How should the constitution be construed?

Sarmiento v. Mison Case Digest

Sarmiento v. Mison, GR. G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

Facts:

Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is
entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.

Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. in unconstitutional?

Held: No. under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, it is clear that those mentioned in the 1st sentence of
Section 16 are those appointments that needed confirmation of the commission on appointment while in those under
the other sentences do not require such.

In the present case, the Commissioner of Bureau of custom is considered under the 4th sentence of the Section not
requiring for the confirmation of the commission of appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by
law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937,
otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:

601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs,
who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head.

PRINCIPLES:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: Give effect to the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. That the court will construe the applicable
constitutional provisions, NOT in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want
then to construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were
knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseeable effects thereof.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution; which clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

1st sentence: speaks of nomination and the appointment by the president with consent of the
Commission on Appointments.

2nd sentence: speaks of nomination alone.

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
- “alone” appears to be redundant and, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and
positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

GREGORIO PERFECTO VS BIBIANO MEER

GR. No. L-2348, February 27, 1950

Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon
his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this
action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue:

Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution (reduction of size)
thereof?

Held:

Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in
the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated,
to wit:

First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include
salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in
the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; and
Second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of
the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs
them.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or
cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon.
Andon incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly
on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend

that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be
hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives
in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges

—
personal and therefore waivable

—
but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore)

PRINCIPLES:

O'Malley case: declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the salaries of judges
appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been approved.
- Resolved the issue of taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that policy
must be enunciated by Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley case, not by
Executive Fiat or interpretation.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO VS SATURNINO DAVID

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

FACTS:

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and
Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides
that

No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation – this is
also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue
reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries
of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a
diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).

The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered
ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret
laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon
the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of
the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition
of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of
the land.

PRINCIPLES :
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the
power granted to the courts by the Constitution.

DAVID G. NITAFAN vs COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE

FINANCIAL OFFICER
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries
or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier
however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice
which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary – but the SC
decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to
exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other
branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that
salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which
may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject
to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase
will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the
law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be
applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.
May the preamble be referred to in the construction of constitutional provisions?

GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs JUAN RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

Facts of the Case:

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City
of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the
petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a
member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were
actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Held:

No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps.
Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the
Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of
the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great
opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In
evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic
chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is no
violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Are the provisions of the constitution self-executing?

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid
of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become
a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And
if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is
to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be
simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines
and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

STATUTE
Requirements for the publication of laws:

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA

G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979

FACTS:

Plaintiff was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police
asked him to stop and was told that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more
particularly, for overtaking a truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license which he surrendered, and
a temporary operator's permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school
building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance
with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendant from enforcing
the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal
case.

After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding that the ordinance was null and
void and had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code.

Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act
No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." In so arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has
been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective
on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal
Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, to wit:
Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended, and all laws, executive
orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict with the provisions of this
Act are repealed.

PRINCIPLE :

GENERAL RULE: later law prevails over an earlier law.

Essential requisite for a valid ordinance: must not contravene . . . the statute, for it is a "fundamental principle
that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state."

When the ordinance and statute are in conflict: the ordinance must give way.

LA CARLOTA SUGAR CENTRAL v. PEDRO JIMENEZ

112 Phil. 232

DIZON, J.:

Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, a domestic corporation hereinafter referred to as the
Central, managed, controlled and operated by Elizalde & Co., Inc., referred to hereinafter as Elizalde, imported
500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate. The corresponding letter
of credit in the sum of $60,930.00, U.S. currency, was opened through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation in the name of the.Central and in favor of the Overseas Central Enterprises, Inc., 141 Battery St.,
San Francisco 11, California, U.S.A. The invoices, bill of lading, and all other papers incident to said importation
were also in the name of the Central.
When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed on, and demanded from the Central
17% exchange tax in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 601, as amended, and the Central paid
in that connection the total sum of P20,872.09 (Annexes B and C attached to the Petition for Review).

