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Concurrence, Douglas
Concurrence, Clark
Concurrence, Stewart
Dissent, Frankfurter
Dissent, Harlan
Judgment:
Remanded to the District Court for consideration on the merits.
Reasoning:
The current case is different than Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), because it is brought under the Equal
Protection Clause and Luther challenged malapportionment under the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause.
An issue is considered a non-justiciable political question when one of six tests are met:
This claim does not meet any of the six tests and is justiciable. There are no textually demonstrable commitments
present regarding equal protection issues by other branches of government. Judicial standards are already in place
for the adjudication of like claims. Since Baker is an individual bringing suit against the state government, no
separation of power concerns result.
Concurring and Dissenting opinions:
Concurring (Douglas):
Since the right to vote is inherent in the Constitution, each vote should hold equal weight. The design of a legislative
district which results in one vote counting more than another is the kind of invidious discrimination the Equal
Protection Clause was developed to prevent.
Concurring (Stewart):
The dissenting and concurring opinions confuse which issues are presented in this case. The majority’s three rulings
should be no more than whether:
In addition, the majority’s analysis is clouded by too many indirect issues to focus on the real issue at hand. The issue
in the case is whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of a federal right to the extent a district court
would have jurisdiction. The complaint does not state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not suggest legislatures must intentionally structure their districts to reflect
absolute equality of votes. The complaint also fails to adequately show Tennessee’s current system of apportionment
is so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Significance:
Baker v. Carr outlined that legislative apportionment is a justiciable non-political question. It established the right of
federal courts to review redistricting issues, when just a few years earlier such matter were categorized as “political
questions” outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
In light of the District Court's treatment of the case: we hold today only (a) that the court possessed jurisdiction
of the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to
appropriate relief, and (c) because appellees raise the issue before this Court, that the appellants have standing to
challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes. [Footnote 16] Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage
to doubt the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found, it is
improper now to consider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial.
It is clear that the cause of action is one which "arises under" the Federal Constitution.
3. Standing
The injury which appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they
reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored
counties. A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as
a right secured by the Constitution when such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, or by a refusal
to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts
4. Justiciability
That review reveals that, in the Guaranty Clause cases and in the other "political question" cases, it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal
judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the "political question." We have said that,
"In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness
under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also
the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations."
Coleman v. Miller: The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers. Much confusion results from the capacity of the "political question" label to obscure the need for case-
by-case inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to
another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative
cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine. We shall then
show that none of those threads catches this case.
The opinion was finally handed down in March 1962, nearly a year after it was initially argued. The Court split 6 to
2 in ruling that Baker's case was justiciable, producing, in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J.
Brennan, three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. Brennan reformulated the political question
doctrine, identifying six factors to help in determining which questions were "political" in nature. Cases that are
political in nature are marked by:
Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, dissented vigorously and at length, arguing that the Court had
cast aside history and judicial restraint, and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.[5] He
wrote:
Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and their votes are
counted. They go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their representatives to the state councils. Their
complaint is simply that the representatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful.