A.M. No.

02-8-13-SC
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
RESOLUTION
Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004
submitted by the Sub-Committee for the Study, Drafting and Formulation of the Rules Governing the
Appointment of Notaries Public and the Performance and Exercise of Their Official Functions, of the
Committees on Revision of the Rules of Court and on Legal Education and Bar Matters, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, with modifications,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
RULE I
IMPLEMENTATION
SECTION 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
SEC. 2. Purposes. - These Rules shall be applied and construed to advance the following
purposes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) to promote, serve, and protect public interest; chan robles virtual law library
(b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries public; and
(c) to foster ethical conduct among notaries public. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Interpretation. - Unless the context of these Rules otherwise indicates, words in the singular
include the plural, and words in the plural include the singular.
RULE II
DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - “Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and -
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily
affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed
the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.
SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term “Affirmation” or “Oath” refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.
SEC. 3. Commission. - “Commission” refers to the grant of authority to perform notarial acts and to
the written evidence of the authority.
SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - “Copy Certification” refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public record, nor
publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.
SEC. 5. Notarial Register. - “Notarial Register” refers to a permanently bound book with numbered
pages containing a chronological record of notarial acts performed by a notary public. chan robles
virtual law library
SEC. 6. Jurat. - “Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; chan robles virtual law library
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
SEC. 7. Notarial Act and Notarization. - “Notarial Act” and “Notarization” refer to any act that a
notary public is empowered to perform under these Rules.
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - “Notarial Certificate” refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized
instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary's signature and seal,
and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as provided for by
these Rules.chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 9. Notary Public and Notary. - “Notary Public” and “Notary” refer to any person commissioned
to perform official acts under these Rules.cralaw
SEC. 10. Principal. - “Principal” refers to a person appearing before the notary public whose act is the
subject of notarization. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The term “regular place of work or business” refers to a
stationary office in the city or province wherein the notary public renders legal and notarial
services. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase “competent evidence of identity” refers to the
identification of an individual based on:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual; or chan robles virtual law library
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual,
or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who
each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
SEC. 13. Official Seal or Seal. - “Official seal” or “Seal” refers to a device for affixing a mark, image or
impression on all papers officially signed by the notary public conforming the requisites prescribed
by these Rules.
SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. - The term “signature witnessing” refers to a notarial act in which an
individual on a single occasion: chan robles virtual law library
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and chan robles virtual law library
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public.
SEC. 15. Court. - “Court” refers to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. Petitioner. - “Petitioner” refers to a person who applies for a notarial commission.cralaw
SEC. 17. Office of the Court Administrator. - “Office of the Court Administrator” refers to the Office
of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.cralaw
SEC. 18. Executive Judge. - “Executive Judge” refers to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of a city or province who issues a notarial commission.cralaw
SEC. 19. Vendor. - “Vendor” under these Rules refers to a seller of a notarial seal and shall include a
wholesaler or retailer. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 20. Manufacturer. - “Manufacturer” under these Rules refers to one who produces a notarial
seal and shall include an engraver and seal maker. chan robles virtual law library
RULE III
COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge to any
qualified person who submits a petition in accordance with these Rules. chan robles virtual law
library
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; chan robles virtual law library
(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age; chan robles virtual law library
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a regular place of
work or business in the city or province where the commission is to be issued; chan robles virtual law
library
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of the
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.
SEC. 2. Form of the Petition and Supporting Documents. - Every petition for a notarial commission
shall be in writing, verified, and shall include the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) a statement containing the petitioner's personal qualifications, including the petitioner's date of
birth, residence, telephone number, professional tax receipt, roll of attorney's number and IBP
membership number;

(b) certification of good moral character of the petitioner by at least two (2) executive officers of the
local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines where he is applying for commission;

(c) proof of payment for the filing of the petition as required by these Rules; and

(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs with light background taken within thirty (30) days of
the application. The photograph should not be retouched. The petitioner shall sign his name at the
bottom part of the photographs.
SEC. 3. Application Fee. - Every petitioner for a notarial commission shall pay the application fee as
prescribed in the Rules of Court. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 4. Summary Hearing on the Petition. - The Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing on
the petition and shall grant the same if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the petition is sufficient in form and substance;
(b) the petitioner proves the allegations contained in the petition; and
(c) the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the Executive Judge that he has read and fully
understood these Rules.
The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a commission and a Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal in favor of the petitioner. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. -
(a) The notice of summary hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city
or province where the hearing shall be conducted and posted in a conspicuous place in the offices of
the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the
petitioner. The notice may include more than one petitioner.

(b) The notice shall be substantially in the following form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a summary hearing on the petition for notarial commission of (name of
petitioner) shall be held on (date) at (place) at (time). Any person who has any cause or reason to
object to the grant of the petition may file a verified written opposition thereto, received by the
undersigned before the date of the summary hearing.chanrobles virtual law library chan robles
virtual law library
_____________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 6. Opposition to Petition. - Any person who has any cause or reason to object to the grant of the
petition may file a verified written opposition thereto. The opposition must be received by the
Executive Judge before the date of the summary hearing. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 7. Form of Notarial Commission. - The commissioning of a notary public shall be in a formal
order signed by the Executive Judge substantially in the following form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place of work or business) in (city or
province) was on this (date) day of (month) two thousand and (year) commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first
day of December (year) chan robles virtual law library
________________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 8. Period Of Validity of Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal. - The Certificate
of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall be valid for a period of three (3) months from date
of issue, unless extended by the Executive Judge.
A mark, image or impression of the seal that may be purchased by the notary public pursuant to the
Certificate shall be presented to the Executive Judge for approval prior to use.cralaw
SEC. 9. Form of Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal. - The Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall substantially be in the following
form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF_____________ chan robles virtual law library
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL chan robles virtual law library
This is to authorize (name of notary public) of (city or province) who was commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending, the thirty-first
of December (year) to purchase a notarial seal.chanrobles virtual law library chan robles virtual law
library
Issued this (day) of (month) (year).
________________________
Executive Judge

SEC. 10. Official Seal of Notary Public. - Every person commissioned as notary public shall have only
one official seal of office in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts
in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. chan robles
virtual law library
SEC. 12. Register of Notaries Public. - The Executive Judge shall keep and maintain a Register of
Notaries Public in his jurisdiction which shall contain, among others, the dates of issuance or
revocation or suspension of notarial commissions, and the resignation or death of notaries public. The
Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the Court Administrator information and data recorded in
the register of notaries public. The Office of the Court Administrator shall keep a permanent,
complete and updated database of such records. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 13. Renewal of Commission. - A notary public may file a written application with the Executive
Judge for the renewal of his commission within forty-five (45) days before the expiration thereof. A
mark, image or impression of the seal of the notary public shall be attached to the application.cralaw
Failure to file said application will result in the deletion of the name of the notary public in the
register of notaries public.cralaw
The notary public thus removed from the Register of Notaries Public may only be reinstated therein
after he is issued a new commission in accordance with these Rules. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 14. Action on Application for Renewal of Commission. - The Executive Judge shall, upon
payment of the application fee mentioned in Section 3 above of this Rule, act on an application for the
renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. If the application is denied, the
Executive Judge shall state the reasons therefor.cralaw
RULE IV
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Powers. - (a) A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) acknowledgments;
(2) oaths and affirmations;
(3) jurats; chan robles virtual law library
(4) signature witnessings;
(5) copy certifications; and
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on an
instrument or document presented for notarization if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: "Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name
of signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary
public"; and chan robles virtual law library
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an acknowledgment,
jurat, or signature witnessing.
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or
make a mark on an instrument or document if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: “Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names
and addresses of person and two [2] witnesses)”; and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat.
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his regular place of
work or business; provided, however, that on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act
may be performed at the request of the parties in the following sites located within his territorial
jurisdiction: chan robles virtual law library
(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of office may be administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or documents
requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or document is confined
for treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if
he:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized; chan robles virtual law library
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest,
cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth civil degree. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these
Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these
Rules if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public reasonable
doubt as to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction requiring a notarial act;
and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will.
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not: chan robles virtual law library
(a) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the notary to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete. chan robles virtual law
library
SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. - A notary public shall not
notarize:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or chan robles virtual law library
(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.
RULE V
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Imposition and Waiver of Fees. - For performing a notarial act, a notary public may
charge the maximum fee as prescribed by the Supreme Court unless he waives the fee in whole or in
part.
chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Travel Fees and Expenses. - A notary public may charge travel fees and expenses separate and
apart from the notarial fees prescribed in the preceding section when traveling to perform a notarial
act if the notary public and the person requesting the notarial act agree prior to the travel.cralaw
SEC. 3. Prohibited Fees. – No fee or compensation of any kind, except those expressly prescribed and
allowed herein, shall be collected or received for any notarial service.cralaw
SEC. 4. Payment or Refund of Fees. - A notary public shall not require payment of any fees specified
herein prior to the performance of a notarial act unless otherwise agreed upon. chan robles virtual
law library
Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary public prior to the performance of a notarial act are not
subject to refund if the notary public had already traveled but failed to complete in whole or in part
the notarial act for reasons beyond his control and without negligence on his part.cralaw
SEC. 5. Notice of Fees. - A notary public who charges a fee for notarial services shall issue a receipt
registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and keep a journal of notarial fees. He shall enter in
the journal all fees charged for services rendered.chan robles virtual law library
A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in his office a complete schedule of chargeable
notarial fees.cralaw
RULE VI
NOTARIAL REGISTER
SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide
for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial
acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages. chan robles virtual law library
The register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Solicitor General to any notary public upon
request and upon payment of the cost thereof. The register shall be duly paged, and on the first page,
the Solicitor General shall certify the number of pages of which the book consists.cralaw
For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum of Agreement or Understanding may be entered into
by the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Court Administrator. chan robles virtual
law library
(b) A notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time.cralaw
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of notarization the following: chan robles virtual law library
(1) the entry number and page number; chan robles virtual law library
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act; chan robles virtual law library
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal; chan robles virtual law library
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary; chan robles virtual law library
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of work or
business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
(b) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the reasons and circumstances for not
completing a notarial act.
(c) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the circumstances of any request to inspect or
copy an entry in the notarial register, including the requester's name, address, signature, thumbmark
or other recognized identifier, and evidence of identity. The reasons for refusal to allow inspection or
copying of a journal entry shall also be recorded.cralaw
(d) When the instrument or document is a contract, the notary public shall keep an original copy
thereof as part of his records and enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and
shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. He
shall also retain a duplicate original copy for the Clerk of Court.cralaw
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or
document the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries.cralaw
(f) In case of a protest of any draft, bill of exchange or promissory note, the notary public shall make a
full and true record of all proceedings in relation thereto and shall note therein whether the demand
for the sum of money was made, by whom, when, and where; whether he presented such draft, bill or
note; whether notices were given, to whom and in what manner; where the same was made, when
and to whom and where directed; and of every other fact touching the same.cralaw
(g) At the end of each week, the notary public shall certify in his notarial register the number of
instruments or documents executed, sworn to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none, this
certificate shall show this fact.cralaw
(h) A certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument
acknowledged before the notary public shall, within the first ten (10) days of the month following, be
forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under the responsibility of such officer. If there is no
entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of certified
copies herein required.cralaw
SEC. 3. Signatures and Thumbmarks. - At the time of notarization, the notary's notarial register shall
be signed or a thumb or other mark affixed by each:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) principal;
(b) credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal; and
(c) witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a signing by the notary public on behalf of a
person physically unable to sign.
SEC. 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. - (a) In the notary's presence, any person may inspect an
entry in the notarial register, during regular business hours, provided;
(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through competent
evidence of identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier, in the
notarial register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the principal in
the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course of an official
investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal intent or
wrongful motive in requesting information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access to
any entry or entries therein.cralaw
SEC. 5. Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial Register. - (a) In case the notarial register is stolen,
lost, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered unusable or illegible as a record of notarial acts, the
notary public shall, within ten (10) days after informing the appropriate law enforcement agency in
the case of theft or vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by any means providing a proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered mail and also provide a copy or number of any pertinent
police report.cralaw
(b) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, or death of the notary public, the notarial
register and notarial records shall immediately be delivered to the office of the Executive
Judge.cralaw
SEC. 6. Issuance of Certified True Copies. - The notary public shall supply a certified true copy of the
notarial record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for such copy upon payment of the legal
fees.cralaw
RULE VII
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Official Signature. – In notarizing a paper instrument or document, a notary public
shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the name indicated and as appearing on the notary's
commission; chan robles virtual law library
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at the time the notarial act is performed.
SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of office, to be
procured at his own expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be
of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the name of the city or province
and the word “Philippines” and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney's number on the
face thereof, with the words "notary public" across the center. A mark, image or impression of such
seal shall be made directly on the paper or parchment on which the writing appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the notarial act is performed and shall be clearly
impressed by the notary public on every page of the instrument or document notarized. chan robles
virtual law library
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the
notary public or the person duly authorized by him. chan robles virtual law library
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is stolen, lost, damaged or other
otherwise rendered unserviceable in affixing a legible image, the notary public, after informing the
appropriate law enforcement agency, shall notify the Executive Judge in writing, providing proper
receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail, and in the event of a crime committed, provide
a copy or entry number of the appropriate police record. Upon receipt of such notice, if found in
order by the Executive Judge, the latter shall order the notary public to cause notice of such loss or
damage to be published, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province where the notary public is commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive
Judge shall issue to the notary public a new Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal.cralaw
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of the notary public, or the revocation or
expiration of a notarial commission, the official seal shall be surrendered to the Executive Judge and
shall be destroyed or defaced in public during office hours. In the event that the missing, lost or
damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it shall be delivered by the notary public to the Executive
Judge to be disposed of in accordance with this section. Failure to effect such surrender shall
constitute contempt of court. In the event of death of the notary public, the person in possession of the
official seal shall have the duty to surrender it to the Executive Judge.cralaw
SEC. 3. Seal Image. - The notary public shall affix a single, clear, legible, permanent, and
photographically reproducible mark, image or impression of the official seal beside his signature on
the notarial certificate of a paper instrument or document.cralaw
SEC. 4. Obtaining and Providing Seal. - (a) A vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals may not sell
said product without a written authorization from the Executive Judge.cralaw
(b) Upon written application and after payment of the application fee, the Executive Judge may issue
an authorization to sell to a vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals after verification and
investigation of the latter's qualifications. The Executive Judge shall charge an authorization fee in the
amount of PhP 4,000 for the vendor and PhP 8,000 for the manufacturer. If a manufacturer is also a
vendor, he shall only pay the manufacturer's authorization fee.cralaw
(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a period of four (4) years from the date of its issuance and
may be renewed by the Executive Judge for a similar period upon payment of the authorization fee
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.cralaw
(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a seal to a buyer except upon submission of a certified
copy of the commission and the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal issued by the
Executive Judge. A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of change of name shall present to
the vendor or manufacturer a certified copy of the Confirmation of the Change of Name issued by the
Executive Judge.cralaw
(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or manufacturer for each Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal.cralaw
(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer shall affix a mark, image or impression of the seal to the
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and submit the completed Certificate to the
Executive Judge. Copies of the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and the buyer's
commission shall be kept in the files of the vendor or manufacturer for four (4) years after the
sale.cralaw
(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of change of name shall present to the vendor a
certified copy of the order confirming the change of name issued by the Executive Judge.cralaw
RULE VIII
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES
SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Certificate. - The notarial form used for any notarial instrument or
document shall conform to all the requisites prescribed herein, the Rules of Court and all other
provisions of issuances by the Supreme Court and in applicable laws. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate. – The notarial certificate shall
include the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the commission;
(b) the serial number of the commission of the notary public;
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province or city where the notary public is commissioned, the
expiration date of the commission, the office address of the notary public; and
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the professional tax receipt number and the place and date of
issuance thereof, and the IBP membership number.
RULE IX
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Certificate of Authority for a Notarial Act. - A certificate of authority evidencing the
authenticity of the official seal and signature of a notary public shall be issued by the Executive Judge
upon request in substantially the following form:chan robles virtual law library
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL ACT
I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive Judge), certify that (name of notary public), the person
named in the seal and signature on the attached document, is a Notary Public in and for the
(City/Municipality/Province) of the Republic of the Philippines and authorized to act as such at the
time of the document's notarization.chanrobles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my signature and seal of this office this (date) day of
(month) (year).chanrobles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge)
RULE X
CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address. -
Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the notary public by court order or by marriage, or
after ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or business, the notary public shall submit a
signed and dated notice of such fact to the Executive Judge.

The notary public shall not notarize until:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of the new name of the notary public and/or
change of regular place of work or business; and

(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps have been completed, the notary
public may continue to use the former name or regular place of work or business in performing
notarial acts for three (3) months from the date of the change, which may be extended once for valid
and just cause by the Executive Judge for another period not exceeding three (3) months.
SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his commission by personally submitting a written,
dated and signed formal notice to the Executive Judge together with his notarial seal, notarial register
and records. Effective from the date indicated in the notice, he shall immediately cease to perform
notarial acts. In the event of his incapacity to personally appear, the submission of the notice may be
performed by his duly authorized representative.cralaw
SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court
to post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the
names of notaries public who have resigned their notarial commissions and the effective dates of their
resignation.cralaw
RULE XI
REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. - (a) The Executive Judge shall revoke a
notarial commission for any ground on which an application for a commission may be denied. chan
robles virtual law library
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate
administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) fails to keep a notarial register;
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
(3) fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days of the
month following;
(4) fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
(5) fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
(6) fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge concerning the
performance of his duties, as may be required by the judge;
(7) fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
(8) fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent evidence;
(9) executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules;
and
(11) commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes
good cause for revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction.
(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested, affected or aggrieved person, the notary public shall be
required to file a verified answer to the complaint. If the answer of the notary public is not
satisfactory, the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing. If the allegations of the complaint
are not proven, the complaint shall be dismissed. If the charges are duly established, the Executive
Judge shall impose the appropriate administrative sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved party may
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for review. Pending the appeal, an order imposing
disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme
Court.
(d) The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate administrative proceedings against a notary
public, subject to the procedures prescribed in paragraph (c) above and impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions on the grounds mentioned in the preceding paragraphs (a) and (b).cralaw
SEC. 2. Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries Public. - The Executive Judge shall at all times
exercise supervision over notaries public and shall closely monitor their activities. chan robles virtual
law library
SEC. 3. Publication of Revocations and Administrative Sanctions. - The Executive Judge shall
immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive
Judge and of the Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have been administratively
sanctioned or whose notarial commissions have been revoked.cralaw
SEC. 4. Death of Notary Public. - If a notary public dies before fulfilling the obligations in Section 4(e),
Rule VI and Section 2(e), Rule VII, the Executive Judge, upon being notified of such death, shall
forthwith cause compliance with the provisions of these sections. chan robles virtual law library
RULE XII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person
who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public; chan robles virtual law library
(b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register, or official records of a
notary public; and
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official misconduct.
SEC 2. Reports to the Supreme Court. - The Executive Judge concerned shall submit semestral reports
to the Supreme Court on discipline and prosecution of notaries public.
RULE XIII
REPEALING AND EFFECTIVITY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Repeal. - All rules and parts of rules, including issuances of the Supreme Court
inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed or accordingly modified.chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Effective Date. - These Rules shall take effect on the first day of August 2004, and shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines which provides sufficiently wide
circulation.
Promulgated this 6th day of July, 2004.

ROAN I. LIBARIOS VS JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS A.M. NO. RTJ-89-286 July 11, 1991Topic: CANON 1
SECTION
4FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mari
ano Corvera, Jr. againstrespondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, gross misconduct andpartiality, relative to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
the respondent judge against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr.and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of
murder fixing their bail without any prior hearing.ISSUE: W/N Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.RULING:Yes. A judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personalinterests, public opinion or fear of
criticism. He should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixingbail for the
temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is
contrary to established principles of law. It has been an established legal principle or rule that in
cases where a person is accused of a capitaloffense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in
a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity topresent, within a
reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of
guilt against theaccused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the
accused. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a
manner as to be free from anysuspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.The respondent
judge is imposed of a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED to
exercisemore care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the same or
similar offense in the future willbe dealt with more severally.
LUCILA TAN, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563
Complainant, (Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)

Present:

Puno, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - *Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

Promulgated:
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE,
Respondent. September 8, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, [1] for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440
and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending
before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent
judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to
complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon
City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-
dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that
respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount
demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal
Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed
that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually
dismissed by respondent judge.[2]
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was
complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay
and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant
also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her
favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. The former
even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no
sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to
Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging about her
close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated
that she could help him get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her
favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a
car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member
of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he
had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left
for New Zealand on study leave.Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change
the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give
complainant copies of said Decisions.[3]
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative
case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence the
copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly
handed to her by a member of respondent judges staff. [5] Respondent judge, on the other hand,
presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce
Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses, [6] copy of
the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440,[7] and various documents composed of the
machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated
December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check
No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998,
Current Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by
complainant to respondents witness, Fernando B. Espuerta. [8]
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANTS VERSION:

1. LUCILA TAN

Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case in
Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two
cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutors Office in Pasig. After resolution,
the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went
to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan was
the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation and the
two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in view of the Motion
for Inhibition filed by Complainants lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two
cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March
3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce, called up the Complainant
and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce
gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie,
the Mayors Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to
meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements
for Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October 2000 and she met the
Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the Cravings Restaurant in
Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant
told the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will convince the Accused
to pay me as soon as possible (TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the
restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone. After she came back,
they went home. On the way home, Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, Sabi niya
magbigay tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo(TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At
first, Josie did not mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her how much, the
former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).Complainant asked for a lesser amount,
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie
agreed, she sent the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two days (TSN,
pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money, the Clerk of Court,
Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she sent
money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there and
there was money in the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003).After that, several
hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce called up the Complainant again
around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called saying that she had an
important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce
called her again and said that she will show Complainant something. When they were in
Complainants car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned Decisions of the
case[s].After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it
will be dismissed if she will not accede to Joyces request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March
3, 2003).Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. Sabi niya it [was]
for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time (TSN, page 34, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for
Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit A for the
Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged Sabi
niya, if I will accede to that request of P150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to reverse the
Decision and Si Judge daw will reverse the Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around
February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further claimed that
Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the Judge. Complainant went again to
the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayors help and she met the Mayor at his Office in San
Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was
called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the Judge was
out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the
phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get
in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge,
Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant heard the Mayor because his voice is very loud. He said, Judge, Saan
ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do not know what is the answer and then
he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na kasi matagal
na iyan (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that they left the Office of the Mayor
and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since the Complainant was
still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be promulgated already, she sought the
advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at
that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant
that she is going to meet with the Judge when he comes back from New Zealand.Complainant
testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met
Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at
about 8:30 in the evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she
got to know as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating
and drinking, the Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While they were inside,
Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it was the Prosecutor who talked
in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his
company were still there drinking. While Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man
came over from behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant did not
know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant said that the
man asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she told the
Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked to the Judge. The
man left and went back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was still scared because
there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it will be in her behalf (sic)
or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the P20,000.00 because her case was very
strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised them that she will give
them after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts. Complainant did not know the actual date
of the promulgation but somebody from the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her
house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When Complainant asked why, Sabi niya baka
mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case
ng promulgation. She received the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said
that the decision was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).

