Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In his answer Lim denied liability by contending that he exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of his employees. He further asserted that as the jeepney
was registered in Vallarta's name, it was Vallarta and not private respondent who was the
DECISION
real party in interest. 1 For his part, petitioner Gunnaban averred that the accident was a passenger jeepney was purchased by private respondent for only P30,000.00, an
fortuitous event which was beyond his control. 2 award of P236,000.00 is inconceivably large and would amount to unjust enrichment. 8
Meanwhile, the damaged passenger jeepney was left by the roadside to Petitioner's attempt to illustrate that an affirmance of the appealed decision
corrode and decay. Private respondent explained that although he wanted to take his could be supportive of the pernicious kabit system does not persuade. Their labored
jeepney home he had no capability, financial or otherwise, to tow the damaged efforts to demonstrate how the questioned rulings of the courts a quo are diametrically
vehicle. 3 ACSaHc opposed to the policy of the law requiring operators of public utility vehicles to secure a
certificate of public convenience for their operation is quite unavailing.
The main point of contention between the parties related to the
amount of damages due private respondent. Private respondent Gonzales averred that The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a
per estimate made by an automobile repair shop he would have to spend P236,000.00 to certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to
restore his jeepney to its original condition. 4 On the other hand, petitioners insisted that operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the
they could have the vehicle repaired for P20,000.00. 5 earnings. 9 Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by
law, the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and
On 1 October 1993 the trial court upheld private respondent's claim and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code.
awarded him P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22 July 1990 as compensatory
damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. In support of its decision, the In the early case of Dizon v. Octavio 10 the Court explained that one of the
trial court ratiocinated that as vendee and current owner of the passenger jeepney primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience for the
private respondent stood for all intents and purposes as the real party in interest. Even business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so
Vallarta himself supported private respondent's assertion of interest over the jeepney that liabilities arising from accidents may be duly compensated. The kabit system
for, when he was called to testify, he dispossessed himself of any claim or pretension on renders illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee to escape
the property. Gunnaban was found by the trial court to have caused the accident since civil liability caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by another and operated under
he panicked in the face of an emergency which was rather palpable from his license. If a registered owner is allowed to escape liability by proving who the
his act of directing his vehicle to a perilous streak down the fast lane of the superhighway supposed owner of the vehicle is, it would be easy for him to transfer the subject vehicle
then across the island and ultimately to the opposite lane where it collided with the to another who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage
jeepney. done. Thus, for the safety of passengers and public who may have been wronged and
deceived through the baneful kabit system, the registered owner of the vehicle is not
On the other hand, petitioner Lim's liability for Gunnaban's negligence was allowed to prove that another person has become the owner so that he may be thereby
premised on his want of diligence in supervising his employees. It was admitted during relieved of responsibility. Subsequent cases affirm such basic doctrine. 11
trial that Gunnaban doubled as mechanic of the ill-fated truck despite the fact that he
was neither tutored nor trained to handle such task. 6 It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is
not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom
Forthwith, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 17 July 1996, responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the
affirmed the decision of the trial court. In upholding the decision of the court a riding public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived,
quo the appeals court concluded that while an operator under the kabit system could not much less involved. DcTaEH
sue without joining the registered owner of the vehicle as his principal, equity demanded
that the present case be made an exception. 7Hence this petition. In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented
in enjoining the kabit system does not exist. First, neither of the parties to the
It is petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. Second, the case arose from the
decision of the trial court despite their opposition to the well-established doctrine that negligence ofanother vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or
an operator of a vehicle continues to be its operator as long as he remains the misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation ofthe passenger jeepney was
operator ofrecord. According to petitioners, to recognize an operator under made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus
the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for damages is it cannot be said that private respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the
utterly subversive of public policy. Petitioners further contend that inasmuch as the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to
the registered owner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the axiomatic that if the suit were for damages, unliquidated and not known until definitely
very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof, interest at the rate of six
