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OF PEASANT UPRISINGS AND

AN AMBITIOUS AGRARIAN
REFORM:
A COMPARTIVE ANALYSIS OF LAND
REFORM IN CHINA AND THE PHILIPPINES

Submitted by: Maria Adela Ching 060735


To Mr. Benito Lim

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PoS 196.1: The Politics and Governance of China – Section A

I. Introduction

For quite some time now, land reform has been ranking high on the policy

agenda. As recent events unfold, revealing the dire need for improved agrarian

reform, we learn more and more about the pleas of the majority of our people:

the poor. In the past 2 years, news about the Sumilao, Negros, Batangas farmers

have filled the pages of our broadsheets. The clamor for improved land reform is

slowly gaining volume. More and more, the issue of land reform is placed in the

forefront. Long-withstanding issues like mass poverty and economic stagnation

have been attributed to the outdated and useless Land Reform Codes and

programs that the Philippines has in its laws.

First off, there is a need to define the term: Land Reform. Since the specific

definition of the term is hard to come by due to the diversity of methods of land

acquisition and farming, we must stick to it primary definition. Land reform is

generally accepted as the redistribution of property or rights in a land for the

benefit of the poorer section of urban and more importantly, rural society. While

this its basic definition, land reform policies are expected to go beyond this

simple definition and look into development efforts and increasing productivity.

Land reform has taken many different forms and has also had varying success

rates. Asia uses more of a “Land for the tiller” approach when it comes to land

distribution. This simply means that after the Second World War, land reform

was geared towards the dissolution of feudal estates. After getting rid of feudal

landowners, the land is awarded peasant farmers who have been working and

tilling the land. Attempts to carry out this land reform approach in the Philippines

have mostly negative results.

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In our country, the poor are strongly dependent on the land especially those

who access land for their livelihood like our local farmers and fishermen. More

than 20 million Filipinos make a living out of the countries agricultural land

resources. At the same time, the urban poor depend on their share of land for

housing and as venues for their income-generating activities such as tailoring,

food preparation, etc. Recent studies have been able to link the inequity of land

distribution laws to the country’s economic growth. The Philippines is one of the

few Asian countries that possesses limited economic potential due to the lack of

social equity and poor distribution of wealth and income. It has even been

compared to that of a Latin American country because it is marked with high

inequity due to poor land distribution. Because of this, many of our farmers have

taken to the streets walking miles and miles I order to fight for the land that is

rightfully theirs. This growing issue has led many have to begin to take notice of

the land reform agenda.

With the presence of many peasant farmer groups pressuring the

government to improve land reform, we see the relevance this issue holds for a

nation that relies mostly on its agricultural resources. Issues and conflicts in land

ownership and land distribution has plagued the government ever since the first

stages of the Spanish colony. It has always been a battle between the lowly

farmers and the land-owning elite families who control most of the countries

resources. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) has been the

most recent fundamental strategy or attempt to provide for poverty reduction and

increasing productivity in the agriculture sector. It was initially designed to be

the main instrument to correct inequities in land distribution and to provide

secure tenure to former agricultural tenants. Both should work towards more

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economic and political empowerment of the poor and increase their social

capital. Generally, the land reform initiatives of the government have been

combinations of (though not limited to) regulation on land tenancy, resettlement

to public lands, and appropriation and redistribution of private lands. All of

these should work towards the reduction of poverty. Unfortunately, however, the

performance of agrarian reform seems to have fallen short of the expectations.

As the world gets to know about the increasing number of peasant farmer

insurgencies in the Philippines, the pressure on the state to develop effective land

reform laws is growing. Looking at the Philippine situation, it is almost hard to

believe that it can be done. As compared to its Asian neighbors, the Philippines

has relatively high inequality. On the other end of the scale, one of the best

examples for a successful and progressive land reform program is our neighbor

to the east: China.

