[G.R. No. 141463.

August 6, 2002] (b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by
VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;
HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City,
THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA KALAW LEDESMA, (c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own
substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. expense;
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.: (d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with interest
[1]
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals computed from the date of filing of the complaint;
dated January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to prohibit
Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a (e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly,
writ of demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court Annexes A and B thereof, at the expense of the defendants.[3]
from implementing an alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners,
through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they
The facts are as follows:
were occupying.
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30, 1998, from the
111267 and 111266, in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to trial court stating as follows:
certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in
the name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively.On October
Before the Court for resolution is the Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of
29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered
Demolition, filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order directing
both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller
the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures on the
lots.
plaintiffs property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The
Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2,
Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33 Doa Regina Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and executory,
St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias writ of
name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons. execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the service of the said
writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject property, they failed to
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated February 9, 1998, issued by the
Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and
Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the
Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action,
structures in order to implement the said decision.
Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue
of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued
for three decades. WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all
constructions, including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly plaintiffs property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this Court
and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered them: will issue a writ of demolition against them.

(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the amount of SO ORDERED.[4]
P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;

Human Rights | 1
 To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from
issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of
execution, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer
for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. [5] Petitioners alleged
that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were
parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of
demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do
so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers
and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who
derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution
order in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered
dismissed.[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition, where
petitioners aver that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE
NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTIES THERETO.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS TITLE
DESPITE THEIR BEING BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR
VALUE.
III.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING THAT THEY STAND TO
SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL
ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE DEMOLITION OF
ALL THE STRUCTURES ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT.[7]
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may
be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for
value and builders in good faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced
against them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling
in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz[8] in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of
Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No.
Q-12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit
that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different
from the circumstances in the present case.
In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No. 496
in 1916 and Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built
houses on the lot without the PRCs consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios
Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the
sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court dismissed
the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot and surrender
possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory. When
Magbanua had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in her favor
and a new title was consequently issued in her name. Magbanua then sought the execution
of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-120. This was opposed by petitioner Medina who
alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of the dispute. She said that she bought
the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while she purchased the lot
from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The latter held the land by
virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In
opposing the execution, Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her, claiming that she was not a party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be
considered as a person claiming under Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120,
which had long become final and executory, could be enforced against petitioner even
though she was not a party thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were
formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in
turn sold them to Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two
judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus Medina could be reached by the order of
execution and writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute, we
sustained Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens title. We
declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land
referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued
and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other
title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title.Moreover,
persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on its face.
Human Rights | 2
 Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner
in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the
original action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case,
petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second,
the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner
in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion
Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners
is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the
registered title in their own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title
of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the
land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of
land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the
registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title
and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
title.[9] It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are
fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner
in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for
value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.[10] The determination of whether one is a
buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take
into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[11] The instant case is covered by this exception to the general rule. As found by
the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent, petitioners purchased the
subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising.[12] Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced
sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land
took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words, the sale to
petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could
reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still
free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for
value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We
note that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this
could not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise
for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and
even during proceedings before the Court of Appeals. [13] Nevertheless, we deem it proper
that this issue be resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the
disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good
faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on
is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. [14] As earlier discussed, petitioner
spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of
Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only
in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
12918, that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil
Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they
were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights
over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case
thereon.[15] Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case
No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in
said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same
manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the
judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. [16] In
our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to
resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 28, 1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in
Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against
petitioners. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PERSON DEALING WITH REGISTERED PROPERTY IS