who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. percent (6%) per annum should be from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right. which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to be reasonably
ascertained). 14
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has the right to
proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as In this case, the matter was not a liquidated obligation as the assessment of the
on his business. Any effort then to frustrate his claim of damages by the ingenuity with damage on the vehicle was heavily debated upon by the parties with private respondent's
which petitioners framed the issue should be discouraged, if not repelled. demand for P236,000.00 being refuted by petitioners who argue that they could have the
vehicle repaired easily for P20,000.00. In fine, the amount due private respondent was
In awarding damages for the tortuous injury, it becomes the sole design of the not a liquidated account that was already demandable and payable. TAcSCH
courts to provide for adequate compensation by putting the plaintiff in the same financial
position he was in prior to the tort. It is fundamental principle in the law on damages that One last word. We have observed that private respondent left his passenger
a defendant cannot be held liable in damages for more than actual loss which he has jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article 2203 of the Civil Code
inflicted and that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just and adequate exhorts parties suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
compensation for the injury suffered. His recovery is, in the absence of circumstances family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. One who
giving rise to an allowance of punitive damages, limited to a fair compensation for the is injured then by the wrongful or negligent act of another should exercise reasonable
harm done. The law will not put him in a position better than where he should be in had care and diligence to minimize the resulting damage. Anyway, he can recover from the
not the wrong happened. 12 wrongdoer money lost in reasonable efforts to preserve the property injured and for
injuries incurred in attempting to prevent damage to it. 15
In the present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney was
purchased in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages considerably greater than this However we sadly note that in the present case petitioners failed to offer in
amount would be improper and unjustified. Petitioners are at best reminded that evidence the estimated amount of the damage caused by private respondent's
indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but unconcern towards the damaged vehicle. It is the burden of petitioners to show
also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other words, indemnification satisfactorily not only that the injured party could have mitigated his damages but also
for damages is not limited to damnum emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum the amount thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be
cessans or the amount of profit lost. 13 proportionately reduced.
Had private respondent's jeepney not met an accident it could reasonably be WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision awarding private respondent Donato
expected that it would have continued earning from the business in which it was Gonzales P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22 July 1990 as compensatory damages
engaged. Private respondent avers that he derives an average income of P300.00 per day and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees is MODIFIED. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
from his passenger jeepney and this earning was included in the award of damages made per annum shall be computed from the time the judgment of the lower court is made
by the trial court and upheld by the appeals court. The award therefore of P236,000.00 until the finality of this Decision. If the adjudged principal and interest remain unpaid
as compensatory damages is not beyond reason nor speculative as it is based on a thereafter, the interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time
reasonable estimate of the total damage suffered by private respondent, i.e. damage judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.
wrought upon his jeepney and the income lost from his transportation business.
Petitioners for their part did not offer any substantive evidence to refute the estimate Costs against petitioners.
made by the courts a quo. aCSEcA SO ORDERED.
However, we are constrained to depart from the conclusion of the lower courts Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
that upon the award of compensatory damages legal interest should be imposed
beginning 22 July 1990, i.e. the date of the accident. Upon the provisions of Art. ||| (Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125817, [January 16, 2002], 424 PHIL 457-468)
2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or
damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty." It is
EN BANC thus: "The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an
illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the
property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its violation. The rule has
[G.R. No. 64693. April 27, 1984.] sometimes been laid down as though it was equally universal, that where the parties
are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. SECOND CIVIL CASES other." (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 5th ed. p. 728) Although certain
DIVISION, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, NICASIO M. exceptions to the rule are provided by law, We see no cogent reason why the full force
OCAMPO and FRANCISCA P. GARCIA, respondents. of the rule should not be applied in the instant case.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable, and cannot be cured
by ratification or by prescription. As this Court said in Eugenio v. Perdido, 2 "the mere
lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void."
