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The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics

and Religion

Article  in  Philosophical Psychology · April 2015

DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838752

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Philosophical Psychology, 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.838752

REVIEW ESSAY

The limits of Haidt: How his

explanation of political animosity fails
Hugh LaFollette and Michael L. Woodruff

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion
Jonathan Haidt
New York: Pantheon, 2012
448 pages, ISBN: 0307377903 (hbk): $28.95

Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind seeks to explain why it is difficult for liberals and
conservatives to get along. His aim is not just explanatory but also prescriptive. Once we
understand that the differences between disputants spring from distinct moral views held
by equally sincere people, then we will no longer have reason for deep political animus.
Conservatives and Liberals have distinct (although somewhat overlapping) moral views
and they understand human nature differently. He claims that these differences are best
understood by consulting an array of psychological studies, key genetic findings, and the
theoretical underpinnings of sociobiology. After summarizing his arguments, we isolate
and discuss the three most important and contentious issues in his book. We argue that
although the project’s motivation is noble and some of his findings are insightful, his key
explanations, inferences, and prescriptions are wanting. We end by suggesting a way he
could defend a weaker version of his view.
Keywords: Conservatives and Liberals; Genetic Basis of Morality; Harm; Intuition;
Political Disagreement; Sanctity; Sociobiology

1. Introduction
The stated aim of Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind is to explain “why it’s so hard
for us to get along.” His aim, however, is more restricted in scope than this language

Hugh LaFollette is Cole Chair in Ethics at the University of South Florida, St. Petersburg.
Michael L. Woodruff is Professor Emeritus at East Tennessee State University.
Correspondence to: Hugh LaFollette, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, 140 Seventh Ave. S.,
St. Petersburg, FL 33701, USA. Email: hughlafollette@tampabay.rr.com

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

2 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff
suggests. He is not explaining obstacles to convivial relations with a reclusive sibling,
an arrogant friend, a troublesome child, or an overbearing boss. He wants to explain
why it is difficult for liberals and conservatives to get along, more specifically, why it is
difficult for American liberals and American conservatives to get along. It may be that a
number of his observations and findings are applicable to individual conflicts and
political animosities within other countries. However, that is not what prompts this
work. He wants to explain why U.S. political rhetoric is so heated.
Haidt’s aim is not just explanatory but also prescriptive. He thinks that once we
understand that differences between disputants spring from distinct moral views held
by equally sincere people, then we will no longer have a reason for political animus.
If Haidt construes this problem as a reciprocal failure to understand one’s political
opponents, then it seems his message would be equally applicable to both sides.
However, there is no way to read this book as being addressed equally to liberals and
conservatives; it is addressed to liberals. Why? Perhaps he sees himself as a liberal and
therefore thinks he will be more effective speaking to like-mind people. He also thinks
liberals need to change more than do conservatives. Perhaps, too, he unconsciously
thinks liberals are more likely to hear and heed his message. Whatever his rationale,
this approach unfortunately means that although he promises to offer a recipe for how
warring political opponents can get along, he offers few specific ingredients.
Before we summarize the main argument, we should note a shift in his language
that might cause confusion. His account of liberals and conservatives evolves through
the book. Initially he identifies five foundations of morality: harm/care; fairness/
cheating; loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation (p. 125). He
claims liberals are more concerned with the first two foundations; conservatives are far
more concerned with the remaining three. Forty pages later (pp. 167– 174) he cites
new studies that require modifying his scheme. He subsequently adds a sixth
dimension—freedom/oppression—which liberals primarily emphasize. Then he
reinterprets fairness—which he had initially treated as reflecting the liberals’ concern
with equality—as capturing a conservative concern with proportionality. To simplify
the discussion, we focus on his final rendering of the moral foundations rather than
alternating between the two versions.

