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Scholars have often taken Foucault by his words and insisted that
his philosophy is completely at odds and opposed to Sartre’s—and Beau-
voir’s—existentialism. However, it is my contention that Foucault’s own
appreciation and intense critique of existentialist philosophy stems from
a series of misunderstandings with regards to the notions of the subject,
freedom, and historicity. The purpose of my essay will be to explore af-
finities between Foucauldian and existentialist philosophy as found in
Sartre and Beauvoir’s works, focusing particularly on the ethical notions
of authenticity and distantiation from oneself. Indeed, if the existentialist
ideal of authenticity as offered by Sartre and Beauvoir aims at a fluctuat-
ing self that “is what it is not and is not what it is,” it stands close to the
Foucauldian subject of the aesthetics of existence who cares for itself as
a subject that is none other than the subject of its own desubjectivation
(to pick up on Giorgio Agamben’s analysis).1 The aporia is that of a sub-
ject that must care for oneself, yet must distantiate oneself from oneself.
Tackling this aporia and explaining its mechanism, my essay will show
how the existentialist analysis of authenticity can help articulate the ethi-
cal and the political in Foucault, given that the caring self is always an
ethico-political agent. The subject that emerges from these processes of
individuation/un-individuation is an ambiguous fluctuating subject—the
only possible actor in an ever-evolving and morphing political arena.
Existential authenticity2
One of the most important ethical questions driving existentialist
thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir is that of authen-
ticity. Authenticity is posited as the good to be pursued by individuals,
but what must the human being do or be in order to be authentic? Sartre
grounds this ethical ideal in the ontological and phenomenological. In-
deed, it is essential for him to be clear on what kind of being the human
being is and how it experiences itself in order to tackle the problem of
authentic becoming. Sartre conceives of the human being as an embodied,
situated, and intentional consciousness. This being for-itself3 is also a
being for-others as it encounters other human beings in the world. Being
Foucault’s subject
It ought to be noted that Foucault has been very critical of exis-
tentialist thinkers and of Sartre in particular. He considers the notion of
authenticity to be dubious. For example, he says,
through the moral notion of authenticity, he [Sartre] turns back to the
idea that we have to be ourselves—to be truly our true self. I think
that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said
is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity – and not of
authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that
there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves
as a work of art.” (237)
But, as Sutton Morris has suggested above, there are a lot of affinities
between the idea that one ought to create oneself as a work of art and the
existentialist view—as expressed by Sartre and Beauvoir—that one must
make oneself authentic. Foucault also appears to misconceive the Sartrean
subject. In fact, and despite some of their irreducible differences, they are
all—Sartre, Beauvoir, and Foucault—concerned with ethics as a “reflective
practice of freedom.”10 Before drawing parallels between Foucault’s views
and those of Sartre and Beauvoir, it is important to clearly delineate the
notion of the human being as a subject put forth by Foucault.
In the essay “The Subject and Power,” Foucault declares that the
general theme of his research is the notion of the subject and not that of
power (209). From a genealogical point of view, it is important for Foucault
that we gain “a historical awareness of our present circumstance” (209). It
is imperative to look into the constitution of the subject and this necessarily
leads us to an uncovering of the workings of power both on and within
the subject. Foucault offers the following: “It is a form of power which
makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject:
subject to someone else by control and dependence, and ties to his own
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form
of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (212). Here, Foucault
indicates two ways in which the subject is constituted (the “two mean-
ings” he has in mind): while human beings are constituted by relations
of power (subject to those forces), they are also engaged in a relation to
themselves that makes them subject of their existence. This is the process
of subjectivation that Foucault talks about in his writings. Christopher
Cordner explains, “Everyone is enmeshed in networks of power […] In his
later work Foucault highlighted the contingency of these determinations
of ‘who we are.’ Rapport à soi is the way in which contingency and history
are recapitulated into the free expression of who we are” (595). What this is
other hand, care of the self also intensifies the relation to political action
rather than hindering it” (Souci 702).16 The techniques of the self that will
be employed by the free subject to care for oneself through a process of
distantiation are varied. I do not wish to expand on this, however, since I
am interested in the notion of the care of the self only insofar as it poses
an ethico-political problem and points to another instance of the process
of distantiation that I have been talking about.