The principle of in pari delicto is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the
United States where common law prevails. Under American jurisdiction, the doctrina is
stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from
an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover
the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its violation. The rule has
sometimes been laid down as though it was equally universal, that where the parties
are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other." 3 Although certain exceptions to the rule are provided by law, We see no cogent
reason why the full force of the rule should not be applied in the instant case. LLphil
WHEREFORE, all proceedings had in Civil Case No. 90988 entitle "Nicasio Ocampo and
Francisca P. Garcia, Plaintiffs, versus LitaEnterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants" of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and CA-G.R. No. 59157-R entitled "Nicasio Ocampo
and Francisca P. Garcia, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Lita Enterprises, Inc., Defendant-
Appellant," of the Intermediate Appellate Court, as well as the decisions rendered
therein are hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lita Enterprises, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64693, [April 27, 1984],
214 PHIL 63-68)
SECOND DIVISION the amount of P546.21 for attorney's fees and P100.00 for
expenses of litigation. The plaintiff also claims that as of February
20, 1978, the total account of the defendant was already
[G.R. No. L-65510. March 9, 1987.] P2,731,05 as shown in a statement of account (Exhibit "B"). This
amount includes not only the balance of P1,700.00 but an
TEJA MARKETING AND/OR ANGEL additional 12% interest per annum on the said balance from
JAUCIAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE C January 26, 1976 to February 27, 1978; a 2% service charge; and
OURT ** AND PEDRO N. NALE, respondents. P546.21 representing attorney's fees.
The decision is now before Us on a petition for review, petitioner Teja Marketing and/or
Angel Jaucian presenting a lone assignment of error — whether or not
respondent court erred in applying the doctrine of "pari delicto."
Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid
either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds them. Upon
this premise it would be error to accord the parties relief from their predicament. Article
1412 of the Civil Code denies them such aid. It provides:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortez, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION Gonzales was guilty of negligence and lack of care and that the Hernandez spouses were
guilty of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. 5
[G.R. No. 160286. July 30, 2004.] Petitioners countered that the proximate cause of the death and injuries
sustained by the passengers of both vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet Dolor, the
driver of the owner-type jeepney, who was driving in a zigzagging manner under the
SPOUSES FRANCISCO M. HERNANDEZ and ANICETA ABEL- influence of alcohol. Petitioners also alleged that Gonzales was not the driver-employee
HERNANDEZ and JUAN GONZALES, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES of the Hernandez spouses as the former only leased the passenger jeepney on a daily
LORENZO DOLOR and MARGARITA DOLOR, FRED PANOPIO, basis. The Hernandez spouses further claimed that even if an employer-employee
JOSEPH SANDOVAL, RENE CASTILLO, SPOUSES relationship is found to exist between them, they cannot be held liable because as
FRANCISCO VALMOCINA and VIRGINIA VALMOCINA, employers they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of their employee.
SPOUSES VICTOR PANOPIO and MARTINA PANOPIO, and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. During the trial of the case, it was established that the drivers of the two
vehicles were duly licensed to drive and that the road where the collision occurred was
asphalted and in fairly good condition. 6 The owner-type jeep was travelling uphill while
the passenger jeepney was going downhill. It was further established that the owner-
DECISION type jeep was moderately moving and had just passed a road bend when its passengers,
private respondents Joseph Sandoval and Rene Castillo, saw the passenger jeepney at a
distance of three meters away. The passenger jeepney was traveling fast when it bumped
the owner type jeep. 7 Moreover, the evidence presented by respondents before the trial
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: court showed that petitioner Juan Gonzales obtained his professional driver's license only
on September 24, 1986, or three months before the accident. Prior to this, he was holder
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the of a student driver's permit issued on April 10, 1986. 8
reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated April 29, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No.
