TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H.

SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.
Esguerra, J.:

Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were
blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging
on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not
do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and
8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went
to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boy’s
parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for
injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Picart v Smith (Torts)

PICART V SMITH G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH,
JR., defendant- appellee.

FACTS:
The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of
the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other side. The automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – La Union – absolved the defendant from liability.
ISSUE:
whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to
a civil obligation to repair the damage done

RULING:
Yes, he is liable.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse
to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

LILIUS, ET AL. v. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANYG.R. No. L-39587, Marc !", #93"$ac%&'
Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his firsttime in
the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledgeof the
existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing toindicate its
existence and, it was impossi le to see an approaching train. !t a out seven or eight metersfrom the
crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. "everal people, whoseemed to
have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. #e slowed down andsounded his
horn for the people to get out of the way. $ith his attention thus occupied, he did not see thecrossing ut
he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge lack mass fling itselfupon him,
which turned out to e locomotive %o. &'( of the )*+ s train. -he locomotive struck theplaintiff s car right
in the center. -he ( victims were injured and were hospitali ed.Lilus filed a case against )*+ in the +/I.
!nswering the complaint, it denies each and every allegationthereof and, y way of special defense,
alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife andcoplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove
his car, and prays that it e a solved from the complaint.-he +/I decided in favor of Lilius. -he two parties
appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said judgement.
I&&()'
$hether or not )anila *oad +ompany is guilty of negligence and civilly lia le.
H)*+'
-he court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant0appellant
company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at 1ayap, to serveas a
warning to passers0 y of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions
eforecrossing the railroad2 and, on the part of its employees 3 the flagman and switchman, for not
havingremained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers0 y of the approaching train2
thestationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to his post on time2 and the
engineer,for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the a sence of
saidflagman and switchman, y slackening his speed and continuously ringing the ell and lowing
thewhistle efore arriving at the crossing. !lthough it is pro a le that the defendant0appellant entity
employed the diligence of a good father of afamily in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did
not employ such diligence in supervising theirwork and the discharge of their duties ecause, otherwise,
it would have had a semaphore or sign at thecrossing and, on previous occasions as well as on the night
in question, the flagman and switchmanwould have always een at his post at the crossing upon the
arrival of a train.-he diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid
damage, is not confinedto the careful and prudent selection of su ordinates or employees ut includes
inspection of their workand supervision of the discharge of their duties.