Society & Natural Resources, 13 : 237È259, 2000

Copyright Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis

0894-1920 /00 $12.00 1 .00

Policy Reviews

A New Vanguard for the Environment : Grass-Roots

Ecosystem Management as a New Environmental
Movement

EDWARD P. WEBER
Department of Political Science
Washington State University
Pullman, Washington, USA

T he emergence of hundreds of rural, place-based, grass-roots ecosystem manage-

ment (GREM) e†orts across the United States constitutes a new environmental
movement that challenges the fundamental premises of existing natural resources
and public lands institutions. T his article establishes GREM as qualitatively dis-
tinct from prior American environmental movements and as a fundamentally di†er-
ent approach to the environmental problematique, which relies on decentralization,
collaboration, citizen participation, and a holistic worldview that seeks to simulta-
neously promote environment, economy, and community. GREM is compared with
the three major American environmental movementsÈpreservation, conservation,
and contemporaryÈalong several dimensions : ideology, movement character, pre-
ferred institutions, and approach of each to science, technology, and the question of
limits to growth. W hile not all aspects of GREM are new, it is a grand synthesis
that borrows readily from past movements, adds new ideas and approaches to
environmental management, and transforms the whole into a distinctive movement
worthy of study.

Keywords adaptive management, citizen participation, collaboration, con-

sensus, environmental movement, folk knowledge, grass-roots ecosystem man-
agement, ideologies, institutions, natural resources, public management,
sustainable development

It is common knowledge that across the western United States the Wise Use move-
ment, Sagebrush Rebellions, and the County Supremacy movement challenge the
fundamental premises of environmental, natural resources, and public lands institu-
tions. Yet the design and actions of rural, place-based (local) ecosystem management
e†orts in the West pose the same essential challenge, but in a fundamentally di†er-
ent way. It is found in places like Willapa Bay (Washington), the Applegate Valley
(Oregon), the HenryÏs Fork basin (Idaho), the Blackfoot River Valley (Montana),
northern California (Quincy Library Group), and the Malpai borderlands region
Received 20 April 1998 ; accepted 7 January 1999.
The author thanks Riley Dunlap, Matt Carroll, and Nicholas Lovrich for their willingness to read
and review the manuscript at an early stage of the process. Thanks also to the several anonymous
reviewers for their useful advice on revising the manuscript.
Address correspondence to Edward P. Weber, Department of Political Science, Washington State
University, 825 Johnson Tower, Pullman, WA 99164-4880 , USA. E-mail : edweber@mail.wsu.edu

237
238 E. P. W eber

(New Mexico, Arizona). By relying on decentralization, collaboration, and citizen

participation, and by adopting a holistic worldview that seeks to meld ecology with
economics and the needs of community in pursuit of symbiotic sustainability, grass-
roots ecosystem management (GREM) arrangements may be redeÐning the lan-
guage of environmentalism. It is not the preservation environmentalism of John
Muir, or the conservation environmentalism of either Gi†ord Pinchot or Aldo
Leopold, much less the top-down environment over economy approach preferred by
the contemporary environmental movement. In short, developments in the western
United States signal the appearance of a new vanguard for the environment.
This is not to say that grass-roots ecosystem management is going to replace
the still prominent vestiges of past movements tomorrow ; rather, its long-term
durability is unknown at this time. Clearly, the new movement will meet Ðerce
resistance from those with a stake in the status quo (e.g., Michael McCloskey, Sierra
Club ; Louis Blumberg, Wilderness Society). Moreover, not all aspects of GREM are
entirely new. What is new, however, is the combination of the GREM movementÏs
deÐnition of environmentalism with its choice of institutions and its approach to
science and technologyÈa synthesis that borrows from past movements, adds new
ideas and approaches to environmental management, and transforms the whole into
a distinctive movement. The change in philosophy a†ects not only the kinds of
policies associated with natural resource management, but also the bureaucratic
administration of such policies.
The Ðrst section of this article provides a general introduction to GREM. The
new movement is then compared and contrasted against the three major American
environmental movementsÈpreservation, conservation, and contemporaryÈalong
several dimensions : ideology, movement character, preferred institutions, and
approach to science, technology, and the question of limits to growth. The conclu-
sion focuses on the larger implications of GREM for American democracy and
policy administration, while also suggesting that despite its distinctiveness, function-
al interdependence exists between GREM and the dominant top-down institutions
that are the legacy of prior movements.

Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management as a Movement

Emerging in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the GREM movement believes that
winÈwinÈwin outcomes are possible relative to the gridlocked and often ine†ective
status quo in public lands management. It adopts a cross-cutting holistic
(ecosystem) approach 1 to policy by seeking to meld nature together with economy
and community. It seeks to devolve signiÐcant authority to local, place-based alli-
ances (networks) of a†ected stakeholders from the community and relevant federal,
state, and local agencies. The local ““placesÏÏ are rural economies dependent on
natureÏs bounty, whether in the form of agricultural commodities, forestry products,
commercial Ðsheries, outdoor recreation and tourism activities, or ranching. The
biophysical, geographical scale of ““placeÏÏ varies and is the product of political,
rather than scientiÐc, agreement among those involved in each e†ort. As such,
““placeÏÏ is often deÐned as a valley and its surrounding topography, or as a water-
shed, rather than as an ecosystem per se. The direct, tangible connection to the local
landscape drives e†orts to reassert local inÑuence over policy decisions a†ecting the
landscape. The ““strong attachment to placeÏÏ leads community members to ““agree to
put their interests, . . . and [their] sense of duty to represent . . . a particular per-
spective, . . . aside in the interest of the collective and [the] ecosystemÏÏ (Sturtevant
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 239

