Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te (G.R. No.

161793) In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s

psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
FACTS: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond.
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of
the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.
latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and the
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision

declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It
ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity
of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally
examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity
was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family
Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant
petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court
declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the

marriage between the parties is null and void?

HELD: The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The
decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and the
decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted
with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity
for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the
defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As
a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and
attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower
court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result
of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court
ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action”.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may
also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who
will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring
that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a
married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus,
she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set
aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against
appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Geluz vs CA
TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to
know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her
aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950
before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her
aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it
aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was
employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21,
1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by
her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at
Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this
time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his
election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor
given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at
P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial
court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an
award of moral damages evidently because Oscar’s
indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates
he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case
against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal
profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he
but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that
he’s after obtaining a large money payment since he sued
Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.
De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a
cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in
law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years
of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop.
He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in
refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed
breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which
a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found
no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50
pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the
trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a

constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a
rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his
name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the
country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her
to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask
his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital
arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a

House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together
for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married
with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the

defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the
ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead
of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other

letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy
proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had

been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as
a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as

admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to
connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The
mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the

continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the
period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that
she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her
great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come
into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on
or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to
stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of
the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-
law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter
into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only
to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not
vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition
of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a
judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya
Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien
woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections
174 SCRA 245 –
Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador
Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s
election and proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in
1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo
said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then
President Marcos was after him; but that participating in the
Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American
citizenship pursuant to American laws. He also assailed the
petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto
which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten
days after his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a
governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as
Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his
citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States.
Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not restore his
being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or
repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the
1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is
a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he
owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty
and fidelity to any other state.
UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC Case Digest
UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC
95 P.R. 890
Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he
also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to
the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled
in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April
of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his
present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he
returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course,
in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He
finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the
Philippines until October 13, 1951.
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word
“residence”, as used in the aforesaid provision of the
Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once
acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile
is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his
purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being,
merely to study therein.
Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be
granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did
not return until several months after the first date set for the
hearing thereof.
Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean
one and the same thing, residence combined with intention to
remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed
permanently for a time for business or other purposes,
constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent,
existing all the while, to return to the true domicile.
Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the
filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until
several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof,
notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would
reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of the
filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of
section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently,
not entitled to a judgment in his favor.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

FACTS: 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to
1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St.
Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres.
Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor
of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate
of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close
ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency

requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election

purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became

Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal

or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the