RESPONDENTS VERSION:

1. JOSEFINA RAMOS

She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was already
the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She met Lucila
Tan when the latter went to the Mayors Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President
Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office, together
with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She
did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no longer
remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did
not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was
to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at
the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for
only Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan
was talking about regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even
intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with
Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan,
Metro Manila. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was
marked as Exhibit 1 (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila
Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).

2. RODOLFO CEA

He testified that his acquaintances usually call him Buboy and for about two years or more he
had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58,
San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she
approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a
favorable decision against her case. He could not remember anymore when that was because
it was a long time ago (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was
still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of
the Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and asked if he can introduce her to
Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually
introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask
Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete dont
(sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September
22, 2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court
in San Juan was the first and the last time. When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that he
approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance payment for
a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered I dont know
about that, sir. (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He identified the Sworn
Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of the
contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit 2 (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around
8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA

He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the
position Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became
Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He recalled having met
Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he saw
Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal
Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had not
been together for a long time and they were long time friends. They ate at the restaurant. When
he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until
11:00 [eleven] oclock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met
Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the
Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the
three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page
50, Hearing of September 22, 2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He
recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign
something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the
waiter. The incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the
incident when she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He
could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it
was nearing Christmas in 2000. Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin,
katunayan nandito po dala ko. Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy. Meron
siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) para iabot
kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking kaibigan. Matagal na kaming
magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya. He told Judge Rosete
about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him
papers. He presented a Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was
marked as Exhibit 3 (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He presented the
papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the exact same
document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The other documents that
Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were marked as Exhibit 4 and
submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the
contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When Lucila Tan
asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and they had
been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the
latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief
Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give
Judge Rosete so that her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN,
pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
 4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ

She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila
Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know Lucila Tan
when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57,
who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay
Judge (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She did not say anything but Lucila
Tan asked may tumawag na ba sa Mayors Office? and she said yes, maam. After that there was a
hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge
Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing and the former told her to tell Judge
Rosete about the case of Lucila na pinakikiusap ni Mayor (TSN, page 12, Hearing of September
29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the former President told her
and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003
that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone
and said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that
she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside
the drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their
Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied that she
called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the one who
called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her something.Lucila Tan
showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised when the former showed her the
copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did not answer and said that
Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She
immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to
her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered that he was in New
Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the Judge,
she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present when the Mayor called
up Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 29, 2003). He
said Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo? I dont know what was your answer(ed)
[sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ganun ba? then Mayor Jinggoy said o sige, okay
na and then we left the Office. She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in
Complainants two cases inside the latters parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed
that Complainant was the one who showed her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied
the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded Php150,000.00 for each of the
two cases then pending before Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return
for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it
was the Complainant who offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and
sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 5, and confirmed and affirmed the
truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).[9]

The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that respondent
judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for him to render judgment in
her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other
hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the
downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the parties
evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence
presented by both parties, we find the complainants version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify
with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the
draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his
staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainants staff met with
her, showed her copies of respondent judges draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120,
and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the
disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft
decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people in his office.
And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a cases disposition if
not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
The respondents evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the
testimonies of two of respondents witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed
complainants claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and
Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied
that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent
judge in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:

Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent

Judges two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident
at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met
Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two
Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with
Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that
he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant.[10] (citations omitted)

Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainants version that she met with respondent judge and
his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards the
dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts
that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with
her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he
entered said country.[11] He did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned
to the Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1,
2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is
consistent with complainants testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with
respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge must
not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his
duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. [12]
Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft
decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate
the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute
gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without salary
and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.