and Lange 1995, 10). In addition, keeping the project and scope locally focused
facilitates agreement between diverse interests. 2 Jim Neal, an aerial logger and co-
founder of the Applegate Partnership in Oregon, observes, ““abstraction equals
death for partnership, but once you . . . talk about a deÐnable piece of land, you can
get beyond philosophy . . . you can agree on what is acceptable and what is notÏÏ
(Shipley 1996, 4).
From the GREM perspective, ““placeÏÏ thus becomes a catalyst for self-
governance. It mobilizes citizens to care enough to participate in the act of govern-
ing ““theirÏÏ place by reminding community members of what they share in
commonÈreliance on the natural landscape (Kemmis 1990, 78). As a result, the
movement takes an inclusive, pluralistic approach grounded in local participation.
Meetings are open to all (even to those who live outside a given ““placeÏÏ), decisions
are made collectively, consensus is emphasized, and ““leadership and responsibility
are shared equally among participants. . . . When considering issues or projects, a
common question . . . is, “Who else needs to be at the table ?ÏÏÏ (Rolle 1997, 614).
Loggers and ranchers sit down with environmentalists, business representatives,
Native Americans, kayakers, hunting guides, county officials, federal and state land
managers, and other concerned citizens.
In the case of the HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council, for example, day-long meet-
ings start with the cofacilitators, Jan Brown and Dale Swenson, setting the ground
rules for deliberation. They remind participants about such things as the importance
of civility, respect for othersÏ views, and the prohibition of personal attacks. Thirty
minutes of community-building ensues in which anyone can speak on any issue.
During this time participants often communicate personal stories, or voice concerns
on matters relevant to the community. These preliminary activities are designed to
focus attention on everyoneÏs connection to place by emphasizing common ground
and a shared sense of community. Action proposals, which can come from anyone,
even outside organizations, are then entertained. The council splits into three
committeesÈagency roundtable, citizens, and technicalÈto deliberate and assess
the validity of proposals. All participants have the right to speak and, in fact, are
expected to contribute, if for no other reason than to signal their (dis)agreement
with othersÏ positions. The council then reconvenes as one body, each committeeÏs
recommendations are made, and further discussion ensues as to which projects will
be implemented. Decisions are guided by the Watershed Integrity Review and
Evaluation (WIRE) process, which is designed to establish whether a proposal
reÑects a total watershed perspective, relies on credible scientiÐc data, emphasizes
ecosystem sustainability, addresses social and cultural concerns, and respects exist-
ing law and agency mandates, among other things. Successful proposals must have
the support of a consensus, which is deÐned as ““general agreement,ÏÏ rather than
unanimity. HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council meetings end with another half hour of
community-building exercise.
To date, GREM has taken hold in over 200 rural communities across the
United States, primarily in the West, and involves more than 30,000 core partici-
pants and volunteers. 3 GREM occurs across the entire spectrum of land ownership
patterns. For example, 70% of the lands covered by the Applegate Partnership are
federal lands. There is an approximate 50È50 split between public and private lands
in the HenryÏs ForkÏs Watershed Council. The Willapa Alliance e†ort focuses on
600,000 acres of land, virtually all of which is privately owned, while the Blackfoot
Challenge (Montana) involves land that is 40% private, split evenly among private
ranches and corporate timber holdings.
240 E. P. W eber

GREM leaders are people like DanÏl Markham, executive director of the
Willapa Alliance, fourth-generatio n Willapa area resident, and practicing evan-
gelical Christian minister. Described as a ““person connected to the pulse of the
community,ÏÏ ““endowed with tremendous people skills,ÏÏ and ““a person whom you
can trust, . . . a straight shooter,ÏÏ Markham wants to preserve the pristine beauty
and natural resources of his ““place,ÏÏ and improve community capacity to manage
place-speciÐc policy problems so ““the magic of the Willapa is kept intact for future
generationsÏÏ (interviews with Alliance members, March 1998). Other leaders include
Michael Jackson of the Quincy Library Group, and Jack Shipley, cofounder and
““charismatic leaderÏÏ of the Applegate Partnership, former contemporary environ-
mentalists who are seeking more e†ective environmental policies using cooperative
rather than adversarial methods. GREM leaders also come from the business and
agricultural sectors of the economy. Karen Snyder, cranberry farmer and small
business owner, is chair of the Willapa Alliance. Dale Swensen, coleader of the
HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council, is the executive director of the FremontÈMadison
Irrigation District in east-central Idaho.
Core members, those serving on GREM boards of directors or program com-
mittees, are citizens with the time, resources, and personal stake in the community
in question, whether deÐned in terms of Ðnances, length of residence, children, or in
many cases all three. They are small business owners (e.g., retail, service, farming,
ranching, tree farming, etc.), professionals like lawyers and doctors, public land
managers, retirees, and interests considered a major stakeholder in environmental
and economic decision making for a community (e.g., local environmental group or
major corporation like Weyerhauser). In some cases, core members are drawn from
the ranks of full-time homemakers. Core members, on average, have signiÐcantly
more education and earn higher incomes than other citizens. Sperry (1997), in a
review of 10 GREM e†orts in western Montana, found that 74% are college grad-
uates and all have high school diplomas, compared to statewide averages of 25.4%
and 81%, respectively. Further, fully 42.6% of those surveyed hold advanced degrees
(e.g., MS, PhD, JD, etc.). In recent interviews I conducted with members of the
Willapa Alliance, 85% hold college degrees, all have high school diplomas, and 21%
have advanced degrees. Moreover, on average, core members earn an annual
median income of $40,000 per household, slightly higher than the average of $35,979
for the western United States. Finally, core members tend to be the ““old growthÏÏ of
a community, having resided in the area for 20 or more years and occasionally, for a
generation or more (Sperry 1997).

Environmental Movements and Ideological Perspectives

The preservation, conservation, contemporary, and GREM movements embrace
distinctive worldviews. Major ideological di†erences include their primary policy
focus, the relationship of humans to nature, the value of nature (and natural
resources), and their temporal outlook (see Table 1).
The preservation movement of the late 1800s, as typiÐed by John Muir, founder
of the Sierra Club, focused on untamed and unspoiled wilderness lands. Seeing the
ravages of development in the eastern United States, Muir and his associates
wanted to set aside signiÐcant portions of western public lands as wilderness
unavailable to timber, grazing, and mining activities, or other kinds of industrial
encroachment. They made the case for nature as something to be valued for its own
sake and held that completeness for industrial man required access to aesthetic,
 TABLE 1 Ideological Perspectives
Characteristics Preservation Conservation Contemporary GREM

Primary mission(s) Wilderness Natural resource Pollution control, human Environment, economy,
development health, wilderness and community
Relationship of Humans with nature Humans over nature Nature over humans Humans with nature
humans to nature Nature as ““spiritual AnthropocentricÈnature Ecocentric/biocentricÈ (symbiotic sustainability)
havenÏÏ for humans serves human needs society is the problem Separation of humans
and must change from nature not possible
Value of nature and Intrinsic worth apart Nature as commodity for Intrinsic worth apart Healthy ecosystems as
natural resources from humans ; nature beneÐt of people from humans ; nature means to community
valued for its own sake Sustainable development valued for its own sake health
(focus is on the Sustainable development
individual tree) (sees the forest as a whole,
trees are only one part)
Temporal outlook Long-term perspective Balanced in theory ; Indiscriminate long-term Balanced long-term
(save nature for future short-term human perspective perspective
generations) perspective dominates in
practice, however