China’s land reform over the past three decades has achieved quite a

significant amount of success. The land reform efforts from the late 1970s up

until the early 1980s have provided redistributed land to almost every rural

family and has therefore aided in alleviating China’s poverty. Land reform

efforts in China were gradual as changes were made in increments within the

span of about 30 years. Rights to land have been given, transferred and secured

to most Chinese farmers. It has done relatively well in its goal to foster socialist

principle of equality and state regulation. Land reforms in China has paved the

way for families to live comfortably and settle in the land they occupy with

security that the state is to protect them and have the whole country’s best

interests in mind.

II. Statement of the Problem and Objectives

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Changes in the Land Reform Code of the Philippines and in the CARP

must be made. This necessity calls for us to examine what needs to be done. We

should take our cue from other Asian countries that seem to have found success

in the area of agrarian reform. Seeing the differences of the results of land reform

in the Philippines and in China, there is a need to question what factors attributed

to its success in China and its mediocre and almost unsatisfactory performance in

the Philippines. Must we look into the policy content and see how the CARP

fairs when pitted against China’s land reform with a two-fold history and

development? The difference could possibly also lie in the social or political

context where these land reforms program take place: one in a western-style

democracy run by an anarchy of elite families and the other under a strict

socialist state wrought with Marxist-Leninist ideology favoring the working and

peasant classes. Could the problem lie in the differences in history or just the

implementation and protection of these land reform efforts?

It also pegs the question of whether this successful agrarian reform will

be possible in the future of the Philippines. If yes, what is the necessary course of

action in order to follow the path of China’s land reform? Would it be applicable

to the Filipino people given the differences? Is successful land reform policies in

the Philippines still possible and could we use China’s land reform as a model?

These are the question this paper wishes to answer:

a. What factors attributed to the success of land reform efforts in China?

We must look at its history, constitutional groundings and socialist

influences.

b. How can these be emulated by the Philippines? Where does the

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problem lie? It is the lack of sufficient policy or the poor

implementation that undermines the presence of credible legislation?

Does the problem lie in the dominance of Elite land-owning families

that simply foster the cycle of social inequity and further widens the

gap between the rich and poor?

III. Hypothesis

A. China’s Success Story

Historical Experience

China has emerged today with a stronger economy and even more

potential. It has emerged as one of the most powerful countries holding power in

manufacturing, industrialization and agriculture. The internal situation in the

country has also been significantly improved because recent economic and social

efforts have paved the way for poverty reduction and high productivity. Today’s

China has been the result of a rough history. There have been both effective and

inefficient land tenure reform.

The land reform agenda only came into the picture upon the

establishment of the People’s Republic of China. On October 1, 1949, Mao

Zedong and the CCP proclaimed the PRC. It was a victory for the Chinese

against the oppressive regime of the Kuomintang. It was the time China regained

its freedom as it slowly tried to reconstruct itself. This new government’s first

task was to redistribute land from feudal lords to peasant farmers. In the early

part of the twentieth century, the Chinese Communist Party of the CCP won the

popular support of the masses during the period of 1949-1956 because of a land

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reform program that was able to grant full private ownership of land to several

poor peasant farmers. This then resulted to an increase in farm income and a

higher increase in productivity in terms of crop production. The government

provided for a nationwide land reform whose development spanned three years

from 1950-1953. The Agrarian Law of 1950 had eradicated the social

distinctions between lord and farmer. The PRC was introduced to a revolutionary

reform that focused on replacing old ideas, customs and habits. Corruption,

bribery, fraud, and cheating were all opposed in the government and more

importantly, the government weren’t only limited to service to its people but it

now espoused Marxist ideas of class struggle ad overthrowing the bourgeoisie.

Ever since the CCP put land reform high o the list of priorities, it has

grown as one of China’s major issues. Then, China decided to pattern land

reform programs under the Soviet Union and promoted ownership via collective

farms. This meant that private ownership became prohibited and all land property

was appropriated to the collectives made up of village communities. These

collectives became automatic farm owners and operators. The effects of the

previous attempts were reversed as production experienced a dramatic decrease.

At this time, China’s land reform seemed doomed, it was able slow down

economic progress and undo the developments achieved previously. Then, in the

1970s, China chose again to go towards a different direction. The collective

farming program was abandoned and the “Household Responsibility System”

was employed. This meant giving individual families the right to utilize their

land. This proved to be a groundbreaking development because it promoted

China’s agricultural development by allowing the movement of resources from

families. This development saw the slow alleviation of poverty as more and more

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people started living above the poverty line. The land reform changes were able

to push China into the hall of fame of poverty-reduction. The movement was

dubbed by economists as “decollectivization” to mean that there was a transfer of

tenure from the farmer collectives to individual families. The new system gave

incentives to farmers to yield higher crops and grains because this would

improve their families’ quality of life. China’s successful land reform policies

have two main characteristics:

a. The reforms provided access to land for mostly all rural families. All

village collectives were divided equally and distributed to every

household. Because of this, the number landless families were

reduced to almost zero. All of China’s farmland has been cultivated

and developed by families and individual households. There was an

equitable allocation of land because of this many household and

families were empowered to be more productive.

b. Land tenure security was also increased because even though

households initially had limited rights, it later on developed in terms

of transferability and security. The time of their legal rights were also

secured and at present, families are entitled to 30 years of legal rights

provided households are in possession of all the necessary legal land

documents.

Despite the success of China’s land reform, there are still improvements to

be done including a long-term legal framework with better regulations and the

addition of mortgage rights. Further improvements must be made in the existing

legal framework because in a recent survey, there are still a number of families

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that has not received any land documentation which the law requires. Many

families have lost their land to compulsory land expropriations while being

inadequately compensated for the exchange. Despite all these necessary

improvements, China’s land reform today has sent poverty rates dramatically

down and have increased productivity as manifested in their grain yields. The

Chinese model is still one that my hold important lessons for developing

countries.

Examining the Chinese land reform experience, there are a couple of

success factors that can be observed as to why it has been able to accomplish its

goals.

a. First is China’s constitutional policy of political consensus. The state

welcomes dissenting opinions and resistance. The policy process isn’t

kept from the public and from people of different political parties. Even

though many traditional officials didn’t favor the transfer of rights to

collective leaders, they were swayed by the few officials who believed

in the program and who believed that decollectivization may possibly

be the answer. Despite the fact that many didn’t necessarily agree, the

party managed to reach consensus when the experimental phase of the

HRS proved to yield positive results as they saw how families, farmers

and local officials accepted the reform. Because of this, they managed

to gain support and share a vision that was critical to the reform.

b. Policy consensus was achieved because they saw its positive effects in

a small experimental set-up. The decollectivization was initially

implemented in small number of villages in rural China. When findings

showed that the land reform was promising, it was formally supported

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by officials in both the central and local units and later on became

subject to a trial and error process which helped tweak and improve it.

This helped redesign and adjust the policy to address the needs of the

different Chinese regions.

c. Another thing that helped design the successful land tenure system is

the fact that it was very well-informed and well-researched. Because of

the pragmatism of officials, there is a need for results and data in order

to be able to come to a consensus. Comprehensive research was carried

out by China in order to be able to create an effective system that was

meant to foster China’s economic growth.

d. Lastly, the HRS succeeded because it faired well in the implementation

phase. A policy may seem like a great idea but it all depends on its

ground implementation. Especially with rural areas as its focus, it’s

hard to ensure proper implementation in provinces because of issues of

proximity. Extra efforts must be made in order to set-up realistic

achievable goals, designate duties and responsibilities, educate

everybody involved and disseminate information.