2. The Structure of Haidt’s Argument

2.1. The Primacy of Intuition
Haidt claims there are three broad explanations for the origins of morality. Nativists
believe morality is purely innate; its truths are accessed via intuition. Empiricists claim
that humans are blank slates at birth; morality emerges from parental or societal
instruction. Rationalists believe people ascertain moral principles on their own, using
their powers of rational discernment.
He thinks the dismissal of nativism is premature, although understandable. Specific
moral beliefs are not writ in genes such that everyone, everywhere, and at every time
endorses the same behaviors. Detailed moral rules vary depending on the evolutionary
 Philosophical Psychology 3
niches and social constructs of their respective cultures. But Haidt maintains that
morality is innate inasmuch as its building blocks are part of human nature. Even the
disposition to embrace one moral view rather than another is genetic. A core aim of
this book is to identify the moral foundations, briefly explain their genetic origins, and
then show how different incarnations of them lead to political animus.
The first step in achieving this aim is to deflate moral rationalism and elevate moral
nativism. That is the core aim of Part I. Haidt begins by offering a phalanx of studies
that show that our moral views arise “automatically and almost instantaneously, long
before moral reasoning has a chance to get started” (p. xiv). He then offers additional
studies which he avers show that moral development theorists of the 70s and 80s give
rationality too robust a role.
The relative roles of intuition and rationality in humans are best thought of as
analogous to that between an elephant and its rider. Intuition is the moral elephant;
rationality, its rider. The rider falsely thinks that she directs the elephant when, in fact,
she serves it, usually by offering post hoc justifications for the person’s intuitive
judgments (p. 32). Therefore, what rationalists identify as the core of our moral lives is
little more than “clever justifications” of views to which we are antecedently
committed. Haidt suggests that the rider (the person’s rationality) should normally
address the elephant—the other person’s intuitive side.
He acquired this insight more than a decade ago during his three week visit to India
(pp. 101– 102). When he first arrived, he was put off by two elements of many Indian’s
moral behavior: their treatment of women and of servants. He was uncomfortable
having women standing behind the table, serving the men who ate and talked with
other men. He was also leery of treating his house servant as sternly as his Indian hosts
urged. However, as he came to know and like those hosts, he came to see the world
from their moral perspective. He describes this experience as a “turning point” in his
understanding of morality (p. 288). It helped him see that morality is driven more by
intuitive responses than by moral deliberation. It was, for him, the first step in
recognizing that liberals hold an overly narrow view of morality.

2.2. Morality is More Than Liberals Think It Is

Haidt claims that his own studies and the studies of others demonstrate that liberals
have an overly narrow view of morality (Part II). Liberals’ moral repertoire is unduly
limited to two foundations: preventing harm (bestowing benefits) and constraining
oppression (and thus promoting freedom and equality). These same studies show that
conservatives embrace four additional moral dimensions that liberals value far less—
or not at all: fairness (as proportionality); loyalty; respect for legitimate authority; and
sanctity.
He initially talks about these six features as “moral foundations,” but in an effort to
base them in innate, presumably genetic, neural systems, he adapts concepts advanced
by Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) referring to them as “moral modules.” These moral
modules are responsible for what Haidt metaphorically calls “universal moral ‘taste’
receptors.” They are, thus, “adaptations to long-standing threats and opportunities in
4 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff
social life” (p. 123). They function similarly to the face detection module (Sperber &
Hirschfeld, 2004) and “draw people’s attention to certain kinds of events” (p. 123).
Once attention is drawn, “instant intuitive reactions” are triggered.
This language, and his use of the concepts proposed by Sperber and Hirschfeld,
suggests that he thinks the moral foundations are distinct cognitive modules
dependent on separate neuronal mechanisms shaped by particular evolutionary
forces. However, an alternative interpretation more accurately matches his emphasis
on the fundamental importance of forming groups to human survival and evolution.
In this view four of the foundations that the conservatives embrace (proportionality,
loyalty, respect for legitimate authority, and sanctity) and liberals (generally) eschew,
really spring from a single module, namely, a genetic propensity for groupishness.
Haidt contends that these moral modules are flexible from person to person in their
ability to influence behavior. However, he does not explain how or why they develop as
they do. His insistence that each module is directly produced by evolutionary selection
is explanatorily flaccid. He could just claim that the moral foundations are biological
strategies shaped by social learning to develop and sustain groups. Unfortunately,
Haidt does not offer anything more definitive. We know only that each foundation/
module (along with religion) springs from human groupishness. This binds us
together, yet also blinds us to the interests of those outside our group.

