VDA DE BORROMEO v POGOY
GR No L-63277 29 November 1983
FACTS
- Petitioner Petra Borromeo seeks to enjoin respondent MTC Judge Pogoy from
taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the administrator to refer
the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
- The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of the building
which is being leased and occupied by Petra Borromeo at a monthly rental of
P500.
- Private Respondent Atty Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon
Petra a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals covering March to
September 1982, and to vacate the premises. Petra failed to do so, hence the
ejectment case.
- Petra moved to dismiss the case, advancing the want of jurisdiction of the trial
court since Atty Reyes did not refer the dispute to the Brgy Court as required
by PD 1508.
o Judge Pogoy denied the motion to dimiss
o MR was not secured by Petra, prompting her to come to the Court
and file a petition for Certiorari.
o Atty Reyes admitted not having availed of the barangay conciliation
process but justified the omission by citing Par 4, Sec 6 of PD 1508
which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same
may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations as applying to
the case at bar.
W/N Atty Reyes is correct – NO
- Under Art 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry
and detainer is 1 year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate the
premises.
- Less than a month has elapsed after the last letter-demand was made
when the complaint for ejectment was filed in court. Under the procedure
in PD 1508, the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and
the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. This gives Atty Reyes 9
months within which to bring his case before the proper court should
conciliation efforts fail. It cannot be truthfully asserted that Atty Reyes would
be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.
Merits of the case
- PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
- PD 1508 refers to a dispute required only of individuals or natural persons.
Not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation,
partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
o Atty Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. Since the estate is a juridical
person, Atty Reyes may file the complaint directly in court, without
the same coursed to the Brgy Lupon.
Property Week 9
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY v CA
GR 97637 10 April 1992
FACTS
- Wilmon, Iloilo Multi Parts Supply, Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales,
and Chang Liang were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas owned
in common by Solinap, Locsin, and Jarantilla.
- After the expiration of the lease, the lessors executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
upon which they sold the leased property to Star Group Resources. The deed
stipulated that the Vendee shall deal with the lessees and occupants of the
properties sold without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the
Vendors.
- Star Group brought the separate actions of unlawful detainer in the MTC.
o The lessees refused to concede and impugned Star Group’s right to
eject them. They argued that the lessors and Star Group violated
their leasehold rights because:
§ they (lessees) were not accorded the right of preemption
§ the buyer was not required to honor the leases
§ the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases
upon the expiration
o The MTC decided to proceed only in some of the cases against
Virgilio Ang, Chang Liang, and Iloilo Multi Parts, but not against
Henry Tan and Southern Sales, and Wimon, as to which the
summary procedure rules were inapplicable. The MR was denied.
The three lessees then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court for
the annulment and setting aside of the MTC orders. Cases were
referred to the RTC where they should have gone for relief in the first
place.
- In the RTC, the Judge issued a restraining order enjoining the proceedings in
the unlawful detainer cases. But a judgment was later promulgated dismissing
the petitioners and dissolving the preliminary injunction since the unlawful
detainer cases fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The RTC did not
warrant the suspension of unlawful detainer cases, “the only issue being
physical possession or possession de facto, while the earlier case is one
involving ownership.’
- Wimon, Southern Sales, and Henry Tan appealed to the Court alleging abuse
of discretion on the part of the MTC for not holding in abeyance the
proceedings in the unlawful detainer cases.
W/N not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee should
be abated/suspended by an action filed in the RTC filed by the lessee on the claim
that he is entitled to a right of preemption/prior purchase of the premises in
question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced – NO
- An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based
on a tenant’s claim of violation of his right of preemption. The actions in the
RTC didn’t involve physical possession. The case in the RTC was merely a
ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding.
SEMIRA v CA - Where the land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure
GR No 76031 2 March 1994 or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the
effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof.
FACTS o Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included
- Juana Gutierrez sold a parcel of land, Lot 4221, to Buenaventura An for P850 within the boundaries regardless of whether the real area should be
by means of a Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa. The Kasulatan provides for an greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.
estimated area of 822.5sqm and as well as the boundaries of the lot.
- An entered the premises observing the boundaries of the lot and not the area Dispositive: MTC decision reinstated. Semira is the lawful owner and possessor.
given.
- An acquired 2 other parcels of land, Lot 4215 located on the east of Lot 4221
from Sps Hornilla and Ilao, and the other lot from Santiago Asi.
- An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew Cipriano Ramirez by means of another
Kasulatan for P2,500 where the lot was described with the same area and
boundaries mentioned with the exception of the boundary on the east which
was changed from Juana Gutierrez to Buenaventura An.
- Ramirez occupied the lot by observing the boundaries. He later sold the lot to
Semira for P20,000. But the area stated in the Kasulatan was 2,200sqm, not
822.5 as appearing in the previous document. This was confirmed by the
Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey.
- Semira entered the premises and began construction of a new rice-mill. An
later filed a complaint for forcible entry claiming that the area of Lot 4221 was
822.5 sqm only and the excess formed part of Lot 4215 which he acquired
from the Hornillas.
- Semira admitted having entered the property but denies illegally doing so,
claiming ownership over the property and invoking the deed of sale in his favor
by Ramirez.
- During the pendency of the case, An applied for and was issued an OCT over
the lots he purchased by Hornillas and Asi.
- The MTC initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the issue of
prior physical possession could not be resolved without first deciding on the
ownership.
o It modified its decision and adjudged Semira as the lawful owner and
possessor hence, cannot be ejected therefrom.
o An appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC ruling that it was
not necessary to delve on the issue of ownership since the question
of prior physical possession could be resolved independently and
that An clearly had prior possession. The RTC held that no matter
how righteous the claim of ownership may be, he has no right to take
the law into his own hands by forcible depriving An of his prior actual
possession of the property.
- Semira appealed to the CA without success.

