RULE 71: CONTEMPT - Failure to provide copies to respondents.
> Legal issue DMAP presented
#1 G.R. No. 155849 August 31, 2011
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER
LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO
LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioners filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect
contempt of court for including allegedly contemptuous statements in
their so-called Sea Transport Update concerning the Court’s resolutions
dated June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002 issued in G.R. No. 152914
entitled Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, et al. v.
Administrator Oscar Sevilla, Maritime Industry Authority, et al.
Antecedents
On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a
Letter-Resolution,1 advising respondent Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required
freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight
rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with
MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).
For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213
(EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994. 2
On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC
153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in
the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29,
2001,3 however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the
Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001.4 Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA
denied DMAP’s motion for reconsideration.5
DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5,
2002,6 the Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for
petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period
of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit
for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of ₱202.00 in
accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule
56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."
On August 12, 2002,7 the Court denied with finality DMAP’s motion for
reconsideration.
In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on
the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo
Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco,
publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update,8 which is reproduced as
follows:
SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE
Oct. 2002 GMM
20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE
1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was
denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
presented.
Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the
amount of filing fee lacking & failure to indicate date of receipt of court
resolution)
> Some technical matters that could cause denial
- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings
PROVREM
- Public Service Act
- Regulated or Deregulated
- MC 153
- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months.
WHAT TO EXPECT?
1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI
WHAT TO DO?
1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:
- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on
merits of the case
- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of
reasonableness of freight is not under their jurisdiction but
with MARINA
- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic)
as there is a pending case filed before MARINA.
- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for
resolution
2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved by
MARINA
3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping service may
not suffer
NEXT MOVE
Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same
case and may be using the same arguments. (emphasis supplied)
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea
Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently,
unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to
some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the
Supreme Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo"9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be
influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that
the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is
at least 3 to 6 months."10 They averred that the respondents’ purpose,
taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision,
for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!"11
In their comment dated January 20, 2003,12 the respondents denied any
intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court. 13 They explained that
their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month time
only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" 14 was not per se
contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the
resolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the
petition was to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to
six months, if the petition was to be given due course; that what made
the petitioners describe the statement as contemptuous was not the real
or actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners’ false,
malicious, scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and
that the petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had
no basis to assert that the DMAP’s presentor, the author of the material,
or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made
any malicious insinuations.15
The respondents further stated that the term time frame was layman’s
parlance to explain to DMAP members that the petition had been
dismissed due to a technicality, considering that the appeals process in
the case before the Court had taken only a month instead of the
expected three to six months;16 that the term lead time, although not
the proper legal term to describe the process that the respondents’
petition had undergone in the Court, was common parlance in the
business sector in which the respondents belonged; that the discussions
during the presentation focused on the legal options of DMAP with
respect to the 20% increase, i.e., to go back to MARINA for the
resolution of the propriety and reasonableness of the 20%
increase;17 that a lead time was indicated in the presentation material
simply to tell DMAP members that the lead time to go back to MARINA
had been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for review; and
that, on the other hand, had the Court given due course to the petition,
the expected time for the Court to resolve the appeal on the merits
would have been from three to six months, a normal expectation. 18
Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of
the decision of the CA, which the Court affirmed, revealed that the
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 1 of 51
decision of the CA centered only on the constitutionality of the assailed
executive issuances, and did not include any determination of the
reasonableness and propriety of the 20% increase; that, accordingly, the
discussion of the recourse with respect to the 20% increase, which was
to go back to MARINA for the resolution on the matter, could not be
considered as a defiance of the order of the Court because the CA itself
decreed that the propriety and reasonableness of the 20% increase
should be brought to and resolved by MARINA;19 and that considering
that there was yet no entry of judgment in relation to the denial of the
petition at the time of the GMM on October 17, 2002, the respondents
were not defying any final order or writ of the Court and thereby commit
any act of indirect contempt.20
Issue
Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or
amount to indirect contempt of court?
Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
I
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. 21 The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different
acts.22
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, 23 and need
not be specifically granted by statute. 24 It lies at the core of the
administration of a judicial system.25 Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to
impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to
their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach and insults of pollution.26The power to punish for
contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without
such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.28
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is
committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in
the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt,
which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of
the court.29
The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and
no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in
facie curiae.30 The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court
committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts
and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this
power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the
administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary
conviction and punishment accord with due process of law.31There is
authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct
contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in
the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to
interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself.32 Also,
contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if
admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily
as a direct contempt,33 although it is advisable to proceed by requiring
the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be
punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the
misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor
or by testimony under oath of other persons.34
PROVREM
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than
the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act
committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need
the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice,
written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges
before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.35
Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for
contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the
offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay,
and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of
complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to
arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with
a conventional court trial.36
A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court
proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence
are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require normal
adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what
procedures must attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with
contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate
contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court
contempts that interfere with the judicial process. 37
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without
further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt
committed directly under its eye or within its view. 38 But there must be
adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence
of the court.39 The exercise of the summary power to imprison for
contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or
oppressive conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to
punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities
of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with
obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in
its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage. 41
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any
action.42 They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or
remedial.
A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in
unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court
or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be
done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing
party therein.43 It is at times difficult to determine whether the
proceedings are civil or criminal.
In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil
is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the
cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant
purpose.44
The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial.45
Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a
court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the
contempt is civil;
where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of
the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the
contempt is criminal.46
Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but
the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private
parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to
enforce such rights.47
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 2 of 51
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. —
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another
to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding
him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or
disrespect.48 There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the
gravamen of the offense.49 Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the
alleged contemnor should be considered.50 Where the act complained of
is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and
is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the
presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held
to be determinative of its character. 51 A person should not be
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be
right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. 52 To constitute
contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or
improper purpose.53
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the
court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when
committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
II.
Utterances in Sea Transport Update,
Not Contemptuous
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts
punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71,
supra.
The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases
the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and
baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced
by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus
leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling
issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6
PROVREM
months,"54 was insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of
indirect contempt.
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea
Transport Update stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal
issue DMAP presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update
reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary to the petitioners’ urging
that such phrases be considered as "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and
baseless innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself to
be influenced by the petitioners"57 or that "the point that respondents
wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the decision, for it was based
on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!’",58 we find the
phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R.
No. 152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the
resolutions. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform
DMAP’s members of the developments in the case, and on the taking of
the next viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as the
ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.1avvphi1
We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any
other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges
as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such
recognition and respect, for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment
aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen: 59
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a
lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns
a concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown
open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (bold
emphasis supplied)60
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the
Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and
did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the
respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard,
then, we need to remind that the power to punish for contempt of court
is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and
only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter
or fail.61 As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 3 of 51
of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of
the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.62
WHEREFORE, the petition for indirect contempt is DISMISSED.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
#2 G.R. No. 190028 February 26, 2014
LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY AND
ITS PRESIDING JUDGE, JUDGE REYNALDO M. LAIGO, SHERIFF IV
LUCITO V. ALEJO, ATTY. SILVERIO GARING, MR. LEONARDO J.
TING, AND MR. BENITO G. TECHICO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated
October 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
106175, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56 (Makati City RTC) in issuing the
following orders (Assailed Orders) in Civil Case No. 03-186:
(a) the Order3 dated February 9, 2007 which directed the
Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, respondent Atty. Silverio
Garing (Atty. Garing), to (1) register the Officer's
Final Deed of Sale issued by respondent SheriffLucito V. Alejo
(Sheriff Alejo) on October 27, 2006 in favor of the highest
bidder, respondent Leonardo J. Ting (Ting), (2) cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8502/T44 in the name of
Spouses Rosario and Saturnino Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay), and
(3) issue a new certificate of title in favor of Ting, free from
any liens and encumbrances;
(b) the Order4 dated March 20, 2007 which directed Atty.
Garing to comply with the February 9, 2007 Order under pain
of contempt of court; and
(c) the Order5 dated April 25, 2007 which reiterated the
directive to Atty. Garing to issue a new title in favor of Ting
after the latter’s payment of capital gains, documentary and
transfer taxes, as required.
The Facts
On November 20, 2002, petitioner Leticia P. Ligon (Ligon) filed an
amended complaint6 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101 (Quezon City RTC) for collection of sum of money and
damages, rescission of contract, and nullification of title with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-10-48145 (Quezon City Case), against Sps. Baladjay, a certain
Olivia Marasigan (Marasigan), Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc. (Polished
Arrow), and its incorporators,7 namely, Spouses Julius Gonzalo and
Charaine Doreece Anne Fuentebella (Sps. Fuentebella), Ma. Linda
Mendoza (Mendoza), Barbara C. Clavo (Clavo), Bayani E. Arit, Jr. (Arit,
Jr.), and Peter M. Kairuz (Kairuz), as well as the latter’s spouses
(individual defendants).
In her complaint, Ligon alleged, inter alia, that Rosario Baladjay
(Rosario) enticed her to extend a short-term loan in the amount of
₱3,000,000.00, payable in a month’s time and secured by an Allied Bank
post-dated check for the same amount.8 Ligon likewise claimed that
Rosario, as further enticement for the loan extension, represented that
she and her husband Saturnino were in the process of selling their
property in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City (subject property),
covered by a clean title, i.e., TCT No. 85029 in the name of Rosario
Baladjay, married to Saturnino Baladjay, and that the proceeds of the
said sale could easily pay-off the loan.10 Unfortunately, the Allied Bank
PROVREM
check was dishonored upon presentment and, despite assurances to
replace it with cash, Rosario failed to do so. Moreover, Ligon discovered
that the subject property had already been transferred to Polished
Arrow, alleged to be a dummy corporation of Sps. Baladjay and the
individual defendants (defendants). As a result, TCT No. 8502 was
cancelled and replaced on October 11, 2002 by TCT No. 927311 in the
name of Polished Arrow. Thus, Ligon prayed that all defendants be held
solidarily liable to pay her the amount of ₱3,000,000.00, with interest
due, as well as ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees and another
₱1,000,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages. Asserting that
the transfer of the subject property to Polished Arrow was made in fraud
of Sps. Baladjay’s creditors, Ligon also prayed that the said transfer be
nullified, and that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued in the
interim against defendants’ assets, including the subject property.
Subsequently, an Amended Writ of Preliminary Attachment12 was issued
on November 26, 2002, and annotated on the dorsal portion13 of TCT No.
9273 on December 3, 2002 (December 3, 2002 attachment annotation).
On February 18, 2003, a similar complaint for collection of sum of
money, damages, and cancellation of title with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the Makati City RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-186 (Makati City Case), by Spouses Cecilia
and Gil Vicente (Sps. Vicente) against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and
other corporations.14 In that case, it was established that Sps. Baladjay
solicited millions of pesos in investments from Sps. Vicente using conduit
companies that were controlled by Rosario, as President and
Chairperson. During the proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary
attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated
on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273 on March 12, 2003. Thereafter,
but before the Quezon City Case was concluded, the Makati City RTC
rendered a Decision15 dated December 9, 2004 (December 9, 2004
Decision), rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps.
Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in
fraud of creditors.16 Consequently, the Makati City RTC directed the
Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel TCT No. 9273 in the
name of Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 "in its previous
condition" in the name of Rosario Baladjay, married to Saturnino
Baladjay.
Meanwhile, in the pending Quezon City Case, Polished Arrow and the
individual defendants (with the exception of Marasigan) were
successively dropped17 as party-defendants, after it was established that
they, by themselves directly or through other persons, had no more
ownership, interest, title, or claim over the subject property. The parties
stipulated on the existence of the December 9, 2004 Decision of the
Makati City RTC, and the fact that the same was no longer questioned by
defendants Sps. Fuentebella, Arit, Jr., and Polished Arrow were made
conditions for their dropping as party-defendants in the case.18 In view
of the foregoing, the Quezon City Case proceeded only against Sps.
Baladjay and Marasigan and, after due proceedings, the Quezon City
RTC rendered a Decision19 dated March 26, 2008 (March 26, 2008
Decision), directing Sps. Baladjay to pay Ligon the amount of
₱3,000,000.00 with interest, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
On September 25, 2008, the March 26, 2008 Decision of the Quezon
City RTC became final and executory.20However, when Ligon sought its
execution, she discovered that the December 3, 2002 attachment
annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject
property was sold by way of public auction on September 9, 2005 to the
highest bidder, respondent Ting, for the amount of ₱9,000,000.00 during
the execution proceedings in the Makati City Case, as evidenced by the
Officer’s Final Deed of Sale21 dated October 27, 2006 (Officer’s Final
Deed of Sale) issued by Sheriff Alejo. In this regard, Ligon learned that
the Makati City RTC had issued its first assailed Order 22 dated February
9, 2007 (First Assailed Order), directing Atty. Garing, as the Register of
Deeds of Muntinlupa City, to: (a) register the Officer’s Final Deed of Sale
on the official Record Book of the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City;
and (b) cancel TCT No. 8502 in the name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a
new title in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances.
Atty. Garing manifested23 before the Makati City RTC that it submitted
the matter en consulta24 to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) as he
was uncertain whether the annotations on TCT No. 9273 should be
carried over to TCT No. 8502. In response to the manifestation, the
Makati City RTC issued its second assailed Order25dated March 20, 2007
(Second Assailed Order), directing Atty. Garing to comply with the First
Assailed Order under pain of contempt. It explained that it could not
allow the LRA to carry over all annotations previously annotated on TCT
No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow as said course of action would
run counter to its December 9, 2004 Decision which specifically ordered
the cancellation of said TCT and the restoration of TCT No. 8502 in its
previous condition. It further clarified that:26
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 4 of 51
[I]f there were liens or encumbrances annotated on TCT No. 8502 in the
name of Rosario Baladjay when the same was cancelled and TCT No.
9273 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City in favor of
Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc. based on the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed between the former and the latter, only such liens or
encumbrances will have to be carried over to the new Transfer
Certificate of Title that he (Atty. Garing) is mandated to immediately
issue in favor of Leonardo J. Ting even as the Order of the Court dated
February 9, 2007 decreed that a new TCT be issued in the name of Mr.
Leonardo J. Ting, free from any encumbrance. On the other hand, if TCT
No. 8502 in the name of Rosario Baladjay was free from any liens or
encumbrances when the same was cancelled and TCT No. 9273 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City in favor of Polished
Arrow Holdings, Inc. by virtue of that Deed of Absolute Sale executed
between Rosario Baladjay and Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc., it
necessarily follows that the new Transfer of Certificate of Title that the
said Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to issue immediately in favor of
Leonardo Ting will also be freed from any liens and encumbrances, as
simple as that. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it pronounced that it was Atty. Garing’s
ministerial duty "to promptly cancel TCT No. 8502/T-44 in the name of
defendant-spouses Baladjay and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of
Title in the name of the highest bidder, Leonardo J. Ting."27
Separately, Ting filed a motion before the Makati City RTC on account of
Atty. Garing’s letter28 dated March 26, 2006 requiring him to comply
with certain documentary requirements and to pay the appropriate
capital gains, documentary stamp and transfer taxes before a new title
could be issued in his name. In its third assailed Order29dated April 25,
2007 (Third Assailed Order), the Makati City RTC directed Ting to pay
the aforesaid taxes and ordered Atty. Garing to immediately cancel TCT
No. 8502 and issue a new title in the former’s name.
On June 7, 2007, Atty. Garing issued TCT No. 1975630 in the name of
Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. Later, Ting sold31 the
subject property to respondent Benito G. Techico (Techico), resulting in
the cancellation of TCT No. 19756 and the issuance of TCT No.
3100132 in Techico’s name.
In view of the preceding circumstances, Ligon filed, inter alia, a certiorari
petition33 against respondent Presiding Judge Reynaldo Laigo (Judge
Laigo), Sheriff Alejo, Atty. Garing, Ting, and Techico (respondents),
alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders. In this relation, she prayed
that the said orders be declared null and void for having been issued in
violation of her right to due process, and resulting in (a) the deletion of
the December 3, 2002 attachment annotation on TCT No. 9273 which
evidences her prior attachment lien over the subject property, and (b)
the issuance of new titles in the names of Ting and Techico.
Consolidated with Ligon’s certiorari petition is a complaint for indirect
contempt34 against respondents, whereby it was alleged that the latter
unlawfully interfered with the court processes of the Quezon City RTC,
particularly by deleting the December 3, 2002 attachment annotation on
TCT No. 9273 which thereby prevented the execution of the Quezon City
RTC’s March 26, 2008 Decision.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated October 30, 2009, the CA dismissed Ligon’s
certiorari petition, finding that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders, adding further that the same
was tantamount to a collateral attack against the titles of both Ting and
Techico, which is prohibited under Section 4836of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529.37 Likewise, it dismissed the indirect contempt charge for lack
of sufficient basis, emphasizing that the Assailed Orders were issued
prior to the Quezon City RTC’s Decision, meaning that the said issuances
could not have been issued in disregard of the latter decision.
Aggrieved, Ligon filed the present petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The Court resolves the following essential issues: (a) whether or not the
CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders; and (b) whether or not Judge
Laigo should be cited in contempt and penalized administratively.
PROVREM
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
A. Issuance of the Assailed Orders vis-à-vis
Grave Abuse of Discretion.
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of
an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the
commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff
or any proper party.38 Case law instructs that an attachment is a
proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property,
enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor
acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or
levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property
attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the
owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had
under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is
satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law.39 Thus, a prior registration40 of an attachment lien
creates a preference,41 such that when an attachment has been duly
levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the
attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment. 42 As
provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of
constructive notice to all persons.43
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred
in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia,
Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property patently
anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-
established in law and jurisprudence.44 In this case, Ligon, in order to
secure the satisfaction of a favorable judgment in the Quezon City Case,
applied for and was eventually able to secure a writ of preliminary
attachment45over the subject property on November 25, 2002, which
was later annotated on the dorsal portion46 of TCT No. 9273 in the name
of Polished Arrow on December 3, 2002. Notwithstanding the subsequent
cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9,
2004 Decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps.
Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in
fraud of creditors, Ligon’s attachment lien over the subject property
continued to subsist since the attachment she had earlier secured binds
the property itself, and, hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps.
Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or
the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its
directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting (i.e., TCT
No. 19756),47 free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of
action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and, also,
defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears
noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid attachment, is
against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had
been effectively restored in view of the RTC’s rescission of the property’s
previous sale to Polished Arrow.48 Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien
against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors-in-interest should have
been preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to any
subsequent certificate of title,49 the most recent of which as it appears
on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico, without prejudice to
the latter’s right to protect his own ownership interest over the subject
property.
That said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the second and final issue
on indirect contempt.
B. Indirect Contempt Charges.
While the Court agrees with Ligon’s position on the issue of grave abuse
of discretion, it holds an opposite view anent its complaint for indirect
contempt against Judge Laigo and/or the respondents in this case.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 5 of 51
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. 50
Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds, namely: direct and indirect
contempt.1âwphi1 Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that
which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.51
The indirect contempt charges in this case involve an invocation of
paragraphs b, c, and d, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
read as follows:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. —
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, x x x;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon failed to sufficiently
show how the acts of each of the respondents, or more specifically,
Judge Laigo, constituted any of the acts punishable under the foregoing
section tending towards a wilful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed
his judicial functions pursuant to the December 9, 2004 Decision in the
Makati City Case which had already attained finality. Thus, without
Ligon's proper substantiation, considering too that Judge Laigo's official
acts are accorded with the presumption of regularity, 52 the Court is
constrained to dismiss the indirect contempt charges in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
October 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106175 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Assailed Orders subject of
this case are hereby declared NULL and VOID only insofar as they relate
to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19756 in the name of
respondent Leonardo J. Ting free from any liens and encumbrances. The
Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is DIRECTED to carry over and
annotate on TCT No. 31001 in the name of respondent Benito G. Techico
the original attachment lien of petitioner Leticia P. Ligon as described in
this Decision. The indirect contempt charges are, however, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
#3 G.R. No. 156208 September 26, 2006
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA),
represented by Its President ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC
EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU) – NORTHERN LUZON
REGIONAL CENTER, represented by its Regional President JIMMY
D. SALMAN, in their own individual capacities and in behalf of the
members of the associations and all affected officers and
employees of National Power Corporation (NPC), ZOL D. MEDINA,
NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR., NECITAS B.
CAMAMA, in their individual capacities as employees of National
Power Corporation, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER
BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as
Chairman of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB),
ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President – Officer-in-charge/CEO of
National Power Corporation and Member of National Power
Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
PROVREM
MARIUS P. CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L.
DOMINGO and NIEVES L. OSORIO, respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a special civil action for Injunction to enjoin public
respondents from implementing the National Power Board (NPB)
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, both dated 18 November
2002, directing, among other things, the termination of all employees of
the National Power Corporation (NPC) on 31 January 2003 in line with
the restructuring of the NPC.
On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA Law), was approved and
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and took effect on
26 June 2001. Section 2(i) and Section 3 of the EPIRA Law states:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the
policy of the State:
xxxx
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of
the assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation
(NPC);
xxxx
Section 3. Scope. – This Act shall provide a framework for the
restructuring of the electric power industry, including the
privatization of the assets of NPC, the transition to the desired
competitive structure, and the definition of the responsibilities
of the various government agencies and private entities. 1
Under the EPIRA Law,2 a new National Power Board of Directors was
constituted composed of the Secretary of Finance as Chairman, with the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Budget and Management, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Director-General of the National Economic
and Development Authority, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, and the President of
the National Power Corporation as members.
On 27 February 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE)
promulgated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA
Law, pursuant to Section 773 thereof. Said IRR were approved by the
Joint Congressional Power Commission on even date. Meanwhile, also in
pursuant to the provisions of the EPIRA Law, the DOE created the
Energy Restructuring Steering Committee (Restructuring Committee) to
manage the privatization and restructuring of the NPC, the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Corporation (PSALM).
To serve as the overall organizational framework for the realigned
functions of the NPC mandated under the EPIRA Law, the Restructuring
Committee proposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was
approved by the NPB through NPB Resolution No. 2002-53 dated 11
April 2002. Likewise, the Restructuring Committee reviewed the
proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan and assisted in the
implementation of Phase I (Realignment) of said Plan, and thereafter
recommended to the NPB for approval the adoption of measures
pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPC personnel. The NPB,
taking into consideration the recommendation of the Restructuring
Committee, thus amended the Restructuring Plan approved under NPB
Resolution No. 2002-53.
On 18 November 2002, pursuant to Section 634 of the EPIRA Law and
Rule 335 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which
provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and
the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of
Organization. Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be legally
terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation
benefits. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution No. 2002-
125, whereby a Transition Team was constituted to manage and
implement the NPC's Separation Program.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 6 of 51
In a Memorandum dated 21 November 2002, the NPC OIC-President and
CEO Rolando S. Quilala circulated the assailed Resolutions and directed
the concerned NPC officials to disseminate and comply with said
Resolutions and implement the same within the period provided for in
the timetable set in NPB Resolution No. 2002-125. As a result thereof,
Mr. Paquito F. Garcia, Manager – HRSD and Resources and
Administration Coordinator of NPC, circulated a Memorandum dated 22
November 2002 to all NPC officials and employees providing for a
checklist of the documents required for securing clearances for the
processing of separation benefits of all employees who shall be
terminated under the Restructuring Plan.
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions are void and without force
and effect, herein petitioners, in their individual and representative
capacities, filed the present Petition for Injunction to restrain
respondents from implementing NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125. In support thereof, petitioners invoke Section 78 of the EPIRA
Law, to wit:
Section 78. Injunction and Restraining Order. – The
implementation of the provisions of this Act shall not be
restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125, petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were not passed and
issued by a majority of the members of the duly constituted Board of
Directors since only three of its members, as provided under Section
486 of the EPIRA Law, were present, namely: DOE Secretary Vincent S.
Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T.
Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala. According to
petitioners, the other four members who were present at the meeting
and signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective
departments but were merely representatives or designated alternates
of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members
of the NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are
violative of the well-settled principle that "delegated power cannot be
further delegated." Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned
Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly
constituted board since no quorum existed because only three of the
nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were
present and qualified to sit and vote.
It is petitioners' submission that even assuming arguendo that there was
no undue delegation of power to the four representatives who signed the
assailed Resolutions, said Resolutions cannot still be given legal effect
because the same did not comply with the mandatory requirement of
endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power Commission and approval
of the President of the Philippines, as provided under Section 47 of the
EPIRA Law which states that:
Section 47. NPC Privatization. – Except for the assets of SPUG,
the generation assets, real estate, and other disposable assets
as well as IPP contracts of NPC shall be privatized in
accordance with this Act. Within six (6) months from
effectivity of this Act, the PSALM Corp. shall submit a plan for
the endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power
Commission and the approval of the President of the
Philippines, on the total privatization of the generation assets,
real estate, other disposable assets as well as existing IPP
contracts of NPC and thereafter, implement the same, in
accordance with the following guidelines, except as provided
for in paragraph (f) herein: x x x.
Petitioners insist that if ever there exists a valid wholesale abolition of
their positions and their concomitant separation form the service, such a
process is an integral part of "privatization" and "restructuring" as
defined under the EPIRA Law and, therefore, must comply with the
above-quoted provision requiring the endorsement of the Joint
Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of
the Philippines. Furthermore, petitioner highlight the fact that said
Resolutions will have an adverse effect on about 5,648 employees of the
NPC and will result in the displacement of some 2,370 employees, which,
petitioners argue, is contrary to the mandate of the Constitution to
promote full employment and security of tenure.
Respondents, on the other hand, uphold the validity of the assailed
Resolutions by arguing that while it is true that four members of the
National Power Board of Directors, particularly the respective Secretaries
of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of
PROVREM
Trade and Industry, and the Department of Finance, as well as the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority,
were not the actual signatories in NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125, they were, however, ably represented by their respective
alternates. Respondents claim that the validity of such administrative
practice whereby an authority is exercised by persons or subordinates
appointed by the responsible official has long been settled. Respondents
further contend that Section 48 of the EPIRA Law does not in any way
prohibit any member of the NPB from authorizing his representative to
sign resolutions adopted by the Board.
From the arguments put forward by herein parties, it is evident that the
pivotal issue to be resolved in this Petition for Injunction is whether or
not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly
enacted. It is petitioners' contention that the failure of the four
specifically identified department heads7 under Section 48 of the EPIRA
Law to personally approve and sign the assailed Resolutions invalidates
the adoption of said Resolutions. Petitioners maintain that there was
undue delegation of delegated power when only the representatives of
certain members of the NPB attended the board meetings and passed
and signed the questioned Resolutions.
We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who
shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has
vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and
discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as
"the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and
one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without
willfulness or favor.8 Discretion, when applied to public functionaries,
means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in
certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment
and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of
others.9 It is to be presumed that in naming the respective department
heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these
secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their
personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy
their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department
secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much
less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is
their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such
responsibility.
There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions
involves the exercise of discretion and not merely a ministerial act that
could be validly performed by a delegate, thus, the rule enunciated in
the case of Binamira v. Garrucho10 is relevant in the present
controversy, to wit:
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it
to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because
he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in
his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties
to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office
requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or
discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he
was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place
has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to
another.
Respondents' assertion to the contrary is not tenable. The ruling in the
case cited by respondents to support their contention is not applicable in
the case at bar. While it is true that the Court has determined in the
case of American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents 11 that a
delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to
assist him in his functions, it must be stressed that the Court explicitly
stated in the same case that said practice is permissible only when the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law. According to the Court, the rule that requires an
administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally authorized
official who makes the final decisionthrough the use of his own personal
judgment.
In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 7 of 51
the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the
secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed
Resolution, as shown by the fact that it is the signatures of the
respective representatives that are affixed to the questioned Resolutions.
This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the specifically
enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in
exercising the corporate powers of the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by
these mere representatives in favor of the adoption of the said
Resolutions must not be considered in determining whether or not the
necessary number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed
Resolutions may be validly enacted. Hence, there being only three valid
votes cast out of the nine board members, namely those of DOE
Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala,
NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and are of no
legal effect.
Having determined that the assailed Resolutions are void as they lack
the necessary number of votes for their adoption, We no longer deem it
necessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the instant petition
WHEREFORE, premises considered, National Power Board Resolutions
No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are hereby
declared VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT. The Petition for
Injunction is hereby GRANTED and respondents are
hereby ENJOINED from implementing said NPB Resolutions No. 2002-
124 and No. 2002-125.
SO ORDERED.
#4 A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37
respondent law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October
19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated
therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly
dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for
indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the
dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution.
Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly
in mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a
member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly
unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this
Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are
members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and
academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this
case are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
PROVREM
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of
a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against
a Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance
of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when
lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn
oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular,
avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any
court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the
pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation
of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here
but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by
respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the
Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper
intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case.
Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves
who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement, 2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean
Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of
freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it
is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this
Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in
open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law
and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own
non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if
purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it
is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for Vinuya, et
al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision, raising solely the following grounds:
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 8 of 51
 I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject
this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s
foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely,
under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions,
such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights
and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in
the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines
is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection
with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to
protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the
rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and
pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L.
Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares),
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230,
where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of
the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other
arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE
JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION
WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG
CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the
fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true
intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments
of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized
in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-
Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J.
Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S.
Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling
on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article
appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010. 13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and
Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today. 14 In the said column,
Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed
that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by
Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the
international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog
entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court
yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-
plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four
sentences and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in
my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-
Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations
until after the motion was filed today.
PROVREM
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens
discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our
article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision
is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.h
tm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues
on the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in
the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in
the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am
compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and
as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception
to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of
Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment
of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible
plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal
Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media
Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive
discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your
esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may
have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them
for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written
precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to
your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time
to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to
the issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court
formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics
Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the
Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and
Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo. 21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s
website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement
also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News
TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s
bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s
website.27
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 9 of 51
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of
the University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty)
to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice
Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement
signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College
of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme
Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not
contain the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated
the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing
beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law
faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and
suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the
government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial
recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230
(28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only
affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated
without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and
credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and
misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of
writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a
taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort
and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into
writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A
judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows
dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land,
to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of
PROVREM
laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and
falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material
shows that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal
writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his
own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes
the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears
the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the
original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the
thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this
case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the
original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This
cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’
writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those
primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of
the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates,
instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence
of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of
organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands
correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It
is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of
the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers,
Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court
actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture,
and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status
of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the
same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the
intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution
by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in
order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it
deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and
damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’
home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage.
National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international
impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered
from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on
the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of
acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition
based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided
this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court
added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false
sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for
even the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of
the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal
profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest
standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar
because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power
in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the
controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear
and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only
further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of
the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of
Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered
the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis
of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 10 of 51
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority
without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its (SGD.) JAY L.
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that BATONGBACAL
Professor
not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its Assistant Professor
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision
must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for
the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and (SGD.) PATRICIA R.P.
(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a SALVADOR DAWAY
BATTAD
higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Associate Dean and Associate
Assistant Professor
Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of Professor
administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity (SGD.) DANTE B.
(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting GATMAYTAN
Assistant Professor
demands of judicial and professional ethics. Associate Professor