2.3. Morality Binds and Blinds

The core aim of morality is to create cohesive and mutually supportive groups. Haidt
is not simply claiming that we are social animals—philosophers since Aristotle have
recognized that. Haidt forwards a more robust sense of groupishness—and the four
conservative foundations it spawns. He also offers a distinct explanation for its origins.
As partially bee-like creatures, we must be loyal to other group members, and we must
bow to the queen’s authority. We must do our part to support the hive
(proportionality); we must promote the hive’s purity by expelling anything spoiling
its environment.
This aspect of his view is so central to his account that he devotes nearly a third of
the book to it. Because his view of the significance of groups is so expansive, he claims
we need a potent evolutionary explanation of its origins. Although natural selection
working on individuals explains minimal forms of sociality, Haidt claims that it
cannot explain full-blown groupishness. To explain that, he appeals to E. O. Wilson’s
sociobiology (1975), a supplement to the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. That
synthesis merges population genetics, Mendelian genetics, and paleontology to
explain speciation through adaptation via natural selection. Wilson avers that any
adequate account of natural selection must also be able to explain human social
behavior.
Historically, sociology explained complex human behavior as arising primarily
from cultural transmission. Wilson—and Haidt following him—think this is
explanatorily impotent. We should be able to isolate the building blocks or morality in
our genes. We cannot do that unless we show how complex human behaviors are
 Philosophical Psychology 5
chosen via natural selection. That is possible only if selection operates directly on
groups and not merely (or even primarily) on individuals. The success of a human
group depends on its having enough members who engage in group-promoting
activities (D. S. Wilson & Sober, 1994; E. O. Wilson, 1975). If it does, then the group’s
fitness increases even if some individual member’s fitness declines. The more its
members engage in group-promoting activities, the fitter the group and the higher the
probability that its members will produce offspring with alleles producing behaviors
that further enhance the group’s evolutionary success. Group selection does not
eliminate the gene as the particulate entity transmitting inheritance by reproduction.
However, it does reduce individuals to “vectors” carrying the genes that make the
group more “fit.”
As odd as this might initially seem, Haidt thinks this explanation is essential for
producing morally robust groupishness. As he puts it:
At least some of these [evolutionary] innovations were directed at marking members
of a moral community, fostering group cohesion, suppressing aggression, and free
riding within the group, and defending the territory shared by that moral
community. . . . Even if group selection played no role in the evolution of any other
mammal, human evolution has been so different since the arrival of shared
intentionality and gene cultural co-evolution that humans may well be a special case.
(p. 212)
Of course, being capable of being groupish does not mean that one will be groupish.
Evolutionary processes produce a “hive switch,” that under certain stimulus
conditions is flipped in ways that constrain selfishness and promote group behavior.
What can trigger the hive switch? It might be something as simple as synchronized
group movements like marching or dance, or being an active spectator at a football
game. More centrally to his argument, it is also triggered by religious ritual. That is one
reason he thinks religion and morality are so intricately related.
Haidt suggests that these groupish tendencies are grounded in two physical systems:
the action of the neurohormone oxytocin and the brain’s mirror neuron system.
Oxytocin, perhaps best known for its effects on lactation, is released by the pituitary
gland into the blood stream in response to a variety of stimuli and is used as a
neuromodulator by neurons in the brain. It has been shown to promote human social
behaviors, especially in promoting attachment to conspecifics (e.g., Churchland &
Winkielman, 2012). Additionally, some neurons in the frontal and parietal cortices are
active during self-initiated movement and in response to viewing similar actions
by others. These “mirror neurons” are thought to promote identification with others
(e.g., Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007).
As we mentioned earlier, Haidt thinks religion directly promotes intragroup
coherence. Religious ritual is also a common trigger for the hive switch, which further
reinforces groupish behavior. Finally, by “creating” a god who punishes morally errant
behavior, religion helps keep most people in moral line. These contributions of
religion, Haidt claims, are palpable: religious people are better neighbors, more
altruistic, and happier than the liberal counterparts. This should prompt liberals to
consider that “conservatives have a better formula . . . to create a healthy, happy
6 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff
society” (p. 289). This illustrates Haidt’s thesis that conservatives and liberals are
influenced by different innate systems. Indeed, he claims work by a group of
Australian scientists shows that the predisposition to be conservative or liberal arises
from differences in specific identified gene alleles.
If this is correct, how does Haidt’s account help us get along better with others? If
differing political views are genetically based, then it seems his goal of rapprochement
between the two groups would be exceedingly difficult. The abstract awareness that we
share the “same,” albeit differently specified, moral building blocks seems insufficient
to moderate acrimonious dialogue.