241
242 E. P. W eber

intact natural havens within which one could replenish the spiritual side of the
human personality (Switzer 1997). Moreover, the lack of population pressure,
limited industrial development, and the vast tracts of wilderness in the United States
at the time made conceivable the possibility of humans and nature existing together
in separate, parallel spheres without radical lifestyle changes. Thus, from the preser-
vationist perspective, human civilization, while in opposition to and a destroyer of
nature, was also viewed as dependent on and able to coexist with nature (Nash
1982, 122È140).
Progressive-era conservationists like Teddy Roosevelt and Gi†ord Pinchot
approached nature from a di†erent angle. Nature existed to help humans survive
and prosper. Its value was predicated on its usefulness to humans. Natural resources
were commodities that played an essential part in a larger strategy to improve citi-
zensÏ standard of living (Cawley 1993, 24). Yet the conservation movement was wary
of giving industry free reign over the extraction of natural resources. The genesis of
the movement owed much to the publicÏs adverse reaction to the private sectorÏs
unbridled exploitation of natural resources in the aftermath of the Civil War. Pro-
tecting the national heritage, deÐned as the natural wealth of the country, from giant
““proÐt-takingÏÏ Ðrms took on the tenor of a crusading patriotic cause. Borrowing
from the Progressives, conservationists ““protectedÏÏ nature from rapacious capitalists
by creating government agencies to control the production of natural resources and
by practicing resource management informed by three main principles : resources
were to be extracted (1) efficiently for the (2) current beneÐt of the citizenry (masses)
using (3) scientiÐc management methods (Pinchot 1967, 42È44). The use of science
suggested that efficiency and current beneÐts as goals were to be tempered with an
eye toward long-term resource sustainability (Hays 1959).
The contemporary environmental movement dates from the late 1960s and
early 1970s. It arose in response to the environmental problems wrought by the
prolonged industrial expansion of AmericaÏs postwar economy and to a society in
which economic growth dominated the policy agenda, consumption was emphasized
above all else, and progress was deÐned in economic, quantitative terms. Movement
leaders, such as Paul Erhlich and David Brower, argued that nature and humankind
were in inexorable conÑict ; there were too many people consuming too many
resources and producing too much pollution. The policy focus was therefore
broader than before, focusing on the degradation of natural resources (e.g., forest
clearcutting, species endangerment) , pollution control, individual lifestyles, and
““quality of lifeÏÏ as the primary indicator of progress (Mitchell 1991).
Policy solutions, however, promoted a single theme : nature over humanity.
Nature not only had intrinsic worth apart from humans, it had rights on a par with
humans (e.g., Stone 1975). Humankind needed to restrict its interaction with nature
or avoid it altogether, whether through zero emissions discharge goals, population
control measures, anticonsumption incentives, or centralized planning e†orts
(Ehrlich 1969). For example, the Clean Water Act of 1972 codiÐed a goal of zero
discharge, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 prohibited consideration of costs
when determining whether species qualify for protection, and hydroelectric dams
were opposed because they destroyed existing ecosystems and promoted economic
growth that ultimately destroyed more of nature (Hays 1989, 139È141). In sum,
nature was the winner even if it came at the expense of the economy and the redis-
tribution of societyÏs resources.
GREM proponents, on the other hand, seek what they see as a pragmatic
middle ground between conservationÏs anthropocentrism and contemporary
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 243

environmentalismÏs ecocentrism. They pursue a cross-cutting, holistic approach by

seeking to meld nature together with economy and community, and consider the
separation of humans from nature an impossible task given population increases,
advances in transportatio n and information technologies, and the wealth of Amer-
ican society together with its growing penchant for outdoor-based recreation activ-
ities. However, rather than view nature and humanity as engaged in an inexorable,
zero-sum struggle, the new movement believes it is possible to match community
assets and needs with ecosystem resources and limits in a symbiotic and sustainable
relationship that will beneÐt both current and future generations. Ensuring the long-
term well-being of community is key (e.g., Willapa Alliance 1995, 1). Ideally, when
protecting the ecosystem translates into economic dislocation for community
members, assistance in the form of career counseling, job training, loans, and so on
is not far behind. Expanding choices within the community also means promoting
environmentally benign, natural resource-based industry and ““lone eaglesÏÏÈ
knowledge workers valued for their brain-based capital, experience, decision-making
skills, and grasp of technology and who carry with them income portfolios (work
orders) of $100,000 or more. 4
The GREM movement does not grant automatic priority to either humanity or
nature when it comes to policy decisions ; instead, outcomes are the product of
community discussion on a case-by-case basis. Decisions may favor nature over
humanity, or vice versa, or may prioritize among environmental protection goals,
for example, and favor some over others, given their importance to ecosystem
health. It treats trade-o†s among goals as inevitable : Not every goal can be maxi-
mized in every single decision. Thus every choice is ostensibly made with an eye
toward ensuring that sustainability occurs and the diversity and integrity of the
ecosystem are preserved. Put di†erently, unlike the conservation movementÏs
approach to resource development, which focuses on the individual ““resourceÏÏ (e.g.,
trees) and its ultimate economic (human) value, GREM attempts to see the forest as
well as the trees.
There are also critical di†erences in temporal outlook among movements. Con-
servationists employ scientiÐc management techniques to develop natural resources,
which, in theory, balances the long-term needs of nature against the short-term,
material needs of humanity. In practice, however, given the close relationship
between natural resource agencies and private industry and the fragmented, special-
ized focus on individual resources, it is the short-term human perspective that has
dominated. Contemporary environmentalists and preservationists, however, adopt
an indiscriminate long-term perspective : Nature is to be saved for future generations
at all costs. Short-term human (economic) needs are given little, if any, consider-
ation, and are delinked from long-term ecological considerations. GREM, by con-
trast, pursues a balanced long-term perspective. Because the short- and long-term
viability of nature and humanity are inextricably linked, short-term human needs
cannot be separated from long-term ecological considerations.

Science, Technology, and Limits to Growth

The idea of ““limits to growth,ÏÏ that there are biophysical constraints on the ability
of industrial societies to continue historical trajectories of population growth and
resource consumption, is central to all four movements. Yet while each believes
there are limits to growth, there are three distinctive approaches to consider.
244 E. P. W eber