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and (SGD.) SOLOMON F.
trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the (SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
LUMBA
opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law Assistant Professor
Assistant Professor
that:

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical
and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence
expected of the Supreme Court; LECTURERS

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A.
integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
ALAMPAY
and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of (SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
cases and the establishment of legal precedents (SGD.) ROSA MARIA J.
through dubious means; (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
BAUTISTA
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of (SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S.
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left QUIMBO
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the (SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B.
petitioners therein; CORONEL TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far- (SGD.) CONCEPCION L.
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the JARDELEZA
honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an (SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may (Underscoring supplied.)
consider appropriate;
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity made known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the
to review the manner by which it conducts research, Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:
prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in
order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to
provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Glasgow, 18 August 2010
Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal
research and writing in pleadings, practice, and Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
adjudication.

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City,
27 July 2010.
Your Excellency,

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law
at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of
one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your
Honourable Court.
(SGD.) FROILAN M. (SGD.) PACIFICO A.
BACUNGAN AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995) The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your
Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations
erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant
(SGD.) SALVADOR T. sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory
(SGD.) MERLIN M.
CARLOTA chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International
MAGALLONA
Dean (2005-2008) and Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic
Dean (1995-1999)
Professor of Law reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in
relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than
with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I
do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.
REGULAR FACULTY

