000; (2) to Domingo
Gonzaga, P400; (3) to Cristina Luna, P300; and (4) to Perfecta
Losantas, P150; all with lawful interest from March 21, 1919. From this
judgment the defendant appealed.
The facts as appearing from the agreed statement, in relation with the
complaint, are to the effect that the defendant Railroad Company
operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of
Albay; that on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said
line, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of
the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses
nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same
were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction
with the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of
strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon.
The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a
strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the
complaint or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first,
though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first
communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it
spread to the others.
In the fourth paragraph of the complaint — which is admitted to be
true — it is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was
conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire, in the
following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper
supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive; secondly,
in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated
without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting
sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan
coal, a fuel of known inferior quality which, upon combustion,
produces sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of
Remigio Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned
by the defendant company, though exactly how far away from the
company's track does not appear. It further appears that, after the
railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his
house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed
position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he
promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did.
Instead, he changed the materials of the main roof to nipa, leaving the
kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is
contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on
the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the
premises of the Railroad Company, and that for this reason the
company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for the
reasons which we shall proceed to state.
In the first place, it will be noted that the fact suggested as
constituting a defense to this action could not in any view of the case
operate as a bar to recovery by the three plaintiffs other than Remigio
Rodrigueza, even assuming that the fire was first communicated to his
house; for said three plaintiffs are in nowise implicated in the act
which supposedly constitutes the defense. In this connection it will be
observed that the right of action of each of these plaintiffs is totally
distinct from that of his co-plaintiff, so much so that each might have
sued separately, and the defendant if it had seen fit to do so, might in
this case have demurred successfully to the complaint for misjoinder
of parties plaintiff. The fact that the several rights of action of the
different plaintiffs arose simultaneously out of one act of the
defendant is not sufficient of itself to require, or even permit, the
joinder of such parties as coplaintiffs in a single action (30 Cyc., 114) if
objection had been made thereto. Domingo Gonzaga, Cristina Luna,
and Perfecta Losantas are therefore entitled to recover upon the
admitted fact that this fire originated in the negligent acts of the
defendant; and the circumstance that the fire may have been
communicated to their houses through the house of Remegio
Rodrigueza, instead of having been directly communicated from the
locomotive, is immaterial. (See 38 Am. Dec., 64, 77; 1 11 R. C. L., 968-
971; Kansas City, etc. Railroad Co. vs. Blaker, 64 L. R. A., 81
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Hope, 80 Pa. St., 373; 21 Am. Rep. 100.)
With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred
that his house stood upon this ground before the Railroad Company
laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof that this
plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the
act of building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the
company, upon making this extension, had acquired the land only,
leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be
considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was
there at the sufferance of the defendant company, and so long as his
house remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the
risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the
defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care.
But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that
might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant.
Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible
negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other
will use the care of the ordinary prudent man. (Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St., 182; 21 Am. Rep., 97.)
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only
cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the
defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio
Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant
company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives
was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster
possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as
contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because,
first, that condition was not
created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this
ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the
Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to
be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in
negligently destroying it. (Grand Trunk Railway of Canada vs.
Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs.
Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line
near Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to
remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose
upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law
itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be
remembered that the company could at any time have removed said
house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it elected
not to do so.
Questions similar to that now before us have been under the
consideration of American courts many times, and their decisions are
found to be uniformly favorable to recovery where the property
destroyed has been placed in whole or in part on the right of way of
the railroad company with its express or implied consent. (L. R. Martin
Timber Co. vs. Great Northern Railway Co., 123 Minn., 423; Ann. Cas.,
1915A, p. 496, note; Burroughs vs. Housatonic R.R. Co., 15 Conn., 124;
38 Am. Dec., 64; 74; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Patterson, 105 Va. 6; 8 Ann.
Cas., 44.) And the case for the plaintiff is apparently stronger where
the company constructs its line in proximity to a house already built
and fails to condemn it and remove it from its right of way.
From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment appealed
from is in all respect in conformity with the law, and the same is
accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
ANDAMO vs. IAC
Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUMNON
LAEDAS.
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent
corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the
land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed
petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered
the lives of the petitioners and their laborers and some other
destructions. This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action
for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC
and a civil action for damages.
Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for
destruction caused by respondent’s
waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows
that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly,
from petitioner’s complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person.” SIC UTERE T
UO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights
and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner
to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed
and maintained using all reasonable care
NATIVIDAD VS. DIZON
ARANETA VS. DE JOYA
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
34277-R ordering Luis Ma. Araneta (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner) to indemnify Antonio R. de Joya (hereinafter referred to as
the respondent) for one-third of the sum of P5,043.20 which the latter
was adjudged to pay the Ace Advertising Agency, Inc., the plaintiff in
the recovery suit below.
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager
of the Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors[1] that an
employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up
special studies in television. The board, however, failed to act on the
proposal. Nevertheless, in September 1953 the respondent sent
Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired about
the trip and was assured by the respondent that Taylor's expenses
would be defrayed not by the company but by other parties. This was
thereafter confirmed by the respondent in a memorandum.
While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor
continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his
salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon the orders of, and
approved by, the respondent and were included in the semi-monthly
payroll checks for the employees of the corporation. The petitioner
signed three of these checks on November 27, December 15 and
December 29, 1953. The others were signed by either the respondent,
or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill
connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in
the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told,
on account of Taylor's travel and studies.
On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the
court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of
the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made
without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his
answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless
ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any event
under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to
authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit.
A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the respondent against Vicente
Araneta, the petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent proved
that Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of the firm, signed a check
representing the company's share of the transportation expense of
Taylor to the United States, and that a series of payroll checks from
September 15, 1953 to December 31, 1953, inclusive, which included
the salaries of Taylor, was signed, by Vicente Araneta and the
petitioner who is a vice-president of the company. Both Aranetas
disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks in
good faith as they were approved by the respondent.
On April 13, 1964 the trial court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with
interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment," and
dismissing the 3rd-party complaint.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on August 2,
1965, rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment in favor
of the Ace Advertising but reversing the dismissal of the 3rd-party
complaint. The appellate court found as a fact that Taylor's trip had
been neither authorized nor ratified by the company.
The appellate court's full statement of its categorical and unequivocal
findings of fact on the nature and extent of the participation of the
petitioner as well as Vicente Araneta is hereunder quoted:
"The evidence not only is clear, but is even not disputed at all by
Vicente and Luis Araneta who neither of them took the witness stand
to refute appellant's evidence, that as to Vicente it was to him that
appellant first broached the subject-matter of sending Taylor to
America, that Vicente Araneta evinced unusual interest, and went to
the extent of entrusting Taylor with letters for delivery to certain
principals of Gregorio Araneta, Inc. in the United States, and he even
signed the check for P105.20 to cover expenses for his tax clearance,
documentary stamps and passport fees, in connection with the trip,
on 8 September, 1953, and then on 5 October, 1953, still another
check for P868.00 which was half the amount for his plane ticket; and
as to Luis Araneta, it not al all being disputed that when Taylor was
already in America, his salaries while abroad were paid on vouchers
and checks signed either by him or by Vicente, or by appellant himself;
because of all these, the conclusion is forced upon this Court that it
could not but have been but that both Vicente and Luis were informed
and gave their approval to Taylor's trip, and to the payment of his trip
expenses and salaries during his absence, from corporate funds; if this
was the case as it was, there can he no question but that they two
were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate
moneys jointly with the appellant; what had happened was in truth
and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval; and as it
was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was
these three without whose acts the same could not have happened,
the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed
upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been
imposed upon all in the first place, Art. 2194, New Civil Code; and only
de Joya having been sued and made liable by the corporation, it was
the right of the latter to ask that his two joint tortfeasors be made to
shoulder their proportional responsibility." (italics supplied)
The basic legal issue is whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict
as held below.
It is our view, and we so hold, that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be upheld. The petitioner's assertion that he signed
the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been
substantiated, he in particular not having testified or offered
testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being
a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner
remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad,
concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the
latter. This plus the fact that he even
approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary,
demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform
his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an
officer. The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the
Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between
the parties, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no
bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages.[2]
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed at
petitioner's cost.