The conservation movement generally believes that the limits to growth are
more apparent than real and can be overcome through scientiÐc advances as well as
top-down management by public sector experts (see Table 2). First, inevitable scien-
tiÐc and technological advances ““solveÏÏ production shortages as they arise by
expanding the stock of available resources. For example, new plant hybrids increase
crop yields, or advances in drilling equipment make possible the exploitation of
previously inaccessible mineral deposits. Second, ““expertÏÏ management of nature by
government bureaucrats increases yields from nature. Using scientiÐc management
to guide resource development, timber harvest yields on public lands can be
increased both in terms of yield per acre and through more frequent harvesting.
Within this worldview, science, technology, and the application of scientiÐc
management methods by experts are treated as unequivocally good. They are the
crucial elements that guarantee progress, deÐned as an increase in the standard of
living. Yet the approach to science and the role of science in agency decision making
is distinctive. Conservationists practice ““productionÏÏ science, an approach that iden-
tiÐes and manages individual natural resource problems but does not generally con-
sider the interactive e†ects on other elements of the larger biotic community (Hays
1959 ; Humphrey and Buttel 1982). With production science, each unit of the
resource under consideration is of approximately equal value, given ultimate end
use as a commodity for human beneÐt (i.e., a tree is a tree is a tree, whether new
growth or old, precisely because it provides lumber for home-building or wood Ðber
for pulp and paper). It is the quantity rather than the quality of nature that matters
most, and given natureÏs role as provider for human needs, more is necessarily
better, and it is the role of science to increase the outputs from nature. Moreover,
conservationists promote science as an objective mode of decision making capable
of separating politics from administration. Science occupies an authoritative role in
administrative decision processes, with the conclusions pro†ered by government
specialists accorded higher value than those of citizens or communities a†ected by
policy (Switzer 1997).
In contrast, the preservation movementÏs primary solution for the environ-
mental problematiqueÈlocking up lands in order to prevent human encroachment
and the acceleration of natureÏs declineÈevokes the image of insurmountabl e limits
to growth. Contemporary environmentalists extend and articulate this second
approach to the question of ““limits.ÏÏ They argue that the seemingly limitless growth
experienced by industrial societies in the twentieth century is an unsustainable illu-
sion. Societal dependence on ““ghost acreageÏÏÈtechnology now allows each human
to produce and consume roughly 10 times more than previously was possibleÈand
an unsustainable rate of resource withdrawal from the earthÏs fossil ““savings bankÏÏ
only allow humanity to temporarily transcend the ecological carrying capacity of the
globe. No amount of knowledge can permanently repeal the laws of nature. More-
over, as the earthÏs population and the reliance on technological ““ÐxesÏÏ increase,
more exponential growth in resource demand and industrial wastes will occur. The
end result of this ““exuberantÏÏ postureÈecological overshoot and catastrophi c
human decline primarily through unavoidable widespread famineÈis inevitable
according to contemporary environmentalists unless society learns to recognize the
limits to growth (Catton 1980).
In addition, contemporary environmentalists promote an ““impactÏÏ science
approach, in which the interactive e†ects of societal decisions are judged according
to how they impact the whole of the ecological complex. Impact science not only
evokes an overriding concern with the quality of natureÈbiodiversity mattersÈbut
 TABLE 2 Science, Technology and Limits to Growth
Characteristics Preservation Conservation Contemporary GREM

Role of science and Spiritual/religious Science over politics Science over politics Science fused with
technology in qualities of nature are Top-down, scientiÐc Distrusts production politics
decision making more important than management (as science, agency expertise ““GoodÏÏ technologies, especially
science practiced by government Technology problematic advanced information
experts) will save us because a key reason why technologies, are critical
Technology is environmental crisis exists management tool
unequivocally good
Approach to science Human-based science Production science/ Impact science Impact science
not comparable to identiÐes problems but Focus on whole of biotic Focus on whole of biotic
natureÏs (evolved) does not tie to bigger community community
intelligence ecological picture ““EquilibriumÏÏ model of ““ChaosÏÏ model of ecology
ecology dominates dominates
““QualityÏÏ of nature matters ““QualityÏÏ of nature
matters
Are there limits to YesÈmust lock up YesÈbut limits can be YesÈmust save nature YesÈbut nature is more
growth ? nature to prevent forestalled by human from humans; earth has robust and resilient than
degradation ingenuity limited carrying capacity others believe

245
246 E. P. W eber

assumes that a particular ecological equilibrium or balanced, optimum state of

nature within individual ecosystems is both possible and desirable. The new
approach recognizes the value of the ecological ““servicesÏÏ provided by healthy
nature (e.g., Ñood and water quality control by wetlands) and the detrimental
impacts of habitat fragmentation on biodiversity (Costanza and Folke 1997, 17).
Further, administrative reforms guaranteeing environmentalists access to govern-
ment scientiÐc advisory boards are used to ensure a hearing for the ““impactÏÏ science
approach, thus countering the perceived bias in government decision making
toward production science and economic growth (Jasano† 1990).
The philosophy of sustainable development embraced by GREM, on the other
hand, implies limitsÈ““not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present
state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the
ability of the biosphere to absorb the e†ects of human activities. But technology and
social organization can both be managed and improved to make way for a new era
of economic growthÏÏ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987,
8). Human ingenuity is still important, but more so in terms of creating institutions
that facilitate innovative rebundlings of community and government assets to solve
the tripartite policy puzzle of environment, economy, and community (Hanna et al.
1997, 1È5). Toward this end, GREM relies on advanced information technologies to
help participants better understand ecosystem capacities and better manage human
interaction within those parameters. The Internet and e-mail ease communication
among GREM participants in rural settings, facilitate the dispersal of information
to the general public, and allow citizens to tap expertise outside the immediate
geographic area. Advanced information technologies also facilitate the collection of
information helpful for assessing policy problems and crafting e†ective solutions.
Geographic information systems (GIS) are often utilized to gain a detailed under-
standing of local topography, vegetation density and type, and watershed drainage
patternsÈall important for understanding how decisions a†ect ecosystems. In addi-
tion, information technologies aid monitoring e†orts, in terms of both mapping
progress toward goals and facilitating oversight by state and federal officials
(Willapa Alliance 1995 ; HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council 1996).
GREM is also more comfortable with the idea of growth (fewer limits) given the
embrace of the ““chaosÏÏ model of ecology. The chaos model suggests that nature is
far more robust and resilient and thus better able to adapt successfully to human
intervention than the competing ““equilibriumÏÏ model of ecology allows. Despite
this, GREM embraces the impact science approach. Yet it takes the impact science
approach a step farther by explicitly emphasizing an integrated approach to pol-
lution control and natural resource management as opposed to the single-medium
(single-resource), fragmented approach promoted by virtually every major federal
environmental statute and supported by a bureaucracy specialized according to
individual natural resources and management tasks. An integrated approach looks
comprehensively at an ecosystem, at the extant and potential stocks of natural
resources, at the sources of pollution, at the relationship among various pollutants
and natural resources in order to calibrate values for trade-o†s, and at whether
solutions actually solve a particular ecological problem, or merely shift its harmful
e†ects elsewhere.

The Changing Character of American Environmental Movements

DeÐning elements of the GREM movement, as already described, are its focus on
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 247

