Facts: The case involves the Villonco Realty Company against Bormaheco, Inc. its president, Francisco N. Cervantes and, his wife, Rosario N. Cervantes. The Cervantes are the owners of Lots 3, 15, and 16 in Buendia Avenue. In February 1964, there were negotiations for the sale of the aforementioned lots and the improvements thereon between Romeo Villonco of Villonco Realty Company and Bormaheco, Inc., represented by Francisco, through the intervention of Edit Perez de Tagle, real estate broker. Bromaheco, Inc. made a written offer dated February 12, 1964 to Romeo Villonco for the sale of the property. It mentioned the property located in Buendia Avenue, with total area of 3,500 sq.m., under the condition that it will be bought at the price of P400.00/sq.m., that an earnest money of P100,000 be placed which will become part of the payment once sale is consummated, that the sale be only consummated only after Cervantes have consummated his purchase of another property in Sta. Ana, Manila, that if the negotiation of the latter property be not consummated by reason beyond Cervante’s control, the earnest money will be returned and the sale of property will not be consummated, and that the final negotiations on both properties be definitely known after 45 days. Cervantes also specified that if the aforementioned terms are acceptable to Villonco Realty Villonco, the earnest money be issued in favor of Bormabheco, Inc., and be delivered thru the bearer of offer, Edith Perez de Tagle. The property in Sta. Ana (Punta Property), mentioned in the offer, was the land of the NASSCO which, after a bidding conducted on January 17, 1964, was awarded to Bormaheco. NASSCO authorized the General Manager to sign the necessary contract. Both companies continued their negotiation for the sale of the Buendia Avenue Property and had a final conference on February 27, 1964. As a result of the conference, Villonco Realty Corporation, through Teofilo Villonco, in its letter of March 04, 1964, made a revised counter- offer for the purchase of the said property. Beforehand, there was a counter-offer dated February 24, 1964 in which some information were corrected by Cervantes. The latest counter-offer by Villonco, dated March 04, 1964, was accepted by Cervantes which contains that the offer pertains to the property in Buendia Avenue with a total of 3,500 sq.m. which will be sold at a price at P400.00/sq.m., including the improvements thereon, that a deposit of P100,000 be given as earnest money which will become part of payment in the event the sale is consummated, that the sale shall only be cancelled if the deal of Cervantes with another property in Sta. Ana will not be consummated,a nd such, the earnest money be returned with 10% per annum interest, and enclosing in the offer is the earnest money of P100,000.00. The Conforme was signed by Francisco Cervantes representing the Bormaheco, Inc. The check of P100.000.00 was delivered by Tagle to Bormaheco, Inc. and was received by Cervantes on the same day. Unexpectedly, in a letter dated March 30, 1964, or 26 days after the signing of the Contract of Sale, Cervantes returned the earnest money with interest amounting to P694.24, ten percent per annum, stating the excuse the circumstance that “despite the lapse of 35 days from February 12, 1964 there is no certainty yet” for the acquisition of the Punta Property. The Villonco Realty Company refused to accept the letter and the checks of Bromaheco, Inc. When Cervantes rescinded the contract, he was already aware that the Punta lot had been awarded to Bormaheco, Inc. Tagle, broker, articulated her shock and surprise at Bormaheco’s turnabout, through a letter to Cervantes, dated March 31, 1964. Cervantes replied to the said letter on April 06, 1964 alleging that the 45 days period had already expired and the sale of Punta Property to Bormaheco, Inc. (BI) was not consummated and that his letter was a manifestation that they were no longer interested to sell the Buendia Avenue property to Villonco Realty Company (VRC). In a letter dated April 07, 1964, VRC returned the two checks to BI stating that the condition for the cancellation of the contract had not arisen and at the same time announcing that an action for breach of contract would be filed against BI. The lower court rendered a decision ordering the Cervantes spouses to execute in favor of BI a deed of conveyance of the three lots in question and directed BI to convey the lots to VRC, pay the P10,000 monthly consequential damages, to pay Tagle the sum of P42,000 as broker’s commission, and to pay P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. BI and the Cervantes spouses appealed. Thus, this case. Issue: Whether the Contract of Sale was perfected? Held: 1. The appeal was held devoid of merit, except as to the issue of damages. 2. “By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.” 3. “The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.” 4. BI’s acceptance of VRC’s offer to purchase the Buendia Avenue property through the revised- counter-offer, dated March 04, 1964, indubitably proves that there was a meeting of minds upon the subject matter and consideration of the sale. Therefore, on that date the sale was perfected. 5. BI’s acceptance of the earnest money of P100,000 shows that the sale was conditionally consummated or partly executed subject to the purchase by BI of the Punta property. Nonconsummation of the purchase would be a negative resolutory condition. 6. The contention of the defendants that the sale was not perfected because Cervantes allegedly qualified his acceptance of Villonco’s revised offer and therefore, Cervantes acceptance amounted to a counter-offer which VRC should accept but no such acceptance was transmitted to BI, is not well-taken. No evidence proved to the alleged changes of the revised offer and there was no evidence that VRC opposed to the supposed changes. What the record reveals is that Miss Tagle acted as intermediary between the parties and thus it is safe to assume that the alleged changes or qualifications made by Cervantes were approved by VRC and that approval was duly communicated to Cervantes or BI by the broker as shown by the payment of earnest money of P100,000 by VRC and which was duly accepted by BI. On the alleged changes or qualification in the revised counter-offer, these were not material and were just mere clarification of what the parties had previously agreed upon. 7. Further, BI’s contention is predicated on the erroneous assumption that BI was to acquire NASSCO land within 45 days or on or before March 28, 1964. The contention of the trial court was right that the 45-day period was merely an estimate or a forecast of how long it would take BI to acquire the NASSCO property. The record does not support the theory of Bormaheco, Inc. and the Cervantes spouses that the forty-five-day period was the time within which (a) the Nassco property and two Pasong Tamo lots should be acquired, (b) when Cervantes would secure his wife’s consent to the sale of the three lots and (c) when Bormaheco, Inc. had to decide what to do with the DBP encumbrance. Cervantes in his offer of February 12, 1964 stated that the sale of the Buendia lots would be consummated after he had consummated the purchase of the Nassco property. Then, in paragraph 5 of the same offer he stated “that final negotiations on both properties can be definitely known after forty-five days.” 8. It is deducible from the tenor of those statements that the consummation of the sale of the Buendia lots to VRC was conditioned on BI’s acquisition of the Nassco land. But it was not spelled out that such acquisition should be effected within forty-five days from February 12, 1964. Had it been Cervantes’ intention that the forty-five days would be the period within which the Nassco land should be acquired by Bormaheco, then he would have specified that period. He could have also specified that period in his “conforme” to Villonco’s counter-offer of March 4, 1964 instead of merely stating “that this sale shall be subject to favorable consummation of a property in Sta. Ana we are negotiating.” The term of forty-five days was not a part of the condition that the Nassco property should be acquired. It is clear that the statement “that final negotiations on both property can be definitely known after 45 days” does not and cannot mean that Bormaheco, Inc. should acquire the Nassco property within forty-five days from February 12, 1964 as pretended by Cervantes. 9. The court affirmed the trial court with a modification on the awarding of damages to VRC.