PER CURIAM:
Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX, stands
charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the performance of her official
duties. The details are as follows:
I. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ. —
This originated as G.R. No. 71179, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985 by
Deputy Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to secure his release
from the Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge for
direct contempt of court consisting in his alleged disobedience to the writ of preliminary injunction
dated January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him from demolishing the
improvements of the intervenors in said case.
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of Branch
CXXIII of the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to demolish the improvements of the
defendants in Civil Cases Nos. C-7380, C-7361, C-7362, C-7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842.
Said defendants are the intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on whose motion respondent judge issued
the preliminary injunction.
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten note of respondent
judge addressed to then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon
orders of this Court, however, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was released from jail on July 2, 1985.
Thereafter, the court resolved to treat the petition as an administrative case 1 and to require
respondent judge to comment thereon. 2
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of Ramirez.
She justified the arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and academic and as a curative measure to preserve
the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten note, on the other hand, was explained as a
means to preserve the integrity of courts of justice in the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She
added that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her original
jurisdiction, while the Order of January 11, 1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, which the latter should not have done as she should have remanded the case to
the court of origin for execution.
II. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ. —
On September 28, 1984, complainant Liwayway B. Samson filed before the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint for damages against Benecio Urgel, Roberto Exequiel, Shigiro Iwata and Remigio Pasion
docketed as Civil Case No. 11559 and assigned to respondent judge. The summonses were served on
the defendants on October 3, 1984. On October 18, 1984, defendants Urgel and Exequiel filed their
answer with cross-claim against their co-defendants Pasion and Iwata They likewise filed a motion
for leave to file a third party complaint against Imperial Insurance Co. This was granted on October
22, 1984. On November 12, 1984, within the extension given by the court, defendant Iwata filed his
answer with compulsory counter-claim and cross-claim and answer to cross-claim against defendants
Urgel, Exequiel and Pasion. The latter did not file any answer. Thus, on November 29, 1984,
complainant thru counsel moved to declare Pasion in default and to set the case for pre-trial On
January 29, 1985, counsel for complainant filed an ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of the
motion of November 29, 1984. When no action was forthcoming, counsel filed another motion on
March 26, 1985, reiterating his prayer in the motion of November 29, 1984. For alleged failure of
respondent judge to act on the motions, the instant complaint was filed on June 6, 1985.
Required to comment, respondent judge stated that the motion of November 29, 1984 was noted for
study on December 18, 1984 and was actually resolved on March 1, 1985, "well within the period even
for the court to resolved [sic] the same and prior to the receipt ... of the letter-complaint on July 2,
1985; " and that the case could not yet be set for pre-trial on account of the existence of the third-party
complaint. In conclusion, respondent judge said that letter-complaint "is not only malicious but was
intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge 3 and should therefore be dismissed.
Complainant replied to the comment for the purpose of placing in issue respondent judge's allegation
that the motion dated November 29, 1984 was resolved on March 1, 1985. She averred that if this were
true, why is it that notice thereof was received by her counsel only on June 22, 1985 after the instant
complaint had been filed; and why is it that respondent judge failed to resolve the other motions? She
concluded that the only reasonable implication is that the order was antedated to show some color of
performance of duties. She likewise cites respondent judge for failure to order the service of summons
and copy of the third-party complaint on the third-party defendant.
It appears that due to the statement found in respondent's comment that "the letter-complaint is not
only malicious but was intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge complainant moved for
respondent's inhibition from Civil Case No. 11559 and its re-raffling to another sala. This motion was
denied.
Eventually, as manifested by respondent in her Rejoinder, she inhibited herself from hearing Civil
Case No. 11559, which has since been assigned to another judge and has been set for pre-trial In said
rejoinder, respondent judge characterized complainant's so-called implication respecting the order of
March 1, 1985 as being founded on conjectures, assumptions and suppositions. Furthermore, she said
that after the third party complaint had been admitted, it was not her duty to order service of the
summons on the third-party defendant, but that of the counsel who espouses the cause of the client.
III. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ. —
In the sworn letter-complaint dated April 28, 1986, Victoria L. Torres charged respondent judge with
ignorance of the law, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary motives. She alleged that
respondent judge had indiscriminately issued restraining orders without conducting hearings on the
applications for the issuance of preliminary injunctions and had reiterated restraining orders after the
lapse of the mandatory twenty [20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the enforcement of
the writs of execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which are
of co-equal jurisdiction; that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other branches whom
she fancies to have offended her, as in the case of Deputy Sheriff Ramirez [cf. Adm. Matter No. R-351-
RTJ] who was merely complying with the order of Judge Liwag and that she has been issuing
restraining orders in ejectment cases involving the so- called "Maysilo Estate" for undoubtedly
suspicious considerations.
By way of compliance to the court's resolution dated June 19, 1986, respondent submitted her
comment on the letter-complaint on July 16, 1986, branding the allegations found therein as false
accusations as it failed to state specific facts on the matters complained of. She stated that she issued a
temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 10526 entitled, "Arturo Salientes, et. al. v. Alexander
Development Corp., et al." but denied having issued an extension thereof. She claimed having issued a
preliminary prohibitory injunction after due hearing.
With respect to the second allegation, respondent explained the issuance of the restraining orders as a
method of maintaining the status quo so that the cases pending before her involving the issue of
ownership may not be rendered moot and academic by the execution of the decisions in the ejectment
cases relating to the same properties.
Respondent reiterated her explanation in Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ in connection with the Ramirez
arrest-incident and asserted that she has been acting on the Maysilo estate cases objectively on the
basis of the law involved and the evidence on hand.
It appears that while the instant complaint was pending evaluation by the Court, complainant
Victoria Torres, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of Alexander Development Co. caused the
implementation of the writ of execution issued by the RTC of Caloocan, Branch CXXX in Civil Case
No. 10645, entitled "Alexander Development Co. v. Jose Chan." The writ of execution was enforced thru
the demolition of a shanty being claimed by Francisco Cruz, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
10526. Because of this, Torres was ordered arrested for contempt of court by respondent judge in an
order dated May 15, 1986. To challenge said arrest order Torres instituted before the IAC a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as AC-G.R. S.P. No. 09162-SP, wherein respondent
judge was likewise required to comment. On June 5, 1986, respondent judge issued an order recalling
the arrest order for being moot and academic. This was manifested in the comment submitted in AC-
G.R. No. 09162-S.P.
IV. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ. —
The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the alleged failure of
respondent judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza
Lazaro," despite the case having been submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Complainant
who is the defendant in Civil Case No. C-9831, claims that the case was submitted for decision on
October 2, 1984 with the filing of defendant's memorandum. She further alleges that as respondent
judge had been drawing her salary during the entire time that the case was pending decision,
respondent judge is likewise guilty of falsification in view of the certification required of judges
before they could draw their salaries to the effect that they have decided all cases assigned to them on
or before the end of three months counted from the time a case is submitted for decision.
On July 16, 1986, counsel for complainant Romulo T. Santos, filed a manifestation and motion to
withdraw the complaint on the ground that "certain facts and conditions which heretofore were
unknown to the complainant and undersigned counsel have come to [their] knowledge ... which
affect their resolution to prosecute the complaint. 4
Said manifestation, notwithstanding, the court by resolution dated July 24, 1986 required respondent
judge to answer the complaint.
In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing on the record shows that
the case has been submitted for decision; that defendant in said case [herein complainant] never
appeared in court during the hearing of the case nor during the series of conferences called by her for
the purpose of effecting an amicable settlement between the parties, as per manifestation of her
counsel, complainant and her husband were always abroad; that defendant in fact told the court
interpreter that she did not want to appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after
she received a telephone call from an alleged close relative of an associate of a national official saying
" If you don't decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro you will be removed, but if you decide in her
favor then you will stay," that she looked into the records of the case where she found the motion of
Mrs. Lazaro, received by the court on March 12, 1986, praying for the early resolution of the case; that
because of the telephone calls and with the point in mind that "this is a revolutionary government,"
she had no recourse but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro, which she did in a decision dated
July 18, 1986; that in view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7, 1986, the instant complaint is
already moot and academic.
V. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ. —
Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision. Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-23527 [84] entitled "People
v. Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned to respondent's court. The decision acquitting the accused
was promulgated on June 10, 1986, allegedly in the absence of complainant and his counsel, so that
complainant learned about the decision only thru a neighbor. Complainant challenged the decision as
erroneous for the reasons that the testimony of the accused on the alleged self-defense was not
convincing, respondent judge erred in her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution as well as in her pronouncement that Cabel had no motive for stabbing complainant
when lack of motive does not preclude conviction.
Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she did not give
credence to the version of the prosecution. She ended with the conclusion that the decision in said
criminal case is just and in consonance with the evidence presented by the parties. She views the
complaint as a means to harass her in the wake of the judiciary reorganization.
VI. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC. —
Civil Case No. C-12172 entitled, "Manchie Sabile Brozo v. Spouses Esmeraldo Quijano and Adelina
Quijano," an appealed case for an unlawful detainer was pending before Branch CXXI of the RTC of
Caloocan City when presiding judge thereof, Judge Salvador J. Baylen, was transferred to the RTC of
Quezon City on November 15,1985. Said judge had previously required the parties to file their
memorandum with. in 30 days from notice of the order dated November 4, 1985, but only the plaintiff
had done so at the time of his transfer.
On January 7, 1986, therein defendants-appellees moved for either the consolidation of Civil Case No.
12172 with Civil Case No. 11724, entitled "Esmeraldo Quijano, plaintiff versus Manchie Sabile Brozo,
Defendant" pending before Branch CXXX of the same court, or the re-raffle of Civil Case No. C-12172
to another judge to avoid delay in its disposition; or if re-raffle is not proper, to effect the transfer of
said case to the pairing judge of Branch CXXI for further proceedings. Plaintiff-appellant opposed the
motion.
On January 9, 1986, Executive Judge Oscar M. Herrera referred the motion to Judge Antonia Corpuz-
Macandog of Branch CXX, the pairing judge of Branch CXXI.
On February 19, 1986, Judge Macandog denied the motion of defendants- appellees. However, on
March 13, 1986, she issued another order recalling, rescinding and setting aside the order of February
19, 1986 and considering the case submitted for decision to her as pairing judge. Counsel for plaintiff-
appellant, Atty. Jose V. Marcella moved for a reconsideration of the order dated March 13, 1986 with a
request that the matter be referred to the Court Administrator for determination or ruling as to which
judge-Judge Baylen or Judge Macandog-should decide the case.
Meanwhile, on April 24, 1986, the Court En Banc designated Judge Domingo M. Angeles, RTC,
Branch CXXIX, Caloocan City as Acting Judge of Branch CXXI of the same court "in addition to his
regular duties without additional compensation, effective immediately and to continue until a regular
incumbent is appointed or until further orders from this Court." 5
On May 15, 1986, Judge Macandog rendered judgment in Civil Case No. C-12172 dismissing
plaintiff's appeal Copies of the decision and the order denying his motion for referral were received
by counsel for plaintiff on May 22, 1986. He forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of both the
decision and the order. Pending resolution thereof, he wrote the Court Administrator a letter on June
9, 1985, requesting for a ruling on who, among the three judges; Baylen, Macandog or Angeles, has
authority to decide the case and who, between Judges Macandog and Angeles, should resolve the
pending motion for reconsideration.
Acting on said letter, the Court En Banc resolved on July 8, 1986 to: "[a] DIRECT Judge Salvador J.
Baylen Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, to decide Civil Case No. C-12172, considering
that before his transfer to another court of equal jurisdiction said case was already submitted before
him for decision and as such all proceedings were totally heard and tried by him and the greater
interest of justice will be better served if he will decide the same; [b] require Judge Antonia C.
Macandog to EXPLAIN within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of notice hereof why she should
not be disciplinarily dealt with for taking cognizance of Civil Case No. C-12172 and deciding the
same against the vigorous objection of the plaintiff and [c] SET ASIDE and declare null and void the
decision rendered by Judge Macandog for lack of authority and the pending motion for
reconsideration and to set aside the decision and the order denying plaintiff's motion to refer the case
to the Supreme Court be recalled and withdrawn." 6
In the explanation submitted on July 18, 1986, Judge Macandog stated that she took cognizance of
Civil Case No. 12172 by virtue of the note/order of Executive Judge Oscar Herrera appearing on the
face of the "Motion to Consolidate and/or to transfer case to the Pairing Judge dated January 7, 1986;
which note reads: "Refer to Pairing Judge, Br. 120" and signed, "Oscar M. Herrera 1/9/86;" that as the
thirty-day period granted to the parties within which to file their memorandum under the order
dated November 4, 1985 expired at the earliest only on December 5, 1985, at which date the case
would be deemed submitted for decision, Judge Baylen could not decide the case, the same not
having been submitted to him for decision at the time of his transfer on November 15, 1985; that she
has been authorized by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take cognizance of all kinds of cases in
Branch XIV [now Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City] and that the resolution dated April 24, 1986 in
A.M. No. 86-499-87, which impliedly revoked this authority came to her knowledge only during the
first week of June, 1986 when Judge Angeles started taking cognizance of and began hearing cases in
Branch CXXI.
Except for the charges of gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust decision
in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ, which must be dismissed outright for lack of merit, the other
charges brought against respondent are indeed serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow
on respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to remain a member of the Bench.
The complaint in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ is anchored primarily on respondent having
given credence to the exempting circumstance of self-defense offered by the accused in Criminal Case
No. C-23527. In Villa v. Llamas, 84 SCRA 277, where the complainant placed in issue the wisdom of the
respondent judge's decision in a civil case for having believed the testimony of the plaintiff, an
alleged operator and maintainer of houses of ill-repute, this Court ruled that said circumstance was
not an indubitable ground for penalizing a judge administratively. The reason, as previously stated in
the case of Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, is that "to hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable.
Similarly, in the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaram, 39 SCRA 430, this Court had the occasion to
pronounce that 11 mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to
produce an influence of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust
decision [which circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar], are irrelevant and immaterial in an
administrative proceeding against him. We further stated: "If in the mind of the respondent the
evidence for the defense was entitled to more weight and credence, he cannot be held to account
administratively for the result of ratiocination." 7
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the
promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the
offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do so.
The actuations of respondent judge in Administrative Matters Nos. R-351-RTJ and R-621-RTJ are,
however, administratively censurable. In both cases, she issued preliminary injunctions to stay the
implementation of writs of execution issued by courts of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction, and
issued arrest orders against a deputy sheriff and an attorney-in-fact of a party who proceeded to
enforce the writs of execution despite said unjunctions. To effect the immediate execution of the order
of arrest against deputy sheriff Ramirez, respondent wrote a handwritten note to Brig. Gen. Alfredo
Lim requesting his assistance on the matter.
To our mind, both orders of arrest were improvidently issued. Respondent judge should have been
aware that forcible entry and detainer cases do not interfere with a proceeding where ownership is at
issue. Thus, in Petargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, it was held that "the determination of the respective right
of rival claimants to public land is different from the determination of who has the actual physical
possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of
the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the
actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any illegal
manner, can never be 'prejudicial interference' with the disposition or alienation of public land."
Besides, in the case of deputy sheriff Ramirez respondent judge should have taken into consideration
that his duty to enforce court orders and processes is ministerial in character and that he has no
authority to determine the validity of the order placed in his hands to implement. Thus, whether
Judge Liwag can, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, legally issue the writ of execution is of no
moment insofar as deputy sheriff Ramirez is concerned, and he should not have been punished by
incarceration for performing his official duty.
Moreover, the handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the least, highly
irregular and improper. Her over-zealousness in implementing the order of arrest creates the
impression that she has taken an interest far and beyond that ordinarily expected of judicial officers
with respect to cases pending before them; which, in turn, puts her impartiality in question.
Respondent judge is of the impression that the release of Ramirez from jail and the recall of the order
of arrest against Victoria Torres had rendered the administrative cases against her moot and
academic. Rather than exonerate her, these facts instead serve to strengthen the charges against her.
For one, the release order issued by this Court only proves the impropriety of her act, while on the
other, the recall order demonstrates the impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the first
place.
The same attitude is observed in respondent judge in connection with Administrative Matter No. R-
684-RTC which she wants this court to consider moot and academic for the reasons that she has
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 and that the complainant had moved for the withdrawal
of said complaint.
We said in the case of Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10, that a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss the
complaint by complainant, does not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against
respondent judge, because "to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant,
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory
power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."
And seriously blunder, respondent did.
While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of facts, in that it was not
indubitably established that the case had been submitted for decision as alleged in the complaint, and
dismissal of the charge should have followed as a matter of course, the case had taken an unexpected
twist. In her answer, respondent judge admitted to have succumbed to pressure in deciding the case
in favor of herein complainant, Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to promote peace so
nobody would call me again by telephone telling the same purpose, the respondent, then decided the
case with the point in mind that this [sic] a revolutionary government and she had nor [sic] recourse
but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro, [Decision dated July 18, 1986, see
attached.]" 8
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed
from the national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the
telephone is a patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law and a
revelation of her weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the public has laid on
respondent their confidence that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong
enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office. Regrettably, respondent has dismally failed to
exhibit these qualities required of those holding such office.
In Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, respondent judge failed to act with reasonable dispatch
required of judicial officers. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the date shown on the order
resolving the motion of complainant to declare therein defendant Pasion in default. If it were true that
the motion was resolved as early as March 1, 1985, We do not think that service of the order upon
counsel for complainant at this office in Espana, Manila would take more than three [3] months, and
most conveniently after the present complaint has been filed.
Delay in the administration of justice is the most common cause of complaint and a judge should
endeavor to avoid it. It is thus incumbent upon a judge to manage his court with a view to the prompt
and convenient disposition of its business and he should not tolerate abuses, indifference or neglect
by clerks, sheriffs and other officers of the court. Hence, upon failure of her clerk to serve summons
on the third party defendant, it became incumbent upon her to remind said clerk of such failure.
The explanation given by respondent judge in Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC is
unsatisfactory. Par. VIII, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974 of this Court provides:
VIII. PAIRING SYSTEM:
A pairing system shall be established whereby every branch shall be considered as
paired with another branch. In the event of vacancy in any branch, or of the absence
or disability of the judge thereof, all incidental or interlocutory matters pertaining to it
may be acted upon by that judge of the other branch paired with it. The latter may
likewise conduct trials or hearings on the merits in criminal cases with detention
prisoners assigned to the other branch, as well as in other kinds of cases, subject to the
conformity of the parties. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to the above-quoted internal procedure, the referral of Civil Case No. C-12172 to judge
Macandog was solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate and/or transfer case to
the pairing judge. Such referral did not in any manner empower or authorize her to decide the case
on the merits, particularly in the light of the vigorous objection interposed by therein plaintiff. The
power and authority of one acting as a pairing judge are clearly defined and delineated by said
paragraph and one acting beyond its tenor certainly oversteps his authority.
Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. 9 They are likewise
charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the
scope of their authority. They are dutybound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures,
designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Thus, confronted with
a serious challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if
not the wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to this Court. The
hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding Civil Case No.
12172 despite the strong objection against her authority and the reasonable request for referral of the
question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary sanction.
Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September 16, 1982 to
take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch CXXI, suffice it to say that the same was revoked, not
by our resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier, by the implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act on January 17, 1983.
Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her
office. Her removal must perforce be effected.
In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered
under undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as
may be warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any
branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST JUDGE
FERDINAND J. MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a hand written letter dated December 9, 1996[1] addressed to the Honorable Andres Narvasa,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos, the wife of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and
their children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith Marcos Barliso complained against Judge Ferdinand
J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at Cebu City, alleging that ever since Ferdinand J.
Marcos was appointed judge of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his family had never
seen nor took hold of his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal amount which was
insufficient for their education and for their sustenance; that they were made to believe that he was
only receiving a small remuneration as an RTC Judge; that it was only in August 1996 when they got
hold of his RATA, JDF and basic salary cheques; that these were not even enough to pay his obligations
with the CFI Community Cooperative and other private persons; that he was enjoying his extra-
ordinary allowance, local and city allowances, bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14 th month pays; that
he even got his second quincena of November direct in Manila when he was enjoying his one-week
leave of absence with his mistress.
Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the remuneration due
Judge Marcos from the Supreme Court be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the school where she has
been serving for 20 years (the Abellana National School) to prevent his mistress from getting
them. They added that Judge Marcos was still receiving local and city allowances and a salary from the
Southwestern University where he teaches in the College of Law. They likewise stated that it would be
advisable for him to resign from the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions would
eventually deprive them of support for he will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or she
would follow him and might pressure him to go into graft and corruption.
In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to file his
comment on the complaint.[2]
In his comment, dated May 15, 1997,[3] Judge Marcos denied his failure to support complainants
and alleged that during the first few months of assuming his job on the bench, he faithfully and
regularly gave to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that he alone spent for their daily
transportation and for the daily miscellaneous expenses of their son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical
student at the time, notwithstanding the fact that his wife also earns a salary as a public school teacher;
that the amount he gave to his wife was sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan
contracted with the CFI Community Cooperative did not pose a serious problem to the financial
standing of his family because it was made during his first five (5) months in the judiciary when he had
not yet received his salary; that most of the proceeds of the said loan were for the tuition fee of their
son Joshua; that said loan was payable in affordable monthly installments and that he hoped it would
be fully paid before the end of the year 1997; that he was not indebted to any private person, not even
when he was still a private law practitioner; that he had no idea why his wife thought that he would be
better off resigning from the judiciary; that even if he were transferred to another sala his regular
support to his family will continue; that the issue of his having a mistress is not true as he has never
been linked extra-maritally with another woman; that his wife and children had already signed a letter
withdrawing their letter/complaint against him; and he had signed a letter of undertaking to give all
the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his wife. He prayed among other things, for the
dismissal of the complaint against him as they were living in one roof as a family and as this
administrative case is becoming a wedge of hostility between them.
On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[4]
In his report dated October 17, 1997,[5] Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis
recommended that the complaint be considered closed and terminated, it appearing that the complaint
against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and there being no more compelling reason
to proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-withdrawal dated January 10, 1997 submitted
by the complainants and the letter of undertaking signed by Judge Marcos.
In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997, [6] the complainants stated that they wanted to
withdraw their letter/complaint against Judge Marcos as he had made an undertaking that Mrs. Rotilla
A. Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the Supreme Court; and that the issue of the alleged
mistress grew out of unconfirmed reports and had already been thoroughly discussed by the family
council. They requested that the matter contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a closed
matter.
 On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no objection to
his wife getting all the checks due him from the Supreme Court and gave her the authority to get them
directly from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Cebu City. He strongly denied
having any relationship with any woman when he talked with his wife and children. His alleged
relationship sprung from unconfirmed reports from the media.[7]
As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the latter did
not report the matter to the Court En Banc, the case remained suspended until the Honorable Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc on August 14, 2000, the scandalous incident
he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association held on August 11,
2000. Among the RTC judges who attended and joined the Fun Run was Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. A
woman who was reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and the querida joined the
Judges at the temporary place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast thereat were
seated near each other.
Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit
relationship with the woman. Judge Marcos admitted, among other things, that he had been living with
the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that he was separated from his wife. Judge
Marcos was the one who supplied the name of the woman.
In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for investigation
to OCA Consultant, Justice Pedro Ramirez, and the suspension from office of Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos.
Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on August 15,
2000 ordering the suspension of Judge Marcos from office until further orders from this Court, in view
of the confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous relations between him and a certain Mae Tacaldo
and the referral of the case to Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for
investigation, report and recommendation. But because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United
States of America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the Court
Administrator.
Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of the Executive
Judge in Cebu City from November 13 to 15, 2000. [8]
On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive Judge of Cebu
City. Only the respondent and his counsel appeared because the notices did not arrive soon enough in
Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of RTC, Cebu City, Branch 18, was requested to serve the
notices on the complainants.
The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive
Judge. Complainant Rotilla Marcos came alone while respondent appeared with his
counsel. Complainant manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous
commitments. Counsel for the respondent begged to be excused as he also had personal
commitments. Thus the case was reset for the next day.
On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13, RTC, Cebu
City. After he was discharged, complainant Rotilla Marcos took the stand herself. Since her testimony
(direct examination) was not completed the hearing was continued the next day. Her direct testimony
was completed on November 16, 2000 but her cross-examination was deferred to December 5, 6, and 7,
2000.
On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-examined
the complainant. After her testimony, complainants introduced four other witnesses, namely: Maximo
Abing, Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig, and Lerma Eguia, all of whom appeared in obedience
to subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-designate. These witnesses were presented principally to
identify certain documents that were marked and later formally offered in writing.
Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" -picture of Maydelane Tacaldo,
the alleged mistress of the respondent; "B" -the letter/complaint received by the Court on December 12,
1996;[9] "C" -RCPI telegram directing respondent to attend a PJA stay-in seminar on June 20-22, 1996 in
Mandaluyong; "D" -Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996; "D-1" -address of respondent at
615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City; "E" -handwritten letter of one Mrs. E. Dandan, dated
October 3, 1995 addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May in the sum of P11
,400; "E-1" -a portion thereof; "F" -RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent purportedly from Mae
Tacaldo; "F-1" -a portion thereof; "G" -Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997
addressed to respondent; "G-1 " -page 2 thereof; "H" -unsigned Certification of Tenant; "I" -Invoice
issued by Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount, for brevity) for a "Toyota Revo"
Model 1999 allegedly owned in common by respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo; "I-1" -portion showing
the names and addresses of the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J. and Tacaldo, Maydelene B. of
Rodriguez St., Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City"; "I-2" -particulars of the vehicle insured; "J" -
Order issued by respondent on January 24, 2000, in Civil Case No. CEB- 19070; "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", and "J-
4" -portions thereof; "K" -October 28, 2000 issue of "THE FREEMAN"; "K-1" and "K-2" -portions thereof;
"L" -October 20, 2000 issue of the "SUN STAR CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" -portions bracketed; "M" -
SUN STAR SUPER BALITA issue of October 20, 1996; "M-1" and "M-2" -portions thereof; "N" -October
28, 1996 issue of SUN STAR SUPER BALITA; "N-1" and "N-2" -portions thereof; "O"-SUN STAR issue
of December 18, 1996; "O-1" and "O-2" -portions thereof; "P" -Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1"
-paragraph 7 thereof; "Q" -Affidavit of Anacleta Marcos; "Q-1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" -portions thereof; "R"
-Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated August 15, 2000 in the present administrative
matter[10]; "R-1" -portion thereof; "S" -Petition filed by respondent in Civil Case No. CEB- 25511 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C. Ares; "T" -Marriage Contract of
complainant and respondent dated December 31, 1971; "U" -Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to PCI
Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" -Certificate of Registration No.15676143 issued on August 4,2000 in the
name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at Capitol Site, Cebu City; "V-1" -portion
thereof; "W" -copy of Certificate of Registration of a "Toyota Revo" in the name of respondent and
Maydelane Tacaldo with address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W-1 " -portion showing
owners' names; "X" - Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota Revo"; "X-1" -portion regarding
ownership; "Y" -Deed of Sale of one "Toyota Revo" executed by one Leticia Cabanes; "Y-1 " -portion
showing vendees being respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "Y-2" -date of execution; "Z" -PNP
Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate; "Z-1 " -portion showing purpose of certificate; "AA" - Subpoena
Duces Tecum issued to Paramount; "BB" -Invoice No.135580 covering a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-1 " -name
and address of respondent as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-1" -name and address of respondent;
"CC-2" - Private Car Policy No. CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" -signature of Paramount's Cebu Service Office
Manager; "DD" -Paramount's Memorandum showing change of mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-
3" -portions of the same; "EE" -fax message received by Paramount re: inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo
as one of the insured; "FF" -Chattel Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "FF-
1" -page 2 thereof; "FF-2", "FF-3", "FF-4", "FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" - portions thereof; "GG" -Motion for
inhibition of respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-19070; "GG-1", "GG-1-A", and "GG-2", -portions
bracketed; "HH" - Comment of Atty. Francis Zosa on the motion for inhibition; HH-1" and "HH-2" -
portions of the same; II" -Deed of Sale jointly executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo
conveying a "Toyota Revo"; II-1" and "II-2" -portions thereof; JJ" -correction made by Paramount as to
who are the assured in CEB- PC-25687; "JJ-1" -the assured were the respondent and Maydelane B.
Tacaldo; "KK" - Counter-Affidavit of complainant on the charge of adultery filed against her by the
respondent; KK-1" to "KK-10" -pages 2 to 11 thereof; "KK-11 " to "KK- 23" -annexes to Exhibit "KK"; "LL"
-opposition to motion to disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu as counsel for Mrs. Marcos in
Civil Case No. CEB-25511; "LL-1 " -page 2 thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" -portions of the same.
From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to the
respondent. Their marriage was celebrated on December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist Church, Cebu City
and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of the Gospel. [11] When they got married, Judge
Marcos was waiting for the results of the Bar exams and did not have a job. Since she was already
working as a teacher in Catmon she supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of her
grandparents. They have two children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who is 26 years
old.
When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported him and
the children. In fact, he stayed home and looked after the children.
Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed presiding judge
of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City. After his appointment, she noticed a change in
his conduct towards her. He became cold and no longer performed the usual acts of a husband,
referring to sexual relations, because he was very busy. What's more they no longer slept in one
room. In March 1996, they were living in San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano dialect, about
her husband's infidelity.While she could no longer produce the letter at the time of the trial, she could
still remember its contents. In English it read: "You are a stupid wife. Until now, you have not learned
that your husband has a mistress. If you don't believe me, go to the office of the RTC, Branch 20, right
now. You go there-to Branch 20. Ask the people there if there is a convention in Manila to be
participated in by RTC judges. He already bought two plane tickets."
Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila. She found
a telegram in Judge Marcos' attache case from a Mario Umali designating respondent as a participant
in a "stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at the Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20 -
27, 1996.[12]
She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the convention
(seminar). Atty. Tecson asked her if she was not informed of the convention to which she replied in the
negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he was going. She asked Judge Marcos that
night. He told her that he was going and that it was exclusively for the judges. She told him not to go,
as she was afraid he was going to take along another woman. He replied that he would not go. But, at
dawn, he told her that he must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that would be
distributed in the Supreme Court.
She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to attend the
convention but she was sure there was a woman.
Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody in
Branch 20 gave her a Statement of Account from Islacom. [13]
The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to Ferdinand J. Marcos
at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, and not to San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu,
where he and his family lived. They have never resided at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City,
nor had they any telecommunication facility with Islacom. Judge Marcos neither has a cell phone nor a
telephone line with Islacom.
Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two months
to find it. She discovered that Maydelane (Mae) Tacaldo and er parents were living in that house. A
Mrs. Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs. Enriquez, one of her co-teachers, lives next
door to the Tacaldos.
She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a while in
the office, as he will go out for 20 minutes. She wanted to go with him but he refused to take her as the
place was only near the office. He would consult somebody.When he came back, he told her that they
would go to Islacom and declare that the cell phone was lost.
She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The
confrontation took place in the Social Hall of the Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her brother and his
wife, Rotilla Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and her sister were all present
then. Rotilla Marcos asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in the name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but
the billing address was that of the Tacaldos, and why she was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The
latter said that they were friends. The latter did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid P9,000.00
for the cell phone's bill when they were only friends.
Complainant found inside respondent's attache case that was in his office a yellow sheet of paper,
dated October 3, 1995, addressed to respondent. It was a bill for the payment of P11,400.00 for "May's
Acct."
As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a secret
because she already had an inkling that he had a relationship with another woman.
She found a birthday card/social telegram [14] addressed to Judge Marcos inserted between the
pages of a law book on a table in the latter's office. It read, among other things, "MT cares a lot, you
know," and "It's wonderful to share my life with you." She discovered it two weeks after his birthday,
which was July 7, 1996. She kept it with the other evidences. She did not show him the card, as it would
precipitate another quarrel.
Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard dated
September 10, 1997.[15] One of the credit purchases was made at the Agencia Nina and Jewelry. She
never saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was it given to her daughter. One of the
"purchases" reflected in the Statement of Account was made at Cafe Laguna. There was no occasion
when she dined at Cafe Laguna with her husband. Another item in the Statement of Account was
groceries bought at Gaisano Metro. The groceries purchased at Gaisano Metro were not for their house,
as respondent was no longer going home in 1997. Respondent judge left the conjugal home in 1997 and
has not returned since then.
Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located at Don
Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. She went to the apartment he was renting. She saw
Maydelane Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she did not go inside. Maydelane Tacaldo left
the apartment, in a car. She drove their (the Marcos) family car and the station wagon, at times.
She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms respondent's slippers,
and empty water dispenser of a brand similar to what they have at their own place, and the laundered
clothes (pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos hanging.
She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went to, and
the latter replied in the affirmative. Judge Marcos and Maydelane were using aliases as the room was
registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She obtained a Certification of Tenant from the
Zomer Development Company.[16] It was dated May 18, 1998, and showed that a Mr. Victorino Timol
was an occupant and tenant of Amville-1 Bldg. located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St.,
Capitol Site, Cebu City from May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General Manager
of the said company, refused to sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.
The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was even
published in the newspapers.
Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K", "L", "M",
"N", and "O") where the affair of respondent with Maydelane Tacaldo was mentioned. In Exhibit "K"
(October 28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former Executive Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as saying
that respondent was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship and that other Judges were
complaining of his behavior. In Exhibit "L" (October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star Cebu) Judge Agana
was once more quoted as having said that she had warned respondent that his affair was going to
destroy him and that the latter never kept his relations with the law student a secret.
After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to give
them support, the latter executed an authority for them to collect his salary from January 1997 up to
January 1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998.Since then they no longer received any
support from him.
Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from getting
the checks was because he allegedly discovered that she had a paramour. She verbally complained to
Judge Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court Executive Judge) about the stoppage of the
checks. She did not complain to the Supreme Court because he told her that she was just an ordinary
classroom teacher with a small salary and that he would use his power as a judge against her.
Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was because
respondent judge threatened to kill her.
Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo, upon
seeing her picture. He had seen her twice: the first time during the wake of the late Sandiganbayan
Justice German Lee, and the second time at the convention of the Philippine Judges Association held in
a hotel in Manila (Hyatt Regency) sometime in June, 1999. Both times he did not see her with a
companion.
At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of some RTC
judges. He knew her to be a law student. He did not think that she was a member of the Judiciary, the
wife of a judge, or an employee of the court.
Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of documents, the
originals of which were in their possession.
Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short), brought a
photocopy of the certificate of registration (Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with Motor No. 7K-0279834
issued by the Land Transportation Office in favor of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane
Tacaldo, with residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as joint owners.
Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for brevity), Cebu
City, brought to the hearing and identified the following documents: (1) the office copy of Certificate
of Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by the LTO in the names of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos
and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (2) a Motor Vehicle
Inspection Report (Exhibit "X") regarding a Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and
Maydelane Tacaldo of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "Y") executed
by one Leticia R. Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane
B. Tacaldo conveying a Model 1999 Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate (Exhibit
"Z") covering a 1999 Toyota Revo owned by Leticia Cabanes, for the purpose of transferring the
ownership thereof to Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo.
Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought to the
investigation copies of certain documents which he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB" as the invoice for the
insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor of Ferdinand Marcos with residence at P.
Rodriguez St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "C" as the Policy Schedule forming part of
the policy which was also issued in favor of the insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol
Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "DD" as an endorsement (No.2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of the
aforementioned policy No. CEB-PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as
an insured party. An earlier endorsement (Exhibit "JJ," No. 2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the
insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelane B." According to the witness, this change
was made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-examination the witness reiterated that the change
was occasioned by a verbal order they received from the PCI Brokers. He further admitted that he had
no knowledge as to whether respondent was notified of the change.
The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by respondent
and Maydelane B. Tacaldo, both residing at Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, in
favor of PCI Leasing was likewise presented as evidence.
Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit II) of the same Toyota Revo in favor of Amina G. Advincula. The same document appeared to
have been signed by the respondent and Miss Tacaldo, and acknowledged by them before Notary
Public Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his Notarial Register as Document No.385, Page No.78,
Book No.220, Series of 2000. Another document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which was an
endorsement issued by Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and
Tacaldo, Maydelene B".
Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked Exhibits
"1" (affidavit of desistance executed by the complainants); "2" (letter of respondent directing the Clerk
of Court to deliver all his checks to complainant); "3" to "3-Y" (savings account remittance slips to
respondent's son Joshua); "4" (electric bill); "5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit application submitted to PCI
Leasing); "6-A" (address indicated therein); "6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT" (postdated
checks issued by Maydelane Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery together with
affidavits]; "9" (reply-affidavit filed with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order dated February 22, 2000); "11-A" and "11-B" (portions
thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22, 2000); "12-A" and "12-B" (portions thereof); "13"
(original complaint for declaration of nullity in Civil Case No CE8-25511 ); "13-A" (portion thereof); "14"
(letter/complaint to Provincial Prosecutor); "14-A", "14-B", and "14-C" (affidavits supporting his
complaint) and "15" (certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These documents, however, were not
formally offered nor transmitted to Justice Quimbo.
Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in the support
of his family. He alleged that he had supported her and their children, except at the time that she
abandoned the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was giving her P22,000.00, more or less, monthly;
that the reason why Mrs. Marcos filed the letter/complaint against him was because she suspected that
he was not giving her the correct amount since he did not show her the checks from the Supreme Court;
that he revoked his undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from the Supreme Court
because he discovered that she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos; that he alone supported
their children and her daughter's family from 1998 until the time he was suspended; that he spent for
the maintenance of their home by paying their electric and phone bills.
He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a medical
student (Exhibits "3" to "3- Y").While assigned in Toledo City, he stated that he was remitting to Joshua,
a medical student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly. When his son found a job in the year 2000, he
reduced his monthly support to P4,000.00. To his daughter Hazel Faith, he gave P1,500.00 weekly while
he was in Toledo City; but when he was transferred to Cebu City, he increased her weekly support to
P2,000.00.
He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of P5,000.00 was given
to his daughter Hazel Faith Marcos as a birthday gift. The groceries bought at Gaisano Metro were
bought and brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu, especially for his granddaughter. It was his
practice, even when he was still a private practitioner, to purchase all the groceries for the needs of his
family.
He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened all his
communications. As to the birthday card found tucked between the pages of a law book in his
chambers, he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as her name did not appear in the card -only
the initials M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has the initials M.T. but as his Clerk of Court,
he didn't expect Monalila Tecson to send him a card with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you know",
and "It's wonderful to share my life with you."
He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's account
by a Mrs. Dandan. He replied that he did not know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the Bebot to whom the
payment should be given. He had never incurred any unsettled account with anybody when he was
still with Branch 20. He believed the note to be spurious and manufactured by his complainant-wife, it
being undated and because he didn't recognize the penmanship. However, he admitted that the note
was not in his wife's handwriting but surmised that it could have been the penmanship of the person
who was asked by complainant-wife to write it.
He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as he has
always lived in Talisay, Cebu where his conjugal home was situated. As to the claim that his slippers
and empty plastic water container were found outside one of the rooms in the Zosa Compound, he
contended that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if he did, his slippers were always left at home and
in his chambers. There were many consumers of mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only in
Talisay but also in Cebu City. He denied having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of the Zosa
Compound and using the alias Victorino Timol.
With regards to the news item [17] wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he was not
even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship, he believed this to be not true because Judge Agana
had never investigated him for any wrongdoing.
He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star Super
Balita.[18] He likewise denied that he and Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in Toledo City where he
was transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he had to stay overnight in Toledo City he
usually stayed in the house of his Process Server, an Arthur Camonggan.
The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a "for-hire"
motor vehicle plying Cebu City and Toledo City. The Tacaldos requested him, being a close friend, to
have his name included in the registration of the motor vehicle. Since he was a judge in Toledo City, he
could help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop Multi-Purpose, a cooperative that accepts motor vehicle
units for plying the Toledo, Balamban, and Cebu City routes.
As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an accident
or there was a damage caused to a third party, he as the owner would be held responsible. He averred
that he felt safe because the vehicle was insured.Though the car was insured it did not cover damages
to third parties. He was likewise aware that if there would be a foreclosure of the chattel because the
chattel mortgage was not sufficient, or if the promissory note was not paid, he would be held liable. He
put himself at risk because he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they are very close family
friends.
The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The address
at P. Rodriguez, Zosa Compound, Cebu City was the address of Miss Tacaldo. In some of the
documents, like the credit application submitted before PCI Leasing and the promissory note he
executed with the same company, he gave his address as San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss Tacaldo, not
his. He and Maydelane Tacaldo did not jointly own the motor vehicle, although it appears on paper
that it was registered in both their names but he had no hand in the preparation of the insurance policy
nor of the policy schedule. Thus, he was not aware that his address was shown to be at Zosa
Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City. He did not have it changed as it was only during the hearing that
he first saw the insurance policy.
The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos have
invested in said motor vehicle. In fact, Miss Tacaldo issued several checks to guarantee payment of the
balance of P300,000.00.
 The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted because
after his suspension, the vehicle was shown on television. The Tacaldo family was afraid that the motor
vehicle might be involved in a case between him and the complainants.
He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a
paramour as early as March 1998 and he had told her that he would file the corresponding adultery
cases once he had sufficient evidence against her and her paramour.And this he did. He filed 13 counts
of adultery cases against his wife with the Municipal Trial Court of Balamban, Cebu and 21 counts of
adultery before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. All these cases, including the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, were filed only after the Court suspended him on August 15, 2000.
He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized, as he has
a bigger build than her.
He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent. He was
diagnosed with diabetes in 1992. As a diabetic, most of his vital organs were affected, especially his
sexual capacity. He was already sexually impotent as early as 1993, when he was first appointed to the
Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete and he could not have sex anymore. He was being
treated for diabetes and sexual impotency. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla, dated
December 6, 2000, stated, among others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla) medical
professional care since September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic since 1992, and was
on maintenance medication.
His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it because his
diabetes caused his sexual impotency.
In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his order
dated February 22, 2000, he denied the motion for reconsideration because it was not true that he was
living in the property of Atty. Zosa.
While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with
him. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. confronted him and asked him whether Maydelane Tacaldo
had a job and whether he had a child with her. He replied that he didn't know if she had a job and that
he didn't have a child with her. The Chief Justice told him, "That is bad for the judiciary." Before he was
able to explain the Chief Justice had already left. The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman
who went there was with him.
He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a seminar of
Judges at the penthouse of the San Miguel Corporation in Mandaue City. She was then the secretary of
Judge Vestil.
He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar
Coliseum but he had never visited their house.
The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been sent to a
certain Urgello. He didn't have an account with Islacom. Neither did he have a cell phone although he
had, at one point, entertained the idea of buying one. When he went to the Islacom office regarding the
allegedly erroneous billing, he did not ask as to who the real account holder was. All he did was to
execute an Affidavit of Loss, per advice of Islacom.
Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the parents
of Maydelane, his wife, and the brothers and sisters of his wife because of the Islacom Statement of
Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the cell phone because during the confrontation,
Miss Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of Maydelane also said he did not see his daughter
with a cell phone. Miss Tacaldo expressly denied having any relationship with him. He also told the
group during the confrontation that he was not related to her, in any way. Complainant-wife instigated
the confrontation.
He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota Revo. The
buyer paid P300,000.00 loan to PCI and P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.
We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo Quimbo, as
contained in his Report. We find the details of his findings amply supported by the evidence on record
leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a. Mae Tacaldo) -that their illicit relationship started even before
he separated from his wife Rotilla Marcos in 1997.
Consider the following evidence:
 The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos not in his
conjugal dwelling at San Jose village, Lawaan 3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Ext., Cebu
City that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the residence of Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos
denied owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to him if he
were not the real owner thereof.
Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant desirous
of its services. Islacom would not have sent Judge Marcos a Statement of Account if he did not apply
for a phone line nor sent it to an address he did not furnish them.
If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have
stood his ground and insisted that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous of him to
execute an Affidavit of Loss.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an explanation that
the bill was erroneously sent to him without raising hell, so to speak, in finding out the identity of the
Islacom employee who was at fault, especially so when this Statement of Account was the catalyst in
the confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla and Ms. Tacaldo.
Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the social
telegram/birthday card, but was delivered on July 5, 1996. This person could be Maydelane Tacaldo or
Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as Judge
Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to
share my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly
intimate with Judge Marcos would send such a card.
We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The book was
found tucked between the pages of a law book lying on top of his office table. He is the most logical
person to have inserted said card in the law book.
The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge Marcos bought,
presumably, jewelry/ies at the Agencia Nina & Jewelry, and groceries at the Gaisano Metro, and dined
at Cafe Laguna.
Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said
restaurant. She testified that her daughter also did not receive jewelry/ies from her father. They also
did not receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer going home then.
Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her husband
was staying. When she found it she saw her husband's slippers and laundered clothes outside the
place. Having been married to him for about 26 years she would have known her husband's preferences
as to wearing apparel and personal items, and would have been able to recognize them upon seeing
them.
In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the fact that
he was residing in one of the units in the Zosa Compound that belonged to Atty. Zosa, counsel for one
of the parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not categorically deny the allegation. Neither did
respondent, in his Order denying the motion, categorically deny the allegation.
Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo
as one of the tenants at Zosa Compound, the fact that they lived together was apparent in the different
documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota Revo, for the address they both gave for these
documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. Zosa Compound, by the way, is located at
Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the
owners of a Toyota Revo.
Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle -a Toyota Revo -and had it registered
in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle with them as joint
beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
and when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both
signed the Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners
of the Toyota Revo.
We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he accommodated the
Tacaldos in their desire to get a slot in the cooperative because they are very close family friends. If they
are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had never been to the house of the Tacaldos. In fact, he
was not even sure as to the exact location of the Tacaldo residence.
 Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration,
the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility vehicles would be assured. He
went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having the vehicle registered in his and Ms.
Tacaldo's names.
There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered as an
owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A simple phone
call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our mind,
to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of transporting passengers.
Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even
mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's.
We cannot gloss over the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted by Chief Justice
Davide. Judge Marcos candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice that he had been living with
Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated from his wife. Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to
public functions was not in good taste considering that Judge Marcos was still very much married even
if he and his wife Rotilla were already living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo
as if she was his wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times
be beyond reproach.
As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS,[19] the personal behavior of a judge should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have
very recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion."[20]
In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,[21] it was held that if good moral character is required of a lawyer, with
more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to
observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency. [22]
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess
the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the
confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal
for immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place
where his court is situated.
"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]), the Court laid
down the rationale why every judge must possess moral integrity, thusly:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond reproach and
above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the administration of justice can not be
maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral
integrity and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is
more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.[23]
No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner
that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up
to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.[24]
The Court once again reminds all those who don judicial robes to maintain good moral character
and at all times observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency.[25]
Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and
children.
"Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when
executed as an afterthought xxx. As held in People v. Ubina[26]: It would be a dangerous rule for
courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses
who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make
solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witness(es)."[27]
Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,[28] the Court once more held that:
"The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein
respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the
Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the
matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interesting the conduct of members of the Judiciary
and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be
derailed by the complainants desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has
violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to remain
in office and continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest form of
disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement
or appointment to any public office including government owned or controlled corporations, and
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
FERNANDO DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. Judge JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig
City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Verified Complaint[1] filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainant
who identified himself as a concerned citizen, respondent was charged with the Violation of R.A. No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and the Code of Judicial Conduct The case stemmed from three (3)
criminal cases assigned to respondent, namely:
a.] Criminal Case No. 11309 against Roberto Agana y Borja, for violation of Section 16, Article
III, R.A. 6425, as amended;
b.] Criminal Case No. 4275-D against Roberto Agana y Borja for violation of P.D. No. 1866;
and
c.] Criminal Case No. 4276-D against Sarah Resula y Puga for violation of Section 16, Article
III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
The complaint, in sum, alleges that respondent as the presiding judge in whose sala the above-
enumerated cases are pending, gravely abused his discretion and exhibited evident partiality by: 1.]
socializing in posh restaurants particularly in Marios Restaurant, Quezon City and the Shangri-la EDSA
Plaza with then Congresswoman Venice Agana, mother of the accused Roberto Agana, together
with their counsel, Atty. Narciso Cruz; 2.] issuing unreasonable orders for postponement which
unjustly delay the administration of justice; and 3.] allowing the two accused, Roberto Agana and his
live-in partner, Sarah Resula, to submit to a drug test thereby postponing the trial of the cases
indefinitely.
The OCA thereafter recommended that the case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals or to any OCA consultant for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from notice.[2]
In a Resolution dated February 16, 2000,[3] the Court designated Associate Appellate Court Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis to conduct an investigation, report and recommendation on charges against
the respondent within ninety (90) days from notice.
 Pursuant thereto, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thereafter proceeded with the investigation of the
case. The complainant did not appear at the hearing. Despite this, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis, bearing in
mind that even a desistance of the complainant is of no moment in an administrative case such as this,
proceeded with the investigation by examining the records of the criminal cases involved which
respondent had brought along. She subsequently submitted a Report containing the following findings
and recommendations:
At this point it must be pointed out that, had the supposed complainant appeared to substantiate his
charges, his testimony could only have been admitted as to the alleged socializing acts of the
respondent with the congresswoman-mother of the male accused granting that he was an eyewitness
thereto and was familiar with the judge and the congresswoman as well as the defense counsel, Atty.
Cruz. However, as to the alleged partiality of the respondent in granting postponements, his
testimony could only be in the form of opinions which would have been inadmissible, considering
that he is not party to the criminal cases, neither does he appear to be involved therein in any other
capacity. As a matter of fact, his real identity remains to be a question, since he did not actually
furnish his real address in his complaints, both with the Ombudsman and with the Court
Administrator.
At any rate, lest the undersigned be perceived as one shirking from responsibility, she opted not to
dismiss the case outright, in view of settled rules that only the Supreme Court can dismiss
administrative cases against judges,[4] and considering further that the bulk of the allegations in the
complaint are verifiable from the records. Thus, she proceeded on with her investigation, giving the
respondent an opportunity to clear his name
From the documentary evidence submitted by the respondent and the record of the three criminal
cases as well as the respondents answers to the clarificatory questionings of this investigator, the
following facts appear:
1. The arraignment of both accused were postponed for three (3) times, all upon motion of
the defense counsel, formerly Atty. Joel Aguilar, the reason being:
(a) unexplained absence of the accused in Court[5]
(b) the intended attendance of Atty. Aguilar at the 6th National Convention for Lawyers [6]
(c) absence of both accused who were reportedly in Tagbilaran City[7]
2. After the arraignment, the accused appeared but once in the three (3) successive settings
for trial on the merits. Their counsel, now Atty. Narciso Cruz, never appeared at all, but
only filed motions for postponement which were invariably granted even over the
objection of the prosecution.[8]
3. Despite the successive absences of the accused, the respondent never issued a warrant of
arrest, nor even asked them to explain their absences. According to the respondent, he
considered their absences as waiver of appearance. Yet, in the two instances that the
prosecution was ready,[9] he (respondent) did not proceed with the hearing which should
have been done if there was a waiver of appearance.
4. When the respondent acted on the Voluntary Submission to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation of both accused, he did not give the prosecution an opportunity to file
comment or opposition thereto.[10]
5. The respondents order of January 26, 1998, allowing the confinement, treatment and
rehabilitation of the accused was not officially sent to the Dangerous Drugs Board. His
directive in the second paragraph of the order, to wit: The pertinent report must be
submitted to the Court soonest[11] is rather vague in that it did not state who should make
the report nor the limit of the period given for its submission.
6. The respondent never checked with the Dangerous Drugs Board whether or not the two
accused had indeed submitted themselves for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation
with said office. This gives the impression that the respondents order of January 26, 1998
was made merely to enable him to suspend the proceedings, including the case for
violation of P.D. [No.] 1866, which is not subject to such suspension under R.A. [No.] 6425,
as amended.
7. When the respondent issued the order of September 18, 1998, [12] where he appears to
have motu proprio set the case anew for hearing on November 12, 1998, there was already
a case filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman[13]on January 30,
1998.[14] Likewise, this administrative complaint was already filed on February 2, 1998
 with the Office of the Court Administrator, and the latter had already directed the
respondent on September 9, 1998, to file his comment to such complaint. [15] Obviously, he
was stirred to action by the filing of such complaints and not because of his diligent
performance of his duties and responsibilities.
8. The respondent denied that he knew of the fact that accused Roberto Agana is the son of
then Congresswoman Venice Agana of Bohol. According to him, he learned about it when
Atty. Narciso Cruz entered his appearance and then he said it was pro bono basis and the
accused is the son of a congresswoman.[16] When asked by this investigator whether that
information was made in open court or in chambers, he answered that he came to my
chambers.[17]
9. Subsequently, after realizing through the statements of this investigator that a judge should
not allow lawyers and parties litigants with pending cases to see him in chambers,[18] the
respondent tried to redeem himself after resting his case on May 9, 2000, by explaining
that when Atty. Cruz saw him in chambers, the latter had not yet entered his appearance
as defense counsel. He did not, however, ask for the correction of the transcript of
stenographic notes of April 7, 2000.
10. The order of inhibition[19] was issued by the respondent long after this administrative case
had been filed against him.Hence, it could not be taken as a voluntary inhibition to show
lack of interest on the criminal cases.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thus found that:
All the foregoing are indications that the respondents official conduct had not been entirely free from
the appearance of impropriety, neither has the respondent remained above suspicion in his official
actuations in connection with the criminal cases involving Agana and Resula. He has fallen short of
the requirements of probity and independence.[20] A judges conduct should be above reproach, and in
the discharge of his official duties, he should be conscientious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual,
just, impartial.[21]
Thus, in the case of Garcia vs. Burgood,[22] the Supreme Court held:
We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the trust and faith reposed on him by
the parties as an impartial and objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that rise
fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded xxx.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis recommended that respondent be fined the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts complained of will be dealt with
more severely.
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct was hardly exemplary
in this case.
The Court in a litany of cases has reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay of
a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. [23] Indeed, the Court has
consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the
principle that justice delayed is justice denied.[24]
In the case at bench, the fact that respondent tarried too long in acting on the pending incidents in
the Criminal Cases Nos. 11309, 4275-D and 4276-D, hardly becomes open to question. If at all,
respondent judges foot-dragging in acting on the incidents in the said cases, which stopped only when
administrative complaints were filed against him with the Ombudsman and the OCA, is a
strong indicia of his lack of diligence in the performance of his official duties and responsibilities.
It must be remembered in this regard that a speedy trial is defined as one conducted according to
the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays.[25] The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused
by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. [26] This purpose works both ways,
however, because it, likewise, is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring
judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. [27]
At the risk of sounding trite, it must again be stated that Judges are bound to dispose of the courts
business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. [28] We have held in numerous cases
that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.[29] If they cannot do so, they
should seek extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability.[30] Indeed, judges ought to
remember that they should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to them, for justice delayed
is often justice denied.
Certainly, Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the peoples faith in the judiciary. [31] It is for this
reason that this Court has time and again reminded judges of their duty to decide cases
expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of even one case constitutes gross inefficiency[32] which this
Court will not tolerate.[33]
With regard to the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa[34] that the peoples
confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the
diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess.[35] It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
RULE 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only
through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is
therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[36] Only recently, in Magarang
v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.,[37] the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are
strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial conduct and with existing administrative
policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of justice. [38]
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.[39] A judges conduct must be above reproach.[40] Like
Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.[41] A judges private as well as
official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond
reproach.[42]
In Vedana vs. Valencia,[43] the Court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have
recently explained, a judges official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence.Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.
As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. [44] A judge is not only required to be impartial;
he must also appear to be impartial.[45]Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges.[46] Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.[47] It was, thus,
held that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the
complainant.[48] Be that as it may, credence can not be accorded to the indictment that respondent judge
had been socializing with the congresswoman-mother of one of the accused as well as accuseds counsel
considering that complainant neither testified nor produced any witness to corroborate this charge.
Viewed vis--vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge violated Rule
1.02,[49] as well as Canon 2,[50] Rule 2.01[51] and Canon 3.[52] He must, thus, be sanctioned.[53] In this
connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu
City,[54] that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not
only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as
to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are
the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of
justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach. [55]
A review of past decisions reveals a wide range of penalties for cases of similar nature. These
penalties include mere reprimand,[56] withholding of salary,[57] fine,[58] suspension[59] and even
dismissal.[60]
This is not the first time respondent has been sanctioned by the Court. In Cecilio Wycoco v. Judge
Jesus G. Bersamira,[61] respondent was initially admonished for absenteesim by the
Court. Subsequently, in Jose Oscar M. Salazar v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira, [62] respondent was again
sanctioned and fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) with the warning that a repetition of the same act
would be dealt with more severely for violating Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1983. Specifically,
respondent intervened in a case which he could not properly take cognizance of causing the
complainant great prejudice resulting from the delay of the execution of a decision in his favor in Civil
Case No. 39608 of the MeTC of Makati.
It appears, however, that being chastised twice has not reformed the respondent with the filing of
the instant administrative complaint against him. Needless to state, such acts of respondent only
further erode the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the
bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary, which
in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.[63]
While the Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct warrants the
imposition of sanctions against him, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed
committed. Given the prevailing facts of the case, a fine of P10,000.00 accompanied by a reprimand,
with a stern warning that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely,
is a more appropriate penalty.[64]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand (P10,000.00). Further, he is REPRIMANDED and sternly warned that a repetition of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA

CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.
SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Present:
Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
 Promulgated:

September 9, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the
Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and
obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible
instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be
and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that
members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest
code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one
of the countrys second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal
and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the
members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has
failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality,
competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.

The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of
Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court
for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of
the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, et al.

To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008
constituted a three-person panel (the Panel of Investigators) composed of retired Justices of the Court;
namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and
Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the
(a) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
(Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth
Division of the CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.[1]

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice Vasquez,
Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting
Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular
senior member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized to act on all cases submitted to
the Ninth Division for final resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15,
2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for duty. The said office order likewise applied
to the other Division(s) where Justice Reyes had participated or took part as regular member or in an
acting capacity.[2]
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco,
Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or
representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as Meralco),
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B.
Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). [3] Aside from the application for
immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that
should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and
show cause orders issued by the SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by
the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a special
raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face of the urgent
motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas). [5] At 3:10
p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty.
Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case in the presence of the
parties in the interest of transparency and fairness.[6]At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-
parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of their motion for
the re-raffle of the case.[7]

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office,
personally filed the urgent motion to defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their motion
to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the
motion would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly
went to the office of Justice Roxas for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy of the
motion.[8] They initially talked to a male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however,
told them that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice
Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one wanted to
sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.[9]

On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave until June 6, 2008.[10] In
the meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters
absence, informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case
on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco.[11] Hence, in an Emergency Request for Raffle,
Justice Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition. [12]

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division
by raffle, in lieu of Justice Mendoza.[13] At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal
(Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman
of the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of
Justice Sabio, Jr. were indispensable on account of the national interest involved in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692.[14]

Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify herself but
(who) said that she had important information regarding the Meralco case. The unidentified caller told
Atty. Elamparo that a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact
been talking to Justice Roxas. The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had
administrative cases and was very notorious, but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more
details.[15]
At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from
his older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG).[16] Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named
the third member of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was
surprised as he had not yet been officially informed about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise
informed him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio of
the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC, and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which
represents the interest of the poor people. Justice Sabio told his brother that he would vote according
to [his] conscience and that the most that he could do was to have the issuance of the TRO and the
injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments, at which the respondents must be able to convince him
that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.

In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated
the circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call
from a member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:

Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25
P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.

As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of
Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and had become friends since before Martial Law
because as Chief Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in
various cases in Bulacan.

Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in
the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the
Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me
to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was no mystery about
his having known of the results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and are
present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is
his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in
seeking my assistance.

I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a
controversy between the long suffering public and the mighty financially and politically
controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a monopoly.
Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the mercy
of MERALCO.

x x x x x x x x x.

Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So I
waited until we would arrive in Manila.

As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed
that he was in fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I
impressed upon him the character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if
the legal situation permitted. He said he would decide according to his conscience. I said: of
course.

x x x x x x x x x.
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas
from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.[18] The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of
the motion at 11:58 a.m.[19]
 Claiming that the TRO was issued to pre-empt the hearing scheduled in the afternoon of that
day before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for
the motion for inhibition as follows:

3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable ponente has been
in contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft
resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary hearing. The
records of this case was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable
ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it learned
that there are supposedly two administrative cases pending against the Honorable ponente,
both of which involve allegations of bias and prejudice.

It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified by
the Raffle Committee that the case was raffled to him. [20] Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty.
Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was
handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a fool-proof Las Vegas
tambiolo, like the lotto machine.[21]

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature, the TRO which he had
prepared, already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the
TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.

Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas,
and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and
directing the respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within
which to file their reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same
Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective memorandum of authorities in connection with
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction together with their comments/reply. After the
parties had filed their memorandum of authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for resolution forty five (45)
days from promulgation of this Resolution. The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on
that day.[23]

For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for inhibition
filed against him. There was no need to put in writing the action on the motion for inhibition.[24]

At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS. [25] Justice
Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious.[26]

On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja),
a person he had lost contact with for almost a year already.[27] Mr. De Borja greeted him with: Mabuhay
ka, Justice. When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the
Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, I
voted according to my conscience.

On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not
grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 in the presence of the parties in the
interest of transparency and fairness, as the case had been raffled in accordance with the procedure
under the IRCA.[28]

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.[29]

 On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing for the
SEC, filed a manifestation and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition)
attached thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.

On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 103692,[31] as well as its memorandum of authorities.

On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio),
delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24,
2008.[32] However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve
the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and
when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio
demanded that it be returned back to him. Personally affronted by the domineering and superior stance
of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication) until
he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case. [33]

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from
Justice Roxas so that he could study the case before the hearing.[34] Justice Roxas asked him whether
Justice Reyes would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice
Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send
the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that
the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division
Clerk of Court asked him whether the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why
the rollo should be with him.

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June 23,
2008 within which to file their consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the
SEC.[35]

On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply to the
comment of the GSIS.[36] Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on what
transpired between her and Justice Sabio when she returned the cartilla. Teary-eyed, Atty. Custodio
begged off from making a report.[37]

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice to avoid an ugly confrontation with the
Justices on the highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society. He explained to the
Presiding Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and the actual practice in similar
situations in the past. The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, for the sake of
transparency and future reference, Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the
matter.[38]

On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter[39] calling the attention
of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the dilemma as to
who between him and Justice Sabio should receive CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these
questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Special
9th Division and who participated in the initial Resolution of the case?

Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as Chairman?

For Justice Reyes, the dilemma was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the
IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or
proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary injunction;
(3) granting new trial; and (4) granting execution pending appeal have been taken, the
 case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report
and the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions
in the same station.

The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for June 23 and 24,
2008, Justice Reyes considered it necessary that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the
referral of the controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the
case before the hearing.[40]

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz,
Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, noting some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is
on Monday, June 23, 2008.[41]

On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter [42] quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of
the IRCA and stating that the [i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the Justices who
participated in the case shall remain therein. Hence, Justice Cruz opined that [n]otwithstanding the
issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman
(Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return. Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice
Cruz in the afternoon of that day.[43]

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He opined
that the motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
states that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A
TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing
on June 23, 2008 was on the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to
participate in the hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion
to lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule
in the IRCA. However, the settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against the exception. The
participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, 2008 was a passport to participation in the
decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA.[44]

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to Justice
Sabio who in turn, opined that a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least
its initial action such that he should be the one to chair the Division. [45] In his office after that
consultation with the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given
him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the Presiding
Justice called up Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio insisted that he would preside over the
hearing of the case, and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was junior to Justice Sabio was no better
than his own opinion.[46]

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the
Presiding Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz because he did not
sign in an official capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity and hence,
the opinion of Justice Sabio was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than
he.[47] Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that he smelled something fishy about the move to transfer
the case to the Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the
fact that they were seated together on three occasions.