Constitutional Basis

China has indeed achieved more than your ordinary Asian country. Its growth

over the recent years have be attributed to their rapid development in terms of

manufacturing and industrialization but the development of their land reform

policies are also remarkable. This success may be traced to certain constitutional

provisions that paved the way for the socialist state to do it primary goal: to

achieve equality and to protect the interests of it laborers and peasants.

Provisions regarding land are found in the constitution. Land tenure and public

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ownership of land is clearly stated in the constitution:

“Article 10. Land in the cities is owned by the state. Land in the rural and
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which
belong to the state in accordance with the law; house sites and private plots
of cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives. The state may in
the public interest take over land for its use in accordance with the law.
(Amended to: The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with
the provisions of law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall
make compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned.) No
organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or
unlawfully transfer land in other ways. All organizations and individuals
who use land must make rational use of the land.”

From this provision, we can see how China’s constitution prevent the

emergence of a land-grabbing elite through its efforts to award ownership of the

land to a. the state or to b. farming collectives which ensures that land will not be

placed in the single hand of an abusive landlord or any other exclusive private

entity. Article 10 also ensures the proper use of the land for ‘rational’ purposes

like farming, etc. It is in no way to create profit unlawfully through re-selling or

lease. All the land controls are designated to the state given the assumption that

the state appropriates all property equally to all members of society.

Finding its Place in the Socialist Market Economy

China pioneered a kind of socialist economy of their own. It employs a

socialist market economy that has public ownership as one of its pillars while still

having a range of economic sectors that are found in a market economy. This

implies a more mixed-ownership structure where public ownership is applied in

large-scale key properties in order to avoid the greedy acquisition of those who

can afford, maintain the equal and rational distribution and appropriation of the

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state’s resources and operate the market in an orderly fashion. China’s socialist

market economy is geared toward achieving the common good which is economic

prosperity for all as its driving principle. The goal is to allow an acceptable

income gap and encourage individual progress for a few but curb it later o to

avoid polarization of the rich and poor. In line with this socialist market economy,

all urban land is owned and operated by the state while all rural farmlands are

physically divided and appropriated equally to inhabitant families.

“Article 11. The individual economy of urban and rural working people,
operated within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist
public economy. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual
economy. The state guides, helps and supervises the individual economy by
exercising administrative control.”

“Article 12. Socialist public property is sacred and inviolable. The state protects
socialist public property. Appropriation or damage of state or collective property
by any organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited.”

“Article 15. The state practises economic planning on the basis of socialist public
ownership. It ensures the proportionate and coordinated growth of the national
economy through overall balancing by economic planning and the supplementary
role of regulation by the market. Disturbance of the orderly functioning of the
social economy or disruption of the state economic plan by any organization or
individual is prohibited.”

The state protects its citizens through the socialist market economy as it
supervises via administrative control. This means that while people are granted
some liberties, over-all supervision and control is still in the hands of the
government. It is important to note that while an overarching control is in the
hands of the government, it must still be in line with the interest of protecting
and promoting the welfare of its people and their economy. The constitution,
while establishing the important role of the state in administrative control, it also
gives importance to the citizens of China as a major priority. Control is
exercised by the state over its economy on the grounds of ensuring rational
distribution, lawfully protecting state property and promoting fairness and

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equality. With its Marxist and Leninist roots, we see how the state keeps most
property from the hands of the oppressive bourgeoisie and appropriates it
equally among all social classes, most importantly to the working class. Also,
Articles found in the constitution also forge the rights of the state to protect its
property basically because it still belongs to the whole country which means
every Chinese citizen has a share in the state’s property.
The socialist market economy also aims for the maximization of
productivity and economic growth through developing forces of production.
“Article 14. The state continuously raises labour productivity, improves economic
results and develops the productive forces by enhancing the enthusiasm of the
working people, raising the level of their technical skill, disseminating advanced
science and technology, improving the systems of economic administration and
enterprise operation and management, instituting the socialist system of
responsibility in various forms and improving organization of work. The state
practises strict economy and combats waste. The state properly apportions
accumulation and consumption, pays attention to the interests of the collective and
the individual as well as of the state and, on the basis of expanded production,
gradually improves the material and cultural life of the people.”

