DOMINGO v.

RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831, etc. February 18, 2008 J. Nachura Cadorna
petitioners Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, et al.
respondents Rogelio I. Ralaya, et al.
summary NLRC Chairman is charged for sexual harassment because of certain acts he committed
against his stenographic reporter. He was found guilty of having committed the acts
complained of, and first penalized with suspension for 6mos1day; however this was later
modified to dismissal, and later, to suspension for 1yr. SC held that the acts indeed
constituted sexual harassment, albeit of the administrative kind, and that the proper penalty
to be imposed was only 1yr and not dismissal since it was just his first offense. In ruling in
such manner, SC says that the disciplining authority, the President in this case bec. the
NLRC Chairman is a presidential appointee, does not have unfettered discretion in
imposing penalties, since the latter should always be in accordance with the law and rules.

facts of the case

Petitioner Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual
harassment against Respondent Rayala (Rayala) before the SOLE. At the time, Rayala was the NLRC
Chairman and Domingo was working directly under him.
Domingo’s complaint was predicated on AO 250, the IRR of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment in
Employment, etc.). To support her complaint, she executed an affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual
harassment complained of. (A/N: medyo mahaba kaya di ko na nilagay, basahin niyo na lang juicy naman eh haha) of
SOLE referred the complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. After an investigation
ordered by the OP where the parties were heard and their respective evidence received, Rayala was found
guilty of the offense charged, with the recommendation that a suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day,
in accordance with AO 250, be imposed upon him.
Upon receiving the recommendation of the SOLE, the OP issued AO 119, which affirmed the finding of
Rayala’s guilt. However, the penalty was modified into one of dismissal, considering the gravity of the
offense and the nature of Rayala’s office.
The case reached the CA, which affirmed the OP, pointing out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful
and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). Upon Rayala’s MR however, the CA modified its decision by deleting the order dismissing
Rayala from service and substituting it with one penalizing him with suspension for the maximum period
of one (1) year.
This led to the filing of the three instant petitions for review where: (1) Domingo questions the
downgrading of the penalty; (2) Rayala contests the finding of guilt and prays that he be totally exonerated;
and (3) the Republic also questions the downgrading.

issue
(1) WON Rayala is guilty of sexual harassment – YES.
(2) WON he could be dismissed on that basis – NO.

ratio
1. Rayala is guilty of sexual harassment

Substantial evidence exist to prove that Rayala committed the acts complained of
All three independent bodies (the Committee formed by SOLE, OP and CA) found that Rayala committed the acts complained of.
These findings, supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts, there being no valid
ground calling for their review.

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The acts complained of constitute sexual harassment
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each
can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
RA 7877 defines work-related sexual harassment under Sec. 3 thereof, and states that a demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor is necessary in order for sexual harassment to be deemed to have been
committed. This section, in relation to Sec. 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of
sexual harassment. Meanwhile, in relation to Sec. 6, said Sec. 3 authorizes the institution of an independent
civil action for damages and other affirmative relief. Finally, Sec. 3, in relation to Sec. 4, governs the procedure
for administrative cases.
Thus, contrary to Rayala’s contention, his culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Sec.
3, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.
It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President,
found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Nevertheless, even if Sec. 3 were to be solely applied, it must be pointed out that the demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor required therein need to be articulated in a categorical oral or written
statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. In this case, Rayala’s acts
(simpleng manyak moves, sugar daddy moves and inappropriate convos) clearly belie the unspoken request for a
sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made
as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that his acts
resulted in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for Domingo.

Intent is immaterial because Rayala is being charged for an administrative offense

Rayala faults that CA for holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum, arguing that intent is an essential element
in sexual harassment, and since he did not commit the acts imputed with malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
However, what Rayala forgets is that the instant case involves an administrative charge for sexual harassment. Thus, whether
the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.

No political persecution and no violation of due process

Rayala wasn’t able to prove his allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus
constitute merely political harassment. Rayala was also properly accorded due process based on the records, and although in the
beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, he appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the
proceedings. Finally, the fact that Domingo’s complaint charged Rayala with sexual harassment, whereas Rayala was penalized for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, does not affect the conclusion in this case. Under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful
and immoral conduct. Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.

2. The proper penalty is suspension for the maximum period of one (1) year

Applicable penalty is only suspension because this is Rayala’s first offense

Under AO 250, Sec. 22(o), Rule XVI of the IRR of Revised Administrative Code, and Sec. 52 A(15) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for the first offense is
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is
dismissal.

President’s discretion as disciplining authority not unfettered

It is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether
there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the
phrase for cause as provided by law. Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense.
The imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for
disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly,

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it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

Aggravating circumstance consisting of Rayala’s office only ground for imposing maximum penalty of
suspension not of dismissal, which is only applicable for second offense
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it
still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Rules, taking undue advantage of a subordinate
may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be
imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.