Justice Sabio smelled something fishy because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a
Chairpersons meeting regarding the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as
Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to the
promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for the inhibition
of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could not have been leaked by
Justice Bato but by a member of the Division.[48]
 The Presiding Justice did not do anything anymore to prevent an unpalatable situation at the
scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding the conflicting opinions of Justices Reyes and Sabio.
The personal view of the Presiding Justice was at the time with Justice Cruz but Justice Sabio had a
different interpretation. Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be
convened because the Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be better if Justices
Reyes and Sabio could settle it between themselves. The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices
practically everyday because he did not want these things to blow up. However, neither did it enter the
mind of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he known that there was
a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have changed his position that it should be the Sabio
group.[49]

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-point presentation
during the hearing.[50] Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft
Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings. [51] Justice Roxas did not act on the
motions.

On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice Reyes
that would handle the case on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.[52]

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr.
(Justice Villarama) who advised him, in no uncertain terms, that his stand was correct and that he
should remain in the case.[53] Justice Villarama said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth
Division regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of the pending motion
to lift TRO, which the Special Ninth Division should resolve following the general rule that when a
decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted
upon by all the Members of that division, whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition
of the decision or resolution, except in case of death, retirement or resignation of such Member.[54]

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former that
since there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised
Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-
problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would follow his suggestion.[55]

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his strong conviction that
the issuance of a TRO is not among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall
remain with those Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s).
Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x
x the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division.[56]

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform him that
the parties and their counsels were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that
he could not preside as Justice Sabio had apparently hardened his position and he wanted to avoid an
ugly spectacle. His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another
hearing room.[57] Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of
Appeals for weeks.[58]

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco.[59] At the
hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas,
the ponente, did not ask a single question.[60] Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up the motion
for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas.[61] In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 agreed to submit, within 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for
by the petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted
for resolution.[62]

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram with
Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries
of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which Division should resolve the matter of injunctive relief or issue the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. [63]

The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the Committee on
Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes,
Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members.[64] The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose
amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 for submission and adoption of the Court en
banc. (The office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to
include as members Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.[65])
The Rules Committee used to be composed of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid,
and Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson. [66]

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV
stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon,
and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos,
the Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4, 2008.[67] Under that office order, Justice
Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice
Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
(Justice Bruselas) as members.

On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class airplane
ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still
on official leave when the reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008.[68]

On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to Courts (sic)
summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the
Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted their
memoranda.[69]

That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for
an important matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed
to meet after his classes but not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is
an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,[70] would be waiting for him.[71] According to Justice
Sabio, the conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:

17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting for me at the
Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were: Alam mo
Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at
sinabi kong Mabuhay ka Justice, si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na
lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter of life and death for
the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by the
Arroyos.

At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He
said: Alam naming may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.

I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal matter of the Court of
Appeals which only happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the CA were not
even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and why I could not relinquish the
chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya
lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law
Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give way to Justice Reyes.
 Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was
treating me like there was a price on my person. I could not describe my
feelings. I was stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin
siya because I had known him since 1993 and this was the first time that he
had ever treated me like this, or shown that he believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may anak
iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told
him my wife and lawyer daughter were waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just
think about it, Justice.[72]

At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a sealed brown paper bag, which he was handling as
if something important was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10
million.[73]
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for
Meralco.[74]

In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself as a
businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner to
touch base and for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at
the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in their car after his classes, they
just agreed to meet at the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO
case allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a confirmed
free-enterpriser. Moreover, De Borja thought that there was [n]othing like hearing things directly from
the horses mouth.[75]

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying a bag,
not an expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator,
intending to walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was
still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the
Panel of Investigators in the grey Kenneth Cole Reaction bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-
shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits A-De Borja and A-1-De Borja and attached to the rollo of
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked
as Exhibit A-2-De Borja, shows that the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag
did not contain P10 million.

Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the hearing
was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr.
De Borja allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag
with paper handle about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size. Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that
it could be the subject of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.

According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO whose wife
was a member of Marthas Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De
Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At
a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but
Mr. Lopez did not say anything.

Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice
Sabio informed him that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the
Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist
the governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: Fifty Million. [76] He alleged that it was Justice
Sabio who called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to feel his reaction to the P50 million solicitation.
Justice Sabio asked him: O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari.

Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as
a balato because he came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was
helping the Roa family in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned more than P25 million although
he received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the Roa property. He
gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de
Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of legal problems, Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the
time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of
Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-togethers of the Roas
with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in the house of Mr. De Borjas mother. [77]

On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio)
was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly
shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both shocked and
amused. Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the offeror was. However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio
found out that Mr. De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked
that Mr. De Borja had the gall to ask her to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.[78]

Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was,
in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the
Presiding Justice did nothing because he could not advise a fellow Justice on what to do the Justice
would know what he should do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-
Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.[79]

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text messages,
Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang
deadline ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung
di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million.
Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio said No. Since Mr. De Borja
did not seem to understand why he kept saying No, Justice Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my
conscience will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a
Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and
Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law
School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal,
eh. Then he added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman
diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I dont know about them, but I am different. Mr. De
Borja then said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To this, Justice Sabio
said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter what, saludo
talaga ako sa iyo.

Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above conversation with
Justice Sabio.

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought
Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice
about the urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face
that the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July
10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding
Justice his apprehension that should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative
liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in
the case be required to comment on the Urgent Motion in a resolution to be issued by the former
9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the
resolution x x x would render moot and academic the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the
Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could
place a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the case did not reach
the Presiding Justice.[80]

For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case
followed him as its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from
the disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any
Justice.[81] Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices
that will render the decision.[82] This is because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of
the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July
4, 2008 reorganization of the CA.[83] He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard
the case should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and Justices may rely on the transcript
of stenographic notes.[84] And so, once the three Justices have signed the decision, the ponente has the
pressing duty to promulgate the decision.[85]

Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted on all the ponencias of Justices Reyes
and Roxas, just as they had acted on his ponencias.[86]

On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.

On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty. Jose
Midas Marquez (Atty. Marquez) regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice
Sabio should write the Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all
that has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called her father
and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a
handwritten letter for her to deliver to the Chief Justice.[87]The handwritten letter, in essence, requested
permission for Justice Sabio to unburden himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case. [88]

At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between them,
as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: Why did you stab me behind my back? He said, Why, what
did I do? I asked him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion
of Ed Cruz, in his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions
only recently and he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things
behind my back and not discuss the matter with me face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco
would take action against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you?
I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the Meralco emissary able to
know that there was an impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal
matter?
→ If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million offer,
what will I think of you?
→ Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole scheme or
shenanigan?
→ Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of their offer,
now they will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they
are uncertain with mine?
→ And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this court,
I have never seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this
stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They
should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.
→ Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the 23 rd and never raised any
question on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
 → Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several days after the
issuance of the TRO, respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and
a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such motion?
→ Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those pending motions.
(Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong
interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I taught the subject for
many years and this is not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter. Bahala ka na. Then I stood up
to show him to the door. He was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm
around me.

For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang
hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.

Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the final decision on the
MERALCO case bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for
concurrence/dissent. According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the
rationale for his conclusion. Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned with an expensive looking
travelling bag from where he pulled out the purported final decision. Before the close of office hours,
Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had
signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up
the next day.[89]

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals
had been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account
of its having issued the TRO.[90] She also concurred with the portion of the decision recommending
administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should
have appeared for the GSIS.[91]

Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes to lay off the
case and allow Justice Sabio to continue and to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume
the chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: Wala talaga ako dito Jun,
Wala akong personal interest dito.

After a careful and judicious study of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day
purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio, who was then on leave of absence
until July 11, 200.[92]Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not submitted their respective
memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the convincing ponencia, including three copies of the
signature page, because Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to
the impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.[93] Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the
final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read
because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as everything was unofficial there was
no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the special seal of Justice
Roxas. It allegedly was thrown in the garbage can.

On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.

On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the
chairmanship of the Division,[95] alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the parties were
first directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room,
 the name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices. Thus,
petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over
and that he would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth
Division of the Honorable Court.

6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of the Court
of Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name
plates on the table for the justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that
(sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over
the oral arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
Petitioners were, thus, of the impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth
Division, Justice Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.

7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice Reyes has
already returned from his temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as
Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr. should now
refrain from acting as the chairman of the Division hearing the instant case as he is
already disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice Reyes.

8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden
judicial responsibility of performing his duties and functions as Chairman of
the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with the justices who participated
therein only when any of the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due
course; (b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new
trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal:
x x x x x x x x x.

9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s
continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who
issued the temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the instant case,
this circumstance is not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a justice of the
Court of Appeals may remain in the Division.

10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a

temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary
injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued
participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the clear Rules of the
Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is
exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.

On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia.[96]

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a meeting to
discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties.
Justice Roxas promised to send to Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.[97]

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos
Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.

On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas to meet
with him as he had by then read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the
meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he
available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice Roxas.[98]

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and
informed Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution
he prepared never saw light.[99]

At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to
Justice Reyes, and told the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the
case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated on the case.[100] After a cursory examination of
the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but
Justice Reyes asked for more time to study the case.[101]

A transcript of the Final Deliberation on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of Volume III of
the rolloof CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-
8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to lend
credence to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section
13 of the Constitution.[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription.
Justice Bruselas did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was
being taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and
Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas
admittedly prepared the transcript from memory.[103]

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were previous
deliberations were really meetings, which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to
Justice Roxas.[104]

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that she
handed her fathers letter to the Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo. [105] A few
days later, however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer
meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.[106]

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice informed
him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice
Sabio berated him and accused him of orchestrating matters. Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of
MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that
much, how much could have been offered to the principals?[107]

On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and informed
him of the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as
to who was the rightful claimant to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco
case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they were both correct.

On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had a brief
chat with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in
the sense that one (1) [of] them can properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided
in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive
relief, or pursuant to the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI. [108]

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice[109] an Interpleader
Petition[110] praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios
Former Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction
or Decision.[111]Justice Roxas averred that [t]he impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has
to be resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO
issued by the Special 9thDivision (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente]
and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal). He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the
interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of
the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand was that the IRCA should
be strictly applied because [w]hen the provisions are clear, there is no room for interpretation.

Justice Roxas endorsed his Interpleader Petition to Justice Reyes for his signature or dissent to
the finalized MERALCO Decision, which had been in Justice Reyes possession since July 14,
2008.[113] He also gave the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.[114]
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had no
authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern over which the
Presiding Justice must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told
Justice Roxas that he would study the matter.[115]

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on what was discussed
between us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30 p.m.[116] Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested to
endorse the case and have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous
comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume
Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.

Justice Reyes expressed doubts that the suggestion was most prudent, as the dispute revolves
around the correct interpretation of the IRCA. He believed that since the question was purely internal,
the CA should not seek enlightenment from the litigants for it would only be construed against its
competence. He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the
Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his best
lights and act accordingly.

On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692
so he could properly submit the requested opinion. It was then that he came across the unresolved
motion praying for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to
hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the TRO.[117]

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received any reaction from the
Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same
day.

The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices opinion on whether
it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he
did not expect the Presiding Justice to answer or resolve the matter anyway.

On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes letter and Justice
Roxas Interpleader-Petition. The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed the
authority to decide the subject conflict simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control
and supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The controversy was certainly not an
administrative matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice has
the authority to act on any matter not covered by the Rules although such action should be reported to
the Court en banc.

The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that the (Special Ninth) Division that
issued the temporary restraining order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition
because it was the Division that issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did
not contest the authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had
reported back to work. Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO have
a bearing on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule
VI[118] points to the retention of the case by the Special Ninth Division. Furthermore, the new Division
headed by Justice Reyes may not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two of its
members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not
believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the
chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be laid to rest
and that whoever would be dissatisfied with its outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had been
promulgated in the Meralco case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices
Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry,
the Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23,
2008.[119]

It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice Sabio,
informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 million in exchange for his voluntary
stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes, and that the decision in
the Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth Division. [120] Shocked that Justice Roxas did not
inform her as a matter of judicial courtesy of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8,
2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,[121] bringing to
his attention the apparent and obvious irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, and
complaining about Justice Roxas lack of judicial courtesy in discarding for reasons she would not know,
his purported final Decision that he had asked her to sign and which she signed after a judicious study
of the records and rollo thereof. Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had to incorporate therein
some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision.

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed surprise and consternation when she learned on even date
that a Decision in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by
Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed
final draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of the ponente,
was not even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing
out of the undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced
mind the following questions: under what basis was the case suddenly transferred to
the 8th Division and why is it that neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman
Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost, what
happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting her precious
time and effort in carefully and laboriously examining the voluminous records
and rollo of the case?

Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation of the
provision of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).

On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter, [122] which was prompted
by a disturbing telephone call he received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice
Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, after the injunction hearing on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him
P10 Million to either favor them or yield the chair to Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas
that he had informed the Presiding Justice of the bribery incident and that he was disgusted over the
turn of events because he should have remained chair of the Special 9 th Division that issued the TRO
on the case. Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter
and that he had participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with the ponencia of Justice
Roxas without such information ever being taken up. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would
not leave the matter as it is because he would bring it up in the open, to media, etc. Justice Sabio asked
Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much would have been offered to the others.

Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting
with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard
about the bribe offer but that he did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it escaped his mind. The
effort of Justice Bruselas to get in touch with Justice Roxas proved futile.

Allegedly prompted by the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how the decision
was promulgated, and that unless an immediate and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken by
the Court of Appeals, both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices and of the Court of
Appeals would undoubtedly be tarnished, Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter [123] to the
Presiding Justice, which precipitated the present investigation.

On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried an account of the letter of Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential letter to the
Presiding Justice leaked out.[124]

Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy of the
letter of Justice Sabio and, through a telephone call, reiterated his full agreement with his desired
investigation.

The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an emergency en banc session at 10:00
a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the possible effect on
the decision rendered. The session was also called in order that the predicament experienced in CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692 could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the
IRCA on the reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de
Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en
banc session to report to the other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to collect
the personal reaction, comment or view of the Justices on the matter. [125]

In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, after a torrid discussion of all the issues, the
Court of Appeals decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator;

(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the
above-entitled case to the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they may deem
appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and

(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the
Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the recurrence of a
similar situation.[126]

After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the Presiding
Justice[127] her strong reaction to the paper of Justice Roxas falsely imputing to her grandstanding before
the media or resorting to media-recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint before the
Supreme Court, and taking exception to the equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that
she is allegedly clinging to the case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding
Justice the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case that resulted in her having been
eased out of the case notwithstanding that she carefully and judiciously examined the ponencia with
more than 50 pages, after devoting her precious time to such study, and affixing her concurrence
thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her prayer for an investigation of the matter.

Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the
businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja
publicly claimed having learned from the news that Justice Sabio was one of the justices in the case
arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO management.
He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him about the blandishments coming from the government side,
that he was being offered a promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr.
De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., What would it take for you to resist the governments offer? and that
the response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was Fifty Million.

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the next
day on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that
this is a matter of self-defense on his part, hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.

Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an initial response to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja,
vehemently denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case,
and that he never asked for money from him.[128]

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement entitled
My Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case.

Expressing anger at the filthy lie of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate almost word
for word his conversations with Mr. De Borja.

In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano[129] executed in Davao City, she
stated that -

Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio
Jr. He related that because he was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to
call him regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was
designated as a substitute member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily
on leave by reason of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same
Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more comfortable, to sit in the division.

So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through
business card.

x x x x x x x x x.

On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to investigate (1)
alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
(Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.

The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were
submitted to the Panel to serve as the parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-
examined by the Panel and the other parties.

On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even date to
the Court en banc.

According to the Report, the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties
committed by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No.
103692, which are detrimental to the proper administration of justice and damaging to the institutional
integrity, independence and public respect for the Judiciary. [130]

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q.

Roxas

Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the

parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
 As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by
Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:

(a) The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition
Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this
case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).

b) GSIS Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30,
2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have
resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never
did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).

(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)

(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point
at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar
motion. Both motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-
621,)

(e) Meralcos Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of
Authorities and Reply to Repondent SECs Comment filed on June 25,
2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralcos Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume
Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case, which was filed on July 10,
2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274).[131] (emphasis supplied)

We agree with the Panel of Investigators that by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his
inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that
he should resolve such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the
Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court. The pertinent portion of the
said provision states:

Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. x x x

xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in
writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the
Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.

This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an
implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a
motion is mandatory.

Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that Justice Roxas failure to act on
the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which
applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary)
providing that:
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.

Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that [j]udges shall perform
all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness. Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the
resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency.[132]With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible
the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
 This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to
resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-
08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two
motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of
impropriety will be dealt with more severely.

Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.

Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the
Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The
Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:

2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.

(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the Transcript of Final Decision, which is
supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division
on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true transcript of the minutes of the
meeting, but purely a transcript from memory because no notes were taken, no
stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which
he composed from my recollection to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which
requires that minutes of the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept. The so-called
transcript is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance when
actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or
deliberation among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a
decision.
(b) The statement in the transcript that it was a recap from our previous
deliberations was another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.

(c) The reference in the transcript to a Final Report of Justice Roxas was
also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a report as ponente, as required
by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14,
2008. The Final Report which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he
and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The Final Report was merely the title of
the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed
closing statement in the transcript that -- We have covered every angle of the Final
Report of Justice Roxas extensively is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the
investigation that he had not seen the transcript until the copy in the rollo was shown
to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes
on August 26, 2008.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she
asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was
labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because
she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas
personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth
Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3)
additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the
decision.[133]

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in
explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the
qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the
penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and
warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion
to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of
dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous
occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on
employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty
of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.[134]

Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his

colleagues in the Court of Appeals.

The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

xxx xxx xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at
that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been reorganized out of the Special
Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he
should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not
promulgating the decision which she had signed.

The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama,
Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it
should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night,
while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas
was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice
B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have
dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio,
Jr. might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five.
If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he
would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice
Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-
Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice
Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices
B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were comfortable.

(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on
his Interpleader Petition he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco
decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the
Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also
reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the
same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was
 embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of courtesy and
respect for his position as head of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices
are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason,
that judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due
to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges are expected to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent
haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It
behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most
exacting standards of propriety and decorum.

Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case

demonstrates his undue interest therein.

In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision
even prior to the submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the Report:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008,
or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of
authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 GSISs 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 SECs 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with
memorandum of authorities

Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their
memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature
on July 8, 2008. His rush to judgment was indicative of undue interest and unseemly
haste, according to J.Romero.

He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they
invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out,
neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before
signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit
memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)

We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the rush to judgment (even before the filing of
the parties memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially
when taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the
merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead
jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his rushing of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing
his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA;
his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice
to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision
and despite the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he
(Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the
promulgation.

We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not
only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. [135] This Court will not
hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their
assigned cases.[136]
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial
Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the
Meralco case.

The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his

brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the
standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a
magistrate of the appellate court.

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May
30, 2008from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of
Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the rightness of
the GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he
would act in accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the Court.

As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers
can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:

Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to
influence his younger brothers action in the Meralco case, because both believe that
our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one
is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal. [137]

For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
 Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence
by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be
free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary
to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case, seemed to
indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield
the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had
returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a
chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on
Meralcos Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9 th Division, which he
probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the
prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.

Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by
his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which
rendered the decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio
to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when
Justice Sabios designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of
absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA
and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper
interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift
and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment
between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.

Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and

indiscreet.

On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:

Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been
wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his
mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco
case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of
Meralco.

But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A
month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for
preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or
resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner
to chit chat about the Meralco case.

Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the
Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the
Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.

Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was
highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in
conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that
covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the
integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1,
Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: Judges shall
exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to
 reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance
of judicial independence.

It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo
Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to
step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of
the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was not comfortable with him (Justice
Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he could not in conscience accept it.

Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think
that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly
perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De
Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop pestering him with his
calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted
would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected
him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that
he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if
the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, saying lang
yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. He testified that his reply to Justice
Sabio, Jr.s call was deadma or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a
lapse in judgment on his part.

Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.s
story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas
denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?

First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day a fact admitted by Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Jr.

Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offerors name
in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja
identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.

Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10
million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he
would not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
He would have waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-offer.[138]
xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is
not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even
after the latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part
of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the
institution to which he belongs.

Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and imprudent
conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the
chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L.

Reyes.

As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated
July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which
Division of the Court of Appeals the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth
Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an
Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact
that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices
Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case
on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did
either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the resolution
of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute
on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under
the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was
completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his
opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled and
humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him.

It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the
Judiciary.

Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple
misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on
his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be
reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the
Presiding Justice.

Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal

The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to
be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading
the parties memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division
required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30,
2008 some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 yet she allowed herself to believe
Justice Roxas misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance
with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the
IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part. [139]

The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the
law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial

colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes
conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.

Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez

It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership
expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the
perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
 Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the
turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized on resolving the
impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the
Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the
reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of
the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them
to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives two daughters employed
in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was
he not aware then, or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the
IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act on any matter involving the Court and its
members? That Rule provides:

Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized
to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be
reported to the Court en banc.

He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery
attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a
member of the Court, calling for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the
judicial processes of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the
Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:

Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc

shall, inter alia:
(a) xxx
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies
for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x
x x.

Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his lapses in judgment.[140]

In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble
now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive
action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act
in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required
of him as leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is
hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as
required of him by the IRCA.

Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case

Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court the
propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind
eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of
other personalities in the Meralco case.

With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his
attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar
Confidant for appropriate action.

With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr.
De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This
matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after
deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse
themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit
themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from
service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for
six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of
Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as
he should be credited for being a whistle blower and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight
(8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension
from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the
government including government-owned and controlled corporations;

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to
act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of
Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty;

(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating
circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will warrant a more severe penalty;

(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice
of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial
duties.

(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment of a member of the
Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;

(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a
member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

 IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC
BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. Present:
NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No.
179120. PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 24, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution
dated December 10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of
Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC,
Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41,
179120 and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential
internal document of the En Banc.