These can be seen in the steps China has taken in the past 30 years. Not
only is land tenure and security the main focus, land reform is also aimed at
achieving China’s full potential when it comes to agricultural resources. In line
with this, land tenure reforms are usually done in order to promote increased
productivity like the 1979 HRS that empowers families to unleash their energy
and resources to maximize their productive potential which would also lead them
to generate more income and improve the quality of their life.

B. The Philippines: Locating the Problem

A History of Failed Ambitious Attempts

Being an agricultural country, the Philippines relies on its natural


resources for most of its progress and economic growth. Since we are a people
who are dependent on the land, land or agricultural reform has always been a key
issue. The problematic agrarian structure of our county has been plaguing the
governments throughout 400 years of history: under colonization, the
commonwealth until the present. Landlessness and unequal allocation of land

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originating from the hacienda system from the Spanish era has lead many peasant
farmers to revolt and protest. At that time, all property could be taken away by
the Spanish elites including and especially the Spanish friars. It was a time of
Filipino oppression when we were stripped of our land and our dignity as a
nation. That is why as the Spanish turned over control to the Americans, it was
an urgent and necessary step for the Americans to establish land reform policies
to redistribute land to those who have lost it. In the 1930s, the Filipinos got their
first taste of land reform.

The first attempt at land reform was done by William H. Taft who was
also the civil governor at that time. It was an achievement at that time because he
was able to buy 166,000 hectares of land from the friars and was to distribute
them to 60,000 tenants. The purchase was initially intended to help the Filipino
landless tenants but because of their ignorance of the government’s policy and
the law, most of the land property went to those who can afford and these were:
businessmen, the same old landlords, etc. It was the beginning of a long history
of elites vs. the peasantry where it was quite obvious who ended up victorious.
The American administration in the Philippines also encouraged Filipinos in
populated urban areas to migrate to the provinces because land is less densely
populated and most of the land weren’t located in the urban centers just like
China. Filipinos were encouraged to settle in the uncultivated areas in order to
increase productivity and develop these bare grasslands into places of profit.
However, the program failed because most Filipinos chose to stay in the city
where most of the life went on. It was in these urban centers that they could find
job opportunities.

Public Act No. 4054 or the Rice Tenancy Act I 1933 was another failed
attempt. It provided for an equal sharing agreement between landowner and
tenant with a 10% interest ceiling on loans made by the tenants. It also provided
for a more secure land reform because there was an agreement of non-dismissal
of the tenants from the land they till and occupy. The one thing that made this
petition unsuccessful was that it also needed support from the municipal council
members; a signed petition was necessary. It became a problem because most
members of the municipal council were the land-owning elite themselves. Who
would want to give up part of their profits for their workers? Greed took over and

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unfortunately, the Rice Tenancy Act failed to live up to its purpose. The Robert
Hardie Report in 1952 followed this and it provided for the abolition of share
tenancy and the establishment of fair tenancy practices for those who work on
the land. However, these provisions were not adopted by President Quirino who
preferred to approve the LADESECO or the Land Settlement and Development
Corporation. The LADESECO was a land resettlement program designed by the
National Land Settlement Administration during the American administration.
Some of its provisions were later on used by President Magsaysay to grant land
ownership which served as an incentive to ex-Huk members. Some of these were
the Land Reform Code of 1955 or RA 1400 and the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
RA 1199. These later on proved to be ineffective because again, personal/elite
interest got in the way. The Elitist members of the congress redesigned the
programs in such a way that would benefit them. This means they added
additional and unnecessary provisions that diluted the policy until it was useless;
it no longer called for significant changes, just the same negligible change that
kept the status quo.

It was followed by some more attempts one of which was the Land
Reform Code on 1963. This called for the creation of the Agricultural
Productivity Commission and the Agricultural Credit Administration tasked to
provide support for the land reform program. Again, this didn’t work out because
the commissions eventually proved to be useless due to the rampant graft and
corruption and mismanagement.

During the Marcos administration, the first major efforts at land reform
was Presidential Decree No. 27in 1972 that established the Operation Land
Transfer and the Operation Leasehold programs but these were unsuccessful later
on because the croplands under this legislation was limited to corn and rice, the
retention limits they set were still relatively high in the region and the procedures
on has to go through in order to obtain land was too troublesome. Marcos was
also very ambitious when it came to land reform. He included tasks to modernize
and revolutionize agriculture and farming in the Philippines. At the end of his
term, there have been significant developments. First is the leasehold operation
which meant all tenants would have already gotten their contracts in a given
target time. Unfortunately, it didn’t happen as fast as they wanted. The second

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accomplishment of the Marcos administration in terms of land reform is the
issuance of certificates of land transfer to a total of 657, 623 tenants but this too
didn’t reach its target date. The third achievements is the fact that they were able
to provide resettlement arrangements for a total of 58, 662 families.

Then, President Cory introduced us to the CARP or the Comprehensive


Agrarian Reform Program that we know today. Along with her presidency, the
1986 Philippine Constitution was drafted and it presented a major improvement
in land reform law compared to previous constitutions. It included various
models of land distribution and a more comprehensive version of past land
reform codes. The problem with land reform during the Aquino administration is
that it was too conservative. Critical aspects such as retention limits were left to
the discretion of the congress who we all know are also protecting their
personal/elite interests. Aquino’s land reform has seen so much promise
especially at that time, she had popular support especially from the working
classes.

Through the years, the CARP had undergone many changes to address
peasant uprisings and the growing demand for better land reform policies.
Despite these efforts, the Philippines still seems to be stuck in poor insufficient
elite-driven land reforms. Although we share this problem with our fellow
Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, there is still a need to asses why this
problem still exists today.

(LACK OF DEFINITE POLICY)

(POOR IMPLEMENTATION)

(AN ANARCHY OF FAMILIES)

IV. Methodology

A. Data Sources

The paper uses internet/ online sources as its primary data source. Most

articles come from Asian/ Asia-Pacific journal focused on Asian nations as

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subjects for analysis and scrutiny. Sources also come from newsletters or

quarterlies that have been stored and archived by an online source for journals

and periodicals. These commentaries and articles will be used to survey the many

opinions and interpretations of the land reform policies present in both countries.

These also contain important facts about the history of land administration in

both countries and how they have evolved to today’s policies. Also, some of

these articles offer an unbiased outsider perspective on the matter which will be

helpful in the critical and comparative analysis of the topic.

References to formal documents such as the Chinese constitution and

Philippine Constitution are also made. However, there is also data gathered from

separate pieces of legislation like the Philippine Land Reform Code, the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, Administrative ordinances regarding

land reform in and Regulations and other specific laws regarding land reform in

China. These formal documents will provide basis as to the content of land

reform policy. They will also serve as basis for evaluating the success or failure

of the state’s efforts to author and implement law that address land reform issues

and concerns.

B. Evaluation of Data

The data gathered is sufficient and appropriate for the subject matter.

Although critical literature on land reform as a whole is not easily available or

accessible, online sources prove to be a much more convenient source. The date

collected is also accurate as it has very little to none contradictions with respect

to other data. The information found is good and sound and is suitable to be used

as reference in this paper.