PROVREM RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 11 of 51

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to
support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In
fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is
precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been
widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law.
Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts
to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to
facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now
a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence
of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how
my work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the
opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which
your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without
properly acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your
Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’
exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy
of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely
reflected the names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.)
beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from
the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee
was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed
on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law
Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed
copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members
appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories
to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous
copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It
also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the
Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in
the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of
ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the
same Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on
August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court. 33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the
following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion
on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated
such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular,
they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived
at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles
supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
PROVREM
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations
of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on
the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the
cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in
an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s
less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010
Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity
and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the
UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. 35 x x x. (Citations
omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota,
Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra
Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio
G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D.
Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 36 11 and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10,
Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated
August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the
investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the
Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of
the UP Law Faculty Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a
regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the
Court, respondents filed the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35
of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.
Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same
charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof.
Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 12 of 51
 (4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for
Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon
10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for
Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch
and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November
19, 2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective
counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common
Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring
Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as
members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one
that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted
with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was
involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further,
respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s
findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed
are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and
officers of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules
1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to
legal processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence,
or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the
issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their
intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its
integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in
the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on
constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for
the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench
and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research
and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with
strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal
processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics,
they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly
guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these
unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue
the Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x
x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They
further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly
drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was
not going to take any action on the grave and startling
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According
to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news
article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez
was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not
order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010
letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing
but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and
misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was
their perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers
posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo
that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the
issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable
in accordance with the standards of academic writing
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A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to
a discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism
against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign
materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue
that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are
therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity
Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included,
among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter
B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through
Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted
without proper attribution the text from a legal article by
Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario
Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International
Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law
Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity
and International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty
and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice Del
Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper
attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by
the Court when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism
issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted
that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are
legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published
reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to
the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism,
specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo
and Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
published on July 25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office
Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in
the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on August 8, 2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis
Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice Del
Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the
Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean
Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law on the calls for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin,
the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on
August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for
Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine
Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of
Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines –
Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on
August 16, 2010;64 and
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 13 of 51
 (x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan
University College of Law published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court
has singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show
Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have
violated specific canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance,
respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing
their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the
court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy
who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United
States v. Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In
the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents
asserted that their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their
academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They
relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008
which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and
responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of
such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and
communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of
reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised
[their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have
created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even
lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the
public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters
and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s
conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to
consider the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George
A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect
for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious
exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of
their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do
well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be
regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. 73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are
entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law,
members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray
that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse
findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its
conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached
their "obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, … and not to promote
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distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b]
committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the
foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the
alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that
before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to
refute and/or address the findings and conclusions
of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including
especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of
malicious intent), and in that connection, that
appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be
adopted and defined that will allow them the full and
fair opportunity to require the production of and to
present testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In
the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the
transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions
in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses who were or could
have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria
T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the
allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly
entitled her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause
Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be
considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in
good faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by
asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista
intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the
Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited
jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that
schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach,
what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be
admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the
schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the
academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other
universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise
of respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can
only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public
safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a
separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In
said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 14 of 51
his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a
topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first
semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained
citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a
copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to
his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced
by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith. 79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution,
Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all
citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers.
He invited the attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In
re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a
discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d. 82 He claims
that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained
any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its
disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the
Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the
Statement."84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court
the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism,
Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October
2010, some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to
commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like
respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless
of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the
academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic
discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that
plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to
pass it off as one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede
that he "might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of
such language [in the Statement] and could have been more
careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with
his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause
Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation
of Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law
Faculty Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three
drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as
follows:
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the
faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the
actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members
subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with
the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August
2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual
physical signature, but which reflects as signatories the names
of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation
"(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and
physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010.
Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially
received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP
College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before
the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring
Integrity II, and which presently serves as the official file copy
of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be
signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the
actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to
Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the
notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of
eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to
PROVREM
explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two
documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared
and came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively
broad agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean
Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it
among the faculty members so that those who wished to may
sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster
to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first
printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring
Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity
Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had
already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the
process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I
among the members of the faculty. Some faculty members
visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their
offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one
reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at
that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their
assurances that they would sign as soon as they could
manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that
Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean
Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a
style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of
Law. Following his own established practice in relation to
significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the
signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the
first printed draft would appear, together with the
corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring
Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite
or above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant
public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to
secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that
"[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals
and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the
signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign
Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his
Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity
II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed
the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the
"(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those
who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his
staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)"
signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that
she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday,
06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also
according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was
leaving for the United States the following week. It would later
turn out that this account was not entirely
accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 15 of 51
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative
officer, however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here
were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to
indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time
unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and
his staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure
Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what
actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff
talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza]
indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents.
However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement.
Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for
him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s
staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to
bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice
Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
before he left for the U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to
Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24
September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This
time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import
of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed,
Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the
Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his
arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already
become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would
take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those
circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable
Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly
aggravate the situation by signing the Statement. 95(Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature
page of Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of
Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s
August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to
the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was
explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I
when it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left
out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in
Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still
included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover
note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed
(the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a
dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of
the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was
unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were
not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s]
essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw
adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving
and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be
made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and
more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen
claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in
a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter did
not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members
of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring
Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any
violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead
PROVREM
nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed
their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he
did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the
Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same
to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper
disposition with the hope that its points would be duly considered by the
Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has
not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation
for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction
for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly
identical reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a
hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly
relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that
he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar
of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting
professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the
same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the
principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United
States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to
speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting
opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio,
Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be
forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he
quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression,
when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of
courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous
whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did
not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to
remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring
to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he
"has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for
the same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as
follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their
freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain
why they should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar
under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are
respondents entitled to require the production or presentation
of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation
issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to
have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 16 of 51
 witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been
presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the
Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally
mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the
underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the
Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as
a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will
plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a
decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are
not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion
in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper
disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under
the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later
submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity
Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a
belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their
expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a
truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations."112 It
was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a
pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show
Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but
only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement
that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or
constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations
of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on
the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the
cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’
freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in
an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
PROVREM
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s
less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010
Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity
and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the
UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. 115 x x x. (Citations
omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’
submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern
that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence
or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but
members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority
of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts
and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the
limits of fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found
Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable
administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the
resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all
the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by
the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that
some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to
do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of
this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes
of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified
nor necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force
thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and
the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason
and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to
threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means
are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of
their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene
and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court
because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that
they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in
this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt
of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the
court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to
intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it
may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 17 of 51
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their
quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo
concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case,
unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to
interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory,
Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher,
80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in
many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who
are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his
injudicious statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of
"erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond
merely ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to
their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 120 cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and
releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client
committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was
described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He
then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so
that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST
with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign
jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the
right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that
such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must
conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an
even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this
view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward
the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x
x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
PROVREM
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion
of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect
— are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit
to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect
are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar
should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission."
(In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality
so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez
Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending
cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior,
tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such
persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to
have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right
to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and
forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten
the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 18 of 51
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law
can be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer,
through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded
criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and
held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task
of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer
than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot
criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of
the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and
it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus,
in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly
declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am
Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned
in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the
freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with
it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of
this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In
re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In
re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive
language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of
disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in
pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158
SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public
Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and
Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
PROVREM
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative
complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will
not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to
his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty
of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings
and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to
advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar
to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the
Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed
as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory
Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common
Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of
life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist
that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered
and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is
the threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of
justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions
and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a
lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements
grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to
wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 19 of 51
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context,
in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. x x x. 132 (Emphases
supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some
respondents133 that the Statement presents no grave or imminent
danger to a legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’
academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and
jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are
free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will
teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause
Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can
teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to
subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious
conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party
in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been
passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of
whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic
freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a
case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech"
defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be
successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in
the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by
their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system.
To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited
in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic
freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the
broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law
are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents
are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts
of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the
Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in
keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled
that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to
give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct
that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations.
With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence,
since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code
of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation
of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of
expression and academic freedom, the Court considers here the other
averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main
ideas: (a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge
PROVREM
against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court
to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of
respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a
misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in
the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in
the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating
the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts
and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have
repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and
Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the
respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and
urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using
contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in
favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement
could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not
only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have
suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis
of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or
equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability
for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters
to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers
it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion
devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del
Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to
attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against
Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents’
submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves
admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest
in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up
their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on
their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the
Statement was intended for effective speech; that speech must be
"forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders
what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court
as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic
values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble
the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students
that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to
their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were
deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to
illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and
the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign
authors are the ones who would expectedly be affected by any
perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are
beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains
to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is
unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same.
These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet
that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his
opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and
unproductive recriminations.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 20 of 51
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the
Court to take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has
some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant
for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported
in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more
plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the
general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the
effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by
Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of
observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when
respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the
Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final
disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this
point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first
drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the
Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief
that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against
Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the
drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its
publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics
Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’
outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the
Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take
action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the
Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of
fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no
merit in the respondents’ reliance on various news reports and
commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are
being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the
Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the
Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138 action.
This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the
possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism
comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full
grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who
appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and
worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court
cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on
legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,
considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have
been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing
to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part
well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is
established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious
language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be
mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his
intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but,
unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment.
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same
conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of
intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that
the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language
used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect
for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re
Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention
constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into
consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to
him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such
concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to
prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the same
course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said
attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and
PROVREM
to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence
the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the
administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences
in his Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the
only one among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere
deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of
how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that
his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason
plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty
prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion
on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of
plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have
been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having
to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless
insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all
that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their
principles but only that they recognize that they themselves may have
committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez
for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true
import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons,
the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of
the Bar of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the
disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these
proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged
as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the
threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the
Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar,
civility and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should
be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show
cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon
10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that
was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring
Integrity II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual
signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the
body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to
downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of
the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity
II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with
dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their
imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively
liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law
faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper
and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view
that the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its
contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally
submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect
accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a
UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons
who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority mainly
depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have
endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’
explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions
as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter
of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s
predicament is the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the
signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and,
instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or
"reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean
Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature
pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 21 of 51
information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as
among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed
staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the
signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed
Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin
board or a website a signed document may have to be reformatted and
signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual.
We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for
posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this
Court, of a signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not
contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is
the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the
very least a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has
not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his
submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010.
There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring
Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean
Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court
submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of
documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean
Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did
not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor
is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer.
In the course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his
administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated
as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors
had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had
not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring
Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one
purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary
to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it
appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when
such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for
perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer
the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at
least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement
when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the
case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that
the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly
determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the
Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the
professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact
signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed
document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as
that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen
should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not
wait for actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this
Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a
required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission
that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance
unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated
lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R.
No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for
alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory,
PROVREM
that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that
purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of
witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation
issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case
against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to
the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and
for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially
echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s
Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the
Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt,
under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished
only after charge and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’
premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due
process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a
hearing in this case springs largely from its characterization as a special
civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her
reliance therein on the majority’s purported failure to follow the
procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for
opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an
indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has
no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on
disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to
wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest
of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall
proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save
that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly
by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal
investigation, through a referral to the specified officers, is merely
discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if
the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in
Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings
do not require a trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.
A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in
Pena v. Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 22 of 51
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of
a complainant or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81,
Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of
Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further
inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record
sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need
of any further investigation after considering his actions based on
records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast
dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also
inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took
judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his
cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the
payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they
claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative
liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no
evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined
for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against
and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court
from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the
errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As
we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be
heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation
filed before this Court.146 (Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a
hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on
these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any
justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have
not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or
testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a
formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence,
and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the
findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause
Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the
conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary
reason for their request for access to the records and evidence
presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate,
the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at
bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the
Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it)
happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the
proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause
Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with language that
the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case
and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go
no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various
versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves
supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources
that are already of public knowledge.
PROVREM
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the
language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the
drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions,
the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of
Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure,
these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is any
evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how
as early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the
ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his
return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of
action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the
Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed"
with the Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court
action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as
worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies
respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or
evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the
Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in
their respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this
time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is
respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are
supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding
the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear
the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records
of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for
lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to
have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social
issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points
of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded
from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy
that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or
private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken
an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to
conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no
exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their
status in the academic community or the law school to which they
belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely,
Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn
(Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan
P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario
O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña,
Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo,
Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L.
Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent
law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence
the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 23 of 51
 (3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the
Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is
excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded
that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law
school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat of
sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access
to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
(the next case is the one cited in the book, so I’ll include this)
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
entitled Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the Present:
University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations CORONA, C.J.,
of Plagiarism and CARPIO,
Misrepresentation in the Supreme CARPIO MORALES,*
Court. VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 19, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another,
or parts or passages of his writings, or the ideas or language of the
same, and passing them off as the product of ones own mind. [1]
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry
L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the Court denied the
petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
officers of the executive department[2] to espouse their claims for
reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the
abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World
War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent from their article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2)
Christian J. Tams from his book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005;
and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006.The allegations of plagiarism centered on
Justice Del Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga
omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota,
Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
PROVREM
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra
Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio
G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D.
Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the
UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls
for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of
allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the
educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but
a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del
Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors
of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim
preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again
been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not
only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went
further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary
injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how
to go about the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its
dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming
lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their published statement
reads,
But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years,
oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking
justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and
plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based
on polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court added
insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled
with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic)
[betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even the
most basic values of decency and respect. (Emphasis
supplied).
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the
UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary,
uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is
the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the
decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before
the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly[3]that any
publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit,
or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of
court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is
critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a
general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of
criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. [4] The court
must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive
of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. [5]
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for
the facultys less than objective comments except to discredit the April
28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 24 of 51
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.[6] Their actions likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11,
and 13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[9]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona,
Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V.
Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the
faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed
to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August
10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement,
entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Enclosed are copies of the said
dummy and signed statement, respectively, attached to the said letter
dated August 10, 2010 and to the Compliance dated August 31,
2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards.
Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter.
Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named
UP College of Law faculty members be effected by personal delivery.
SO ORDERED.
#5 A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S.
SORREDA.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In a letter1 to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with
copies thereof furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other
government entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as "member, Philippine Bar",
expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the
manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to
wit:
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances
surrounding the dismissal on February 7, 20002of the very first case he
filed with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda
PROVREM
had previously written a letter3 dated April 2, 2001 addressed to the
Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the
Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself
in the aforesaid case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely
unworthy of the majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the
land. It is the action not of men of reason or those who believe in
the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom
"might is right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving
down a hapless suitor’s throat a ruling which, from all
appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August
14, 2001,4 required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be
properly disciplined "for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the
Supreme Court by using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous
derogatory language against it".
In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2)
more letters to the Court dated December 2, 20015 and June 16,
2002,6 arguing for the propriety of his action and practically lecturing the
Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law.
In its Resolutions of January 15, 20027 and August 27, 20028, the Court
merely noted said two letters.
Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of
Atty. Sorreda disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting,
offensive and derogatory language, to wit:
"SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH
THE COUNTRY’S JUSTICE SYSTEM"9
"WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR.
CHIEF JUSTICE?
xxx xxx xxx
I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-
handed actuations as the Honorable Court has displayed. They are as
one might expect in a dictatorship or authoritarian regime."10
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and
uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject
letter of February 21, 2005:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the
most palpably meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the
Supreme Court, or any court of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt
that were it not for the Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents
that ensued from it, at least some of these ten cases would have met
with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to
any reasonable and impartial mind.
In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has
taken it personally against me. To the detriment of my innocent
clients. And of justice.
Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against
me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that.
As I had stated in one communication-
[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Court’s position, it is that
x x x if indeed I had wronged the Court in the way it had described,
and if indeed my explanations and arguments "lack merit," I should
indeed be disciplined; and surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It
should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of the
charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked.
Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to
deny to the undersigned the "full opportunity" for self-defense that he
request … therefore he is now left without any defense, and he can only
wonder why no sanction has come down until the present time.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 25 of 51
Might it be because I had continued, "Of course, I shall also only expect
that such judgment, when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as
thoroughly discussed perhaps as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for
the proper guidance of all concerned"- and the Court knows that it is not
able to give such a "fully-reasoned judgment" as I ask? But rather than
admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it would rather "get back"
at me by means of unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to it- let the
innocent litigants, whose only mistake was to hire me as their counsel,
and the cause of justice suffer as they may.
Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven
cowardice, to deal with an adversary like that. It is not
something I would have expected from the supreme judges of
the land.
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light.
The same verifications that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became
course for dismissal. What other interpretation can I give it, than that
the court had run out of excuses to dismiss, since I was being careful not
to repeat the same adjudged "shortcomings"; and was now scrounging
every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get my
"comeuppance."
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division-
only either to the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo, which handled the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired
by the Chief Justice, to whom I have directly written afterwards. Could it
be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely explanation that the powers-
that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get favorable ruling?
Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillo’s
retirement on November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the
nation’s judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way
beyond the constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so
much mystery and intrigue has surrounded the appointment of his
successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was
sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new retirement took
place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this latest
retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to
other than the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug,
then Chairman of the Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable reputations for
independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in the court exercised
their utmost influence to at least prevent the both of them sitting in the
bench at the same time, lest together they should "buck the system"
and divide the Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably rule
on the undersigned counsel’s cases before it?
xxx xxx xxx
But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly
convinced that the court is in the wrong. I cannot but thus be filled with
both acute sadness and burning indignation. Sadness as counsel, to
come to the realization that the high institution of which I am an
officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that the
public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find
justice, should instead give judgments that so insult the
intelligence and glare with iniquity.
Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could
pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days, and not to have to account
for it? Who can believe that the supposedly most illustrious legal minds
of the land, would miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the actions of
an agency that directly contravened numerous laws and rules all at
once? How could democracy’s vaunted "last bulwark" suffer a widow and
her children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly
void sale and illegal demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the
court pause for even three minutes to put itself in the shoes of an
evidently innocent man kept locked up for three years now on a
manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its
"discretion" not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the Court get
such brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the
ground that the docket fees had not been paid, when the
evidence clearly show they in fact were? What manner of men
are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt,
and the bar to become like "Frodo" in the fight against society’s
evils in your public speeches and writings, and yet you
yourselves committing the same evils when hidden from public
view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the
‘What-are-we-in-power-for’ mentality? (Underscoring ours)
PROVREM
Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorreda’s aforesaid letter of
21 February 2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of
the Court.
In an en banc Resolution11 dated March 15, 2005, the Court again
required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its
Justices.
By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda, in
his letter of May 10, 200512, again with copies thereof furnished the
Justices, judges and lawyers thereunder listed, states that he "does not
see the need to say any more" because the "cause" has "already been
shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter of 21 February 2005, adding
that "[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter
swiftly and decisively". While admitting "the great seriousness of the
statements and imputations I have leveled against the Court", he dared
the Court whether "it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the
‘Supreme Judge’".
After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses
the Court of being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by
its rulings thereon. Atty. Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does
not know how to count when it dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of
failure to file the petition therein within the reglementary period. For the
enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition
in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the period fixed in
Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or
certified true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule
46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56.13 In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs.
CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was dismissed on the mere
ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be
reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective
verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a
substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.14 We see no need to belabor the
grounds for the dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said
grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions which
were plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even
to those who do not have a formal education in law. Suffice it to say that
the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation
among members of this Court.
Atty. Sorreda’s imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle
of cases is utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his
imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the
court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of
the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In Ang vs. Castro15, this Court held that if a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same
court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct
contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily. 16
Atty Sorreda’s conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically -
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
xxx
Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not
supported by the record or having no materiality to the case.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 26 of 51
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his client’s genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, 17 he must do so only within the bounds
of the law.18 A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be
exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer’s fidelity to his client must
not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common
sense.19
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to
criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the
unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into
disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound "to act to
preserve its honor and dignity … and to safeguard the morals and ethics
of the legal profession".20
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer21 are enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good
fidelity xxx to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold."
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,22 Justice Sanchez
further elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,23 we held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirement of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice.24 No less must this be and with greater reasons
in the case of the country’s highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last
bulwark of justice and democracy
PROVREM
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice, to which his client’s success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession
is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. 25
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as
a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. 26
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character
in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.27
In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile,28 we
imposed on the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the
Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from
the Bar a fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the
privileges of membership to the profession. It is imperative to instill in
him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be
done outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to which he will be
allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds. 29
WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt
of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar
and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until otherwise
ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be
distributed to all courts for their information. This Resolution shall be
spread in his personal record and is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
#6 G.R. No. 158971. August 25, 2005
MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well as in his
capacity as owner of PHILIPPINE AGRI TRADING
CENTER, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELENA
EMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
For resolution is private respondent Elena Embang’s motion to cite Atty.
Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt
of court for delaying this case and impeding the execution of the
judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon 121 and Rule 12.042 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang
against petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center. The labor arbiter
ruled in favor of Embang. The dispositive portion of his September 29,
2000 decision3 read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Embang] to be a
regular employee of the PHIL-AGRI TRADING CENTER and ordering the
latter to reinstate her to her former position and pay her backwages
from the date of her dismissal on February 18, 2000 until her
reinstatement which computed as of today amounts to ₱37,771.50
(₱5881 x 6.5 months) plus 1/12 thereof or the amount of ₱3,147.62 as
corresponding 13th month pay for the period.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 27 of 51
An additional award of 5% of the total award is also rendered since [,]
compelled to litigate [,] [Embang] had to engage the services of counsel.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision
of the labor arbiter with modification. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit and the Decision dated September 29, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in [that Mariano Y. Siy] should be made jointly and
severally liable together with Phil. Agri Trading Center and that
[Embang] is entitled only [to] the ten (10%) percent of his awarded
13th month pay as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution,
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a
petition for certiorari. Finding the petition to be without merit, the
appellate court dismissed the same.5 The motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner was likewise denied.6
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court questioning the CA’s decision (dismissing his petition) and
resolution (denying his motion for reconsideration). Since we found no
reversible error on the part of the appellate court, we denied the petition
in our September 22, 2003 resolution. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of our resolution but we resolved to deny the same with
finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made on December 30, 2003.
In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang’s
counsel filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated
February 16, 2004 before the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo
entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a comment to the
motion for writ of execution.7 He alleged that Embang rejected the
various offers of reinstatement extended to her by petitioner; hence, she
should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the
date of the promulgation of the labor arbiter’s decision.
This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and motions
between the parties.8 Finding that his office was never informed by
petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention on their
part to reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued
an order dated July 30, 20049 granting the February 16, 2004 motion
and directing that a writ of execution be issued.
Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC
on August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave
abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order that the backwages
should be computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no
backwages should accrue thereafter because of Embang’s refusal to be
reinstated.
Embang’s counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the
appeal was not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading
Center did not post the required cash or surety bond. Pending the
resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite Atty.
Quevedo in contempt of court.
By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the
execution of the decision but only sought the consideration of Embang’s
refusal to be reinstated in any writ of execution that may be issued. He
claims that such refusal on Embang’s part constituted a supervening
event that justified the filing of an appeal ― notwithstanding the finality
of the decision. He also asserts that an appeal was the proper remedy to
question the July 30, 2004 order of the labor arbiter.
Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution10 on
February 28, 2005 resolving not to give due course to the appeal and to
remand the case to the regional arbitration branch for further
proceedings. The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order was not
appealable. Despite the denial of the appeal, however, Atty. Quevedo
PROVREM
filed a motion for clarification/partial reconsideration of the NLRC’s
February 28, 2005 resolution.
For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment,
we hold Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to
its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard
or disobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct tending to bring
the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. 11 Under the
Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either direct or indirect
contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same.12 Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a
court.13 It is an act done at a distance which tends to belittle, degrade,
obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.14
Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect
contempt is committed by a person who commits the following acts,
among others: disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order
or judgment of a court;15 any abuse of or any unlawful interference with
the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt;16 and any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. 17
We denied with finality the petitioner’s petition for review
on certiorari almost two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter
(affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this
Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo’s sly
maneuvers on behalf of his client.
Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the
matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits
of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s
verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement
in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:18
…well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime
and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must
frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical
errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Contrary
to Atty. Quevedo’s contention, there existed no supervening event that
would have brought the case outside the ambit of the general rule on the
immutability of final and executory decisions.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment
becomes final and executory or to new circumstances which
develop after judgment acquires finality.19 The "refusal" of Embang to be
reinstated happened, assuming it really happened, before the finality of
our September 22, 2003 resolution, i.e., before the decision of the labor
arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final and executory.
In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embang’s
rejection of the same was not a new one and had already been passed
upon by the courts. Atty. Quevedo himself admits that petitioner brought
the issue before the CA in his June 6, 2002 petition for certiorari and
December 3, 2002 memorandum. The appellate court brushed it aside
and found neither factual nor legal merit in the petition. The matter was
again raised in petitioner’s June 3, 2003 motion for reconsideration
which was denied on the ground that the basic issues had already been
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 28 of 51
previously considered by the court. Embang’s alleged refusal to be
reinstated was also alleged in the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner before this Court. We denied it for failing to show that a
reversible error had been committed by the CA.
Atty. Quevedo’s client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of the
modified decision of the labor arbiter. He should not have tried, under
the guise of a flimsy appeal to the NLRC, to reopen a case already
decided with finality. Nor should he have raised anew matters previously
considered and issues already laid to rest.
Atty. Quevedo’s act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was
obviously intended to defeat the implementation of a final and executory
decision. Elementary is the rule that an order granting a motion for a
writ of execution is not appealable.20 Thus, Atty. Quevedo’s deceptively
"innocent" appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross
ignorance of basic rules of procedure resulting in the obstruction of
justice.
By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying
the fruits of her hard earned legal victory. In effect, he has been tying
the hands of justice and preventing it from taking its due course. His
conduct has thwarted the due execution of a final and executory
decision. By appealing an order which he knew to be unappealable, he
abused court processes and hindered the dispensation of justice. His
dilatory tactics were an affront to the dignity of the Court, clearly
constituting indirect contempt.
We note that the ground cited in the motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in
contempt of court was his violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While a lawyer’s violation of his
duties as an officer of the court may also constitute contempt, the
grounds for holding a person in contempt and for holding him
administratively liable for the violation of his lawyer’s oath are distinct
and separate from each other. They are specified in Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court. A finding of contempt on the part of a lawyer does not preclude
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him for his contravention
of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus:
x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are
separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the
exercise of the other. A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is
designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the
object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court
and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy
to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to
cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court [while that]
of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to
assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as
judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a
contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent
charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner, an attorney’s
conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor
on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise been
the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering
that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the
procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and
139 thereof.
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for
contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme
Court and are equally incidents of the court’s basic power to oversee the
proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial
functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.:
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play
in cases like that before us here: the Court’s inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for
contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and
PROVREM
non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor
is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the
Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged
also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of
court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court
over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to
the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any
act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.21
We therefore refer the complaint against Atty. Quevedo’s behavior to the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
an investigation of his possible liabilities under Canon 12 and Rule 12.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a FINE of ₱30,000 is imposed upon him,
payable in full within five days from receipt of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
#7 A.M. No. MTJ-05-1587 April 15, 2005
PILAR BARREDO-FUENTES, LOURDES J. ESTRELLADO, CLARITA
ESTRELLADO-MAINAR, and FLORENDA ESTRELLADO-
DIAZ, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ROMEO C. ALBARRACIN, MTCC, Branch 3, Davao
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case arose when a Complaint-Affidavit dated 31 May
2004 of Pilar Barredo-Fuentes, Lourdes J. Estrellado, Clarita Estrellado-
Mainar and Florenda Estrellado-Diaz (complainants) charged Judge
Romeo C. Albarracin (respondent judge) of MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City,
with Gross Ignorance of the Law and/or Procedure and Grave Abuse of
Discretion. The charges refer to respondent judge’s acting on an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion without hearing and without the motion served
on the complainants.1 The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion sought the issuance of
an order specifically directing Sheriff Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the
writ of execution and special writ of demolition, including the demolition
of defendants’ buildings and other improvements filed by plaintiffs in the
following cases:
(1) Special Civil Case No. 6, 298-C-98 entitled "Heirs of Dr.
Jovito S. Francisco, et al. v. Pilar E. Barredo-Fuentes" for
Forcible Entry;
(2) Special Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98 entitled "JS Franciso
and Sons, Inc. v. Nicolas Estrellado and Narcisa Trono-
Estrellado" for Forcible Entry; and
(3) Special Civil Case No. 6, 296-C-98 entitled "JS Francisco &
Sons, Inc. v. Lourdes J. Estrellado" for Forcible Entry.
As gleaned from the complaint, complainants are the defendants in the
aforementioned cases. After trial on the forcible entry cases, judgments
were rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Thus, complainants filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a petition for annulment of
judgments under Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court. The case was
raffled to RTC Branch 13 and is pending resolution.2
On 4 March 2004, respondent judge issued a writ of demolition despite
the pendency of the case for annulment of judgments. Complainants
requested respondent judge to await the result of the annulment of
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 29 of 51
judgments case. Respondent judge, however, still issued the questioned
writ of demolition. This prompted complainants to file a petition for
prohibition to restrain respondent judge from further acting on the
subject cases during the pendency of the case for annulment of
judgments. During the pendency of the petition, respondent judge, after
notice and hearing, issued three (3) separate writs of execution and
special writs of demolition on 30 April 2004 relative to the subject
cases.3
On 20 May 2004, the plaintiffs in the ejectment cases filed the
aforementioned Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. Complainants aver that they
were not served a copy of the motion. Neither was the motion set for
hearing in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Respondent judge, however, still granted the motion, an act
which allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law and procedure. 4
Respondent judge denies the charges filed against him. In
his Comment dated 23 August 2004, he argues that the case filed
against him was dilatory in nature.
Respondent judge narrates his own account of the doggedness of the
complainants in pursuing their claims through judicial processes. He
alleges that on 9 October 1998, JS Francisco & Sons, Inc., one of the
plaintiffs in the civil cases, filed against complainants cases for forcible
entry which were raffled to his sala at MTCC Branch 3. After trial,
judgments were rendered in favor of plaintiff corporation. Complainants
appealed to the RTC Branch 12 which affirmed the decisions of the
MTCC. Unperturbed, complainants filed petitions for review before the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court also denied the petitions. 5
Optimistic of a favorable outcome, complainants filed with the RTC the
petition seeking to annul the judgments of the MTCC. The complainants
also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking, among others, that
respondent judge be provisionally enjoined from taking immediate
possession of the parcels of land. The Executive Judge of RTC Davao
City, however, denied the application for the issuance of TRO and
directed the inclusion of the case in the special raffling of cases. The
case was raffled to RTC Branch 13 which eventually dismissed the case.
Undeterred, complainants filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court which is still pending resolution. Complainants also
filed with the RTC petitions for cancellation of adverse claim of JS
Francisco & Sons, Inc. which was eventually dismissed.6
Respondent judge further contends that on 24 March 2004, upon motion
of the plaintiff corporation and after several hearings, he issued an order
granting plaintiff corporation’s prayer for the issuance of a special order
of demolition. However, Sheriff Del Campo failed to fully implement the
demolition. Plaintiff corporation thus filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
which was eventually granted in an Order dated 26 May 2004.7
Subsequently, complainants filed a consolidated motion seeking to
expunge the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. Respondent judge inhibited himself
from further handling the ejectment cases since complainants had
already filed the present administrative case. In view of the inhibition,
the cases were raffled to MTCC Branch 6, Davao City. The consolidated
motion was eventually denied.8
Respondent judge denies complainants’ charge that the granting of
plaintiff’s corporations motion which directed Sheriff Del Campo to
enforce the special writ of demolition despite the pendency of the case
for annulment of judgments at the RTC Branch 13 reflects gross
ignorance of the law. He argues that the RTC where the forcible entry
cases were elevated did not issue any TRO or any injunctive relief to
restrain him from granting the motion to enforce/implement the writ of
demolition. He contends that the granting of the motion was incidental
to the motion for execution which has long been granted. In addition,
the Court of Appeals in its decisions affirmed the decisions of the lower
court.9
On the charge that he granted without hearing plaintiff corporation’s
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, respondent judge asserts that a hearing is not
necessary because the special writ of demolition had already been
granted after several hearings and the ex-parte motion was merely for
the enforcement or implementation of said writ.10
After a perusal of the evidence on record, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) ruled that complainants have no basis for their
PROVREM
charges. It noted that the wheels of justice would run smoothly if the
members of the judiciary who perform their functions conscientiously are
not hampered by groundless and vexatious charges. Complainants’
contention that respondent judge should not have acted on the motion
for issuance of special writ of demolition due to the pendency of the
petition for annulment of the decisions in the subject cases with the RTC
is baseless. It would not bar respondent judge from acting on the said
motion considering that there was no TRO or injunction to prevent him
from proceeding with the subject cases. Further, the decisions in the
subject cases had already become final and executory. However, due to
the numerous delaying tactics employed by complainants the same
remained unexecuted.11
The OCA concluded that the allegation that respondent judge violated
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court had no leg to
stand on. The ex-parte motion was merely to request the branch sheriff
to implement the special writ of demolition which had long been issued
by the court after several hearings. As such, it could be considered as a
non-litigable motion which may be acted upon by the court without
prejudicing the rights of herein complainants. Thus, the OCA
recommended that the administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit
and that complainants be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment administrative
case.12
We sustain the findings of the OCA except as to the imposition of fine on
complainants.
This Court has ruled that when a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the
competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. 13 However,
gross ignorance of the law is more than an erroneous application of legal
provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary
action, even though such acts are erroneous.14 For liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the
judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be
erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was
moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. 15
Such circumstances are not obtaining in the case at bar. In fact,
respondent judge correctly applied Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court which read, thus:
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be
addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10)
days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion
set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of service thereof.
The evidence reveals that respondent judge notified complainants and
conducted a hearing before the issuance of the writ of execution and
special writ of demolition.16 It was only when the execution and
demolition were not implemented that, upon ex-parte motion of the
plaintiffs, respondent judge directed Sheriff del Campo to enforce the
writ of execution and special writ of demolition despite the absence of
notice and hearing considering that these rights had already been
availed of by complainants. It is worthy to note that the second order
was a mere implementation of a prior order implementing execution and
demolition. Even Section 10(d) of Rule 39 is silent as to the need for a
second hearing in case the first motion for the issuance of writ of
execution and special order of demolition was not fully implemented:
SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.⎯
(d). Removal of improvements on property
subject of execution. – When the property subject of
the execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by
the court.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 30 of 51
Procedural rules are primarily designed to promote expeditious
administration of justice. Procedural remedies not expressed in the law
or rules and which may cause unreasonable delay in the final
determination and enforcement of cases must be ignored to give
significance to the drafting of the Rules of Court. Thus, in issuing the
assailed order, respondent judge merely sought to carry out the
expeditious implementation of a judgment which was already final and
executory. For such commendable act, respondent judge should be
praised, not condemned.
As to the recommendation to impose fine on the complainants, we rule
that the circumstances of the case fail to warrant such course of action.
The OCA cannot just penalize complainants by way of imposing fine on
them without the benefit of a thorough determination of the liability
based on evidence adduced by the parties. They must be given an
opportunity to refute the charges by adducing evidence on specific
charges against them, not in a mere administrative case which involves
a matter different from the alleged culpability of the complainants. This
requirement is fundamentally a part of due process enshrined in the
Constitution17 that a person can only be penalized for a charge of which
he was sufficiently informed and only after he was given an opportunity
to be heard and present evidence to prove the contrary.
Nonetheless, assuming that the acts of the complainants may be
considered as "delaying tactics," remedial action may be enforced
against them through contempt of court proceedings. A brief review of
the rules governing contempt proceedings is useful.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of
the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or
their witnesses during litigation.18
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty
of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so.19 Indirect contempt or constructive contempt
is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. 20Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect
contempt.21 The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct the
administration of justice falls under this latter category.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
following requisites prior to conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge
in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and
(c) to be heard by himself or counsel.22 With respect to constructive
contempts or those which are committed without the actual presence of
the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner
permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense to the charges before
punishment is imposed.23 The proceedings for punishment of indirect
contempt are criminal in nature. The modes of procedure and rules of
evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those
used in criminal prosecutions.24
Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings against complainants for the injury was not committed
against this tribunal, but against respondent judge.
There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or
condemn the complainants to suffer the penalty for contempt,
considering that the "contemptuous" act was not directed against the
Court itself. The penalty as recommended by the OCA cannot be
sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be
penalized for filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate
proceeding, if warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we modify the conclusion
reached by the OCA. The administrative case filed against Judge Romeo
C. Albarracin is hereby DISMISSED.
PROVREM
SO ORDERED.
#8 G.R. No. 205956 February 12, 2014
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG
LA'O, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in
G.R. No. 199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already
dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique
Cu-Unjieng La'O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while
respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her counsel
therein.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-
PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP
Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are
charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident which
transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of
respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay,
were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at
Ortigas Center, which incident was captured by a television crew from
UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed,
among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set
aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn;
and that charges for murder be filed.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in
Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where
Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which
resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This
encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for
him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan
incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano,
organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press
conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in
handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the
merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan and his
co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-
CBN news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, as
follows:
Atty. Diokno
So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is
very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa
loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a
shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano
Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga
mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo
na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 31 of 51
Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa
yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant
because they protected him all these years. They let him get away with
it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of
murdering so many innocent individuals.
Atty. Diokno
Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and
company have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their
participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by
their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our
consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed
a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po kami
noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon wala pa
pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag
charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na they were
killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno
Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the
policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man
who is involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam free and remain
unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens, we firmly
believe that police rub-out will not stop until you personally intervene.
Ernesto Manzano
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with
us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule,
making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and
malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the
Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the
criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his
co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position that the press
conference was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of
influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed before it and the
outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by drawing an ostensible
parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident.
The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation
of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of
their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and
did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice
in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances
were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of
public interest and concern; and that this petition is intended to stifle
legitimate speech.
The petition must fail.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the
judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this
rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. –
x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxx
PROVREM
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in
nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless
the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 6
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really
appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. 91âwphi1
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to
conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which
tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct
the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of
freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two
rights.10
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of
the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a
clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration
of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the
exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that
the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat.11
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate
to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the
conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim
to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered
by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No.
199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from
homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said
statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition
cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments
reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any
action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of
the Court either.
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a
judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in
such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the
respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments
of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh
heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 13 The
power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.14 In the present case, such necessity is wanting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 32 of 51
SO ORDERED.
#9 G.R. No. 162299 March 26, 2014
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., DEAN ELIZABETH FE-DACANAY,
ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, DR. ROBERTO LEGASPI, DR.
ANASTACIO AQUINO, LOURDES JACINTO, DR. JOHN ANTHONY
DOMANTA Y, and NORA PO NOC, Petitioners,
vs.
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, SHIERYL A. REBUCAL, JENNY RIZA A.
BANTA, BRANDO B. BADECAO, and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174758
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, SHI ERYL A. REBUCAL, JENNY RIZA A.
BANTA, and BRANDO B. BADECAO,Petitioners,
vs.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., DEAN ELIZABETH FE-DACANA Y,
ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, DR. ROBERTO LEGASPI, DR.
ANASTACIO AQUINO, LOURDES JACINTO, DR. JOHN ANTHONY
DOMANTAY, and NORA PONOC, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For assessment and disposition before the Court are the following
consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
In G.R. No. 162299, Saint Louis University (SLU), along with co-
petitioners Dean Elizabeth Fe-Dacanay (Dean Dacanay), Rev. Father Paul
Van Parijs, Dr. Robert Legaspi, Dr. Anastacio Aquino, Lourdes Jacinto,
Dr. John Anthony Domantay, and Nora Ponoc, are challenging the
Resolutions, dated November 18, 20031 and February 10, 2004,2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. No. SP. 78127, dismissing SLU’s
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which sought the reversal of the
orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Baguio City (RTC), to wit:
1] Order,3 dated July 18, 2003, directing the petitioners to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of court; 2] Order, 4 dated June
6, 2003,5 directing compliance with the July 16, 2003 RTC decision; 3]
Writ of Execution,6 dated July 18, 2003, signed by the Branch Clerk of
Court, without any motion for its issuance; and 4] Order, 7 dated July 18,
2003, signed by Judge Ayson directing the issuance of a writ of
execution pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the
reason that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the RTC.
In G.R. No. 174758, Baby Nellie Olairez, Shieryl A. Rebucal, Jenny Riza
A. Banta, and Brando B. Badecao (Olairez group) are assailing the April
7, 2006 Decision8 and the September 11, 2006 Resolution9 of the CA, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27861, setting aside the July 23, 2003 RTC Order and
dismissing the contempt charges against SLU.
The Factual Antecedents
SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City offering various
diploma courses in different fields of study.
Baby Nellie M. Olairez (Olairez), Shieryl A. Rebucal (Rebucal), Jenny Riza
Banta (Banta), and Brando Badecao (Badecao), were fourth-year
graduating students of SLU’s College of Medicine Batch 2002. On March
18, 2002, Olairez and Rebucal filed their Complaint for Mandatory
Injunction with Damages and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order before the RTC, against Dean Dacanay, a certain April
Lily Bangaoet and other unidentified individuals, referred to as "John
Does," challenging the implementation of the revised version of the
Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for
graduation from SLU’s medicine course.10 The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 5191-R. In their complaint, Olairez and Rebucal alleged that as
a condition for graduation, SLU required their students to complete and
pass the COWE and, and if a student would fail, the student concerned
may take another remedial exam.11 Olairez alleged that the then newly
designated Dean Dacanay, suddenly devised and revised the COWE by
PROVREM
further subjecting the graduating students to additional requirements
such as completing Orals 1 and Orals 2, along with added months of
medical clerkship (Revised COWE).12 Contending that the
implementation of the Revised COWE was contrary to SLU’s Student
Handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation, they sought
injunctive relief from the trial court.
Thereafter, Jenny Riza Banta and Brando B. Badecao intervened in the
same proceedings.13
In the meantime, on April 2, 2002, after submitting their applications for
graduation with waiver, the Olairez group was allowed to attend the
graduation rites.
After a few days or on April 9, 2002, the RTC granted the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction preventing SLU and Dean Dacanay from enforcing
the Revised COWE.14
In their Fourth Amended Complaint,15 the Olairez group disclosed that
they had completed, passed and received their final grades in all the
subjects required for the conferment of the degree of doctor of medicine.
They were allowed to march and attend the commencement exercises.
They received the symbolic diploma and were eventually conferred with
the degree, Doctor of Medicine. Similarly, the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges permitted them to attend the twelve-month post
graduate internship at the Baguio General Hospital. Subsequently, they
obtained clearances from various departments except for two
departments, the Administrative Secretary and the Training Officer of
SLU. Still, Dean Dacanay refused to issue certifications in their favor. To
them, it was unacceptable.
Thus, the Olairez group prayed that Dean Dacanay and SLU be ordered
to forward their final grades (SLU Form No. 4) to the Registrar’s Office
for recording; to issue their clearances, certificate of graduation, diploma
and include them in the SLU Registry of Graduates; to cease and desist
from exerting pressure on the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges
(APMC) to recall their certifications granting their internship and on
Baguio General Hospital to pull them out from their internship; to
declare the Revised COWE as moot and academic insofar as they were
concerned; and to pay them ₱2,000,000.00 as moral damages,
₱100,000.00 as nominal damages, ₱250,000.00 as exemplary damages
and ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.16
Decision of the RTC
On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Olairez
group as graduates of the College of Medicine, SLU. 17 It explained that
the Revised COWE became moot and academic for the following reasons:
1] the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
issued a certification that the Olairez group had completed all the
requirements for the Degree of Medicine, notwithstanding the grant of
autonomy to SLU by the CHED; and 2] SLU allowed the Olairez group to
participate in the graduation rites. The decretal portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs Baby Nellie Olairez and Shieryl Rebucal and intervenors
Jenny Rizza Banta and Brando Badecao and against the defendants, as
follows:
1. Ordering the Administrative Secretary, Training Officer,
Hospital Administrator and Medical Director of Saint Louis
University Hospital to sign the clearance of plaintiffs and
intervenors.
2. Ordering defendants Dean Elizabeth Fe Dacanay and Saint
Louis University to issue the Certificate of Graduation to
plaintiffs and intervenors;
3. Ordering defendant Dean Dacanay to forward the Final
Grades (SLU Form No. 4) of plaintiffs and intervenors
submitted to her office to the Office of the Registrar of Saint
Louis University for proper recording in the Transcript of
Records;
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 33 of 51
 4. Ordering defendants Dean Dacanay and Saint Louis
University and all those acting for and in their behalf to issue
the diploma and transcript of records of plaintiffs and
intervenors and include them in the SLU Registry of Graduates
(ROG);
5. Ordering defendants Dean Dacanay and Saint Louis
University and all those acting for and in their behalf to cease
and desist permanently from exercising pressure on the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges (APMC) to recall the
permit issued by it to plaintiffs and intervenors for their
internship.
6. Ordering defendants Dean Dacanay and Saint Louis
University and all those acting for and in their behalf to cease
and desist permanently from exerting pressure on the Baguio
General Hospital (BGH) to pull out plaintiffs and intervenors
from their internship at BGH or from recalling the same.
7. Declaring the plaintiffs and intervenors as having graduated
with the Degree of Doctor of Medicine having completed all the
requirements leading to the Degree of Doctor of Medicine as
certified to by the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
Director Joseph de los Santos;
8. Declaring the Revised COWE with Orals 1 and 2 with
additional two to four months of medical clerkship as moot and
academic insofar as plaintiffs and intervenors are concerned
since they have already graduated with the Degree of Doctor
of Medicine as certified to by the CHED Director Joseph de los
Santos;
9. Declaring that the matter of the writ of preliminary
injunction (mandatory) prayed for which was agreed upon by
the parties to be resolved together with the judgment on the
merits of the case in [view] of time constraints is actually
deemed resolved herein as, in effect, a final writ of injunction
(mandatory) is issued by the Court ordering defendants Dean
Dacanay and the Saint Louis University and all those acting for
and in their behalf to issue immediately the plaintiffs’ and
intervenors’ clearances, final grades, certificate of graduation,
diploma and transcript of records and include them in their
Registry of Graduates and certify them as graduates qualified
to take the Board examination for Medicine this August, 2003.
10. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims for damages,
actual damages, moral damages, nominal damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, considering that both
the plaintiffs and intervenors on the one hand and the
defendants on the other hand acted in good faith in pursuing
and advocating with vigor and zeal their respective positions
and were not in bad faith.
Furnish a copy of this judgment not only to the counsels of defendants
but also to the defendants themselves, Dean Elizabeth Dacanay, Saint
Louis University and those acting for and in their behalf such as Dr. John
Domantay, the Administrative Secretary, Hospital Administrator,
Training Officer and Medical Director of the Saint Louis University
Hospital of the Sacred Heart for their immediate compliance of the Final
Writ of Injunction (Mandatory) issued herein.
SO ORDERED.18
The next day or, on July 17, 2003, the Olairez group trooped to SLU and
insisted on its immediate compliance with the RTC ruling. Unable to get
a favorable reply from SLU, the Olairez group filed, on the same day, a
"Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt" setting the hearing
of the motion for July 18, 2003.19 Meanwhile, SLU filed its Notice of
Appeal20 before the RTC.
In its Order, dated July 18, 2003, the RTC cited Section 4, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court specifying that a judgment in an action for injunction was
immediately executory, but reset the hearing on the motion to cite SLU
in contempt of court to July 22, 2003 to allow compliance with a
technical defect in the motion.21 In the order22 read in open court, it was
mentioned that SLU had already filed a notice of appeal. The RTC,
however, stressed that its judgment of injunction was immediately
enforceable even though SLU interposed an appeal.
PROVREM
On that same day, the Olairez group submitted their "Compliance," by
providing the required verification.23 Thus, in another Order, dated July
18, 2003, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution.24 Afterwards, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ of
execution.25
On July 19, 2003, the RTC sheriff served SLU with the said writ of
execution.
On July 21, 2003, SLU moved for the inhibition of Presiding Judge
Ayson,26 but its motion was denied in the Order, dated July 22,
2003.27 Thereafter, the hearing of the motion to cite SLU in contempt
proceeded on the same day without any participation of SLU and its
officials.
On the next day, or on July 23, 2003, the RTC found SLU guilty of
indirect contempt.28 The decretal portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds defendant Dean Elizabeth Dacanay guilty of
Indirect Contempt of Court under Sections 3 letter (b) and 7 of Rule 71
in relation to Section 4 and 11 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and
sentences her to pay a Fine of Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos.
Likewise, the Court finds those acting for and in behalf of Dean Elizabeth
Dacanay, namely, Administrative Secretary Nora Ponoc, Hospital
Administrator Lourdes Jacinto, Training Officer Dr. Anastacio Aquino and
Medical Director Dr. Roberto Legaspi, Dr. John Domantay and Acting
President Atty. Arnulfo Soriano guilty of Indirect Contempt of Court
under Sections 3 letter (b) and 7 of Rule 71 in relation to Sections 4 and
11 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and hereby sentences them to pay a
fine of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000.00) each.
The Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Medicine are
likewise ordered to conditionally allow if feasible plaintiffs Baby Nellie
Olairez, Shieryl Rebucal, Jenny Rizza Banta and Brando Badecao to take
the Medical Board Examination scheduled on August 2003 until the
Judgment (Decision) of the Court dated July 16, 2003 is finally
enforced.29
The Petition for certiorari
Thereafter, SLU filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA, docketed as C.A. G.R. SP No. 78127, questioning
the following trial court issuances:
1. Order, dated July 18, 2003, directing the defendants (SLU)
to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt;
2. Order, dated June 6, 2003, directing compliance with the
July 16, 2003 decision of the RTC;
3. Writ of Execution, dated July 18, 2003, signed by the
Branch Clerk of Court without any motion for its issuance; and
4. Order, dated July 18, 2003, signed by Judge Ayson
directing the issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
On November 18, 2003, the CA dismissed SLU’s petition outright for its
failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration.30 The CA explained that
"a special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration so as to allow
the lower court to correct the alleged error."31
SLU moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution,32 dated February 10, 2004.
Unsatisfied, SLU elevated the disputed CA resolutions before the Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R.
No. 162299.33
The Appeal Proper
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 34 of 51
Meanwhile, SLU appealed the order of the RTC finding it guilty of indirect
contempt before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27861.
Regarding the merits of the appeal in the indirect contempt case, the CA
reversed the July 23, 2003 Order of the RTC in its April 7, 2006
Decision.34 Citing Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the CA opined that to
comply with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt, there
must be: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for
contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a
person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for
the person charged to appear and explain his conduct. 35
The CA observed that the second element was lacking as there was
haste in the conduct of the proceedings and in issuing orders which
deprived SLU of the opportunity to explain the reason for not complying
with the mandatory injunction. The CA then stated that "in order for a
party to be guilty of indirect contempt, the rules require that he be given
enough and reasonable opportunity to explain his side against the
alluded contemptuous act. Deprive the party of such opportunity would
be to deprive him of due process of law. It is in that non-observance of
the constitutional right to due process that we find the order citing the
appellants in contempt to be unsustainable due to the unprocedural
process and the precipitate issuance of the contempt order."36 The
dispositive portion of the April 7, 2006 CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL FOREGOING, THE INSTANT APPEAL is hereby GRANTED,
the challenged order dated July 23, 2003 in Civil Case No. 5191-R,
RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING the
assailed contempt charge against herein appellants. No pronouncement
as to cost.
SO ORDERED.37
Unperturbed, the Olairez group moved for a reconsideration of the said
ruling.38 On September 11, 2006, the CA denied their motion for
reconsideration.39
Thus, the Olairez group filed a petition review on certiorari under Rule
45, docketed as G.R. No. 174758.40
In the Resolution of April 16, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate the
two cases.41
The Issues
G.R. No. 162299
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL
EXCLUDES THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO FILE
A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE
TRIAL COURT.42
G.R. No. 174758
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FORMER THIRD DIVISION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IT SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN ITS FINDING THAT THE THREE-DAY NOTICE RULE WAS VIOLATED,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THE LEAD
COUNSEL ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SLU
VICE-PRESIDENT FOR ADM[I]NISTRATION AND ALSO THEN ACTING
PRESIDENT OF THE PRINCIPAL RESPONDENT SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY,
INC., WERE PERSONALLY SERVED COPIES ON JULY 19, 2003 OF THE
NOTICE OF HEARING SET ON JULY 22, 2003 AT 8:30 A.M.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS
FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE DENIED DUE
PROVREM
PROCESS OF LAW WHEREIN ALLEGEDLY THEY "WERE FOUND NOT TO
HAVE BEEN AFFORDED REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
APPELLANTS TO APPEAR AND EXPLAIN THEIR CONDUCT"—AS A
GROUND FOR REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
WHICH FOUND RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF CONTEMPT.
III.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS
FINDING THAT THE INITIATORY PLEADING COULD NOT BE TREATED AS
A MOTION FOR EXECUTION.43
The Court’s Ruling
G.R. No. 162299
SLU contends that the CA erred in dismissing its petition for certiorari for
filing it without a prior motion for reconsideration which, according to it,
constituted a fatal infirmity.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.44 Its purpose is to grant
an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.45 It is not, however, an ironclad rule. There
are recognized exceptions such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.46
Under the circumstances, the Court is not convinced that SLU’s
explanation constitutes sufficient ground for the application of the
exception to the rule. In the same vein, petitioners may not arrogate to
themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
necessary or not.47 It should be emphasized that procedural rules are
tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. Although the
Court, in some cases, permits a relaxation in the application of the rules,
this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. It is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, but it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.48
In this case, a liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may
not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or
cause needless delay in the administration of justice. For it is equally
settled that, except for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance
is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. 49
G.R. No. 174758
The Olairez group argues that the CA erred in ruling that SLU and its
officials were denied of due process as they were not given the
opportunity to comment and be heard on the contempt charges against
them.50
The group’s petition is bereft of merit.
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 35 of 51
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. —
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another
to enter into or upon such real property, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding
him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. 51 Thus, the
good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered.52 Where
the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face
that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith,
is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is,
in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. 53 A person
should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the
purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. 54 To
constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate
or improper purpose.55
The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group
visited the school on July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the
decision was not borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to
be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent
to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary,
SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately
heed the demand of the Olairez group.
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule
on hearing of motions as provided in Section 4,56 Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court when they scheduled the hearing on their "Very Urgent Motion to
Cite Defendants In Contempt" on July 18, 2003 or just one day after
they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received
for filing57 and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, 58 subject
only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice59 or if there was
substantial compliance.60
Under the attendant circumstances, there was no substantial compliance
with procedural due process because although the hearing on the said
motion was reset to July 22, 2003, the disputed writ of execution was
actually issued on July 18, 2003 and served on SLU and its officials on
July 19, 2003 before the rescheduled hearing date. while their counsels
on record received their copies on July 21, 2003. In due process, the
PROVREM
parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be heard, as
well as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or
controvert the grounds upon which it is based.61
This was not properly afforded to SLU.
The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with
him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be
used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
solemnity of the proceedings therein and the administration of justice
from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities and contumacious
refusal to comply with court orders.62 This contempt power, plenary it
may seem, however, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with
highest self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retribution
or vindication.63 It should not be availed of unless necessary in the
interest of justice.64
Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the CA decision
to absolve SLU and its officials from the contempt charges filed against
them.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 162299, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly,
the Resolutions, dated November 18, 2003 and February 10, 2004, of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. SP 78127, are AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 174758, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the April 7,
2006 Decision and the September 11, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 27861, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
#10 G.R. No. 189949 March 25, 2015
CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(CASCONA), Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ISIAS Q. VIDUA, VICENTE M. BARRETO,
JOSE M. SANTIAGO, JOSE NASERIV C. DOLOJAN, JUAN
FERNANDEZ, HONORARIO DILAG, JR., FIDEL CORREA, ALICIA
MERCADO, LECIRA JUAREZ,ATTY.FULGENCIO VIGARE, JR.,
ANGELITO U. SACRO, MILDRED ESGUERRA, ANTONIO APALISOK,
SALAMAN D. MANGCA, DANILO S. SEGOBRE, EDMUNDO D.
ENGAO, P/SUPT. ROLAND FELIX, P/SUPT. JERRY SUMBAD,
P/INSP. GERRY HADUCA, P/INSP. ROBIN FUGIRAN,
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (CDA), BARTOLOME
GALARITA, JR., WILFREDO JIMENEZ, HITLER UNTAL, JOEL JOHN
PACTORES, ROLLY CADORNA, RUDY ELIPSE, IBRAHIM LAHI,
RODOLFO BONIFACIO, JR., ANECITO VIEJO, JR., JONARD IRAN,
ANGELITO BALDONAZA, NIKKO DAJAY, ROLANDO ASPA, JESON
CABATINGAN, JOBERT UGANG (SECURITY GUARDS), JOHN DOES
(MEMBERS OF THE ZAMBALES PROVINCIAL MOBILE GROUP OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE), Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a verified petition for indirect contempt with application for
preliminary injunction filed by Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc.
(CASCONA) against several respondents for disobeying the March 13,
2009 Decision1 of this Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-36, entitled ZAMECO II
Board of Directors v. CASCONA, et al.2
The Facts
Petitioner CASCONA is an organization of electric consumers from
Castillejos, Zambales, under the coverage area of Zambales II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II). Acting on a letter-complaint filed by
CASCONA, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) issued its
Resolution, dated November 24, 2004, removing respondents Jose
Dominguez, Isias Vidua, Vicente Barreto, Jose Santiago, Jose Naseriv
Dolojan, Juan Fernandez, and Honorario Dilag, Jr., (Dominguez, et al.)
and all incumbent members of the Board of Directors of ZAMECO II for
mismanagement of funds and expiration of their term of office. 3
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 36 of 51
Dominguez, et al. appealed the November 24, 2004 resolution of the
NEA to the Court of Appeals (CA) on the ground that Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) abrogated
the regulatory and disciplinary power of the NEA over electric
cooperatives.
In its Decision, dated March 13, 2007, the CA upheld the authority of the
NEA over ZAMECO II. Aggrieved, Dominguez, et al. appealed to this
Court and argued that the power of the NEA to supervise and control
electric cooperatives had been abrogated by the EPIRA. They further
stated that they had registered ZAMECO II as a cooperative under
respondent Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and, thus, it was
the CDA which had regulatory powers over ZAMECO II.4
On March 13, 2009, the Court promulgated its decision in G.R. Nos.
176935-36 which held that "[t]he passage of the EPIRA xxx did not
affect the power of the NEA particularly over administrative cases
involving the board of directors, officers and employees of electric
cooperatives."5 The Court further ruled that there was substantial
evidence to justify the penalty of removal from office imposed by NEA
against the board members, Dominguez, et al. 6
With respect to the issue of ZAMECO II being under the regulatory
powers of the CDA in view of its registration, the Court declared then
that the matter could not be adjudicated yet. It stated that the EPIRA
provided that an electric cooperative must first convert into either a
stock cooperative or stock corporation before it could register under the
CDA. "[W]hether ZAMECO II complied with the foregoing provisions,
particularly on the conduct of a referendum and obtainment of a simple
majority vote prior to its conversion into a stock cooperative, is a
question of fact which this Court shall not review. At any rate, the
evidence on record does not afford us sufficient basis to make a ruling
on the matter. The remand of the case to the Court of Appeals solely on
this question is, therefore, proper."7 The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings in order to determine whether the
procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, and its Implementing Rules
for the conversion of an electric cooperative into a stock cooperative
under the Cooperative Development Authority had been complied with.
The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle this case immediately upon
receipt of this Decision and to proceed accordingly with all deliberate
dispatch. Thereafter, it is directed to forthwith transmit its findings to
this Court for final adjudication. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8
On May 4, 2009, Dominguez, et al. moved for reconsideration, but their
motion was denied by the Court on August 10, 2009.9 In view of the
denial, an Entry of Judgment was issued on September 2, 2009.
Dominguez, et al. promptly filed a motion to set aside the entry of
judgment on the sole ground that the March 13, 2009 Decision of the
Court was an interlocutory order.10
On February 3, 2010, the Court granted the motion of Dominguez, et al.
and recalled the Entry of Judgment. The March 13, 2009 Decision was
indeed interlocutory in character as there was still something to be done
by the CA because it would still determine whether the proceedings
outlined in the EPIRA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR),
for the conversion of an electric cooperative into a stock cooperative
under the CDA, had been complied with. In this sense, the March 13,
2009 Decision could not have attained a final and executory character. 11
Meanwhile, by virtue of the November 24, 2004 Resolution of the NEA,
ZAMECO II was managed and operated by an interim board of directors
under the authority and supervision of NEA.12
On September 1, 2009, respondent Atty. Fulgencio Vigare (Atty. Vigare),
as CDA Administrator for Luzon, issued the Memorandum, 13 declaring
that the CDA should assume jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. It stated,
among others, that in the August 26, 2009 hearing of the House of
Representatives Committee on Cooperative Development (August 26,
2009 House Committee Hearing), the NEA readily acceded that the CDA
should assume jurisdiction over ZAMECO II.14 Also, a task force was