In the views of the subject offered by Sartre, Beauvoir, and Foucault, the
self is engaged in this process of creating oneself. In each case, the subject
aims toward one’s self as a quasi-essence—the “ideal complex pattern”
identified by Sutton Morris above. That movement toward oneself—con-
stantly at work, always renewed because the subject is never fixed, and
always unfolding through its own relations—is called authenticity in
Sartre and Beauvoir and caring for oneself in Foucault.20 The distantiation
process that is at the heart of each instances of moral striving is the same.
It is therefore safe to conclude that there is no difference between these
such, always in relation with others. Through the reflective reprise that
allows the individual to re-apprehend oneself as the being it is—as a being
which is what it is not and is not what it is or, in Foucauldian terms, as a
being that is always at a distance from oneself—one may re-apprehend
one’s self as othered—or altered—by and through the encounter with the
other. This encounter, however, is always ongoing. One is never in isola-
tion. One comes to the world in which there are others. One is shaped by
this. Sartre would say: one is being made into a being for-others. This is
the passive way of existing as a being in the world with others. Through
reflective reprise, one may become a being-with-others—indeed one
ought to. Because one is a free being and may exercise one’s freedom to
re-apprehend oneself, one may avoid being fixed in one’s being at the
hand of the other. In virtue of being the beings we are—situated in a
world in which there are others—we will always be objectified through
the look of the other—or alienated, as Sartre would have it. However,
we may recuperate from this objectification and give it a positive spin by
making it part of the process of individuation through which we make
use of the reflective practices of freedom and ultimately become ethical
beings. It is our duty to not only become more than passive subjects of
power relations but to actually become the active subjects of our own
lives. This requires embracing our being as in flux and acknowledging
the distantiation process that is at the heart of our being. It also requires
the recognition that we will always unfold historically and through our
relations and experiences—that our existence will always precede and
supersede essence.
***
The fluctuating subject that Sartre, Beauvoir and Foucault offer is
the ethical and political agent that can respond to the quickly changing
and evolving political world. Being ambiguous and in flux itself, it can
better respond to worldly fluctuations since these fluctuations themselves
form the very fabric of its being. Sartre, and to a greater extent Beauvoir
and Foucault, allow us to see how we may exercise our freedom and
not let ourselves be dispossessed by the action of these power relations.
They permeate us and make us who we are but we are still in a posi-
tion to control our ethical and political being through a free reflective
reprise of ourselves. The déprise at the heart of our ontological being is
also brought to us externally through our social being, as ethical agents
engaged in interpersonal relations and as political agents engaged in the
social world. We are dispossessed of our selves at multiple levels but this
déprise can, at every moment, be re-apprehended. This is what Sartre,
Beauvoir, and Foucault wish to convey and why they remained optimistic
Notes
1. See Agamben.
2. This section draws and borrows from the more detailed analysis I have provided in “The
Ethics of Authenticity” in Reading Sartre.
3. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre introduces the distinction between two modes of being:
being in-itself and being for-itself. The human being is the being for-itself—that instance
of being which is conscious of itself.
4. Heidegger famously discusses authentic and inauthentic Dasein in Being and Time. Much
debate has surrounded these sections of the work since interpreters have wanted to
read them as proposing an ethics while Heidegger insisted that this was only to be read
ontologically.
5. My translation of “L’authenticité est un devoir . . . Être authentique, c’est réaliser pleine-
ment son être-en-situation, quelle que soit par ailleurs cette situation,…” (244, my em-
phasis). Note the use of ‘duty’ in this instance. This suggests that there is some objective
value to authenticity. We have to be authentic because there is an exigency to be such
that is grounded in our being for-itself which is a being-in-situation.
6. Admittedly this unveiling of being is a “creationist” act of some sort. The human being
is the one that creates the world through unveiling being. Is it possible that one may
not have to desire to be God since one already is godly? One must desire to act as this
unveiling of being. Even though this “desire to be God” also seeks self-justification—my
life will be meaningful if I engage in the act of unveiling—it differs significantly from
Sartre’s view in that the key to justifying my creative act of unveiling being lies in my
encounter with and appeal to the Other. More on this below.
7. When I recognize the Other as an impotent object—when I alienate him by oppressing
him or when I recognize him as an omnipotent subject that objectifies me through the
look for example—there is no mutual recognition of freedom; we are not peers. In such
relationships, my project and unveiling of being cannot be grounded and justified by
the Other: either he is made impotent or he does not care, exercising his own potency
at my expense.
