1. MACARIOLA VS.

ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77 (1982)

FACTS: Macariola charged respondent judge asuncion of “act of unbecoming a judge” for purchasing a
portion of lot-1184-E, which he was the presiding judge on a civil case no.3010. The Judge contends that
he brought the lot when it was no longer a subject of litigation and that he bought it not from the
plaintiff in civil action but on the person of Dr. Galapon. Spouses Asuncion and Spouses Galapon sold
their shares to the trade manufacturing and fisheries industries inc. in which respondents was the
president. The complainant alleged that it violated paragraph 1 and 5 Art.14 of code of commerce when
the judge associated himself with the TMFI.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the code of commerce?

RULING: NO. code of commerce partakes of the nature of political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officer and employees. Code of commerce is a Spanish code
which extends to the phil. Upon transfer of sovereign from Spain to the US and later from US to the
Phil., Art.14 of the code must be deemed to have been abgrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

2. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

FACTS: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The
complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”

ISSUES: Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

RULINGS: This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota
or crux of the controversy.

3. AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents

G.R. No. L-32717. November 26, 1970

FACTS: petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this
special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections
enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, which, according to him, is "violative of [his]
constitutional right ... to freedom of speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary
injunction. respondent Commission on Elections contends that the justification for the prohibition was
premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates
"to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."

ISSUE: Whether or not comelec was in excess of its jurisdiction when it enjoined the petitioner from
using taped jingle?

RULING: Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however,
that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda
gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." For
respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter
differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind
or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was
the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote
for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" It has been the
constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from
respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech.

4. RIZAL ALIH vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX,
ZAMBOANGA CITY

G.R. No. L-69401

FACTS: On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and
elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez
street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.

The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire.
However the besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were
arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military
also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds
of ammunition found in the premises.

the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining
order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as
evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of their right against self-incrimination.

The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act
on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. There was also the suggestion that the
measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.

ISSUES: Whether or not the search was valid/legal and constitutional and the evidences obtained by
respondents is admissible to the court.

RULING: the search of the petitioners' premises was declared ILLEGAL by the court and all the articles
seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings.The
precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the
non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Superior
orders cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the
Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took.

THE RESPONDENTS defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military"
so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. The search was violative of the Constitution, all the
firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the
proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree.

However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that
have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.

5. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 constitution in the grants of
rights and privileges covering the national economy and patrimony in his bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, won the bidding. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS matched
the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad but the GSIS refused to accept.

petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. Respondents maintained that: First, Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the constitutional mandate on Filipino first policy is not self-executing and
does not cover the GSIS in the said bidding contract?

RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. The mandate covers the transaction, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law.

It is self-executing , Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. respondents is directed to CEASE and
DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.

6. GONZALES vs COMELEC

21 SCRA 774
FACTS: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the
plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14,
1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this
was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be
more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the
plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with
their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because
it is a political question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

HELD: No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such
powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when
Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but
rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative
act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act
of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.

7. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

FACTS: private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative.

The comelec directed Delfin to cause the publication of the petition for initiative and later on granted its
petition.
petitioner Santiago filed A special civil action for prohibition raising that the constitutional provision on
people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress.

Delfin maintains that Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor adequately covers such initiative.

RULING: It does not cover, the court declared R.A. NO. 6735 INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM of
initiative on amendments to the constitution. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section
reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. The people are not accorded the power to
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative.

8. RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner Raul L. Lambino commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.

the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The Lambino Group contends that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition. Alternatively,
the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

ISSUES: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

RULING: The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution
for conducting a people's initiative. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution states that:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein.

Two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached
to it.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of
the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is
not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative
clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

10. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-34150. October 16, 1971

FACTS: Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional
amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to
eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1
of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions (resolution 2
and 4) , by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the
holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC)
performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and
void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as
laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight
senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of
Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by
said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by
the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised
by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment
in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE: whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification
by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the above quoted Organic Resolution No. 1,
in the manner and form provided in said resolution.

RULING: NO. The Court holds that the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed
by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose THE COURT hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.

11. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. H. N. BULL

G.R. No. L-5270. January 15, 1910

FACTS: The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No.
55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275 he contends that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of
certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case.
H. N. Bull master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and
there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and
city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport,
and bring into the port and city of Manila, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-
seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animalsthat by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so
in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed
about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed. All contrary to
the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

ISSUE: Whether act no.55 is valid, AS AMENDED BY ACT.275?

RULING: YES. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States
of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate
foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to
the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. Congress has expressly
authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving
harbors and navigable waters. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the
Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after .The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. This Act
has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. the Legislature has full constitutional power to enact laws for
the regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that
Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.

12. ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-1123. March 5, 1947

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines
to be appended as an ordinance thereto. The validity of the resolution is attacked as contrary to the
Constitution.
that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in
the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the
opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in
their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present
petition was filed.

At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny
that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or
resolution.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOR THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES OF AN ENROLLED
BILL OR RESOLUTION?

RULING: YES. There is some merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which
is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of
evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the
juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they boil down to the same
thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the
judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within
the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision

13. PLANAS VS. COMELEC

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973

FACTS: While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the
Convention approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting
to the people for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for
said ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from
implemented PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the
Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the
president announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the
cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as
soon as possible”.

ISSUES: Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?

RULING: yes. The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases
decided by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which
expressly provides for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the
decree itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any
amendment as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.

14. JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-36142. March 31, 1973

FACTS: Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the
Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said
respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose
Constitution not found in the present Constitution" — referring to that of 1935. The petition therein,
filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit,
for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January
24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana
alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution,
thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the
President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void."

ISSUE:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-
justiciable, question?

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?

RULING:

1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine the Court, hold that the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. the Court may
inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the
affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the
Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935
Constitution been complied with.

2. On the second question of validity of the ratification the Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV,
section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
87 stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article
XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said
Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein were cast,
reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have
no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the
votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of
plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the
orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in
doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political
aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
15. PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44640. October 12, 1976

FACTS: A prohibition suits and preliminary injunction was filed by petitioners to question the power of
incumbent president to propose amendments to the constitution in the absence of the interim national
assembly.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum for
the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays"). Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President
issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree
No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. the Solicitor
General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in
nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner has locus standi on the present case?

RULING: The court ruled that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad)
possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and
1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-
may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No.
991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired
into.

16. Occena vs. Comelec

73 SCRA 1 (1981)

FACTS:

1. There is a prohibition proceedings as to the validity of the three Batasang Pambansa Resolution
calling for the amendments of the constitution petition by Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales

2. The three Batasang Pamabansa resolution states; Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area
of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.

3. Batasang Pambansa as a parliament (legislative body) can propose amendments or revision to

the constitution as an exercise of its constituent power stated in 1973 Constitution

4. "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision." 1973 Constitution Article ? Section?

5. The three resolutions were approved through a majority vote by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. The date of the plebiscite is set
for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the three Batasang Pambansa resolutions proposing for the amendments of the
constitution are constitutional?

RULING:
YES, Under Sec. 1 (1,2) Article XVII Any amendments to, or revision of this constitution may be proposed
by: 1. The congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or 2. A constitutional convention.
This power given to the legislative body has been consistent since 1935 constitution. The existence of
the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. As stated in the 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. As to the validity of the proposed amendments or revision
is immaterial because such the new constitution shall be ratified by the sovereign people.

NOTES:

That there is a two prohibition proceedings on the matter of the constitutionality of the three resolution
approved by the Batasang Pambansa to amend the constitution. The petitioners are former delegate of
the constitutional convention that framed the 1973 Constitution are suing as taxpayers. Their
arguments are; questioning the power of the Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and asserting
that the constitution is not a fundamental law questioning the ratification of the present constitution.

The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument
against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire
Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

17. Philippine Bar Association vs. Comelec

140 SCRA 455 (1985)

FACTS: Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for President and
Vice-President on February 7, 1986.

The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably
vacating the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is
proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation."

The principal ground for the challenge to the validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation
of the President did not create a vacancy required by Article VII, Sec. 9 which authorized the calling of a
special election.

ISSUES:

Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run on that said special
election.

RULING: After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to declare
the statute unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v. Executive Secretary, of the view that as
there were less than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional. The petitions should be dismissed.

On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. Thus, it is outside the ambit of the courts.

The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to the give
the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.

18. Lawyers League vs. President Aquino

G.R. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:

1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

2. President Corazon C. Aquino government was under the Freedom Constitution and a
revolutionary government established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not the government established under President Corazon C. Aquino is constitutional
or legitimate? (De jure or De facto)

RULING: YES, Under Sec. 1 of Article II “The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them”. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of the Supreme Court
were reorganized and have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government. It was established by authority of legitimate sovereign, the people it was a revolutionary
government established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed

NOTES:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that
petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.

19. IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

FACTS:

In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the provision of the
Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the then-incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino. After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino
were declared the winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986
after the infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and Vice-
President was held last May 2, 1992. The government established through the people power under the
Presidency of Corazon C. Aquino which was in defiance of the 1973 Constitution constituent that such
government was under the Freedom Constitution/Provisional Constitution Please take note that the
1987 Constitution took effect on February 7, 1987. There was no constitution to such effect and they
were not bound under the previous constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition?

RULING:

The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:

1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court states
that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief,
Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure.

2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to sue, and his
allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge, and
the people have made judgment.

20. De Leon v. Esguerra

153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

FACTS:

On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a
Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of
1982 with their terms of office explicitly state it shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988
and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. On the other hand
the Barangay Election Act have been repealed by the provisional Constitution which state under section
2, All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986. That petitioner received a memorandum from OIC Governor ordering the
replacement of Barangay Officials of all barangays at Taytay, Rizal, such memorandum was antedated
having signed on February 8, 1987 although dated December 1, 1986 which was received by petitioner
on February 9, 1987.

ISSUES: Whether or not the memorandum issued by OIC Governor to replace petitioners of their public
office constitutional and/or legal?

RULING:

NO, Section 8, Article X 1987 Constitution The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years. With the requirement of a special law to
determine the term to hold such office the Barangay Election Act of 1982. The 1987 Constitution was
ratified on February 2, 1987 superseded the Provisional Constitution. Thus the memorandum issued by
herein respondent have no legal force and effect. OIC Governor was deemed inoperative during such
time.

21. Angara vs. Electoral Commission

63 Phil. 139 (1936)

FACTS:

On September 17, 1935 Jose A. Angara won the election as member of the National Assembly at first
district, Province of Tayabas and took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935
the National Assembly adopted Resolution No. 8 confirmed the election of Angara. On December 8,
1935 Pedro Ynua one of the rival candidate of Angara during the election filed a Motion of Protest
before the Electoral Commission. The creation of Electoral Commission was on the period of December
2-4, 1935 then on December 9, 1935 issued a resolution pertaining to the last day of filing electoral
protests. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua. On that
matter there is already a conflict/breach of jurisdiction of who should prevail between the resolution of
the National Assembly or of the Electoral Commission.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition?

RULING:

YES, Under Sec. 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution “The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As a final
arbiter created by the constitution to exercise its judicial power to review cases and controversies that
raised constitutional questions and with the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
constitution and defining constitutional boundaries between government branch and instrumentalities
in conflict. Upon such principle this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission. As to the issue on the conflicting resolution, the
resolution issued by the National Assembly confirming the election of the petitioner is unnecessary it is
beyond their mandate the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly is given to Electoral Commission.

NOTES:

Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to
fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns
of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary.

22. Francisco vs. House of Representatives

G.R No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003

FACTS:

There were two impeachment complaints against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justice, the first complaint was on June 2, 2003 by then former President Joeseph E. Estrada for “for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." On October
22, 2003 such complaint was dismissed although sufficient in form but insufficient in substance by
House Committee on Justice. The day after such dismissal, October 23, 2003 second impeachment
complaint herein filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Given such instance Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution states No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional?

RULING:

YES, Under Sec. 3 (5) Article XI of the 1987 Constitution “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year”. Therefore there is a clear
violation of the constitution because although there is already decision for the dismissal of the first
impeachment complaint the House of Representatives initiated the second impeachment complaint.
Therefore there is a clear issue of justiciability. Under Sec. 1 Article VIII ““The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government”. Supreme Court can take cognizance of this case to settle controversies by defining and
maintaining the boundaries of authority a matter of check and balances to ensure the three branches of
the government are within the scope of their mandate in accordance with the constitution.

NOTES:

What constitute impeachment proceeding initiated?

The proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action.

23. PACU vs. Secretary of Education

97 Phil. 806 (1955)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They
deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without
due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. This
also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by
private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from
being used in schools.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is a need to exercise judicial review to settle the controversy?
RULING:

NO, As prescribed in the constitution Sec. 1 Article VIII, For the court to exercise its judicial power there
must be an actual controversy or case, and/or there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of the government instrumentality as in this case
the Secretary of the Education. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the
petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they
are not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit
does not amount to a justiciable controversy. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the
exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law. Second, the State
has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution under Article XIV
provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic
conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. This Court held that
there was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation
of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the
Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does not amount to a justiciable controversy.

24. Mariano vs. Comelec

G.R No. 118577 March 7, 1995

FACTS:

Two petitions assailing the constitutionality of R.A 7854 which deemed to convert the Municipality of
Makati into a highly urbanized city to be known as City of Makati. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7854 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

NO, First and foremost to challenge the constitutionality of a law specific requirements must be met. 1)
There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
The decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself, so
that Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case as part of its power of judicial review under Sec. 5
(2A) Article VIII. The challenge is premature petitioners premise only on occurrence of many contingent
events and petitioners are not proper parties they are resident of another city (Taguig, except Mariano).
To challenge the constitutionality of a law requirement must be met

25. Cutaran vs. DENR

G.R No. 34958, January 31, 2001

FACTS:

Petition for prohibition originally filed with the appellate court to enjoin the respondent DENR from
implementing DENR Special Order Nos. 31, as amended by 31-A and 31-B, series of 1990, Special Order
No. 25, series of 1993 and all other administrative issuances relative thereto, for having been issued
without prior legislative authority.

In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no. 31 entitled
Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral
land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region and after due evaluation of the claims, to issue
appropriate land titles (Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim) in accordance with existing laws. The same
year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for
certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John
Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on
Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among
the recognized tribes of Baguio City. The same year, Heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an application for
certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping
some portions of the land occupied by the petitioners which DENR haven’t neither approve nor deny
such claim.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is a judicial controversy at bar?

RULING:

NO, Justiciable controversy as defined , a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of
a law. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioner’s speculation that the DENR will approve the
application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or
will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the
jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is still no decision given by the DENR to the claim by the
heirs of Apeng Carantas as such no actual case or controversy is of existence. This court will not take
cognizance over speculative or hypothetical cases. Petitioners are simply speculating that they might be
evicted from the premises at some future time. Therefore the court cannot take cognizance of the case
because it fails to have an actual controversy or case nor grave abuse of discretion as clearly stated
under Sec. 1 Article VIII of the Constitution.

26. Montecarlos vs. Comelec

G.R No. 152295, July 9, 2002

FACTS:

The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK for brevity) elections
originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age
requirement for membership in the SK. Petitioners allege that public respondents connived,
confederated and conspired to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership
age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. The first SK elections took place on December
4, 1992. RA No. 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every three years
thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules
the Comelec shall promulgate. Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos.
4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections on May 6, 2002. On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo
(Chairman Benipayo for brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In
his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections
simultaneously in May 2002. On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
their respective bills postponing the SK elections. The Bicameral Committees consolidated bill reset the
SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but
not more than 18 years of age. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is judicial controversy at bar?

RULING:

NO, Under Sec. 2C (1 & 7) Article IX, “Enforce and Administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall” & “Recommend to Congress
effective measures to minimize election spending…”, thus Comelec has the primary mandate to
supervise the conduct of SK election and they acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and
duties, the court find no grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts. Petitioners have no substantial
interest in maintaining this suit for they are not already qualified as candidates and voters for SK
Election as the new law prescribes, R.A 9164. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy.

27. Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary of DAR

G.R. No. 93100. June 19, 1997

Ponente: Romero, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners claim that Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17 and 32 of the Comprehensive Agrarian reform law
are unconstitutional for these extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands when Sec. 4, Art, 13 of the
Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands. The Supreme Court held that the questions
concerning the aforesaid provisions have become moot and academic with the passage of RA 7881.
Sec. 3(b) includes “raising of fish” in definition of “agricultural, agricultural enterprise or agricultural
activity.”

Sec. 11 defines “commercial farms” as private agricultural lands devoted to fishponds and prawn ponds.

Sec. 13 calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan

Sections 16 and 17 rest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to determine just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehesive Agrarian Reform Law.

Sec. 32 spells out production-sharing plan mentioned in Sec. 13 (3% of gross sales from production of
lands to be distributed within 60 days at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above their compensation, provided that individuals or entities
realize gross sales in excess of P5M per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a
lower ceiling. For every profit realized, an additional 10% of net profit after tax shall be distributed to
regular and other farmworkers within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year.

RA 7881: The following provisions shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequently converted to
fishponds or prawn farms, provided the size of the land converted does not exceed the retention limit of
the landowner.

ISSUES:

WON Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, they are not unconstitutional because RA 7881 expressly states that fishponds and prawn farms are
excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

28. GONZALES vs NARVASA

G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in
order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and
the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on
the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
43

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any
“injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s
powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that
he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner
has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be
sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a
real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be
entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a
representation.

29. LACSON vs PEREZ

G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001

FACTS:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the
Armed Forces of the Philippine and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were effected.

On May 6, 2001, President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in Metro
Manila.

On May 10, 2001, four petitions were filed before the Court:

● G.R. No. 147780 (by Lacson , Aquino, and Mancao): prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and
habeas corpus
● G.R. No. 147781 (by Defensor-Santiago): mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order
● G.R. No. 147799 (by Lumbao): prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order
● G.R. No. 147810 (by Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino): certiorari and prohibition

ISSUES:

WON the petitions should be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic.

RULING:

Petitions are dismissed for being moot and academic.

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. The lifting of the
said declaration in Metro Manila has rendered the petitions moot and academic.

When an issue or case no longer presents a justiciable controversy or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved, it becomes “moot.” In such case, a determination of the issue would have no
practical use, and there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

As a rule, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. The Court may only
adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.

30. Defunis v. Odegaard

416 U.S. 312

FACTS: DeFunis has applied to the University of Washington Law School, but was denied although his
test scores were considerably higher than some of the minority students that had been admitted.
DeFunis had petitioned a trial court to require that the school admit him, which it did. When the matter
was appealed by the school, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the decision, upholding the initial
decision to deny DeFunis entry into the law school. The U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the matter,
at roughly the time DeFunis was beginning his final year of law school elsewhere.

