NE r—~—~—~—~~~~—O””:C TITLE ONE FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CHAPTER ONE FELONIES : ARTICLE 3. Definition. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). pa). when the act is performed with and there is ili when the _, Felony define Alon is on act or emissionpunshablenbyathe "Revised Penal Code. / Offense defined. eel Under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, the term "offense" refers to any act or omission whether L— Section 2[0], Republic Act No. 9344) 46 ELEMENTS OF A FELONY Ant Infraction or misdemeanor defined. Visti afte Lond nar cong i An infraction or misdemeanor. is an act or omission punishable By municipal or city ordinances. Crime defined. that i There must be an act or omission: 6 gs or omission must be punishable by th The act or omission must be voluntary. eo ee la wre Hain i nal 4 Voluntariness of act or omission. was tf dalp w wlpa. ‘An act or omission is voluntary when_all the following _slements are present: 7 1T 1. There must be freedom. There must be intelligence. 3. There must be intent. Freedom. Freedom is an essential element of voluntariness. 1. One who acts under compulsion’ of an irresistible force (Article 12, Paragraph 5) or a7An3 ELEMENTS OF A FELONY 2. One who acts under the impulse 6f an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury (Article 12, Paragraph 6) is exempt from criminal liability. One of the essential elements to make an act or omission voluntary is intelligence.’ Thus, the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An insane or imbecile person. (Article 1 1, Revised Penal Code) -... 2. A child who is 15 years of age or under; or a child who is above 1 but below 18 years ‘old at the time of the Gpmmiesion W2 the ‘ten =a ‘Unless ) he has acted with ection 6, Republic Act Ni fer Justice and Welfare Act) : eee as ioety | Criminal intent is one of the elements to make an act or omission voluntary. Without criminal intent, one c criminally liable. Thus: annote hele 1. One who 2. One who acts. under any of the tit citcumstances under Aricle 11, except Paragraph 4, or ia 3. One whose acts constitute scams ret an accident under Article is free from criminal liability. a Qk.12 part And perm whe wkil parbivimany 0. lavafil Ok ef dae WN Cather om “et by now audchat Jo Fault ur iakation 4 cairerzy O + 48 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN AFELONYOR —_Art.3 MALUM IN SE AND AN OFFENSE OR MALUM PROHIBITUM Distinctions between a felony or malum in se and an offense or malum prohibitui or ne or malum prohibitum 7. Wis inhereniiywiohg and 7. The act is inotiinherently that is, (ifimoral’ but becomes so immoral in its nature and because its commission is injurious in its | expressly forbidden by positive consequences without any | law (Black's Law Dictionary). regard to the fact of it being | Examples: illegal possession of noticed or punished by the | firearms, violation of Batas law of the state (Black's | Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Anti- Law Dictionary). Examples: | Bouncing Checks —_ Law), rape, murder, homicide, | violation of the Anti-Fencing robbery, arson. Law, illegal recruitment. i} [2. A felony or malum in se|2. An offense or malum) act or prohibitum generally is an act or j omission jibe: empecis penalilaws) i.., laws which are penal in nature but do not operate as amendments to the Revised Penal Code. | 3 isan] 3. Criminal intent ig@igiy an essential element essential element. is an 4 /Honestimistakeof factiisiy 4. Honest mistake of fact isiifoti) \@cetense; a defense. @¥a defense. [Reason & Gon ah | "6. Persons criminally liable ‘pnsp leoilee te are AES. | ‘and accessories. |. unless specifically \" | provided for by the special law. | 49An DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN A FELONY OR ALUM IN SE AND AN OFFENSE OR MALUM PROHIBITUM into three stages, namely: | divided into stages. consummated, _ frustrated and attempted stage into degrees and periods. | specific in terms of years, | months or days, unless provided for by the special law itself. 7. Its execution is divided | 7. Its execution is generally not eae et tion are] %. Penalties are classified | 8. Generally, penalties are 9. Rules on mitigating, | 9. Generally, the rules on aggravating and alternative | mitigating, aggravating and circumstances (Articles 13, | alternative circumstances 14 and 15 of the Revised | (Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Penal Code) apply. Revised Penal Code) do not | apply, unless provided for by the special law itself. — The use by a special penal law of a penalty designated under the Revised Penal Code doce not make tho act a felony or malum in se. The use of the penalty designated under the Revised Penal Code by a special penal law does not make the act a felony or malum in se. ¥ Thus, Republic Act No. 8745 (the Anti-Torture Law of 2009) uses the terms reclusion perpetua, reclusiort temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor as penalties for violations thereof. The use of these penalties, however, does not make a violation of this law a “felony.” A _. Violation of this law remains an offense or malum prohibitum. Likewise, Republic Act No. 8049 (the Anti-Hazing Law) uses the terms reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor and prision correccional as penalties for violatons 50 EEE ET MANNER OF COMMITTING FELONIES Art. 3. thereof. The use of these penalties, however, does not make a violation of this law a “felony.” A violation of this law remains an offense or malum prohibitum. The controlling factor in the determination of whether the violation is a “felony” o” an “offense” is-not the penalty prescribed but how the felony-is defined and described in the special law itself. Manner of committing felonies. ¢ A felony may be committed by means of: Dolo defined. There is dolo when the ‘elony is committed by means of meer Deceit defined. There is deceit when the act is performed with igetberate intent Culpa defined. There is culpa whenthelfelony is committedGr when ‘the, Concept of “act” or “om An iii is ‘ending to produce People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 309) 51 ion.”An MANNER OF COMMITTING FELONIES Mere criminal thoughts existing in the mind of a person does not make him criminally liable. An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused Is. It is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to Which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. (People vs. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62) The act or omission should be punishable by the Revised Penal Code. There should be a provision in the Revised Penal Code expressly defining the act or omission as a felony and specifically imposing penalty therefor. Without the provision in the Revised Penal Code, the act or omission does not constitute a felony. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. This 52 MANNER OF COMMITTING FELONIES Ant. 3 Latin phrase means that there is no crime, unless there is a law punishing it. # Treason. (Article 114, Revised Penal Code) Arbitrary detention. (Article 124, Revised Penal Code) Bi Murder. (Article 248, Revised Penal Code) + Rape. (Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code) #6! Kidnapping and serious illegal detenti 267, Revised Penal Code) 2 Examplesioffelony:by omission: Misprision of treason. (Article 116, , code) ® c , Revised Penal Delay in the delivery of detained persons t to th proper judicial authorities. (Article 125, Revised Penal Code) © illegal exaction. (Article 243, Ps h Revised Penal Code) ‘ } Paragraph 2b) Refusal of assistance (Article 233, code) (arti |, Revised Penal Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. (Ar 270, Revised Penal Code) Pmt ance ‘commi 4. Frauds against the publi public treasur (Article 213, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code) me , 53Art. 3 MANNER OF COMMITTING FELONIES: Bh everson. (Article 217, Paragraph 2(b), Revised PenallCode) | ra Voluntary failure of a collection officer to issue an offic receipt. (Article 213, Paragraph 2(b), Revised Penal Code) Pestata. (Article 315, Revised Penal Code) © 4 Simple seduction. (Article 338, Revised Penal Code) | may be committed by, iniprudente, e, lack of foresight, or ff Judgment rendered through negligence. (Artiéle 205, Reviséd Penal Code) Unjust interlocutory order. (Article 206, Revised Penal Code) Negligence and tolerance in the prosecution of offenses, (Article 208, Revised Penal Code) ¢. Betrayal of trust by an attorney. (Article 209, Reviséd Penal Code) Criminal negligence. (Article 365, Revised Penal Code) 5 | (Malawin®se! are essentially the acts or omissions punishable by the. Revised Renal ade Mala prohibit) are essentially the acts or omissions Punishable peaa apace = J, 15th Ed., 1998, p. 90) MANNER OF COMMITTING FELONIES Ant. 3 The distinctions between avfelony.end an atiaase are essentially the same as the distinctions between mela-in:se and malarprohibite Examples of an offense or malum prohibitum: ra Violation of the law punishing illegal possession of firearms. (P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294; Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001, 358 SCRA 373) (@ Violation of the Omnibus Election Code. (B.P. No. 881; Herrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140651, February 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 327) Violation of the Revised Forestry Code. (P.D. No. 705; People vs. Dator, G.R. No. 136142, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 222) \@! Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. (People vs. Sy Bing Yok, G.R. No. 121345, June 23, 1999, 309 SCRA 28) Illegal recruitment. (Poople vs. Gharbia, G.R. No. 123010, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 685) Violation of the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law. (Batas Pambansa Big. 22) Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. (P.D. No. 1612; Lim vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100311, May 18, 1993, 222 SCRA 279) — Motive (cited in Padilla, Ambrosio, Revised Penal Code, Book 55Art. 3 ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA Motive 4. Criminal intent is an 1. Motive is not an element of |sais semen ateons a felony. However, i Criminal intent becomes material only when there is doubt as to the identity of the offender. 2. Criminal intent must be 2. Motive need not be proven proven by the prosecution. by the prosecution. (U.S. vs. McMann, G.R. No. 2229, July n. ( Yoi0 15 Pai 1910, 15 Phil. 47) Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Criminal intent is essential in felonies under the maxim “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." This Latin phrase means that the act of a person does not make him a criminal unless his mind is also criminal. Thus, without criminal intent, the act is not a felony. Manzanaris vs. People (G.R. No. L-64750, January 30, 1984, 127 SCRA 201) Facts: A certain Geronimo Borja was charged with malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Basilan. To oblain his »provisional liberty during the pendency of his case, Borja submitted to the court Original Certificate of Title No. 877 as his property bond, As clerk of court, Selso Manzanaris had official custody of the records pertaining to Geronimo Borja’s case. Manzanaris discovered that OCT No. 56 ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISIMENS SITREA Art. 877 did not exist in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan. To protect the interest of the State, Manzanaris gave the copy of OCT No. 877 to Geronimo Borja in order that the | same may be reconstituted because the unreconstituted title was inefficacious as the property of Geronimo Borja. OCT No | 877 was reconstituted through the efforts of Mrs. Trinidad M. Borja, wife of Geronimo Borja. She never delivered the same to the court despite demands from Manzanaris because the reconstituted title could not be located. Having removed OCT No. 877 from the court records without a court order, Manzanaris was charged with the crime of infidelity in the custody of public documents. Held: Manzanaris is not liable for infidelity in the custody of documents. To warrant a finding of guilt of the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of removal, as a mode of committing the offense, should be coupled with criminal intent or illicit purpose. This calls to mind the oft- repeated maxim "Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,” ‘which expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. It is quite clear that in removing the certificate of title in question from the court's files and delivering the same to Borja for the purpose of effecting its ‘administrative reconstitution, Manzanaris was not prompted by criminal intent or illegal purpose. Rather, he was motivated with a sincere desire to protect the interest of the Government. Manzanaris cannot be punished criminally. Relucio vs. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. November 21, 2002, 392 SCRA 435) 147182, Facts: Evelyn M. Relucio applied for the grant of veteran Preference rating at the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO). She claimed that her father, Alberto Mansueto, was a Veteran. She was issued Certification No. 22413A and Master ist No. 274 by Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, certifying 87At.3 ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA that her father Alberto Mansueto was a World War II Veteran with the rank of Private. As a result of the certification issued by the PVAO, Evelyn Relucio was able to use the same to avail of the benefits of a 10% veterans preference granted to children of veterans. She was also issued a Career Service Professional eligibility and subsequently appointed under permanent appointment at the Palao City Government, ligan City. However, after verification done by the Civil Service Commission, it’ was determined that the name of Alberto Mansueto was not found in any of PVAO's official records of velerans. By reason of her alleged misrepresentation, the CSC dismissed Relucio under the provisions of Section 23, Rule XIV, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the provisions ‘of Book V, of E.0, No. 292, which indicates that dishonesty and falsification of official document are grave offenses punishable with dismissal from service. On her part, Relucio claimed good faith. Held: The dismissal of Relucio was not proper on the basis that she committed falsification of official documents. Evelyn Relucio was undoubtedly in good faith when she claimed that her father was a World War Il veteran. She was aware that her father's veleran status was not yet confirmed. She submitted affidavits of the superiors and contemporaries in the military of her father to prove that he indeed served during World War II In fact, on the basis of said affidavits, the PVAO recognized her father's services and consequently issued a Master List and a Certification stating that Alberto Mansueto, Jr. was a World War II Veteran with the rank of private. The rule is that “there can be no conviction for falsification of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith." Thus, the maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. 58 HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT _An honest mistake of fact is the misperception‘of fact | on the part of a person who injures another. An. 3 Mistake of fact negates the presumption of malicious intent. This leads to the acquittal of an accused, provided that the act committed is also accompanied with the absolute absence of negligence or bad faith. The accused does not commit a felony, although he commits a wrongful act. This principle is also known as The act done would have been gjl/had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. he (mmiteny of the accused was lawful. p@! There was or (culpa). (Padilla, Ambrosio, The Revised Penal Code, Book |, 15th Ed., 1998, p. 63) ua ‘Ah Chong (G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil Facts: Ah Chong was a cook and the deceased was a house boy. Both were employed in the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night after Ah Chong had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called cut twice, "Who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leapt from the bed ‘and again called out: "If you enter the room | will Kill you." At that moment Ah Chong was struck by a chair which had been laced against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, Chong seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally 59At 3 HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT Wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Ah Chong was charged with the crime of murder. Held: Ah Chong is not liable for the crime of murder. There is no criminal liability. The ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative @ particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged, it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where a person Volunterily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to commit U.S. vs. Bautista (G.R. No. 10678, August 17, 1915, 31 Phil 308) Facts: Armed with an order of arrest, the chief of police of Gerona and a policeman went to the house where Manuel Bautista was staying for the purpose of arresting him. The police authorities entered the house without permission and fttempted to arrest Bautista without explaining to him the cause or nature of their presence there. Bautista, according to the ctief of police, resisted the arrest, calling to his neighbors for assistance, using the following language: "Come here there are some bandits here and they are abusing me." The policeman in his declaration said that when he attempted to arrest, Bautista said to him: "Why do you enter my house, you shameless brigands?” Bautista called to one Basilio, saying "There are some bandits here!" The policeman further testified that he then informed Bautista that he came for the purpose of arresting him, Bautista asked him if he had an order of arrest, which question was answered by the policeman in the affirrative. Said policeman further testified that immediately after ne had notified Bautista that he was a policeman and had 60 HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT An. 3 an order of arrest, Bautista submitted to the arrest without further resistance or objection. Bautista was charged with the crime of assault upon agents of the authorities, Held: Bautista is not liable for the crime of assault Of he authostioe. One wno resists an arest, without knoning that the person or persons who are attempting to make the arrest are vested with authority, but who submits to the arrest immediately upon being informed that such persons have a right to make the arrest, is not guilty of the crime of resistance to the agents of the authorities, People vs. Bayambao (G.R. No. 29481, October 31 Boonie ve jober 31, 1928, 52 Facts: While the wife of Fambaya Bayambao was cooking she called out to him saying, “Pambaya, Pambaya, someone has thrown a stone at the house.” Bayambao took his revolver and went down. Having gone under the house, he looked around but did not see anybody; however, he did not go far because he was alone. Then, while he was near the staircase, about to ascend, he heard a noise and saw a black figure that rushed towards him, with hands ited up as if to strike him. Bayambao was frightened, and fired at the black figure. Bayambao was charged with the crime of murder of his brother-in-law. Held: Bayambao is not liable for the crime of murder. Bayambao acted from the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an injury, at least equal in gravity, in the belief that the deceased was a malefacior who attacked him with a kampilan ‘or dagger in hand, and for this reason he was guilly of no crime and is exempt from criminal liability. Bayambao is acquitted of the crime of murder. Ignorance or error of fact on the part of the Bayambao Was not due to negigerce or bad faith, and this reDuts the resumption of malicious intent accompanying the act ofNO HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT An. IF THERE IS FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE Killing, The doctrine laid down in the case of United States vs ‘Ah Chong is applicable to the present case. There is no honest mistake of fact when there is negligence or fault on the part of the accused. People vs. Oanis (G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943, 74 Phil. 257) Facts: Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and an escaped convict, and, | If overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspect's house, the two went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their 32 and .45 caliber revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal. Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder. Held: Oanis and Galanta are liable for the crime of murder. In support of the theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact, Oanis and Galanta rely on the case of United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488), The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this_applios—only-when-the mistake is committed without fault_or-carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "Who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leapt from his bed and called out again, "If you enter the room 1 will kill you.” But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who tured out to be his roommate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of @ 62 NO HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT IF THERE IS FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE Art. 3 man who was masked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a.further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act Immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, Oanis and Galanta, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, Oanis and Galanta had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to one eyewitness. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for Oanis and Galanta to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight, but to arrest him, and to pit dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered y him. People vs. Apego (G.R. No. 7929, November 8, 1912, 23 Phil. _ Facts: Genoveva Apego lived with her married sister. The ‘spouses returned to thair house one night where Apego was sleeping. Failing to awaken her, the spouses ascended the ‘stairs and entered the house. The husband, in groping around the dark, stumbled over the sleeping woman and touched ‘her left arm. She received no reply whatever to her question S to who was beside her in the darkness of the house. (ego, under the impression that she was being assaulted 63An. 3 NO HONEST MISTAKE OF FACT If THERE IS FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE with intent to commit rape, stabbed her brother-in-law with Subsequent fatal results. Immediately after delivering the blow, aapieter ita lamp and Apego then for the first time becathe Meare of the identity of her supposed assailant, Apego Wer, Charged with the crime of murder. She invoked the defense of her person and rights, Hold: Apego Is not liable for the crime of murder. She is lable far the erime of homicide. Upon Apego’s awakening, she was Saaled at feeling somebody grasp her left arm and belley!ng that an attempt was being made against her honor, she referstood that there was a postive unlawful aggression from) aiwsh she had to defend herself with @ pocketknife, and itis ies undeniable that there was no previous provocation on her part, However, Apego exceeded her right of defense in making ge of this deadly weapon, even in the defense of her person snd rights, by decidedly wounding him who had touched het or Caught her by the arm. There was no real need for ‘wounding cathe said) weapon the man who had merely caught her am, and perhaps did so to awake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to her sisters calls. Once awake and provided ret an fective weapon for her defense, there was neither just nor reasonable cause for striking a blow therewith to the see or of the body, where the principal vital organs are seated, Cfthe man who had not performed any act which might be considered as an actual attempt against her honor. The mistake of Apego was excusable under the circumstances. Where the mistake of fact is excusable, punishment must be predicated upon the operative facts constituting her mistake. in view of the shape and direction of the wound received hy the deceased and the part of the body where it ‘has inflicted, the wound was inficted by Apego alter she hag wes an from tha piace where she had been sleeping. or, at least, when she had raised up in a sitting posture or was 64 MALUM PROHIBITUM An. 3 seated on the floor, at the time that th a le deceased perhay stooped over, in stumbling against her, touched her ie arm. In the commission of the crime there cicumetance of complete exertion lm responsibly, 2 all the three requisites specified in subarticle 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code (now Article 11[1] of the Revised Penal Code) are not applicable. The criminal act is not altogethe excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said paueles nous majority of them were present, that is first an e third requis is It _ to frst and the Ire rau sites, Apego is found guilty of the In US. vs. Ah Chong, the Supreme Court hel murder‘ the deceused Dy hs mae nd, commited wht laboring under the misapprehension that the deceased was a robber attempting to enter the house at night, was excusable and acquitted Ah Chong, even though the evidence showed that Ah Chong attacked the deceased with intent to kill In the case at bar it is held that a woman in practically the same situation, but believing that the attack is made with intent to Tape her, is not justified in going so far in the exercise of her fight of self-defense as to kill her assailant, this although there ig a strong presumption from the evidence that the blow which she struck at her assailant was fatal by the merest chance. “Illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum. For conviction of the accused, it i , it is enough that the pense committed the act prohibited by the statute. Good faith or honest intention is not a defense. In the following Gases, however, there are variations in the Court rulings: 65FO Art. 3 MALUM PROHIBITUM Cuenca vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. L-27586, June 26, 197, 33 SCRA 522) FactstlERn@stelCUehiea was a special watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency. It was the practice in the agency that when the security guards reported for work, they were provided with firearms and ammunition, which they would return after their tour of duty. Cuenca was detailed at the Philippine Savings Bank as security guard. He was armed with a pistol, Ithaca, .45 cal. Pat, Paul Sabate arrested Cuenca for illegal possession of the said firearm and ammunition. When asked to produce his license to possess the firearm and ammunition, Cuenca told him that he was a special watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm and ammunition belonged, and the license to possess the same was in the office of the agency. Cuenca told Pat. Sabate that the owner of the agency was one Mr. Jose Forbes, who had the license for the said firearm and ammunition. It appeared that the agency had(fdlicense to possess the firearm and ammunition in question; hence, neither Cuenca nor the agency was a licensed possessor of said firearm and ammunition. The accused claimed that he was made to believe in the agency that Mr. Forbes had license to possess them. Cuenca was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Held: Cuenca is not liable for the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Cuenca was enlilled-te-assume that his employer had the requisite licensé to possess said firearm and ‘ammunition and to turn them over to him while he was on duty as one of the regular security uards. Those dealing with the security agency, either as clients or as employees thereof, are entitled to presume, in the absence of indicia to the contrary — and there were none in the present case — that it has complied with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. What is more, Jose Forbes had told Cuenca that the firearm and ‘ammunition in question were duly licensed, and, as an 66 MALUM PROHIBITUM A. 3 employee of the agency, Cuenca could not be expected to demand from his employer proof of the veracity of the latter's assertion before relying thereon. Cuenca is acquitted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. ~T” Note: The Supreme Court sustained good faith as a defense in this case although illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitur. ——_ people vs. Landicho (No. 21431-R, September 5, 1968, [C.A] 55 OG. 842) Facts: PC soldiers came to the house of barrio lieutenant Cipriano Landicho and asked if he really had a firearm. He readily surrendered from his possession a Thompson submachine gun with its magazine and seven rounds of ammunition. He possessed it without any license because of the rampant stealing of livestock in their place and for the protection of his animals. He was authorized by the municipal mayor to collect loose firearms in order to help in the restoration of peace and order in the municipality, and these ‘would be paid for by the government, He added that he bought the firearm from two unknown persons for Php120.00 and it ‘was his intention to tum it over to the municipal mayor the following mornng. Cipriano was convicted of illegal possession of a firearm. Held: Cipriano was acquitted. Illegal possession of a firearm is, malum prohibitum, and intention is immaterial because it is presumed from the mere act of possession. For the criminal liability to arise, it is sufficient that the prohibited act is done. Considering, however, the social policy of the government Concerning loose firearms, persons collecting them should be “allowed temporary and_incidental possession thereof for the Purpose of surrendering tham to the proper authorities. The doctrine of immateriality of animus possidendi should be Telaxed in a certain way. Otherwise, the avowed purpose of 67Art. 3 MALUM PROHIBITUM the government's policy cannot be realized. Ot course.__it would be a different story if it is shown that the possessor has held on to the firearm for an undue length of time when he.had all the chances to surrender itto the proper authorities. People vs. Mallari (No. 7716-R, October 4, 1958, [C.A] 55 O.G. 1394) Facts: A policeman came to the house of Nicolas Mallari and asked if he had a firearm. It was handed over. Nicolas was arrested, although he informed the arresting officer that he had a pending application for the renewal of his permit. During trial, PC agent Jesus Santos testified that he advised Nicolas to keep it pending the application. Nicolas was convicted of illegal possession of a firearm, Held: Nicolas was acquitted. The spirit of the law regarding the possession of firearms is to punish only those who possess the same without the knowledge of the authorities concerned, and-without even” bothering themselves to legalize such possession. He had a pending application for a permanent permit. His possession was not unknown to an agent of the law who advised him to keep it in the meantime. Any doubt as to his claim would be resolved in his favor. Nicolas should not be made to suffer the consequences of the delay of the action ‘on his application, for to do so would be tantamount to ‘oppression. 68 CONSEQUENCES OF COMMITTING AFELONY Art. 4 ARTICLE 4. (Criminal Nability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1 By any person commiting! aeleny (tty atnough the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. yy any person hich would BS" ere it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. 1. Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. For this paragraph to apply, the following requirements must be present: | 1, The accused must be committing a felony, i.e. an_act or omission punishable by the Revised Penal Code. 2, The felony must be “intentional” since the last portion of this Paragraph provides “although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.” This, therefore, cannot apply when the act committed through negligence, carelessness, lett foresight or lack of skill. In this instance, the liability the accused is determined by Article 365 df the: 69And PROXIMATE CAUSE Revised Penal Code which penalizes criminal negligence. 3. The felony committed by the accused should be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. There should be a relationship of cause and effect between the felony committed and the result thereof. Proximate cause. Proximate cause is defined to be that cause which in the ordinary and continuous sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. (Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited in Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 4957, 102 Phil. 181) The rationale behind Article 4, Paragraph1 lies on the Spanish principle: “el que es causa de la causa es causa del ‘mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th ed., 1968, pp. 335-336, cited in People vs. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801, March 27, 1974, 58 SCRA 138) Cases on the proximate cause of death. 1. The accused gave a fist blow on the back part of the head that caused the victim to fall and hit his head on the asphalt pavement. People vs. Cagoco (G.R. No. 38511, October 6, 1933, 58 Phil 524) Facts: Francisco Cagoco attacked Yu Lon by giving him a fist blow on the back part of his head from the rear. As a consequence, Yu Lon fell down and his head hit the asphalt pavement. Yu Lon was brought to a hospital where he died 70 PROXIMATE CAUSE Art. 4 immediately thereafter. Cagoco was charged with the crime of murder. Held: The death of Yu Lon was the direct consequence of Cagoco's felonious act of striking him on the head. If Cagoco | had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner, then | he would nevertheless have been guilty cf homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased, Since Cagoco did ‘commit the crime with treachery, he is guity of murder. 