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V. Review of Related Literature

1. Jolly, Michael. “Land Reform in the Philippines and Taiwan in the First Half
of the Twenty-first Century.” Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. Accessed
on: February 3, 2010. <http://ryerson.edu>
“Land reform, frequently regarded as a prerequisite for economic
development, is difficult to achieve in traditional societies dominated by
landowning elites. Consequently it has often been implemented only as a
result of external intervention, such as rule by a colonial power. This paper
compares the reforms adopted by colonial powers in Taiwan and the
Philippines during the first half of the twentieth century. In Taiwan the
Japanese authorities implemented a successful land reform which was later
extended by their Guomingdang successors, but in the Philippines the U.S.
authorities were less successful in implementing reforms.1 The paper
discusses the importance of land reforms for economic development in the
two countries and considers explanations for the differences in their
experiences.”

“Land reform in the Philippines during the period of American rule was
much less successful than was the case in Taiwan, in large part because the
U.S. administration governed in association with the local landowning elite.
As a result it failed to force through reform and successive governments of
the Philippines since independence have lacked the strength or will to do so.
Thus the experience of these two Asian countries suggests that land reform is
unlikely to be achieved without some foreign authority or strong external
pressure to overcome the obstruction of local elites. “

In a study conducted by Michael Jolly on land reform in the Philippines

and Taiwan, he establishes one of the Philippine political flaws that hinder the

success of land reform policies and subsequently, economic development. The

Philippines is a presidential democratic regime but in reality, the state is virtually

run by the anarchy of Filipino land-owning elite families. This comes from a

history of colonization that left us with the landlord system and left vast pieces of

land in the hands of a select fortunate few. It has later on evolved into the

political and economic monopoly of a few, specifically those who hold majority

of the country’s resources. The power held by these elites spills over almost all

aspects of Philippine society, whether in the private or public sphere, their

presence and dominance is apparent. These elites have stunted economic growth

and development and at the same time prevented any real progress of land reform

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policy agenda.

This literature helps us gain a better picture of the socio-political and

economic setting of the Philippines. It helps us understand the key state actors

and players that help or prevent the proper implementation of certain laws that

sometimes finds itself in the middle of conflicts of interest. This information

provided by Jolly is useful in this paper because it looks at one of major reasons

why the Philippines is having difficulty with their land reform. It examined the

dominant presence of the Filipino elites and how it affects Philippine Land

Reform.

The next article then looks at the development of China’s land reform

throughout the years and how it has evolved to be the only successful land

reform effort in Asia.

2. Stavis, Ben. “China and the Comparative Analysis of Land Reform.” Modern
China. January 1978: 13-15. <http://jstor.org> Accessed on February 18, 2010.

“Comparative analysis and greater political sensitivity could have highlighted


China's success in implementation and administration of land reform. In many
countries land reform exists on paper, but is not really carried out. Large land
owners are able to distribute land titles to relatives and dependents and thus
retain actual management. They often can dispossess tenant farmers who might
be entitled by law to purchase the land they cultivate. Rather than being helped,
the tenants may be hurt by land reform legislation. In addition, courts obstruct
government purchase of land, and bureaucracies are slow in distributing it. In
some cases land reform simply is a tool for a political leader to attack his
enemies. Implementation can be very selective indeed.

Whether or not land reform laws are carried out depends on the overall political
climate and the degree to which the top political leadership benefits from a land
reform which eliminates political rivals and establishes an environment for
economic growth that it wants. This is shown clearly in the analysis by Tai (1974)
of eight land reforms, not including mainland China's.

In China, since there was a clear political commitment to land reform and to
rural social transformation, land reform was implemented with remarkable
effectiveness. Crucial for this implementation was a very sophisticated
combination of central leadership and mass participation, expressed through a
wide range of local organizations. Land reform committees and people's tribunals
were set up at county and higher levels; peasant associations were set up as mass
organizations at township levels. People's militia and special land reform police

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supplemented the regular army forces to discourage landlords from opposing
land reform violently.