ISSUES: The legal question presented was whether the case was a moot issue since DeFunis had already
matriculated, and thus outside the scope of judicial review.

RULING: The Court held that yes, the issue was moot.

The Supreme Court reasoned that since the University of Washington Law School had agreed to admit
DeFunis, the case was in effect moot. Since DeFunis would have completed his legal studies and earned
his degree by the time of a decision, that fact of mootness was driven home even further. The Court
ruled that the dispute between the parties had “clearly ceased to be ‘definite and concrete’ and no
longer ‘touch[ed] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'”

Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, arguing that because of the profound social significance of the
case (affirmative action vs. reverse discrimination-affirmative action), the matter should have been
resolved despite its mootness

31. ACOP V. GUINGONA

G.R No. 134855

FACTS:

1. On July 30, 1998 , the petitioners-appellants Supt. Romeo M. Acop and Sr. Supt. Francisco G.
Zubia Jr. filed for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek for a
reverse and set aside the Decision dated July 30,1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which dismissed this petition for injunction.

2. The factual antecedents leading to the present petition are as follows:

 a. On May 18,1995 eleven suspected members of the criminal group known as the
Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along the Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged
shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police.

b. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command of the
PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation on the incident made a public
disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the eleven members of the gang were
summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC.

3. On June 2,1995 , Senator Raul Roco, who was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice
and Human Rights, recommended the admittance of the appellants to the government’s Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, they were admitted into the said Program.

4. Herein petitioners, in their capacity as tax payers, but who are among the PNP officers
implicated in the alleged rubout, contended that under Sec 3 (d) for R.A No.6981. law enforcement
officers are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may
be testifying against other law enforcement officers.

5. Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead :

a. An injunction be issued enjoining the Department of Justice from continuing to provide

benefits accruing under the Witness Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2
dela Cruz

b. Order the immediate discharge of respondent SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz
from WPP and for the latter be ordered to cease and desist from accepting benefits of the WPP, and

c. Order respondent officers to return whatever monetary benefits they have received
from the government as a consequence of their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP.

ISSUES:

WON the petition for judicial review prosper. ( legality of the respondent's admission to the WPP)

RULING:

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the petition lacks merit and that the
same has been rendered moot and academic.

Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary
to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future
guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have
ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol,[3] and Viola vs. Alunan III,[4] "courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"

NOTES:

Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981: The Witness Protection Security and Benefit Act

Petition for certiorari: Article VIII (5)

32. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 159085

FACTS:

1. In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O. 4, both declaring
a “state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations,
the Oakwood occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion.

2. WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes
necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call
out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;

“NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,

hereby confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of
rebellion.In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion
with due regard to constitutional rights.”

3. The Petitioner (Sanlakas) a party-list organization contends that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces and
there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period. They also assert the following:

a. that a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs,
petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and
welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. The
petitioner is committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the
citizens.
 b. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the
exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of
expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their
grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same.

ISSUES:

1. WON Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

2. WON the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

RULING:

Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has rendered the case moot.

1. The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether
the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress
is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article Vl.

2. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. Based on the foregoing, petitioner Sanlakas has no legal standing to sue.

33. Pimentel vs Ermita

GR No 164978. October 13, 2005

FACTS:

1. This is a petition for certiorari (Article Vlll,Section 5)and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
(Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul
M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of
their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the
duties of department secretaries.

2. The respondents took their oaths and assumed duties.

3. The Congress commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and Senators Aquilino Pimintel,
Edgardo Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile, Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim, Jamby
Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed petition for certiorari and prohibition against respondents. The
Senators contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292 the undersecretary shall be
designated as acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while Congress is in
session there can be no appointments without first obtaining consent from Commission on
Appointments. When Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to the same respondents.

ISSUES:

WON President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional

HELD:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the
respondents as ad interim immediately after the recess of the Congress, the petition has become moot.
However as an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

NOTES:

A. Mootness of the petition- Arroyo's appointment was "ad interim"

B. On the nature of the power to appoint- essentially executive

C. GMA's constitutionality of appointments

1. (16) Article Vll

2. EO 292 - president`s power of appointment

3. (16) (17) Chapter 5, title 1, book lV of 292

34. Joya v. PCGG

G.R. No.96541

FACTS:

1. The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon Aquino regarding
the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of 82 Old Masers Painting
housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique silverware in the custody of Central
Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the consignment was signed the following day.

2. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit submitted audit findings to the President – the assets
subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law.

3. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have
legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to
Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring suit.

WON the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this court to exercise its power of Judicial
Review.

RULING:

Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing means a personal and
substantial interest on the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the
members of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration
was toppled and the said objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true
owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said objects that have become
publicly owned.

35. Agan v. PIATCO

G.R No. 155001

FACTS:

Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the
following agreements executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1) the Concession Agreement signed on July
12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated November 26, 1999, (3) the First
Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated August 27, 1999, (4) the
Second Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated September 4, 2000,
and (5) the Third Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated June 22, 2001
(collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).

ISSUES:

WON the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.

RULING:

Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on
temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay “reasonable cost for the use of the
Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times
necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the public which
is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Police
power is the “most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its exercise therefore must not be
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of
damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business
contravenes the Constitution.

36. CHR Employee Association v. CHR

G.R. No. 155336

FACTS:

Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of
these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank
and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification
that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUES:

WON CHR's implementation of upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management valid?

RULING:

The petition is GRANTED.

1. The Decision of the CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital
Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.

a. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System

in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the
DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.

b. The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of
government offices, sans qualification.

c. The power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by

the CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend
the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the
government of the state.

2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation,
allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval
or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must
first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.
This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to
wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President
in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control
of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and
creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As
such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the
DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a
constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

a. Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the
species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the
CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant
right to fiscal autonomy.

b. Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of
similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

b.1 SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.

b.2 SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

b.3 SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an
Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary
authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress
may establish an independent economic and planning agency.

5. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, (1)(5) Article IX

It is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in
the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing,
act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied.

NOTES:

1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no
official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its
employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president has the authority to sue the
CHR.

On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one
who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the
Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the
injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commission’s savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance
of the CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office.
CHREA’s personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the merits of this
case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence
that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due
process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of “providing
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions,” the DBM, in the case under
review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading
scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY
1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by
the President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve
positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director
IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions.

This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified
compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency,
which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction
of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

37. Tanada vs Tuvera

136 SCRA 27

FACTS:

1. Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners
filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations and administrative orders.

2. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUES:

WON the publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

RULING:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: “there shall be published in the Official Gazette….” The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced
if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

NOTES:

Article lV (6) of the 1987 Constitution

38. Chavez v PEA and AMARI

G.R. No. 133250

authorized by it under a proper contract.

FACTS:

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore
and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of
Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312,
in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President
Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee
Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA
of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution
on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

ISSUES:

WON the petitioner has a legal standing to induce PEA to comply with its constitutional duties
with regards to its negotiation with AMARI?

WON the JVA between PEA and AMARI legal or void?

RULING:

Petition granted. As stated in Article II, Sec. 28 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by Law, the state adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.’; As well as in Article III, Sec. 7 of such
Constitution, “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” These twin negotiations cover even
official information on “on-going negotiations before a final contract” as defended by PEA.

Article XII, Sec. 2 and 3 states that ”All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated…” and “Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.”’respectively. The
provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether
foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a
proper contract.

39. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia

G.R. No. 115381

FACTS:

1. In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to
allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or below the LTFRB
official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the transport sector
which the government intends to implement and to make progress towards greater reliance on free
market forces.

2. Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires
publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus Operators
Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate increase, which was
granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to LTFRB suggesting a swift action on
adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order & to lay down deregulation policies.
Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.

3. Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c
was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily granted
by the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

WON the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above existing authorized fare
range is unconstitutional and invalid.

RULING:

The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas
delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable because a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru instrumentality of his
own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the
delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare
rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators who can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it
necessary.

40. John Hay PAC v. Lim

G. R. No. 119775

FACTS:

1. R.A. No. 7227 likewise created and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-
free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a
liberalized financial and business climate.

2. And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive
proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air
Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.

3. On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which established a SEZ on a
portion of Camp John Hay.

4. In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to
the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established
under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn
the US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment.
ISSUES:

WON Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within
and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ.

RULING:

No, based from the Article VI, Sec. 28 (4) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.”, It
was not stated in RA 7227 that there is a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base
areas. Said grant contravenes said stipulation above.

41. IBP v. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUES:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

NOTES:

In view of standing

Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi The
mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.

National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution
authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.

Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed.
Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for
the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
In view of abuse of discretion

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is
not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues
which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom.

In view of burden of proof on factual basis

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence
to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.

The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain
ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether it is the calling out of the
armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or
rebellion), the exercise of the President's powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof — not mere
assertion. 4 As has been pointed out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm."

Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on these
questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is not even the calling
out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement. We need to have evidence on
these questions because, under the Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed forces in
order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of
this power is required in the interest of public safety.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there
must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in
the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

In view of the Courts concurrence

We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the light of
present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless
elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of
deployment described in the LOI 2000. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in
conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor
can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They have two aspects: (1) those
matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which
have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government, with
discretionary power to act. 3 The exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive
branch of government was often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question
doctrine.

42. Executive Secretary v CA

429 SCRA 781

FACTS:

1. Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on 15 July
1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council Philippine CHaptr Inc (ARCO-Phil) filed petition
for declaratory relief.

2. The alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and
authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that
while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders
thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction.

3. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore,
repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of
Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. In their answer to the petition, they contend that ARCO-Phil
has no legal standing, it being a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest
as petitioner in the action. It is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent
are profit-oriented.

ISSUES:

WON ARCO-Phil has locus standi to assail RA 8042.

RULING:

An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members
are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers.
We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.

43. KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA

GR No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110

FACTS:

1. Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO was interested in
operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the
ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long engaged in lottery operations in Asia,
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad
(through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to
be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be
offered and delivered to PCSO.
2. Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease
Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated by the
Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report
was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President
announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the country's on-line lottery system and that the
corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final clearance and approval by the Chief
Executive.

3. On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. Petitioners also submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of
Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-
line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and
restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-
line lottery system, also known as "lotto."

ISSUES:

WON the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid

RULING:

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent
PCSO and respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the
locus standi of the petitioners which was raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor.
The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being
of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it
is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents
tried to take advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg.
42, is indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot exercise it "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of Lease
violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg.
42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.

44. US V. RICHARDSON

418 US 166

FACTS:

-Petitioner, the United States, sought certiorari review of an order from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which found respondent taxpayer demonstrated standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

-The Respondent taxpayer attempted to gather information from petitioner Government regarding
detailed expenditures of the CIA.

-Respondent sought a declaration that the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (CIAA), was not
constitutional because the CIAA violated the federal Constitution's requirement to report federal
spending.

-The trial court granted a dismissal motion on the ground that the respondent lacked standing and that
the issue was actually a political question.

-On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling.

-The appellate court held that the respondent met the two-tiered test for standing which required a
logical link between the respondent's status as a taxpayer & the statute, as well as a nexus between
respondent's status and a limitation on the taxing and spending power.

ISSUES:

Is taxpayer status sufficient to establish standing to bring suit in this case?

RULING:
-On the Government's petition for certiorari review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
holding, stating that the respondent had failed to allege a direct injury and that he failed to challenge
the taxing or spending power, thus, the respondent had no standing.

-The Respondent failed to show he suffered an injury that was different from the one that he suffered
by the public in general.

CONCLUSION: The Court reversed the lower appellate court's judgment.

45. ITF VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 159139

FACTS:

1. On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

2. On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for
the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election
System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting
and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.

3. On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which
allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of
Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

4. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".

5. On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process
had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a
re-bidding.

ISSUES:

WON the bidding process was unconstitutional;

 WON the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;

WON the petitioner has locus standi; and

WON the petition is premature.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution
No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also
declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions
(MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement
entered into with regard to this project.

1. Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately
checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the
proferred computer hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed
to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:

A. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding

B. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory
eligibility requirements

C. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the
issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on
April 21, 2003 31

2. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were
violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own
Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA

3. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the
bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology

4. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the
automated counting machines

5. After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument,
the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge
on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:

A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder

 B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical
tests

C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the
award, and their effect on the present controversy

In view of the bidding process

Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or
criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-
appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM
hardware but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the
following:

1. Evaluation of Technical Bids

2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures

3. Election Day Use."

In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to
the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That
software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one
that would be used on election day.

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the
Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being
considered as being in final form?

In view of awarding of contract

The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the
Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's
first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and
capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid
Envelope itself.

The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business
registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents
containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and
production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial documents, including audited financial
statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity.
 However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement,
memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported
consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for
determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the
arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract
and to protect the government's interest.

In view of standing

On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and
concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and
of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an
unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any
taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their
faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract
for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal
disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or
when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law."

In view of prematurity

The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the
prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the
Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol.
Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be disregarded, as follows:

"(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,

(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,

(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."

46. Jumamil Vs. Cafe

G.R. No. 144570. Sept. 21, 2005

FACTS:

Mayor Jose Café entered into contracts with individuals who advanced and deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer from their personal funds the sum of 40,000 pesos each for the construction of the
stalls at Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by a fire. Some of the said individuals were close
friends and relatives of the mayor while others are members of the Sangguniang Bayan (Panabo). After
the project’s completion, the stalls were rented out through a public raffle limited only to the individuals
the mayor contracted with. Citing his capacity as taxpayer, Vivencio Jumamil filed a petition for
Declaratory Relief with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Writ of Restraining Order before the RTC
against the mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE:

Whether Jumamil lacks legal standing to question the constitutionality of tax laws because he is not a
party of the subject contract.

RULING:

Jumamil does not lack legal standing because he filed the taxpayer’s suit citing his capacity as a taxpayer
and not in his personal capacity. Therefore, he does not need to be a party to the contract for him to
question the constitutionality of tax laws. However, he must still prove scientific interest in the
prevention of the illegal expenditure of money collected from taxation. Having failed to have submitted
such proof, he has no legal standing in the case.

47. Tolentino Vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

FACTS:

After Teofista Guingona, Jr. became Vice President, Resolution No. 84was passed by the senate on Feb.
8, 2001 which certified to the existence of a vacancy in the senate. The resolution called on COMELEC to
fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections. It also
provided that the candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes will serve only for the unexpired
term of Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Petitioners Tolentino and Mojica sought to prevent COMELEC from
proclaiming the winner with the 13th highest vote for the 3-year-term seat. They prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to maintain suit.

RULING:

The petitioners failed to present sustained personal injury suffered from the said governmental act. On
the other hand, the court relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to give due
course to voter’s suit involving the rights of suffrage.

48. Ople Vs. Torres

G.R. No. 127685. July 13, 1998

FACTS.

Senator Ople filed a petition to invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308, otherwise known as
“Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” which was issued by Pres. Fidel
Ramos for the reason of violating the Right to Privacy. There are two constitutional grounds for
invalidation:

(1) The order is a wrongful seizure of the power of the legislature.

(2) It violates the citizen’s Right to Privacy.

ISSUES.

(1) Whether or not Sen. Ople has standing to maintain suit.

(2) Whether or not Administrative Order violates Right to Privacy of the people.

RULING.

(1) Yes. As a Senator, the petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
of the said order’s usurpation of Legislative Power. The distinct demarcation line between the Legislative
Branch and the Executive Branch must not be blurred for this will result to a disturbance in their delicate
balance and cannot be allowed.

(2) Yes. The broadness and vagueness of Administrative Order No. 308 which, if implemented, will put
our people’s Right to Privacy in clear and obvious danger. The violation of our people’s right is
accentuated when we consider that as an individual lacks control over what can be read or verify the
correctness of the data encoded.

49. People Vs. Vera

G.R. No. L-45685. November 16, 1937

FACTS.

Mariano Cu Unjieng filed for a motion for reconsideration and four other motions for new trial but all
were denied. The defendant, Mariano Cu Unjieng, sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the
Supreme Court but was denied the petition for certiorari and SC remanded the appeal to the lower
court for a new trial. The petitioner then filed for an application for probation. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuazon presiding, referred the application for probation to the Insular
Probation Office which was also denied by the IPO. However, Judge Vera, upon another request by the
petitioner, allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The fiscal of the city of Manila filed an opposition,
the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things,, that Act. No. 4221, assuming that
it has not been repealed by Section 2 of article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless in violation of Sec.
1, Article III of the Constitution that guarantees equal protection of the laws.

ISSUES.

(1) Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of Legislative power.

(2) Whether or not Act No. 4221 denies Equal protection of the Laws.

RULING.

(1) Yes. Sec. 11 of Act no. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative power to
the provincial boards and for this reason, is determined as unconstitutional and void. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which violates the Constitution and the Doctrine of the Non-
delegation of Power.

(2) Yes. Act No. 4221 denies Equal Protection of the Laws because it violates Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees Equal protection of the Laws. Judge Vera specifically violated procedural
due process by granting the petitioner probation wherein fact there must be a denial of procedural due
process to an accused charged with an offense and convicted of another.

50. Estrada Vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

FACTS.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was prosecuted under Republic Act No. 7080 (an act defining and
penalizing the crime of plunder) because he assailed its constitutionality. The petitioner argued that the
said Republic Act abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes that are already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code and a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the cause of accusation against him.

ISSUES.

(1) Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is considered as malum prohibitum.

(2) Whether R.A. 7080 is unconstitutional.

RULING.

(1) No. Plunder, as held by the Supreme Court, is malum inse which requires proof of Criminal Intent.
The crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or wrong and are
committed willfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge.

(2) No. R.A. 7080 is constitutional. A law is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the
employment of general terms or the failure to define terms used therein. The petitioner cannot rely on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine since this does not apply to laws that consist of imprecise language.

51. Umali v Guingona

G.R. No. 131124. March 29, 1999

FACTS.

On October 27, 1993, Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the BIR by then
President Ramos. He was assigned in Manila, from Nov. 29, 1993 – Mar. 15, 1994, and in Makati, from
Mar. 16, 1994 – Aug. 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, the President received a confidential memorandum
against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his
incumbency as Regional Director. President Ramos authorized the issuance of an Order for the
preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint to the Presidential Commission
on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Umali was informed of the charges, and was
directed to provide answers to the inquiries, to which he did. After evaluating the evidence on record,
the PCAGC issued its Resolution of Sept. 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the
twelve (12) charges against petitioner. Upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, President Ramos
issued Admin. Order 152, dismissing Umali from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits.

Note: Prima Facie- A fact presumed to be true unless it is disproved.

-Apparent nature of something under initial investigation.

ISSUES.

Whether or Not:

(1) AO No. 152 violated petitioner's right to Security ofTenure.