W/N the CA erred in not holding that the question of ownership is so necessarily
involved that it would be impossible to decide the question of bare possession
without first setting that of ownership – NO
- The Court held in favor of Semira and sustained the MTC decision that the
issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of
ownership
- The question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the
real owner of the disputed portion is.

Property Week 9
WONG v CARPIO and Mercado - Possession passed from Giger to Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro.
GR L-50264 21 October 1991 The later sale a retro in favor of Wong failed to pass the possession because
there is an impediment – the possession exercised by Mercado. Possession
FACTS as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in 2 different
- Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land, lot 3 pcs-295, from William personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase executed in 1972 for - Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
P3,500. In 1973 Giger again asked an additional amount fo P2,500 for possessor shall be preferred; if there are 2 possessions, the one longer in
Mercado so he required Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale. possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents
- In 1972, Mercado began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid taxes the title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
on the land for Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
never placed any person on the land to watch it. Neither did he reside on the proceedings.
land as he resides in Lower Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur while the subject land
is at Colongan Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he
is in actual possession.
o He knew that Wong’s laborers were in the land as early as 1976 and
they have a hut there but he did not do anything to stop them. He
was instead happy that there were people and a hut on the land.
- 1976, Wong went to the land to find out if there were other people residing
there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So he bought the
parcel of land from Giger and his wife Valenzuela.
o Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name. He
tried to register the pacto de retro sale but could not be registered
due to some technicalities.
o Wong placed laborers on the land in suit, built a small farm house
after making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also
placed signboards.
- Later that same year, Mercado went to the land again to make copras. The
matter was brought to the attention of the police and incident entered in the
police blotter.
- Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts and nobody disturbed him.
- November 1976 Wong received a copy of Mercado’s complaint for forcible
entry. During the pendency of the complaint, Giger filed a case for reformation
against Mercado.
- MTC found that Wong had prior, actual and continuous physical possession
of the property, and dismissed the complaint and counter-claim.
- On appeal, the CFI ruled in favor of Mercado since he took possession of the
property earlier in point of time and Wong is an intruder.
- Wong filed the instant petition to the CA. The CA certified the case to the Court
since the issue is pure question of law.

W/N the CFI Judge erred – NO

- Wong’s claim: Mercado did not establish prior possession since his periodic
visit may have been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner for
the purposes of paying an obligation that may be due to the person gathering
said nuts, and that he may be converting fruits to copras as a hired laborer.
- Possession is acquired by material occupation of a thing or the exercise
of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. The
execution of a sale thru a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery
of the thing, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

Property Week 9
JAVIER v VERIDIANO and Rosete
GR L-48050 10 October 1994
FACTS
- Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot 1641 of the Olongapo
Townsite Subdivision with the District Land Officer in 1963.
- In 1970, she alleged that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the
land by Ben Babol prompting her to file a complaint for forcible entry.Lim
o The City Court dismissed the case considering the subject area to be
outside Lot 1641. The decision became final and executory.
- In 1973, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT covering
Lot 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol had sold the property he was occupying,
including the portion in question, to Rosete.Javier demanded the surrender of
the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the
demand.
- 4 years from the finality of the forcible entry case, Javier instituted a complaint
for the quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol
and Rosete.
- Rosete claims that the case should be dismissed based on res judicata.
W/N res judicata applies – NO
- While there is actual identity of the parties between the actions since Rosete
is a successor in interest of Babol, there is no identity of causes of action
between the civil cases.
- The first case is a complaint for forcible entry where the issue is prior
possession regardless of who has lawful title over the property (possession
de facto, not de jure).
- The later civil case captioned as quieting of title and recovery, is in reality an
action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria. It is an action
whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession.
- The judgment in forcible entry which disposes no other issue than possession
and declares who has right of possession, does not bar an action for
determination who has right or title of ownership.
Property Week 9
LIM KIEH TONG, INC v CA, Judge Pizarro, Reginaldo Lim
GR 93451 18 March 1991
FACTS
- Lim and his family resided for some time in Room 301 of a building owned by
petitioner corporation, until they transferred to their present residence at No 3
Igdalig Street, Quezon City.
o Room 301 was then utilized as a place where he keeps some of his
important belongings, such as his law books, documents, and
appliances.
o The building has only 1 common maid door through which all the
occupants of the various rooms can enter.
o In 1987, Lim wanted to go inside his room to get 3 law books but he
was surprised to find out that the key given him could no longer fit
the door lock which was then already changed.
o Lim had to buy 3 new law books to prepare for his cases. He was
only able to contact defendant through its OIC, MR. Rafael Lim the
following day, but his request to be provided for the appropriate key
produced negative result, hence this suit.
- Lim claims that there was violation of his rights to use and enjoy Room 301 of
the building owned by the defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction/restraining order commanding the corporation to furnish Lim with
the appropriate key in order to prevent great or irreparable damages upon Lim.
- MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Lim instituted another action
reiterating the same allegations. A TRO was issued by respondent Judge
pending trial on merits and commanding the petitioner corporation to deliver
the appropriate keys. Petitioner corporation filed the instant petition.
W/N an action for forcible entry and detainer is available to a LESSEE? – YES
- Any person deprived of possession of any land or building may file an action
for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person
unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him.
- This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a
lessee, or tenant, or any other person against whom the possession is
unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession within 1
year after such unlawful deprivation.
Sps. Nazario Penas Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Lupo Calaycay
GR No. 112734
July 7, 1994
Facts of the case
- There was a written contract of lease executed by Nazario Penas in favor of
Calaycay on the property at 24-B Scout Santiago St., Laging Handa, QC
o At an agreed monthly rental of 110.00, the lease was on a month to
month basis
- Penas died and an extra-judicial settlement of his estate was executed by his
surviving heirs, (one of whom is petitioner Nazario Jr)
- After death of their mother, the children executed an extra-judicial settlement
of her estate and as time went on, the monthly rentals had been gradually
increased the latest had been 691.20 pesos.
- In a letter, petitioner notified Calaycay that they are no longer interested to
renew the lease and demanded that he vacate the premises
o In the same letter, they gave him an option to continue occupying the
premises provided he agrees to execute a new lease for 1 year
and to increase the monthly rental to 2,500 and they were given
a deadline to decide (Feb 28, 1990) otherwise judicial action for
unlawful detainer shall ensure
- Calaycay failed to abide by the demand but he continued staying on the leased
premises and effective March 1990, he deposited the monthly rentals with the
PNB in his name ITF (in trust for) Lucila and Nazario Penas Jr.
- Petitioners refused to accept the rentals and there was no instance that they
manifested any desire to withdraw the same
- On August 1992, petitioners through counsel sent another letter to vacate and
pay back rental arrearages (60k) which Calaycay failed to satisfy
- September 25, 1992, an unlawful detainer suit on the ground of termination of
the month to month lease and failure to execute a new lease agreement was
filed
- MTC dismissed saying that the action already prescribed and has no
jurisdiction over the action since the complaint was filed more than 1 year after
Calaycay began the unlawful occupation.
- RTC affirmed the MTC decision.
- CA affirmed. Saying that since petitioners were not collecting rentals, there
was no longer a lease contract for 2 years since the first letter of petitioners to
the respondents. The remedy is accion publiciana for recovery of possession.
Had the action prescribed? No.
- 1 year period within which an unlawful detainer can be filed should be
counted from the LAST LETTER OF DEMAND TO VACATE, the reason
being that the lessor had the right to waive the right of action based on
previous demands and let lessee remain in the premises
- Even if Calaycay was depositing rentals in trust, what was being deposited
were rentals at the old rate, which the Penas are not bound to accept/withdraw
- The latest demand to vacate the premises were made on August 10, 1992
followed by the action for unlawful detainer on September 25, 1992.
- Action has not yet prescribed.
Property Week 9
Francel Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip
GR No. 117051
January 22, 1996
Facts of the case
- Francel Realty executed a Contract to Sell to Sycip, Lot 16, Building No. 14 in
the Francel Townhomes at 22 Real St., Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite for 451k and
that in case of default in the payment of 2 or more installments, the whole
obligation will become due and demandable and seller will be entitled to
rescind the contract and take possession of the property, the buyer will vacate
the premises without the necessity of court action and down payment will be
treated as earnest money or as rental for the use of premises
- Francel alleged that Sycip failed to pay the monthly amortization of 9,303 since
October 1990 despite demands to update his payments and vacate the
premises
- Latest demand was made on September 26, 1992 and because of the unjust
refusal to vacate, they were constrained to engage the services of counsel
and filed an unlawful detainer case with the MTC
- Sycip moved to dismiss but it was denied. He filed his answer in which he
alleged that he stopped payment because the townhouse was of defective
construction and that a complaint was filed for unsound real estate business
practice with the HLURB
- MTC ruled that the answer was filed out of time but the case was still
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, that the case was cognizable by HLURB but
awarded damages
- RTC affirmed the MTC decision holding that HLURB had jurisdiction over
actions filed by developers for unpaid price of lots or units
- CA dismissed the appeal.
Did MTC have jurisdiction? No.
- The case involves a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties
in a sale of real estate under PD 957, it is not a simple case for unlawful
detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to pay rents
o Indeed private respondent claims that he has a right under P.D. No.
957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice
to the owner or developer of his decision to do so because of
petitioners alleged failure to develop the subdivision or condominium
project according to the approved plans and within the time for
complying with the same.
- Since the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the
HLURB, the question of the right of petitioner must be determined by the
agency
- MTC correctly held itself to be without jurisdiction over the complaint but it was
an error to grant the counterclaim for damages for the expenses incurred and
inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as the result of the filing of the
ejectment case
Sps. Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada
GR No. 152423
December 15, 2010
Facts of the case
On February 24, 1997, petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla
(Victoria) filed an ejectment case against respondent Maria V. Coprada before the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna.
Petitioners claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in
M.H. Del Pilar St., Barangay San Miguel, Majayjay, Laguna, containing an area of Two
Hundred Fifty-Three (253) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-93542.
- In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the Esmaquels to allow her and her
family to use and occupy the land for their residence under the condition that
they will vacate the premises should they need to use the same.
o Coprada was allowed to construct their residential home
- Since then, Esmaquels never attempeted to drive them away out of pity
knowing that Coprada and her 8 children have no other place to live in, they
have been occupying the premises free of rent, including the payment of realty
taxes
- Coprada’s present situation improved since her children are already working
and regularly sending her financial assistance and she has acquired her own
residential house in Brgy. Panglan, Majayjay, Laguna, and because of this,
Esmaquels verbally demanded she vacate the land but she refused
- They were forced to send a demand letter dated August 22, 1996, giving
Coprada until November 30, 1996 to vacate but it remained unheeded
- Esmaquels filed an ejectment case before the MCTC
- Coprada averred that the lot was orally sold to her and she had been paying
realty taxes due the property since then, and she built a semi-concrete
structure and basically that the claim is barred by laches.
- MCTC dismissed the complaint for laches. RTC reversed. CA reversed.
Is the right of the registered owners to recover possession barred by laches? No.
- Petitioner’s cause of action for the unlawful detainer is based on their
ownership of the land covered by the TCT and on their claim that they merely
tolerated the stay of the respondents
- It is undisputed that the property is covered by the TCT registered in the name
of the Esmaquels and as against the unproven claim of the oral sale, the
Torrens title of Esmaquels must prevail—since it is the evidence of their
ownership thereof.
- A person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
- The issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in
an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent
has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
- A registered owner cannot lose his right to recover its possession by
reason of laches. As the registered owner, the right of the petitioner to
eject any person illegally occupying the property is not barred by laches.
Property Week 9
Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon, and Esteban Abobo v. Victor Eusebio
GR No. L-11977
April 29, 1959
Facts of the case
- Eusebio and Azarcon had a dispute over the possession of a parcel of land in
1954 (Eusebio filed a lease application which was occupied by Azarcon under
a homestead application)
- Before the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint with the CFI
alleging that he had acquired a big parcel of land by lease from the Bureau of
Lands that while he was in possession, Azarcons occupied a portion of about
6 hectares and prayed that they be ordered to vacate
- Azarcon answered alleging they had actual possession of the 24 hectares
since 1941 without interruption by virtue of a homestead application that the
lease was subsequent to the homestead application
- CFI ordered Azarcons to restore possession to Eusebio.
- CA denied the appeal on the ground that a writ of execution was already
issued while the case was pending appeal.
- Evidence showed that in spite of the receipt of the writ of execution
commanding the defendants to forthwith remove from said premises and
that Eusebio have restitution of the same, the Azarcons entered the land
to gather the palay which was then pending harvest
Who is the lawful owner of the pending crops? Azarcon.
- Order of execution did not expressly prohibit them from gathering the pending
fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the
land, it cannot be said that they committed an act in clear violation of the order
of the court.
- Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but was
not expressly prohibited by the court's order, and was even ratified when the
court ordered the suspension of the execution
- This is even bolstered by the fact that the writ of execution has been set aside
and Azarcon posted the required bond as required by the court. If the order
was then reinstated it was because of the wrong premise that the bond wasn't
posted by Azarcon as required.
Mangulon, Fernando, Asuncion, Mirasol, Arsenia, Paula, Cristituto, Candelaria,
and Crispina Calagan v. Court of First Instance of Davao and Petra Sandoval
GR No. L-30402
January 28, 1980
Facts of the case
- In 1954, petitioner (Mangulon and wife) were granted a homestead patent
over a 5.29 hectares in Dawis Digos Davao and were issued the OCT therefor
- In 1955, the wife died, survived by her husband (Mangulan and their
children—petitioners)
- On August 8, 1961, Mangulon and his daughter (Paula) sold a portion of 9230
sq. mtr. To Sandoval in consideration of 2,340.00 petitioner’s title to land was
borrowed by Sandoval so he could have the sale annotated
- In 1963, Manuglon offered to the portion sold but Sandoval refused, there
were offers to repurchase but he declined maintaining that she was to comply
with the demands of the Calagans provided she was to be reimbursed the
value of the house she constructed on the land.
- On April 15, 1966, petitioners brought an action for reconveyance and the trial
court ruled in their favor.
o Provided they return the 2340.00 and pay 3000 as the value of the
house constructed in good faith
- Petitioners appeal the payment of 3000 as the value of the house.
Is Sandoval entitled to the reimbursement of the house? Yes.
- There can be no question that the house which was constructed by Sandoval
is a useful expense (increases the value or augments the income of the
property)
- In applying Article 547 of the Civil Code, the homesteader desiring to
repurchase should be given the option to require the vendee to remove the
useful improvements on the land, under Article 1616, the vendor must pay for
the useful improvements introduced by the vendee otherwise, the latter may
retain possession until full reimbursementà which would render nugatory the
right of repurchase granted by law to a homesteader because the vendee can
prevent repurchase by building something on the homestead beyond the
capacity to pay of the homesteader seeking to repurchase
Petitioners are not exercising the option to refund the amount of the expenses
incurred nor to pay the increase in value, in turn, Sandoval, may remove her
house since this can be dome without damage to the principal thing, as
stipulated in Article 547
- Calagans should not be made to refund the value of the house, else, the
salutary policy behind the Public Land Law would be thwarted and rendered
meaningless
Property Week 9
Jose Cruz v. Reynaldo Pahati et al
GR No. L-8257
April 13, 1956
Facts of the case
- The case is an action for replevin instituted by Cruz in the CFI of Manila to
recover the possession of an automobile and a certain amount as damages.
- Pahati admitted having bought the automobile from Bulahan for 4,900 which
he paid in check.
- When the Manila Police Dept. impounded the vehicle, he cancelled the sale
and stopped the payment of the check, and as a result he returned the car to
Bulahan who surrendered the check for cancellation
- Bulahan on his part claims that he acquired the car from Belizo for value and
without having knowledge of any defect in his title
o That Cruz previously acquired title by purchase from Belizo as
evidenced by a deed of sale executed to that effect
o That later, Cruz delivered the possession to Belizo for resale and
gave him a letter of authority to secure a new certificate of registration
in Cruz’ name
- Bulahan claims that between 2 innocent parties, he who gave occasion,
through his conduct, to the falsification committed by Belizo, should be the
one to suffer the loss.
- Court rendered a judgment declaring Bulahan to be entitled to the automobile
in question and ordered Cruz to return the sum of 4,900 with legal interest
- Automobile was originally owned by Northern Motors sold to Chinaman Lu
Dag, and sold it afterwards to Belizo and sold it later to Cruz.
nd
- Belizo was a dealer of 2 hand cars and 1 year after, Belizo offered to Cruz
to sell the automobile for him claiming to have a buyer for it, Cruz agreed
- On March 7, 1952, the letter was falsified and converted into an
authorized deed of sale in favor of Belizo by erasing a portion thereof
and adding in its place the words "sold the above car to Mr. Jesusito
Belizo of 25 Valencia, San Francisco del Monte, for Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000)."
o Armed with this deed of sale, Belizo obtained a registration in his
name on the same date and he sold the car to Bulahan who in turn
sold it to Pahati
Who has a better right over the car? Cruz.
- Under Article 559, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same,
and the only defense is if he acquired it in good faith at a public sale.
- Cruz had a better right to the car in question than Bulahan for it cannot
be disputed that Cruz had been illegally deprived of possession because
of an ingenious scheme utilized by Belize to enable him to dispose of it
as if he were the owner
- Cruz can still recover the possession of the car even if Bulahan acted in good
faith
AZNAR v. YAPDIANGCO acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article
GR No. L-18536 establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when
March 31, 1965 the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the
Facts of the case owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when
- In May 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in 2 newspapers the sale of his Ford the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
Fairlane 500.
- A certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Petition DENIED.
Santos residence to answer the ad. Irineo, son of Teodoro, received and
talked with De Dios who informed him that Vicente Marella was interested in
buying the car.
- At a subsequent meeting Vicente agreed to buy the car for 14.7k with the
understanding that the price would be paid only after the car had been
registered in his name.
o The deed of sale and the registration of the car in Vicente’s name
was effected. Teodoro instructed his son, Irineo, not to part with the
documents until Vicente shall have given the full payment of the car.
o Ireneo and L. De Dios proceeded to Vicente’s place where they
demanded the payment. Vicente informed them that he was short by
some 2k, and begged off to be allowed to secure the shortage from
his sister, also living in Manila.
o Vicente ordered L. De Dios to go to that sister and suggested that
Irineo to go with him. He also requested for the documents under the
pretext that he would show them to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith
of Vicente, Irineo handed over the documents and went to the sister’s
house with L. De Dios.
- In Azcarrage Street, Manila, the place of the sister, Irineo was left to wait at
the sala while L. De Dios went inside a room. However, De Dios did not return.
After waiting for a length of time, Irineo discovered that the car and De Dios
was not there anymore. Irineo reported to his father and they promptly advised
the police.
- On the same day, Vicente sold he car to Jose Aznar for 15k, who was a
purchaser in good faith, and without notice of the defect to Vicente’s title.
- The car was seized by the Philippine Constabulary in consequence of the
report by Teodoro Santos. Aznar then filed for replevin.

