Banal v Tadeo (11 December 1987)

Gutierrez, J.

FACTS:

Fifteen informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Rosario Claudio before the RTC of Quezon
City assigned to Branch 84.

The judge of said branch inhibited himself, and was re-raffled to Branch 105 presided by Judge Serquina.
Judge Tadeo then replaced Judge Serquina.

On 08 January 1987, the RTC issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito Bustos as private
prosecutor on the ground that the charge does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the
motion.

The court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES + RULING:

WoN the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the appearance of a private
prosecutor. YES.

Petitioner contends that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable, and hence indemnity may be
recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not BP 22 so provides.

On the other hand, respondents argue that BP 22 is an offense against public order and hence, it is the
State and the public that are the principal complainants; hence, there is no civil liability.

Civil liability arises not so much because the act or omission is a crime, but because it caused damage to
another.

What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.

Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action.

Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party
may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful
act of another.

The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

The framers of the law could not have intended to leave the offended private party defrauded and
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

BARREDO VS. GARCIA AND ALMARIO

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a
separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil
action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him –
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).

Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco

G.R. No.165732

December 14, 2006

Facts:

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would
sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank,
and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a
separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of
Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed
with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on
August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense.
Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.

Issues:

(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the
Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code?

(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?

Held:

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted
in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around
the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and
the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that
he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain
the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant
case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It
ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its
employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence
simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision
contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and
instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and
employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied
with.

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil
liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of
Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability
recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises
from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished
with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable
and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not
joint or solidary.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is
SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code

ELCANO VS. HILL GR. NO. L-24803

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at
the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a
matter of equity.

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People, 329 SCRA 600 , April 03, 2000

Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; In negligence cases, the same act or omission can create two kinds of
liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto but the
offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.—In negligence cases, the
aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any
other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, “the same act or omission can create
two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
delicto” either of which “may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.

Same; Same; Same; Vicarious liability of the employee is founded in Article 2176 in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code and on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; Under Article 2176 the liability of
the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee; Enforcement of the judgment against
the employer does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the
employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.—
Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused,
to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the
employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law. The first is expressed in Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be
instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would
necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the
negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an
action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the
liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint
tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an
employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge
of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of
his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged.

Same; Same; Same; Reservation of the right to file the separate civil action waives other available civil
actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver.—Pursuant to the provision of Rule
111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as
complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action
includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Same; Same; Same; Award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against
the employer.—With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was
improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by
the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, “civil
indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed.” The only issue brought before the trial
court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included
therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused
truckdriver.

Criminal Law; Information; Penalty; No offense of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law under the Revised Penal Code; In reckless imprudence cases, the
actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes
committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.—Parenthetically, the trial court
found the accused “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136).” There is no such nomenclature
of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused “to
suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum.” This is
erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or
series of crimes. [Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People, 329 SCRA 600(2000)]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory
arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not
excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego).
On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs
Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case,
the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final
judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no
party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the
Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will
only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the
Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a
summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability
based solely on the act complained of.