(2) Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) PCAGC is a validly constituted govt. agency and petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality
belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

(4) The ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the
petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No.

RULING.

(1) Claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. Burden of proof was on Umali, but he failed
to produce sufficient evidence.

(2) Petitioner was not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show petitioner
filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violations of internal revenue laws and
regulations and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body.

(3) The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration
before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings

(4) Charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC
and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. The petition is dismissable. Taking into
consideration that the charges in the Ombudsman were dismissed, BIR and Commissioner’s office were
no longer interested in pursuing the case, and due to the position taken by the Sol. Gen, The Court
hereby GRANTS the petition. AO No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire
with full benefits.

52. Arceta Vs. Mangrobang

G.R. No. 152895. June 15, 2004

FACTS.

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22
in an Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an Information that on or about 16 September
1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R.
Castro payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to
pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof
within 5 banking days after receiving notice. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her
dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Arceta was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should
be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend
proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the
Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).

ISSUE.

Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present economic and financial
crisis.

RULING.

The Court examined the contentions of Arceta carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22 by
itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. As stressed in Lozano, it is
precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and
confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency
substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further,
while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now,
that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

53. Mirasol Vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128448. February 1, 2001

FACTS.

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Private respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB)
financed the Mirasols sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop
loan financing scheme. President Marcos then issued a Presidential decree No. 579. The decree
authorized private respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for
export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The decree further authorized PNB to finance
PHILEXs purchases and directed that whatever profit PHILEX acquired from sales of sugar abroad was to
be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and
liabilities had been deducted. Petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of
their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable
accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. The Mirasols filed
a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

ISSUES.

(1) Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial
Court.

(2) Whether Presidential Decree no. 579 is unconstitutional.

(3) Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in not applying the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil between respondents PNB and PHILEX.

RULING.

(1) Yes. Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order.

(2) The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners
agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota
of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.

(3) PNB and PHILEX are separate juridical persons and there is no reason to pierce the veil of corporate
personality. Both existed by virtue of separate organic acts. They had separate operations and different
purposes and powers.

55. Salonga Vs. Cruz-Pano

G.R. No. L-59524. Feb. 18, 1985

FACTS.

Jovito Salonga was implicated by Victor Burns lovely, Jr. (a victim of a bombing in manila in 1980) as one
of those responsible for the mishap. Lovely dragged his name in his testimony as a leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons; (1) because his residence was used as a contact point and (2) because of
his remarks during a party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. The petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and
prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him.

ISSUE.

Whether or not Salonga’s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech.

RULING.

Yes. The petitioner’s opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression.
Protection is mandated in political discussions. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. Lovely also
declared that the bombing was directed against a particular family which negates any politically
motivated or subversive assignment.

56. Javier Vs. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

FACTS.

The petitioner and the private respondent were both candidates for Batasang Pambansa elections in
Antique. The petitioner appeared to have more popular support but the respondent had the advantage
of being the nominee in Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. The bitterness between the two of them reached its
peak when several followers of Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the men of the
respondent, Pacificador. The private respondent was then confirmed as the winner by the second
division of COMELEC. Petitioner Javier went to the Supreme Court to argue that the proclamation was
void because it was not made by the COMELEC en banc as required by the Constitution. During the
pendency of the case, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.

ISSUE.

Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

RULING.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Solicitor-General’s Tenor. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. There cannot be equal justice wherein a suitor goes to court
already in favor of another party. Due process is intended for equal justice. Where it not for Javier’s
death, the petition would have been granted and the decision of COMELEC set aside as violative of the
constitution.

57. Ynot Vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. L-74457. March 20, 1987

FACTS.

President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which declares that no carabao or carabeef be
transported from one province to another. Anyone who violates the said Order shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos. The
petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been
transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of Executive order No. 626-A. The petitioner issued a writ
for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of the Executive Order.

ISSUE.

Whether or not Police Power is properly enforced.

RULING:

No. The Police Power is defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of public welfare. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.

58. Serrano de Agbayani Vs. PNB

G.R. No. L-23127. April 29, 1971

FACTS.

Petitioner obtained the loan in the amount of 450 pesos from defendant bank. The loan came with a
Real Estate Mortgage which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years late, PNB sought to foreclose the
mortgage. The petitioner filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. He also claims
that he received an injunction from the sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the
period from the time of issuance of Executive order 32 to the time when Republic Act 342 was issued
should be deducted. PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since
during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet
prescribed.

ISSUES.

Whether the action prescribed or not.

RULING.

The action did NOT prescribed. However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative
act must have been in force and had to be complied with. The past cannot always be erased by judicial
declaration. The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. During the eight-year-period that E.O. 32 and R.A. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.

59. Salazar Vs. Achacoso

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

FACTS.

POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of petitioner Salazar’s recruitment agency, having
verified that she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He further ordered the seizure of the
documents and paraphernalias,being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting illegal
recruitment. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.

ISSUES.
May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38
of the Labor Code?

RULING.

No. The provisions of PD 1920and EO 1022, now embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying
vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is
only judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in cases of
deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration
may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

60. Court of Internal Revenue Vs. Campos Rueda

G.R. No. L-13250. October 29, 1971

FACTS.

Campos Rueda died in Tangier, Morocco, an international zone in North Africa. The CIR assessed her
estate for deficiency taxes. Rueda’s defense was a tax treaty between Tangiers and the Philippines. The
Supreme Court held that Tangier was a state, defining such as “a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a
nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.”

ISSUES.

Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the
acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the
exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code1 is now ripe for adjudication.

RULING.

In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In
fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which,
although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or
death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a
similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been
recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso
of Section 122 of our Tax Code." The Collector — hereafter named the respondent — cites decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the
Philippines belonging to a nonresident foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the
estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly
taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene
would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make
an exemption where conditions are such that demand reciprocity — as in this case. And the exemption
must be honored.

61. Reagan v. CIR

30 SCRA 968

Facts:

• William C. Raegan, petitioner, a citizen of the US, employee of an American corporation

providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force assigned at Clark Air Base.

• Petitioner imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car;

• Petitioner requested the Base Commander for a permit to sell the car which was granted
provided that the sale will be made to a member of the USAF or a citizen of the U.S. employed in the
U.S. Military Base;

• The car was sold as evidenced by a Deed of Sale;

• Petitioner was made to pay an income tax realized thru the sale and paid the said tax but after
so, he questioned the payment of the said tax as the transaction took place at the Clark Air Base and
hence he contended that the base is outside Philippine territory therefore it is beyond the jurisdictional
power to tax.

Issue:

Is the sale considered to be done in a foreign soil hence not subject to Philippine Income Tax?
Ruling:

No, a state can allow another power to participate in the exercise of its jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory but even so, such areas retain their status as native soil and thus they are still
subject to its power. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not disappear.

62. The People of the Philippines v. Loreta Gozo

53 SCRA 476

Facts:

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. The house was demolished and Gozo built another one on its
place without securing a building permit as she was told that by one Ernesto Valle and neighbors, that it
was no longer necessary. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City
Engineer’s office together with patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force
apprehended four carpenters working on the said house and were brought to the police headquarters.
After due investigation, Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance no. 14, Series of 1964
with the City Fiscal’s Office. She was sentenced to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the
costs. She then appealed to the court of the first Instance of Zambaoles and again found her guilty but
merely sentenced her to a fine of P200 and to demolish the house. She elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals and questioned the validity of such ordinance on constitutional grounds and the applicability of
the said ordinance in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional

Whether or not such an ordinance is applicable to appellant in view of the location of her dwelling
within the naval base

Ruling:

The Philippine Gov’t has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases hence retains not only
jurisdictional rights over the said base. Such ordinance is still applicable to applicant as Municipal
Corporation retains administrative jurisdiction.
63. People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

G. R. no. 145951

Facts:

Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged
with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
25741. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted for their personal
use the amount of P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). On 12 November 1999, Ramiscal filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-
RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent
Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on 6 January 2000. Ramiscal, et.
al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on 12 May 2000, the Sandiganbayan
sustained Ramiscal, et. al.'s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 25741. Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation and,

corollarily, whether its funds are public or private.

Ruling:

The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the
GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in
the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military
personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-
RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. For this purpose, the law provides that the
contribution by military officers and enlisted personnel to the System shall be compulsory. Its enabling
law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by
him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of
the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed
money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from appropriations. While it
may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the
Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to
the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-
RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its
funds are in the nature of public funds.

64. MIAA v. Court of Appeals

G. R. No. 155650

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of
Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands
and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew
the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity
of the Local Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:
Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax, levy against and auction for public sale the
Airport Lands and Buildings.

Ruling:

MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No
one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
“roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The
term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State.

Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic
travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The
charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for
public use.”

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential
public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and
auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the
600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

65. ACCFA v. CUGCO

30 SCRA 649

Facts

1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was reorganized and its name
changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While
ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), are labor
organizations (the Unions) composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed
to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5
days later, the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations
and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair
labor practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of
the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the
matter of promotions and refusal to bargain.

3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed
which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining
rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA
under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial
court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.

Issue:

Whether or not court has jurisdiction of the case which depends on whether ACCFA exercised
governmental or proprietary function

Ruling:

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment
and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental
objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the
State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans
and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil
Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt
as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
"because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.

The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA
3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function
NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions
as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern
society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete.
Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed
within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of economic forces.

66. Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.

170 SCRA 256

Facts

Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter on June 4, 1986 to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte Jr., GSIS
General Manager wherein he requested the list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang
Pambansa who secured a clear loan of 2M each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. Also, to be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan or if not, access to the
said documents by citing Art. IV Sec. 6 of the 1973 Constitution:

“The right of the people to information on public concern shall be recognized…”

Belmonte replied on June 17 through the Deputy General Consul of the GSIS asserting that a confidential
relationship exists between GSIS and its borrowers and would be improper to breach this confidentiality
as it would mar the image of GSIS unless so ordered by court.

On June 20, apparently not yet having received the reply of GSIS, Valmonte wrote another letter saying
that they would now necessary action to attain their objective which is to have access to the said
documents in pursuance of public interest.

6 days after, petitioners filed the instant suit.

Respondent asserted that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are private in nature and
hence are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were entitled to the documents sought by virtue of their constitutional
right to information

Whether such loan transactions are indeed private in nature and thus not subject to Constitutional right
to information

Ruling:

The request was within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in governmental dealing.

GSIS is GOCC whether performing proprietary (granting of loans) or governmental functions are
accountable to the people. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held
by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest.

67. Government v. Monte de Peidad

35 Phil. 728

Facts:

In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in
turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank
argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent
bank.

Ruling:

Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in
accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the
people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No
other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has
the right to take back the money intended for the people.

68. Cabanas v. Pilapil

58 SCRA 94

Facts:

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits
shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when
Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of
the child.

On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of
the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding
only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

Issue:

Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance
policy.

Ruling:

Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be
affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best
interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards
the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s
tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

69. Gonzales vs. Marcos65 SCRA 624

GR.NO. L-31685 July 31, 1975

FACTS:

President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30, which is a trust that provides for theconstruction of a
national theater, a national music hall and an arts building and facilities thatwould be collectively known
as the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The project aimed to promote, preserve, enhance, and develop
the Philippines' cultural heritage. Creation of CCP aimed to promote constitutional policy encouraging
arts and letters (Section 4, article XIV of the Philippine Constitution). First Lady ImeldaMarcos headed
the Board of Trustees entrusted in building the project and they were also therespondents in this
petition for certiorari alleging the encroachment of EO 30 on the legislativepowers of the executive
branch and the question of whether the funds would come fromtaxpayers' money.

ISSUE:

Whether the creation of Executive Order No. 30 is unconstitutional as it allegedly encroached on the
legislative power

RULING:

No, the creation of EO no. 30 is constitutional as it represented the legitimate exercise of executive
power, there being no invasion of the legislative domain. It would thus appear that for the President to
refrain from taking positive steps and await the action of the Congress could be tantamount to
abandonment of duty. What is more appropriate agency for assuring that they be not wasted or
frittered away than the Executive, the department precisely entrusted with the management functions?
Also, factor of which is the fact that the funds involved were from donations and contributions and not
from taxation.

70. Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh

75 Phil 113, 371

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings
and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such
authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation
were no de facto government.

Issues:

Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.

Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.

Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial
acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by
Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and
govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in
his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government
are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts
— in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which
regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto
government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”

General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944,
but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and
liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p.
516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a
law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings:

The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being
de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice
of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only
judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive
Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws)
are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a
theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-
point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.”
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and
the government established by the occupant of transient character.

71. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS.
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing
the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

RULING:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the
Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government.

72. Macariola vs Asuncion

114 SCRA 77 May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 2012 for lack of an appeal. A project of
partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the parties thereto was petitioner
Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was adjudicated t the
plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E.

The fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to
respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc,
owned and managed by Judge Asuncion.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion charging him with
"Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, pars.1 and 5 of the Code
of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of RA No. 3019, Section 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. A certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints.
Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned provisions.

RULING:

The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act Unbecoming of a
Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time.
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is
the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. Respondent judge purchased the said lot
after the decision rendered was already final because no party filed for an appeal within the
reglementary period which makes the lot in question no longer the subject to litigation. Furthermore,
Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather from a Dr. Arcadio
Galapon.

Petition is hereby DENIED.

73. Harvey v. Commissioner

162 SCRA 840

Focus Topics: Acts of the State; Sovereignty; Elements; State

FACTS

American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, and Adriaan Van
Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen, are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences.

The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard
Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission
Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being
live-in for some time now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after
three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three petitioners have
chosen to face deportation.

Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46
of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.Tthe Board of Special Inquiry
III commenced trial against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID denied.

Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to a self-deportation”
and praying that he be “provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty.
Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country.” However, it appears that on the same date that the
aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present
petition.

Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the
Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ
was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.

ISSUES

Whether or not the Philippine Immigration Act clothed the Commissioner with any authority to arrest
and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.

RULING

AFFIRMATIVE. [The Court] reject petitioners’ contentions and uphold respondent’s official acts ably
defended by the Solicitor General. The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby
denied.

There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the
Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of the
constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon
probable cause.

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance
for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable
cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant. [The fact that] petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal.

The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The
requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings.”

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge
be substantiated by competent evidence.

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was in
order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation proceedings
do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be
invoked by aliens in said proceedings.

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as
it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good
and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly
committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV,
Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.

74. Republic v. Feliciano

148 SCRA 840

FACTS:

President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving lands for settlement purposes which
happen to include respondent’s land. Respondent filed a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines for recovery of ownership of a parcel of land consisting of four lots.

The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the Philippines to
dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be
sued without its consent.

Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No.
1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the
public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision
of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20
years under claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they
did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented
additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of
Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow them to
present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution
with the Appellate Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether or not the doctrine of nonsuability of the State applies in this case.

2. Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

RULING:

1. YES. The Court finds petition meritorious. The doctrine of nonsuability of the State has proper
application in this case. By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against
the State which under settle jurisprudence is not permitted except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the statutory construction too plain to
be misinterpreted.

2. No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to
be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action
in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds
only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency
created by Republic Act No. 3844.

The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.

Discussions:

A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language
too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be
construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body.

75. Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco

G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief
Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of
private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-
owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the
MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and
frequency assignments for the Philippine satellite.

The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union
two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites.
PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government
confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its
satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s
assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.”

PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded
with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment
of loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for
Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and
sabotage the business of PASI.”

Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by
then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for
injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.

The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged “crusade”
to malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.
Issue:

Is the suit one against the state?

Ruling:

The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer
of the government by a private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although the latter has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer
is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.

As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction
against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of
nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for
damages against Lichauco herself.

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the
government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint
must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between
where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity
and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is
the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.

As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not
apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in
constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability
against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes
of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of
action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the
DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit
only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be
noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.”

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for
the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.

76. Sayson vs Singson

G.R. No. L-30044 December 19, 1973

FACTS:

1. On January 1967, District Engineer Adventor Fernandez and Requisitioning Officer Manuel S.
Lepatan signed a requisition order of various spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer.

2. It was then approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza

3. On May 5, 1967, a canvass or public bidding was conducted and the committee on award
accepted the bid of Singkier Motor (owned by respondent Felipe Singson) for the sum of P43,530.00
which subsequently was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

4. On May 16, 1967, Secretary of PWC sent a letter order to Singkier Motors Services, Mandaue
Cebu, requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed for the lot price of P43,530.00

5. A voucher with control No. 07806 reached the Highway Auditor Lorenzo Sayson for pre-audit he
then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. After finding the indorsement of the District
Engr. And Commissioner of the PWC that the price is reasonable and with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, also verified by V.M. Secarro, a representative of the Bureau of
Supply Coordination Manila, Sayson approved the payment in the sum of P34, 824.00 with a retention
of 20% or P8, 706.00 for the reason that he was to submit the voucher with supporting documents to
the Supervising Auditor, which he did.

6. The voucher was then paid on June 10, 1967, after which Sayson received a telegram from the
Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting “IN VIEW OF EXCESSIVE PRICE CHARGE FOR PURCHASE OF SPARE
PARTS AND EQUIPMENTS SHOWN BY VOUCHERRS ALREADY SUBMITTED THIS OFFICE DIRECT ALL
HIGHWAY AUDITOR REFER GENERAL OFFICE PAYMENTS SIMILAR NATURE FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.”

7. GENERAL AUDITING OFFICE, also made a canvass of the spare parts among other suppliers in
Manila. USI Phil and exclusive dealer of the spare parts of Caterpillar Tractors in the Phil. quoted the
spare parts at only P2592.00 which was P40, 000.00 less than the price of Singkier.

8. On July 18, 1967, GAO took up the matter with Secretary of PWC during the third indorsement,
the Secretary then circulated a telegram holding the District Engr. responsible for the for the
overpricing, furthermore charges for malversation were filed against the District Engr. and requisitioning
officer involved and it was the failure of Sayson that led to the filing of the mandamus suit by the
respondent Singson to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld.
Hence this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mandamus suit of the respondent Singson involving money claims against the
government on a contract valid.

RULING:

No, because the mandamus suit filed by Singson is a suit disguised to compel the auditors to approve
the voucher for payment, the cause is contrary to law, morals or public policy, therefore the mandamus
is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim. It is a suit against the state which will not
prosper because it does not have the consent of the state.

77. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PURISIMA

G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977

FACTS:
1. A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration
in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an
alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

2. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service
where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against
any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be
shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.

3. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

Is the decision of the Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima valid?

RULING:

NO, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of
the present Constitution in Article XVI Section 3. “The State may not be sued without its consent” They
could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having
the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication and not
against the State itself adding more they also do not have the consent of the state. The consent, to be
effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice
Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government.

78. MERITT vs GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

FACTS:

1. Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, collided with an
ambulance of the General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded
any whistle or horn.

2. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a
contractor was affected. The inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the
damages resulting therefrom even if the collision was due to the negligence committed by an agent or
employee of the government which is the chauffeur.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Government may be held liable in this case.

RULING:

No. That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904,in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the
said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903of the Civil Code. (Supreme
Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government
of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent of the government. Thus the issue of state immunity refers only to those
identities related to the government.

79. PNB vs CIR

G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978

FACTS:

1. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers
Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds:

2. That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the
writ of execution was contrary to law and
3. That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the
motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide
by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

4. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the
lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of
Garnishment’ dated May 6, 1970.”

5. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a
grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies:

“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial personality. If
the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.”

From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we
think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its
associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.

As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a government
owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation. Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging
in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.
80. SSS vs CA

G.R. No. L-41299 February 21, 1983

FACTS:

Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS with residential lot
located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments. When
delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure of their real estate
mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment,
Pursuant for these application for foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel
for spouses Cruz sent a letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment
of the monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheeded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS
before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the government performing
government function. The trial court and court of appeal nevertheless awarded damages in favor of
spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.

RULING:

NO. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. The SSS does not enjoy
immunity from suit by express statutory consent. It has corporate power separate and distinct from the
government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These words
“sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the
SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of
the explicit provision of the afore-cited enabling law, the government must be deemed to have waived
immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has
given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby
has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.

81. RAYO vs CFI

G.R. No. L-55273-83 December 19, 1981

FACTS:

1. At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the
three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of
said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the
respondent corporation.

2. Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents for dismissal of the case and contended that
the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic
act, it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the
power to be sued for tort.

RULING:

The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be
sued in any court under its charter.

As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.
The petition of the petitioners was granted.

Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their own, separate and distinct
from the government. Therefore, although they are considered to be public in character, they are not
exempt from garnishment.

82. FAROLAN vs CTA

G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993

FACTS:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying
among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging Buhay Trading (Baging Buhay). The import
was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem.
Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of
Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment
consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Upon re-examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as
previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government.
Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the
Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several
motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards
released, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus,
respondents demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it
actually lost.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the P43,050 yards actually lost by the
private respondent?

RULING:

Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with
regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay
for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious
that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political
doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys
immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function
of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for
damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

83. RP vs SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 85284 February 28, 1990

FACTS:
ISSUE:

RULING:

84. FROILAN vs PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO

G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

FACTS:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,
alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down
and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase
price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of
said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and
delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of
the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract
with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be
issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he
be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed
for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said
vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason
that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10, 000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of
the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of
said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.
RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a
complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to
the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the state.

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the
mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so, it
becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

85. LIM vs BROWNELL

G.R. No. L-858 March 24, 1960

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

86. MALONG vs PNR

G.R. No. L-49930 August 7, 1985

FACTS:

The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime
Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City
and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All
Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages total to P136,
370.The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a
government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. The petitioners appealed to SC
pursuant to RA No. 5440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine National Railways is immune from suit

RULING:

NO. Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila
Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the
operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. However, as held in
precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate,
are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives “for which
the entity was organized.” The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a
particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac
vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing
private corporations.”

The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways.

It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue
the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons
engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.

The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an instrumentality of the
government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration. He mentioned the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an example of government instrumentality that is not immune from suit for it also
performs proprietary functions. He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the part of the
government corporations to deny justice that is due to the people they are to serve.

87. FONTANILLA vs MALIAMAN

G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

FACTS:
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable
for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia
Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was
ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for
hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains,
however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its
driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on
January 26, 1990.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused
by its driver, who was not its special agent

RULING:

Yes. Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as
compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government.
While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal
and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited
by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the
agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its own assets and
liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors and to transact such
business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. The court concluded that the National Irrigation
Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who
was not its special agent.

88. SANTIAGO vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-48214 December 19, 1978

FACTS:

1. On August 9, 1976, Petitioner Santiago filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City against the government of the Republic of the Philippines for the revocation of a deed
of donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971.

2. The reason for this is that the Bureau failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the
property donated and to build an office building and parking thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974 which is in the terms of the
donation.

3. That led him to conclude that under the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance with
such an explicit constitutional command.

4. The lower court sustained a motion to dismiss on the part of the defendant RP because the New
Constitution of the Philippines expressly provides that the state may not be sued without its consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government/state has not waived its immunity from the suit.

RULING:

Yes, the failure of the Government to comply with the conditions of the donation, waived its immunity.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. The petitioner has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the
fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the
demands of the procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. Wherefore
the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of dismissal of Oct. 20, 1977 i9s nullified.
89. AMIGABLE vs CUENCA

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS:

1. Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation
proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of
the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the
government.

2. Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees.

3. The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government
did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government.

RULING:

Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price
or value at the time of the taking.

90. TORIO vs FONTANILLA

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

FACTS:

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for
management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment
and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was
being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of
the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The
defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its
Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The
defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and
as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore,
they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the
municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed
the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.

ISSUE:

Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

RULING:

Yes. Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with
law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with. The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or
political on the one hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are
those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on the other hand,
are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community. These include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate. This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of
the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in
the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no recovery can be had from the
municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they
performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable
to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.

91. Holy See vs Hon. Rosario Jr

Dec 17, 1994

● FACTS
o Holy See owned Lot 5-A contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under Philippine Realty
Corporation.
o Agent Cirilios sold 5-A, 5-B, and 5-D with earnest money of P100, 000 to Licup who
assigned rights to Starbright Sales Enterprises.
o Squatters’ responsibility dispute.
o Holy See said that SSE should remove squatters themselves or earnest money will
be returned.
o Earnest was returned then Cirilios sold same land to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation.
o SSE filed complaint against said sale.
● ISSUES
o WON Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
● HELD
o YES.
o Holy See argued they are immune due to Art II Sec 2 (generally accepted principles
of international law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws
of the land) based on 1963 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (diplomatic
envoy shall be immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
state over any real action relating to private immovable property) which the Court
agreed upon.
o The act of sale was not for business purposes but merely due to the petitioner not
being able to evict the squatters themselves.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”
o 1963 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
▪ “Diplomatic envoy shall be immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction
of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property.”

92. USA vs Ruiz

136 SCRA 487

● FACTS
o USA naval base in Subic, Zambales provided under Military Bases Agreement.
o USA invited bids for some projects.
o Elizio de Guzman & Co. Inc. submitted bids.
o USA declined bids due to previous unsatisfactory performance rating of said
company on previous contracts given to them and that the award for the projects
was given to third parties.
o The company filed a complaint to order the defendant to allow them to perform the
projects and if performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages.
● ISSUES
o WON the US naval base can invoke the state immunity.
● HELD
o YES
o Traditional rule of state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver.
o The US did not give its consent to be sued due to the contract not being for private,
commercial, or proprietary acts or jure gestionis but being for sovereign and
governmental acts or jure imperii. State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii.
o The contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions in which the projects
are integral part of the naval base that is devoted to the defense of both the US and
the PH, indisputably a function of the government.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art XVI Sec 3
▪ “The State may not be sued without its consent.”

93. USA vs Guinto

GR No 76609 Feb 26, 1990

● FACTS
o Cases consolidated due to them all involving the doctrine of state immunity.
▪ USA vs Guinto (GR no 76607)
● Contract for barber services bid won by Dizon who, as claimed by
respondents, included in his bid area no included in the invitation.
● Rebidding requested also.
▪ USA vs Rodrigo (GR no 79470)
 ● Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as a cook
from USAF Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station.
● It was ascertained after investigation that Genove poured urine into
the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to club
members.
● Club manager suspended him then referred the case to arbitrators
which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal.
▪ USA vs Ceballos (GR no 80018)
● Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, was arrested following
a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners (USAF)
● An information was filed against Bautista; petitioners testified
against him which got Bautista dismissed.
● Bautista filed for damages against petitioners claiming it was
because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.
▪ USA vs Vergara (GR no 80258)
● Complaint for damages, filed by private respondents against
petitioners (US military officers) for injuries sustained from beating,
handcuffing, and unleashing dogs at respondents.
● Petitioner denies this and claimed that respondent was resisting
arrest for theft which incurred them their injuries.
● ISSUES
o WON the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts
done by them in performance of their official duties.
● HELD
o Guinto
▪ NO
▪ Petition dismissed. Evidence regarding the alleged irregularity in the grant
of the barbershop concessions was not available and the case was
remanded to the court below for further proceedings. Grant was also with
commercial enterprises operated by private persons (barbershops).
o Rodrigo
▪ YES
▪ Petition granted. Restaurant services were commercial and the employment
contract with Genove implied that US gave up its sovereign immunity from
suit. But complaint dismissed due to the termination of Genove being
proper because of the “unbelievably nauseating act” he did.
o Ceballos
▪ YES
▪ Petition granted. The buy bust operation was within their exercise of official
function which petitioner also testified against the complainant which also
then makes them immune from suability.
 o Vergara
▪ NO
▪ Petition dismissed. Though claims were conflicting, there was still a claim
that petitioner actually exceeded their authority thereby raising the need
for inquiry by the lower courts so it may assess and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art XVI Sec 3
▪ “The State may not be sued without its consent.”
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”

94. Minucher vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 142396 Feb 11, 2003

● FACTS
o Scalzo, a US DEA agent, aided PH police narcotics agents in capturing Minucher who
was caught with heroin.
o Scalzo also became the principal witness against Minucher but the latter was
acquitted.
o Minucher filed civil case for damages which he claims Scalzo only made false
accusations against him.
● ISSUES
o WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. Yes.
● HELD
o Depending on if it is proven that Scalzo did not trump up the drug trafficking charges
against Minucher but with him working within the confines of Diplomatic Relations
then he is free to enjoy diplomatic immunity.
o Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function of
duties.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”
o 1963 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
▪ “Diplomatic envoy shall be immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction
of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property.”
95. Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon

GR No. 154705, June 26, 2003

● FACTS
o Counsellor Partinah entered into Maintenance Agreement with Vinzon Trade and
Services who is to maintain equipment (AC, etc) and was to take effect in a period of
four years.
o When Minister Counsellor Kasim came into position, he allegedly found R’s work
and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the
agreement with which he terminated the agreement.
o R claims that termination was arbitrary and unlawful which P invokes immunity.
● ISSUES
o WON Republic of Indonesia can invoke doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
● HELD
o YES
o Par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.
o Jure imperii (public acts, for sovereign activity, not for gain or profit) and jure
gestionis (private acts, for business purposes, for gain or profit).
o Rep of Indo did not waive its immunity because the contract with private entity was
only to maintain the premises, furnishing, and equipment of the embassy.
o Rep of Indo acted in pursuit of sovereign activity in the PH.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”
o 1963 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
▪ “Diplomatic envoy shall be immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction
of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property.”

96. World Health Organization vs Aquino

GR No. L-35131 Nov 29, 2003

● FACTS
o Dr. Verstuyft from WHO was assigned to regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services and came to PH with personal effects
contained in 12 crates, allowed free entry from duties and taxes.
 o Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COsAC) suspected crates to contain highly
dutiable goods which Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for search and
seizure.
o Sec of Foreign Affairs Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Verstuyft is immune
due to the diplomatic mission he pursues in PH.
o Both Solicitor General and WHO joined Vertuyft in asserting diplomatic
immunity.
● ISSUES
o WON personal effects of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure
under the diplomatic immunity.
● HELD
o YES
o The executive branch, likewise the Solicitor General, expressly recognized his
immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement between WHO and
PH, Sec 15 (a): “…immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure
of their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or written and all acts
done by them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every
kind.”
o The Court held that the responded judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant
issued by him in disregard of diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”
o Host Agreement between WHO and PH, Sec 15(a)
▪ “…immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their
personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or written and all acts
done by them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of
every kind.”

97. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs vs Nat’l Labor Relations Commission

GR No. 113191, Sep 18, 1997

● FACTS
o Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB, asking to be reinstated and paid
full back wages among other things.
o ADB and DFA notified Labor Arbiter of ADB, president, and officers were covered by
an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties, or sale of
securities.
 o Art 50(1) and Art 55 of Agreement Establishing the ADB (the Charter) in relation to
Sec 5 and Sec 44 of Agreement between the Bank and the Gov’t of the PH regarding
the Bank’s HQ (the HQ Agreement).
o Labor Arbiter, on the impression the ADB waived its diplomatic immunity, rendered
decision in favor of Magnayi.
o ADB did not appeal but DFA referred matter to National Labor Relations
Commission which DFA sought a “formal vacation of the void judgment.”
o DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from NLRC then filed a petition for
certiorari (review of decision of a lower court by the higher court).
● ISSUES
o WON ADB is immune from suit.
● HELD
o YES
o ADB immune according to the Charter and the HQ Agreement.
o Also, ADB is independent from municipal law (lower court); because lower court
decisions “…may interfere with their operations or even influence or control its
policies and decision of the organization.”
o “Mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such act can only be the start of the inquiry.”
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”
o Charter and HQ Agreement between PH and ADB
▪ “…may interfere with their operations or even influence or control its
policies and decision of the organization.”
▪ “Mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be the ultimate test. Such act can only be the start of the inquiry.”

98. Animos vs PH Veterans Affairs Office

174 SCRA 214, 1989

● FACTS
o Isidro Animos, WWII veteran, member of USAF of the Far East then the guerilla
forces, with his family, filed a suit for mandamus (superior court to inferior gov’t
official to properly fulfill their official duties or correct an abuse of discretion)
against PH Veterans Affairs Office for full payment of full pension benefits.
o P’s claim denied on the basis that Animos’ disability was only considered partial
rather than total according to Rules of Disability Ratings by PVAO.
o P submits that rating system be null and void.
 ● ISSUES
o WON the complaint against PVAO can be considered a suit against the State.
● HELD
o As the suit is aimed at a public official of PVAO, immunity cannot be invoked.
o When officers and agents of the gov’t are sued in their individual capacity, the cloak
of protection of the gov’t is removed.
o “A public official may be considered liable in his personal private capacity for the
damages caused by his acts done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope
of authority and jurisdiction.”
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art XVI Sec 3.
▪ “The State may not be sued without its consent.”

99. USA vs Reyes

GR No. 79233, Mar 1, 1993

● FACTS
o Nelia Montoya, American ID checker of US Navy Exchange at the Joint US Military
Assistance Group HQ.
o Braford, activity exchange manager, managed a retail store in the HQ.
o After shopping from the store, Montoya’s bought goods, her person, and her car
were searched by Mrs. Yong Kennedy in front of Bradford and several onlookers.
Montoya protested against the search to Bradford to which she said that it was to
be made to all JUSMAG employees that day.
o Montoya found out that only she was searched that day and was informed by NEX
Security Manager Roynon that employees will only be checked if there is strong
evidence of wrong-doing.
o Montoya is also aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or
shoplifting.
o After filing a protest with no action from manager, Montoya decided to file a suit
against Bradford due to oppressive and discriminatory acts committed to P for
undue embarrassment and indignity.
o Bradford invoked immunity then tried to leave the country and dispose her
properties to which was stopped by the Regional Trial Court thanks to Montoya.
● ISSUES
o WON the case was a suit against the State.
● HELD
o NO
o Because Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing
governmental functions from which resulted to be injurious to the rights of P, she
 was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope and place
of her official function.
o She is also not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art 16(b) of 1953
Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. And even if she was, she still
performed acts outside of her official function.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art XVI Sec 3
▪ “The State may not be sued without its consent.”
o Art II Sec 2
▪ “Generally accepted principles of international law are adopted by our
Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land.”
o Art 16(b) of 1953 Military Assistance Agreement
▪ “The Chief of the Military Advisory Group and not to exceed 6 other senior
members of the group to be designated by him will be accorded diplomatic
immunity.”

100. Lansang vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 102667, Feb 23, 2000

● FACTS
o General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) was allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in Rizal Park by the Nat’l Parks Dev’t Committee (NPDC). The verbal contract
was unclear due to it not having any document or instrument involved.
o The new Chairman of NPDC, Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated
the agreement with Gabi and demanded they vacate.
o The notice was signed by the president of GABI, Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to which later on claimed that he was deceived into signing it.
o On the day of eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC
but was dismissed because the complaint was actually against the State.
o The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ruled that a government official
being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability
for acts done without or in excess of his authority.
● ISSUES
o WON the complaint against Lansang was a suit against the state.
● HELD
o The suit was not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity.
o It is evident in the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal
motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from the Rizal Park.
o There was no evidence of Lansang abusing his authority.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
 o Art XVI Sec 3
▪ “The State may not be sued without its consent.”

101. Shauf vs Court of Appeals

191 SCRA 713, 1990

● FACTS
o Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin married to an American USAF member, was rejected
for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base,
for which she is eminently qualified.
o By reason of her non selection, Shauf filed a complaint for damages and an equal
employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, civilian personnel
officer Detwiler and Education Director Persi, for alleged discrimination by reason of
her nationality and sex.
o Shauf offered a temp position as temp Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day
period until a vacation occurs that she will be absorbed but if not, she will be
released but witll still be selected for future vacancy if she is available.
o Shauf accepted and later on Mrs. Abalateo, another employee, was nearing her
contract’s end but her appointment was extended that ultimately hindered the
absorption of Shauf to which Shauf claimed that Abalateo’s stay was extended
indefinitely to deny her appointment as retaliation for her previous complaint to
which Persi denied and said that it was a joint decision of the management.
o Shauf again filed for damages, again.
o RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering the defendant to pay.
o Both parties then appealed to the Court of Appeals with Shauf praying for increase
in the damages to be collected and the defendant continuing to invoke immunity.
o CA claimed that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case
should be dismissed and then reversed RTC decision. CA: defendants are immune.
o Shauf claims respondent were being sued for their private capacity but respondent
still maintain their immunity hence this petition for review on certiorari.
● ISSUES
o WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the USAF.
● HELD
o NO
o Doctrine of immunity cannot be invoked if the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and
agents of the gov’t is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity.
 ▪ Public officials may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damages they may have caused by their act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
o There is ample evidence that Shauf was refused appointment on accounts of
discrimination of sex, color, and origin because Shauf was more qualified and
eligible than the one appointed, Isakson.
o Art XIII Sec 3. “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.” The private respondents violated this and should
be held accountable.
o Though Shauf failed to avail of her remedy under US federal laws, SC ruled that it is
a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy which will best advance
and protect her interest. There is nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in PH
courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive
representations of private respondents on that score.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
o Art XIII Sec 3
▪ “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.”