2, The accused is liable for his wife's ceath caused by his relentless beating. People vs. Dalag (G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 264) Facts: As Armando was being admonished by his wife Leah for drinking hard liquor, he pushed and kicked the left side of her body. She fell to the ground. Even zs Leah was already lying prostrate on the ground, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different paris of the body. He grabbed Leah's hair and banged her head on the wall. Leah's forehead directly hit the walll. In the process, Armando stepped ‘on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband, she told him "Toy, Toy, | will find some medicine for your wound.” Leah told Armando that she was going to the house of Felisa to get medicine for his injured foot merely as a ploy to enable her to escape from him and avoid further physical abuse. Leah did not bother getting medicine for the injury on the foot of Armando when he stepped on a nail as he martyred ___ Leah. When she returned, he pushed her. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and ordered the daughter Princess Joy to get ‘some water, which she did. She poured water on the face of ‘her mother but the latter did not move. Armando then tried to vive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no il. Thereafter, Armando sat near Leah, while nonchalantly nm EEEAn PROXIMATE CAUSE smoking cigarette. The son Francis got a piece of carton from their store and placed it underneath his mother's body. Francis then suggested to his father that they bring Leah inside the house. Armando nonchalantly remarked, "You really love your mother.” Leah never woke up and died a week later. The trial court found Armando guilty of the crime of parricide. Held: Armando is liable for the orime of particide. Leah cannot be faulted for preferring to escape from the clutches of ‘Armando rather than get medicine for the injured foot of the latter, She was being assaulted by Armando relentlessly and without mercy. Unless she escaped from the clutches of Armando, she would be killed by him. Leah could not be expected to first get medicine, retun to the house and treat the injured foot of Armando only to be assaulted again by her husband. For the trial court to blame Leah for preferring to escape and survive rather than treat the injured foot of Armando, and reward him by mitigating his oriminal liability is a travesty. The injuries suffered by Leah that caused her death were the consequence of the Armando’s deliberate and intentional acts. Armando is criminally liable for the death of Leah pursuant to the first Paragraph of Article 4. 3, The accused is liable for the death of a bystander who was hit by a lance that he threw at his enemy. People vs. Vagallon (G.R. No. 22688, January 26, 1925, 47 Phil. 332) Facts: Roque Salomon was a suitor of the sister of Ramon \Vagallon, Roque had been living in Ramon's house. Roque was ejected from the house because Ramon’s sister gave birth to a child and Roque was not in a position to marry her. When Ramon came to his com plantation, he and Roque met with the resentment originated by the preceding event. There was sufficient motive on the part of either party for taking revenge. A fight occurred. Roque received one wound, while 72 | PROXIMATE CAUSE at | Ramon suffered six. Wounded and bloodied, Ramon came to his house, and his mother gave him a lance. With it he retumed to the scene of the fight. During the fight, Ramon | threw the lance against Roque. The latter avoided the biow, and the lance struck the girl Natividad on her side, as she was | then behind the combatants. Natividad died the following day. | The trial court found Ramon guilty of the crime of homicide. Held: Ramon is liable for the crime of homicide. There is no doubt that Ramon caused the death of the girl Natividad. While the accused had ro intention to accidentally wound and kill her, he is responsible for the consequences of his acts. 4, The accused is liable for the natural result of his act, although unexpected. ES vs. Brobst (G.R. No. 4935, October 25, 1909, 14 Phil 10) Facts: James Brobst was engaged in work on a mine, where he gave employment to a number of native laborers, one of whom was Simeon Saidivar. Saldivar was discharged and warned not to come back to the premises. Brobst was not to employ him again because he was a thief and a disturbing element for the other laborers. A few days later, Saldivar came to the mine to look for work. Brobst ordered him off the place, exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamusf (Begone). Saldivar made no move to leave, and although the order was epeated, merely grinned at Brobst. Enraged, Brobst struck Saldivar with a powerful blow using his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle of Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from which it was Suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, ‘Staggered and without saying a word, went away in the irection of his sister's house. He died as he reached the door te house. Brobst was charged with the crime of homicide, 73Ard PROXIMATE CAUSE Held: Brobst is liable for the crime of homicide. The evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and unlawful infliction by Brobst of a severe blow on the person of the deceased, While it is true that Brobst does not appear to have intended to take the life of his victim, there can be no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some injury, at least fo the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him. Brobst is, therefore, criminally responsible for the natural, even if unexpected, results of his ‘act. The law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural consequences of his illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such consequence, but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. 