created primarily to reinstate the duly-recognized incumbent members
of the board of directors who should perform their functions until such
PROVREM
time as elections were conducted, and their successors should have been
elected and qualified.15
Pursuant to the said memorandum, on October 19, 2009, the CDA
issued Resolution No. 262, S-200916 which created a team composed of
the respondent-officers of the CDA. The team was mandated to meet
with the ZAMECO II management about its issues and concerns; to pave
the way for the conduct of the election of officers; and to seek the
opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ) about the jurisdiction of the
CDA over electric cooperatives. The said resolution was implemented by
Special Order 2009- 304 issued on October 20, 2009.17
According to CASCONA, on October 22, 2009, respondents Fidel Correa,
Alicia Mercado and Angelito Sacro (Sacro) entered the ZAMECO II
premises and refused to leave. Come night fall, respondent-members of
the PNP and security guards assembled outside the gates of ZAMECO II
but were not allowed inside the premises.
The next day, on October 23, 2009, respondents P/Insp. Gerry Haduca
and P/Insp. Robin Fugiran asked the interim President of ZAMECO II for
a discussion. When the latter opened the gates, the respondent PNP
members and security guards forcefully entered the grounds of ZAMECO
II. The interim board of directors did not surrender the management of
ZAMECO II to the respondents.
On October 24, 2009, respondents Jose Dominguez and two other
former board members (Jose Naseriv Dolojan and Juan Fernandez)
arrived at the electric cooperative premises. Tensions only de-escalated
when the respondent-PNP members left the scene through the
intervention of Governor Amor Deloso.
Hence, this present petition for indirect contempt.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS IN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE
CONTROL OF ZAMECO II AND ULTIMATELY REINSTATE THE
RESPONDENTS-FORMER BOARD MEMBERS TO THEIR FORMER
POSITIONS DESPITE THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE REMOVAL OF THE
RESPONDENTS-FORMER BOARD MEMBERS FROM THEIR
POSITIONS AND THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE PUNISHABLE AS INDIRECT
CONTEMPT UNDER RULE 71, SECTION 3 (B), (C) AND (D). 18
CASCONA asserts that the respondents committed several acts of
indirect contempt as follows: first, the CDA officials issued the
September 1, 2009 Memorandum for the takeover of jurisdiction over
ZAMECO II; second, CDA also issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and
Special Order 2009-304 which scrutinized the management and
operation of ZAMECO II; and lastly, the respondents attempted to
forcefully occupy ZAMECO II on October 22, 2009. According to
CASCONA, these acts clearly pre-empted the Court’s decision in G.R.
Nos. 176935-36.
CASCONA contends that, with the intent of reinstating Dominguez, et al.
and under the guise of the purported authority of the CDA over ZAMECO
II, the respondents acted in conspiracy, took the law into their own
hands, and attempted to take control of ZAMECO II.
On February 10, 2011, Dominguez, et al., filed their Comment to
Petition.19 They argue, first, that the March 13, 2009 Decision of the
Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-36 was not yet final and executory, thus,
they had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing any act. Second,
R.A. No. 9520 or the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, which took
effect on March 22, 2009, divested the NEA of its authority over electric
cooperatives in favor of the CDA. Lastly, the respondents cited the CA
decision, Abdon v. NEA,20 which held that it was the CDA, and not the
NEA, that had regulatory powers over ZAMECO II.
On May 31, 2011, respondents Mildred Esguerra (Esguerra) and Antonio
Apalisok (Apalisok), as officials of the CDA, filed their compliance with
urgent request not to be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt.21 They professed that they excluded themselves from the
team created by Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-
304 because the creation of this team would place them at a grave risk
of being punished for contempt by the Court.22
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 37 of 51
On June 9, 2011, respondents Atty. Vigare and Sacro, as officials of the
CDA, filed their Comment to Petition23which essentially concurred with
that of respondents Dominguez, et al.
On April 10, 2013, CASCONA filed its Reply24 stating that the May 31,
2011 compliance filed by respondents Esguerra and Apasilok admitted
the contemptuous acts of their co-respondents.
Preliminary Matters
Before proceeding with the Court’s ruling on the indirect contempt
charge, several developments in the main case of ZAMECO II v.
CASCONA, docketed as G.R. Nos. 176935-36, must be noted.
On March 25, 2010, the CA submitted its Report pursuant to the March
13, 2009 decision of the Court. The CA found that the registration of
ZAMECO II with the CDA did not comply with the referendum
requirement under the IRR of EPIRA. In the absence of a referendum,
ZAMECO II failed to obtain the required simple majority vote in order to
validly convert it into either a stock cooperative or a stock corporation. 25
On October 20, 2014, the Court promulgated the decision in G.R. Nos.
176935-36. It finally ruled that ZAMECO II was an electric cooperative
and remained under the jurisdiction of the NEA, and not the CDA, based
on (1) R.A. No. 6939 or Cooperative Code of 1990, (2) R.A. No. 9136 or
EPIRA,
(3) R.A. No. 9520 or Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and (4) R.A.
No. 10531, or the National Electrification Administration Reform Act of
2013.
The Court also declared that the CDA’s issuance of a certificate of
registration in favor of ZAMECO II in December 2007 did not operate to
divest the NEA of its jurisdiction because Dominguez, et al. failed to
comply with the statutory requirement of conversion outlined under the
EPIRA.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. 26
There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and
indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court.27 A person who is guilty of
disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt.28
Also, a contempt charge can either be criminal or civil in nature. A
criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity
and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists
in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action
for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. 29
In the case at bench, the respondents committed several acts which
constituted indirect contempt. The CDA issued the September 1, 2009
Memorandum stating that it had jurisdiction over ZAMECO II and could
reinstate the former members of the Board of Directors. The CDA
officials also issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-
304 to interfere with the management and control of ZAMECO II. Armed
with these issuances, the other respondents even tried to physically
takeover ZAMECO II on October 22, 2013. These acts were evidently
against the March 13, 2009 decision of this Court and, thus, constituted
PROVREM
indirect contempt against the Court. These contemptuous acts are
criminal in nature because these obstruct the administration of justice
and tend to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court enumerates the acts which amount to indirect
contempt, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
xxxx
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1
of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxx
The respondents argue that the March 13, 2009 decision in G.R. Nos.
176935-36 did not order them to do any act or refrain from doing an
act. Hence, they did not, in any manner, disobey or resist a lawful writ,
process, order or judgment.
The defense of the respondents does not persuade. The March 13, 2009
decision should not be taken in isolation. A perusal of the said decision
shows that there were several pronouncements which must be respected
and obeyed, to wit: first, the CA shall make a factual determination as to
the propriety of ZAMECO II’s registration with the CDA; second, the
continuing jurisdiction of the Court, as the case is not yet final and
executory; and lastly, that there is substantial evidence to justify the
removal from office of respondents Dominguez, et al.
Precisely, the Court remanded the case to the CA to determine whether
ZAMECO II was properly registered as a stock cooperative under the
CDA. Until the CA properly had ascertained such fact, the Court could
not determine conclusively that the CDA had supervisory powers over
ZAMECO II. The parties were then expected to maintain status quo and
refrain from doing any act that would pre-empt the final decision of the
Court. Hence, the Court continued to exercise its jurisdiction in G.R. Nos.
176935-36 until a final decision was promulgated. The respondents,
however, unreasonably interfered with the proper procedure mandated
by the Court when they decided for themselves that the CDA had
jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. This constituted a contemptuous act
because it unlawfully interfered with the processes or proceedings of a
court.
Worse, the respondent-officials of the CDA, fully aware of the Court’s
pronouncement,30 attempted to reinstate respondents Dominguez, et al.
despite the existence of substantial evidence that warrant the latter’s
removal from office. Glaringly, this grave allegation was never refuted by
the respondents. Dominguez, et al. were found unfit to hold office yet
the respondents relentlessly endeavoured to return them to the seat of
power in ZAMECO II. This blatant disregard of the March 13, 2009
decision of the Court is an improper conduct that impedes, obstructs, or
degrades the administration of justice.
The respondents justify their acts by stating that in the August 26, 2009
House Committee Hearing, the NEA acceded to the jurisdiction of the
CDA over ZAMECO II. This contention, however, is completely
unsubstantiated. Notably, respondents Esguerra and Apalisok admitted
that the creation of a task force to take over ZAMECO II would place dire
consequences against the CDA. Even CDA Regional Director Manuel A.
Mar doubted that the NEA consented to the authority of the CDA over
ZAMECO II.31
Indeed, the October 20, 2014 decision of the Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-
36 conclusively settled that it is NEA, and not the CDA, that has
jurisdiction and disciplinary authority over ZAMECO II. The substantial
issues of the case have now been laid to rest. The Court, however,
cannot turn a blind eye to the contemptuous acts of the respondents
during the pendency of the case. If the Court condones these acts of
interference and improper conduct, it would set a dangerous precedent
to future litigants in disregarding the interlocutory orders and processes
of the Court.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 38 of 51
 Liability of the Respondents
The Court cannot agree with CASCONA that all of the respondents were
in conspiracy to commit the contemptuous acts. CASCONA failed to
substantiate its claim that all the respondents acted in unison to disobey
the March 13, 2009 decision of the Court. It was established that only
the CDA officials and the former board members who pursued to
reinstate Dominguez, et al. to ZAMECO II. Thus, the other respondents,
the PNP members and security guards merely acted as a conduit of their
contumelious intent.
Respondents Esguerra and Apalisok cannot be adjudged liable because
they did not participate in the acts complained of as evidenced by the
November 5, 2009 Memorandum.32 Also, respondents Lecira Juarez,
Alicia Mercado and Juan Fernandez cannot be affected by this decision
because they were not properly notified by the processes of the Court as
CASCONA failed to provide their proper addresses. 33 With respect to
respondent Jose Santiago, records show that he has passed away as
shown by his death certificate.34
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for the penalties for
indirect contempt, as follows:
If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
hebymay be punished a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he guilty is
adjudged of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment
not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the
violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status
quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the
party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount
as may be alleged and proved.
xxxx
Based on the circumstances of the case, a fine amounting to Ten
Thousand Pesos (I!l0,000.00) is a sufficient penalty to be imposed
against each liable contemnor.
WHEREFORE, finding Jose S. Dominguez, Isias Q. Vidua, Vicente M.
Barreto, Jose Naseriv C. Dolojan, and Honorario Dilag, Jr., as former
board members of ZAMECO II, and Atty. Fulgencio Vigare, Jr. and
Angelito U. Sacro, as CDA officials, GUILTY of indirect contempt for
attempting to pre-empt the final decision of the Court in G.R. Nos.
176935- 36, the Court orders each of them to pay a FINE of Ten
Thousand Pesos (I! 10,000.00), within ten (10) days from the finality of
this decision.
SO ORDERED.
#11 G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017
BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N. MOJICA,
ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA, JOSEFINA PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND
ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioners
vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the May 25,
2011 Decision2 and the December 19, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985. The assailed Decision affirmed
theRegional Trial Court Decision,4 which found petitioners Bro. Bernard
Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Cirila N. Mojica, Alejandro N. Mojica,
Josefina Pascual, Atty. Silvestre Pascual, and St. Francis School of
General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (petitioners) guilty of Indirect
Contempt.1âwphi1 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.5
This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate
controversy among the Board of Trustees of petitioner St. Francis School
of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).6
PROVREM
St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle
brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita Custodio (Custodio),
petitioner Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Josefina),
Monsignor Felix Perez, and Brother Vernon Poore.7 These five (5)
incorporators served as St. Francis School's Board of Trustees until the
latter two (2) passed away.8
Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the
necessary supervision to establish the school's academic foundation. 9
On September 8, 1988, the incorporators and the La Salle brothers
formalized their arrangement in a Memorandum of Agreement, under
which De La Salle Greenhills (La Salle) would supervise the academic
affairs of St. Francis School to increase enrollment. La Salle appointed
supervisors to sit in the Board of Trustees without voting rights. 10
In 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca (Bro. Oca) became a member of St.
Francis School as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat in the Board of
Trustees and was later elected as its Chairman and St. Francis School's
President.11 In 2000, petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua (Bro. Magbanua)
was also admitted as a La Salle-appointed supervisor.12 He sat as a
trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of St. Francis School. 13
Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees came
into a disagreement regarding the school's administrative structure and
La Salle's supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro.
Magbanua wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's supervision to
includematters relating to the school's finances, administration, and
operations.14
This was opposed by Custodio.15 After several incidents relating to the
disagreement, Custodio filed a complaint against St. Francis School, Bro.
Oca, and Bro. Magbanua on June 7, 2002 with Branch 23, Regional Trial
Court, Trece Martires, Cavite. She alleged that Bro. Oca and Bro.
Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees. 16 She also
prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent Bro. Oca from
calling a special membership meeting to remove her from the Board of
Trustees.17
This case was dismissed.18 Custodio was subsequently removed from the
Board of Trustees and as Curriculum Administrator. 19
Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal but
eventually withdrew her appeal to file a new suit instead. 20
On October 3, 2002, Custodio again filed a complaint against petitioners
for violating the Corporation Code with Branch 21, Regional Trial Court,
Imus, Cavite.21 She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as
members and trustees of the school and to declare void all their acts as
President and Treasurer, respectively.22 She likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
remaining board members from holding meetings and to prevent Bro.
Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their functions as members,
trustees, and officers of St. Francis School.23 This case was docketed as
SEC Case No. 024-02.24
On October 8, 2002, the Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. 25
The day after the hearing, Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after the hearing for the
Temporary Restraining Order, the counsel for petitioners went to St.
Francis School to instruct several parents not to acknowledge Custodio's
administration as she had been removed as a member, trustee, and
curriculum administrator and that her complaint had been dismissed.
The parents were also allegedly directed to pay the students'
matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner Alejandro N. Mojica
(Alejandro), son of petitioner Cirila. Alejandro held office at the Rural
Bank of General Trias, Inc. which was allegedly owned by the family of
petitioner Josefina.26 This meeting allegedly caused 15 teachers to hold a
strike, which nearly disrupted classes and caused parents to request the
early dismissal of their children for fear that violence would
ensue.27 Custodio reiterated her prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order. She moved that the hearing be converted into an injunction
hearing or that a status quo order be issued to allow her to continue
functioning as school director and curriculum administrator. 28
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 39 of 51
Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court
clarify to whom the school's fees should be paid while her Complaint and
Manifestation and Motion were still pending. Petitioners allegedly
manifested that the payment of matriculation fees must be made to
Alejandro. However, Custodio pointed out that Alejandro was not the
school cashier and that the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. was not
authorized to receive payments for St. Francis School. She also
manifested that prior to October 8, 2002, the school cashier was Ms.
Herminia Reynante (Reynante).29 This Motion was set for hearing on
October 18, 2002.30
On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
designating Reynante to act as school cashier "with authority to collect
all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts." 31 The trial
court also directed all parties in the case to submit a report on and to
turn over to Reynante all money previously collected, thus:
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles, Ms.
Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court to act as cashier of
the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect all fees
and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all accounts. Said
authority shall continue until the matter of the application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction is heard and resolved. This
is hereby ordered so that an orderly operation of the school will be
achieved.
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom,
and the dates collected Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
disbursements made.
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they would
have proven that Reynante lacked the moral integrity to act as court-
appointed cashier had they been given the opportunity to be heard. 33
On January 3, 2003, the Regional Trial Court denied reconsideration. 34
On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation
and Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the
October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee
collections and by turning over to Reynante a manager's check in the
amount of P397,127.64 payable to St. Francis School.35 The amount
allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees from October to
December 2002.36 However, they alleged that Reynante refused to
accept the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash or
in a check payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed the check in the
custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping. 37
Custodio filed a Comment dated February 26, 2003.38 Custodio
manifested that petitioners did not even substantially comply with the
October 21, 2002 Order because it excluded from its accounting and
turnover the following amounts:
1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No.
239 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
2) ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No.
459 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen;
and
4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19,
2003.39
Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that
only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts
of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary payments to four
(4) employees who had resigned. 40
PROVREM
On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another
Order41 directing petitioners to fully comply with its earlier order to
submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had
collected:
This treats of defendants' explanation, manifestation and compliance and
plaintiff's comments thereto.
A pernsal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of ₱397,127.64
representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on what
have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates collected.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from
receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
(1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings
Deposit No. 239 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
(2) ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings
Deposit No. 459 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
(3) ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the
school canteen;
(4) Other fees collected from January 2003 to
Febrnary 19, 2003; and
(5) Accounting on how and how much defendants
are paying Ms. Daisy Romero and three (3) other
teachers who already resigned.
SO ORDERED.42
Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and
Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among others, that the trial court
issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts
which were not covered in its October 21, 2002 Order. 43
On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying all
motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance,
Exception and Motion and declared that they had not complied with the
March 24, 2003 Order:44
This treats of defendants' manifestation, observation, compliance,
exception and motion dated April 18, 2003, plaintiff's
comment/opposition and defendants' rejoinder thereto filed on July 2,
2003.
Defendants are asking the Court first to set aside its orders dated
October 21[, 2002] and March 24, 2003 for having been issued "without
notice and hearing" and in "acting without or in excess of its
authority/jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction" ...
With respect to the first matter, the motion is denied for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). The motion which
assails the two questioned orders is actually a motion for reconsideration
but worded differently - "motion to set aside March 24, 2003 Order" but
both have the same purpose and objective and that is to reconsider the
order(s).
....
On the contrary, the court found out that defendants have not complied
with the order of the court dated March 24, 2003 directing defendants
and Mr. Al Mojica to submit a report and to turn over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 40 of 51
1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.)
2. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.)
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen.
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003.
5. Accounting on how and how much defendants are paying Ms. Daisy
Romero and the three (3) other teachers who already resigned.
Accordingly, the defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed to
comply with the aforementioned order of March 24, 2003, within ten
days from receipt hereof.
....
SO ORDERED.45
In the meantime, La Salle served Custodio a notice dated January 4,
2003, that they were terminating the Memorandum of Agreement with
St. Francis School.46
On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting
Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002 and issuing a
status quo order47 allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school
director and curriculum administrator.48 The trial court ruled in favor of
Custodio when it found that petitioners had already established another
school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of St. John) in Sta. Clara,
General Trias, Cavite:49
This treats of plaintiff's manifestation and motion praying that the court
"immediately issue a temporary restraining order ... where plaintiff will
be allowed to continue discharging the functions of a school director and
curriculum administrator ... "
During the hearing of the said motion and manifestation on October 11,
2002, both parties and counsel agreed before the court that no incident
similar to what happened on October 8, 2002 will occur while the motion
is being heard.
Plaintiff and defendants presented evidence, testimonial and
documentary, to prove their respective causes. It took them nine
months to present their evidence before the matter was submitted for
the court's resolution.
After a thorough review of all the evidences presented by both parties,
the Court is inclined to rule in favor of the plaintiff. The [pieces of]
evidence of both parties are convincing. But, the factor that convinced
the Court to rule in favor of plaintiff was the information conveyed to the
court by plaintiff and admitted by defendants, through their counsel, that
another school named Academy of St. John, a new La Sallian Supervised
School in Sta. Clara, General Tria[s], Cavite, was opened by defendants
Josefina A. Pascual and Cirila N. Mojica and their respective families. In a
brochure handed by plaintiff's counsel to the court during the hearing on
June 17, 2003 with a heading of Academy of Saint John, De La Salle[-]
Supervised, General Tria[s], Cavite, it said that "such idea was
conceived as a result of the corporate problems and the never ending
dispute in a former La Salle[-]supervised school that finally brought
confusion and havoc in the said community."
It further said that "alarmed with the impending loss of the La Salle
Supervision which they both thought of leaving it as a legacy to the
youth, Mrs. Pascual and Mrs. Mojica together with their respective
families were convinced to continue their mission of spreading quality
education etc."
It appears from the brochure that defendants Pascual and Mojica have
set up another school in the same municipality where the St. Francis
School is located. The name of the school is Academy of St. John. The
Academy of St. John likewise offers the same courses as th[ose] offered
by St. Francis [S]chool. Needless to state, this action of defendants
PROVREM
Pascual and Mojica is very inimical to the interest of St. Francis School
as the Academy of St. John put up by the aforementioned defendants is
in direct competition with St. Francis School. In other words, a conflict of
interest now exists insofar as defendants Pascual and Mojica are
concerned in view of their establishment of the Academy of St. John
which is of the same kind and of the same nature of business as that of
St. Francis School. One cannot serve two masters a[t] the same time.
And as already intimated above, considering that there are now two
competingschools in the same locality where defendants Pascual and
Mojica hold an interest, they cannot be expected to give their full
devotion and cooperation to one without being disloyal and unfaithful to
the other.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is granted.
Accordingly, a status quo order is hereby issued wherein the plaintiff is
hereby allowed to continue discharging her functions as school director
and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and
actually discharging functions as school officer[s] to continue performing
their duties until the application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order is resolved.
SO ORDERED.50
Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification, 51 They alleged that the bulk
of the money ordered to be turned over to Custodio and Reynante was
allotted to St. Francis School's teachers' retirement fund. Considering
that it must be preserved, petitioners raised several queries. They
wanted to know if Custodio and Reynante would use the money for other
purposes other than for the teachers' retirement benefit and if Custodio
and Reynante would be required to file a bond to guaranty its
safekeeping and exclusive use as teacher's retirement compensation.
Finally, they asked who would be held liable in case of Custodio and
Reynante's unlawful use of this fund.52
On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in
Contempt of Court53 under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.54 She likewise
prayed that an order be issued reiterating the Orders dated October 21,
2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003.55
In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued
an Order dated October 8, 200356 clarifying that the retirement fund was
to be held in trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also directed Custodio
and Reynante to file a bond of ₱300,000.00 each.57 Later, it ordered
petitioners to comply with the mandate in the March 24, 2003 and
August 5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose to the court the
total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for teachers' retirement
benefit and its bank details:58
This treats of the motion for clarification filed by the defendants through
counsel.
The motion sprung from the Order dated March 24, 2003 and again
reiterated in the Order of August 5, 2003 which required the defendants
and Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all the money
which [is] in their possession enumerated in the aforesaid orders.
Considering that the bulk of the money pertains to the teacher[s']
retirement funds, defendants seek to clarify (1) for what purpose the
funds will be used by the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante; (2) whether the
funds will be turned-over to the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante without them
having to put up a bond as a security for the protection of the teachers;
and (3) whether defendants will be held liable civilly and criminally, in
case of unlawful use and disbursement of the funds.
Teachers' retirement funds are funds principally set aside for the purpose
of the retirement of the teachers. As such, these funds cannot be used
for any other purpose other than that for which it is intended. Thus,
neither the plaintiff nor Ms. Reynante may use this amount for the
operation of the school. They should hold the same in trust for the
beneficiaries of the same.
As to whether the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante shall be required to put up
a bond as a security for the protection of the teachers before they
receive the teachers' retirement funds, the same is not only correct but
also proper. Considering that they will hold these funds in trust for the
retiring teachers, they should be required to file a bond to guarantee
their obligations as trustees of these funds. Accordingly, the plaintiff and
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 41 of 51
Ms. Herminia Reynante are hereby directed to file a bond in the amount
of ₱300,000.00 each.
As to whether the defendants will be held liable, civilly and criminally, in
case of unlawful use and disbursement of the teachers' retirement funds,
the answer is in the negative. A person cannot be held liable for his
action when such was done in compliance with the lawful order of the
court. Besides, considering that the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante are
required to file a bond, the bond shall guarantee for whatever damage
the retiring teachers may incur by reason of the unlawful use and
disbursement of the funds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby
ordered to comply with the mandate contained in the order dated March
24 and August 5, 2003.
Defendants are further directed to inform the court of the total amount
of the funds deposited reserved for teachers' retirement, and in what
bank and under what account the same is deposited.
SO ORDERED.59
On October 10, 2003, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals to question the Regional Trial Court's
Orders60 dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003.
Eventually, this was elevated to this Court and was docketed as G.R. No.
174996.61
Meanwhile, trial commenced for the contempt case. Custodio presented
as her lone witness, Joseph Custodio (Joseph), St. Francis School's
finance and property resource development administrator. Petitioners did
not present any witness.62
In its Decision63 dated February 6, 2008, Branch 90, Regional Trial
Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt
for failing to comply with the Orders dated October 21, 2002 and March
24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly and severally pay a fine of
₱30,000.00.64 It likewise directed them to account for the amount that
they had paid the four (4) teachers who had already resigned: 65
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms.
Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica, Atty. Silvestre
Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, GUILTY of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial Court, Branch
21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the Orders of the Court
dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and they are hereby
ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the amount of
Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court and to
comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March
24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this judgment.
....
SO ORDERED.66
In its May 25, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court Decision.67 It found that it was sufficiently established that
petitioners did not remit all the money they had previously collected
despite the trial court's October 21, 2002 Order, which they admitted to
be lawful.68
It found that the March 24, 2003 Order merely reiterated the October
21, 2002 Order directing the payment of all money they had collected
and specified the amounts to be remitted. 69 It noted that the trial court
already clarified which funds to turn over but petitioners still refused to
obey the orders.70
The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted
to contumacious conduct, which "tended to prejudice St. Francis School's
operations due to lack of operational funds."71
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioners did not deny that the
Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 was heard on October
PROVREM
18, 2002; thus, contradicting their claim that they were not afforded an
opportunity to be heard.72
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated
December 19, 2011.73
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing that they
complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith and that the
validity of the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders were being
assailed in a separate case with this Court.74 Likewise, they contended
that there was reasonable doubt on their guilt and that the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to dismiss the petition with respect to petitioners
Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre Pascual (Atty. Silvestre) who were not
parties in SEC Case No. 024-02 where the assailed orders were issued.75
Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be
guilty of willful disobedience.76 However, they did not disobey the trial
court orders.77 They insisted that they had complied in good faith
because the trial court October 21, 2002 Order only pertained to the
school's matriculation fees and not any other fees.78 They claimed that
the October 21, 2002 Order was a response to Custodio's Motion for
Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only requested that the
matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante.79 Thus, they averred that
it was reasonable for them to conclude that the subject of the turnover
was the matriculation fees only.80
Petitioners further claimed that in Custodio 's Comment to their February
19, 2003 Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance, Custodio
surreptitiously included a prayer for the turnover of other funds. 81 They
attested that Custodio's Comment became a litigated motion that should
have been set for hearing by the trial court.82 However, the trial court
did not set a hearing or require the filing of a responsive
pleading.83 They insisted that they were denied due process because the
trial court's March 24, 2003 Order expanded the scope of its October 21,
2002 Order and required the turnover of additional sums which were not
included in the October 21, 2002 Order.84
Petitioners insisted that the lack of due process and the expansion of the
scope of the October 21, 2002 Order rendered the trial court March 24,
2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders unlawful.85 They questioned these
orders in GR. No. 17 4996 and insisted that their resort to legal
remedies showed that they acted in good faith. They argued that to be
charged with indirect contempt, the violated order must have been a
lawful order.86 Since the validity of the trial court orders was being
questioned in GR. No. 174996, the Court of Appeals' ruling was
premature as it should have waited for this Court's finding on the orders'
validity before charging them with indirect contempt. 87
Petitioners asserted that these circumstances showed that there was
reasonable doubt on their guilt and their acquittal was warranted. 88
Lastly, they held that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be dropped
as parties in the petition for indirect contempt as they were not parties
in the intra-corporate controversy filed with the trial court and were not
subject to its jurisdiction. Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre could not have
been aware of the trial court's orders. They averred that there was no
showing that they acted in conspiracy with the other petitioners and that
their guilt could not be assumed or based on mere inference. 89
In its March 5, 2012 Resolution, this Court denied the Petition on the
ground that the issues raised were factual in nature and petitioners
failed to raise any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. 90
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.91
In its February 18, 2013 Resolution, this Court set aside its March 5,
2012 Resolution and ordered Custodio to file a Comment.92
Custodio filed her Comment93 arguing that there was clear and
contumacious defiance of the trial court orders and that the guilt of
petitioners was established beyond reasonable doubt. 94
Custodio posited that petitioners only remitted the matriculation fees in
the amount of ₱397,127.64. They did not render a report on the amount
or turned over any other amounts. They only partially complied with the
trial court orders.95
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 42 of 51
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4)
teachers who had already resigned despite the trial court order that only
Custodio and Reynante were authorized to settle St. Francis School's
accountabilities.96
Custodio argued that petitioners did not refute the evidence she
presented but merely attested that the orders only pertained to
matriculation fees.97
Custodio ave1Ted that petitioners were afforded due process. She
pointed out that her Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 was
set for hearing on October 18, 2002, which was attended by petitioners'
counsel.98
Custodio claimed that petitioners' Explanation, Manifestation and
Compliance dated February 19, 2003 was heard by the trial court. Thus,
petitioners were not denied due process when she filed her Comment. If
petitioners wanted to assail the Comment, they could have easily filed a
Reply.99
Custodio insisted that the trial court March 24, 2003 Order was a
clarification, not an expanded version, of its October 21, 2002 Order.
Custodio reasoned that the March 24, 2003 Order was not even among
the orders they questioned in G.R. No. 174996; thus, showing that they
were not acting in good faith. She insisted that their claim of lack of due
process was merely an afterthought after they were directed several
times to comply with the trial court orders.100
Similarly, Custodio claimed that the August 5, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court was not a violation of petitioners' right to due
process. It was issued in connection with their motion to set aside the
March 24, 2003 Order, which was heard. Moreover, the August 5, 2003
Order was a mere reiteration of the March 24, 2003 Order.101
Custodio held that the trial court orders are deemed valid and are
entitled to respect while they are not yet reversed by a higher court. 102
Custodio averred that despite the trial court's rulings on the issues
raised, petitioners insisted on filing prohibited pleadings under A.M. No.
01- 2-04-SC, or the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies. These pleadings by petitioners were their (i) Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 8, 2002, (ii) Explanation,
Manifestation, and Compliance dated February 19, 2003, (iii)
Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion dated
April 18, 2003, and (iv) Motion for Clarification dated September 1,
2003.103
Custodio posited that in filing these pleadings, petitioners abused court
processes as they served no purpose other than to avoid compliance
with the trial court orders.104
She claimed that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre were equally guilty of
indirect contempt. Despite the fact that they were not parties to the
complaint, Alejandro collected the matriculation fees for the school while
Atty. Silvestre, as a member of the Board of Trustees, was empowered
to cause compliance of court orders.105
Lastly, Custodio pointed out that petitioners' raising of factual issues was
not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.106
107
Petitioners filed their Reply.
Later, the parties filed their respective Memoranda. 108
Meanwhile, on December 3, 2014, during the pendency of this indirect
contempt case, this Court issued a Decision in G.R. No. 174996, which
found that the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003 and October 8,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court were valid. The dispositive portion of
the December 3, 2014 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated
October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79791 are
hereby AFFIRMED in part insofar as they upheld the assailed August 5,
2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court. They are REVERSED
PROVREM
with respect to the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order which is
hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The trial court is further DIRECTED to resolve respondent's application
for injunctive relief with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.109
For resolution is whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.
To resolve this, it is important to determine:
First, whether petitioners are guilty of willful disobedience;
Second, whether petitioners can refuse to follow the orders of the
Regional Trial Court on the premise that their legality is being questioned
in this Court; and
Finally, whether Alejandro N. Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual are
equally guilty of indirect contempt despite the fact that they are not
parties to the complaint.
I
This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are
guilty of indirect contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part
to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or
defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity. 110It constitutes conduct
which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties['] litigant or their
witnesses during litigation."111
All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt. 112 This
power is an essential necessity to preserve order in judicial proceedings
and to enforce the due administration of justice and the court's
mandates, orders, and judgments.113 It safeguards the respect due to
the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the judicial
institution.114
In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.:115
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing
with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to
be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice
from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious
refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is
power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish
disobedience, disrespect or interference with the court's orderly process
by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given to the
courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as
respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which
are necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for
the laws themselves.116(Citations omitted)
There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii)
indirect contempt.
Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before [it]." 117 It
includes: (i) disrespect to the court, (ii) offensive behavior against
others, (iii) refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition. It can be
punished summarily without a hearing.118
Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated
under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her]
official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 43 of 51
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1
of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
him [or her].119 (Emphasis supplied)
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an
opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged. 120
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt
through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
orjudgment of a court."
II
Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002
Order in good faith as they have already turned over the matriculation
fees to Reynante.121 They claim that this Order pertained to the
matriculation fees only, excluding any other fees, as it was issued in
connection with Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14,
2002, which requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to
Reynante.122 Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002
allegedly did not cover other fees.123
However, the October 21, 2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation
fees only:
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles, Ms.
Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court to act as cashier of
the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect all fees
and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all accounts. Said
authority shall continue until the matter of the application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction is heard and resolved. This
is hereby ordered so that an orderly operation of the school will be
achieved.
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom
and the dates collected. Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
disbursements made.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)
The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do
not pertain only to the matriculation fees but
to all collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also states that petitioners
were to render a report and turn over all the amounts they had
previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were
to be handed over.
Likewise, the subject of Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October
14, 2002 did not solely cover matriculation fees. Her prayer sought to
clarify "where the matriculation fees and other fees should be paid
PROVREM
pending the hearing of the Complaint and the Manifestation and
Motion."125 She also prayed for other just and equitable reliefs. 126 Thus,
the trial court ordered that all amounts be turned over to Reynante for
the orderly operation of the school.127Understandably, the school would
operate better if all accounts were handled by one (1) person and not
divided into two (2) arguing factions.
Petitioners insist that Custodio's Comment to their February 19, 2003
Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance surreptitiously included a
prayer for the turnover of other funds, making it a litigated
motion.128 Petitioners claim that they were denied due process because
the trial court did not set it for hearing.129 Moreover, in its March 24,
2003 Order, the trial court allegedly required the turnover of additional
sums which were not included in the October 21, 2002 Order.130
This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly
expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order as petitioners argue.
The October 21, 2002 Order itself already directed that all fees be turned
over to Reynante.
Furthermore, Custodio's Comment dated February 26, 2003 simply
argued that petitioners did not comply with the October 21, 2002 Order
because they did not remit the following amounts:
1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 of the
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
2) ₱5,639,856.ll deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of the
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen; and
4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003. 131
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other
employees who had already resigned, violating the court order that only
Reynante and Custodio were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts
of St. Francis School.132
Thus, it cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious prayer for
the turnover of funds not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. She
simply stated that petitioners failed to substantially comply with the
October 21, 2002 Order and specified the other amounts that petitioners
needed to turn over.133 When she prayed for the turnover of the other
amounts, she merely sought petitioners' compliance of the trial court
October 21, 2002 Order.134
The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified
more particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted. It stated:
A perusal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64
representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on what
have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates collected.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from
receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
2. ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen;
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003;
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 44 of 51
5. Accounting on how and how much defendants are paying Ms. Daisy
Romero and three (3) other teachers who already resigned.
SO ORDERED.135
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court did not unduly expand the scope
of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its March 24, 2003 Order.
However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with
the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation,
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003,
praying that the trial court exclude the other amounts, which were
allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. 136
The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation,
Observation,Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5, 2003
Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is
a prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). 137 The trial
court noted that petitioners still had not complied with its March 24,
2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn over
all the money they had collected.138
Still, petitioners refused to comply.
On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation and
Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a status quo order allowing
Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and curriculum
administrator because it found that petitioners had already established a
new school.139
However, petitioners still did not comply despite this Order. Instead,
they filed their September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising
questions on Custodio's use of the turned over money, Custodio's and
Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the money's exclusive use as teachers'
retirement fund, and petitioners' liability in case of Custodio's misuse of
this amount.140
This prompted Custodio to petition the trial court to cite petitioners in
indirect contempt.141
The trial court responded to petitioners' Motion for Clarification dated
September 1, 2003 and issued its October 8, 2003 Order, agreeing that
the retirement fund would be merely held in trust by Custodio and
Reynante.142 It also directed Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of
₱300,000.00 each. Again, it ordered petitioners to comply with the
mandate in its March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders and directed
them to inform the court the total amount of the money deposited and
reserved for teachers' retirement and its bank account details. 143
Nonetheless, petitioners still did not comply. Instead, they argued in the
contempt proceeding that the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003
Orders were unlawful and were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996.
They claimed that their availment of legal remedies showed their good
faith.144
All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the
orders of the trial court.
Again, the trial court did not exclude any other kind of money in its
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003 Orders, all of
which directed petitioners to turn over all monies.145 Petitioners,
however, still insisted that they had complied because they had remitted
the matriculation fees. Even after clarification, petitioners were defiant.
The trial court also noted that even after petitioners had already
established another competitor school and Custodio and Reynante had
already posted bond, petitioners still refused to comply. 146
The trial court reiterated the orders to turn over the amounts at least
thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous pleadings reveals their
contumacious refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes.
PROVREM
Their defense that they were denied due process deserves little
consideration. Petitioners had attended hearings and had filed several
pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to present
their position on the matter. All these were considered before the trial
court rendered its orders.
In Oca vs. Custodio,147 this Court ruled on the validity of the trial court
August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders:
With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in
jurisprudence that while it is true that the right to due process
safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one
may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has time and
again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its side"
or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due process
because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.
In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due process
by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated August 5,
2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records would show
that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate their arguments
through pleadings and that the same pleadings were acknowledged in
the text of the questioned rulings. Thus, petitioners cannot claim grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on the basis of denial of
dueprocess.148(Citation omitted)
Thus, the question of whether petitioners were denied due process has
already been settled.
This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over
the stated amounts was that the amounts constituted teachers'
retirement fund, which consequently did not belong to St. Francis School
and was not covered by the assailed Orders.149 However, the trial court
lent credence to Joseph's testimony that the amounts deposited in the
Special Savings Accounts were funds for the operations of the school. 150
In any case, whether the amounts are for the teachers' retirement fund
or the school's operation fund, the trial court had determined who was to
have custody over these amounts during the pendency of the intra-
corporate case. Thus, it is not for petitioners to choose which amounts to
turn over.
III
The same principle applies to petitioners' argument that the trial court
orders were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996.
In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are
immediately executory:151
Section 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. - All decisions and
orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory except
the awards for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
if any. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the enforcement
or implementation of the decision or order, unless restrained by an
appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal.
Questioning the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or
implementation. There is no showing that the trial court orders were
restrained by the appellate court.
Hence, petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court orders
just because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the parties
to decide whether they should or should not comply with a court order.
Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the implementation of
the trial court orders nor was there an injunction to prevent the trial
court from hearing and ruling on the contempt case.152 Petitioners'
stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because they were convinced of
its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of questioning the orders does
not show that they are in good faith.
Petitioners likewise cannot invoke the principle of judicial courtesy.
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 45 of 51
Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending a lower court's proceedings
although there is no injunction or an order from a higher court. 153 The
purpose is to avoid mooting the matter raised in the higher court. 154 It is
exercised as a matter of respect and for practical considerations.155
However, this principle applies only if the continuation of the lower
court's proceedings will render moot the issue raised in the higher
court.156
In the two (2) cases involved, there are two (2) separate issues. In G.R.
No. 174996, the issue was whether the orders of the trial court were
valid. In this indirect contempt case, the issue is whether petitioners
willfully disobeyed the orders of the trial court. Although this Court may
find the orders invalid in G.R. No. 174996, the petitioners may still be
cited in contempt for their contumacious refusal and defiance of the trial
court orders. Therefore, the finding of indirect contempt will not render
moot this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 174996.
This Court has acknowledged the trial court's power to cite parties in
indirect contempt for their refusal to follow its orders, although the
validity of the orders is being questioned in another proceeding.
In Roxas v. Tipon,157 this Court found a party guilty of contempt
although the disobeyed order was the subject of a pending petition
before the Court of Appeals:
The issue of indirect contempt needs further discussion because while
the Order of the RTC to allow audit of books of HEVRI has been rendered
moot, it does not change the fact that at the time that the Order was a
standing pronouncement, petitioners refused to heed it ...
....
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a
willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation. The asseverations
made by petitioners to justify their refusal to allow inspection or audit
were rejected by the trial court.
....
The RTC initiated the contempt charge. In the Order dated 9 January
2002, petitioners were directed to appear in court and to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of court for their refusal to
allow Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit the books of HEVRI. Petitioners
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration claiming that said order was
the subject of a pending petition before the Court of Appeals and that
they can only be cited for contempt by the filing of a verified
petition. The RTC denied the motion and reiterated in its Order on 26
April 2002 explaining that it chose to initiate the contempt charge.
The RTC acted on the basis of the unjustified refusal of petitioners to
abide by its lawful order. It is of no moment that private respondents
may have filed several pleadings to urge the R TC to cite petitioners in
contempt. Petitioners utterly violated an order issued by the trial court
which act is considered contemptuous. Thus, in Leonidas v. Judge
Supnet, the MTC's order to the bank to show cause why it should not be
held in contempt, was adjudged as a legitimate exercise of the MTC's
judicial discretion to determine whether the bank should be sanctioned
for disregarding its previous orders.158 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
In this case, petitioners were given several opportunities to comply with
the trial court orders. Even after the trial court clarified which funds to
turn over, they still refused to obey. While petitioners questioned the
legality of these orders, they are immediately executory. Moreover, the
parties do not have the power to determine for themselves what should
and should not be excluded from the orders. Their failure to turn over
the amounts showed petitioners' defiance and disregard for the authority
of the trial court.
PROVREM
Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal
proceedings, and thus, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt of
their guilt.159
The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt
and criminal contempt.
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order
of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other party."160 A criminal
contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority
and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or
judge.161
This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to
punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to
compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.162
In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:163
Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them,
contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure
to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit
of the opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct
directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in
unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or
judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment imposed,
whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to
protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine
payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a
judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to
be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by
imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the performance of some
act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree
rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made before final
decree, be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made
after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on
appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to
the review of judgments in civil cases. . . . The question of whether the
contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the jurisdiction
or the power of a Court to punish the same ....164 (Emphasis supplied)
The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further
elaborated in People v. Godoy:165
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be
determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of
criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the
Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a
crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking
of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but
really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings
should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent
with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held
that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a
prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded
many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular
form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in
their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some
duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing
required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an
action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to
benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt,
regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 46 of 51
one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party
and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of
procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal
prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings ...
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an
aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary
interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it
is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the
defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to
prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil
contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on
the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence.
It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding
lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the
civil "fair preponderance" burden.166 (Citations omitted)
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey acourt
order, judgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit
of another party. It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a
right of a private party, who is the real party in interest in the
proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel
obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal
proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove
it.167
In the case at bar, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms.
Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica, Atty. Silvestre
Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, GUILTY of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial Court, Branch
21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the Orders of the Court
dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and they are hereby
ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the amount of
Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court and to
comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March
24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this judgment.
....
SO ORDERED.168
While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both
criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than
criminal.
The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding
show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in
the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply.
Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
This Court has ruled that while the power to cite parties in contempt
should be used sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its power of
contempt to maintain the respect due to it and to ensure the infallibility
of justice where the defiance is so clear and contumacious and there is
an evident refusal to obey.169
This Court finds that it was sufficiently proven that there was willful
disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to
be cited in contempt.
IV
However, this Court rues that the charges against Alejandro and Atty.
Silvestre ought to be dismissed.
PROVREM
While they were not parties to SEC Case No. 024-02, the trial court ruled
that they were guilty of indirect contempt on the following premise:
The latter Orders are directed to "ALL" the defendants in SEC Case No.
024-02, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N.
Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual and St. Francis School; while the
respondent Al N. Mojica was particularly mentioned in the said orders in
view of the fact that it was he that collected matriculation fees, as a
cashier. With respect to Atty. Silvestre Pascual, the latter was impleaded
in this case because he was a member of the Board of St. Francis School
at the time the petition was filed, and he is empowered to cause
compliance with these Orders. His failure to prove that he has the
intention to comply with the subject orders showed his acquiescence to
the collective act of defiance.170
In Ferrer v. Rodriguez,171 this Court ruled that a non-litigant may be
cited in contempt if he or she acted in conspiracy with the parties in
violating the court order:
Nevertheless, persons who are not parties in a proceeding may be
declared guilty of contempt for willful violation of an order issued in the
case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties in
violating the court's order.
"In a proceeding to punish for criminal contempt for willful disobedience
of an injunction, the fact that those disobeying the injunction were not
parties eo nomine to the action in which it was granted, and were not
personally served, is no defense, where the injunction restrains not only
the parties, but those who act in connection with the party as attorneys,
agents, or employees, and the parties accused, with knowledge of the
order and its terms, acting as the employees of a party, willfully violate
it." (People ex rel. Stearns, et al. vs. Marr, et al., 74 N.E. 431.)172
However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The powerto
punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
judiciously."173 Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that the
non-litigants are guilty of contempt.
This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold
both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt.
Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated cashier
who worked in the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. He neither exercised
power over the money nor had the authority to order how it would be
kept or disposed. Moreover, it has been established that the
matriculation fees had already been turned over to Reynante.
Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees. However,
decisions of the Board of Trustees are not subject to the control of just
one (1) person. While a board member may protest, the majority of the
board may overrule him or her. Thus, it is not correct to say that a board
member is empowered to cause compliance of the trial court orders. It
does not matter if Atty. Silvestre was unable to prove his intention to
comply with the orders. The burden of proving contempt is upon
complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in contempt
proceedings such that the party accused of contempt must prove that he
is innocent.174
In the absence of proof of conspiracy, it cannot be said that Alejandro
and Atty. Silvestre are guilty of contempt.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 25, 2011
Decision175 and December 19, 2011 Resolution176 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985 are AFFIRMED. However, the
complaint against Alejandro Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
#12 G.R. No. 216124 July 19, 2017
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES EDUARDO and HENEDINA
ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA, MR. JO VITO· C. SORIANO,
ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA, ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 47 of 51
B. DENSING, JR., HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, and ATTY.
ERWIN S. OLIVA, Respondents
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for indirect. contempt 1 with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) filed by petitioner Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) against respondents Federico
A. Serra, et al., for acts allegedly disregarding this Court's final and
executory decisions in G.R. Nos. 103338,2 182478,3182664,4 and
203241.5
The Facts
On 25 August 2011, RCBC filed a motion for execution before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 134 (RTC-Makati), in Civil Case No.
10054. RCBC sought to execute the RTC-Makati's Order dated 5 January
1989, which directed respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) to sell to
RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-232 on which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC is
located (subject property).
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 10054, Serra mortgaged the
subject property to respondent Spouses Eduardo M. Andueza and
Henedina V. Andueza (Spouses Andueza) on 21 September 2011. On 26
September 2011, Spouses Andueza had the real estate mortgage
annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2011000513.6
In an Order dated 16 February 2012,7 the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's
motion for execution for lack of basis. The RTC-Makati found that it had
been almost 18 years after the 5 January 1989 Order had become final
and executory that RCBC filed the motion for execution. Neither did
RCBC file an action to revive judgment within ten years from the date
the Order became final.
In an Order dated 26 July 2012, the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's motion
for reconsideration.
On 11 October 2012, RCBC filed a petition for review with this Court
assailing the RTC-Makati's Orders dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July
2012. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 203241. In its petition,
RCBC prayed for the issuance of a TRO to prevent any attempt to
remove it from the subject property, since Serra and Atty. Gina Besa-
Serra had already caused the service of a notice to vacate and demand
for the payment of accrued back rentals, dated 6 September 2012, on
RCBC.
On 3 December 2012, the Court issued a TRO, which restrained Serra
and the RTC-Makati from implementing and enforcing the Orders dated
16 February 2012 and 26 July 2012 and from performing any act to
remove or threaten RCBC from the subject property.
On 14 February 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued by this Court annotated
on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2013000087.
On 10 July 2013, the Court issued a Decision in G.R. No. 203241 which
reads:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July
2012. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 3
December 2012 is made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
City is DIRECTED to issue the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 10054
for the enforcement of the decision therein. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.8
The Decision became final and executory on 27 November 2013. 9
Meanwhile, Andueza filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage,10 dated 13 August 2013, with the Provincial Sheriff of
Masbate since Serra defaulted on his loan obligation.
PROVREM
Pursuant to the Decision in G.R. No. 203241, RCBC filed on 27 February
2014 a new motion for execution before the RTC-Makati. Andueza, a
non-party to the case, filed an opposition to the motion for execution
with affirmative reliefs.
In an Order dated 14 May 2014,11 the RTC-Makati granted the motion for
execution and dismissed the opposition of Andueza. The RTC-Makati held
that the real estate mortgage is inferior to RCBC's right since the
mortgage was constituted when Serra no longer had ownership and free
disposal of the subject property. Accordingly, the RTC-Makati ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution.
Andueza did not file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Makati's
execution order. Neither did he file an appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Thus, the Order of 14 May 2014 became final.
On 23 June 2014, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of execution.12
Based on his Report,13 Sheriff Roberto V. Harina (Sheriff Harina) of the
RTC-Makati attempted to serve on Serra a copy of the Notice to Comply
and a copy of the Writ of Execution. However, Serra was not in his office
so Sheriff Harina left with Serra's caretaker copies of the Notice to
Comply and the Writ of Execution, who returned such copies by leaving
them at the information table of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Masbate
City.
Meanwhile, acting on the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure,
respondents Atty. Leomar R. Lanuza (Atty. Lanuza), Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, and Jovito C. Soriano
(Soriano), Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, scheduled the public auction of
the subject property on 26 June 2014 at 2:00 in the aftemoon.14
On 14 June 2014, RCBC filed a petition for injunction15 before the RTC-
Masbate, docketed as Civil Case No. 6971, to enjoin the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale and public auction of the subject property. Respondent
Judge Maximina R. Ables (Judge Ables), as Executive Judge of the RTC
Masbate, issued a 72-hour TRO on 25 June 2014.
In a Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure and Sale of Real Estate Mortgage
dated 18 August 2014,16 Soriano scheduled anew the public auction sale
of the subject property on 24 September 2014 at 2:00 in the afternoon.
In the meantime, RCBC filed before the RTC-Makati a motion to divest
Serra of his title, invoking Section 10(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 17
In a Resolution dated 23 September 2014,18 the RTC-Masbate denied
RCBC's motion for the issuance of a 20-day TRO.
The public auction sale of the subject property proceeded on 24
September 2014, with Andueza being the highest bidder. 19
On 25 September 2014, a Certificate of Sale20 was issued by Soriano,
noted by Atty. Lanuza and approved by Judge Ables. The certificate of
sale showed that the subject property was sold to Andueza.
In an Order dated 26 September 2014,21 the RTC-Makati granted RCBC's
motion to divest Serra of his title. The. RTC-Makati also granted RCBC's
prayer to have the Registry of Deeds for Masbate cancel Entry No.
2011000513, representing the mortgage of the subject property. The
RTC-Makati stated:
In the same vein, the Court resolves to grant plaintiff's prayer to remove
or cancel the mortgage annotation on OCT No. 0-232, specifically Entry
No. 2011000513. As held by this Court in its Order dated 14 May 2014,
defendant no longer had ownership and free disposal of the property by
the time he fraudulently mortgaged the property to the Spouses Eduardo
M. Andueza and Dina Andueza. Clearly, mortgagees-spouses Andueza do
not have any right or interest over the property and the title to be
transferred to plaintiff must be free from invalid encumbrances, such as
that of Entry No. 2011000513 of the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the
Spouses Andueza.22
In his Comment dated 7 October 2014,23 Serra asserted that due to the
public auction sale on 24 September 2014, where the subject property
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 48 of 51
was sold to Andueza for being the highest bidder, he could no longer sell
the subject property to RCBC.
In a motion dated 10 December 2014,24 Spouses Andueza pleaded that
the RTC-Makati vacate its 26 September 2014 Order. Spouses Andueza
claimed that the RTC-Makati erred in cancelling the real estate mortgage
without the trial court conducting any full-blown hearing.1âwphi1 They
also alleged that they were not parties in Civil Case No. 10054; thus,
they are not bound by whatever decision or order the trial court issued
in the case. RCBC opposed the motion.25
On 22 December 2014, RCBC had the Decision in G.R. No. 203241
annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2014000568.
On 27 January 2015, Andueza, through his counsels respondents Atty.
Paris G. Real (Atty. Real) and Atty. Prudencio B. Densing, Jr. (Atty.
Densing) filed before the RTC-Masbate an ex-parte motion for issuance
of writ of possession,26 which was granted by Judge Ables in an Order
dated 28 January 2015.27
On 29 January 2015, respondent Atty. Edwin L. Rana (Atty. Rana), Clerk
of Court of RTC-Masbate, Branch 47 and Assistant Provincial Sheriff of
RTC-Masbate, issued a writ of possession,28 directing the provincial
sheriff to place Andueza in possession of the subject property, and to
eject all persons claiming rights under Serra.
On the same day, Atty. Rana issued a Notice to Vacate, 29 directed
against Serra and RCBC, and all persons claiming any right under Serra.
The Notice to Vacate was served on RCBC on 30 January 2015. The
Notice to Vacate directed RCBC to "vacate the subject property and to
peaceably turn-over its possession in favor of the mortgagee within five
(5) working days from receipt hereof."30 The Notice to Vacate also stated
that RCBC will be forcibly evicted from the subject property should it
refuse to vacate.
On 4 February 2015, RCBC filed the present petition for indirect
contempt with prayer for a TRO to enjoin respondents from enforcing the
Notice to Vacate and the Writ of Possession issued by RTC-Masbate, and
to enjoin the respondent Register of Deeds from annotating on OCT No.
0-232 the Notice to Vacate and Writ of Possession. RCBC pleaded that
respondents be declared guilty of indirect contempt for disregarding the
Court's decisions in G.R. Nos. 103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, as
well as the permanent restraining order in G.R. No. 203241.
On 11 February 2015, the Court issued a TR0,31 enjoining respondents,
the RTC-Masbate, the Register of Deeds of Masbate City, their agents,
representatives, and all other persons acting on their behalf from (1)
enforcing or causing the enforcement of the Notice to Vacate and the
Writ of Possession, and (2) annotating on OCT No. 0-232 the Notice to
Vacate and Writ of Possession.
In its petition for indirect contempt, RCBC argues that Serra is liable for
indirect contempt of court for refusing to obey the Court's restraining
order and Decision in G.R. No. 203241, the RTC-Makati's 5 January 1989
Order, and for colluding with Spouses Andueza for the illegal mortgage
and foreclosure of the subject property.
Respondents filed their respective Comments to the petition.
In his Corrected Comment filed on 13 March 2015, 32 Serra alleged that
he is not liable for indirect contempt of court. He stated:
As it is, the enforcement of the aforesaid Supreme Court Resolution
dated July 10, 2013 was directed by the Supreme Court to the RTC of
Makati, Branch 134. In turn, the enforcement of the RTC of Makati,
Branch 134's May 14, 2014 Order of Execution and Writ of Execution
dated June 23, 2014, were directed to be enforced by Sheriff Roberto V.
Harina. Such being the case, Atty. Serra, to whom the power and
authority to enforce the aforesaid Order and Writ of Execution is not
being directed to, cannot be held liable for indirect contempt of court. x
x x.33
Serra further claimed that he did not collude with Spouses Andueza in
having the subject property mortgaged in 2011. Serra alleged he was a
mortgagor in good faith and the Spouses Andueza were mortgagees in
good faith when they executed a real estate mortgage over the subject
PROVREM
property on 15 August 2011. Spouses Andueza validly annotated the
mortgage on the title of the subject property with the Register of Deeds
for Masbate City on 26 September 2011. At the time of the execution of
the mortgage, OCT No. 0-232 had no notice of lis pendens, no adverse
claim, and there was no other lien annotated on the title of the subject
property. In addition, Serra alleged that RCBC is guilty of forum-
shopping. RCBC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC-Masbate's denial of RCBC's application for TRO.
Meanwhile, RCBC filed with this Court the instant petition for indirect
contempt seeking a similar relief.
In their Comment filed on 19 March 2015,34 Spouses Andueza35 and
Atty. Real contended that they are not guilty of indirect contempt
considering that the writ of execution issued by the RTC-Makati was
directed to Sheriff Roberto V. Harina, and not to Spouses Andueza; and
the Decision in G.R. No. 203241 was not directed to Spouses Andueza,
who are not parties in the case. Spouses Andueza accused RCBC and its
counsels of negligence and lack of prudence in failing to annotate for
almost 18 years RCBC's supposed rights over the subject property on
OCT No. 0-232. Spouses Andueza claimed good faith in executing the
real estate mortgage with Serra, after checking with the Register of
Deeds of Masbate City that OCT No. 0-232 was free from any lien. RCBC
and its counsels allegedly did not exercise prudence to protect RCBC's
interests even after the annotation of the real estate mortgage on OCT
No. 0-232 on 26 September 2011. Neither did RCBC and its counsels
inform Spouses Andueza of RCBC's rights over the subject property.
RCBC and its counsels also failed to oppose Andueza's petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, which Andueza filed after Serra defaulted on his
loan obligation. They also failed to file any action to cancel the real
estate mortgage with application for TRO to possibly enjoin the
foreclosure proceedings. Spouses Andueza also claimed that RCBC
committed forum-shopping when it filed the present petition since it had
a pending petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking
practically the same relief, which is to prevent the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage and auction sale of the subject property. Likewise,
RCBC violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when it filed the
present petition directly with this Court, when it should have been filed
with the RTC.
In his Comment filed on 26 February 2015, Atty. Densing alleged that he
was not a party or a counsel in G.R. No. 203241. He was merely a
collaborating counsel in the extrajudicial foreclosure case filed by
Spouses Andueza.
In his Comment filed on 9 July 2015,36 Judge Ables argued that he
issued a writ of possession order in favor of Andueza "after finding
mortgagee x x x Andueza to have satisfied all the requirements provided
for under Act No. 3135 x x x." He stated that he "simply performed his
ministerial duty and was not in a position to adjudicate and look further
on matters not forming part" of the case before him. Further, he alleged
that at the time he issued the writ of possession, there was no injunction
from the Court.
In their Comment filed on 11 March 2015,37 Atty. Lanuza, Atty. Rana,
and Soriano claimed that they were merely performing their ministerial
duties under A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 which prescribes the procedure in
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. The TRO issued by this Court was
specifically addressed to Serra, RTC-Makati, their agents,
representatives and any person acting in their behalf. In short, the TRO
was not addressed to respondent clerks of court and sheriff. Further,
Atty. Rana issued the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate against
Serra, RCBC, and all persons claiming rights under the former pursuant
to the Order of RTC-Masbate dated 28 January 2015 and Section l0(c),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In his Comment filed on 6 March 2015,38 respondent Atty. Erwin S.
Oliva, as Acting Register of Deeds for the Province of Masbate, argued
that he was merely performing his ministerial duty to approve and
annotate documents when all the requirements have been complied
with. The restraining order was allegedly not directed or addressed to his
office.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether respondents are liable for indirect
contempt.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is granted in part.
Indirect Contempt
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 49 of 51
In Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc. v. Dominguez, 39 the Court
defined contempt of court, as follows:
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority.1âwphi1 In its broad sense, contempt
is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative
or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its
restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of
the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.
There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and
indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court. A person who is guilty of
disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt.
In this case, RCBC accuses respondents of committing indirect contempt
under Section 3, paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
or judgment of a court, including. the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxx
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding
him in custody pending such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
RCBC alleges that respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for
disregarding this Court's final and executory decisions in G.R. Nos.
103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, which essentially upheld RCBC's
superior right over the subject property.
In G.R. No. 103338, which became final and executory on 15 April 1994,
the Court found that "the contract of 'LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY'
between [Serra] and [RCBC] is valid, effective and enforceable, the price
being certain and that there was consideration distinct from the price to
support the option given to the lessee."40
In G.R. Nos. 182478 and 182664, the Court issued separate Resolutions
dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final and
executory on 27 August 2008 and 3 March 2009, respectively, finding
neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals which held that Serra's donation of the subject property
to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serra's obligation
of selling the subject property to RCBC. Consequently, the deed of
donation was null and void.41
The Decision and TRO in G.R. No. 203241
PROVREM
In its Resolution of 3 December 2012 in G.R. No. 203241, the Court
issued a TRO which pertinently reads:
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, You, the respondent [Federico A. Serra], and the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 134, Makati City, your agents, representatives
and anyone acting on your behalf are hereby RESTRAINED from
implementing and enforcing the Orders dated 16 February 2012 and 26
July 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 134, Makati City, in Civil Case
No. 10054 and from performing any act to remove or threaten to
remove the petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation from the
subject property.
x x x x42 (Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision of 10 July 2013 in G.R. No. 203241, the Court directed
the RTC-Makati to issue the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 10054
and made the TRO permanent. The Court further stated that:
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the
decision which became final and executory 9n 15 April 1994. This
decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in
favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra
transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to
Liok. Serra's action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly,
the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his
own advantage.x x x.43
Serra and Spouses Andueza are guilty of indirect contempt.
As a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the
Court's decision and restraining order in that case. The TRO was issued
on 3 December 2012 while the decision was promulgated on 10 July
2013. By virtue of the TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was
enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the subject property.
Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with Andueza, and Andueza's
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in effect allowed the
removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to
impede the administration of justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be
removed from the premises of the subject property, in contravention of
the clear directive in the decision and restraining order in G.R. No.
203241. Therefore, Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and accordingly
fined ₱30,000.
Serra also claims that "he can no longer execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of [RCBC] because the subject property was already foreclosed
and sold in public auction in favor of Spouses Eduardo and Dina Andueza
x x x."44In other words, Serra alleges that a supervening event - the
foreclosure sale in favor of Spouses Andueza - occurred precluding the
execution of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 203241.
InAbrigo v. Flores,45 the Court held:
A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment
became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after
the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were
not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not
yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may
properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in
order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party
who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should
necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it
would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final
and immutable judgment.
The Court is not convinced that a supervening event occurred which
would effectively prevent the execution of the decision in G.R. No.
203241. While the foreclosure sale proceeded on 24 September 2014,
after the finality of the decision in G.R. No. 203241, the real estate
mortgage in favor of Spouses Andueza was executed on 21 September
2011 while G.R. No. 203241 was pending. Serra could not possibly be
unaware that a foreclosure sale would likely transpire since he was the
mortgagor who defaulted on his loan obligation. Clearly, Serra
performed acts intended to defeat and circumvent the conclusive effects
RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 50 of 51
of the final decision in G.R. No. 203241. Serra defaulted on his loan
obligation and did not lift a finger to prevent Andueza or any person for
that matter from removing RCBC from the subject property.