102. Republic vs Sandoval

GR No. 48607, Mar 19, 1993

● FACTS
o Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program.
o After a confrontation against the police, 12 rallyists were left dead and many
wounded.
o FP C. Aquino issued AO 11 creating Citizens’ Mendiola Commission for the purpose
of conducting an investigation on the matter.
o The Commission’s most significant recommendation was for the heirs of the
deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the gov’t to which
recommendation the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages
against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.
● ISSUES
o WON there is a valid waiver of immunity.
● HELD
o NO
o The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the
 State. The Commission was simply a fact finding body and only aimed to find the
basis for a cause of action to be taken in the event any party decides to litigate the
same. Thus, the recommendation does not in any way bind the State.
o The State cannot be made liable for the actions of the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the deaths and injuries suffered. The military and
police officers responsible for the event can be held personally liable as they
exceeded their authority.
o There was also lack of justification by the gov’t forces in the use of firearms, the
actual opposite of their main purpose in the rally which was to ensure peace and
order.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED

103. PNB vs Pabalan

83 SCRA 595, 1978

● FACTS
o Judge Pabalan issued a writ of execution (judgment be enforced) followed
thereafter by a notice of garnishment (seize any debt one owes or will owe to the
debtor) on the funds of PH Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) deposited with
the PH Nat’l Bank in La Union.
o PNB La Union filed an administrative complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse of
discretion alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are
of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied
upon.
o PNB La Union invoked the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of
garnishment.
● ISSUES
o WON PNB may be sued.
● HELD
o YES
o Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from
garnishment.
o PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is
attributed.
o The gov’t has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has stepped
down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing
ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued.
o The petition of PNB La Union denied.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED
104. Municipality of Makati vs Court of Appeals

190 SCRA 206, 1990

● FACTS
o Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC
of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the
private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of
P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ
of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However,
such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the
Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this
petition for review.
● ISSUES
o WON funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy
upon execution.
● HELD
o It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved
the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent
sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted
from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is
merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds
are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for
the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of
land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be
exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED

105. Nessia vs Fermin

220 SCRA 615, 1993

● FACTS
o Jose Nessia complained about Mr. Fermin's negligence and non-payment of the
former's vouchers to reimburse his travel expense allowances incurred from doing
his official duty as a deputy municipal assessor of Victorias. The respondent
countered that he did not approve Nessia's claims because he exceeded the budget.
The Municipality of Victorias supported Fermin and added that the petitioner didn't
give an explanation why he exceeded the budget.
o The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner because it found in the evidence that
Fermin refused to act on his vouchers through his inaction over the petitioner's
follow-up letters inquiring the status of the reimbursement. The court granted the
compensation to Nessia, although it was less than what he prayed for. Both parties
elevated the case to the C.A. Nessia prayed for an increase in the damages awarded
to him and Fermin sought release from liability. The Municipality of Victorias did not
appeal.
o The appellate court dismissed Nessia's complaint on the ground of lack of cause.
From its own findings, the C.A. held that the real issue is that Nessia accused Fermin
of failure to act on the vouchers, which were not proved to be received by the
latter. Even if he was able to receive them, they could not be approved because
they were late and not supported by an appropriation. The petitioner elevated the
case to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
● ISSUES
o WON respondent court may reverse the decision of the trial court which has
become final and executory.
● HELD
o NO
o The Supreme Court was inclined to sustain the trial court because its appraisal of
conflicting testimonies is afforded greater weight and respect. Thus, the
determination of the trial court that they were actually received should be followed.
o Between the findings of the CA, which were simply drawn from reviewing the
records and transcripts of the hearing, the determination of the trial court deserves
greater acceptance because it actually heard the case, even if both conclusions are
supported by evidence. Moreover, Philippine jurisprudence substantially provides
that "If the decision of the Court of Appeals on the controversial matter suffers...
from some ambiguity, the doubt should be resolved to sustain the trial court in the
light of the familiar accepted rule that 'the judge who tries a case in the court
below, has vastly superior advantage for the ascertainment of truth and the
detection of falsehood over an appellate court sitting as a court of review" (Roque v.
Buan, G.R. No. L-22459, 1967).
 o The Supreme Court granted Nessia’s petition, set aside the CA’s dismissal of the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and reinstated and affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
● ARTICLES AND LAWS RELATED

106. City of Caloocan vs Allarde

Gr no. 107271, September 10, 2003

Facts:

● In 1972, mayor samson of Caloocan abolished the position of assistant city administrator
(Santiago) and 17 other positions via ordinance no. 1749.
● In 1973, the city of Caloocan deemed the ordinance illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the
dismissed employees and payment of back wages. The city appealed the ruling but was
dismissed.
● In 1986 the city paid Santiago 75,083.37 as partial payment. The other employees where paid in
full.
● In 1987 the city appropriated funds for her unpaid back wages but still refused to release the
money to Santiago.
● October 5, 1993 the city of Caloocan passed ordinance no. 0134 which included the back wages
of Santiago.
● May 7, 1993, judge Allarde ordered that the funds of the city of Caloocan be garnished to the
claim of Santiago.
Issue:

● Whether or not the funds of city of Caloocan may be garnished?

● Whether or not the waiver for immunity from suit carries with it the seizure of property of the
government if proven liable?
Ruling:

● Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to

subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by
such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all
government funds deposited in an official depositary of the Philippine government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds
and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation
as required by law.
● Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends
when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not,
and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a
seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that
the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction
 thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when
there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Art XVI general provisions

Section 3. the state may not be sued without its consent. 7. Suability, liability, execution

107. Ocampo vs HRET

432 scra 145 June 15, 2004

Facts:

● Mario B. Crespo, a duly elected congressman of the 6th district of Manila, was declared ineligible
after holding office for 22 months since the May 2001 elections.
● Pablo V. Ocampo the second placer of the election, averred that he should be declared the
winner having garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue:

● Whether or not a second placer in congressional elections be proclaimed the duly elected
congressman upon disqualification of the winner.
Ruling:

● No. The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later disqualified does
not give rise to the second candidate who garnered the second highest vote to be declared the
winner. To do otherwise would violate the most basic precepts of democracy and republicanism.
The only recourse is to hold another election.
Art II Principles

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority from them. 11. Democratic and republican state

108. Villavicencio vs Lukban

Gr. No. L-14639

Facts:

● The mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which has been permitted in the Manila,
closed.
● Between October 16 to 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district
by police.
 ● During this period, the city authorities made arrangements with the bureau of labor to send
these women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers.
● On October 25, midnight, the police, acting on orders from the chief of police, and Mayor
Lukban, hustled some 170 inmates into wagons, placed them aboard steamers which would
take them to Mindanao.
● The women had no knowledge that they were being taken to Mindanao. They had not been
asked if they wanted to be taken from the region and did not given their consent for
deportation.
Issue:

● Whether or not the women’s liberty was violated.

Ruling:

● Yes. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even
being given the opportunity to collect their things, inform their families and worse, without
even consenting to being transported to Mindanao.
● Even if the Mayor’s intent was for the promotion of peace, order and general welfare, still the
women’s’ rights for the protection of life and liberty must be of top priority.
Art. II Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.

109. Mejoff vs The Director of Prisons

Gr. No. L-4254

Facts:

● Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent was brought to the Philippines from Shanghai as a
secret operative by the Japanese forces.
● Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps
on March 18, 1948.
● The People’s Court ordered Mejoff’s release, but the Deportation Board then found out that he
had no travel documents and referred the matter to the immigration authority.
● On April 5, 1948, the immigration authorities determined that Mejoff entered the country
illegally in 1944 and ordered that he should be deported back to Russia.
● He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then to Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October
1948.
● He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis of too long a detention may justify
the issuance of writ of habeas corpus, but it was denied.
● Over two years having elapsed since the decision was made, the Government was not able to
deport Mejoff, because no ship wanted to take him back to Russia.
 ● This is his second petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:

● Whether or not the prolonged detention of Boris Mejoff is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

● The prolonged detention of Boris Mejoff is unconstitutional and it violated the right of liberty of
the petitioner.
● The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Art II Sec.3 The Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the Nation.”

110. Agustin vs Edu

Gr. No. L-49112

Facts:

● President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users
or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in
their cars acquire from any source depending on the owner’s choice.
● Incompliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation
Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
● This petition alleges that such letter of instruction is unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates
the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and un due delegation of police
power.
Issue:

● Whether or not the letter of Instruction No.229 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

● The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statues in question are deemed
not unconstitutional.
● The letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the general
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
● The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolution of the Vienna
Convention on Road Sighs and Signals and the discussion on traffic and safety by the United
Nations.

111. Inchong vs Hernandez

Gr. No. L-7995

Facts:

● Legislature passed RA 1180 (Ac to Regulate Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent non-
Filipino citizens from having a stronghold upon the people’s economic life.

● The petitioner, Lao H. Inchong, in his own behalf and on behalf of the other alien residents, filed
an action declaring the act unconstitutional, for the ff reasons:

- It denies the alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty.

- The act violates international and treaty obligations.

Issue:

● Whether or not RA 1180 or the Act to Regulate Retail Business deprives the resident aliens
of equal rights and protection of the law.

Ruling:

● RA 1180 is valid, it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the law. There are real
and actual positive fundamental difference between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted.

112. In Re: Garcia

2 Scra 984

FACTS:

● Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a
Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage.
● He had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved,
selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as
“Licenciado en derecho”.
● Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the
provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE:

● Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.
RULING:

● The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and
the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot
be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to
practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in
the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the
privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges
provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and
regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession.
● The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

113. The People of the Philippines vs Lagman and Zosa

Gr. No. L-45892 and Gr. No. L-45893

Facts:

● Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Zosa are charged with the violation of Section 60 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law.

● The two were alleged, that being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years old,
willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the first and
seventh April of 1936, even though they had been required to do so. They were notified to
appear before the Acceptance Board but still did not register up to the date of filing of
information.

● The two did not deny the facts but allege in their defense that they did not register in
military service because Zosa is fatherless and has mother and an eight-year-old brother to
support, and Lagman has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to
kill or be killed.

● The Court of First Instance sentenced both of them to one month and one day
imprisonment, with the costs.
Issue:

● Whether or not the National Defense Law was constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Art II of the
constitution which states that, the defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.

Ruling:

● Yes. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not
go against this constitutional provision (Art II, Sec. 2) but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the government to defend the state cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. Defense of the state, justifies compulsory military service, whether
actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective. The circumstance of the appellants
does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves to the Acceptance Board because
they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to their family responsibilities.

114. Estrada vs Escritor

AM no. P-02-1651

Facts:

● Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is nit her husband, for more than 25 years, they have a son
together.

● Escritor’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Qualipo is still legally
married to another woman.

● Both Escritor and Qualipo are Jehovah’s Witness.

● Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate Escritor. According to Estrada, Escritor
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such
act.

● Escritor claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion. The Jehovah’s
Witnesses. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of the
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.

Issue:
 ● Whether or not the state could penalize Escritor for such conjugal arrangement.

Ruling:

● No. The state could not penalize Escriitor for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution.

● Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to the public and secular morality.

● The court further states that our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises. The benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.

115. Bayan vs Exec. Sec.

Gr No. 138570

Facts:

● On July 18, 1997 the Philippines and the United States of America engage in talks regarding the
complementing strategic interests of the Philippines and the United States in the Asia Pacific
Region. Both side discuss, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement of VFA.

● On February 10, 1998 then president Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA.

● On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, ratified the VFA.

● On October 6, 1998, the instrument of ratification, letter of the president and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution was transmitted to the
senate. It was received by the Committee on Foreign relations and Committee on national
defense and security.

● On May 3, 1999, the committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No.443, recommending
the concurrence of the senate to the VFA.

● On May 27, 1999, proposed senate resolution was approved by the senate with 2/3 votes of its
members. Senate resolution no. 433 was the re-numbered as senate resolution no. 18.

● Petitioners argued, that the VFA violates sec. 25, Article VII of the constitution, which provides
that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty dully concurred by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state.
Issue:

● Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

● No, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

● There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case. The two/thirds vote
of the senate that led to the concurrence handed through Resolution No.18.

● The record reveal that the United States Government, through their ambassador, has stated
that they are fully committed to the VFA. For as long as the United States of America
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds with the obligations of the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the Constitution.

116. Lim Vs. Exec. Sec.

Gr. No. 151445

Facts:

● Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-
1” on January 2002.
● The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the
United States in 1951.
● Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
● Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly
affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
● The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT) between the Philippines and the United States.
● Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed
attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat
operations in Philippine Territory.
Issue:

● Whether or not the “Balikatan-02-1” violates the constitution.

Ruling:

● The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and it is the
VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the
current Balikatan exercise.
 ● The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging war on
Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the
Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of
future violation of the Terms of Reference.
● Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of “Balikatan-02-1” joint
military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for the
correction on its part.
● The petition has been dismissed.

117. Pamatong vs. Comelec

Gr. No. 161872

FACTS:

● Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December
17,2003.
● Respondent Commission on Elections refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy, although such decision was not unanimous.
● The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with a national constituency.
● In this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were
allegedly rendered in violation of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public
service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated
by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people
to choose their leaders.
Issue:

● Whether or not the resolution made by the Comelec violated the rights of the petitioner.
Ruling:

● No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II is merely a privilege subject to limitations by law.
It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
● The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing. The provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, “equal access to opportunities for public service”
118. Calalang vs Williams

GR. No. 47800

Facts:

● On July 17, 1940, the National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from
7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to
traffic.
● It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of
police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
Issue:

● Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes upon
the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held:

● The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any
given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism,
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.

119. APCD Vs. PCA

Gr. No. 110526

Facts:

● The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 232 as an
independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of
the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers
become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a
regulatory scheme set up by law.
● PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. In March
1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing
to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such
business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective
regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition
 among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of
coconut-based commodities.
● The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to
compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
Issue:

● Whether or not the petition should be granted.

Held:

● Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an
economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to
promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of
“protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. 12,
Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

120. PLDT VS NTC

Gr. No. 88404

FACTS:

● On 22 June 1958, RA 2090 was enacted granting Felix Alberto & Co. (later ETCI) a franchise to
establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications.
● On 13 May 1987, ETCI filed an application with the NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to operate, etc. a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an alpha
numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for
provisional authority to operate within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with a motion to
dismiss.
● On 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT’s opposition and declared RA 2090 should be
liberally construed so as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service as part
of services of the franchise.
● On 12 December 1988, NTC granted ETCI provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain
a cellular mobile telephone service initially in Metro Manila subject to the terms and conditions
set forth in its order, including an interconnection agreement to be entered with PLDT.
● PLDT filed a motion to set aside order which was denied by the NTC on 8 May 1989.
● PLDT challenged the 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 NTC orders before the Supreme Court
through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUES:

● Whether the provisional authority was properly granted.

● Whether ETCI’s franchise includes operation of cellular mobile telephone system (CMTS)
● Whether PLDT can refuse interconnection with ETCI.
RULING:

● The provisional authority granted by the NTC (which is the regulatory agency of the National
Government over all telecommunications entities) has a definite expiry period of 18 months
unless sooner renewed; may be revoked, amended or revised by the NTC; covers one of four
phases; limited to Metro Manila only; and does not authorize the installation and operation of
an alphanumeric paging system. It was further issued after due hearing, with PLDT attending
and granted after prima facie showing that ETCI had the necessary legal, financial and technical
capabilities; and that public interest, convenience and necessity so demanded. Provisional
authority would be meaningless if the grantee were not allowed to operate, as its lifetime is
limited and may be revoked by the NTC at any time in accordance with law.
● The NTC construed the technical term “radiotelephony” liberally as to include the operation of
a cellular mobile telephone system. The construction given by an administrative agency
possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience and deserves great
weight and respect. It can only be set aside by judicial intervention on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law.
● The NTC merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of telecommunication
networks when it decreed interconnection. PLDT cannot refuse interconnection as such is
mandated under RA 6949 or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989. What interconnection seeks
to accomplish is to enable the system to reach out to the greatest number of people possible in
line with governmental policies. With the broader reach, public interest and convenience will be
better served. Public need, public interest, and the common good are the decisive, if not the
ultimate, considerations. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must
yield.
● The NTC order does not deprive PLDT due process as it allows the parties themselves to discuss
and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of
the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection which it can very well impose.

121. Maquera vs. Borra

G.R. no. L-24761 September 7, 1965

Petitioner: Leon G. Maquera

Respondent: Juan Borra

Facts:

The Congress passed Republic Act 4421 requiring all candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position
to which he is a candidate. In compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the Commission on Elections
had, on July 20, 1965, decided to require all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives to file a surety bond amounting to P60,000 P40,00 and
P32,000 respectively, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable to the Commission. Failure
to comply with surety bond requirements under RA 4421 will disqualify the candidates. Finding RA
4421 as well as the aforementioned action of the COMELEC to be undemocratic and contrary to the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, the petitioners filed the petition assailing the constitutionality of RA
4421.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 4421 is constitutional.

Ruling:

No. Said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system
ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political
system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall
not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes
equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of
poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.

- Republican system( see pg. 56 1987 consti by bernas, 2009 ed.)

122. Brigido R. Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights

G.R. no. 100150 January 5 1994

Petitioner: Brigido R. Simond

Respondent: Commission on Human Rights

FACTS:
A "Demolition Notice," dated July 9 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the
Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA to give
way to the construction of the"People's Park".

On July 12 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with
the CHR against the petitioners, asking for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing
the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

Petitioners started the demolition despite CHR’s order to desist. Respondents consequently asked that
petitioner’s be cited in contempt.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents. They alleged that
the Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it involved respondents’ privilege to engage in
business, not their civil and political rights.

In an Order, dated September 25 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be
(considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines "

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petioners Simon Jr. et al filed a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private respondents’ complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR the right to acquire jurisdiction to hear the complaint and investigate the case.

RULING:

No. Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to investigate, on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.

In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres Narvasa observed that:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have

CHR’s investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.

The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state
or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public
trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against
the religious."

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-
a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

- Art 13 section 18 powers granted to CHR

123. Philippine Service Exporter Inc. vs. Franklin Drilon

163 SCRA 286 June 30, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept.
Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males
and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with
the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Whether or not Department order no . 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:

Yes.

Yes.

SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics
working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was
exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law
under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law

3. They are not confined to existing conditions

4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things,
to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic
helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

-section 3 article 13- Labor, police power as power of the state, intervention of legislation in personal
liberty and property.

124. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez

152 SCRA 370 1987

Facts:

Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,
Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or
successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which
established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate
of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition
for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all..

Ruling :

No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of
1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education;
(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed
certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools.

The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion,
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provision is Article 14, Section 1 which states “The State shall
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps
to make such education accessible to all.

The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all
who might for any number of reasons wishes to enrol in a professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements.”

Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of the Court,
is a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote important interest and needs -- in other
words, the public order -- of the general community. An important component of that public order is
health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first
to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for
admission to the medical profession has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical schools
do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.