Communist Party cadres were "the sinew of the movement," Wong notes, tying
together the mass organizations at the local level, with the Party policy
determined at higher levels. The Party guided the activities of over one million
cadres, most of whom were not Party members, but who had gone to special
training programs to learn how to carry out land reform. Cadres learned to
collect information from poor peasants, to single out the few powerful local
gentry, and to arrange verbal attacks against them at mass peasant meetings. The
best cadres in land reform were not those "who were conversant with land reform
regulations and laws but those who were armed with a mass viewpoint and would
better activate the peasant masses" (p. 109).

The Chinese success with integrating central and local leadership is consistent
with the findings of Montgomery (1972). In an analysis of 25 land reforms (not
including the mainland of China) he found that peasants' productivity and welfare
gains were best served through devolution of authority to carry out land reform to
local political organization.”

This article by Ben Stavis looks at the different aspects of land reform in
China and compares the many different literature on the matter. It first examines
the work of John Wong, a writer who believes in the success of China’s land
reform policies. He attributes is success to many factors namely: the political
climate, coordination of local and central units of the government and the
presence of institutions that aided in carrying out and implementation.

It looks at the political climate (whether political events foster untiy and
cooperation or discord and competition) because it figures in a lot in terms of the
personal and political interests of state leaders. The effectiveness of land reform
laws rests on the whether political leaders benefit from it. Redistribution of the
land also holds value because it helps them legitimately weaken rivals in order to
promote economic growth with the false pretense of promoting national interest.

Then, it tackles how China can attribute the progress of its land reform
policies to the successful coordination of the central leadership, local units and
mass participation. The devolution of authority by the central units to the local
groups were successful because it was able to more closely monitor and
implement land reform policies at the local. It provided a very hands-on and
specific approach to making sure the goals they were set out to achieve were met.

Related to the previous paragraph, the article then talks about the role of

20
political and state institutions. Because there was a wide range of local
organization established, integration and coordination was an easy task. Land
reform committees, people’s tribunals, peasant associations, people’s militia and
a special police force were set up at all different level of the state. These
institutions helped with information dissemination, education, data collection,
land protection, implementation and other aspects of land reform. Without these
seemingly smaller-scale institutions and groups, the central government would
have had a hard time implementing a land reform policy that covered 6 billion
square meters of land, most of it in rural areas.

VI. Conclusion

VII. Bibliography

Jolly, Michael. “Land Reform in the Philippines and Taiwan in the First Half of
the Twenty-first Century.” Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada.
<http://ryerson.edu> Accessed on: February 3, 2010.
Stavis, Ben. “China and the Comparative Analysis of Land Reform.” Modern
China. January 1978: 13-15. <http://jstor.org> Accessed on February 18, 2010.

Reyes, Celia M. “Impact of Agrarian Reform on Poverty.” The Philippine


Institute for Development Studies Discussion Series No. 2002-002. January
2002: 1-9. <http://jstor.org> Accessed on: February 3, 2010.

Brandt, Loren, et al. “Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues.”
The China Journal. January 2002: 67-97. Contemporary China Center, Australian
National University. <http://jstor.org.stable/3182074> Accessed on: February 3,
2010

Kerkvliet, Benedict J. “Land Reform in the Philippines Since the Marcos Coup.”
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3. Autumn 1974: 286-304. University of British
Columbia. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2755767> Accessed on: February 4,
2010.

D.N.. “Breaking the Deadlock: Land Reform Revisited.” Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 37, No.26. July 2005: 2545-2549. <http://jstor.org/stable/412288>
Accessed on: February 4, 2010.

Allen, James S. “Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs, Vol.11


No.1. March 1938: 52-65. Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia.
<http://jstor.org/stable/2750989>

Han-Seng, Chen. “Agrarian Reform in China.” Far Eastern Survey, Vol 17, No.4.
Feb. 25, 1948: 41-43. Institute of Pacific Relations.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3022740> Accessed on: February 5, 2010.

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Bandyopadhyay, Rekha. “Global Review of Land Reform: A Critical
Perspective.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 11. March 1996:
679-691. Economic Political Weekly. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4403916>
Accessed on: February 5, 2010

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