3. Evaluation
The book raises three central issues that merit discussion.
1. Does Haidt accurately reflect the current best thinking on the relative roles of
intuition and reason in moral thought?
2. Does his use of evolutionary biology and genetics offer plausible support for (a)
the origins of groupishness, and (b) his claims that genes establish strong
political predispositions?
3. Does he plausibly explain why and how we can get along with those who
advocate radically different political views?

3.1. Intuitions, Rationality, and Value Pluralism

Haidt correctly notes that most people make most moral judgments before they
deliberate. Some people never rationally reflect on morality, even if they have time.
Nonetheless, we have three worries about his characterizations of and inferences from
these insights: 1) his criticism of earlier moral psychologists is notably unfair; 2) his
criticism of philosophers is partly unfair; and 3) he makes flawed inferences from these
findings, in part because he conflates descriptions and prescriptions.
One, he claims moral development theories are rationalistic (pp. 5 –7). However,
this is true only in an attenuated sense. Although Kohlberg and Turiel do think some
people do, and all people should, rationally evaluate moral actions, it is implausible to
claim that they think humans always—or even regularly—do this, or that they think
all people do it before acting (Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 2002).
Although this is not a view they expressly develop, Kohlberg and Turiel are plausibly
construed as holding that elements of rational moral deliberation occur after the fact,
as an audit of previous behavior. Its aim is not ideally to rationalize what we have done,
but to rationally evaluate what we did. Having done so, we can then adjust future
behavior accordingly. The same is true of successful prudential behavior. We learn to
choose a job more wisely, to write more clearly, and to shop more economically by
reflecting on our previous choices, paper writing, and spending patterns.
Moreover, these theories expressly deny that all stages of moral development are
rational. In both theories, the early stages of development are decidedly non-rational.
Finally, neither Kohlberg nor Turiel think most people—let alone everyone—reaches
 Philosophical Psychology 7
the higher stages of development where rationality plays a central role. They think
many people are stuck at lower levels of moral development.
His critique of ethicists is not wholly unfair. Some philosophers say, and many more
imply, that rationality plays an executive role in moral action: that before we act we
do—or should—consciously deliberate. Sometimes that is exactly what we should do.
Still, we agree with Haidt that some theorists err in overly rationalizing morality.
Normally we do not consciously decide to rescue a drowning child or assist an elderly
person who falls while crossing the road. If we pause to deliberate, the child and the
elderly person may die. Much moral behavior, e.g., telling the truth, consoling
someone whose spouse was murdered, etc., springs “intuitively” from ingrained rules
or deeper disposing traits. They do not directly arise from rational deliberation.