Art. 2, sections 11,13,17

Art. 14 sec 1

Art 14 sec 5

Ra 2382 medical act of 1959 amended by ra 4224 and ra 5946

Mecs order 52 series of 1985

125. PRC vs. De Guzman

G. R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

Facts:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila.They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of
Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as
successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that
the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College

in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics
and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored
100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one
scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks
of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the
performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the
unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking
phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.

For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions.”The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
"immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne
examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial court’s
judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the
physician’s oath and to register them as physicians without prejudice to any

administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and
in the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other
professionals.

Issue:

Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 known as The Medical Act of 1959 a valid exercise of
police power.

Ruling:

Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But
like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to
the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific
or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice
medicine. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority
to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not,
however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.

126. UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CAG.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999

313 SCRA 404

FACTS:

Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of
the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and finished her
dissertation and was ready for oral defense.
After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism.
However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a
passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed
her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request
the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board
of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate
granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's
doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree
recommended by the University Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied
by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive due
process.

RULING:

No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent
had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side
of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has
availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due
process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to
answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met
with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition,
she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the
Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the
attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

128. City of Mandaluyong vs. Francisco

[GR 137152, 29 January 2001

Facts:

Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar, constructed residential houses several
decades ago on a portion of the 3 lots located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of
Mandaluyong. The Aguilars had since leased out these houses to tenants until the present. On the
vacant portion of the lots, other families constructed residential structures which they likewise
occupied. In 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under
Proclamation 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the tenants and
occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from the Aguilars, but the latter refused to sell. On 7
November 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an
association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution 516, Series of 1996
authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of
the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On
10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a letter to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said
property at P3,000.00 per square meter. On 4 August 1997, the City filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation, seeking to expropriate 3 adjoining parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters in the names of the Aguilars, and praying that the
fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, the
Aguilars, except Eusebio who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to
purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is
not for a public purpose; that the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while the City has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; and that the fair
market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages of
P21 million. On 5 November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional
defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. The City
also excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated
from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters.The Amended Complaint
was admitted by the trial court on 18 December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an
order dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small property owners" whose
land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act 7279. The court also found that the expropriation
was not for a public purpose for the City's failure to present any evidence that the intended
beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City
moved for reconsideration. On 29 December 1998, the court denied the motion. The City filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of private persons, but
which is within the Areas for Priority Development (APD).

Ruling:

Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President Marcos in
1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities from blight, congestion
and hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a
national resource for public welfare. Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in
1979 declaring the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform.
This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and
specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Pursuant to
Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1)
government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands;
(4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP)
sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites
which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single
provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be read together with
Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing under RA 7279 are to be acquired in several
modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land
assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two
conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted;
and (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. The
acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set forth in
the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD may be acquired only in the modes
under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10. Herein, the City claims that it had faithfully observed
the different modes of land acquisition for socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the
priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state with
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it
decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted." The City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by
negotiated purchase. The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the Aguilars but
the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even
Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to
effect the expropriation of the subject property states whether the city government tried to acquire the
same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation
to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.

129. SSS Employees Association v. CA

G.R. No. 85279, 28 July 1989

FACTS:

The officers and members of the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) staged illegal
strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands and after the Social Security System (SSS) deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. The strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to
work. The strikers refused to return to work and as a result, the SSS suffered damages. On the basis of
the foregoing, the SSS filed a complaint for damages with a writ of preliminary injunction against the
SSSEA before the RTC. Eventually, the RTC, having found that the strike was illegal, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. As the SSSEA's motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision was denied
,SSSEA filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. In a
resolution, the Court resolved to refer the case to the CA whereby the CA ruled against the SSSEA.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

RULING:
No, By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including
those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression,
for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil
service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and
(50)].Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition
also includes the right to strike. The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that
under the1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters"[Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.

-Art III sec 8

-social justice and human rights

Art 9 sec 2 CSC-scope

130. Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary; consultation to LGU regarding national
projects

GR No. 129546, Dec 13, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned
citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for lack of cause of
action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through
Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications.

The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under the
territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is
to be constructed in Watershed reservation.

Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and Municipality of San
Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite
was re-opened.

A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that the
project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.

Issue:

Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San Mateo is
needed before the implementation of the project

Ruling:

Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No.
635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code,
which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a
program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is
obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the
appropriate local government units, should apply to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.

Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order,
Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of
Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was
brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of
petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any
further attempt to dump garbage in their province.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants
the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of th(e) Code.” These include:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447
(1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the
jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning
ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws,
rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating
the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with
the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and
facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities,
…providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and
watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ….and,
subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water
supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and
reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this
purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the
consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:

(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and

(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.

Article X sec 3

131. ROE vs WADE

410 US 113

132. Meyer vs Nebraska

262 US 390

Facts:

Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching
of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue:

Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment?

Ruling:

The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and
fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.

The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The
state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native
tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to
those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected,
and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion:

Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not
reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.
133. Pierce vs Society of sisters

262 US 510

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are two Oregon corporations owning and conducting schools against the Governor and
other officials of the State of Oregon.-

Compulsory Education Act effective September 1, 1926, requires every parent, guardian or other person
having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send him "to a public
school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year" in the district where
the child resides, and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor.

The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by normal children, between
eight and sixteen, who have not completed the eighth grade, which allegedly would seriously impair,
perhaps destroy, the profitable features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of their
property.- Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with power to
care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools, and
acquire necessary real and personal property. It has long devoted its property and effort to the secular
and religious education and care of children, and has acquired the valuable good will of many parents
and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior colleges, and maintains
orphanages for the custody and control of children between eight and sixteen.- The Compulsory
Education Act of 1922 has already caused the withdrawal from its schools of children who would
otherwise continue, and their income has steadily declined. The appellants, public officers, have
proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce the statute. A preliminary injunction was granted against
the officials by the District Court from threatening or attempting to enforce an amendment to the
school law requiring parents and others having control of young children to send them to the primary
schools of the State. Hence, this appeal.- The Society of sisters alleges that the enactment conflicts with
the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious
training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and
teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the
Constitution and void. And, further, that, unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined the
corporation's business and property will suffer irreparable injury.- Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a
private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged in owning, operating and
conducting for profit an elementary, college preparatory and military training school for boys between
the ages of five and twenty-one years. By reason of the statute and threat of enforcement, appellee's
business is being destroyed and its property depreciated; parents and guardians are refusing to make
contracts for the future instruction of their sons, and some are being withdrawn. It argued that the
challenged Act contravenes the corporation's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and
that, unless appellants are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to enforce it,
irreparable injury will result.

Issues:

WON the challenged Act is a deprivation of property without due process of law and unlawful
interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons.

Ruling:

YES. INJUNCTION ISSUED AFFIRMED.RATIO

The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees against the deprivation of their
property without due process of law.

It declared the right to conduct schools was property, and that parents and guardians, as a part of their
liberty, might direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that
these schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and that enforcement of the challenged statute
would unlawfully deprive them of patronage, and thereby destroy their owners' business and property.

Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause irreparable injury, and the suits were
not premature.- No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition,
that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.- The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act
under consideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private
primary schools for normal children within the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind of
undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly there is
nothing in the present records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons,
students or the State. And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which demand
extraordinary measures relative to primary education.- Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is
said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. But
they have business and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and prospective
patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such
action.

Ruling:
The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and
fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.

The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The
state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native
tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to
those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected,
and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

134. ANGELES vs JUDGE SISON

112 SCRA 26, 1982

135. TANADA vs ANGARA

GR No. 118 295, May 2, 1997

136. PLDT vs NTC

GR No. 88404, Oct 18, 1990

137. LEGASPI vs CSC

150 SCRA 530, 1987

138. VALMONTE vs BELMONTE

170 SCRA 256, 1989

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO
OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
Vs.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. respondent

FACTS:

Valmonte requested from Belmonte, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) General
Manager, for a copy of the list of names of the Batasang Pamansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately, upon the approval of then First Lady
Imelda Marcos, before the February 7 elections; together with their pertaining documents.

Balmonte, through Solicitor Genral Meynardo Tiro, did not approve of such request due to the
confidentiality between GSIS and its borrowers.

On June 20, 1986, apparently, having not yet received the reply of the agency, respondent
wrote another letter stating that failure to reply will result for said respondent to do any type of legal
action with regards to the issue, to which then they filed a suit together with other petitioners by June
26, 1986.

Separate comments were filed by Balmonte and the Solicitor General, to which the petitioners
filed a reply. The petition was given due course. Having complied the case was deemed submitted for
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to access the documents evidencing the loans
granted by the GSIS to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban members.

RULING:

Granted. The petition of Valmonte et.al. is granted and respondent General Manager of GSIS is
ordered to allow access to the petitioners pertaining to the documents and records evidencing loans
granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa.

1987 Constitution is Art. III, Sec. 7, states that:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The information sought by the petitioners is the records as to whether or not that certain Members of
the Batasang Pambansa were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS. Considering the loanable
funds of the the GSIS and the public office held by the borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern.

Although respondent claimed that there is confidentiality existing between the agency and the
borrowers, said respondent did not cite any rule granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subjected. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.

139. DE JESUS vs COA

GR 109023 August 12, 1988

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO, VENUS M. POZON AND other similarly situated
personnel of the LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN in his capacity as COA-LWUA Corporate

Auditor, respondents.

FACTS:

As members of the Local Water Utility Administration (LWUA), prior to July 1, 1989, they were
receiving honoraria being members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee.

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758) known as An Act Precsribing A Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took
effect, to which Section 12 of the said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were
exempted from consolidation.

To implement Rep. Act 6578, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective
November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.

In accordance with the law, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on
post audit, the payment of honoraria to the petitioners.
 Petitioners appealed to COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10.
They contended that said circular is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758, therefore, void;
and without force and effect since it was not published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the payment of honoraria which they were
receiving prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act 6758.

RULING:

Granted.

As stated in Art. 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

DBM-CCC No. 10 has no legal force and effect since it was absent from publication on the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The circular is not remedial in
nature, rather it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation
needed for living. Before said circular is permitted to significantly reduce their income, employees
involved should be noted or alerted in order for them to voice out any opposition in the matter. Which
is in line with fairness and transparency.

Although respondent COA, pointed out that to allow honoraria without DBM or presidential
authority, would be against Sec.8, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution:

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law…

Nonetheless, without its publication in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, DBM-CCC No. 10 is ineffective, hence its resolution of issue at bar is unnecessary.

140. CHAVEZ v. PEA & AMARI

G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
authorized a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to
repossess specific foreshore and offshore areas in Manila Bay. Part of the contract is the construction of
Phase 1 and Phase II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. The CDCP compelled all the construction work in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977 then President Ferdinand Marcos issued a Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating Public Estates Authority (PEA). PD No. 1084, tasked PEA “to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.”
Same date, then Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore in Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On December 29. 1981, then Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum tasking the PEA to amend its
contract with CDCP, in order for the PEA to own all future works in the MCCRRP.

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, allowing
the transfer to PEA the parcels of land under the MCCRRP. To which subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued Transfer certificates in the name of PEA
covering Freedom Islands, three reclaimed islands in southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Paranaque City.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation, through negotiation without public bidding. Part of the JVA was to develop Freedom
Islands, and required reclamation of additional hectares of submerged areas. The JVA was confirmed by
the Board of Directors of the PEA on April 28, 1995. To which on June 8, 1995 then Pres. Fidel V. Ramos
through then Secretary Ruben Torres, approved said JVA.

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as a scam
which he delivered through a privilege speech in the Senate, to which resulted to a joint investigation
consisting of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations.
 On December 5, 1997, Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 was issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos, creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the JVA.

On April 13, 1998, Antonio Zulueta filed before the Court a petition “Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” seeking to
nullify the JVA but was dismissed. To which then on April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez, as a
taxpayer filed “Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order.”

On October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, PEA and AMARI filed their comments, respectively.

On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion, that requires (a) the PEA to submit
the terms of the renegotiated contract between AMARI, (b) issuance of a temporary restraining order,
and (c) set the case for hearing.

On May 26, 1999, Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO to which the Court
denied. But the Court gave due course to the petition in a resolution dated March 23, 1999 which
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

On March 30, 1999 PEA and AMARI signed the JVA which was approved by then President
Joseph Estrada on a day before the said date.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to induce PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties with regards to its negotiation with AMARI?

OR

Whether or not the JVA between PEA and AMARI legal or void?

RULING:

Petition granted. As stated in Article II, Sec. 28 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by Law, the state adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.’; As well as in Article III, Sec. 7 of such
Constitution, “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” These twin negotiations cover even
official information on “on-going negotiations before a final contract” as defended by PEA.
 Article XII, Sec. 2 and 3 states that ”All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated…” and “Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.”’respectively. The
provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether
foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a
proper contract.

141. In re: LAURETA and MARAVILLA

148 SCRA 382 (1987) March 12, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986, to
Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter dated October
22, 1986 to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano.

On December 16, 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the
facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division
and en banc.

Defendant also initiated the circulation of a false headline implying graft and corruption charges
against Justices.

Sent threatening letters were written by Atty. Wenceslao Laureta. He also convinced Ilustre’s
pursuit of the Affidavit-Complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants actions violate the principle of separation of powers.

RULING:
 Yes. Respondents clearly attempted to subject the Judiciary to the Executive. From trying to
expose the graft and corruption of the Supreme Court to the media, to the Affidavit-Complaint before
the Tanodbayan. Judiciary independence is crucial for enforcing the superiority of the Constitution.

142. DEMETRIA v. ALBA

148 SCRA 208 (1987)

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO
Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO
G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P.,
ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V.
GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,

vs.

HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his
capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Assailing the legality of the Sec 44 of the Presidential Decree No. 1177 (PD No. 1177), Budget Reform
Decree of 1977, specifically its first paragraph, the petitioners as Philippine citizens, as members of the
National Assembly or Batasan Pambansa in representation of their constituents, and as taxpayers, states
that Sec.44 :

(a) contravenes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys,

(b) opposes the constitution for it fails to state its purposes and objectives for what the transfer of
funds are to be made

(c) allows the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations

(d) results to undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive

(e) results to the excess of authority by the President and Budget Minister.

The legal standing of the petitioners was questioned by the Solicitor General and held that the
responsibilities and duties of one branch of the government cannot be enjoined with another.
He also stated that the petition has become moot and academic in relation to Article VIII, Sec 16 (5) of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PD No. 1177 is constitutional

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the legal power to act on the berated executive act

RULING:

1. No. Sec 44 of PD No. 1177, specifically paragraph 1, unduly overextends the privilege granted
under Article VIII, Sec 16 (5) of the 1973 Philippine Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, of the Executive Department to any program,
project or activity of any department, included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment; whether or not said funds are actually savings in the item. It disregards the standards set in
fundamental law resulting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, and goes beyond the tenor
thereof.

Said constitutional infirmities render the provision null and void.

2. Yes. It becomes the duty of the judiciary, if legislative or executive acts go beyond their
constitutional powers, to declare whether said acts are void or not. Seeing as it is part of its
constitutionally conferred judicial power.

143. MANTRUSTE SYSTEM vs CA

179 SCRA 136 (1989)

MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, MAKATI AGRO-TRADING, INC., and LA
FILIPINA UY GONGCO. CORP., respondents.
FACTS:

On August 28, 1986, Mantruste Systems,m Inc. (MSI) entered into a four interim lease
agreement with Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel, wherein
MSI would operate the hotel “a minimum of three months or until such time that the said properties are
sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP.”

On December 8, 1986, the President issued Proclamation No. 50 that subjected the hotel for
privatization, to which it was transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition.

DBP notified MSI, due to the proclamation, that it was terminating the lease agreement. The
APT, having sent through letter, granted the extension of thirty days within which to effect the delivery
of the Bayview Hotel to APT.

However, MSI sent a letter to APT informing that having leased the hotel for more than a year,
the agreement is long-term, hence, the MSI has acquired preference in buying the property. They also
positioned that they have legal lien over the property due to the hotel operations and repairs amounting
to P 12,000.000.00. APT disagreed, and stated that the bidding took place which the MSI desisted from
participating. Two were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P 85,000,000.00, namely
Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation.

On November 13, 1981, MSI filed a complaint with respondent lower court with regards to
awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders. It was granted but the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the trial court for having violated Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50, which stated that “No
court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the trust in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or
injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from
taking possession of any assets purchased by him.” The CA rejected the Trial Court’s view as to the
constitutionality of the proclamation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC was right in declaring Sec.31 of Proclamation No. 50-A as constitutional,
prohibiting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the TC.

RULING:

Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that “to settle actual controversies which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” In view of this, Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not violate the inherent power
of the courts. The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs
to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

“Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge
of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except
when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess
of, or without jurisdiction.”

144. INS v CHANDHA

462 U.S. 919 (1983) February 22, 1982/December 7, 1982

FACTS:

Appellee-respondent Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a
nonimmigrant student visa, remained in the US after his VISA has expired; to which the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) questioned on why he should not be deported. The respondent applied for
suspension of deportation, and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge in pursuant of § 244(a)(1),
authorizing the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation, ordered the suspension, and
reported the suspension to Congress. After which the House of Representatives passed a resolution
pursuant to § 244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension and the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation
proceedings.

The respondent moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that 244 (c)(2) is
unconstitutional, but the Judge stated that he had no authority to rule on its constitutionality, and
ordered Chadha deported. Chadha’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Apeals was dismissed, hence he
filed for petition for review in the Court of Appeals; to which said Court held that § 244(c)(2) violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease
taking any steps to deport Chadha based upon the House Resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the veto made by the House is constitutional

RULING:

No. The Act (Veto) violated constitutional regulations of lawmaking and congressional authority.

The House took action that had the purpose and effect of modifying the legal rights, duties and
regulations of persons. Including even, the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all
outside of the legislative branch.

Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, the authority to allow
deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. Congress may delegate
authority, but once it does so it must abide by its decision until that delegation is legislatively altered or
revoked.

145. LA BUGAL-BLAAN v RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004

Facts:

On March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), which was before Republic Act 7942 - The
Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942), took effect. WMCP is a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
95-23, which was then repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners pleaded that RA 7942, including the FTAA between WMCP and the government be
declared unconstitutional.

On January 2001, Australian Mining and Exploration Company, Western Mining Corporation
(WMC) sold its shares to Sagittarius Mines. 60% of which is owned by Filipinos and 40% of which is
owned by Indophil Resources, a foreign (Australian) company.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the transfer of the
FTAA to Sagittarius Mines but Lepanto Mining Co. also claimed the same. (Case is still pending in CA)

On July 25, 1987, Executive Order No. 279 was issued by former President Aquino giving
authority to the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large
scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of
the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On the other hand, WMCP
stated that the termination of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippine and Australia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7942 is unconstitutional for allowing foreign corporations to utilize the
Philippine mineral resources.