Between Teodoro Santos and Jose Aznar, who had a better right to the
possession of the car? TEODORO SANTOS.
- Vicente did not have any title to the property because the same was never
delivered to him. He could have acquired ownership or title to the subject
matter thereof only by the delivery or tradition of the car to him.
o the car in question was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor
as to complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of
the contract. It should be recalled that while there was indeed a
contract of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro Santos, the
former, as vendee, took possession of the subject matter thereof by
stealing the same while it was in the custody of the latter's son.
- Art. 559 applies. Under it, if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the
finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have

Property Week 9
DE GARCIA v. CA
GR No. L-20264
Jan. 30, 1971
Facts of the case
- Angelina Guevarra, while talking to Consuelo de Garcia, owner of La
Bulakena restaurant, recognized a ring in the finger of Garcia. When inquired
where she bought it, she answered that it was from her comadre. Guevarra
explained that the ring was stolen from her house in Feb. 1952. Garcia handed
over the ring and it fitted the finger of Guevarra.
- Some days later, spouses Guevarras, with Garcia, went to the store of Mr.
Rebullida to whom they showed the ring. Rebudilla examined the ring and
concluded that it was the very ring Guevarra bought from him in 1947. The
ring was returned to Garcia, who despite a written demand, failed to deliver
the ring to Guevarra.
o Guevarra on the other hand claims that the ring was purchased by
her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Ms. Angelita Hinahon, who in
turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, who was boarding in her
house.
Can Guevarra recover the ring from Garcia? YES.
- According to Art. 559, "The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner
has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor."
- Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in
question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia
who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows
is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in
which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
- there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error that her
possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent
Guevara's claim. even on the assumption that there was good faith, the owner
can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation.
o the title established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof,
may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
o Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is as yet not the owner;
for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire
indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary
period, no proof of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former
owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it
under any condition.
Petition DENIED.
Property Week 9
DIZON v. SUNTAY
GR No. L-30817
Sept. 29, 1972
Facts of the case
- Suntay is the owner of a three-carat diamond ring valued at 5.5k. Suntay and
Clarita Sison entered into a transaction wherein the ring was delivered to
Clarita for sale on commission.
- After the lapse of a considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned
to the Suntay the ring, the Suntay made demands on Clarita R. Sison for the
return of it but the latter could not comply with the demands because, without
the knowledge of the Suntay, three days after Clarita received the ring, her
niece, Melia Sison, pledged the ring with Dizon’s pawnshop for 2.6k.
- Since Suntay insistently demanded from Clarita, Clarita delivered to her the
pawnshop ticket. Suntay filed for estafa against Clarita, and sought to take
possession of the ring from Dizon.
Can Suntay recover the ring from Dizon? YES.
- According to Art. 559, "The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor."
o Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence
would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is
offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such
care be taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting
opportunity for profit, he should be the last to complain if thereafter
the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized. The
law for this sound reason accords the latter protection.
Petition DENIED.
EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the
GR No. 80298 books.
April 26, 1990 - Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz
before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her
Facts of the case assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. Although the title of
- A certain Prof. Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with EDCA Publishing Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books,
for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more
and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check proof before deciding to buy them.
covering the purchase price of 8.9k. - EDCA’s remedy is against de la Pena, and not against Santos.
- Cruz subsequently sold 120 of the books to respondent Leonor Santos, who
paid him 1.7k. Petition DENIED.
- EDCA became suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
the clearing of the fist check. They made inquiries with DLSU where he had
claimed to be a dean. They were informed that there was no such person.
Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account with the bank.
o EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz.
The investigation revealed that his real name is Tomas de la Pena.
o On the same day, EDCA sought assistance from the police, which
forced their way into the store of Santos and threatened Leonor with
prosecution for buying stolen property.
o They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van
belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to EDCA.
- Santos now files for the recovery of the books.

