#15 Spouses Africa et al vs Caltex Philippines,
Boquiren and the Court of Appeals
16 SCRA 448 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Res
Ipsa Loquitur
FACTS: In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a
tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground
storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from
the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned
several houses including the house of Spouses
Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a
passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being
transferred which caused the fire. But there was no
evidence presented to prove this theory and no
other explanation can be had as to the real reason
for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch
owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete
firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable
to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the transaction speaks
for itself”) which states: “where the thing which
caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the
injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not occur if he having such control use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendant’s
want of care.” The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that
the incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall
prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception
because the burden of proof is shifted to the party
charged of negligence as the latter is the one who
had exclusive control of the thing that caused the
injury complained of.
#16 Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego,
a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria,
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment
of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA
decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the
grounds of negligence.
RULING:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing
or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. All
the requisites for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference
appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not
cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any
defense relating to the incident.
#17 Cebu Shipyard v William
G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999
Facts: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc.
repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the
non-life insurance business. William Lines, Inc., the
owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo
vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the
incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential
for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW was insured
for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairer’s liability
policy. They entered into a contract where
negligence was the only factor that could make
CSEW liable for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW
was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The
Hull Policy included an “Additional
(INCHMAREE)” Clause covering loss of or damage to
the vessel through the negligence of, among others,
ship repairmen.
William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW
for repairs. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the
ship while it was being repaired. After the vessel was
transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and
sank, resulting to its total loss.
William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it
the was through the latter’s negligence that the ship
caught fire and sank. Prudential was impleaded as
co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured
items. It was subrogated to 45 million, or the value it
claimed to indemnify.
The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45
million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for loss of
income, and more than 13 million in other damages.
of The CA affirmed the TC decision.
CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due
to William’s hotworks on the said portion of the ship
the which they didn’t ask CSEW permission for.
Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the
negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance
when they didn’t mind rubber insulation wire coming
out of the air-conditioning unit that was already
burning.
Hence this MFR.
Issue:
1. WON CSEW had “management and supervisory
control“ of the ship at the time the fire broke out
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
against the crew
3. WON Prudential has the right of subrogation
against its own insured
4. WON the provisions limiting CSEW’s liability for
negligence to a maximum of Php 1 million are valid
Held: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Petition denied.
Perils
Ratio:
1. The that factual findings by the CA are conclusive
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
They are entitled to great weight and respect when
the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the
trial court.
The CA and the Cebu RTC are agreed that the fire
which caused the total loss of subject M/V Manila
City was due to the negligence of the employees and
workers of CSEW.
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of
fact cannot be entertained.
2. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a
given situation, the following conditions must concur:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2)
that the instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence.
The facts and evidence reveal the presence of these
conditions. First, the fire would not have happened in
the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and
diligence had been exercised.
Second, the agency charged with negligence, as
found by the trial court and the CA and as shown by
the records, is CSEW, which had control over subject
vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.
What is more, in the present case the trial court
found direct evidence to prove that the workers
didn’t exercise due diligence in the care of subject
vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the
conclusion that CSEW was really negligent even
without applying such doctrine.
3. Petitioner contends that Prudential is not entitled
to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines, Inc.,
theorizing that (1) the fire which gutted M/V Manila
City was an excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured
under the Marine Hull Insurance Policy. This was
wrong. The one who caused the fire has already
been adjudicated by the courts as CSEW.
Upon proof of payment by Prudential to William
Lines, Inc., the former was subrogated to the right of
the latter to indemnification from CSEW. As aptly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, the law says:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured,
and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the
wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights
of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person
who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by
the insurance company does not fully cover the
injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to
recover the deficiency from the person causing the
loss or injury.
When Prudential paid the latter the total amount
covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to
the right of the latter to recover the insured loss
from the liable party, CSEW.
Petitioner theorizes further that there can be no right
of subrogation as it is deemed a co-assured under
the subject insurance policy with reliance on Clause
20 of the Work Order which states:
20. The insurance on the vessel should be
maintained by the customer and/or owner of the
vessel during the period the contract is in effect.
Clause 20 of the Work Order in question is clear in
the sense that it requires William Lines to maintain
insurance on the vessel during the period of dry-
docking or repair. However, the fact that CSEW
benefits from the said stipulation does not
automatically make it as a co-assured of William
Lines. The intention of the parties to make each
other a co-assured under an insurance policy is to be
read from the insurance contract or policy itself and
not from any other contract or agreement because
the insurance policy denominates the beneficiaries of
the insurance. The hull and machinery insurance
procured by William Lines, Inc. from Prudential
named only “William Lines, Inc.” as the assured.
There was no manifestation of any intention of
William Lines, Inc. to constitute CSEW as a co-
assured under subject policy. The claim of CSEW
that it is a co-assured is unfounded.
Then too, in the Additional Perils Clause of the same
Marine Insurance Policy, it is provided that this
insurance also covers loss of or damage to vessel
directly caused by the negligence of charterers and
repairers who are not assured.
As correctly pointed out by respondent Prudential, if
CSEW were deemed a co-assured under the policy, it
would nullify any claim of William Lines, Inc. from
Prudential for any loss or damage caused by the
negligence of CSEW. Certainly, no shipowner would
agree to make a shiprepairer a co-assured under
such insurance policy; otherwise, any claim for loss or
damage under the policy would be invalidated.
4. Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion
have been consistently upheld as valid per se; as
binding as an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes
instances when reliance on such contracts cannot be
favored especially where the facts and circumstances
warrant that subject stipulations be disregarded.
Thus, in ruling on the validity and applicability of the
stipulation limiting the liability of CSEW for
negligence to P1M only, the facts and circumstances
vis-a-vis the nature of the provision sought to be
enforced should be considered, bearing in mind the
principles of equity and fair play.
It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured
with Prudential for P45M. Upon thorough
investigation by its hull surveyor, M/V Manila City
was found to be beyond economical salvage and
repair. The evaluation of the average adjuster also
reported a constructive total loss. The said claim of
William Lines, Inc., was then found to be valid and
compensable such that Prudential paid the latter the
total value of its insurance claim. Furthermore, it was
ascertained that the replacement cost of the vessel,
amounts to P55M.
Considering the circumstances, it would unfair to
limit the liability of petitioner to One Million Pesos
only. To allow CSEW to limit its liability to P1M
notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered
by the assured and paid for by Prudential amounted
to P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of
diligence short of what is ordinarily required because,
then, it would not be difficult for petitioner to escape
liability by the simple expedient of paying an amount
very much lower than the actual damage suffered by
William.
#21 RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to
remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon,
to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would
find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did
not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late
for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
“botched” the administration of the anesthesia
causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain
damage. The botched operation was witnessed by
Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of
College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital,
the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages.
The petitioners showed expert testimony showing
that Erlinda's condition was caused by the
anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in
“intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda
was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to
exercise due care in intubating the patient, the
surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
“good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late
and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the
doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the
surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly
and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The
CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were
negligent and thereby caused the
condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are
solidarily liable for the damages.
RATIO:
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to
disprove the presumption of negligence on their part
in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be
an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not
the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur
applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on
the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity
with the patient and which is an act of negligence
comatose and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He
failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain
of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that
which means “the thing or the transaction speaks for it exercised the diligence of a good father of the
itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art.
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a one in control of the hiring and firing of their
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s “consultants”. While these consultants are not
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on
defendant to meet with an explanation, where the selection and termination of doctors who work
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-
complaining party must present expert testimony to employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was
prove that the attending physician was negligent. allocated a share in the liability.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the #22 Ramos v. CA (2002)
day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already #23 Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital (2000)
surrendered her person to the private respondents #24 United States v. Juanillo (1912)
who had complete and exclusive control over her. #25 Chapman v. Underwood (1914)
Apart from the gallstone problem, she was #26 Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai (1968)
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the #27 Mallari v. CA (2000)
procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged— #28 FGU Insurance Corporation v. CA (1998)
res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself! #29 PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. UCPB General
Insurance Co. (2008)