RULING:

Unconstitutional, for allowing fully foreign owned corporations to utilize the Philippine natural
resources. Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that, “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State…the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.”

The utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is not
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Also said Constitution only allows technical and financial assistance. Since RA 7942 authorizes
service contracts, it is invalid. Its relevant provisions treat the agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors.

148. ARNAULT v BALAGTAS

97 phil 358 (1995) July 30, 1955

Facts:

A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by Jean Arnault against Eustaqio Balagtas, the Director of
Prisons. Petitioner was imprisoned in relation to a resolutionby Senate finding by the appellant in
disdain for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a
government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The case affirmed the Legislature's
power to hold a person in contempt for refusing to obey with an order in a legislative investigation.

Arnault ultimately disclosed the name of Jess D. Santos, the one to whom he transacted with in relation
to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. The Senate not satisfied with the petitioner’s explanation,
adopted Resolution No. 114:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA
AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING
JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON
AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF
THE SENATE.

xxx

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially
changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to
hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having
been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should
have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the
occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its
dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of
the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied
by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

xxx

The Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.

Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.

RULING:

Yes, the Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.

No, the CFI does not have the right to review the finding of the state. The Judicial Department
has no authority or power to interfere with the proceedings of the Legislative Department. Same as the
State has no jurisdiction to invade the judicial realm. Said instance is a direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The CFI purposed itself
to review the finding of the State which is clearly an interference to the proceedings of the State.
 “The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.”

149. GOLDWATER v CARTER

444 U.S. 996 (1979)

Facts:

President Jimmy Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan. Senator Barry Goldwater along with
the other members of the Congress challenged the President’s use of his executive power. Carter acted
upon without the approval of the Congress. Barry comprehended that the action deprived them of their
function. The Senate contemplated to release a resolution that the President needed the Senate’s
approval before any mutual treaty could be terminated but it was never acted upon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President’s action to terminate the treaty without approval of the Congress
was justiciable

RULING:

Yes, the termination of the treaty by the President involves his political authority towards
foreign relations not justiciable, hence, not reviewable by the Supreme Court.

The court has the power to review when a branch of government has an exclusive power
towards decision-making over an issue but it cannot review political questions. The issue did not
develop since the Senate did not acted upon a resolution. If the said resolution was acted upon, issue
would be a question of justice since it would be requiring the decision of the Supreme Court.

148. GARCIA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

211 scra 219 (1992)

Facts:

On November 7, 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 (EO 438) which imposed,
“in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across
the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines.”

On January 3, 1991, Executive Order No. 443 (EO 443) was promulgated which increased from five
percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem.

On August 15, 1991, Executive Order No. 75 (EO 75) was issued by the president reducing the rate of
additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except
in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of
nine percent (9%) ad valorem.

Petitioner, Enrique Garcia claims that EO 475 and EO 478 are unconstitutional for they infringe upon
Sec. 24 of Article IV of the Philippine Constitution. He defended that under the Constitution, authority to
enact revenue bills belongs to the Congress, hence, the President has no power to issue said EO 475 and
EO 478.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 475 and EO 478 are constitutional.

RULING:

Sec. 24 of Article IV of the Philippine Constitution states that: “All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.” Due to this, it is understood that the authority to enact revenue bills belongs to the
Legislative Department.

However, it does not mean that EO Nos. 475 and 478 cannot be exercised by the President even
though they revenue bills by nature. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution states that: “The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.” Hence, there is Constitutional permission that allowed the President to enact said
Executive Orders.
149. JAWORSKI V PAGCOR

G.R. No. 144463 January 14, 2004

Facts:

On July 11, 1983 then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1869 that
enacted the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) which is Government –Owned
and Controlled Corporation.

On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument known as Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted the
Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) authority to “operate and maintain Sports
Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and
international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and
procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.” Said document was
subsequently executed on September 1, 1998, to which SAGE started its operations by conducting
gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings
available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.

Peitioner Robert S. Jaworski, Secretary, filed the petition pleading that the grant by PAGCOR
given to SAGE be nullified. He stated that PAGCOR is not authorized to allow SAGE to operate gambling
on the internet, because at the time the decree was enacted the internet was non-existent and
gambling was confined to real space. Furthermore he also argued that the internet being a network of
computers, exceeds beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, hence the grant to sage with
regards to internet gambling operations surpasses beyond PAGCOR’s franchise.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to give SAGE the authority (legislative franchise) to operate
internet gambling.

RULING:

No. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a

privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for
public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such
conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is
Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the
manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the
charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a
veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.

SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it were to
legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

150. US vs TANGHO

43 phil 1 (1922)

Facts:

In 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act no 2868: "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose,"

Section 1 of said act authorized the Governor-General, “whenever, for any cause, conditions
arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with
the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit: (a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice
or corn. (b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the
commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself. (c) To fix, from
time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.”

On August 1, 1919, the Governor General issued a proclamation fixing the price of how much
the rice should be sold since it was not stated in the Act.

Subsequently on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, for selling
rice at an excessive rate to which it was in violation of Executive Order No. 53. (EO 53)Upon this, he was
found guilty, imprisoned, and fined. He appealed, claiming that the lower court erred in finding EO 53 of
1919 to be of force and effect, in finding him guilty, and imposing the sentence.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2828 can delegate legislative power to the Governor-General.

RULING:

Act No. 2868, with regards to authorizing the Governor-General to issue a proclamation in fixing
the price of the rice, to make the sale of rice in violation of the said price of rise and making said
violation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

The Philippines lives under a republican form of government, no republican state or nation has
ever passed a law delegating legislative power. The right of the Governor-General with regards to the
terms and conditions stated in the Act, in fixing the price of rice and making it a a crime to tell it at a
higher price is unconstitutional. Said Governor-General has no right to decide to undertake to interpret
the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.

151. Conf vs POEA

243 scra 666 (1995); April 21, 1995

FACTS:

On January 14, 1994, the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, amending and increasing the
compensation and other benefits as stated under Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers .

Subsequently, on January 19, 1994, Memorandum Circular No. 05 was issued by POEA
Administrator Felicisimo Joson, addressing all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies, shipownersl
managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers of the adjustments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not issuance violate Section 1 and 10 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution.

RULING:
 Section 1 of Article III provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The
petitioners claimed discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen
and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. There can be no
dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms
of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to
social, civic, and spiritual activities. Hence, it does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Section 10 of Article III states that “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
Said prohibition is not to be read literally. It is restricted to contracts of property or some object of value
that establishes rights that maybe declared in a court of justice. It does not apply to Statutes relating to
public subjects within the legislative realm of the State and involving public rights and welfare of the
community affected by it.

152. Pelaez vs Auditor General

15 scra 569 (1965) December 24, 1965

FACTS:

From September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President of the Philippines, declaring an act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124
and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.

On November 10, 1964, Vice President of the Philippines, Emmanuel Pelaez, instituted a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General and his representatives and agents,
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or
any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner stated that said executive orders are null and void , because Section 68 has been
repealed by Republic Act. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power.
RULING:

Yes. According to Section 10, of Article VII of the Constitution: “The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” With
regards to local governments, the President is limited to supervision of said units and their performance
of duties. So as long the officers are performing their duties within the scope of their authority, the
President has no right to interfere. Hence, with regards to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the President went beyond his executive duties - constituting an undue delegation of legislative
power.

153. People vs Judge Dacuycuy

173 SCRA 90 (1989) May 5, 1989

FACTS:

On April 4, 1975, Chief of Police Hindang Leyte failed a complaint against respondents Celestino
S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, who were charged
before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic
Act No. 4670 (RA 4670) - Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Said private respondents pleaded not
guilty to the charge.

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of
Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555. They alleged that Section 32
of RA 4670 is unconstitutional for it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of
the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 – The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is
unconstitutional.

RULING:
 Yes. By vesting the court the responsibility of enforcing the duration on the punishment of
imprisonment, Section 32 of RA 4670 acts as if the courts were the legislative department of the
government, hence, violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power

154. Powell v McCofmack

395 US 486 (1969)

Facts of the case

Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New
York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When
Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal
contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of
Representatives voted to exclude him.

Question
May the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected member if the member has satisfied the
standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the
U.S. Constitution?

RULING

No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not
expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does
have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the
purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue,
Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents
and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the
chamber was powerless to exclude him.
 Macias vs COMELEC GR No
155.

18684 14 September 1961

Facts: Petitioner Lamberto Macias requests for the prevention of implementing Act 3040
that apportions representative districts in the country on the ground that it apportioned
districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondent
COMELEC contend that they are merely complying with the statute and that the census
submitted on November 1960 that became the basis of the bill although “preliminary”
should be considered “official for all purposes.”

Issue: Whether or not Act 3040 was constitutional?

Decision: Act 3040 declared void as it infringes the Constitution. The Constitution directs
that the 120 members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the
provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective inhabitants. Act
3040 violated this provision when it gave Cebu, Manila, Pangasinan etc more members than
Rizal, Cotabato, etc with a bigger population. Such disproportion of representation clearly
violates the Constitutional provision.

156. Tan
vs COMELEC GR No
73155 11 July 1986
Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted creating a new province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on 03 December
1985. Patricio Tan filed a case for prohibition to stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite
and implementing the same. Due to Christmas holiday, this was not acted upon and the
plebiscite was held and ratified only to inhabitants of Negros del Norte excluding the rest of
Negros Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop the implementation of the said law.
Issue: Whether or not the creation of the new province, Negros del Norte was
constitutional?

Decision: BP Bilang 885 declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province
Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials were declared null and void. Pursuant
to Article 11 Section 3, it si imperative to obtain approval of majority of votes in a plebiscite
in the units affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. The boundary of Negros Occidental would be
altered by the division of its exiting boundaries to create the new province. There is no way
to reconcile in holding a plebiscite that eliminates the participation of the two component
political units.

157. Veterans Federation Party vs

COMELEC GR No 136781 06
October 2000
Facts: Under the party-list system, a voter elects, apart from the district representative, a
registered party, organization or coalition that will be entitled to a maximum of three party-
list representatives in the House of Representatives depending on its obtaining a required
percentage of the national vote. RA 7941 provides for the manner of selection for the party-
list representatives.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent party-lists are entitled to a arty-list seat despite their
failure to get at least 2% of the national vote in the election?

Decision: Petition partially granted. 14 sititing party-list representatives were affirmed. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling the 38 parties entitled to a party-list seat as
it violated RA 7941 requirements of 2% threshold and proportional representation. The
imposition of threshold ensures that only parties having sufficient number of constituents
deserving representation are actually represented in Congress.
159. Bagong Bayani OFW Labor
Party vs COMELEC GR No
147589 26 June 2001
Facts: Petitioners challenge Omnibus Resolution No 3785 issued by COMELEC that
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners contend that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented. The inclusion of the political parties is objectionable. Solicitor General
argued that RA 7941 allow political parties to participate as this is open to all registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organization.

Issue: Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Pursuant to RA 7941, respondents may not be disqualified

from participating on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution also
provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”

160. Aquino vs COMELEC GR

No 120265 18 September 1995
Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati
stating that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he
filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in Makati for more
than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s
disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for
suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he
must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the
place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he
eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks of
residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to
vote or to be voted upon.

161. Marcos vs COMELEC GR

No 119976 18 September 1995
Facts: Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the 1st district of Leyte stating
that she has been residing there for seven months. Incumbent, Cirilo Montejo filed for
motion for disqualification of Marcos for failing the required residency. Marcos amended her
certificate of candidacy to residing in the district since childhood. COMELEC decided in
favour of Montejo. Marcos received the highest number of votes and her proclamation was
suspended, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not Marcos failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: COMELEC resolution was set aside and directed to proclaim Marcos as duly
elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken his abode ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave then as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
162. Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado
Nov. 17, 2005
Facts:

Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the
May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera,
Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera sought Dumpit-Michelena's
disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation under Sections 74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-
Michelena, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a
resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and was a registered
voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as voter to San
Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24, 2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a
new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot
on April 19, 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-
Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she
actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in its ruling
the motion for reconsideration filed by Dumpit-Michelena. Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-
Michelena.

Issues:

1.Whether Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration was filed on time;

2.Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and
3.Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.

Held:

1. SC ruled that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Dumpit-Michelena's
motion for reconsideration for late filing

Dumpit-Michelena

failed to prove that she has complied with the residency requirement. The
concept of residence in determining a candidate’s qualification is already
a settled matter. For election purposes,residence is used synonymously with
domicile.
163. Santiago vs Guingona GR No
134577 18 November 1998
Facts: The Senate convening on 27 July 1998, Senator Marcelo Fernan and Francisco Tatad
were nominated for president. Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2 and declared President of
Senate. Senator Ople was president pro tempore and Senator Drilon as majority leader
were likewise elected. Senator Tatad manifested that he will assume minority leader. This
was contested by Senator Flavier stating that their party being the minority group will
determine the holder of the said post. Thereafter, they voted for Senator Guingona. Hence
the petition for quo warranto by Tatad.

Issue: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the constitution in the election of
Senate officers?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The term “majority” simple means “the number greater than
half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than
one half of all the Senators.

164. Jose Avelino vs Mariano

Cuenco
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate
floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to
do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada,
Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open
session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to
forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being
blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others,
as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the
disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be
placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was
immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that
it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and
the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,
Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of
the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then
filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case.
This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves
who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

165. Pacete vs The Secretary of

Commission on Appointments GR
No 25895 23 July 1971
Facts: Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato. He assumed office on 11 September 1964. His appointment was made during
recess of Congress and was only submitted to COA in 1965 session and was unanimously
confirmed on 20 May 1965. On 07 February 1966 the Secretary of Justice advised him to
vacate his post on the ground that his appointment was by-passed. Pacete clarified the
matter with Commission on Appointments.COA took no action and the Secretary of Justice
still moved to Pacete to vacate his post and withheld his salaries.

Issue: Whether or not a motion for consideration with COA without being acted on is a new
one?
Decision: Petition granted. The constitutional requirement is clear; there must be either a
rejection by COA or nonaction on its part. Pacete’s confirmation became final and
irrevocable upon the adjournment of the Fifth Congress as no rule of the Commission as to
a motion for reconsideration could have the forece and effect of defeating the constitutional
provision that an ad interim appointment is effective until disapproved by COA or until next
adjournment of the Congress.

166. Arroyo vs De Venecia GR No

127255 14 August 1997
Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were
challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its
report to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship
speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of
quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.

Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of
quorum?

Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in
the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their
remedy in their own department.
167. Alejandrino vs Quezon GR No
22041 11 September 1924
Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente
de Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator.
He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon
from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.

168. Osmeña Jr vs Pendatun GR No

17144 28 October 1960
Facts: Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr during his privilege speech made charges against
the Office of the President. House Resolution 59 created a Special Committee headed by
Congressman Salipada Pendatun. The committee required him to substantiate his
allegations against President Garcia and if he failed to do so he must show cause why the
House should not punish him. Osmeña filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. He contended that the said resolution violated his
parliamentary immunity.

Issue: Whether or not HR 59 violated Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislative complete

freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil action
 before any court outside Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress
can be censured, committed to prison, suspended or expelled by the votes of their
colleagues.

169. SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a

complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension
against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent

public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue
an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts
about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In
fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered

to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’

Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
170.

171. Casco Philippine Chemical Co vs

Gimenez GR No 17931 28
February 1963
Facts: RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee
of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. On November and December 1959 Casco
Philippine Chemical purchased urea and formaldehyde, the main ingredients in
manufacturing glues, and paid corresponding margin fees. Casco sought a refund pursuant
to Section 2 RA 2609, “shall not be imposed… urea formaldehyde…” The Bank Auditor of
Central Bank did not honur the vouchers for refund and was affirmed by the Auditor
General. Respondent contend that “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product and
distinctly different from “urea” and “formaldehyde.”

Issue: Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?

Decision: Decision appealed from is affirmed. If there has been any mistake in the printing
of the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree.

172. United States vs Pons GR No

11530 12 August 1916
Facts: Juan Pons was charged and convicted of bringing opium to Philippines on board
steamer Lopez Y Lopez. Pons contend that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void.

Issue: Whether or not Act 2381 is valid?

Decision: Judgment affirmed. When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of
adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous they are conclusive.
Extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.

173. PHILCONSA VS MATHAY

18 SCRA 300 (1966)
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General
of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of
the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative
of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being
that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the
term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act
expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only
the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who
approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes
effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the

increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the
Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that
the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not
the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses
for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of
the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all
the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application
of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the
terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by
RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

174. Ligot vs Mathay GR No 34676

30 April 1974
Facts: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30,
1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term
by virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid
and filed for retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the
unapproved amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for
reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement using php 32k?

Decision: Petition denied. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose

terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency

175. Jimenez vs Cabangbang GR No

15905 03 August 1966
Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President
and caused its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the
allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political
build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a
candidate for President in 1961.

Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication?

Decision: Order appealed from affirmed. The determination of the issue depends on
whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate in
Congress” as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of
the performance of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open
letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing
the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication
is not absolutely privileged.

176. People vs Jalosjos GR No

132875-76 03 February 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
Decision: Petition denied. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class

177.
178. Puyat vs De Guzman GR No
51122 25 March 1982
Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to
which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman
could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative
body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed
a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in

the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution?

Decision: Commissioner’s order granting Fernandez to leave to intervene in SEC was

reversed and set aside. He had signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero which
was objected to by petitioners. He decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation. the Court is constrained to find that there has been
an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. That is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The
intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in
some other capacity.
179. Abbas vs Senate Electoral
Tribunal GR No 83767 27
October 1988
Facts: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election
contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the
exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition
from the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said
case.
Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are
sitting in the tribunal?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations of for the substitution of senators designated to the Tribunal.
Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes for the vindication in the fairness and
sense of justice of the Tribunal.

180. MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al

G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992

Facts:

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as
permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis
of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives
for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?
Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the
reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully
pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public officer, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as
those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual
services rendered.

181. Bondoc vs Pineda GR No

97710 26 September 1991
Facts: Petitioner belongs to Nationalista party while respondent was with Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino. After respondent was proclaimed winner, petitioner filed protest
before electoral tribunal. The tribunal decided in favour of petitioner. Congressman
Camasura, an LDP member voted also for petitioner. On the eve of promulgation he was
replaced.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives may replace representative in the
tribunal before the promulgation?

Decision: Petition granted. Withdrawing nomination of Camasura on the tribunal was null
and void. The expulsion of Camasura was not for a lawful and valid cause but to unjustly
interfere with the tribunal’s disposition of the Bondoc case and clearly in violation of Article
6 and Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
182. Pena v. HRET
G.R. No. 123037
March 21, 1997

FACTS:
• Pena and Abueg were rivals for the Congressional seat in Palawan during the May 8, 1995 elections.
Apparently, Abueg was proclaimed winner.