Can EDCA recover the books from Santos? NO.

- It is the contention of EDCA that the Santos have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a
receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is unacceptable. Precisely,
the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with
further proof.
- Santos is in the business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-
up sellers who urgently have to part with their books at reduced prices. To
Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many such sellers she
was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for anyone in the
business of buying and selling books to buy them at a discount and resell them
for a profit.
- ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet
been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind
the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
- Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over
the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The
fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and

Property Week 9
LEDESMA v. CA because of the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration which
GR No. 86051 does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced
Sept. 1, 1992 party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract.
- It was therefore erroneous for the respondent Court to declare that the private
Facts of the case respondent was illegally deprived of the car simply because the check in
- A certain Jojo Consunji purchased for his father Rustico, two brand new motor payment therefor was subsequently dishonored; said Court also erred when it
vehicles form Citiwide Motors: divested the petitioner, a buyer in good faith who paid valuable consideration
o One (1) 1977 Isuzu Gemini, 2-door Model PF 50ZIK, with Engine No. therefor, of his possession thereof.
751214 valued at P42,200.00; and
o One (1) 1977 Holden Premier Model 8V41X with Engine No. 198- Petition GRANTED.
1251493, valued at P58,800.00.
- The next day, the vehicles were delivered, and Jojo issued a manager’s check
of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank for the amount of 101k as
full paymet. However, upon deposit, it was dishonoured on the ground that it
was tampered from P101.00 to P101,000.00.
- Citiwide reported the Philippine Constabulary, and it was found out that the
impostor is Armando Suarez who has a long line of criminal cases for using
the similar modus.
- The Holden Premier was recovered from an abandoned place in QC. On the
other hand, the Isuzu Gemini was transferred by Suarez to the possession of
Jaime Ledesma.
o Ledesma for his defense, claims that he purchased the car in good
faith.

Was Citiwide unlawfully deprived of the car? NO.

- It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present possessor
even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for
under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent
to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make possession of movable
property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith;
(b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the
possession is in the concept of owner.
- Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully
deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily parted with the possession
thereof. This is the justification for the exceptions found under the second
sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code.
- The petitioner successfully proved that he acquired the car in question from
his vendor in good faith and for valuable consideration. According to the trial
court, the private respondent’s evidence was not persuasive enough to
establish that petitioner had knowledge that the car was the object of a fraud
and a swindle and that it did not rebut or contradict petitioner’s evidence of
acquisition for valuable consideration.
- There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private
respondent and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the
transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first
vendee — even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a
fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate
of registration to the vendee’s alleged representative Title thereto was
forthwith transferred to the vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check

Property Week 9
CHUA HAI v. KAPUNAN o 4) That the judge taking cognizance of the criminal case against the
GR No. L-11108 vendor of the possessor in good faith has not right to interfere with
June 30, 1958 the possession of the latter, who is not a party to the criminal
proceedings, and such unwarranted interference is not made
Facts of the case justifiable by requiring a bond to answer for damages caused to the
- Roberto Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware, owned by Ong Shu, possessor.
700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets and 249 pieces of round iron bar for
6.1k. In payment thereof he issued a check for 7k. When the check was Petition GRANTED.
presented for payment, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
- Soto sold 165 sheets in Pangasinan and 535 sheets in Calapan, Mindoro. Of
those sold in Pangasinan, 100 were sold to petitioner Chua Hai.
- Ong Shu filed for estafa and asked that the 700 iron sheets be returned to
him. Chua Hai opposed with respect to the 100 he bought from Soto.
- The court ordered the return of the 700 to Ong Shu.

Was Citiwide unlawfully deprived of the car? NO.

- Chua Hai’s good faith is not questioned. To deprive the possessor in good
faith, even temporarily and provisionally, of the chattels possessed, violates
the rule of Art. 559 of the Civil Code. The latter declares that possession of
chattels in good faith is equivalent to title; i.e., that for all intents and purposes,
the possessor is the owner, until ordered by the proper court to restore the
thing to the one who was illegally deprived thereof. Until such decree is
rendered (and it can not be rendered in a criminal proceeding in which the
possessor is not a party), the possessor, as presumptive owner, is entitled to
hold and enjoy the thing; and "every possessor has a right to be respected in
his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or
restored to said possession established by the means established by the laws
and the Rules of Court."(Art. 539, New Civil Code).
- The decision of the court below, instead of conforming to Arts. 559 and 539 of
the Civil Code, directs possessor to surrender the chattel to the claimant Ong
Shu before the latter has proved that he was illegally deprived thereof, without
taking into account that the mere filing of a criminal action for estafa is no proof
that estafa was in fact committed. Instead of regarding the possessor as the
owner of the chattel until illegal deprivation is shown, the court below regards
the possessor of the chattel not as an owner, but as a usurper, and compels
him to surrender possession even before the illegal deprivation is proved.
- In sum:
o 1) That the acquirer and possessor in good faith, of a chattel or
movable property is entitled to be respected and protected in his
possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until a competent
court rules otherwise;
o 2) That being considered, in the meantime, as the true owner, the
possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to I surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery
of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor;
o 3) That the filing of an information charging that the chattel was
illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by the transferor
of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the
possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor; and
Property Week 9