CHARGED WITH NOTICE ONLY OF CLAIMS AS ARE ANNOTATED ON THE TITLE; CASE AT BAR.
— Where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens
system, the person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate
of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens
and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses
Human Rights | 3
Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the
Torrens system.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; WRIT OF EXECUTION MAY ISSUE
ONLY AGAINST A PARTY AND NOT AGAINST ONE WHO DID NOT HAVE HIS DAY IN COURT;
CASE AT BAR. — As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners
have rights over the subject property and hence are proper parties in interest in any case
thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No.
Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said
case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to
a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by
writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses Victor
and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL
BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession
of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which
is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned
in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches
and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash
money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects
seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Human Rights | 4
 Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof,
for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices
they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is
clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had
not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus
vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786,
789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining
herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions
need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are
null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of
our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to
be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political
strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Human Rights | 5
 Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional,
the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other
legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing
the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his
rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on
the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held,
in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right
of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At
the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
Human Rights | 6
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by
the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state
officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain
an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other
basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that
to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the
spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish
a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral
effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of
the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution
as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized
in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said
petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion
of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts
of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In
other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said
motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application
of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized
in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for
are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Human Rights | 7
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and
other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated
in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Stonehill vs Diokno
20 SCRA 383
Facts:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in
the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the
corporation.
Held: No.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice v. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, Jr. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ G.R. No. 153675, 19 April 2007, EN BANC DIVISION (Sandoval – Guitierrez, J.) Juan
Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong (HK) Court of three (3) counts of
accepting advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of
arrests were issued against him [by the HK Court, not a court in the Philippines] which when
convicted; he would face 7 to 14 years of jail for each charge. The DOJ received a request
for the provisional arrest of Muñoz from the HK DOJ. The DOJ forwarded the request to the
NBI, which in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application to effect such request. Thus,
an Order of Arrest was issued against Muñoz and he was arrested and detained thereafter.
[Note: the Philippines and HK signed an “agreement for the surrender of accused and
convicted persons” or an extradition treaty in 1995 that is why, the HK was represented by
the DOJ] Government of HK filed a petition for extradition of Muñoz with the RTC. Muñoz
for his part filed a petition for bail. The said bail petition was initially denied by then Judge
Bernardo holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail on extradition cases and
Muñoz is a high “flight risk.” On motion for reconsideration, a different judge (Judge Olalia,
herein respondent) took cognizance with the case and granted the motion of Muñoz to bail.
Hence, this petition reached the SC. [Note: Sec. 2(a) of PD 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law)
defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government”] ISSUE: Is the right to bail impermissible on the grounds
that: an extradition case is not a criminal proceeding; and there is no law allowing an
extraditee to do so? RULING: No, bail can be granted to subjects of extradition proceedings.
Bail is generally availed in criminal cases; however, an extradition proceeding -- although
ostensibly administrative -- bears all the earmarks of criminal process. A potential
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
Human Rights | 8
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. Since jurisprudence on
extradition is but an infancy in this jurisdiction, the SC decided to overturn its previous
rulings of not granting bail in extradition cases. They held that “it is a modern trend in
public international law that primacy is placed on the worth of individual person and
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be
a subject of international law is now taking root.” The Philippines as a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This is enshrined in
Sec. II, Art. II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, is
under the obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Indeed, there is no law allowing the
right to bail on extradition cases, but the Constitution is silent as to deprive subject
offenders for the same. Moreover, it is important to note that on several occasions, the SC
granted bail in deportation cases as this was sanctioned the UDHR as well as our obligation
to comply with other international conventions to uphold human rights. Thus, the SC said
that there is no justification why it should not be allowed in extradition cases. Note: Since
extradition is a “sui generis” (a kind of its own) that is “merely administrative in character”,
the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail is based on CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. This is neither a criminal, civil, and administrative case. Thus such
quantum of evidence is somewhere between proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases and preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
US VS. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication)
through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of
the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before
the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false,
scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.
Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right
to free speech and free press.
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether
the law is wisely or badly enforcedis, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of
all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of
any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is toinquire into and
punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably forconsultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that
any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriatebranch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public
affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of thedoctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a
party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true
by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think
that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of
these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
Human Rights | 9
 In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege 2.
destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
3.
4.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, 5.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. 6.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents. 7.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH
Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark,
or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the
RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of
a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right
to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not
fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
Human Rights | 10
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’
speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all
of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court
has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when
the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting
of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin
in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
Human Rights | 11
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection
of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH
Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations
are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . .
to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”

Human Rights | 12