• On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the HRET, claiming that the elections in the 2 nd
district of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote--‐buying, intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during
the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which
affected the results of the election.

• Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the election by almost 7k votes. He then
assailed Abueg’s proclamation.

• Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss on June 23, averring that the HRET has not acquired
jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the
motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts
where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many
votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.

• Pena later submitted a list of specific contested precincts on July 10, or 17 days after Abueg’s answer.

• In October, the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore,
insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.

• Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE:
WON the HRET committed GAOD in dismissing Pena’s petition ad cuatelam for lack of substance (which
Pena later cured)? NO.

HELD:
• Pena’s petition lacking substance, dismissal proper
A perusal of the petition Ad Cuatelam, reveals that petitioner makes no specific mention of the
precincts where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it
goes into the very substance of the protest.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition
must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the
faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the
petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by
petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.

The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare
allegation of “massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities,”
without specification and substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in
the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper,
otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each
other, racing to disembark from the water.

• Substantial amendments may be allowed but must be within time period (10 days after
winner’s proclamation)
The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET, that substantial amendments to the
protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule
16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.
• Exception to liberal construction
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must
stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the
lapse of the statutory period for filing the protest.

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with
the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme
cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and
wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to
take any other step.

183. GUERRERO v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

FACTS:

Guillermo Ruiz file a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Fariñas as acandidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had
been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite
his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before
the election, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas
who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of
Ruiz.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas,
since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate.
On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives. Comelec dismissed the MR on the ground that the matter is now within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

ISSUES:

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the
validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?

HELD:

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its
jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as
Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power
to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power
following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the
jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of
the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
 begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.

In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winningcandidate who has
taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people’s mandate.

184. G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against
respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the
suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation
was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently
disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution
was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void.
Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while
petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:
1. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been
disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was
null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore,
respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s
choice.
2. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and
that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become
final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.
185.

186. Daza vs Singson

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

Facts:

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the
lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew
the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber
elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza
who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.

Issue:

Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the
Commission on Appointments.

Held:

As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve

Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each house respectively on
the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the
authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it
may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
187. Coseteng
vs Mitra Jr GR No
86649 12 July 1990
Facts: LDP became the majority party in the House of Representatives. This caused a
reorganisation of representation in the Commission on Appointments. Dominique Coseteng,
being the only member of KAIBA claimed that she is entitled to a seat for having
endorsement of nine congressmen.

Issue: Whether or not Coseteng was entitled to a seat by virtue of endorsement?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Even if Coseteng is to be considered as an

opposition party, she will only represent 0.4% or less than 1% of the House membership
and therefore not entitled to one of the twelve seats in the Commission of Appointments.

188. Guingona vs Gonzales GR No

106971 20 October 1992
Facts: As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed by the
following by parties: LDP – IS, NPC – 5, Lakas – 3. Applying the mathematical formula
agreed by parties they are entitled to twelve seats. On the organization of the Senate,
Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated eight senators for Commission on Appointments.
Senator Guingona objected on the nomination of Osmeña.

Issue: Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12 senators in
the Commission?

Decision: Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 Senators for the
Commission to function. Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies
which perform their functions even if their composition is expressly specified by the
Constittion.
189. Tio vs Videogram Regulatory
Board GR No L-75697 18
June 1987
Facts: Petition assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). A month after the
promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing for an annual tax on processed video-tape
cassette and a sales tax on blank video tapes.
Petitioner alleges that taxes are excessive and confiscatory, there is over-regulation of the
industry, undue delegation of authority and there is no legal or factual basis for the exercise
of Presidential decree.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1987 is unconstitutional?

Decision: Presidential Decree No. 1987 is not unconstitutional.

Tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is a sovereign right and it is inherent
in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation. The tax imposed
by the decree is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure. The public purpose of a
tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was
to favor one industry over another. Decree of authority to the Board is not a delegation of
the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation. Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
190. Lidasan vs COMELEC GR
No L-28089 25 Ocotber 1967
Facts: Republic Act 4790, being disputed, reorganized the barrios in different municipalities
of Province of Lanao del Sur. It came to light later that 2 barrios in the statute are within
the boundaries of other municipalities and that other 10 barrios are parts and parcel of
another municipality, all in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. As the statute
stood, 12 barrios are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.” Comelec, by
resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute
“should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”

This triggered the petition for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and
taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967
elections. Petitioner requested that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that
Comelec’s resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement that “[n]o bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.”

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

Decision: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under
one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import
of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed in
the title” of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not
exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the
same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

Since the petitioner is a qualified voter from the affected barrio, he has every right to
become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

191. Demetria vs Alba GR No

71977 27 February 1987
Facts: Demetrio Demetria filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction in the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977.” The said PD authorizes
the President to transfer any fund appropriated for different departments to any program,
project or activity of any department. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to
dismiss, stating that the nullity of Section 16 (5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986 has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot
and academic.

Issue: Whether or not Budget Reform Decree is constitutional.

Decision: Instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience
of the government. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared it still ought
to be resolved. Justice demands that the Court act not only for the vindication of the one’s
right but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and
categorical under the 1973 Constitution. PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted
under said Section 16 (5) Article VIII. It does not only completely disregard the standards
set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond its tenor. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

192. Guingona vs Caraque GR No

94571 22 April 1991
Facts: The 1990 budget consists of Php 98.4 billion in automatic appropriation and Php
155.3 billion appropriated under RA No 6831 – General Appropriations Act or a total of Php
233.5 billion while the appropriations for the Department of Education Culture and Sports
amount to Php 27.02 billion. The automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by
PD no 81 – amending Certain Provisions of RA 4860 as Amended. Petition is filed to restrain
the disbursement for debt services under the 1990 budget pursuant to PD 81, PD 1177, PD
1967.

Issue: Whether or not automatic appropriation is valid?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The legislative intention in RA 4860 as amended is that the
amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Philippines to pay
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to
enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. The purpose of these
laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and / or advances for all loans
to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
193. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
GR No 115455 25 August 1994
Facts: The constitutionality of RA 7716 which expanded the scope of the value added tax
was questioned on the ground that the second and third readings were read on the same
date. It was also claimed that the certification by the President the urgency of its enactment
was invalid as there was no emergency and the certification only dispensed with the
requirement that the bill be presented in its final form before its approval on the third
reading.

Issue: Whether or not three readings on different dates is mandatory?

Decision: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only
with the requirement of these readings on separate readings. It is nonetheless urged that
the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the
condition stated in the certification of a growing budget deficit” not being an unusual
condition in this country.

194. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez

GR No 113105 19 August 1994
Facts: The General Appropriations Act appropriated Php 86.3 billion for debt services.
Congress added a special provision which provided that the amount appropriated shall be
used for payment of the national debt only and not to be paid to the liabilities of the Central
Bank. The appropriation for DPWH also provided that the maximum amount to be
contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges should not exceed 30% the
appropriation for medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines required approval
Congress for the release of funds.
In the General Appropriations Act of 1994 the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines contains a provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
appropriation to augment the pension and gratuity fund of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The President vetoed the authorization given by the Chief of Staff to use savings
to augment the pension and gratuity fund. Several Senators questioned the validity of the
veto.

Issue: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Congress can not include in the general appropriations
matters that should be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the inappropriate
provision must be treated as an item and can be vetoed by the President.
The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
and gratuity fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29 (paragraph 1) of Article
6 of the 1987 Constitution. Only the President is authorized to augment items from savings
in the general appropriation to the executive branch. Also pursuant to Section 29 – no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

195. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was
acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
and excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of
legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes
of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind
of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule,
the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.

196. Lung Center vs Quezon City

GR No 144104 29 June 2004
Facts: Petitioner asserts that the property on which the Lung Center stands should be
exempt from real property taxes as it is generated and engaged in charitable work.

Issue: Whether or not the entire property is exempt from real property taxes?

Decision: Petition partially granted. The precise area of land leased by private persons to
be taxed. Petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real
property is actually directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of
the hospital are used for charity, other portions are being leased to private individuals.

197. Tan vs. Del Rosario Case Digest

237 SCRA 324
Facts:

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the simplified income taxation

scheme (SNIT) under Arts (26) and (28) and III (1). The SNIT contained changes in the tax
schedules and different treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional
for being isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution.

Issue:

Is the contention meritorious?

Ruling:

No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely require
that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both privileges
and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial
distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and must apply
equally to all members of the same class.

The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.

198. Garcia vs Executive Secretary

GR No 101273 03 July 1992
Facts: Executive Order no 475 imposed an additional duty of 9% on crude oil and oil
products while Executive Order 478 imposed a special duty on crude oil and oil products.
Petitioners claimed that both EOs are unconstitutional because all revenue measures must
originate from the House of Representatives and the Tariff and Customs Code authorized
the president to increase the tariff duties only to protect local industries but not to raise
additional revenue for the government.

Issue: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed are valid?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are valid.
Congress may by law authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other duties within
specified limits. The issuance of these EOs authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. There is nothing in the law that suggests that the authority may only be
exercised to protect local industries. Custom duties may be designated to achieve more
than one policy objective the protection of local industries and to raise revenue for the
government.

199. [G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003]

JOHN HAY PEOPLES
ALTERNATIVE COALITION vs LIM
Facts:

R.A. No. 7227 likewise created and grantedthe Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax aN
duty-
free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to othe
r hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.

And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive
proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected,
other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark milit
ary reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Ha
y.

On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which established a
SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay.

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by exten
ding to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ
which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing t
he legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activit
y or investment.

Issue:
WON Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exe
mption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ

NO!

Nowhere in RA 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in ba

se areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 which provides for tax exemption to the estab
lished Subic SEZ. The tax exemption grant to John Hay SEZ contravenes Article VI, Sect
ion 28 (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “No law granting any tax exempt
ion shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress
.

Furthermore, it is the Legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution,

which has the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from
taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. The grant by Proclamati
on No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is VOID for being
violative of the Constitution.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC.

V. CA

200. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994.

Mendoza, J.
FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the

decision of the Second Division sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals
from the decisions of the Board of Investments and,
consequently, dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over

appeals from the decisions of the Board of
Investments.

RULING:

Yes. The authority of the Court of Appeals to

decide cases appealed to it by the BOI must be
deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129,
Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.

201. Fabian vs Desierto GR No

129742 16 September 1998
Facts: Section 27 of RA 6770 was assailed on the ground that it provides for an appeal to
the Supreme Court from decisions in administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman. It is
contended that the provisions goes against Section 30 of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution
which states that “no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent.”

Issue: Whether or not the court may appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman?
Decision: Section 27 of RA 6770 can not validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court
from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription of Section 30 Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was
intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction, otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court.

202. Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred
the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she
vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an
Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the
President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of
the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.
203. Bengzon vs Drilon GR No
103524 15 April 1992
Facts: Republic Act No 1797 provided that pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals who served for 20 years shall be adjusted. In 1979, Presidential
Decree 644 repealed RA 1797 but was not published. In 1991, the Court issued a resolution
adjusting their pensions in accordance to RA 1797. The General Appropriations Act
authorized the Chief Justice to use savings for the adjusted pensions. The president vetoed
all portions containing references to the adjustment of pensions.

Issue: Whether or not the selective veto of the President is valid?

Decision: Petition granted. The veto power is not absolute. The Constitution provides that
only a particular item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

204. INS v. Chadha

Posted on October 24, 2012 | Constitutional Law | Tags: Constitutional Law Case Brief

FACTS
An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend the deportation of
an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain “severe hardship” as a result. Additionally, if either the
Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to veto the attorney general’s decision regarding
deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney
general held that he should remain in the US due to hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the
decision to grant amnesty, thereby sustaining the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after
the legislative veto.

ISSUE
Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that it violates the principle of
separation of powers.

HOLDING
Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of “efficiency” regarding a single house
vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney general may frequently override
deportation and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for each instance would be time consuming
and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear that legislative decisions are to be
bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair representation of states that maintain this justification as
paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The act of overriding an
executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative support.

205. Bowsher v. Synar

Posted on October 22, 2012 | Constitutional Law | Tags: Constitutional Law Case Brief

FACTS
An Act passed by Congress permitted certain levels of budgetary deficit, with the eventual goal of
eliminating the deficit altogether. The act provided that if deficit levels exceeded a particular level, there
would be across the board cuts, which would be recommended by the OMB and CBO directors and
evaluated by the Comptroller General who then made a recommendation to the President. The President
would then be required to create an executive order to make cuts pursuant to the Comptroller’s
recommendation. If Congress in the meantime decided to make the appropriate level cuts before the
Comptoller’s recommendation reached the President’s desk, those would go in effect instead. The
Comptroller is classified as an official of the legislature.

ISSUE
(1) Whether the Comptroller’s powers of evaluating the budgetary cuts recommended by the OMB and
CBO, for which the President must execute is an unconstitutional delegation of executive authority to an
official outside the executive branch.

(2) Whether Congress can remove the Comptroller – who is assigned to executive tasks – by
impeachment.

HOLDING/ANALYSIS
(1) Yes, law validated. Congress cannot delegate executive authority to an agent of the
legislature. This, in effect, takes away power for the executive. The Comptroller’s role in evaluating the
budget cuts recommended by the OMB and CBO directors would be constitutional, were his
recommendations not binding on the President. The role of the Comptroller, in this instance, is “the very
essence” of executive power. The executive acts as an executive when he interprets an Act for its
execution, then commands the executive branch to execute the law as he determines.

(2) No, law invalidated. Giving Congress impeachment power of a federal official tasked with the
execution of laws, effectively makes the officer responsive only to Congress. With the threat of job loss
looming, the official is not able to faithfully execute the laws. The impeachment power, therefore, gives
Congress executive authority it should not have by beholding the officer to their will As such, the
impeachment power is contrary to the separation of powers doctrine.
206. Miller vs Mardo GR No 15138
31 July 1961
Facts: Republic Act 991 provided that the reorganization plan drafted by Department of
Labor and Employment and submitted it to the president for approval shall deemed as
approved by the Congress after its adjournment unless in the meantime, Congress by
resolution disapproved the plan and assailed its constitutionality.

Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative inaction is valid?

Decision: The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring

positive and separate actions of each house. It is contrary to the “settled and well-
understood parliamentary law” which requires that the “two houses are to hold separate
sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to
be submitted to the separate determination of the other.”

207. Tanada vs Tuvera GR No

63915 24 April 1985
Facts: Invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette.
Petitioner, Lorenzo Tanada seek writ of mandamus to compel respondents to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents through Solicitor General
argued that petitioner has no legal personality and that publication requirement is not
essential for laws providing their own effectivity dates. The point stressed on “unless
otherwise provided” pursuant to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not publication is essential to effectivity of law?

Decision: Court ordered publication in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application and unless so published they shall have no
binding force and effect. The clause “unless otherwise provided” pertains to a different
effectivity date provided by the law itself and not the publication. Before a person may be
bound by law, he must be first be officially informed of its contents. It would be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the lapse of a law which he had no
notice.

208. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS

JUDGE VEGA
G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine
Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the
bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not
necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took
effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court
upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.
209. Senate vs Ermita GR No
169777 20 April 2006
Facts: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
executive department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project. However the President issued Executive Order 464 invoking executive
privilege. This was used by Ermita in response to the invitation.

Issue: Whether or not the Senate has power to inquire into the operations of the executive
department?

Decision: Petition partly granted. Since Congress has power to inquire into the operations
of the executive branch it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar and informed by executive
operations.

210. Sabio vs Gordon GR No

174177 17 October 2006
Facts: Executive Order No 1 Section 4 (b) limits the power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial or legislative or
administrative proceeding. Petitioners refused to appear before the Senate Committee due
to this.

Issue: Whether or not legislative power of inquiry is superseded by EO No 1?

Decision: Petition for habeas corpus dismissed and EO No1 Section 4 (b) declared repealed
by the Constitution. Either house may institute any investigation having reference to its own
organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights or
privileges or any matter affecting public interest upon which it may be important that it
should have exact information and in respect to which it would be competent for it to
legislate.

211. Arnault vs Nazareno GR No

3820 18 July 1950
Facts: Arnault was cited for contempt by the Senate for persistently refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave a sum of money in connection to the Buenavista and
Tambohong Estates deal the Senate was investigating. He was ordered imprisoned and
claims to be released as the Congress is no longer in session.

Issue: Whether or not contempt of court and its sanction is dependent to the Congress’
session?

Decision: Petition denied. The Senate is a continuing body and therefore the incarceration
should continue despite the election of the Lower House.

212. Arnault vs Balagtas GR No

6749 30 July 1955
Facts: Arnault continuously withheld information. This time about an affidavit supposedly
giving details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave the name Jesse
Santos as the person he gave the amount to.

Issue: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness?

Decision: Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the contempt is related to the exercise of
the legislative power and is committed in the course of legislative process, the legislative
authority is supreme. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power or necessary to effectuate said power.

213. Bengzon Jr vs Senate Blue

Ribbon Committee GR No 89914 20
November 1991
Facts: A petition for prohibition was filed to enjoin Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from
requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale
of the equity of Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group in several corporations.
Earlier, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile had delivered a speech asking the Senate to look into
possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because of the said purchase.

Issue: Whether or not Senate has authority to conduct inquiry?

Decision: Petition granted. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, the investigation must be
“in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”

214.
215. G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-
TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M.
GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed
resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of
“unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation
of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would
likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the
“unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the
resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power “to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial
determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec’s promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the
court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole
and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-
President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in
Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to
conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the
guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and
NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed
COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” It being “unofficial”, any
disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No.
9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the
same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic
devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties
and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.

216. PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
462 SCRA 622
G.R. No. 158088 July 06, 2005

Facts:

On December 28, 2000, the Philippines through the Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations, signed the Rome Statute which established the
International Criminal Court. Thus, herein petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the
respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
— to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate for ratification the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the
signature of the President.

Held:

The Supreme Court rule in the negative.

The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.

217. Francisco vs House of

Representatives GR No 160261 10
November 2003
Facts: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate
Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative
Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of
which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of
one year.” Senator Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine
the validity of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
Decision: The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Applying the principles of constitutional construction, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of
the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court.” Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the government. The
courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as its officers , this is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.

ADVOCATES

Leon JaworskiArgued the cause for the United States

Philip A. LacovaraArgued the cause for the United States

James D. St. ClairArgued the cause for the President

Facts of the case

A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the
Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio
tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune
from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information
from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive
branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.
Question
Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege"
confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review?