local community as the primary management unit, its deÐnition of community as

comprising those within a speciÐc ecologically deÐned geographical space, its loca-
tion in rural economies dependent on natureÏs bounty, the direct involvement of
citizens as partners in the policy process, and the sharing of authority among public
and private participants.
The character of GREM, however, contrasts sharply with prior environmental
movements, each of which adopted a paternalistic, elite-led (top-down) approach to
environmental matters. The pattern is clearest in the cases of the preservation and
conservation movements. Although the preservation movement spurred the devel-
opment of several inÑuential national interest groups such as the Wilderness
Society, it never inspired a mass following. Its membership was largely limited to the
wealthy and educated (Nash 1982, 158È168). The conservation movement enjoyed a
measure of popular success given its close association with Progressivism, but for all
intents and purposes was the creature of elites, chief among them President Teddy
Roosevelt and Gi†ord Pinchot. Moreover, the heavy emphasis on organizational
hierarchy, science, and decision making by experts assigned the task of discovering
and applying the public interest precluded participation by the masses (Behan 1966 ;
Nelson 1995). In both cases, public participation in the policy process was largely
passive (i.e., limited to voting).
The roots of the contemporary environmental movement, on the other hand,
are pluralistic. Initially, citizens across the country and the entire socioeconomic
spectrum pushed elected officials to protect the environment, and the movement
itself was deÐned by ““decentralization, participatory democracy, direct action, and
[attempts to] toppl[e] the economic-political power structureÏÏ (Chase 1987, 340).
Mass-based public enthusiasm for all things environmental succeeded in pushing
environmental protection near the top of the national policy agenda by 1970
(Dunlap, 1995).
Within a few years, however, the populist instinct gave way to a consolidation
of political power among a handful of nationally based advocacy groups. Sta†ed by
graduates of the nationÏs elite law and graduate programs, and with membership
rolls drawn from the middle and upper socioeconomic strata, these groups became
proxy advocates for the general public and were rapidly absorbed into the estab-
lished system of interest intermediation among organized economic groups. Without
their organization and expertise, the argument went, important legislation would
fail to pass, bureaucracies would prevent and delay implementation, enforcement of
industry compliance would be lax, and environmental degradation would increase.
Given that participation by most group members tended to be passive (i.e., ““check-
bookÏÏ environmentalism), organized advocates deÐned environmentalism and the
substance of policy initiatives (Mitchell 1991 ; Mitchell et al. 1991 ; Weber, 1998,
48È50).

Institutional Arrangements for Protecting and Managing Nature

The preservation, conservation, and contemporary movements all target market
failure as the primary rationale for government intervention. Preservationists believe
that government is the primary, and perhaps only, institution capable of defending
nature against the exploitative dynamic of markets. Within this worldview, complete
separation between the public and private spheres is necessary to ensure the survival
of nature (see Table 3). The belief that government must manage human interaction
248
TABLE 3 Character and Institutions of American Environmental Movements, Part 1
Characteristics Preservation
Character of Paternalistic
movement Elite-led
Role of government Government as ““bestÏÏ
defender of nature
Government protects
against exploitative
““marketsÏÏ by locking up
land and promoting
““benign neglectÏÏ
Hierarchy and coercion ;
government decides and
imposes
Relationship of Clear delineation/
government to public and private
industry sectors separate
Role of public in Elite entrepreneurs press
administrative for action within
process conventional political
channels
““PassiveÏÏ general public
(e.g., elections)
Conservation Contemporary
Paternalistic Pluralistic, egalitarian
Elite-led in theory ; but
paternalistic in practice
““Us versus themÏÏ theme
Government as ““best,ÏÏ Government as defender/
most efÐcient manager manager of nature, but in
of nature ; it owns tandem with
resources ; controls environmental groups
access Government corrects
Specialized agencies to market failures with regulations
manage nature and land lock-ups
Centralized (federal), Environmental protection
hierarchical control as a right to be enforced
Bureaucracy decides by government
how to harvest resources Increases federal control
within broad restrictions and coercion
PublicÈprivate boundary Strictly enforce publicÈ
blurred/expertise pooled private boundary
Industry is only private- Agency structure changed
sector stakeholder to avoid ““captureÏÏ
No trust ; industry is evil
Bureaucratic experts Consultative and
discover and implement participative ; ensure
public interest balanced representation
““PassiveÏÏ general public Public in semiactive role
(e.g., elections) given dominance of
organized national groups
GREM
Grass-roots (place-based),
pluralistic, bottom-up
thrust
““Them is usÏÏ motto
Alternative institutions
needed to correct for
government failure
Brings society back in ;
government important, but
in partnership with
intermediary, place-based
institutions
Decentralized, premised
on collaboration and
negotiation ; but within
existing legal
superstructure
PublicÈprivate boundary
blurred/expertise pooled
Industry joined by other
private-sector stakeholders
Trust, but verify
Consultative and
participative
Community ““folk
knowledgeÏÏ important
Public in active role
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 249

with nature is shared by the conservation movement. In both cases, it is government

that ultimately decides the rules for resource management and then imposes conclu-
sions on society. In the conservation framework, however, it is government as
manager of rather than protector of nature. Conservationists also lock up land in
order to protect it from the ravages of the market, but it is because they believe that
government will do a better, more efficient job of extracting and managing natural
resources. To achieve its goals, the conservation movement deposits authority in
specialized agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation, and prefers centralized,
hierarchical control of decision making. Trained experts are hired and are generally
given the latitude to decide how to harvest resources, within broad restrictions and
according to established agency routines. The boundary between the public and
private sectors, however, is often blurred in practice. Not only do bureaucrats and
industry agree that economic growth is the top national priority, but preferred insti-
tutions prove conducive to cozy publicÈprivate relationships. In fact, the conserva-
tion approach historically has been associated with private, special-interest
government by the few at the expense of the many. SigniÐcantly, industry is the only
private-sector interest allowed the privilege of working together with government-
based resource managers (Culhane 1981 ; Wilkinson 1992).
Contemporary environmentalism also views government intervention as a
necessary corrective to market failure, but speciÐcally designs institutions to avoid
the special-interest government pathologies of conservation-base d arrangements.
The widespread distrust of ““evilÏÏ industry and generally lax attention to environ-
mental issues by state governments spurred environmentalists to centralize control
of pollution control and natural resource matters at the federal level. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) represents the purest expression of this
change in institutions. The scope of the U.S. EPAÏs jurisdiction is designed to
prevent agency capture ; the U.S. EPA is specialized according to a speciÐc policy
jurisdictionÈpollution controlÈand focuses on matters a†ecting multiple industries
rather than on a particular commodity or industry such as timber, water, or truck-
ing. Further fragmentation occurs in response to the particularized demands of con-
gressional committees and the single-medium design (e.g., air, water, land) of major
pollution control statutes. In short, just like conservationists, contemporary
environmentalists maintain the compartmentalized approach to nature by charac-
terizing and treating natural resources, species, and pollution in individual fashion.
The contemporary environmental movement also favors a particular form of
regulatory arrangementÈcommand-and-control Èto deÐne the relationship
between the regulators and the regulated. Command-and-contro l is premised on a
hierarchical authority relationship between federal regulators and the regulated
community. The federal government uses its authority to ““commandÏÏ compliance
with policy goals and to write detailed regulatory programs using a top-down
notice-and-commen t rule-making process. States and the private sector must then
comply with the rules as written. Program implementation is ““controlledÏÏ by limit-
ing the discretion over how goals are to be achieved and by enforcement actions
based largely on punitive sanctions. In this way, the command-and-contro l frame-
work intends to ensure that policy outcomes accord with environmentalistsÏ prefer-
ences (Weber 1998, 6È7).
In practice, this means a regulatory system designed to capture all polluter
variance within national uniform rules (““one size Ðts allÏÏ) and to manage both the
substance and the process of compliance decision-making. Regulators adopt a
detailed, source-speciÐc, industry-by-industr y strategy of control over virtually every
250 E. P. W eber

aspect of implementation. They identify and prescribe uniform end-of-pipe pollution

