Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C.
Climaco Assuming Ledesma's good faith, his appointment as an election
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an
accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October
13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental.He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a
motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent
Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time
service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion
of the petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma’s withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of
fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions.The
practice of law is not a privilege but a right. The legal profession is
dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered
without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal. His duty, therefore, to
the courts and to his client take precedence.
Membership in the Bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standards. Law is a profession and not a trade or craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks aid the courts in the administration of justice. As such,
an attorney may be called or appointed as counsel de oficio to aid
indigents for the realization of their constitutional right to counsel
especially in criminal cases like this where a person may be convicted not
because of his or her guilt but because he or she lacks competent legal
representation.
registrar cannot be availed of now when granting his withdrawal will
result to the delay in the administration of justice.It is to be noted that
the proceedings has been delayed at least eight times at the defense's
instance, resulting to undue inconvenience to the parties involved.
Furthermore, his work as election registrar is not incompatible with his
duty as counsel de officio. Refusal to be counsel de oficio must be
grounded on serious and valid reasons and not only flimsy and whimsical
ones.
 Counsel de Officio
o Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court,
considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of
the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel
de officio such members of the bar in good standing who
by reason of their experience and ability, can
completely defend the accused.But in localities where
such members if the bar are not available, the court may
appoint any person, resident of the province and of good
repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
o A counsel de officio is the counsel appointed by
the court torepresent and defend the accused in case he
cannot afford to employ one himself
 Counsel de Parte
o A counsel de parte is an attorney retained by a party
litigant, usually for a fee, to prosecute or defend his
cause in court. The term implies freedom of choice
either on the part of the attorney to decline or accept
the employment or on the part of the litigant to
continue or terminate the retainer at any time.
 Alawi vAlauya
Facts:
Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City.They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's
agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by
Alauyaof one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing
loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa& Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence. He also wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya's letters,
Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.
One of her grounds was Alauya‟s usurpation of the title of
"attorney," which only regularMembers of the Philippine Bar may properly
use. Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that
it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which
Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for “councilor,"
"konsehal " or the Maranao term "consial ," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title
of Attorney?
Held:
He cannot. The title of atty. is only reserved to those who pass
the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya'sbuse of the title
of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'aBar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
In Re: Letter Of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
Facts:
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980.On 1983, the Court of Appeals was
reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP
Blg. 129.On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of
Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the
Judiciary. After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary.A
Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate
Court and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate
Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number
11 in the roster of appellate court justices.When the appointments were
signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes from
number 11 to 26.
Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was
due to "inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to
the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.Petitioner Justice Reynato S.
Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals.The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's
request.A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices
Campos Jr. and Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.They
alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts
where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his
last appointment.
Issue:
WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old
Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the
promulgation of E.O. No. 33?

Held:
The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system
abolished by the 1986 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was
established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from
the courts existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
People v. Villanueva
Facts:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the
municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party
asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently,
Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the
appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that
according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to
the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
Issue:
Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice?
Held:
No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the
case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for
free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved
Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.
Cayetano v. Monsod
Facts:
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by
Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to
meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of
the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least
ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one
year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in
economics and held various positions in various foreign
corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for
various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
Issue:
Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What
constitutes practice of law?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court
appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in
the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what is loosely described as business
counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the
average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least
some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this
work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range
of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document
drafting, and negotiation.
ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC
FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease
and desist from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of
the law profession other than those allowed by law.The said advertisement
of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage
and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are
giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive
of the confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a
member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements.
On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the
publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through
paralegals.It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed
based on certain US cases decided.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
Whether or not the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements complained of.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court.When a person
participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter
to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of
law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And
applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised,
engaged in the “practice of law”.
No, the ads should be enjoined.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he
appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple
professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of
the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack.
Hence, it should be enjoined.
“When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law”
knowledge of the case against him. The commission of his offense itself is
devoid of honesty. With the practice of law a matter of privilege and not
as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member of the law profession
therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the respondent to
take oath.

Tan vSabandal Artiaga v. Villanueva

Facts:
Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows
respondent to finally take oath and practice the law profession after
IN RE: EDILLON
considering his plea for forgiveness and showing willingness to reform
along with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which
Facts:
is a testimonial by the IBP Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in
testimonial was only signed by its President, a counsel for the in-laws of
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court
Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members. The court
the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
allowed the IBP to manifest testimony to certify as to the good moral
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of
character of the respondent and asked for a comment from the RTC Judge
the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III,
in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested that they see no
of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the RTC Judge
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
informed the court of the civil case against the respondent concerning the
mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which turned out to be
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a free patent. The civil
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
case however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
of any crime. Subsequently, Tan already forgave the respondent and
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
withdrew her opposition for the taking of oath of office of the respondent
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide.
to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Issue:
Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule
WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
Ruling:
Issue:
The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his
have concealed the civil case brought against him in the course of his
membership fee to the IBP?
series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together with the
testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of
Held:
the pending case against him. The court finds this as manipulative and
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent. Although there were
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is
testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without any
merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court
only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is
a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore,
the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of
its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may
compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
JoselanoGuevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala
Facts:
On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. NoliEala for grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first
met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that
from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love you,” “I miss
you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually
went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day,
and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001
complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he
saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off
all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter
dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon
saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11
Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001,
Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.
Issue:
Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman
constitute gross immoral conduct?
Ruling:
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral
conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman
who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as
it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
(Vitug v. Rongcal)
Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay) oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before
admission to practice law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of

the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife
"to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.

Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of
office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution
and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in
any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was
accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any
husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is
not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prisioncorreccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of
ART. XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s
grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that
he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose
Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his