The investigating committee, composed of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as

Chairperson and Mme. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members,
submitted the following report:

INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE

EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HON. REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice

HON. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice
HON. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice
HON. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice
HON. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice
HON. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice
HON. ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice
HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, Associate Justice
 RE: Report on the Investigation of the Unauthorized Release of the Unpromulgated Ponencia
of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the Consolidated Cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando
v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, Docketed
as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, Respectively, to Determine Who
are Responsible for the Leakage of a Confidential Internal Document of the En Banc
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Chief Justice
and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court the following report on the results of the
investigation of the committee created under the En Banc Resolution dated December
10, 2008.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on
the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. Comelec,
Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, (Limkaichong
case) which was used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no
one raised any further objections to the draft, the En Banc approved it. It having been
already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were
concurring in the result, Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the
same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that seven of
the 13 Justices (excluding Justice Reyes) concurred in the result with the ponencia of
Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice Reyess ponencia or ponencia or
unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro then informed the Chief Justice that they too wanted to concur only in the result.
Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only in the result, the
Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was
noted that if a majority concurred only in the result, the ponencia would have no
doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House
of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority
for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then volunteered to write
his Reflections on Justice Reyess ponencia for discussion in the following weeks En Banc
session.
During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice
Carpios Reflections which had in the meantime been circulated to the members of the
Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the date
for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.
On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included
in the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold
oral arguments remained, however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in
Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter
signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at the instance
of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and
with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the
Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated December
10, 2008, directed
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division and Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate
the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes
 to determine who are responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal
document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the
appropriate actions thereon;

2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Resolution, why he should not be punished for contempt for writing
the undated letter and circulating the same together with the
unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes.
As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior
Justices, conducted initial hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Courts above-quoted Resolution
dated December 10, 2008, Biraogo submitted to the Court his Compliance dated
December 22, 2008 to which he attached the following annexes: (1) an undated
photocopy of a 3-page printed letter addressed to Dear Mr. Biraogo which purportedly
was sent by a Concerned Employee as Annex A; (2) a June 12, 2008 note handwritten
on a memo pad of Justice Reyes reading:
Re: G.R. Nos. 178831-32, etc. [the comma and etc. are
handwritten]
Dear Colleagues,
I am circulating a revised draft of the ponencia.
(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES,
together with a copy of Justice Reyess Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008
agenda as Annex B; (3) a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices as Annex C; and (4) a photocopy of Justice
Carpios Reflections as Annex D.
Justice Ynares-Santiago later inhibited herself upon motion of Justice Ruben T.
Reyes while Justice Carpio voluntarily inhibited himself. They were respectively
replaced by Justice Renato C. Corona and Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, by
authority of the Chief Justice based on seniority. Additional hearings were then held
by the reconstituted committee on January 14, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22, 2009.
The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:
1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T.
Reyes
2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes
3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes
4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office
8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice
9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc
10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of
Administrative Services
11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court
12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court
13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura
14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court
15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T.
Reyes
16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura
 18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes

SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONIES
Below are the summaries of their testimonies:
1. ARMANDO A. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows:
He was in charge of circulating ponencias for the signatures of the
Justices and of forwarding signed (by all the Associate Justices who are not on
leave) ponencias to the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ).
On July 15, 2008, after the En Banc session, he received from Justice
Reyes the original of the unpromulgated ponencia (Gilbert copy). Because he
was busy at that time, he instructed his co-employee Rodrigo Manabat, Jr. to
bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature and to wait
for it. He instructed Manabat to rush to Justice Nachuras office because the
latter was going out for lunch. After more than 30 minutes, Manabat returned
with the Gilbert copy already signed by Justice Nachura, who was the last to
sign.[1] Del Rosario then transmitted the Gilbert copy together with the rollo,
temporary rollos, and diskettes to the OCJ pursuant to standard operating
procedures for the promulgation of decisions. The documents were received
by Ramon Gatdula on the same day at around 3:00 p.m.
The following day, on July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes
instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy and the accompanying documents
and diskettes as he was told that the promulgation of the ponencia had been
placed on hold. He brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to
keep it. He then placed the Gilbert copy in a sealed envelope and placed it
inside his unlocked drawer and wrote a note in his logbook when he retrieved
the Gilbert copy that its promulgation was on hold and would be called again
on July 29, 2008.[2]
The Gilbert copy was in his sole custody from July 16,
2008 until December 15, 2008 (when the investigating committee held its first
hearing).[3] He never opened the envelope from the day he sealed it on July 16,
2008 until December 10, 2008, when Justice Reyes told everybody in their office
that the Gilbert copy had been photocopied and leaked. He did not have any
news of any leakage before then. And he also did not photocopy the Gilbert
copy. The seal placed on the envelope was still intact when he opened it
on December 10, 2008.[4] Although the lawyers in their office knew that he kept
original copies of drafts in his unlocked drawer, he believed that nobody in his
office was interested in photocopying the Gilbert copy. He was solely
responsible for keeping the Gilbert copy. He did not know any of the parties
to the case and none of them ever called him. And he did not know what
Gatdula did after receiving the Gilbert copy.[5]
The Limkaichong case was called again on July 29, 2008 as Item No.
66. The Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for the said date
on July 25, 2008. Upon receipt of the said En Banc agenda and the new item
number, their office prepared a new cover page and attached it to the Gilbert
copy. The original cover page of the Gilbert copy for the agenda of July 15,
2008 showing the case as item number 52 was thrown away.[6]
On being recalled on January 20, 2009, Del Rosario further testified as
follows:
On July 15, 2008 when the Justices were about to leave the En Banc
session room after the adjournment of the session, he entered the room just
like the rest of the aides.[7] He carried the folders of Justice Reyes, returned
them to the office, and went back to, and waited for Justice Reyes until Justice
Reyes finished lunch at the En Banc dining room. [8] The Gilbert copy was left
with Justice Reyes.[9] Before 1:00 p.m., after the Justices had taken
lunch,[10] Justice Reyes, who was then carrying an orange envelope, handed to
him the Gilbert copy and instructed him to speed up the ponencias signing by
Justice Nachura (who was not taking part in the oral arguments of a case
scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day) since the latter might be leaving.[11] He heard
Justice Reyes say Ihabol mo ito Ihabol na ipapirma kay Justice Nachura in the
presence of Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Rosendo Evangelista, as the three of them
were going down the stairs to their office from the session room.[12]
He was not the one who brought the ponencia to the Office of Justice
Nachura because he gave the task to Manabat to whom he relayed the
instruction.[13] There were already signatures on page 36 of the ponencia when
he gave it to Manabat and only the signature of Justice Nachura was
missing.[14] He pointed this to Manabat saying, ito na lang ang walang pirma,
dalhin mo doon. Manabat obliged him.[15]
After a few minutes, Manabat returned to their office bearing the
Gilbert copy. He went to Atty. Evangelista, showing him that the ponencia had
already been signed by Justice Nachura. Atty. Evangelista then instructed him
to have the ponencia promulgated by delivering the same to the OCJ. He (Del
Rosario) complied, personally handing the Gilbert copy with the rollo, records
and diskettes to Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ at 3:30 p.m., also of July 15,
2008.[16] The ponencia stayed at the OCJ until the afternoon of the following
day, July 16, 2008.[17]
He was not told that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold
until the afternoon of July 16, 2008, when Justice Reyes called him to his
chambers and instructed him to retrieve the ponencia. He also stated that
someone from the OCJ called their office and requested them to retrieve
the ponencia because its promulgation was on hold.[18] At 4:00 p.m. that day, he
retrieved the ponencia etc. from the OCJ[19] and gave the ponencia to Justice
Reyes.[20]
He merely showed the ponencia to Justice Reyes who ordered him to
keep it (tabi mo muna yan).[21]He then placed a note Hold, reset July 29 in his
logbook after being informed by Atty. Evangelista of such date of
resetting.[22] He reiterated that he placed the Gilbert copy in a brown envelope,
sealed it with the officially issued blue and white seal provided by the Printing
Office, and placed the envelope inside his unlocked drawer. The envelope was
still sealed when he checked it on December 10, 2008.[23] He admitted that from
the time he kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer until the Special En Banc
meeting on December 10, 2008, he and no one else was in possession of the
Gilbert copy. But he denied that he ever opened the envelope or photocopy the
Gilbert copy. In fact, he did not mind it.[24] And nobody inquired about it
since July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008.[25] He likewise denied that he
knew Congressman Paras or Biraogo or that the two ever called his office. [26]
When asked if he could produce the envelope into which he placed
the Gilbert copy, he replied that Justice Reyes had taken it.[27] He also informed
that what was placed on the face of the brown envelope was a computer print-
out containing the title of the case, the names of the ponente and the other
Justices, and the manner they voted.[28]
When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it was possible
for him to recognize any tampering if, for instance, the envelope and the seal
were replaced with a similar envelope and blue and white seal with a similar
print-out information on the face of the envelope, he answered in the
negative.[29] (At that point, Justice Carpio Morales remarked that Del Rosario,
therefore, could not have been certain when he said that the envelope
remained sealed from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.)[30]
Nobody else knew where he put the Gilbert copyin the same place as
the other drafts. It was possible for someone to take the Gilbert copy from his
drawer and photocopy it on a weekend or after office hours. [31] Nobody told
him to guard the Gilbert copy.[32]
 Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine.[33] He
drew a sketch of the layout of the desks inside the office of Justice Reyes,
illustrating that his location was two desks away from the table of April
Candelaria, a secretary in the office, and that the xerox machine was situated
at the back of the long table of the receiving clerks.[34]
He stayed in the office as long as Justice Reyes was still there but he
could not say for sure that nobody photocopied the Gilbert copy after office
hours as he also went out of the office to smoke in the nearby garden area or
repair to the toilet.[35]
He never reported to office on Saturdays and there was one time
Justice Reyes went to office on a Saturday as he was also asked to report but
he refused.[36] Justice Reyes sometimes dropped by the office on Sundays after
attending services at the United Methodist Church along Kalaw Street, as told
to him by the driver.[37]
He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the decision to the
other Justices but he never received a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections.[38] He
did not offer an explanation why the Gilbert copy, which was in his possession,
and the Revised Draft, were leaked.[39] No information was supplied by his
officemates, friends or relatives to help explain the leakage. [40] Among his
relatives working in the Court are his mother-in-law, Jasmin P. Mateo of the
OCJ, sister of former Court Administrator Ernani Pano, and Mrs. Mateos
sibling, who works at the Hall of Justice Committee.[41]
He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the main door of
the Office of Justice Reyes but he could not say that only the two of them held
keys to the main door.[42] April Candelaria and Atty. Ferdinand Juan asked for
and got duplicates of the key, but could not remember exactly when. Atty. Juan
got a duplicate of the key because the lawyers sometimes went out for dinner
and needed to go back to the office to retrieve their personal belongings.[43]
April Candelarias secretarial functions included recording of the
social activities of Justice Reyes and delivering door-to-door papers to his
chambers.[44] Candelaria and the driver were in the staff of Justice Reyes since
the latters stint at the Court of Appeals, while Atty. Juan was employed ahead
of him.[45]
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine
because all of them photocopied personal documents and were too ashamed
to ask other officemates to do it for them.[46]
When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called all his legal
staff and him to a meeting. In a tone that was both angry and sad, Justice Reyes
asked them if they knew anything about the leakage. [47] A meeting among
Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and him took place on December 15,
2008, before the initial hearing by the investigating committee.[48] Justice Reyes
also talked to him one-on-one and asked him if a copy of Justice
Carpios Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and other documents
when they were sent to the OCJ. He replied that there was none and that he
just kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer and had in fact forgotten all about it
until Justice Reyes inquired about it in December.[49] He was not able to read
Jarius Bondocs column about the leakage of the Gilbert copy (which came out
in the Inquirer in October 2008 about the Gilbert copy) nor had Justice Reyes
confronted him about said column before December 2008. [50]
During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody talked to him
or knew that he was testifying as he was even surprised that he was called to
testify.[51] When confronted with the testimony of his officemate, Chester Del
Castillo, who testified that Justice Reyes called only one meeting, he opined
that Del Castillo might not have known about the meeting with the lawyers
since Del Castillo was frequently absent.[52]
 2. RODRIGO E. MANABAT, JR., PET Judicial Staff Employee II, Office of
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows:
He was the personal aide of Justice Reyes. On July 15, 2008, he brought
the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature upon the
instruction of Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista. [53] He gave the Gilbert copy
to the receptionist and waited outside the said office. After ten minutes, the
document was returned to him.[54] He then immediately gave it to Del
Rosario. It took him not more than 15 minutes to return the document to Del
Rosario.[55] He averred that he did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor did he
notice if anybody from the Office of Justice Nachura photocopied it.[56] He also
did not know if Del Rosario placed the document in a sealed envelope or
photocopied it.[57] After returning the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario, he went
back to Justice Reyes who asked him if Justice Nachura had already signed
the ponencia. He answered yes and told Justice Reyes that the ponencia was
already with Del Rosario.[58]
3. ATTY. ROSENDO B. EVANGELISTA, Judicial Staff Head, Office of
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified that as follows:
Around 1:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes instructed him to have
signature page 36 of the ponencia reprinted and circulated for signing allegedly
because Justice Minita Chico-Nazario wanted to change her qualified
concurrence thereonin the resultto an unqualified concurrence. He thus
instructed Jean Yabut, the stenographer in charge of finalizing drafts, to reprint
page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered the reprinted page circulated for
signatures together with the other pages of the ponencia. He assumed that
the original page 36 was discarded as it was no longer in their files. He
likewise assumed that the signatures were completed on the reprinted page 36
as the Gilbert copy was forwarded around 3:00 p.m. to the OCJ per standard
operating procedure.[59] He was not informed then by Justice Reyes or
anybody that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy had been put on hold per
agreement of the Justices.[60] He came to know that it was on hold only on July
17, 2008, when Del Rosario informed him upon his arrival at the office.Because
the information was unusual and because it was his duty to make sure that
signed decisions were promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes. Justice Reyes then
confirmed that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold.[61] After that, he
just assumed that the Gilbert copy was in their office with Del Rosario who
was assigned to keep such documents. However, he did not know exactly
where in his work area Del Rosario kept it.[62] He did not make a photocopy of
the Gilbert copy nor did he order Del Rosario and Manabat to make
photocopies. Neither did he know how the Gilbert copy was photocopied. He
only came to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008. [63]
When, on January 22, 2009, he was recalled by the committee, he further
testified as follows:
He occupied the last cubicle in the lawyers room and the xerox
machine was located outside the lawyers room.[64] It was upon the instruction
of Justice Reyes that their office reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy and
circulate it for signature. The instruction to circulate the reprinted page, which
was circulated together with the other pages of the Gilbert copy, was given by
him to either Manabat or Del Rosario.[65] He saw the original page 36 where
Justice Chico-Nazario (supposedly) wrote the phrase in the result on top of her
signature.[66] Aside from him, Court Attorney VI Czar Calabazaron, who
principally researched on the case, also saw the qualification in Justice Chico-
Nazarios signature while the Gilbert copy lay on top of Justice Reyess coffee
table inside his chambers. He recalled that at about 12:30 p.m. or before 1:00
p.m. right after the En Banc session on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes called the
him and Atty. Calabazaron to his chambers.[67] In that meeting, Justice Reyes
phoned Justice Chico-Nazario after noticing that Justice Chico-Nazarios
signature bore the notation in the result.[68] He, however, did not hear what
they talked about since the less-than-five-minute phone conversation was
inaudible, even though he was just approximately one meter away.[69] Justice
Reyes thereafter instructed him to reprint the second signature page (page
36). He assumed from the context of the instruction that it was due to the
change in Justice Chico-Nazarios concurrence, without asking Justice Reyes
the reason therefor.[70] He then directed the stenographer to, as she did, reprint
the second signature page, page 36, which was brought in to Justice Reyes in
his chambers.[71]
He attended the oral arguments on a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. on
that day (July 15, 2008) and arrived at the session hall before that time. [72] As
far as he could recall, he went down to the Office of Justice Reyes about 3:00
p.m. to retrieve a material needed for the oral arguments. He denied having
testified that he went down purposely to check if the ponencia had been
circulated and the second signature page signed anew and to make sure that
the ponencia had already been transmitted to the OCJ. [73] When confronted
with the transcript of stenographic notes, he maintained that it was part of his
duties to see to it that every ponencia of Justice Reyes was promulgated.[74] He
was sure that he went down to their office at around 3:30 p.m., although he
could not recall his purpose for doing so. It was probably to get some materials
related to the oral arguments, and that it just so happened that Del Rosario saw
him and informed him that the Gilbert copy had already been transmitted to
the OCJ.[75]
When asked as to the whereabouts of the original signature page 36,
he surmised that it must have been shredded since it was not made part of the
official documents submitted to the OCJ.[76] While he searched for it in his
cubicle, it could no longer be located.[77] He did not inquire from Justice Reyes
or from Del Rosario who also had access to that page, because he assumed that
it could not be located since what was submitted to the OCJ was the one where
Justice Chico-Nazarios concurrence was no longer qualified by the phrase in
the result.[78] As he was attending the oral arguments, he had no opportunity
to see the reprinted signature page 36 with the affixed signatures prior to the
transmittal to the OCJ.[79]
He came to know that the Gilbert copy was retrieved on July 16,
2008. It was Del Rosario who informed him on July 17, 2008 that the
[80]

promulgation of the ponencia was on hold and was returned to their

office.[81] Justice Reyes did not advise them earlier that the promulgation was
on hold.[82] After learning about it, he inquired from Justice Reyes who
confirmed that the promulgation was indeed on hold. He never asked for the
reason even though that was their first on hold incident because he thought
that the case would be called again at another session.[83] He read the
newspaper reports about the unpromulgated ponencia but did not validate
them with Justice Reyes.[84]
He assumed that Del Rosario, being the custodian, kept the Gilbert
copy in their office.[85] Their office reprinted the second signature page 36 of
the Gilbert copy.[86] When shown page 36 of the Gilbert copy by the committee,
he assumed that it was the reprinted page since Justice Chico-Nazarios
signature no longer contained any qualification. [87] He stated that it was the
practice of their office to photocopy drafts signed by Justice Reyes and to
furnish the other Justices with advance copies for their review before the
session. Only such drafts were photocopied. Ponencias, which had already
been signed by the other Justices and printed on Gilbert paper, were never
photocopied. Del Rosario only logged them in his logbook and prepared soft
copies for submission to the Division Chair or the Chief Justice. [88] He assured
the committee that this practice was 100% complied with despite the fact that
he was not one of those assigned to photocopy, but later yielded to given
situations by Justice Carpio Morales.[89]
When directed to compare the front page of the photocopy Biraogo
submitted as Annex C to his Compliance to the Show Cause Order with the
original Gilbert copy submitted to the committee by Justice Reyes, Atty.
Evangelista noticed the difference in the dates of the agenda. He noted
that Biraogos copy, which was the copy allegedly leaked to him, bore the
agenda date July 15, 2008, while the Gilbert copy submitted by Justice Reyes
to the committee bore the agenda date July 29, 2008. He also noted that
the item numbers were also different because the Limkaichong case was listed
as Item No. 52 in the photocopy submitted by Biraogo, whereas in the Gilbert
copy, the case was listed as Item No. 66.[90] To him, it was probable that Biraogo
got his copy from another source but it was not probable that Biraogo
photocopied a copy in the office.
Only a few persons were authorized to operate the xerox machine in
their office, namely, Conrado Bayanin, Jr., Armando Del Rosario, Chester Del
Castillo, a certain Leonard and a certain Ramon. [91] He could not recall who
among the five had been directed to photocopy the July 15, 2008 draft.[92] He
ventured a guess that the top page of the Gilbert copy might have been
reprinted but could not impute any motive to any person. [93] Even if he was
the staff head, he was not privy to the preparation of the first page nor of the
top cover bearing the date July 29, 2008 copy.[94]
Finally, he manifested that from the time the Gilbert copy was signed
by 14 Justices until December 15, 2008, he did not acquire exclusive control or
possession of the Gilbert copy because Del Rosario was the custodian
thereof.[95] He reiterated that he did not know where, exactly, Del Rosario kept
the documents. He admitted that he was remiss in his duties as staff head for
not knowing.[96] It was their practice not to lock drawers.[97] He was aware that
Justice Reyes eventually prepared another draft of a ponencia changing his
position in the Limkaichong case because he helped in the research in
November 2008.[98] He never consulted the Gilbert copy because he had a
softcopy thereof in his computer.[99] He did not ask why Justice Reyes was
departing from his original position.[100] He denied that he knew Biraogo,
Limkaichong, Jerome Paras, Olive Paras or any party to the case. [101]
He winded up his testimony by manifesting that the investigation was
an experience that he hoped would not happen again and that he would not
have to undergo again.[102]
4. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO testified as follows:
She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc conference room
before going to the En Banc dining hall. [103] Justice Reyes was beside her,
looking on, when she affixed her signature. Immediately after signing, she
returned the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who circulated it for the signatures
of the other Justices. She remembered that Justice Reyes was holding the
document even when the Justices were already at the dining hall. She did not
photocopy the ponencia nor was there any opportunity for her to do so as there
was only one Gilbert copy and the only time she held it was when she affixed
her signature. She added that her concurrence to the ponencia was without
qualification but when it was noted during lunch that most of the Justices had
simply concurred in the result, she and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
signified their intention to qualify their concurrence and concur likewise only
in the result.[104] However, she was no longer able to indicate the change on the
document as she and the other Justices had decided to put on hold the
promulgation of the decision until after holding oral arguments on the
Limkaichong case. No reprinted signature page was ever sent to her office for
her signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy of
the ponencia. She was not the last to sign the ponencia.[105]
 5. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO testified as
follows:
She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session and Justice
Reyes was right beside her when she signed the ponencia.[106] No reprinted
signature page 36 was ever sent to her office for signature and she did not affix
her signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She did not photocopy
the ponenciaand there could have been no opportunity to do so right after she
signed it.[107]
6. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA testified as
follows:
He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc conference
room just before he went to the En Banc dining hall for lunch. He believed he
was never sent a reprinted signature page. He either returned the ponencia to
Justice Reyes right after signing it or passed it on to the other Justices for them
to sign. He could not recall if he was the last to sign the ponencia. Asked
whether he leaked the decision, Justice Nachura replied that he did not. Nor
did he order any of his staff to photocopy it. In fact, there was no opportunity
to photocopy the ponencia as he was not in custody thereof.[108] Although he
knew the husband of one of the petitioners, Olivia Paras, neither she nor her
husband ever asked for a copy of the ponencia.[109]
7. ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ,
Chief, Public Information Office (PIO), testified as follows:
The copy of Biraogos undated letter with the attached copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes, which he furnished the En Banc,
came from a member of the media. Around 3:00 p.m. on December 9, 2008, a
reporter called him on the phone, asking if he would like to give a statement
because Biraogo was going to hold a press conference about
the Limkaichong case later that day at Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, in front of the
Court of Appeals. He requested the reporter to inform him of what was going
to be taken up during the press conference. The reporter went to his office
around 5:00 p.m. the same day, and furnished him a copy of Biraogos undated
letter. Attached to the letter was a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. The
reporter informed him that Biraogo distributed to the media during the press
conference copies of the letter and the attachment.[110]
Sometime in October 2008, months before Biraogo held the press
conference, Jarius Bondoc had published a blind item column on
the Limkaichong case. On November 8, 2008, another column, this time by
columnist Fel Maragay, came out in the Manila Standard. The words used in
both columns were the same so he thought that there was really an effort to
report the story in the media. Knowing Jarius Bondoc to be a respectable
journalist, he met with him to clarify matters as many of the statements in the
news item were false or inaccurate. He provided Bondoc with the surrounding
circumstances on the matter so that Bondoc would have the proper context in
case he was again requested to publish the story. Bondoc offered to write about
what he had said, but he told Bondoc that there was no need because there was
no truth to the story given to the media anyway. He left it to Bondoc whether
he would use the new information if he was again asked to publish the
story.[111]
The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were never given
a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. He
also did not bring drafts from the OCJ to the PIO. It is only after a case has been
promulgated that the Clerk of Court gives the PIO copies. But in this case, the
Clerk of Court did not even have a copy as the decision had not been signed
by the Chief Justice.[112]
8. RAMON B. GATDULA, Executive Assistant III, Office of the Chief Justice,
testified as follows:
 On July 15, 2008, at 3:30 p.m., he received from Armando Del Rosario
the Gilbert copy of the ponencia together with the rollos and two diskettes. He
kept the Gilbert copy in his locked cabinet overnight and gave it to the Chief
Justices secretary the following day. In the afternoon of July 16, 2008, an
employee from the Office of Justice Reyes retrieved the Gilbert copy. He did
not inquire anymore about the reason why they were retrieving it as it was
common practice for the offices of the ponentes to retrieve drafts whenever
there were corrections. When asked whether he photocopied the ponencia,
Gatdula said that he does not photocopy the decisions he receives. Their office
also never photocopies decisions. They forward such decisions straight to the
Clerk of Court for promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after the
Clerk of Court has affixed her signature thereon and indicated the date of
promulgation.[113]
9. ATTY. MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA, the En Banc Clerk of Court, testified
on the procedure for promulgation of ponencias.
After the Chief Justice affixes his signature on a decision, the decision
is brought together with the rollo to the En Banc Clerk of Court to be logged,
recorded and checked. If the necessary requirements for promulgation are
present, she signs the decision. It is at this time that the decision is considered
as promulgated. The Office of the Clerk of Court distributes copies to the
parties to the case. The date of promulgation is then encoded in the case
monitoring system and a copy of the decision is given to the PIO.[114] Decisions
reaching their office usually come with the rollos except where a particular
decision is considered rush. [115]