On November 18, 1955 the Central filed, through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for
the refund of the P20,872.09 paid as above stated, claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned
heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of five haciendas known as "Esperanza", "Mahalin",
"Valencia" owned by Elizalde "Consuelo" and "Maayon", these last two managed by the same company, and
therefore the importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax law in accordance with Sec. 2, Rep. Act 601,
as amended by Act 1375. The Auditor of the Central Bank, however, denied the petition on July 2, 1956. The
Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the
reconsideration was denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines, who on
January 18, 1957, affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that "the importation
of the fertilizers here in question does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Act No, 1375. Accordingly, the decision of the Auditor, Central
Bank of the Philippines, denying the aforementioned request for refund of 17% exchange tax, is hereby
affirmed". In view of this result, the Central and Elizalde filed the present petition for review.

The only question to be resolved is whether upon the undisputed facts of the case the importation of the
fertilizers mentioned heretofore is covered by the exemption provided by Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No.
601, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1175, 1197 and 1375, which read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be assessed, collected and paid a special excise tax
of seventeen per centum on the value in Philippine peso of foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank of the
Philippines, or any of its agents until June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and fifty-six.

"SEC. 2. The tax provided for in section one of this Act shall not be collected on foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges of canned milk, canned beef, cattle, canned fish,
cocoa beans, malt, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate; supplies and equipment purchased directly by
the Government or any of its instrumentalities for its own exclusive use; machinery, equipment, accessories,
and spare parts, for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers; and fertilizers when
imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives; * * *."

The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the
same were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. In the present case, as
appellants admit that the Central "is not the planter ultimately benefited by the fertilizers, much less a
cooperative within the purview of Rep. Act No. 601, as amended", the only possible conclusion is that the
imported fertilizers in question are not entitled to the exemption provided by law.

It is, however, argued that the Central imported the fertilizers for the exclusive purpose of accommodating the
haciendas mentioned heretofore, who were to use the fertilizers; that the Central acted merely as an agent of
the aforesaid haciendas; that considering the relationship and corporate tie-up between the Central, on the one
hand, and Elizalde, on the other, the act of the Central in importing the fertilizers should be considered as an
act of Elizalde and, therefore, the act of the haciendas themselves, three of which were owned and two
managed by Elizalde. We find these contentions to be without merit.

As already stated, the exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or
through their cooperatives. The word "directly" has been interpreted to mean "without anything intervening"
(Words and Phrases, Vol. 12A, p.140 citing Gulf Atlantic Warehouse, etc. vs. Bennet, 51 So 2nd 544, 546, 36 Ala.
App. 33); "proximately or without intervening agency or person" (Idem, p. 142 citing Employers' Casualty Co. vs.
Underwood, 286 p. 7, 10; 142 Okl. 208). Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter
through an agent, other than his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption. This
conclusion acquires added force upon consideration of the fact that the legal provision in question has already
established an exception from the meaning or scope of the term "directly" by providing coverage for fertilizers
imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives. The latter, therefore, is the only agent of planters
or farmers recognized by the exception, and we can not recognize any other.

On the other hand, that the agent acted simply to accommodate the planter or farmer and without any idea of
making any profit from the transaction would seem to be immaterial considering the language employed in the
statute under consideration.

In connection with what has been stated heretofore, we have to bear in mind likewise that when the issue is
whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision
is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the
result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and
against the taxpayer (82 C.J.S. pp. 957-958; Helvering vs. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 US 46, 85 L. ed. 29 S.
Ct., 51 Am. Jur. p. 526). Indeed, were we to adopt appellants' construction of the law by exempting from the
17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, we
would be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported by
planters or farmers through their cooperatives.

In view of the foregoing, the ruling appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Case Digest: US v. De Guzman Case No. 297
 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote
No.95
Posted on October 20, 2017 by mylawsome
FACTS:

Defendant De Guzman, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder) and
sentenced to life imprisonment.

The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, on the day and at place mentioned in the information,
De Guzman who was walking through a field with Pedro and Serapio Macarling and Rufino Garin, deceased,
struck the latter on the head, knocked him down and held him on the ground while Pedro Macarling stabbed
him to death. Information was duly filed charging De Guzman, jointly with the two Macarlings, with the murder
of Guzman entered into an agreement with the fiscal under the terms of which he promised to appear and
testify as a witness for the Government at the trial of his coaccused, and to tell the truth as to all that occurred,
provided the information was dismissed as to him and he himself was not brought to trial. With the consent of
the court, and in pursuance of this agreement, he was not arraigned nor brought to trial, and the information
was dismissed as to him. One of his coaccused pleaded guilty and the other not guilty, and thereafter the case
came on for trial. after several witnesses had been called, De Guzman was placed on the witness stand, and
denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied that he had ever said anything implicating his coaccused, and
swore that a statement made by him before a justice of the peace was false, and that it had been made through
fear of certain police officer.