60357, which affirmed with modification the amount of damages awarded in the On November 24, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
November 24, 1997 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch IV. respondents, the dispositive portion of which states:
The undisputed facts are as follows: Premises duly considered and the plaintiffs having
satisfactorily convincingly and credibly presented evidence clearly
At about 3:00 p.m. of December 19, 1986, Lorenzo Menard "Boyet" Dolor, Jr. satisfying the requirements of preponderance of evidence to
was driving an owner-type jeepney with plate no. DEB 804 owned by her mother, sustain the complaint, this Court hereby declares judgment in
Margarita, towards Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing the road at Barangay Anilao favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Defendants-
East, Mabini, Batangas, his vehicle collided with a passenger jeepney bearing plate no. spouses Francisco Hernandez and Aniceta Abel Hernandez and
DEG 648, driven by petitioner Juan Gonzales and owned by his co-petitioner Francisco Juan Gonzales are therefore directed to pay jointly and severally,
Hernandez, which was travelling towards Batangas City. the following:
Boyet Dolor and his passenger, Oscar Valmocina, died as a result of the 1) To spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita Dolor:
collision. Fred Panopio, Rene Castillo and Joseph Sandoval, who were also on board the
owner-type jeep, which was totally wrecked, suffered physical injuries. The collision also a) P50,000.00 — for the death of their son, Lorenzo
damaged the passenger jeepney of Francisco Hernandez and caused physical injuries to Menard "Boyet" Dolor, Jr.;
its passengers, namely, Virgie Cadavida, Fiscal Artemio Reyes and Francisca Corona. 3
b) P142,000.00 — as actual and necessary funeral
Consequently, respondents commenced an action 4 for damages against expenses;
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, alleging that driver Juan
c) P50,000.00 — reasonable value of the totally wrecked attorney's fees awarded to the private respondents. The decretal portion of the decision
owner-type jeep with plate no. DEB 804 Phil of the Court of Appeals reads:
'85;
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
d) P20,000.00 — as moral damages; appealed decision is AFFIRMED. However, the award for damages,
actual expenses and attorney's fees shall be MODIFIED as follows:
e) P20,000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses and
attorney's fees. 1) To spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita Dolor:
2) To spouses Francisco Valmocina and Virginia Valmocina: a) P50,000.00 — civil indemnity for their son Lorenzo
Menard Dolor, Jr.;
a) P50,000.00 — for the death of their son, Oscar
Balmocina (sic); b) P58,703.00 — as actual and necessary funeral
expenses;
b) P20,000.00 — as moral damages;
c) P25,000.00 — as temperate damages;
c) P18,400.00 — for funeral expenses;
d) P100,000.00 — as moral damages;
d) P10,000.00 — for litigation expenses and attorney's
fees. e) P20,000.00 — as reasonable litigation expenses and
attorney's fees.
3) To spouses Victor Panopio and Martina Panopio:
2) To Spouses Francisco Valmocina and Virginia Valmocina:
a) P10,450.00 — for the cost of the artificial leg and
crutches being used by their son Fred a) P50,000.00 — civil indemnity for the death of their
Panopio; son, Oscar Valmocina;
The defendants are further directed to pay the costs of 4) To Fred Panopio:
this proceedings.
a) P50,000.00 — as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 9
5) To Joseph Sandoval:
Petitioners appealed 1 0 the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the same with modifications as to the amount of damages, actual expenses and a) P3,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 11 ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
Hence the present petition raising the following issues: those of persons for whom one is responsible.
1. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct when it The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
pronounced the Hernandez spouses as solidarily liable with Juan mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
Gonzales, although it is of record that they were not in the children who live in their company.
passenger jeepney driven by latter when the accident occurred;
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors
2. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
temperate damages to private respondents namely the Spouses their company.
Dolor, Spouses Valmocina and Spouses Panopio and to Joseph
Sandoval, although the grant of temperate damages is not The owners and managers of an establishment or
provided for in decision of the court a quo; enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
3. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in employed or on the occasion of their functions.
increasing the award of moral damages to respondents, Spouses
Dolor, Spouses Valmocina and Fred Panopio; Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
4. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
the grant of attorney's fees to Spouses Dolor and to Spouses business or industry.
Valmocina although the lower court did not specify the fact and
the law on which it is based. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
Petitioners contend that the absence of the Hernandez spouses inside the caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
passenger jeepney at the time of the collision militates against holding them solidarily which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
liable with their co-petitioner, Juan Gonzales, invoking Article 2184 of the Civil Code,
which provides: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent,
if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions (Emphasis supplied)
of article 2180 are applicable.