She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes

and stated that the same never reached their office during the period from July
16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.[116] She and her staff only learned of the draft
decision after it was circulated by the media.[117] In her office, decisions for
promulgation are always brought to Verna Albano for recording, then to her
for signature.[118] If Verna is absent, it is Atty. Felipa Anama, the assistant clerk
of court, who receives the ponencias and rollos.[119] She further stated that in her
more than 10 years of work in the Court, she never heard any incident of a
draft ponencia being leaked except this one.[120]
10. MAJOR EDUARDO V. ESCALA, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security
Division, Office of Administrative Services, testified as follows:
Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00 p.m.[121] Security
personnel used to inspect even the offices of the Justices, but they stopped
doing so since last year.[122] As far as photocopiers are concerned, security
personnel only make sure that these are unplugged after office hours. [123] His
office has nothing to do with the operation of the machines.[124] They always
check if employees bring out papers from the Court. But they encounter
problems especially from the offices of Justices because employees from these
offices always claim that they have been allowed or instructed by their Justice
to bring papers home with them, and there is no way to check the veracity of
those claims.[125] Since he assumed office on July 14, 2008, he is not aware of
any record of a leak.[126] He suggested that the memory cards of the machines
be checked.[127]
11. ATTY. FELIPA B. ANAMA, Assistant Clerk of Court, testified as follows:
She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty. Villarama.[128] Their
office never releases unpromulgated ponencias[129] and they ascertain that
every decision or resolution to be promulgated is complete. [130] She
remembered that their office released the Show Cause Resolution
dated December 10, 2008 and had it delivered personally to Biraogo as it was
an urgent resolution.[131] Willie Desamero was the employee who personally
served the resolution on Biraogo.[132]
 She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something at Biraogos
residence for by the account of Desamero, he was stopped at the guard house
and was made to wait in the clubhouse until Biraogo was notified of his
presence; and that it took Desamero two hours to serve the December 10,
2008 resolution on Biraogo.[133]
She has been with the Supreme Court for 29 years and she never
encountered a leak nor did she ever issue a resolution or decision without the
signature of the Chief Justice.[134]
12. WILLIE DESAMERO, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court En
Banc, testified as follows:
He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo on December
12, 2008.[135] It was difficult to serve the Resolution. It took him six rides to get
to Biraogos subdivision in Laguna and when he got there, he was stopped by
the security guards at the entrance of the subdivision. They asked him to wait
at the clubhouse and it took Biraogo two hours to arrive.[136] When Biraogo saw
him, Biraogo commented, Ang bilis naman[137] and bakit ka lang naka-tricycle?
Meron naman kayong sasakyan?[138] Birago read the Resolution before he signed
to receive the document.[139] Biraogo arrived in a car and had a back-up
car.[140] Biraogo was in his early 50s, was wearing short pants, and had a
sarcastic smile at that time.[141]
An officemate of his had also been to Biraogos house to serve some
Resolutions.[142] While it was not his usual duty to serve court processes, Atty.
Anama and Atty. Villarama requested him to serve the resolution on Biraogo
since the regular process servers in their office were not then available and he
is the only one in their office who resides in Laguna.[143] In his years of service
with the Court, he knew of no case which involved leakage of court
documents.[144]
13. GLORIVY NYSA TOLENTINO, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows:
She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-door
papers that come in at the Office of Justice Nachura. [145] She presented page
267 of her logbook, to which Justice Reyes had earlier invited the committees
attention. According to the logbook entry, the Gilbert copy was brought to
their office on July 15, 2008 and that Justice Nachura signed the
copy. However, since it is not office practice to record the time of receipt or
release, she could not remember what time the Gilbert copy was brought to
their office for signature.[146] Nonetheless, the Gilbert copy did not stay long in
their office because it was a door-to-door paper and was accordingly given
preferential treatment. Justice Nachura immediately signed the ponenciawhen
she gave it to him.[147] However, she could not recall if Justice Nachura was the
last to sign the Gilbert copy.[148] She added that their office did not have a copy
of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. They only
had the advance copies circulated for concurrence.[149]
14. ONOFRE C. CUENTO, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court En
Banc, testified as follows:
He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his residence last
August 6, 2008, together with driver Mateo Bihag.[150] On the day he served the
resolutions, they were stopped at the guardhouse and were escorted by a
barong-clad security officer to Biraogos house.[151] They had a hard time
getting to the residence of Biraogo whom he does not personally
know.[152] Biraogo did not mention or send his regards to any member of the
Court.[153]
15. CHESTER GEORGE P. DEL CASTILLO, Utility Worker, Office of Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows:
 He joined the staff of Justice Reyes in September 2007 upon the
recommendation of Court of Appeals Justice Mariano Del Castillo and Retired
Justice Cancio Garcia.[154]
He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers in the office
of Justice Reyes so it was to him that the task of photocopying documents was
usually given by Del Rosario and the lawyers.[155] He, however, never
photocopied any paper bearing the signatures of the Justices. [156] He did not
handle ponencias in Gilbert paper nor ever photocopy any ponencia in Gilbert
paper.[157]
He usually left the office at 4:30 p.m. He sometimes saw members of
the staff photocopying papers even beyond 4:30 p.m. It was Del Rosario who
often gave orders to photocopy drafts and who was the most trusted member
of the staff as demonstrated by the fact that he could go in and out of Justice
Reyess chambers.[158] Del Rosario never left the office before Justice Reyes and
he (Del Rosario) often left late.[159]
He had never been to Barangay Malamig although he had been to Bian,
Laguna.[160] He does not know Biraogo or his wife.[161] Neither does he know
Paras.[162] He did not know where Gilbert copies were kept.[163] When he was
asked who would leave the office first, Justice Reyes or Del Rosario, he said he
did not know. Del Rosario was tasked to lock the main door of the office. [164]
The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the Limkaichong case,
but the staff remained apathetic and did not talk about it. [165] The apathy was
probably because the staff thought that the matter had already been settled
since Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista had already been interviewed. [166] He
was not sure if anyone from their office was involved in the leakage. [167] He
was not part of the meeting called by Justice Reyes before the start of the
investigation.[168] Only Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario, and Manabat were
called to the meeting.[169] He surmised that the meeting was about the
leakage.[170]
16. CONRADO B. BAYANIN, JR., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice
Ruben T. Reyes, who was called by the committee upon Justice Reyess suggestion,
testified as follows:
Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to receive and
release papers and rollos as he was seated near the door.[171] It was not his duty
to handle or receive ponencias in Gilbert form.[172] He could not remember if he
had ever received any paper in connection with the Limkaichong case.[173] While
he knew how to operate the xerox machine, just like all the other utility
workers in the office,[174] he had never photocopied anything signed by the
Justices, especially those on Gilbert paper.[175]
When asked who handled photocopies ordered by Justice Reyes, he
replied that he did not know.[176]He did not know and had no opinion on how
the ponencia was leaked.[177] He only knew that his officemates talked about the
leak,[178] but he did not know specifically what his officemates talked
about.[179] Before Justice Reyess retirement ceremony, Justice Reyes called him
to his chambers and very calmly asked him if he knew if anybody had
photocopied the unpromulgated ponencia.[180]
17. FERMIN L. SEGOTIER, Judicial Staff Assistant II and receptionist at the
Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows:
His duty is to receive communications, but only Glorivy Nysa
Tolentino keeps a logbook for the door-to-door papers that come to their
office.[181] He does not remember any details pertaining to the July 15,
2008 signing of the Limkaichong Ponencia, aside from the fact that it was to
Justice Reyess staff to whom he gave it back.[182] He assumed that it was to Del
Rosario to whom he returned the Gilbert copy because in the Office of Justice
Reyes, Del Rosario was the one in charge of circulating ponencias in Gilbert
form for signature.[183] He could not recall handing a Gilbert paper to
 Manabat.[184] The ponencia stayed only for a short time (about 5 minutes) in
their office because it was a door-to-door paper. After it was signed by Justice
Nachura, it was handed back to the staff of Justice Reyes, so there was no
chance for them to photocopy the ponencia.[185] It was not their standard
operating procedure to leave any Gilbert paper in their office if it could not be
signed right away.[186]
18. RETIRED JUSTICE RUBEN T. REYES, for his part, submitted during the
hearing on January 22, 2009, a written statement entitled Notes/Observations (Notes)
consisting of 12 paragraphs. In his Notes, Justice Reyes stressed the following:
Biraogo did not point to him as the source of the leak of the
unpromulgated ponencia;[187] in Biraogos December 22, 2008 Compliance with
the Courts Show Cause Order, Biraogo stated that his informant was allegedly
a SC concerned employee who left a brown envelope with a letter and some
documents in his Bian, Laguna home; it could be seen from the attachments to
Biraogos Compliance that it was not only the unpromulgated ponencia or
Gilbert copy that was leaked but also two other confidential documents: his
Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda (attached as Annex B to the
Compliance) and Justice Carpios Reflections (attached as Annex D); and
since these other documents were circulated to all Justices, the investigation
should not only focus on the leak of the unpromulgated ponenciabut also on
the leak of the two other confidential and internal documents of the Court.[188]
Justice Reyes also pointed out in his Notes as follows: the committee
should not only look into his office but also the offices of Justice Carpio and
the other Justices. He, however, reiterated that he had said in his media
interviews that he believed that none of the Justices themselves, much less the
Chief Justice, leaked the ponencia or authorized its leakage.
Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogos informant mentioned a certain
Atty. Rosel, who was allegedly a close friend and former partner of Justice
Carpio. Justice Reyes said that Atty. Rosel allegedly asked a favor from Justice
Carpio before the latter wrote his Reflections.[189] Thus, he said, the committee
should also question Atty. Rosel and even Justice Carpio himself.
On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of the decision,
despite reports regarding the leak, Justice Reyes stated that he was on a
sabbatical leave with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education research in
four States in the United States from October 10, 2008 to November 1, 2008.
He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a second
draft decision (deviating from his prior disposition) after oral arguments were
held on the case.
Thus, in his Notes, he posed: If he leaked it, why would he prepare a
second different decision? He willingly obliged to the holding of oral
arguments. He had no commitment to anybody and had no reason to leak the
unpromulgated ponencia.[190] He added, [I]f he had a hand in the leak, why
would it include Justice Carpios Reflections which was contrary to the
unpromulgated decision?
Justice Reyes, still in his Notes, stated that no Justice in his right mind
would leak the unpromulgated ponencia or other confidential documents, such
as the Revised Draft and Justice Carpios Reflections.
He went on to refer to Biraogos Compliance that the informant was
purportedly an old hand in the Supreme Court who was accustomed to the
practices of the Justices and had a circle or group in the Supreme Court. Since
all his office staff, except two stenographers, one utility worker and one
messenger, were all new in the Court, then the old hand referred to could not
have come from his office. But if it could be proven by evidence that one of his
staff was the source of the leak, Justice Reyes argued that only that staff should
be made liable, for he had publicly declared that he did not and would never
allow nor tolerate such leakage.[191]
 More on Justice Reyess Notes: He suggested that Newsbreak writers
Marites Vitug and Aries Rufo be cited for contempt of court, for obtaining,
without lawful authority, confidential information and documents from the
Court, officials or employees, and for writing false, malicious articles which
tended to influence the investigation of the committee and to degrade, impede
and obstruct the administration of justice. [192]
Aside from submitting his Notes, Justice Reyes also testified as follows:
While he was first heard on January 16, 2009, after he presented a 9-
paragraph written statement, he noticed that it needed refinement and
revision so he requested for time to edit it. Hence, he submitted his above-
mentioned Notes on January 22, 2009.
Justice Reyes identified the Gilbert copy, which he submitted earlier
to the committee for safekeeping, and his Notes.[193] He clarified that the
Compliance he was referring to in his Notes was Biraogos December 22,
2008 Compliance with the Courts Show Cause Order.[194]
His desire to include Justice Carpio in the investigation, per number 4
of his Notes, came about because it appeared from Biraogos Compliance and
from the alleged informants letter that it was not only the
unpromulgated ponencia signed by 14 Justices that was leaked but also the
Revised Draft ponencia and Justice Carpios Reflections.[195] He suggested that
what should be investigated was the source of the three documents.[196] Justice
Quisumbing replied that the matter seemed settled because Justice Reyes also
mentioned in Paragraph No. 6 of his Notes that he believed that none of the
Justices, much less the Chief Justice, caused or authorized the leak. [197] Justice
Reyes stressed that he thought it was only fair that the Committee also call
Justice Carpio to shed light on the matter in the same way that he was asked
to shed light thereon.[198]
Justice Carpio Morales pointed out that Justice Reyess ponencia as signed by 14
Justices did not come into the possession of the other Justices but only of Justice
Reyes.[199] She added that if logic were followed, then all of the Justices should be
investigated because copies of Justice Carpios Reflections were circulated to all. She
declared that she was willing to be investigated and that she was volunteering to be
investigated.[200] However, she pointed out that the logic of Justice Reyes was
misplaced, considering that the documents attached to Biraogos Compliance were
allegedly received at the same time. If Biraogo received the documents at the same time
and one Justice never took hold of the ponencia as signed, said Justice could not have
made the leak to Biraogo.[201]
Justice Reyes went on to testify as follows: The Gilbert copy which he
submitted to the committee was given to him by Del Rosario.[202] He did not photocopy
the Gilbert copy nor provide Biraogo a copy thereof or instruct any of his staff to
photocopy the same.[203]
The xerox copy of the Gilbert copy attached to the Compliance of Biraogo
appeared to be the same as the committees copy because he (Justice Reyes) looked at
the initials on each page and found them to be similar. [204]Justice Quisumbing
thereupon invited Justice Reyess attention to the cover page of the Gilbert copy which
had been submitted to and in custody of the committee (committees copy).[205] Upon
perusal thereof, Justice Reyes stated that the cover page of the committees copy did not
appear to be the same as the cover page of Biraogos copy.He observed that the cover
page of the committees copy showed the agenda date July 29, 2008, and that the
Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66, whereas the cover page of Biraogos copy
showed the agenda date July 15, 2008, and that the same case was listed as Item No.
52.[206] Justice Reyes then qualified his earlier statement and said that he was only
referring to those pages of the decision itself which bore his initials, when he spoke of
similarity, and said that the cover page did not bear his initials. [207]
Justice Corona pointed out, and Justice Reyes confirmed, that page 1 of the
committees copy also differed from page 1 of Biraogos copy. Justice Corona pointed
that in the committees copy, there were asterisks after the names of Justice Azcuna and
Justice Tinga and footnotes that the two were on official leave, whereasno such
asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of Biraogos copy.[208] Justice Corona also
pointed out and Justice Reyes once again confirmed that there was a slight variance
between the initials on page 34 of the committees copy and the initials on page 34 of
Biraogos copy.[209]
Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether Justice Reyes would
admit that there were at least two sources.[210] At this juncture, Justice Reyes brought
out another photocopy (new copy or Justice Reyess new copy) of the Gilbert copy to
which new copy the left top corner of the top cover was stapled a 1x1 piece of thick
paper bearing the initials RTR and on the right top corner of the same cover appeared
a handwritten notation reading Gilbert copy. Justice Reyes repeatedly stated that his
new copy was a facsimile of the committees copy. He pointed out that the initials on
page 34 of the new copy and that of the committees copy matched. He concluded,
however, that page 34 of Biraogos copy was not a faithful reproduction of the
committees copy.[211] Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he or his staff kept
more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert copy that had been signed by majority or 14
members of the Court, saying that he could not say so because he did not personally
attend to photocopying of decisions.[212] He stressed that his initials on page 34 of the
new copy differed from the initials appearing on page 34 of Biraogos copy. [213] He also
pointed out that in Biraogos copy, particularly on page 3, there was a handwritten
correction superimposed over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such
handwritten correction appeared on page 3 of both the committees copy and the new
copy.[214] He added that he did not know who made the handwritten correction in
Biraogos copy and that the new copy he was presenting to the committee
was furnished to him by the committee. Said copy was allegedly the xerox copy of the
Gilbert copy.[215]
Justice Reyes professed that he had nothing to do with the leak as he would
not leak, authorize, allow, or tolerate any leak of his decision or revised draft. He
dispelled any pecuniary profit from such leakage, especially since he was about to
retire when the leak happened. He could not, however, say the same of his office staff
since he did not want to speculate, so he was giving the committee the broadest latitude
in calling any of his staff.[216]
Upon Justice Carpio Moraless interrogation, Justice Reyes stated that he found
the new copy in his files just the week before the January 22, 2009 hearing.[217] Justice
Carpio Morales then invited his attention to the fact that page 1 of the new copy, like
page 1 of Biraogos copy, did not contain the footnotes and asterisks appearing in the
committees copy. She also noted that the copy of Biraogo and the new copy presented
by Justice Reyes matched to a T.[218] Justice Reyes only replied that he did not pay
particular attention nor personally attend to the photocopying. [219]
Justice Reyes stated that there should only be one copy of the Gilbert
copy,[220] but it appeared that he supplied the committee with two apparently different
copies (the Gilbert copy and the new copy).[221] Justice Reyes noted that the new copy
and Biraogos copy did not match exactly as regards pages 3 and 34. He stressed that
there appeared on page 3 of Biraogos copy a handwritten correction over the
misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such correction was made on the new
copy. Additionally, on page 34 of Biraogos copy, his initial appeared to have a smudge
while on page 34 of the new copy, there was no smudge. [222]
When asked to explain why the new copy, which he claimed to have been
photocopied from the committees copy, did not match the committees copy on page 1
but matched page 1 of Biraogos copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation.[223] Justice
Reyes also refused to submit the new copy to the committee (Why should I?) and
questioned the committees request that he initial the controversial pages of the new
copy.[224] Thus, the committee members decided to affix their signatures on the first
five pages of the new copy and then drew a rectangle around their signatures and the
dateJanuary 22, 2009. [225] The committee then had the new copy
photocopied. [226] Justice Corona soon noticed that Justice Reyes was trying to hide the
new copy between his files. At that point, Justice Corona pulled out the new copy from
Justice Reyess files. Justice Reyes then repeatedly said that he was not submitting it to
the committee.[227] The committee proceeded to discuss the other matters contained in
Justice Reyess Notes.
Justice Reyes at that point then stated that he had not withdrawn his standing
motion for inhibition against Justice Carpio Morales, to which Justice Carpio Morales
replied that she would remain impartial. Justice Carpio Morales likewise stressed that
the committee would decide according to the evidence.[228]
Upon being asked by the committee, Justice Reyes said that he could not recall
if he was holding the Gilbert copy after the En Banc session and while having
lunch.[229] He stated that per standard arrangement, his staff would usually get his
folders and bring them to his office.[230] As far as he could recall, before the Court
adjourned, the members already knew that many concurred only in the result.[231] He
could not recall, however, if the Chief Justice learned about it only at the dining
room.[232]
Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the instruction to reprint
signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy and stated that it must have been Atty.
Evangelistas sole decision. What Justice Reyes remembered telling Atty. Evangelista
after the En Banc session was that many concurred only in the result and that Justice
Chico-Nazario wanted to change her concurrence.[233] Justice Carpio Morales
confronted him with certain portions of the December 15, 2008 TSN where he clearly
volunteered the information that he was the one who instructed Atty. Evangelista to
reprint page 36 which is the second signature page.[234] Justice Reyes replied that
maybe Atty. Evangelista was under the mistaken impression that the change of the
said page pushed through because, as it turned out, there was no qualification in the
concurrence of Justice Chico-Nazario. He also insisted that he did not volunteer the
information that he was the one who ordered the reprinting of page 36. He contended
that he was in fact questioning Atty. Evangelista when the latter said that the
instruction came from him.[235]
With regard to the re-signing by Justice Nachura,[236] Justice Reyes declared
that it was difficult to speculate and rely on inaccurate recollection, especially since
several months had passed. Justice Corona replied that the testimonies could not be
inaccurate since there were entries in the logbook, showing that Justice Nachura indeed
signed in his chambers.[237] Justice Reyes stated that the changing of the original
signature page 36 was not carried out[238] and that Atty. Evangelistas recollection of the
event was inaccurate. Justice Reyes also stated he could not recall calling Justice Chico-
Nazario on the phone after the En Banc session on July 15, 2008.[239]
Justice Reyes stated that Del Rosario was assigned to keep and take care of the
circulated drafts and ponencias printed on Gilbert paper, and from time to time Atty.
Evangelista would have access to them since the latter was the judicial staff
head.[240] Justice Reyess staff members in October were the same until he retired
on December 18, 2008.[241] Justice Reyess impression of Biraogos letter was that
somebody who had an axe to grind against the Chief Justice or who wanted to discredit
him could have done it.[242]
Justice Reyes said that he never had any personal interest in the case and
argued that the best proof of this was that he did not stick to his original decision after
the case was heard on oral arguments on August 26, 2008, just to prove that he was not
beholden to any party.[243]
Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the question of what his
undue interest was in still trying to have the signature of all the Justices after he had
taken his lunch and to forward the Gilbert copy and the rollo etc. to the OCJ even after
the decision to put the promulgation of the ponencia on hold was arrived at, at
lunchtime of July 15, 2008. He simply dismissed the recollections of his staff
and preferred to believe Del Rosarios over those of Evangelistas or Manabats. He
insisted that he never had the chance to talk to Del Rosario or to Atty. Evangelista right
after the En Banc session, and claimed that he never gave the instruction to bring the
Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He likewise insisted that the testimony
of Atty. Evangelista was incorrect and that he would rather believe Del Rosarios
testimony.[244]
THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES FINDINGS OF FACT
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee finds the following facts
established.
On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at lunchtime to withhold
the promulgation of the Gilbert copy in the Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under
his misimpression that Justice Nazario had concurred in the result and that she would
finally remove such qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Evangelista,
and Del Rosario to have the signature page 36 (where the names of Justices Nazario,
Nachura and three others appeared) reprinted and to bring the Gilbert copy to the
Office of Justice Nachura for signature as Justice Nachura, who was not participating
in the oral arguments on the case scheduled at 1:30 that afternoon, might be going
out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty. Evangelista to reprint the second signature page
(page 36) on Gilbert paper.
The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of the pages of the
Gilbert copy, was then given by Atty. Evangelista to Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn,
gave the Gilbert copy, together with the reprinted signature page 36, to Manabat whom
he instructed to go to the Office of Justice Nachura for him to affix his signature
thereon.
Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice Nachura and handed the
Gilbert copy to Fermin Segotier, the receptionist at Justice Nachuras office. As the
Gilbert copy was a door-to-door document, Segotier immediately gave it to Glorivy
Nysa Tolentino who recorded it in her logbook. She then brought the Gilbert copy to
Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of the Gilbert copy was brought out from
Justice Nachuras chambers and returned to Tolentino, she recorded it in her logbook
that it was already signed. The whole process took not more than five minutes. The
Gilbert copy was returned to Manabat, who had waited outside the office of Justice
Nachura.
Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes who inquired from
him if Justice Nachura had signed the reprinted page 36 to which he answered in the
affirmative. Manabat thereafter handed the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario.
When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral arguments on a case
scheduled that afternoon, went down the Office of Justice Reyes at about 3:30 p.m., he
and/or Del Rosario must have eventually noticed that Justice Nazario did not, after
all, qualify her concurrence on the original signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy with
the words in the result. Since neither Atty. Evangelista nor Del Rosario was advised by
Justice Reyes that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold, Del Rosario
brought the Gilbert copy, together with the rollo, records and diskettes to the OCJ to be
promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ. Gatdula later
transmitted the Gilbert copy to the secretary of the Chief Justice.
The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes called Del
Rosario to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from the
OCJ, informing him for the first time that the promulgation of the ponencia had been
put on hold. Around that same time, the OCJ phoned the Office of Justice Reyes and
told them to retrieve the ponencia for the same reason.
Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the return of the Gilbert
copy. As Gatdula had already forwarded the same to the Chief Justices secretary for
the Chief Justices signature, Gatdula retrieved it from the secretary. Del Rosario
retrieved all that he submitted the previous day, except the rollo which had, in the
meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio.
Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to
keep it. Del Rosario informed Atty. Evangelista the following day, July 17, 2008, that
the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold. After Atty. Evangelista verified the
matter from Justice Reyes, he (Atty. Evangelista) told Del Rosario that the case would
be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario made a note in his logbook to that effect.
On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda
for July 29, 2008 where the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66. A new cover
page reflecting the case as Item No. 66 was thus prepared and attached to the Gilbert
copy bearing only 14 signatures.
After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July 16, 2008, it remained
in the sole custody of Del Rosario until December 15, 2008, the initial hearing
conducted by the investigating committee. The Gilbert copy remained inside his
unlocked drawer, in a brown envelope, which he had sealed with the blue and white
seal used by all Justices. He opened it only on December 10, 2008, after Justice Reyes
informed his staff that there was a leak of the ponencia.
When news of Biraogos conduct of a press conference on December 9,
2008 bearing on the leakage came out, Justice Reyes immediately called his legal staff
and Del Rosario to a meeting and asked them if they knew anything about the
leakage. He called for a second meeting among Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and Del
Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by the investigating committee took
place in the afternoon of that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a one-on-one talk with
Del Rosario and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections was attached to the
Gilbert copy and related documents when they were sent to the OCJ, to which he (Del
Rosario) answered in the negative.
EVALUATION
The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert copy
occurred between July 15, 2008, before it was brought to the OCJ or after it was
retrieved on July 16, 2008 from the OCJ, and July 25, 2008, when the Office of Justice
Reyes caused the preparation of the new cover page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that
it was agendaed as Item No. 66 in the July 29, 2008 En Banc session, because the cover
page of the photocopy in the possession of Biraogo, as well as the cover page of Justice
Reyess new copy, still bore the agenda date July 15, 2008 and Item No. 52.
The committee likewise finds that the leakage was intentionally done. It was
not the result of a copy being misplaced and inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or
someone in his behalf. The committee notes that none of the offices to which the Gilbert
copy was brought (OCJ and the Office of Justice Nachura) and which acquired control
over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert form and released photocopies thereof to party
litigants. In any event, as earlier reflected, page 1 of the Gilbert copy that was sent to
the OCJ and Justice Nachuras Office and page 1 of Biraogos photocopy differ.
To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was
photocopied and that a copy thereof was intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to
Biraogo. As will be discussed below, the committee FINDS that the leak came from the
Office of Justice Reyes.
It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the OCJ even if the Gilbert
copy stayed therein from 3:30 p.m. on July 15, 2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16,
2008. This is clear from the fact that page 1 of the copy in Biraogos
possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert copy which was forwarded to the
OCJ. Thus, on page 1 of the Gilbert copy which contains the names of the Justices of
the Court, there appear asterisks after the names of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna and
Justice Dante O. Tinga. These asterisks have corresponding footnotes stating that
Justice Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order No. 510 dated July 15, 2008 and
Justice Tinga was likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated July 16,
2008. In contrast, page 1 of Biraogos copy and Justice Reyess new copy, glaringly
contain no such asterisks and footnotes, which indicates that page 1 of Biraogos copy
was photocopied from page 1 of the draft prepared by Justice Reyes before it was
finalized on Gilbert paper.
The leak also could not have come from the offices of the other associate
justices, contrary to Justice Reyess insinuation. Justice Reyes insinuated that because
all the Justices were furnished with advance copies of the draftponencia before the
session of July 15, 2008, anyone from those offices could have leaked the decision. An
examination of the copy in Biraogos possession readily shows that every page thereof
pages 1 to 36 contained Justice Reyess authenticating initials while none of the advance
copies furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated.
Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a working basis for
deliberations are not initialed by the justice who prepares it. And they do not contain
the signature of any of the Justices, except the one who prepared the draft, precisely
because the Justices have yet to go over it and deliberate on it. As standard procedure,
it is only after a draft decision has been adopted by the Court that it is finalized-printed
on Gilbert paper and every page thereof is authenticated by the ponente, and circulated
for signature by the other Justices.
It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity for anyone from the
offices of the Associate Justices to photocopy the ponencia as none of said offices
acquired possession of the document, except the Office of Justice Reyes and the Office
of Justice Nachura. But based on testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia stayed in the
Office of Justice Nachura only for less than five minutes, which did not suffice for it to
be signed by Justice Nachura and to be photocopied. Again, and in any event, page 1
of the photocopy in Biraogos possession does not match the same page of the Gilbert
copy.
Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate Justices took hold of the
Gilbert copy only briefly when they signed it at the En Banc conference room. At no other
time did any of them hold the document long enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to
standard procedure, only the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and his staff, took
custody of the ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices before it was sent to the OCJ.
But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the
unpromulgated ponencia? While the evidence shows that the chain of custody could
not rule out the possibility that the Gilbert copy was photocopied by Del Rosario who
had control and possession of it, and while there is no direct evidence as to the identity
of the perpetrator of the leakage, the committee FINDS that based on the circumstantial
evidence reflected above, particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to
circulate a draft ponencia of the case soonest even before the memoranda of all the
parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario
that the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and, instead, allow the
immediate promulgation after lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the
promulgation was arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who leaked a
photocopy thereof.
Recall that the Court gave due course to the petition on April 8, 2008 and the
first memorandum was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General only on June 16,
2008. The other parties, namely, Olivia Paras, Speaker Nograles, et al., and Biraogo
subsequently filed their respective memoranda only on July 1, 2, and 24, 2008. Even
before the En Banc session of June 10, 2008, however, Justice Reyes had already
circulated a draft decision.
Further, still later or on June 12, 2008, Justice Reyes circulated, via transmittal
letter of even date printed on his memo pad and signed by him, a Revised Draft, copy
of which transmittal letter, as well as the Revised Draft, also came into the possession
of Biraogo (Annex B to Biraogos Compliance).
Furthermore, even after the Justices had, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008,
unanimously decided that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy would be put on hold-
-and this was, it bears repeating, admitted by Justice Reyes--, Justice Reyes, after
partaking lunch at the dining room and before 1:00 p.m., instead of advising his Chief
of Staff Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation was put on hold, still
instructed them to reprint the second signature page (page 36) and to have the
reprinted page immediately brought to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature; and
before Justice Reyes left for the session hall for the oral arguments of that case
scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, Justice Reyes still followed up the case by asking
Manabat if Justice Nachura had already signed the Gilbert copy.[245]
 When confronted with the incontrovertible evidence of his undue interest in the
case and haste in having the Gilbert copy promulgated, Justice Reyes was notably
evasive. On January 16, 2009, Justice Carpio Morales asked Justice Reyes if he would
admit that he prepared a draft of the decision even before the first memorandum was
submitted on June 16, 2008. Justice Reyes stated that he could not admit that
fact.[246] Such fact is documented, however, and it would not have escaped him as the
records of the Limkaichong case were with him and yet he already prepared and caused
the circulation of a draft of the decision on June 12, 2008.
Justice Reyes also gave conflicting accounts on when he gave the Gilbert copy
to Del Rosario after the En Banc session of July 15, 2008 was adjourned. During the
proceedings of the committee on December 15, 2008, Justice Reyes categorically stated
that pursuant to standard operating procedures, he gave the signed Gilbert copy to Del
Rosario after the Chief Justice noted that seven Justices had concurred in the
result.[247] It bears recalling that the Chief Justice confirmed noting such fact during
lunchtime. However, the following day, during the December 16, 2008 proceedings,
Justice Reyes implied that pursuant to standard operating procedures, his staff got his
folders including the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session. Hence, so he
reasoned, as the agreement to put on hold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy and to
hold oral arguments on the case was arrived at only after lunch which followed the
adjournment of the En Banc session, his staff did not know about such
agreement.[248] But even Del Rosario, whose testimony he credits more than any of the
other members of his staff, categorically stated that Justice Reyes gave him the Gilbert
copy after he (Justice Reyes) had taken his lunch and while he (Del Rosario), Justice
Reyes and Atty. Evangelista were, before 1:00 p.m., on their way to Justice Reyess
office, and that, at that instant, Justice Reyes instructed Atty. Evangelista to have the
signature page 36 reprinted and have Justice Nachura (who was not participating in
the oral arguments scheduled that afternoon) sign.
During the January 22, 2009 hearing, when asked to explain why the top cover
of the new copy which he brought with him and which he claimed to have been
photocopied from the committees copy, did not match the top cover of the committees
copy (or the original Gilbert copy) but matched the top cover of Biraogos copy, Justice
Reyes offered no explanation. Neither did he account for the other dissimilarities
between page 1 of his new copy and the same page 1 of Biraogo on one hand, and page
1 of the Gilbert copy , viz: page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogos copy, does
not have asterisks after the names of Justices Tinga and Azcuna and the corresponding
footnotes, which the Gilbert copy has.
Justice Reyes, despite his professed desire to bring out the truth, refused to
submit his new copy to the committee and questioned the committees request that he
place his initials on the questioned pages of his new copy.Later, while the committee
was discussing other points in his Notes, Justice Reyes tried to hide his new copy.
Justice Corona had to pry it out of Justice Reyess files. As Justice Reyes repeatedly said
that he was not submitting his new copy to the committee (Why should I), the
committee members were prompted to photocopy his new copy, but only after they
affixed their signatures and date (January 22, 2009) on the first 5 pages thereof.
To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and
circumstances constitute more than substantial evidence which reasonably points to
Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence,[249] as THE source of the leak. He
must, therefore, be held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
Effect of Justice Reyess Retirement
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he is
answerable.[250]
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of
the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyess retirement.
 Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed,
there are other penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the
administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any
government office and the forfeiture of benefits.[251]
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the
charges or declare him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy
would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal
conduct during his/her last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and
unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable
acts knowing fully well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the law and
immune from all administrative penalties?
If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction
over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for
acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests
of litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication
of his/her name and integrity as he leaves the government which he/she served well
and faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[252]
The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the task of preserving the
confidentiality and integrity of court records. A number of rules and internal
procedures are in place to ensure the observance of this task by court personnel.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct[253] provides that confidential information
acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. [254]The Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to
wit:

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person

any confidential information acquired by them while employed in the
judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized
sources.

Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public

record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public
concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases,
including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal
memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,

records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses
in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after
the decision, resolution or order is made public.

SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of

statute, court rule or administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons
authorized to do so.

SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court

personnel shall not disclose confidential information given by litigants,
witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person.

SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information

acquired by them during their employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by
current court personnel of the same information would constitute a breach of
 confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this provisions shall constitute
indirect contempt of court.[255](Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an
unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internal deliberations of the
Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential.[256] A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity
and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-
making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.[257]
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr.,[258] the Court stated that [c]ourt documents are
confidential documents. They must not be taken out of the court without proper
authority and without the necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and
integrity. Thus, the Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct.
Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross misconduct destroy the good image of
the judiciary so the Court cannot countenance them nor allow the perpetrators to
remain in office. This same pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen v.
Masangcay.[259] Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court, it is but
logical that a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza,[260] in fact, commands persons who routinely handle
confidential matters to be confidential employees. They are thus expected to be more
careful than an ordinary employee in their day to day business. They are reposed such
trust and confidence that a breach of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied
to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty amounts to breach of public trust as the
committee believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is
settled that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority
upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence,
ignorance of the law or misconduct.[261]
In People v. Valenzuela,[262] which deals with the administrative aspect of a case
brought on certiorari, the Court dispensed with the conduct of further hearings under
the principle of res ipsa loquitur and proceeded to consider critical factors in deducing
malice and bad faith on the part of the judge, after it did not accept at face value the
judges mere denial. In that case, the judge ordered the return of the peso equivalent of
the foreign currency to the accused despite its forfeiture as dutiable goods and even
after the finding that the accused had nothing to do with the mailing thereof.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr.,[263] where the Court took into
account glaring circumstancesin the proceedings of the case in concluding that the
judge acted with bad faith, the judge was similarly found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct when he unjustly declared the defendant in default and awarded
outrageously exorbitant damages. l
Prudential Bank v. Castro[264] was an administrative case spawned by a partys
complaint, wherein the Court, in light of the surrounding circumstances, found that
the judge committed serious and grave misfeasance because the issuance of the orders
and ill-conceived summary judgment showed the judges partiality to, or confabulation
with the plaintiff and its lawyers.
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano,[265] the Court proceeded
in adjudging the attendant circumstances as tainted with bad faith and questionable
integrity to call for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers over members of the
judiciary. In that case, the Court found the submissions of the judge unacceptable and
clearly inadequate to overcome the cumulative effect of the highly questionable
actuations taking cognizance of a claim for damages arising from an attachment,
instead of having it litigated in the same action where the writ was issued as evincing
gross ignorance of the law and active bias or partiality.
The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza,[266] perceived the judges persistent pattern of
approving bail bonds and issuing release orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction as
evincing a modus operandi that flagrantly flaunts fundamental rules.
 In De Los Santos v. Magsino,[267] the Court again applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur when a judge irregularly approved a bail bond and issued a release order of
an accused whose case was pending in another province, in palpable disregard and
gross ignorance of the procedural law on bail.
The principle was also applied to discipline court personnel and suspend
members of the Bar from the practice of law.
The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Pardo,[268] found the clerk of
court guilty of gross discourtesy in the course of official duties when he failed to accord
respect for the person and rights of a judge as can be gleaned from a mere reading of
his letter to the Executive Judge.
In Sy v. Moncupa,[269] the Court found the evidence against the clerk for
malversation of public funds eloquently speaks of her criminal misdeed to justify the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The clerk admitted the shortage in the
court funds in her custody and pleaded for time to pay the amount she had failed to
account for.
In maintaining an earlier Resolution,[270] the Court, in In re Wenceslao
Laureta, [271] also declared that nothing more was needed to be said or proven and the
necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated. In that case, the Court
found that the letters and charges leveled against the Justices were, of themselves and by
themselves, malicious and contemptuous, and undermined the independence of the
judiciary.
Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v.
Dioneda,[272] it was held that it was reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, the respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards by his act
of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in a case and subsequently
failing to render such service. The Court found the respondent liable for disloyalty to
his client and inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him.
The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz:
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the
assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature,
a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly
deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless party. The facts
themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give
rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was
clearly deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa
loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the
facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the
clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or
are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would
negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing
to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent
is necessary.[273] (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)
The apparent toning down of the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was
further amplified in at least two cases. In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva,[274] the Court
ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to cases of knowingly
rendering a manifestly unjust judgment, and even if the doctrine is appreciable,
complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad faith.
Then came Fernandez v. Verzola,[275] where it was held that failure to substantiate
a claim of corruption and bribery and mere reliance on conjectures and suppositions
cannot sustain an administrative complaint. In dismissing the complaint, the Court
rejected as untenable the reasoning that the decision itself is evidence of corruption per
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It upheld the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless
judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify the judges dismissal from the service.
The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in Dizon only
bolstered and solidified the application of the doctrine in cases not only of gross
negligence but of serious misconduct as well, since it speaks of inference of evil intent.
 As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in administrative cases is
that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, and
that he cannot be subjected to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.The rule adds
that the proper remedy is via judicial recourse and not through an administrative
action.
It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross ignorance of the law
and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In cases of leakage or breach of
confidentiality, however, the familiar rule obviously does not apply. While the injured
party is the Court itself, there is no judicial remedy available to undo the
disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not spring from the four corners
of the assailed decision or resolution nor can it gleaned on the face of the issuance
itself. Indeed, one need not dwell on the substance of the decision since that in itself is
inherently insufficient. In unearthing the misdeed, it becomes not only desirable but
also necessary to trace the attendant circumstances, apparent pattern and critical
factors surrounding the entire scenario.
In Macalintal v. Teh,[276] the Court pronounced:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or
he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's
dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only
if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be
accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[277] (Underscoring
supplied.)
The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic and essential rule of
confidentiality that, as described in one case, [a]ll conclusions and judgments of the
Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation [and c]ourt
personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations
are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. [278]
As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not dispense with the
necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely
expresses that absent a credible explanation, it is clearly sound and reasonable to
conclude a strong inference of evil intent on the basis of facts duly admitted or shown
by the record. In fine, jurisprudence allows the reception of circumstantial evidence to
prove not only gross negligence but also serious misconduct.
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee
likewise finds Justice Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for
violating his lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he
may be disbarred or suspended per Section 27,[279] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the
Court and impeded and degraded the administration of justice. The act is rendered all
the more pernicious considering that it was committed by no less than a justice of the
Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started
is of no moment. The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against
an impeachable officer who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the bar
as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure and does not create
immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations.[280] Once the said impeachable officer
is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent
disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and impose the corresponding
sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to the Courts power
of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements
of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for
misconduct committed during their incumbency. Thus, in Caada v. Suerte,[281] this
Court ordered the disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed during his
incumbency as a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyess infractions may have been, the
committee finds the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In
the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the
Court takes into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is
primarily addressed to the Courts sound discretion, the sanction should neither be
arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it
should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Under the circumstances of
this case, the committee finds the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law sufficient and proper.
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes Judicial Staff Head,
was remiss in his duties, which includes the supervision of the operations of the office,
particularly with respect to the promulgation of decisions. While it is incumbent upon
him to devise ways and means to secure the integrity of confidential documents, his
actuations reflected above evinced a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.[282]
Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the responsible safekeeping of
draft ponencias in an unlocked drawer of a member of the staff. He failed to make sure
that the unused portion of confidential documents like the second signatory page of
the ponencia in Gilbert form had been properly disposed of or shredded. He was not on
top of things that concerned the promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to ascertain
the status and procedural implication of an on hold order after having been apprised
thereof by his subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17, 2008.Despite his awareness that
the Limkaichong case would eventually be called again, he admitted that he was not
privy to the preparation of the copy of the ponencia for the subsequent session on July
29, 2008.
With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY.
Liability of Armando Del Rosario
The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to
exercise the required degree of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario
admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16,
2008 to December 10, 2008 when he should have known that, by the nature of the
document in his custody, he should have kept it more securely. His carelessness
renders him administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as the
failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either
carelessness or indifference.[283]
 Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility
which court officials and employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance
of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct,
act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the peoples faith in the
judiciary.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and
one day to six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules,
the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the
alternative.[284] Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect
of duty,[285] we find the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the
amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively, just and reasonable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating Committee respectfully
recommends that
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for
violating his oath as a member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility
and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar;
(2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and be
FINED in the amount of P500,000, to be charged against his retirement benefits; and
(3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario be held liable
for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and be FINED in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000,
respectively.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.