The 5 January 1989 Order of the RTC-Makati, which directed Serra to

sell to RCBC the subject property, became final and executory on 15
April 1994.1âwphi1 Serra has delayed for 23 years the execution of this
Order. As the Court observed in G.R. No. 203241, "Serra has continued
to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality." Clearly, Serra
deserves to be sanctioned for such reprehensible conduct of delaying for
23 years the execution of the final and executory order of the RTC-
Makati, as affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 203241.

Despite being non-parties in G.R. No. 203241, Spouses Andueza have

notice of the pendency of such action. On 14 February 2013, RCBC had
the TRO issued by this Court annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry
No. 2013000087. Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of
the Court's TRO in G.R. No. 203241 prior to their filing of the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property on 13 August 2013.
Further, the decision in G.R. No. 203241 was promulgated prior to the
Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings. Spouses
Andueza cannot therefore invoke lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest
over the subject property when they filed the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure. Hence, such knowledge should have prevented, or at the
very least cautioned, the Spouses Andueza from proceeding with the
foreclosure which had the effect of removing RCBC from the property, in
contravention of the clear language of the Court in G.R. No. 203241. In
other words, the Spouses Andueza's act of instituting the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, which would ultimately result in removing RCBC
from the subject property, obviously tended to impede the
administration of justice and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.
Accordingly, the Spouses Andueza are likewise adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt and fined ₱30,000.

The other respondents, namely the counsels of the Spouses Andueza,

merely acted to protect the interests of their clients over the subject
property while the public respondents simply acted pursuant to their
ministerial duties and responsibilities in foreclosure proceedings. These
acts do not constitute indirect contempt of court absent any clear and
convincing evidence that they willfully disobeyed the _decision and
restraining order in G.R. No. 203241 or committed any act which tended
to impede the administration of justice.

The TRO must be lifted.

The TRO earlier issued in this case must be lifted. The Court notes that
RCBC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 137314, assailing the denial by Judge Jose C. Fortuno of
RTC-Masbate, Branch 48 of its motion for issuance of a TRO, and praying
for a writ of injunction to enjoin "respondent Clerk of Court and
Ex Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Mas bate City, Deputy
Sheriff Soriano, respondent Spouses Andueza, the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Masbate, and respondent-intervenor Federico A. Serra, x
x x from further performing any act done pursuant to or resulting from
the illegal foreclosure sale of the subject property, x x x and any other
act pursuant to or resulting from the foreclosure sale that has the effect
of ousting petitioner RCBC from the subject property, x x
x."46 RCBC's certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals questions the
proceedings resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
subject property and similarly involves the respondents impleaded in this
contempt petition. Since the certiorari petition before the Court of
Appeals likewise prays for an injunction writ and clearly involves the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property, the Court of Appeals
must be given the opportunity to resolve the propriety of such prayer for
injunction, and ultimately the validity of RCBC's claims over the subject
property. This petition for indirect contempt is not the proper action to
determine the validity of the mortgage between Serra and the Spouses
Andueza, and the foreclosure proceedings resulting from such mortgage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. Respondents

Federico A. Serra and Spouses Eduardo and Henedina Andueza are found
guilty of indirect contempt of court and accordingly ordered to pay a fine
of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) each. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued earlier is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

PROVREM RULE 71- FULLTEXT Page 51 of 51