8. “Our freedoms support each other like the stones in an arch, but in an arch that no pillars
support. Humanity is entirely suspended in a void that it creates itself by its reflection
on its plenitude” (Beauvoir, “Pyrrhus” 140). It must be noted that while Beauvoir might
be more optimistic than Sartre with regards to interpersonal relations she is not naïve
either. One’s appeal to the Other might very well be met with non-reciprocation and
lack of recognition. However, one must take that risk since authenticity will be found
only through intersubjective being.
9. And, I would like to argue, of Heidegger’s, insofar as Sein und Zeit does have ethical
implications.
10. This is a point that Florence Caeymaex makes very clearly about Sartre and Foucault in
her essay “Les Enjeux éthiques de l’existentialisme sartrien,” p. 31.
11. Frédéric Gros says, “Parler de subjectivation suppose d’abord que le sujet ne soit pas
donné à lui-même, mais qu’il se construise, s’élabore, […]” (232).
12. My translation of “La transformation de la subjectivité n,est pas de découvrir ‘qui je
suis,’ mais de rejeter d’abord ‘qui je suis’ en résistance au pouvoir et au savoir” (14).
13. See “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?”, p. 841.
14. See her entry on “Esthétique (de l’existence)” in her Dictionnaire Foucault, p. 51.
15. This has its source in the Greek concept of epimeleia heautou.
16. Alain Beaulieu notes that the care of the self has two aspects to it: it is valuable insofar
as it makes an individual a potentially good social/political agent, one who may act in
a leadership role, and it is also valuable in itself (166).
17. See her entry “Jean-Paul Sartre” in her Dictionnaire Foucault, p. 166.
18. See Foucault’s critique toward the notion of authenticity at the beginning of the previous
section.
19. My translation of “Loin d’être un ‘sujet fondateur,’ le sujet sartrien est éclaté en une
multiplicité d’actes de conscience discontinus, et n’est identifiable qu’à travers les objets
concrets du monde” (114).
20. I would argue that it is not only Foucault who is influenced by Nietzsche with regards to
this notion of creating oneself but also Sartre and Beauvoir. It is interesting that Foucault
would claim Nietzsche as a source while the other two, due to profound misunderstand-
ings of Nietzsche’s fundamental concepts, reject his philosophy. Taking Sartre by his
words that his philosophy takes nothing from Nietzsche, Thomas R. Flynn thus says:
“Had he lived to see it, Sartre might have pondered a similar curve in Foucault’s final
thought, centering, as it does, on the Nietzschean proposal to make of one’s life ‘a work
of art’” (25). In fact, Sartre has been influenced by Nietzsche all along, as I have shown
in previous work of mine. As well, it can be shown that there is a line of influence from
Nietzsche to Beauvoir. It might thus be the case that it is the Nietzschean link—admitted
in one case, and unacknowledged by the other two—that brings them all together with
regards to authenticity and caring for oneself.
21. Pierre Verstraeten would agree with my reading since he concludes, coming at it from a
different perspective, that whatever difference there is between Sartre and Foucault—
Verstraeten is not concerned with Beauvoir—is one of emphasis and not of substance.
See his essay “Sartre-Foucault (une opposition biaisée).”
22. My translation of “La liberté est la condition ontologique de l’éthique. Mais l’éthique
est la forme réfléchie que prend la liberté” (Dits et écrits IV, 711-12, no. 356).
23. It has been argued—first by Sonia Kruks and then by others—that Beauvoir had
a major influence on Sartre’s philosophical development, in particular, with regards to
the notion of freedom. Starting with his Notebooks for an Ethics—written after Beauvoir’s
Ethics of Ambiguity—Sartre revisits his views on interpersonal relationships as delineated
in Being and Nothingness. There he acknowledges the limitations of conflict and speaks
of conversion to the Other as being essential to ethical authenticity. For Beauvoir’s in-
fluence on Sartre regarding freedom, see Sonia Kruks’ “Simone de Beauvoir: Teaching
Sartre About Freedom,” in Sartre Alive, edited by Ronald Aronson and Adrian van den
Hoven, Wayne State University Press, 1991, pp. 285-300.
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