control standards, best available control technologies (BACT) to achieve pollution
reductions, and detailed decision processes that guide industry step by step toward
compliance (e.g., permitting) (Vogel 1986). Compliance failures (at least in theory)
are met with immediate, harsh, punitive enforcement actions that deter future shir-
king. States also must create and operate implementation plans according to federal
criteria. If states default on these obligations, they su†er Ðnancial sanctions (e.g.,
forfeited federal funding for infrastructure projects like highway construction) and
risk federal takeover of their regulatory e†orts.
Formal procedural protections during implementation provide the Ðnal piece of
the institutional puzzle for the contemporary environmental movement. In order to
overcome the dominance of economic interests, environmentalists pushed through
reforms designed to balance representation during the administrative phase of the
policy process. Chief among these e†orts are the 1969 National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), which forces consideration of environmental values and impacts
prior to major public decisions, the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),
designed to ensure adequate representation of public interest advocates on advisory
committees, the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA), which forces con-
sideration of environmental values and broad public participation in forest planning
processes, and mandatory public hearings prior to Ðnal bureaucratic decisions
(Wilkinson 1992).
The GREM movement is a stark departure from preceding movements, not
only in terms of the institutions it embraces, but in its unwillingness to treat govern-
ment as the Ðrst and best defender of ecosystem health. Proponents believe that its
governance arrangements are better suited to the greater cross-cutting character and
political, economic, social, and cultural complexity of the current generation of
environmental issues. These complexities ““include difficult scientiÐc questions, such
as the appropriate scales for resource management ; thorny administrative matters,
such as inter- and intra-governmenta l relations ; political controversies surrounding
land use planning and property rights ; the problems involved in the restructuring of
natural resource-based economies [to accommodate the concern for ecology] ; and
cultural underpinnings of ranching, logging, Ðshing, and other traditional resource
dependent communitiesÏÏ (Haeuber 1996, 2).
In addition, while the successes of the contemporary environmental movement
are evidentÈmany of the most obviously polluted airsheds and waterways have
been cleaned up or improvedÈthe limits of government-centered , top-down regula-
tory approaches to environmental protection and the largely untapped ““environ-
mentalÏÏ potential of market-base d mechanisms have become increasingly clear.
Many now contend that e†ectively dealing with the added complexities, while
avoiding the problems associated with top-down approaches and free markets,
requires complex, collaborative partnerships among diverse government, civic, and
business actors at the state and local levels (Chertow and Esty 1997 ; John 1994).
It is toward this end that the GREM movement is attempting to carve out a
space for autonomous action within the larger top-down system of governance that
is the legacy of the three preceding movements. Instead of a system premised on
hierarchy and commands from above, GREM devolves signiÐcant authority to
local, place-based alliances (networks) of a†ected stakeholders from the community
and relevant federal, state, and local agencies. Shared authority between levels of
government, and between government and citizens through citizen participation in
agenda setting, decision making, monitoring, and enforcement activities, blurs the
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 251

distinction between public and private spheres so important to the preservation and
contemporary environmental movements. Further, the new movement employs
cooperation, deliberation, negotiation, and consensus to deÐne common ground and
create a common vision for the surrounding ecosystem. It also seeks to translate
national environmental law into a more coherent, holistic application for the
a†ected geographic area by balancing it against local ecological, economic, and
social conditions. And despite criticisms to the contrary by leaders of national
environmental groups, GREM participants argue that such arrangements are
designed to work within the larger framework of national laws, not in lieu of them
(e.g., Applegate Partnership 1996).
GREM also emphasizes broad, direct participation in governance arrangements
by the citizenry in order to release the ““untapped potential in the people and placesÏÏ
of a particular ecosystem (Hollander 1995, 8). SpeciÐcally, an open, deliberative
forum is used to ease access and ensure public discussion of issues. In theory, active
involvement reconnects citizens to government in a positive way by giving them a
stake in governing and helps tame selÐsh passions through deliberation, information
sharing, and a better understanding of the ““bigÏÏ policy picture a†ecting the com-
munity (Landy 1993). Moreover, by creating new opportunities for citizens to take
control over their lives, citizens are empowered, the citizenship skills critical for
self-government are strengthened, and the degree of local oversight and implementa-
tion expertise is enhanced. The cross-fertilization from information sharing means
that more are educated and, in some cases, minds are changed regarding the posi-
tive value of public programs. It also makes more likely more fully speciÐed policy
databases (better information), which enables solutions that are not possible with
less information. Moreover, citizens experience ““ownership,ÏÏ and are more likely to
invest in the work of governance, whether in terms of program design, voluntary
compliance with rules, or program implementation, instead of Ðghting and attempt-
ing to overturn governance decisions. In fact, many GREM arrangements have
evolved out of attempts to employ negotiation-based , conÑict resolution techniques
as a way to avoid policy gridlock and litigation (Reich 1990 ; Snow 1997).
The belief that ““place,ÏÏ collaboration, and deliberation will trump, or somehow
transform, self-interest into enlightened self-interestÈthe understanding that what is
beneÐcial for the collective community can also provide beneÐts to the individualÈ
further sets GREM apart. Prior movements assume that self-interest is the primary
motivator for individuals. Therefore the challenge is to channel or constrain self-
interested behavior using formal institutions, rules, and coercion (e.g., command-
and-control regulations ; designating public lands as wilderness ; criminalizing
regulatory noncompliance). Individuals are treated as classic economic man ; they
are self-interested, autonomous actors largely devoid of social connections (at least
to the extent that society controls or shapes individual choices) (Etzioni 1996).
In contrast, GREM implicitly accepts that there is a strong social component to
human behavior. Self-interest is still treated as an important key for shaping behav-
ior ; this much is clear from the multiple emphasis on environment, community, and
economy. The success of ecosystem management is enhanced to the extent that eco-
nomic activities (i.e., the proÐt motive) are aligned with the dynamic of ecological
systems. For example, Dan Dagget (1995) documents the ““stories of ten ranchers
who invited their neighbors, “experts,Ï environmentalists, and others to work with
them to Ðnd better ways to manage their rangeland. They speak with pride of
revegetated lands, larger and more diverse wildlife populationsÈand higher proÐtsÏÏ
(Getches 1995, viii ; emphasis added). But GREM arrangements take the concept of
252 E. P. W eber