The Solicitor General relying on provisions of General orders recommends the discharge of the appellant.

Section 34, 35, and 36 of General orders No. 58, upon which counsel for defense and the Solicitor-General rely,
are as follows:

SEC. 34. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, the court, at any time before the
defendants have entered upon their defense or upon the application of the counsel of the Government, may
direct any defendant to be discharged, that he may be a witness for the United States.
SEC. 35. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, and the court shall be of opinion in
respect to a particular defendant that there is not sufficient evidence to put him on his defense, it must order
him to be discharged before the evidence is closed, that he may be a witness for his codefendant.

SEC. 36. The order indicated in sections thirty-four and thirty-five shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant
discharged, and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.

The question raised on this appeal being his right to exemption from prosecution for the crime thus committed,
on the ground that a former information, charging the same offense, had been dismissed as to him in order that
he might testify as a witness for the prosecution.

ISSUE: Should the defendant be discharged from prosecution even if he did not faithfully comply as to the
sworn agreement made prior the trial which entitled him immunity as witness for the States

HELD:

No, the defendant should not be discharged.

General rule of statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of the original and history of the
statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of the facts which affect their derivation,
validity and operation. Looking at the legislative history of the statute under the old system of criminal
procedure with a system borrowed on large part from English and American precedents, it can be gleaned that
faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the
trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. CA, GR No. 77425, 1991-06-19

Facts:

On November 29, 1984, private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of
donation,... On November 29, 1984, private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed
of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners
Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao... and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 095-84... therein.

rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and
Soledad C. Ignao... and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 095-84... therein

On November 29, 1984, private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation,
rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and
Soledad C. Ignao... and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 095-84... therein

In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and
Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila covering a... parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit,
Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less.

August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of
donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a... parcel of land (Lot
No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or
less.

The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not... dispose or sell the property within a period
of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition
would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property... would revert to the estate of the
donors.

It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the
property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province
of Cavite owned by... the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of
absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in
consideration of the sum of

P114,000.00.

Issues:

It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has already prescribed,
invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the
donor, when the... donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter,"
and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised... against the donee's heirs."

Ruling:

We do not agree.

Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not
applicable in the case at... bar.

he deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case
of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not... necessary.

By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition thereof would
render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, We are of the opinion that there would... be no legal
necessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of
donation itself declares it so.

In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for rescission of a
contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any
of its terms and... conditions.

It called attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without... court
intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the
contract.

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764
of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306... of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for... automatic
revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory
condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred
(100) years from the date of... execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an
undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.

The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before... us constitutes a patently unreasonable and
undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable
attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must... not be perpetual or
for an unreasonable period of time.

In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property
for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or... impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil
Code.

It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land for one hundred
(100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of donation. At the same time, it was likewise
the controverted... fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial
court and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue of prescription.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.

Principles:

David v COMELEC
Panganiban, 1997
FACTS:

David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, filed
apetition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May
1997.Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also filed a petition to seek a judicial review by
Certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: (1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2) COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and
2887fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related
thereto; and,(3) The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General
AppropriationsAct of 1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections.

Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5 years. Although the
LGCreduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to
barangayofficials.

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions.

ISSUES & HELD:

Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA 7160 - 3 years)

Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional? (YES)

Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)
RATIO:

Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years

RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws,
the later enactment prevails. (Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant .) During the barangay elections
held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and directly electedone punong barangay and seven
kagawads (as in the Code).

In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover
expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained
that a general registration of voters shall be held “immediately after the barangay elections in 1997.” These are
clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May,
inaccordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.

In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that “the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned
isbarely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997.” This judicial decision is“part of the
legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8)
.”

RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically and
definitivelyprovides in its Sec. 43- c that “the term of office of barangay officials shall be for three years.” It is a
special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of
May1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.

Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution

The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It
merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition,thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies
of publicservice. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
Thepetitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they
aver.

Constitutional Commission on how long the term of barangay officials is:

“As may be determined by law”; moreprecisely, “as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits
their term to 3 years).”Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms

Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected
to, under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable
because under NCC 3 , “ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.