PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ 99 Phil.

515 (Digest)

No Complex Crime of Rebellion With Murder, Arson or Robbery

20. PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ 99 Phil. 515

FACTS:
Amado HERNANDEZ5 (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of Labor Organizations) re-filed
for bail (previous one denied) for his conviction of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies. The
prosecution said to deny this again because the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense however contends
that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The information states that the “…murders,
arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion,
in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”

ISSUE: W/N rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

Held: NO!

RATIO:

Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein
are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as means “necessary” for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and
1357, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one
penalty. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in
war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These
expressions imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply
since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes.

Facts

It was the height of the Government action against communists and the Hukbalahap guerillas. President Elpidio
Quirino, through his Defense Secretary (and later, President) Ramon Magsaysay intensified the campaign against
them, and the crackdown was on against communist organizations. Due to such government action, several
communist leaders like Luis Taruc and the Lava brothers were soon in government custody.

On January 20, 1951, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) headquarters was raided. Writer (and future
National Artist for Literature) Amado V. Hernandez, himself a labor leader, was arrested on January 26 for various
rebellious activities with the CLO. Upon his arrest, he was charged in the criminal information of “Rebellion with
Murder, Arson and Robbery”. Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the court where his case was
pending, but was denied on the basis of the nature of the offense (if the crime was complexed, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a petition to the Supreme Court.

Arguments

The government, headed by Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, argued that the gravity of the crime committed
required the denial of the bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by the government against Hernandez has been
successfully imposed with other arrested communist leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Decision

The Supreme Court, through then Associate Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed
with other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the said crimes, thus
granting the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is
taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime and that there is no reason to
complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited several cases convicting the defendants of simple rebellion
although they killed several persons.

Thus, the petition for bail was granted. On May 30, 1964, the Supreme Court acquitted Hernandez (People v.
Hernandez (1964)).
Enrile vs Salazar

Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990

Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February
28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming
that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed
on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,
the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information
filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging
simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The
Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is
fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Enrile vs Salazar another

In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup
attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the
crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus
questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there
is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the
landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which is
bailable.

Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only
took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile
claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the
voluminous record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge
may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not been
complied with.

For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it
should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.

2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.

HELD:

1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D.
942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be
complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to
her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under
the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only
Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it
stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are
absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.

2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the
warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a
voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Enrile vs Amin
March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest
pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the
information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied
Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused
Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the
grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged
co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution
of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of
merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following
grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1
December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently
charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same
meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829.
The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting
in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed
against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised
Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings
of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos.
92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing
proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a
procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
 The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for
the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a
constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000
to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by
giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from
justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such
failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3)
employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some
100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of
December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December,
1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about
100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his
house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that
they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident
which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice
resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated
murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and
100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily,
being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent
or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance
of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960];
People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the
basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense
under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case,
it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a
special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not
bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All
crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom
or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p.
528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These
common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory
of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws
which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately
tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate
crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with
Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by,
merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People
v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the
crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged
in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already
absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same
accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was
convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

 [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present
case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him
in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the
occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion
under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the
Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however,
clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE
BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no
application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no
separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether
to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and
multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate,
the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished
separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted
in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional
Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.

CASE DIGEST: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al.

FACTS:

On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at
Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave contained skeletal remains of 67
individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of
the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).The letters requested appropriate legal
action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including
petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano
Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis
(Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the Central Committee.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by members of the
CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.

On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others,
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-
affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not served the
copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a
counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.

In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder
against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein

Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio
Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of
the prosecution.

The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge
Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).

On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended
bail for their temporary liberty.

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition.

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis and
Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward the
political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of
rebellion.

While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/
Suspend Service of Warrant.

Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the records of
Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.

Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail
respectively.The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court granted the
motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000, subject to the condition
that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations

ISSUE:

Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest?
Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under the political offense doctrine?

HELD:

A. Preliminary Investigation

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense."
What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones
own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in their
last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence
before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he
was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at
their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his counsels
formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused
to participate.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to claim
that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that
the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other witnesses attesting to the
allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994.Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact,
the judges personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for
determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the
existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis
of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of
additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr. 317
Phil. 101

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the
sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.

***

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested
of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are
mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with
the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act
to be conclusively demonstrated.
***

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil 905 if during trial, petitioners are able to
show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court
shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would
not be placed in double jeopardy.

People vs Lovedioro
G.R. No. 112235
November 29, 1995

Facts:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market
when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's
right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen
policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a
tricycle and fled.

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from
Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified
the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin)
and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other
parts of the body. On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant committed Rebellion under Art. 134 and 135 or Murder under Article 248 of the
RPC?

Held:

The court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy
with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories
provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the
sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the
sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.

In his appeal, appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting
his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that
Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army.

However, the appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of
defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Finally, treachery was adequately proved in
the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing
having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law. The trial court's decision dated September 14,
1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.