3.1.1. Intentions and rationality

Haidt acknowledges that reason has a role in moral thought; its primary aim is to
“fabricate” reasons for wholly intuitive action (p. 32). Even when we engage in
something resembling rational debate, we should primarily address the elephant, not
the rider (chapter 3: “Elephants Rule”). We do not find this satisfactory; the approach
sounds more like manipulation than reasoning.
Although most moral philosophers do give reason a more robust role than Haidt
does, few deny intuition’s temporal priority. Most believe that many people’s moral
judgments are made quickly, and are typically shaped by parental instruction, the
mores of their societies, or their self-interests. These forces are extraordinarily potent.
However, rather than infer, as does Haidt, that we should simply accept this fact as an
indication of how we should behave, many ethicists aver that we should strive to
combat these non-rational influences. We should expose ourselves to opposing views
in their most plausible forms. Only then can we overcome familial and social forces
that “make a man a Churchman in London . . . a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking”
(sic) (Mill, 1985, p. 17). Many deontologists share Mill’s perspective. Kant’s
recognition of the power of intuitive forces explains why he thought that being moral
is exceedingly difficult. The only way to best inclinations is by having a good will
(Kant, 1785/1999, pp. 6 –9).
Put differently, the issue is not whether moral intuitions are temporarily prior to
moral judgment; they often are. The issue is whether intuitions are morally
authoritative. Are they reliable guides on how we should behave? Some philosophers,
like W. D. Ross (1988), think the answer is “yes.” Yet even he thinks rationality is
required to know how to balance conflicting prima facie (intuitively grasped) duties.
Haidt would doubtless respond, as he has to other similar criticisms, that we
mistakenly claim that he gives rationality no moral role. Perhaps some people do think
that; we don’t. What we claim is that he gives rationality too small a role, “only in very
special circumstances . . . when countervailing intuitions have been turned off ”
(Haidt, 2012b). Unfortunately, intuitions rarely get turned off in such a polarized
society. Of course, if disputants can squelch their pretheoretical intuitions, then
rationality may reach someone who has been morally recalcitrant. We think rationality
can also play a more central role even when a person’s intuitions are active. Each
8 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff
author recalls instances where someone’s arguments forced us to reassess our moral
views, even when our intuitions (elephants) were at full alert. In short, no one needed
to first calm our elephants to address our rationality. In this, we are not alone.
This example illustrates a troubling feature of his argument. He claims that he is
merely describing moral views and behavior (pp. 120 & 221). Yet he often morphs into
making prescriptions. He assumes that since he knows how most people make many
decisions, he then knows the way people should make them.
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the six innate foundations. Having conducted
studies that suggest that conservatives identify four ethical dimensions that liberals
miss or downplay, he infers that morality really includes more than liberals think it
does (Part II). He apparently forgets that the mere fact that someone thinks that a
belief concerns morality does not make it so. As a teenager, one of the authors
supported segregation; for him, the belief that the society should be racially segregated
was an unshakeable, intuitive moral truth. However, his moral beliefs were mistaken;
instead, they reflected the significant power of parental, religious, and cultural
prejudice.
We suspect that Haidt’s views about the “existence” of the six moral foundations
arise from a commitment to a particular form of moral pluralism.

3.1.2. Pluralism
At several points in the book, Haidt claims that there are multiple and sometimes
incommensurable, or even wholly incompatible, values. He expressly rejects common
consequentialistic or deontological theories because they boil moral deliberation
down to a single principle. He raises this objection as if it were radical. Perhaps it is
radical among psychologists studying ethics, although we suspect it is not. It is
certainly not radical among philosophers (Mason, 2013). Indeed, moral pluralism has
probably been the dominant view among philosophers for some years. A number of
prominent ethicists have argued not only that we often have incompatible moral
values, but that there is no algorithm for deciding how to adjudicate between them
(Stocker, 1989).
Still, Haidt’s understanding of pluralism is unique in two significant respects. One,
he claims that the buds of the conservative’s moral palette include authority and
sanctity; these are not principles most ethical pluralists countenance. Two, while the
philosophical pluralist thinks values are genuinely competing, the American
conservatives Haidt studies appear to think that sanctity (almost) always outweighs
principles liberals embrace (harm and freedom). If the conservatives gave these latter
values serious moral weight, then they would be less inclined to take absolutist stances
when sanctity is at stake. Most vehemently condemn gay marriage and abortion. If
they really thought sanctity was merely one value balanced against the others (harm
and freedom), then in some cases, the latter values would outweigh sanctity. However,
that is (almost) never true. This suggests that many conservatives don’t have moral
taste buds liberals lack; rather, they have wholly different taste buds.
 Philosophical Psychology 9
Their four foundations are almost entirely explained by our innate groupishness.
That is why his evolutionary explanation of groupishness is key to evaluating his
project.