self-interest farther than this. Self-interest is also profoundly shaped by social inter-
action with others. As such, preserving and protecting nature is much more than
adopting a set of formal, legal rules governing the interaction of people with nature,
or realigning the rules to better reÑect stakeholdersÏ economic self-interest. Informal
institutionsÈnorms and customsÈoccupy a critical role in achieving and sustaining
an e†ective system of environmental protection. This is why, according to leaders of
GREM e†orts, diversity and broad representation of community members are
crucial : ““ItÏs the only way a visionary project . . . [aimed at promoting a] paradigm
shift in the way the whole community understands itself . . . will workÏÏ (Hollander
1995, 8È9 ; Marston 1997, 1).
The GREM movement thus focuses its energy as much on strengthening the
bonds of community through processes of shared decision making, the encour-
agement of new cooperative alliances, and projects designed to enhance citizen-to-
citizen communication, as it does on formal, written solutions directly related to
natural resource management (Shipley 1996 ; Johnson 1997 ; Sturtevant and Lange
1995). In addition, because GREM e†orts often rely on informal, written agreements
rather than legally binding agreements, compliance is voluntary and enforcement is
a matter of collective responsibility. Participants aware of potential noncompliance
generally rely on social persuasion, reminding the potential defector of their collec-
tive obligations, voluntarily agreed to, and warning them of the possible conse-
quences of their action (e.g., expulsion from the EM e†ort ; return to gridlock and
higher costs for the defector ; loss of community ““statusÏÏ). The expectation is that
these sanctions are severe enough that, over time, and in combination with the gains
from collaboration and the disincentive provided by the gridlock and high costs of
the alternativeÈtraditional ““conÑict-orientedÏÏ politicsÈoutcomes will become self-
enforcing.
GREM expands the concept of expertise beyond bureaucratic and organized
interest expertise, and seeks to engage and catalyze available community assets.
Explicit attempts are made to include technical expertise within the community and
citizen generalists with a ““communityÏÏ perspective. In the latter case, for example,
citizen input concerning the quality of community life, or other values the com-
munity holds dear, are treated as legitimate contributions on a par with the techni-
cal recommendations made by scientiÐc experts. At the same time, GREM relies on
““folk knowledgeÏÏÈthe individual and collective expertise of those community
members most familiar with a particular problem and ecosystem capacities, whether
it is the history of watershed drainage patterns, the resilience of and changes in
forest ecosystems over time, recollections of conditions promoting healthy riparian
areas and Ðsheries, or memories regarding what works and what does not when it
comes to managing nature. Tapping the existing store of folk knowledge is expected
to enhance the e†ectiveness of governance regimes for natural resources by bringing
““new,ÏÏ qualitatively di†erent knowledge to the table (Little 1997, 7È11 ; Ostrom and
Schlager 1997, 144È145).

Institutional Focus : Environmental Results or Disconnected Rules ?

How do American environmental movements treat the ultimate bottom line of
environmental results ? Do the rules focus stakeholdersÏ compliance e†orts on the
regulatory rules rather than environmental outcomes ? The preferred institutions of
earlier movements tend to emphasize compliance with the rules as the proxy equiva-
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 253

lent of policy successÈa cleaner, healthier, or protected environmentÈand thus

disconnect rules from results. But GREM is rebelling against the established
pattern. Environmentalist Michael Jackson challenges people to walk the spotted
owl forests of northern California and see what existing policy has wroughtÈ
habitat so crowded with undergrowth it is unsuitable for the owl (Christensen 1996).
Or, as participants in the HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council have discovered, govern-
ment rules and practices have not stopped, and in some cases have hastened, the
decline of a world-class trout stream (HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council 1996). In
both cases, the environmental results bear little resemblance to policy goals (see
Table 4).
Instead, GREM participants endorse a results-oriented approach emphasizing
on-the-ground ecosystem conditions as the basis for decision making and evaluation
of policy success. Participants are asked to suspend preconceived ideas of the ““rightÏÏ
way to achieve the ultimate goal of a healthy ecosystem. Instead, Ðeld-inspectionsÈ
walking toursÈinvolving a full cross-section of members are used to examine the
physical condition of the landscape. ““Walking the groundÏÏ reinforces the connection
to ““placeÏÏ and the importance of nature to the entire community, while focusing
discussion on the actual problems of the ecosystem in question. In combination with
the emphasis on the ““bestÏÏ available science, it provides an opportunity to develop a
deeper understanding of how a particular management strategy helps or hurts the
forest or watershed (Dagget 1995 ; Johnson 1997 ; Van de Wetering 1996).
There are other elements feeding into the movementÏs results orientation and
the more general concern for governance performance (i.e., the ability of GREM
institutions to actually deliver on promises). The Ðrst is the adoption of holistic
mission statements designed to avoid the spillover and reverberation e†ects
common to the specialized and single-medium (or commodity ; species) models of
other movements. Second, collecting information and improving databases, whether
scientiÐc, cultural, folk knowledge, and so on, is fundamental to GREM e†orts. It is
typically the second step in the collaborative process after the initial gathering of
place-based stakeholders establishes the common ground of a shared love of place
(Little 1997). Third, supporters and participants expect that performance, and hence
results, will be enhanced given the close, customized match of management pro-
grams to the distinctive conditions of individual ecosystems and communities (see
also Ostrom and Schlager 1997, 145). Fourth, proponents argue that by coordi-
nating and catalyzing action among multiple agencies, levels of government, and the
private sector, GREM provides a vehicle for breaking policy gridlock and extending
the e†ectiveness of public management by creating additional problem-solving
capacity (HenryÏs Fork Watershed Council 1996, 5 ; Little 1997 ; Hollander 1995).

Scale and Adaptiveness of Management Arrangements

The conservation, preservation, and contemporary environmental movements favor
state- and federal-level agencies as the primary managers of nature (large scale) and
treat institutional adaptiveness as a minor concern. GREM, however, takes a rad-
ically di†erent approach. Small geographic scale and Ñexible, adaptive management
are fundamental to institutional design (see Table 4).
The primary emphasis on ecosystems or smaller biophysical units (e.g.,
watersheds) as the appropriate unit for management, and the distinctiveness and
complexity of individual ecosystems favor arrangements focused at a relatively small
254
TABLE 4 Character and Institutions of American Environmental Movements, Part 2
Characteristics Preservation Conservation Contemporary GREM

Environmental Disconnected rules Disconnected rules Disconnected rules Environmental results

results or (rules as proxy for as a critical guide to
disconnected rules? environmental results) decision making
Scale and Large scale Large scale Large scale Small scale
adaptiveness of Adaptiveness of minor Adaptiveness of minor Adaptiveness of minor Adaptive management as
management concern concern concern critical component
arrangements
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 255

geographic scale. The use of collaborative, consensus-based processes imposes logis-

tical limits on scale. While directly involving dozens or even hundreds of local stake-
holders is likely to be difficult enough, expanding the scale to the state or national
level is likely to prove impossible in all but exceptional cases. There are also limits
associated with ““place,ÏÏ in particular the use of physical landscape inspection as a
management tool. The costs of catalyzing and coordinating such ““walking toursÏÏ
are likely to rise, perhaps exponentially, as scale expands beyond the local.
The focus on environmental results, management by walking around, the
limited understanding of ecosystem dynamics, and the inherent uncertainties of a
cross-cutting, integrated approach to policymaking lead GREM toward adaptive
management. Instead of locking-in the ““bestÏÏ solution, or automatically employing
the same administrative structure for every program, learning through experimen-
tation is the rule. SpeciÐcally, long-term experimentation with humanityÏs inter-
action with ecological processes facilitates the process of learning what works and
what does not (Lee 1993, 8). Practicing adaptive management suggests either an
administrative sphere with complete autonomy from politics (so science and experi-
mentation can advance unimpeded) or, as in the case of GREM, one completely
fused with politics in which participants suspend judgment based on narrow self-
interest and trust processes designed to act and react, to continually innovate and
adapt in response to changing conditions and failed solutions.