5, The strangulation of the wife accelerated her death due to a heart ailment. People vs. Martin (G.R. No. L-3002, May 23, 1951, 89 Phil 18) Facts: Aniceto Martin made a confession in the Ilocano dialect that he wound the rope one turn around the neck of his sick wife, Laura Luiz, which caused her death. A resident physician of the llocos Norte Provincial Hospital performed an autopsy and later certified and testified that the cause of death was heart failure due to fright or shock. Martin was charged with the complex crime of parricide with abortion. After trial he was acquitted of abortion, but found guilty of parricide. Held: Martin is liable for the crime of parricide. Martin contends that the death of Laura was not due to the strangling, but to her heart disease. It should be noted, however, that the heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by the strangling; consequently, Martin was responsible for the death, notwithstanding the fact that the victim was already sick. Had not the defendant strangled the deceased, the latter, 74 PROXIMATE CAUSE Ant 4 notwithstanding her illness, would not have di d . ied. Ir words, Martin directly caused her death nother 6. The accused is still liable when the proximate cause of death is the stab wound that he inflicted, although the immediate cause of death is mucuous colitis arising from the weakened condition of the victim. People vs. Piamonte (G.R. No. L-5775, J Phil. 293) , January 28, 1954, 94 Facts: In the course of a robbery, Guillermo Mascarifias stabbed Magno Israel several times with a hunting knife. The victim was brought to a hospital where he was operated upon. The operation did him well but he had a stormy post-operative period until he died due to mucuous colitis. The accused was charged with robbery with homicide. Held: Mascarifias is liable for the crime of robt it homicide. It is true that the victim did not die imnelatoy ar the infliction of the wounds and that he was able to survive for sometime because of the operation to which he was subjected and the medical treatment extended to him at the hospital. But ‘the fact remains that he died as a result of the mucuous colitis he contracted because of his weak condition resulting from the wounds he had received. His attending doctors agreed that this weakened condition which had caused disturbance in the functions of his intestines made it possible for him to contract mucuous colitis, which shows that, while said wounds were ot the immediate cause, they were however the proximate ‘cause of his death. This is enough to make the accused Tesponsible for the crime charged. 75Art. 4 PROXIMATE CAUSE 7. The accused is liable for the death of a bystander killed by @ stray bullet coming from his firearm. People vs. Itlanas (G.R. No. 60118, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 202) Facts: Itlanas fired at Edmar Mag-aso who was killed on the spot. A bystander who was not at al involved in the fight was hit by stray bullets coming from the gun of Itianas. Held: Itlanas is guilty of homicice for the death of the bystander. Article 4 is so clear that there is no room for interpretation. 8. The accused is liable for the death of the victim who died due to “asphyxiation by suffocation” caused by stuffing “pandesal" into her mouth. People vs. Opero (G.R. No. L-48796, June 41, 1981, 105 ‘SCRA 40) Facts: Intending to commit robbery, Diego Opero and Reynaldo Lacsinto subdued Liew Soon in her room at the House International Hotel by assaulting her, tying her hands land feet, stabbing her and stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal. Liew Soon was found dead in her room. The cause of death was due to a pandesal stuffed in her mouth that caused “asphyxiation by suffocation.” Opero advanced the theory that he never intended to Kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, for if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he could have easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his liability should be only for robbery. Held: The accused are tiable for the crime of robbery with homicide. When a direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime 76 PROXIMATE CAUSE Art 4 } of robbery with homicide. The movements of the victim that | caused the “pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, | however, attrbutable to what Opero and his co-accused did to | the victim, for if they did not hogtie her, she could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation. 9. The accused is liable where the direct and immediate cause ‘of the death of the victim is the mortal wounds inflicted by mauling and clubbing the victim on different parts of the body with a steel hammer and a wooden stick. People vs. Sitchon (G.R. No. 134362, February 27, 200: SCRA 68) i ad Facts: Emelito Sitchon attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the sleeping 2-year-old Mark Anthony Fernandez, by mauling and clubbing him on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick, approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. Sitchon was charged with the crime of murder and he pleaded not guilty. In his defense, Sitchon purportedly claimed that he did not intend to kill the toddler. Held: Sitchon is liable for the crime of murder. The rationale for Article 4, Paragraph 1 is found in the doctrine that "el que @s causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.) Thus ihere Sitchon violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts ‘of the latter's body, Sitchon is liable for the supervening death '@S a consequence of the injuries. Assuming, therefore, that itchon merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for the death of the victim ised by such injuries. (See also People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 24, January 18, 1996, 252 SCRA 31) 7Ana PROXIMATE CAUSE 40. The blow of the accused hastened or accelerated the death of the victim who was already suffering from an internal malady. U.S. vs. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 7123, August 17, 1912, 23 Phil 12) Facts: Marclano Magno was previously affected by some internal malady. Rosalino Rodriguez dealt Marciano Magno two blows with the fist, one on the left side toward the stomach and the other on the back, which knocked him down. Magno endeavored to return to his home. A short distance away, ‘Magno fell to the ground dead. Held: Rodriguez is liable for the crime of homicide. A blow with the fist or a kick, though causing no external wound, may very well produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause death; and although the assaulted party was previously ‘affected by some internal malady, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened. Rodriguez produced the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. 41. The accused is liable if the victim removed the drainage of the wound due to the physical pain. People vs. Quianzon (G.R. No. 42607, September 28, 1935, 62 Phil. 162) Facts: Juan Quianzon took hold of a firebrand and applied it to the neck of Andres Aribuabo who so pestered him. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day after the incident. It is contended by Quianzon that even granting that it was he who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had 78 PROXIMATE CAUSE An. 4 placed to control or isolate the infection. Quianzon charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide. and Held: Quianzon is liable for the crime of homicid is le. Aribuabo removed the drainage of his wound due to nervousness and realessness arsing from the physical pain caused by the wound aggravated by the contact of the drai i inflamed peritoneum. elena 12, The accused is liable for the death of the victim due to a paralysis of the ileum contracted when the internal organs of the victim were exposed during the surgical operation in the abdomen caused by the wound inflicted by the accused. People vs. Reloj (G.R. No. L-31335, Feb SCRA 526) ‘ebruary 29, 1972, 43 Facts: Justiniano was stabbed by Pablo with an icepick wrapped in a pieze of paper outside a cockpit. Justiniano was brought to the hospital, where a surgical operation was performed upon him. Although the operation was successful and Justiniano seemed to be in the process of recovery, he developed, five days later, a paralytic ileum — which takes place, sometimes, in consequence of the exposure of the intemal organs curing the operation — and then died. Pablo was charged wit and convicted of the crime of murder. Held: Pablo is liable for the crime of murder. Justiniano died due to a paralysis of the ileum that supervened five days after ‘the stabbing when he appeared to be on the way to full covery after the surgery. There was evidence that paralysis the ileum Is sometimes caused by the exposure of internal ins during the surgical operation in the abdomen which the ceased had fo undergo after he was stabbed with an icepick __ Every person is to be held to cont E template and to be sible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a 79(ee Art 4 ABERRATIO ICTUS person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of the felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskilful and improper treatment, which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. The rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. The accused is also criminally liable in the following instances: 4, Abberatio ictus or mistake in the blow. 2. Error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victim. 3. Praeter intentionem or lack of intent to commit to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Abberatio ictus or mistake in the blow. Example: Ramon Mabug-at fired at Juana Buralo but due to lack of precision the bullet landed on her niece Perfecta Bural, The 80 ERROR ON PERSONAE/PRAETER INTENTIONEM Art. 4 crime committed is frustrated murder (People vs. Mabug-at, GR. No. 25459, August 10, 1926, 51 Phil. 967). Aberratio ictus is not a defense. Error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victim, Example: Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and an escaped convict, and, if ‘overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, the two went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal. The crime committed is murder. (People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943, 74 Phil 257) Error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victim isnot a defense. Praeter intentionem or lack of intent to commit to commit ‘50 grave a wrong as that committed. Exampl Infuriated by the conduct of his wife Magdalena de los Santos, Jaime Tomotorgo picked up a piece of wood nearby And started hitting her with it until she fell to the ground ‘Complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he done, Tomotorgo picked his wife in his arms and brought jer fo their home. De los Santos died despite the efforts of her and to alleviate her pains. The crime committed is ide (People vs. Tomotorgo, G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, |, 136 SCRA 238), Lack of intent to commit so grave a atArd EFFECT OF INTERVENING DISEASE. wrong as that committed can only mitigate the accused's criminal liability but it cannot exonerate him from criminal liability. Effect of failure or refusal of the victim to submit to medical treatment. Filomeno Marasigan drew his knife and struck at Francisco Mendoza. On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand. A finger was rendered useless. Marasigan asserts that if he (Marasigan) permitted a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal condition. Mendoza is not obliged to submit to a surgical ‘operation in order to relieve, minimize and completely absolve Marasigan from the natural and ordinary consequnces of this felonious act. It was Marasigan’s voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza. (U.S. vs. Marasigan, G.R. No. 9426, August 15, 1914, 27 Phil. 504) Effect of intervening disease. 4. If the intervening disease is associated with the wound inflicted by the accused upon the deceased, then the accused shall be held liable for the resulting death. Example: People vs. Ancasan (G.R. No. 28620, February 24, 1928, 53 Phil. 779) Facts: Bancailan and Felizardo undertook to sing a duet, but as Felizardo sang in a higher pitch than Bancailan, the latter became very angry and tried to throw Felizardo down on the floor. His efforts did not meet with success and he himself fell down with Felizardo on top of him. While the two men were lying in that position, Ancasan, a friend of Bancailan, struck Felizardo on the back of the head with a heavy cudgel: 82 EFFECT OF INTERVENING DISEASE Art. 4 causing a wound which was later infected with tetanus and led to the death of Felizardo a few days later. Ancasan and Bancailan were charged with and later convicted of the crime of homicide. Held: Ancasan and Bancailan are liable for the crime of homicide. 2. If the accused inflicted upon the deceased a wound not sufficient to cause his death, but he died due to a totally unrelated disease, then the accused shall not be held liable for the death of the deceased. His liability shall only be to the extent of the wounds he inflicted 3. If the wound inflicted is mortal, i.e., sufficie cause the death of the victim, but the victim died due to 9 sickness or disease neither associated with nor related to the wound, then the accused is still liable for the victim's death. This is so because in the ordinary and continuous sequence of events, the mortal wound would cause the death of the victim. Presumption of death as a natural consequence of the injury. When on a person of normal health, physicial injuries fare caused from which death may be expected and death ‘ensues within a reasonable time it shall be presumed that it is natural consequence and result of the injuries infloted \ e deceased. (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 42117, March 29, 1935, 61 Phil. 341) a neous or unskillful medical treatment will not relieve accused from liability for the death of the accused if injury is mortal. The general rule is that he who inflicts injury is not ved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, is calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though 83