On the other hand, Article 2176 provides —
The Hernandez spouses argues that since they were not inside the jeepney at
the time of the collision, the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which does not Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
provide for solidary liability between employers and employees, should be applied. there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
We are not persuaded. contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. ICTcDA
Article 2180 provides:
While the above provisions of law do not expressly provide for solidary liability, damages is left to the sound discretion of the court provided that such an award is
the same can be inferred from the wordings of the first paragraph of Article 2180 which reasonable under the circumstances. 18
states that the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. We have gone through the records of this case and we find that, indeed,
respondents suffered losses which cannot be quantified in monetary terms. These losses
Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with Article 2194 of the same Code, came in the form of the damage sustained by the owner type jeep of the Dolor spouses;
which categorically states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the internment and burial of Oscar Valmocina; the hospitalization of Joseph Sandoval on
quasi-delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is account of the injuries he sustained from the collision and the artificial leg and crutches
solidary. 12 Verily, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer may be held that respondent Fred Panopio had to use because of the amputation of his right leg.
solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee. 13 Further, we find that the amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondents
were reasonable under the circumstances.
The solidary liability of employers with their employees for quasi-delicts having
been established, the next question is whether Julian Gonzales is an employee of the As to the amount of moral damages which was awarded to respondents, a
Hernandez spouses. An affirmative answer will put to rest any issue on the solidary review of the records of this case shows that there exists no cogent reason to overturn
liability of the Hernandez spouses for the acts of Julian Gonzales. The Hernandez spouses the action of the appellate court on this aspect.
maintained that Julian Gonzales is not their employee since their relationship relative to
the use of the jeepney is that of a lessor and a lessee. They argue that Julian Gonzales Under Article 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
pays them a daily rental of P150.00 for the use of the jeepney. 14 In essence, petitioners ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish for the
are practicing the "boundary system" of jeepney operation albeit disguised as a lease death of the deceased." The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained,
agreement between them for the use of the jeepney. thus:
We hold that an employer-employee relationship exists between the . . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
Hernandez spouses and Julian Gonzales. within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and
therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
Indeed to exempt from liability the owner of a public vehicle who operates it intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
under the "boundary system" on the ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no
abet flagrant violations of the Public Service Law, but also to place the riding public at relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 19
the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers — reckless because the measure of their
earnings depends largely upon the number of trips they make and, hence, the speed at Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
which they drive; and irresponsible because most if not all of them are in no position to expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the former to obtain means,
pay the damages they might cause. 15 diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone
due to the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the
Anent the award of temperate damages to the private respondents, we hold suffering inflicted. 20
that the appellate court committed no reversible error in awarding the same to the
respondents. Truly, the pain of the sudden loss of one's offspring, especially of a son who was
in the prime of his youth, and who holds so much promise waiting to be fulfilled is indeed
Temperate or moderate damages are damages which are more than nominal a wellspring of intense pain which no parent should be made to suffer. While it is true that
but less than compensatory which may be recovered when the court finds that some there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, 21 we
proved with certainty. 16 Temperate damages are awarded for those cases where, from hold that the Court of Appeals' award of moral damages of P100,000.00 each to the
the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the Spouses Dolor and Spouses Valmocina for the death of their respective sons, Boyet Dolor
court is convinced that there has been such loss. A judge should be empowered to and Oscar Valmocina, is in full accord with prevailing jurisprudence. 22
calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than the plaintiff should suffer,
without redress, from the defendant's wrongful act. 17 The assessment of temperate
With respect to the award of attorney's fees to respondents, no sufficient basis
was established for the grant thereof.
It is well settled that attorney's fees should not be awarded in the absence of
stipulation except under the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As
we have held in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v. Court of Appeals: 23
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Hernandez v. Spouses Dolor, G.R. No. 160286, [July 30, 2004], 479 PHIL 593-
606)