#30 Anoneuvo v. CA (2004)
Facts: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his
bicycle, while Añonuevo,traversing the opposite lane
was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and
Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother.
Añonuevo was in the course of making a leftturn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to
undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an
action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a
criminal complaint against Añonuevobefore the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the
latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the criminal
charge.
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of
the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article 2185.
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a persondriving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
Issues:
A. Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil
Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles,
making Villagracia presumptively negligent.
B. Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for
failure to comply with traffic regulations.
C. Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of
contributory negligence
Held: No to all.
A. Application of Article 2185
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article
2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The
provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
was violating any traffic regulation.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply
by analogy to all types of vehicles[23]. He points out
that modern-day travel is more complex now than
when the Code was enacted, the number and types
of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of
then. He even suggests that at the time of the
enactment of the Code, the legislators must have
seen that only motor vehicles were of such public
concern that they had to be specifically mentioned,
yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and
nature has inescapably become matter of public
concern so as to expand the application of the law
to be more responsive to the times.[24]
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there
existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles
ranging from human-powered contraptions on
wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn
carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of
transport were even more prevalent on the roads of
the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the
framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude
these alternative modes from the scope of Article
2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If
Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of
Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater
interaction today of all types of vehicles, such
argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio
of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles,
as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it
stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by
statistical data, assuming such has been compiled,
much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos To hold a person as having contributed to his
characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is that brought about his injuries in disregard of
more apropos to the past than to the present. warnings or signs of an impending danger to health
There is pertinent basis for segregating between and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is
motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized still necessary to establish a causal link, although not
vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical proximate, between the negligence of the party and
exertion. Is capable of greater speeds and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the sam contributory only when it contributes proximately to
etime, motorized vehicles are more capable in the injury, and not simply a condition for its
inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an occurrence.[61]
accident or collision. This is due to a combination of As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower
factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as the courts adjudged Añonuevo assolely responsible for
greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why
greater combustibility due to the use of fuel. this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine
that the same result would not have occurred even if
B. Negligience on the part of Villagracia Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety
equipment.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by the personal judgment of the actor in
a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
determines what would be reckless or negligent.
Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as
the latter had transgressed traffic regulations.
However, Añonuevo was speeding as hemade the
left turn, and by his own admission, he had seen
Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had
he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the
turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to
avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was the
proximate cause of the accident.

Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see

Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped
with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to
slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

C. Contributory Negligience