3.2. Haidt’s Account of the Evolutionary Grounds of Morality

Haidt postulates that four of the six moral foundations could have arisen only through
group selection. Although Wilson and his colleagues identified group selection in
bacteria and insects, the empirical evidence for a similar process in humans is thin. All
arguments for group selection in humans are vulnerable to three criticisms.

3.2.1. Three criticisms

One, group selection requires promiscuous use of the “adaptationist program” (Gould
& Lewontin, 1979). We, as well as Gould and Lewontin, understand that the theory of
adaptation is a powerful method for studying evolution (D. S. Wilson, 2000, p. 164).
Lewontin (1979), however, has noted that use of either a forward- or backward-
looking adaptationist explanation without strong independent empirical evidence
lacks explanatory power. In the forward form, an environmental problem is identified
and then researchers specify a phenotype to “solve” the problem. In the backward
form, scientists isolate a phenotype and then look for environmental forces that might
have produced it.
Haidt’s argument for the existence of religion, and probably the moral foundations
that promote groupishness, represent the backward form. Specifically, religion is a
behavioral phenotype. Therefore, there must have been some problem that made
religion a successful adaptation. The problem: groups needed mechanisms to promote
their survival. Therefore there must have been an adaptive phenotype that made that
possible. Religion fits the bill: it creates an all-seeing god who encourages groupishness
and reduces the tendency to engage in disruptive behaviors even when other members
of the group are not present (the “free rider” problem). The explanation sounds
vaguely plausible. However, Haidt never considers alternative explanations (like
cultural transmission), nor does he consider the possibility of “production of
nonadaptive structures by developmental correlation with selected features” (Gould &
Lewontin, 1979). Unfortunately, his narrative lacks independent empirical support,
unlike the more plausible adaptive explanations for lactose persistence that we discuss
later. This makes his argument for the innate basis of the origins of religion, and
ultimately for the moral foundations, to have a whiff of circularity.
Some of Haidt’s arguments are clearly circular. He argues that shared intentionality
arose from a major transition in human evolution, stating:

Homo heidelbergensis is therefore our best candidate for Rubicon crosser. These
people had cumulative culture, teamwork, and a division of labor. They must
[emphasis added] have had shared intentionality including at least some
rudimentary moral matrix and that helped them work together and then share
the fruits of their labor. (p. 209)
10 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff
In short, members of Homo heidelbergensis worked together; therefore they must have
had shared intentionality. Why? Because shared intentionality led them to work
together.
Two, it is not just that there is no empirical evidence for these adaptive explanations;
evolutionist Jerry Coyne thinks they are not experimentally testable:
Some modern thinkers have constructed elaborate scenarios about how our sense of
morality, and many moral tenets, might be the products of natural selection. . . . But
in the end these ideas come down to untested—and probably untestable—
speculations. It’s almost impossible to reconstruct how these features evolved (or
even if they are evolved genetic traits) and whether they are direct adaptations or,
like making fire, merely the by-products of a complex brain that evolved behavioral
flexibility to take care of its body. (2009, p. 230)

Think, for a moment, about Haidt’s use of oxytocin and mirror neurons to explain the
hive switch. Although oxytocin promotes social behaviors, particularly attachment to
conspecifics, its function is so broad and in many cases so subtle that it is hard to see
how we could test whether it is a toggle “switch” as Haidt avers (Churchland &
Winkielman, 2012). Then, although mirror neurons likely play a role is social
awareness, it is unclear how we could test whether their increased activity leads to
sudden changes from self-centeredness to group-centeredness, particularly since they
are active during both self-initiated movements and similar movements produced by
others (e.g., Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Uddin et al., 2007).
Three, appeal to group selection is unnecessary since we can explain most of these
morally laden developments as individual adaptations. Therefore, reference to group
selection is unparsimonious. Consider one element of groupishness: reciprocal
altruism. As Price explains, “individual group members tend to acquire return benefits
via their cooperation, by engaging in behaviors that can be regarded as n-person
reciprocity or conditional cooperation—competitive altruism—and status-for-
altruism transactions” (2012, p. 46). If Price is right, we don’t need group selection
to explain some hivish behavior. Whether a more standard selectionist explanation
gives Haidt everything he wants is something we explore in the paper’s last section.

3.2.2. Are genes the source of political orientation?

In the final chapters of The Righteous Mind, Haidt seeks to bolster earlier arguments
about the six moral foundations by citing studies of twins that indicate that that there
is a genetic basis for being conservative or liberal. These studies indicate a degree of
heritability of political orientation. However, Haidt overreaches by relying
significantly on a paper by Hatemi et al. (2011). In so doing, he suggests that
political differences are linked to specific genes:
After analyzing the DNA of 13,000 Australians, scientists found several genes that
differed between liberals and conservatives. Most of these genes were related to
neurotransmitter functioning, particularly glutamate and serotonin, both of which
are involved in the brains’ response to threat and fear. (pp. 278–279)

However, Hatemi’s paper does not support this conclusion.

 Philosophical Psychology 11
Hatemi et al. (2011) used a Genome-Wide Analysis to isolate genes that might
be related to conservatism or liberalism. Hatemi’s team identified four chromosomes
(2, 4, 6, and 9) with markers that might relate to political divisions. A careful reading
of Hatemi’s results would lead many geneticists to reject the markers on chromosomes
6 and 9 since they are outside the standard statistical confidence limits. Hatemi et al.
realized this weakness; that is why they made a strong case only for the gene linked to a
marker on chromosome 4. This gene was identified as the NMDA receptor-regulated
gene 1 (NARG1). NARG1 is expressed at high levels in the neonatal brain and is
involved in regulating the proliferation of neurons. It is almost completely turned off
in adults. Given the anatomically general distribution of NARG1 action during brain
development and its down-regulation in the adult it is unlikely to be involved in
production of specific neural modules. Thus, the use by Haidt of the study by Hatemi
et al. to support a case for the genetic basis of the conservative/liberal dichotomy
appears premature at best, and misleading at worst.

3.3. Does Haidt Offer Advice That Might Help Us All Get Along?
In some respects, the answer is “yes.” We are all better off if we can avoid demonizing
the other. Far too often we assume that others’ behavior we deem immoral stems from
agents’ deeply flawed (if not outright evil) characters. That judgment is detrimental.
Of course some people seem preferentially wicked (Milo, 1984). However, we think
that is less likely than most of us assume. Much evil stems from a lack of serious self-
criticism. However, that does not mean we must conclude that people who demean
women are morally no different from those who don’t. They are. These behaviors
should be criticized just as others challenged folks like one of the authors, who, in his
early years, embraced second class citizenship for blacks and women.
However, even if we were wrong, his proposed aim of the book will fail, at least if
conservatives read his book. The problem is twofold. One, when he is talking about
liberals coming to understand conservatives, he is not talking about how liberals might
come to understand the run-of-the-mill conservative, that is, a Republican. There are
many Republicans with significantly different views and values. Many of these, from
the strict libertarian to the self-interested CEO, do not necessarily embrace or find
attractive the loyalty or authority or sanctity foundations crucial to fundamentalist
conservatives.
The fundamentalist will object for different reasons. He or she will be appalled by
Haidt’s explanation of religious belief and his embrace of sanctity. He derides the
“New Atheists” (Harris, Dennett, Hitchens, and Dawkins) for focusing on religionists’
metaphysical claims about the existence of supernatural beings. That, he says, is
demeaning to conservatives. We think it is more demeaning to fundamentalists to
treat their metaphysical claims about god as a fiction they created to make cohesive
societies and to control undesirable behavior. The New Atheists at least give
fundamentalists the courtesy of acknowledging that they believe what they say they
believe.
12 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff
Finally, his analysis of the differences between liberals and conservatives assumes
that they embrace fundamentally different values. Certainly some do. However, many
differences between these groups’ beliefs arise primarily from different empirical
beliefs. For instance, a key element of the conservatives’ beliefs, according to Haidt, is
that differences in wealth and influence stem largely from differences in effort.
Conservatives are less likely to think that upbringing and institutional structures can
influence the ways people’s lives go. Liberals disagree. They think that some people’s
life chances are significantly shaped by genetic, economic, social, and familial factors
over which they have no control. These different empirical beliefs significantly shape
their differences in moral beliefs.
In such cases, should we talk to other people’s elephants, as Haidt proposes, or their
riders? It might be strategically wise to talk to the elephants, although that seems
conniving. Generally, we think it is best to frankly point out the other side’s empirical
errors.

4. How Haidt Might Strengthen His Account

We applaud Haidt’s efforts to soften political rhetoric; we agree that we should spend
more effort understanding others and less time demonizing them. We also think he
offers important insights about moral behavior. Nonetheless, as we have explained, we
have misgivings about key descriptive, and especially prescriptive, claims.
Perhaps not all is lost. Above we offered several reasons why we find that Haidt has
been overly promiscuous in his use of theory and data from evolutionary biology to
support his own theory. This is not to say that we reject the importance of evolution in
the development of the human mind. However, Haidt’s theory would be better served
if he placed more emphasis on the importance of culture in gene-culture coevolution
then he does in this book. For example, he makes a great deal of the link between
domestication of cattle and the development of lactose tolerance in ancestral
Europeans and believes that this example of gene-culture coevolution can be
legitimately generalized to explain the emergence of his proposed moral modules. We
agree that gene-culture coevolution is explanatorily powerful; we just think it
mistakenly assumes that this process requires group selection. Let us explain.
Most of our ancestors were lactose intolerant; 65% of adults in the world today still
cannot digest lactose. This is because following weaning, the enzyme lactase that
converts milk into usable sugars becomes inactive. Somewhere between six and eight
thousand years ago, pastoral peoples in Europe began to show lactase persistence (LP)
and the ability to tolerate lactose as adults (see Gerbault et al., 2011 for a review). This
is generally attributed to the domestication of cattle and increased availability of milk.
This is not merely a backward form of the adaptationist program; it is a story
supported by the archeological and genetic evidence. The archeological evidence
shows that adult LP developed after the introduction of dairy farming. Today, LP is
associated with groups with a long history of dairy farming. Thus, LP is far lower in
southern Europe (15– 54%) than in the British Isles and Scandinavia (96%); it is rare
in Asian populations (Gerbault et al., 2011). Genetic findings support the
 Philosophical Psychology 13
anthropological evidence. The frequency of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
that are markers for the alleles that encode lactase persistence increased in our
ancestors after they began dairy farming (Gerbault et al., 2011).
Haidt uses the development of LP to support the proposed selection of the moral
foundations at the group level. His assertion is that “if cultural innovations (such as
keeping cattle) can lead to a genetic response (such as adult lactose tolerance), then
might cultural innovations related to morality have led to genetic responses as well?
Yes” (p. 211). This is an unwarranted leap. It is one thing to claim with strong
empirical support from replicable data converging from several disciplines that
changes in a comparatively simple phenotype (LP), explained by one to three
identified alleles, is the consequence of gene-culture co-evolution. It is quite another
to extrapolate this evidence to support the claim that cultural pressure on the group is
necessary to explain a host of complex human behaviors.
Further, group selection is not necessary to explain the evolution of LP. Gerbault
et al. (2011) propose niche construction theory (NCT) as an alternative to group
selection as an explanation for LP. NCT, first advocated by Lewontin (1979), “refers to
the activities, choices, and metabolic processes of organisms, through which they
define, choose, modify, and partly construct their own niches” (Laland, Odling-Smee,
& Feldman, 2000, pp. 132 –133 and Tishkoff et al., 2006). A constructed niche then
exerts selective pressures on all organisms living in it.
Further, NCT recognizes that the environments organisms create may also be
“passed on” to future generations; they may be sustained and modified by behaviors
that are learned vertically between generations and horizontally within them. In the
case of humans, this includes the cultural environment. The selective effects of niches
are passed along like genes, albeit through a different channel (Laland, Odling-Smee, &
Myles, 2010; Odling-Smee, 1988).
We suspect that NCT could give Haidt part of what he wants. However, it is unclear
that that can undergird his insistence (a) that there are four moral foundations liberals
miss or downplay, and (b) that religion plays a necessary role in the formation and
sustenance of morality.

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