Conclusion
GREM seeks to bring society back in, to meld market and state (government) with
community (society) via the use of intermediary institutions (see Etzioni 1996, 141È
142 ; Snow 1997). Moreover, the movement is tied together by a common ideaÈ
namely, if the goal is a healthy, functioning ecosystem, then a variety of
management approaches is appropriate (Van de Wetering 1996, 26). All this would
be mere grist for the academic mill if GREM was not rapidly gaining a foothold as
a legitimate way of managing public lands and natural resources in the American
WestÈbut it is.
Beyond the many di†erences substantiating the claim that GREM is a new
environmental movement, its emergence raises a separate series of questions related
to durability and accountability. GREMÏs embrace of devolution, collaboration,
and consensus increases the uncertainty over policy outcomes for elected officials
and organized interests to the point that they may be unwilling to give GREM the
support it needs to survive.
Moreover, ensuring that broad-base d accountability under such arrangements
actually occurs is a difficult matter. GREM proposes that (1) participants will seek
to control and maximize their individual goals (micro), but will do so within the
constraints provided by the community (meso), and (2) the community (meso) will
seek to control and maximize its collective goals, but will do so within the broader
constraints provided by the state, region, and nation (macro). But in a world of
self-interested behavior, why would anyone seeking to maximize their own gain,
whether individual or community based, accept the constraints of either the com-
munity or the macro level, respectively ? Some have criticized GREM as nothing
more than an ingenious cover for the self-interested machinations of industry, who
will use such proceedings to impose the values of economic growth and efficiency
and to rid themselves of the burdens of national environmental laws (McCloskey
1996). Others fear that such place-based administrative arrangements will make the
256 E. P. W eber

microÈmeso connection, but not the mesoÈmacro. Individuals within communities

will Ðnd much in common and will willingly accept and support collective, meso-
level goals. The danger is that such communities will develop a sense of themselves
apart from and to the detriment of the entire nation. There are also legitimate con-
cerns over the limits of an approach predicated on a small scale. Locally grounded
GREM e†orts are institutionally incapable of addressing environmental issues that
occur on a regional, national, or even global scale (e.g., global warming).
Nonetheless, there are limits to the growth of GREM and little risk that it will
usurp existing institutions. Concerns over accountability and political pressure to
maintain the status quo should combine to limit its spread, while the movementÏs
preferred institutional framework and scale of management will do likewise. Finally,
GREM is centered in rural communities dependent on nature. There is a natural
limit to the number of communities Ðtting this category.
The new governance arrangements also appear to be more of a supplement to
existing institutions than a complete replacement for them. Movement members
themselves do not talk about GREM as a way to emasculate or replace federal- and
state-level controls ; rather, they see their e†orts coexisting with current arrange-
ments. Part of this stems from the belief that strong public support for environ-
mental protection makes it impossible to roll back the superstructure of federal
environmental laws. Another part stems from the realization by local environ-
mentalists that federal regulations are a Catch 22. On the one hand, the problems
and the conÑict associated with top-down federal control are a key catalyst behind
the emergence of GREM, while on the other, if the top-down superstructure of law
and bureaucracy disappears, it is not clear that industry will maintain its partici-
pation in GREM.
The potential for coexistence may be what leads to the movementÏs long-term
survival. For while GREM provides the political force to change, reform, and
perhaps enhance the e†ectiveness of existing natural resource institutions, it appears
to need existing institutions, if for no other reason than as sanctioning authorities of
last resort, as visible reminders of the high costs of doing business without GREM,
and as an institutional ““safe havenÏÏÈa minimum Ñoor of environmental protection.
Ultimately, however, survival is likely to hinge on whether powerful national inter-
ests recognize the potential for institutional compatibility and are willing to grant
GREM the political space necessary to experiment, innovate, and succeed. In
October 1998, the U.S. Congress and President Clinton took one step in this direc-
tion by endorsing the land management plans of the Quincy Library Group, a
GREM e†ort in northern California. Further steps are being taken by federal
agencies (e.g., Bureau of Land Management, BLM), the PresidentÏs Council on Sus-
tainable Development, and state-sponsored watershed initiatives in Washington,
California, Idaho, and Oregon. Moreover, reinventing government e†orts at all
three levels of U.S. government, including the Government Performance and Results
Act, reinforces the results orientation of GREM by pushing land managers toward
an outcome as opposed to an output approach to management. Likewise, philan-
thropic groups like the Ford Foundation, the Bullitt Foundation, and the North-
west Area Foundation, among others, are contributing large sums of money to
support GREM aspirations (Johnson 1997).
Yet while the survivability of the GREM movement may be in doubt to some,
movement members are not stopping to debate such an abstract point. They are
pursuing their version of environmentalism with a zealousness that strikes some as
remarkably close to the religious fervor of the contemporary environmental move-
 Grass-Roots Ecosystem Management 257

ment during the early 1970s (interview with local environmentalist, 9 February
1998). The task for scholars is to conduct the necessary Ðeldwork that will help us
develop a better understanding of the conditions under which GREM works best,
for what kinds of environmental problems, and the mechanisms by which such local,
collaborative e†orts can fruitfully be linked to larger scale institutional e†orts
designed to deal with natural resource problems that are clearly national and global
in scope.

Notes
1. Ecosystem as used here connotes the holistic approach to resource management,
rather than the biophysical scale of management.
2. Geographic scale is one way to keep collaboration manageable. There are others ;
see Weber (1998, 105È119).
3. Sources for the number of e†orts (Johnson 1997 ; Jones 1996 ; Sperry 1997 ; Ya†ee
et al. 1996 ; Natural Resources Law Center 1996). Each e†ort met a series of criteria :
(1) place-based (rather than strictly federal or state-based) ; (2) rural with the eco-
nomic activity stemming from the amenities and raw materials from nature compris-
ing a major portion of the economy (greater than 25%) ; (3) relies extensively or
exclusively on cooperative decision-making processes ; (4) focuses on environmental
protection, economic development and community or regional sustainability ; and
(5) involves private citizens and stakeholders directly in decision-making processes,
or in leadership roles.
4. Lone eagles are attractive not only because they exert little impact on the
environment, but unlike ““footloose corporationsÏÏ seeking greener pastures, they are
less likely to leave given that a key factor in their choice of a community is the
amenities of the local natural landscape. Moreover, ““Lone Eagles become major
community assets. They will commit to the community, and they will not require
tax subsidies and other give-aways that corporations demand. . . . Knowledge
workers will sink their roots ; they will serve on the library board and perhaps even
run for the county commission, bringing new ideas and a fresh perspective, contrib-
uting to the ongoing process of community renewalÏÏ (Center for the New West
1994, 1È2).

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